Hindu Class and Hindu Education System in Bali:
Emergence, Organization, and Conception in the Context of Indonesian Educational and Religious policies

ABSTRACT

The present study focuses on specific aspects in the organization of teaching religion in Indonesia. It analyses the position of religion within the Indonesian Basic Law, consequential legislation, and educational policies. How does this framework translate into national and regional policies pertaining to the emergence, institutionalization, and organization of the Hindu class and the Hindu education system in Bali from 1945 to 2008?

Muslim majority Indonesia constitutes an interesting laboratory for doing fundamental research on religious plurality and transformations of religion. The model of organizing the religion class in Indonesia is rooted in a specific historical, socio-cultural, political, and legal context, which is fundamentally different to European models of religious education. In addition, in contrast to classical Islam and modern Islamic states, Indonesia recognizes Asian religions as equal in status with the religions of the book. Besides Islam and Christianity, Hindu Dharma and Buddhism were recognized as state funded religions in 1965. This recognition had important consequences for the Indonesian model of organizing five confessional religion classes and faith-based education systems.

The Balinese are a rare case of a religious and ethnic minority being simultaneously an ethnic and religious majority. Therefore, the Balinese provide an outstanding case to analyze how Indonesia's religious and educational policies do deal with that particular ethnic and religious minority. In addition, how do the Balinese themselves use the constitutional and legal framework to establish the Hindu religion class in public schools and a private Hindu education system from the level of pre-school to higher education?

A qualitative examination was conducted basing on a combination of theoretical and empirical investigations. The province of Bali and three educational institutions were chosen, because the Balinese were the reformers of Indonesian Hindu Dharma and the inventors of the Hindu education system. As the study focuses on constitutional and legal contexts of the Hindu class and the Hindu education system, teachers' professional education, and composition of curricula and textbooks, a qualitative approach was applied combining ethnographic fieldwork and case study research. In consequence, the subject positions the study in the academic disciplines of Religious Studies and Area Studies. Data were collected through bibliographical surveys and fieldwork.

The amended 1945 Basic Law and consequential legislation give the same right to state sanctioned religions. The state is based on "One Supreme Lordship" prescribing national monotheism or monism. Indonesia's spirited statehood is based on a religious, but not confessional interpretation. In addition, the strategy to manage religious plurality is authoritarian, as positive freedom of religion is limited to six state-funded religions, whereas negative religious freedom is not provided for. Despite the equal status of the six state funded religions, discriminative practices prevail with regard to funding those Asian religions. Notwithstanding, the Muslim majority *Pancasila* state can serve a model function for countries with illiberal politics in the Muslim world.

The first objective of strategic and educational policies is to mould a citizen who has faith in God, follows the commands of God, and has morals. The dimension of spiritual intelligence in education is a particular Indonesian dimension of education, which Indonesian educational planners added to the UNESCO standards of student-centered learning throughout life. Indonesia organizes the religion class and faith-based education systems in a confessional but pluralistic style. The citizens are required to attend the religious class in the religion they adhere to instructed by a teacher of the same belief from elementary to higher education. In addition, the religious mark is a compulsory item in the school report, and whether a pupil/student stays back or is promoted to the next level depends, amongst other factors, on how the religion teacher grades the student.

Unlike the Muslim or Christian based education systems, the Hindu education system is still marginal and minuscule. Its funding is discriminative. Funding and expansion are linked to national policies, and the personal networks of Hindu agents are given the mandate to organize the Hindu administration and education system.

MOTTO

The advent of modern schooling was not a simple imposition of the colonial state on society. Different groups with different interests – some with nothing to lose, others with whole kingdoms under their traditional authority – welcomed, modified, and sometimes contested the introduction of schooling. (….) one of the most distinctive and insistent themes, the Balinese concern with religious identity (Bakker 1993, 44)

Examination of the discussions, meetings and study groups of the 1920s and 1930s reveals that Balinese intellectuals were, for the first time, having to explain their religion: to rationally synthesise rituals, custom and hierarchy to make them fit Dutch understandings of such matters. This meant the conceptual separation of religion and society.

(Lynette Parker 2000: 58)

The knowledge of Tantra is the essence of God himself.

