TY  - JOUR
A1  - Blonski, Matthias
A1  - Herbold, Daniel
T1  - Partnerships based on Joint Ownership
T2  - Games and economic behavior
N2  - In a unifying framework generalizing established theories we characterize under which conditions Joint Ownership of assets creates the best cooperation incentives in a partnership. We endogenise renegotiation costs and assume that they weakly increase with additional assets. A salient sufficient condition for optimal cooperation incentives among patient partners is if Joint Ownership is a Strict Coasian Institution for which transaction costs impede an efficient asset reallocation after a breakdown. In contrast to Halonen (2002) the logic behind our results is that Joint Ownership maximizes the value of the relationship and the costs of renegotiating ownership after a broken relationship.
KW  - Relational contracts
KW  - Joint Ownership
KW  - Property rights
KW  - Renegotiation
KW  - Coase Theorem
Y1  - 2024
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/82859
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-828593
SN  - 0899-8256
VL  - 144
SP  - 183
EP  - 202
PB  - Elsevier
CY  - Amsterdam
ER  -