TY  - JOUR
A1  - Prüfer, Jens
A1  - Walz, Uwe
T1  - Academic faculty governance and recruitment decisions
T2  - Public choice
N2  - We analyze the implications of the governance structure in academic faculties for their recruitment decisions when competing for new researchers. The value to individual members through social interaction within the faculty depends on the average status of their fellow members. In recruitment decisions, incumbent members trade off the effect of entry on average faculty status against alternative uses of the recruitment budget if no entry takes place. We show that the best candidates join the best faculties but that they receive lower wages than some lesser ranking candidates. We also study the allocation of surplus created by the entry of a new faculty member and show that faculties with symmetric status distributions maximize their joint surplus under majority voting.
KW  - Academic faculties
KW  - University governance
KW  - Status organizations
KW  - Labor market competition
Y1  - 2011
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/25951
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-259512
SN  - 0048-5829
SN  - 1573-7101
N1  - Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
VL  - 155
IS  - 3
SP  - 507
EP  - 529
PB  - Springer Netherlands
CY  - Dordrecht
ER  -