(Acarya Sadyojyoti, IX Century A.D.; in Victor M. Fic 2003)

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Introduction

1.1 Focus of the study

The subject of the present study constitutes the emergence, institutionalization, and organization of the Hindu class and the Hindu education system in Bali. In this, the study focuses on specific aspects of how to organize teaching religion in Indonesia. Indonesia forms an interesting laboratory for doing fundamental research on processes of religious plurality, transformations of religion, and the founding of new congregations in a nation state characterized by longstanding socio-cultural plurality and colonial history. In consequence, the subject positions the study in the academic disciplines of Religious Studies and Area Studies. In order to demonstrate how Hindu education is informed by the institutional context of the *Pancasila*[1] state, the study analyses the position of religion in the constitutional and legal framework in Indonesia and how this constitutional and legal framework translates into national strategies and policies pertaining to the organization of religious education. On a more general level, the study locates the Indonesian organization of religious plurality in the general context of international human right documents.

The religion class in Indonesia is grounded in a historical, social, political, and legal context which is fundamentally different to European models of religious education. Therefore, the focus lies on direct formal Hindu religious education in two institutions: state schools/universities and Hindu denominational schools/universities. Hindu denominational schools/universities are private faith-based organizations that integrate Hindu modules in general subjects or attach a considerable amount of Hindu oriented subjects to the curriculum. Therefore the study sets aside all phenomena of

1. Hindu informal religious education as *pasraman* (Hindu Sunday Schools);
2. Islamic models of education (*pesantren, madrasah*)
3. religious education in families and the Hindu religious communities;
4. religious studies at state or faith based universities (established in 1999[2]);
5. multi-faith education (not provided for in Indonesia);
6. inter-religious education (not provided for in Indonesia)
7. moral education/ethics (only provided at certain schools)[3]

In 2004, I conducted a four month field work at the Indonesian Hindu University in Denpasar writing up my MA thesis on a Balinese purification ritual. During a discussion, Prof Dr Edmund Weber expressed his surprise on the empirical phenomenon that Indonesia – the state that is home to the largest percentage of Muslims worldwide - organizes for all state sanctioned religions compulsory confessional religious classes in public schools from primary to tertiary education. Despite having studied one term Indonesian language in Surakarta, Java and two terms Hindu theology in Denpasar, I never wondered about this empirical fact. Yet, Prof Dr Weber insisted on the uniqueness of the observed phenomenon, and thereby I had won my doctoral project focusing on Hindu religious education in Indonesia. The then Head of Master Studies at the Indonesian Hindu University, Prof Dr Ida Bagus Yudha Triguna acted as second supervisor.

The broad research interest in the question why Indonesia operates statutory religion classes remained too general. Initially, during a first preparatory field work phase in 2005, I planned to examine the Hindu education system across the Indonesian archipelago, but due to the magnitude of the task, limited monetary and temporal resources, and the geographic extension of the Archipelago, the research scope was narrowed down during a second preparatory field phase in 2006 in order to be workable. The study positions the Hindu religion class in public schools and universities and the private Hindu education system within the social and legal context of Indonesian policies on religion, education, and religious education. Basically, I identified three areas of inquiry that translate into research questions, aims, and objectives:

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[1] The Pancasila are five principles on which the Indonesian state is based.

[2] At the tertiary level, there are a few State Universities and State Islamic Universities that Religious Studies. In this area, further research is required.

[3] On the subject of moral education (*Budhi Pekerti*) see the monograph of Prof I Made Titib (2006) Menumbuhkembangkan Pendidikan Budhi Pekerti Pada Anak (Perspektif Agama Hindu). Denpasar: Pustaka Bali Post; also Donder 2004; and Wibawa, Made Aripta (2006) Siapakah yang disebut GURU? (Suatu kajian theologis dan sosiologis) Denpasar: Panakom Publishing

1. Religious diversity, religious pluralism, and freedom of religion: *Pancasila* as a model?
2. Institutionalization of Hinduism in the nation state and the legal framework of religious education
3. Case study at Bali

Heil (2003) outlines three research areas in conducting empirical research on religious education: 1.) What happens in the class room (*Unterrichtsgeschehen*); 2.) Learning process (*Unterrichtsrezeption*); 3.) Contexts of education (*Unterrichtskontexte*). Under the precondition of religious plurality, Heimbrock et al. (2001) identify two basic research areas of religious education: first order and second order problems. First order problems are concerned with the plurality of religions and other world views during the learning process in the classroom. In this, they are concerned with the first and second research area outlined by Heil (2003). Second order problems concern the organization of plurality in schools under religious and cultural diversity and are fused here with Heil's social and political context research approach to doing research on or comparing religious education.

