TY  - UNPD
A1  - Betzer, André
A1  - Gider, Jasmin
A1  - Metzger, Daniel
A1  - Theissen, Erik
T1  - Strategic trading and trade reporting by corporate insiders
T2  - Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2011,04
N2  - Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes–Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, for example, by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements were frequently violated and that the strategic timing of trades and reports was common. Event study abnormal re-turns are larger after reports of strategic insider trades than after reports of otherwise similar nonstrategic trades. Our results also imply that delayed reporting is detrimental to market efficiency and lend strong support to the more stringent trade reporting requirements established by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. JEL Classification: G14, G30, G32 Keywords: Insider Trading , Directors' Dealings , Corporate Governance , Market Efficiency
T3  - CFS working paper series - 2011, 04 
KW  - Insider Trading
KW  - Directors' Dealings
KW  - Corporate Governance
KW  - Market Efficiency
KW  - USA
KW  - Insidergeschäft
KW  - Insiderregeln
KW  - Publizität
KW  - Publizitätspflicht
KW  - Börsenkurs
KW  - Markteffizienz
KW  - Kapitalmarkteffizienz
KW  - Internes Kontrollsystem
Y1  - 2011
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/20888
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-91473
IS  - Version November 2010
ER  -