TY  - UNPD
A1  - Inderst, Roman
A1  - Müller, Holger
T1  - CEO replacement under private information
T2  - Working paper series / Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability ; 29
N2  - We study a model of “information-based entrenchment” in which the CEO has private information that the board needs to make an efficient replacement decision. Eliciting the CEO’s private information is costly, as it implies that the board must pay the CEO both higher severance pay and higher on-the-job pay. While higher CEO pay is associated with higher turnover in our model, there is too little turnover in equilibrium. Our model makes novel empirical predictions relating CEO turnover, severance pay, and on-the-job pay to firm-level attributes such as size, corporate governance, and the quality of the firm’s accounting system.
T3  - Working paper series / Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability - 29 
Y1  - 2009
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/7316
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-72972
UR  - http://www.imfs-frankfurt.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/WP_2009_29_Inderst.pdf
N1  - Published in: Review of Financial Studies, 2010, vol. 23, issue 8, pp. 2935-2969
ER  -