As the present study did not concentrate on first order problems related to the classroom or learning processes (Heimbrock 2001; Heil 2003), I investigated into second order problems: the emergence, organization, and the social, legal, and political context of Hindu religious education. The general question in research on contexts of religious education inquires into what impacts social and political contexts wield on religious education (henceforth RE). Studies that do not especially treat in-classroom didactics and pedagogy, but focus on the legal context of RE, the professional education of teachers, composition of curricula and textbooks, and their printing belong to this research area. In this they advocate for a qualitative research approach. (Heil 2003: 23) More specific, the present study focuses on constitutional and legal contexts (Heil 2003) of the Hindu class and the Hindu education system in Indonesia. It aims to give a thick description (Geertz 1973) of second-order problems that is the social and legal context (Heimbrock 2001; Heil 2003) of the Hindu class and the Hindu education system in the province of Bali. The province of Bali has been chosen because the Balinese were the inventors of such an education system. The broad research focus is laid on the years 1945 - 2008, whereas the narrow research focus is laid on the years of transition to democracy from 1998 onwards that dramatically changed the social, political, and legal situation in Indonesia.

The purpose of the study was to give a comprehensive analysis of the Hindu education system at three formative sites in Denpasar and one in Jakarta to generate and develop a comprehensive set of basic knowledge on the religion class in Indonesia and to generate a propositional theory of the current state of Hindu religious education. In consequence, the objectives of my study have been 1.) Analyzing the Indonesian political and juridical style of managing religious plurality(how the state organizes its interaction with and relation to religious traditions) 2.) describing the emergence, institutionalization, and organization of the Hindu religion class. The style of accommodating the demands of minorities, such as the Balinese Hindus, to establish private schools, and to enclose their tradition, culture, and religion in the national administration and education system is of interest to the academic disciplines of Religious Studies and Area Studies. The present study contributes to the field of academic studies that deal with the Indonesian Hindu education system; it gives a comprehensive account of the Indonesian legal framework pertaining to religious education from 1954 to 2007. In addition, it describes the impact national policies of religion exert on the emergence and organization of Hindu religious instruction. In analyzing the current state of the Hindu class and education at public and faith-based schools and universities in Indonesia, the present study adds to the general scholarship in Religious Studies, Southeast Asian Studies and the academic field of comparing religious education with an international perspective. In this, the study is aimed to be of interest for students and academics working in the fields of Southeast Asian Studies, Religious Studies, religious pedagogy, and policies on religion.

A major objection to confessional religious education as answer to religious pluralism is that "separation fosters intolerance in the population". (Nipkow 2006: 585) As the present study aimed to generate a thick description of the legal context, institutionalization, organization of the Hindu class in doing a case study, I do not discuss the strength and weaknesses of the different approaches to religious education. However, it is Nipkow (2006: 585), who reminds us that "One must not forget that the pupils will be instructed together in all other subjects and that the separating influence of a two-lessons subject on attitudes and behavior should not be overestimated."

With exception of the *Taman Siswa* Movement, approaches of multi-faith or inter-faith education (Souza 2006; Nesbitt 2006; Lähnemann 2008) are not provided for in contemporary Indonesia, and a discussion would be far beyond the scope of the present study. The state Islamic and private Islamic school system is extensive. The question in how far Islamic curricula integrate brotherhood, mutual respect, tolerance, and a pluralist paradigm along Islamic concepts is an interesting one, but it has been as well beyond the scope of my study. As the question in how far inter-religious education helps to realize public and global peace is of great relevance to the study of religion, the current study indicates that there is a need for further research in this specific area. Inconsequence, religious education is compulsory and confessional in Indonesia despite its pluralistic character, and the concept of interreligious or interfaith education is not promoted. Such a multi-faith approach appears to be contrary to many ideals the *Shafi'i*-conservative educational reformers and planners in the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Jakarta hold. (Tan 2011)

Pluralistic elements of citizenship are included in the civics subject. In Indonesia, inter-religious modules aiming to mould tolerant and pluralistic citizen are to be found in civic education (*pendidikan kewarganegaraan*) that emphasize learning of friendly encounter, religious harmony, and tolerance. Since 2003, *Pancasila* education is integrated into reformed civic education classes which include human rights modules. From 2005 onwards, the member nations of the ASEAN hold workshops in which experts discuss and conceptualize human rights modules to be integrated into the curricula of the confessional religion class, but since the focus of the study was direct formal Hindu religious education in state schools and Hindu denominational schools, the present study leaves out these topics, but signals that there is immediate need for further research in this area.

