TY  - UNPD
A1  - Laux, Christian
A1  - Laux, Volker
T1  - Board committees, CEO compensation, and earnings management
N2  - We analyze the effect of committee formation on how corporate boards perform two main functions: setting CEO pay and overseeing the financial reporting process. The use of performance-based pay schemes induces the CEO to manipulate earnings, which leads to an increased need for board oversight. If the whole board is responsible for both functions, it is inclined to provide the CEO with a compensation scheme that is relatively insensitive to performance in order to reduce the burden of subsequent monitoring. When the functions are separated through the formation of committees, the compensation committee is willing to choose a higher pay-performance sensitivity as the increased cost of oversight is borne by the audit committee. Our model generates predictions relating the board committee structure to the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation, the quality of board oversight, and the level of earnings management.
KW  - Topmanager
KW  - Generaldirektor
KW  - Vorstandsvorsitzender
KW  - Geschäftsführer
KW  - Corporate Governance
KW  - Executive Compensation
KW  - Earnings Management
KW  - Board Oversight
Y1  - 2006
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/34558
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-345587
UR  - http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/QFS/en/papers/laux.pdf ‎
IS  - September 2006
ER  -