TY  - UNPD
A1  - Hirsch, Julia
T1  - Public policy and venture capital financed innovation: a contract design  approach
T2  - Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2006,29
N2  - The effects of public policy programs which aim at internalizing spill-overs due to successful innovation are analyzed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard doublesided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analyzing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programs, ex ante grants and some types of investment grants depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome. JEL Classification: D82, G24, G32, H25, H81
T3  - CFS working paper series - 2006, 29 
KW  - Public Policy
KW  - Contract Design
KW  - Venture Capital
KW  - Moral Hazard
KW  - Asymmetric Information
KW  - Öffentliche Ordnung
KW  - Risikokapital
KW  - Moral Hazard
KW  - Asymmetrische Information
Y1  - 2006
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/1632
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-38039
N1  - Version Dezember 2006
IS  - This Version Dezember 2006
ER  -