On a normative level, the Indonesian legal framework gives the same right to state sanctioned religions in Indonesia to organize faith-based education in public schools and a faith-based education system. The first principle, *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*(One Supreme Lordship), is interpreted as guarantor of rights-based pluralism, for the reason that it accepts plurality of theologies and religious traditions, yet the strategy followed is authoritarian or delimited (Howell 2003), as the state vindicates the right for itself to limit the freedom of pluralistic expression. The state limits the positive freedom of religion as six religions (*agama*) which is funded whereas belief system (*kerpercayaan*) is not funded and faces not only several governmental restrictions, but also social hostilities, whereas negative religious freedom is not provided for at all.

The national basic norm (*Grundnorm*) *Pancasila* provided Hindus with room to maneuver, (Willford/George 2005) who use the public space strategically in order to make their voices heard, to participate in the government, and receive state funding and legal protection. A specific objective of my study is to contribute to a positive understanding of Indonesian policies on religious education. In the perspective of the human rights instruments, which assure the individual right to attend the religious class in public schools, the Indonesian management of religious classes may be regarded - despite its confessional character - as pluralistic and therefore modern, and in this regard, Indonesia could serve as a model for other (Islamic) countries in managing rights-based religious pluralism by demonstrating that democracy, pluralism, and Islam are compatible.

1.2 Research questions, aims of research, and structure of the thesis

This chapter introduces the central research questions of this study, describes the aims and specific focus of research, and provides the rationale for research. The structure of the thesis follows the logic of the research questions and answers them. Three areas of inquiry were identified that translate into research questions, aims, and objectives:

1. Religious diversity, religious pluralism, and freedom of religion: *Pancasila* as a model?
2. Institutionalization of Hinduism in the nation state and the legal framework of religious education
3. Case study at Bali

Question1:How does Muslim majority Indonesia organize the relation between state and religion under the condition of religious plurality?

This question about the first problem, the political organization of religious diversity, had to be answered first in order to position the right of the Hindu community to practice and teach their religion within the national legal framework. The supposition underlying this study is that the particular Indonesian *Weltanschauung*[4] combined with Indonesian Muslims' interpretation of diversity produced the unique context of Indonesian religious pluralism as expressed in the five principles (*Pancasila*), the state motto Unity in Diversity (*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*), the concept of *agama* (religion*)*, and *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* (One Supreme Lordship). Those conceptions were analyzed in order to

Question 1/ Aim 1/ Objective 1: conduct an assessment of what social and political contexts brought forward the operation of six faith based religious education systems and classes and thereby identify the emic political or legal framework that established non-Islamic RE in majority Muslim Indonesia.
Question 1/ Aim 2/ Objective 2: to gain an understanding of the cultural and legal framework of religious freedom and education in Indonesia and to provide a discussion of their transferability as model of and for organizing religious education.

The question how to guarantee or to limit religious freedom directs attention to the issue of whether the state should provide religious instruction or not? In Indonesia, only state sanctioned religions receive funding and protection. With this in mind, the political and conceptual struggle of the Balinese to get their religious practices acknowledged, funded, and protected automatically moves into the focus of interest. The second problem concerns thus the organization process of Hindu education with a special reference to the consolidation of Hindu Dharma Indonesia. Certainly concerning the acknowledgment of the Asian religions as proper religion (*agama*) in Indonesia, the main national symbol, the concept of One Supreme Lordship, constituted the main problem.

