TY  - UNPD
A1  - Wu, Youchang
A1  - Wermers, Russ
A1  - Zechner, Josef
T1  - Managerial rents vs. shareholder value in delegated portfolio management: the case of closed-end funds
T2  - Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 548
N2  - We examine the dynamics of assets under management (AUM) and management fees at the portfolio manager level in the closed-end fund industry. We find that managers capitalize on good past performance and favorable investor perception about future performance, as reflected in fund premiums, through AUM expansions and fee increases. However, the penalties for poor performance or unfavorable investor perception are either insignificant, or substantially mitigated by manager tenure. Long tenure is generally associated with poor performance and high discounts. Our findings suggest substantial managerial power in capturing CEF rents. We also document significant diseconomies of scale at the manager level.
T3  - CFS working paper series - 548 
KW  - Closed-end fund
KW  - Closed-end fund discount
KW  - Managerial rent
Y1  - 2016
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/41867
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-418673
UR  - https://ssrn.com/abstract=2858912
IS  - July 3, 2016
PB  - Center for Financial Studies
CY  - Frankfurt, M.
ER  -