TY  - UNPD
A1  - Gropp, Reint
A1  - Mosk, Thomas
A1  - Ongena, Steven
A1  - Simac, Ines
A1  - Wix, Carlo
T1  - Supranational rules, national discretion: increasing versus inflating regulatory bank capital?
T2  - SAFE working paper series ; No. 296
N2  - We study how higher capital requirements introduced at the supranational level affect the regulatory capital of banks across countries. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that treated banks exploit discretion in the calculation of regulatory capital to inflate their capital ratios without a commensurate increase in their book equity and without a reduction in bank risk. Regulatory capital inflation is more pronounced in countries where credit supply is expected to tighten, suggesting that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations.
T3  - SAFE working paper - 296 
Y1  - 2020
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/55281
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-552814
IS  - This version: November 15, 2020
PB  - SAFE
CY  - Frankfurt am Main
ER  -