How do Hindus, who are traditionally said to be polytheists by Muslims, negotiate and define this key element of national Indonesian life? How did the Balinese re-invent their religious practices? The present work describes how HDI was transformed from dozens of locally defined regional variants into one congregational Hindu community and one more or less coherent set of religious concepts. The study further shows how HDI was gradually institutionalized in the Hindu Council (*Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia*) and the Directorate General for Guidance of the Hindu Congregation at the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA). Logically closely related to the second area of inquiry, the third area of inquiry gives a thick description of the three cases studied. In consequence, the final research step and chapter describes in detail the process how Hindu education has been institutionalized in three educational institutions: *Dwijendra* Foundation, State Hindu Dharma Institute, and Indonesian Hindu University.

Question 2: How did the institutionalization process of Indonesian Hindu Dharma proceed? Related to its institutionalization in the Indonesian Hindu Council and Ministry of religion, how did then a Hindu education system emerge?
Question 2/ Aim 1/ Objective 1: to gain an understanding of the consolidation and systematization of Hindu Dharma and thereby providing a thick description of its institutionalization process in the Indonesian Hindu Council and Ministry of Religion.

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[4] In his "Birth of the Pancasila" Address, President Sukarno used the term *Weltanschauung* in German on June 1st, 1945. Therefore the use of the term is legitimate in this context.

<u>Question 2/ Aim 2/ Objective 2:</u> to gain an understanding of the establishment process and organization of Hindu education system in Bali by doing a case study at three educational units in Bali and one in Jakarta and thereby offering a systematic thick description of the history and contemporary situation of those institutions to an academic readership.

The structure of the thesis follows the logic, that only if readers are aware of the institutionalization process of Balinese religion in the Indonesian Hindu and Council (*Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia*) and the Directorate General for Guidance of the Hindu Congregation at the Ministry of Religious Affairs, may they fully grasp the positive consequences of the educational reform of 2003 for the built-out of the Hindu religious education system in democracy. The structure of the book discusses first the institutionalization of Hindu Dharma Indonesia and only then the legal framework of the religion class and religious education. As religion is considered a vehicle of development and modernism in the past and contemporary Indonesia, the present study investigated in national policies of strategic development, religion, and education from 1954 to 2008

<u>Question 3:</u> How is the legal setup of religious education? How did this legal framework translate into the Hindu class and Hindu education sector on Bali?

<u>Question 3/ Aim 3/ Objective 3:</u> to provide an overview of the Indonesian educational acts on religious education from 1954 to 2008 and thereby to identify the legal framework in which the Hindu education system is operated and institutionalized and thereby offering a systematic thick description of the history and contemporary situation of three Balinese Hindu education institutions to an academic readership.

The rationale behind the present study has been to analyze the statutory requirements for religious education and Hindu education from 1945-2008 to make its socio-cultural and legal context internationally comparable. The focus is on how Indonesian cultural diversity produced six state funded religions and how statutory religion classes and faith-based education systems were enacted in historically specific situations. The importance ascribed to the religious classes in Indonesia motivated the current study to fill an assessed gap of academic studies concerned with Hindu religious education and to investigate into the genesis of stated phenomenon in order to explain the specific Indonesian setting to an international readership. The central task of the study is to make sense out of the specific Indonesian situation through "thick description". (Geertz 1973).

1.3 Research Design

Tailored to answer the cluster of research questions, the basic research design adopted in this study uses a variety of approaches. (Janesick 1994; Flick 2003) This study consists of a qualitative examination based on the combination of theoretical and empirical investigations. Data were collected through bibliographical surveys and fieldwork. The internal publications of the organizations studied here are of particular importance. In consequence, the present study applies a heuristic (Chou 2005), open and circular research design (Strauss/Corbin 1996; Flick 2003;Glaser/Strauss 2005) and combines ethnographic fieldwork with case study research (Denzin/Lincoln 1994).

Since reality provides the dataset to generate theories, the applied research design is inductive as research questions were gradually generated out of the gained data set and not out of a prevalent theory (Glaser/Strauss 2005). The present study uses methods strategically; that is as resources for understanding and for producing knowledge about the research topic. Chou (2006: 131) recommends a heuristic approach for an academic inquiry of the Southeast Asian region. A heuristic approach is not a fully developed theory of any kind; more accurately, it is an approach which provides the flexibility to seek solutions creatively that make sense empirically or lead to a solution to the inquiry. (Chou 2006: 130; cf. Hammersley/Atkinson 1983)

> A heuristic approach as I have proposed relaxes self-binding categorical rules to allow everybody and anybody from whatever point of view, but with a rich and in-depth experience of Southeast Asia either as an academic discipline or as homeland or as an activist, to offer a contribution towards our understanding of the region. (…) Rather than serving as a static unit for comparative scholarship, a heuristic approach in encompassing a hybrid of global, local as well as indigenous knowledge and material to studying the region promises to elevate it to be a more dynamic "field" crossing traditional disciplinary as well as geopolitical boundaries. (Chou 2006: 132)

Besides literature review, this study used a heuristic approach employing the emic strategy, methods of extended ethnographic fieldwork, and case study research to decode the Indonesian context by encoding its specific *Weltanschauung*, organization of religious freedom, and religious education. The ethnographic approach was applied because the scientific purpose necessitates a systematic description of how religious education is conceptualized in Indonesia. Ethnography denotes in-depth empirical research and a variety of data collection techniques, which rely on prolonged and intensive interaction between researchers and their subject of research in the field. The ethnographic research strategy combines extended fieldwork, participation, and introspection to result in a thick description of the field.

Basing on a differentiation between a universalist (normative) point of view and a relativistic (descriptive) point of view, two main strategies of analysis of cultural processes and data collection are deduced: The etic and the emic strategy. The etic strategy is based on the analyst-centered, objective, and transcultural interpretation of culture. An etic approach is a description of a behavior or belief by an observer, in terms that can be applied to other cultures; in other words, an etic account is culturally neutral. The etic approach aims to systematize data from different (emic) domains in order to construct categories that work trans-emically. (Avruch 1998: 60-61; Mariappanadar 2005) In order to render intelligible the nature, history and cultural particularity of the Hindu education system and to identify nuances of cultural and social change leading to the emergence and conception of Hindu religious education, the study employed the actor-centered (emic) strategy of analysis of cultural processes and data collection.

Based on an actor-centered understanding, the emic strategy provides microscopic, context-specific, and in-depth analyses (a thick description) of the object of study at a certain time, space, and situation. By identifying, systematizing and utilizing native/indigenous categories, terms and propositions about the world, culture or domain under study, the emic strategy deals with crucial ideas, conceptions and institutions plus patterns of meaning and social functions inherent to those local cultures. Only on that base, can abstraction and a process of inter translatability proceed, because distilled, locally bound cultural categories are offered to comparison, which are then used to generate a theory grounded in data. (Avruch 1998. 58-59; Lohmann 2005: 2089).In this context, I position the study within the context of relativism. Ethical relativism, held by the anthropologist Ruth Benedict (1887-1948) and others, comprises three doctrines. (Goring 1992: 434)

1. cultural relativism, the anthropological hypothesis that different societies have fundamentally different views about values
2. normative relativism, the thesis that there are no absolute values valid for all societies
3. meta-ethical subjectivism, the doctrine that there can be no objective decision procedures for resolving value disputes

Relativism contends that opinions are to be evaluated relative to the societies or cultures in which they appear and are not to be judged true or false, or good or bad, based on some overall criterion but are to be assessed within the context in which they occur (Popkin 1987: 274)[5].

The present study takes the perspective of cultural relativism: religion is defined as a cultural system providing solutions to life problems (Geertz 1973; Prothero 2010) but it rejects the perspective of normative relativism, because there are generic elements of culture common to all species. (Avruch 1998) Likewise, critics of relativism have suggested that 1.) evidence of cultural differences does not rule out the possibility that there exist common beliefs and attitudes held by most or all cultures; and 2.) factual information about such differences does not eliminate the possibility that one belief system may in fact be better, or more true, than another. (Popkin 1987: 275) While the present study does not agree with the truth claim of the second argument, it argues that factual information about such cultural differences does not answer the question whether the traditional core definer of religion, the "sacred", exists or not.

As every researcher, I entered the field and processes of data collection and interpretation with preexisting ideas and conceptions of the problem (Strauss 1987; Strauss/Corbin 1996; Flick 2003; Glaser/Strauss 2005). As the majority of the population adheres to Islam, the minority religion Hinduism provides us with an attractive case for analyzing how Indonesia's policies deal with (religious) minorities and the principle of religious

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[5] Climate, history, customs, education, institutions, and so on would account for the fact that societies differ in their social, cultural, and religious practices. One's personal psychological conditions would account for an individual's strong or weak religious conviction. (Popkin 1987: 274)

freedom. Indonesian Hindus comprise various ethnic groups, with considerable variations in religious tradition and practice, some settle in the Riau region, others are the *Karo Batak* (Sumatra), Indians in Medan, Banten, and Jakarta, Sikhs in Medan, Banten and Jakarta, Hindu *Tenggerese* (East Java), Hindu *Kaharingan* (Kalimantan), *Toraja, Aluktodolo, Mamasa* (Sulawesi), Lombok Hindu, Balinese in transmigration areas, Hindus in Ambon, Madura, and the Javanese Hindus (*wongso weton, wongso kulon* nearby Gresik).

As the high concentration of Hindus is in Bali only, in consequence, among the Indonesian Hindu minority, the Balinese constitute a regional ethnic majority - a <u>rare case</u> of a religious and ethnic minority being simultaneously an ethnic and religious majority. Hence the case of the Balinese provides an outstanding population to analyze how Indonesia's religious and educational policies deal with that particular ethnic and religious minority and how Balinese themselves use this room to maneuver to establish the Hindu religion class in public schools and a private Hindu education system from pre-school to tertiary level.

The contemporary structure and theology of Indonesian Hindu Dharma were conceptualized as valid religious normative framework of the Hindu congregation throughout Indonesia in the 1960s by mostly Balinese Hindus. (Geertz 1973; Howell 1978, 1982; Bakker 1993; Howe 2001, Picard 2004, 2011) The embryo of Hindu Dharma Indonesia is local Balinese religious tradition. Following the political and conceptual struggle of the Balinese to get their religion acknowledged, the reinvention or systematization of Balinese religion in interaction with Indian Hinduism proceeded along the lines of the definition of religion of the Indonesian Ministry of Religion. (Howell 1978, 1982; Bakker 1993; Howe 2001, Picard 2004; 2011) Only since 2005, the curriculum standard of the Hindu religion class is unitary for all Indonesian Hindus irrespective of the specific ethnic religious or Hindu tradition they belong to. Only the local content curriculum incorporates specific religious ideas and practices of those many ethnic or Hindu traditions into the national unitary Hindu class curriculum. In consequence, the present study does not investigate in detail into Balinese culture and religion, but conceptualizes the national legal framework and national history as the focus of study.

The current work illustrates the thirteen years lasting struggle and steps undertaken by Balinese reformers to assure Hinduism a place within the legal framework of the nation-state. In the 1950s and 1960s,they felt the need that they had to form a new Western-educated Hindu elite, which could not only supplement the traditional priesthood's ritual function, but which were capable to develop and teach a systematized theology and ethic, and who could be employed in strategic governmental and military positions. (Howell 1978; Bakker 1993) These experts considered a reformulation of their varying sets of religious practices by constructing a more or less coherent set of religious concepts according to local, Indian, and national discourses. (Howell 1978; Bakker 1993; Picard 2004, 2011) The present work presents the *Upadeca* (Howell 1978, 1982; Bakker 1993; *Parisada* 1967), the catechism of Hindu Dharma Indonesia, compiled in 1967 by the Hindu Council, a doctrinal manual in the style of questions followed by answers, as the basic summary of the Indonesian Hindu doctrine. Out of political and administrative needs and the question of identity, the primary task of religion experts is to develop, provide, and disseminate the coherent set of Hindu concepts (*tattwa* (theology)*, susila* (ethics)*, upacara*(ritual)) and symbols codified in the *Upadeca*, thereby a doctrinal Hindu Dharma orthodoxy has been systematized.

Consequently, I focused on the dilemma in which Balinese or Hindu individuals, groups, and institutions have been in, while reaching an agreement in public sphere on the relation between Islamic majority, nation state and their religion. The contemporary Hindu Dharma Indonesia (henceforth HDI) and its image of Lordship were to be constructed along the narrow, Islamic definition and standards proposed and developed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The whole point of the legal changes sought by Balinese and Indonesian Hindus was to bring their individual practices into the public realm as legitimate forms of religion. Since 1955, Hindu religion classes are held in Bali, but until today Hindus in other provinces struggle for their right to educate their children in religion motivated by big concerns about the religious competence of their offspring. (Personal observation, Work Shops organized by Ministry of Religious Affairs)

As through prior studies (1999) and fieldwork at the Indonesian Hindu University in Denpasar (2003-2004; 2005), I had been provided with access to the field and a good academic network. In consequence, as a good access into the field had been given, I decided out of pragmatic reasons and directed by findings of a first survey in 2006 to interview only experts in the field of religious education and religious policies in addition to an extensive literature review of primary sources (Indonesian laws and regulations, publications of government agencies, statistical data, publications of the Ministry of National Education (*Kementerian Pendidikan Nasional*, MONE), publications of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (*Kementerian Agama*, MORA)[6], publications of Institutions where I conducted my case study, eye witness accounts, interviews in Jakarta or Bali) and secondary literature sources (technical literature, articles in newspapers, books, internet, and scholarly journals). As implied by an inductive, circular research design, the research is based to a large extent on my analysis of Indonesian primary material. Then I coded existent models and theories to which my data set had pointed. The long period of fieldwork (2007) enabled me to continuously member-check (Flick 2003) my findings and thereby I could validate my dataset and the conclusions it had pointed to.

In an initial step, I conducted three problem-centered biographic interviews. These interviews were recorded, transcribed, and textual units were thematically paraphrased irrespective of the sequentiality of statements made by the interviewee during the interview (Meuser/Nagel 2005; 2009). Thereby I gained a first understanding of the field, which provided the background for the selection of the samples of the case study, the emergent theoretical sampling, and the consecutive steps of emic conceptualization and theoretical generalization. (Meuser/Nagel 2005; 2009) With this I identified key agents and agencies involved in the field of Hindu education, in other words, the coding and analysis of the first three interviews defined the specific cases to be studied: the *Dwijendra* Foundation (*Yayasan Dwijendra*) in Denpasar, the State Hindu Institute (*Institute Hindu Dharma Negeri*) in Denpasar, the Indonesian Hindu University (*Universitas Hindu Indonesia*) in Denpasar, and the Directorate General for the Guidance of the Hindu Congregation (*Direktorat Jenderal Bimbingan Masyarakat Hindu*)at the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Jakarta, and the Indonesian Hindu Dharma Council (*Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia*).

Consequently, the selection of experts to be interviewed within the predefined sample was guided by theoretical sampling (Strauss/Corbin1996; Flick 2004), as further experts were interviewed following a chain approach – if specific information was needed, the respective expert who had the knowledge, the documents or the competences to provide the information and insight, was located, contacted, and interviewed, often on the basis of the recommendation of another expert. Thereby the predefined theoretical sampling included implicit data source triangulation (Flick 2007: 53)

All interviews were made with individual experts, not with focus groups. Experts were defined as executives, government officials, professionals, experts, university lecturers, and teachers in the sector of religion and education. (Meuser/Nagel 2005; 2009) All experts are classified as primary selection. To identify their technical and process expert knowledge (*technisches Wissen* and *Prozesswissen*) (Bogner 2005: 43) about the Hindu class, individual problem-focused expert interviews, and informal interviewing were conducted at the research sites. A critical sample was included. It is of interest to the study why I chose to interview only the 'Hindu elite', in other words, professionals and religious experts, in Denpasar and Jakarta. I interviewed experts, because I think as those professionals have the power or are in the position to enforce standards on others, their statements concerning *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*, the Hindu catechism and curricula, the management of the Hindu congregation provide much factual information to understand and describe the social, political and legal context of the Hindu religion class. In addition, they are the agents that shape the future of Indonesian Hindu Dharma and the Hindu class. Out of their technical and processual expert knowledge I could reconstruct a preliminary theory of the state of Hindu education in Bali.

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[6] In 2009, all former Departments (*Departemen*) were renamed into Ministries (*Kementerian*).

As I have been provided with several legislative texts and ministerial documents related to the religion class by Prof Yudha Triguna in March 2007, I analyzed in the first step the legal framework of the religion class in order to locate Hindu religious education in its larger political and legal context. Likewise, the study explicitly uses official statements of Indonesian politicians, officials, and Hindu experts and officials, because those people are the ones responsible for compilation, ratification, and implementation of strategic visions, missions, policies, and curricular content in the religious or educational sectors. The broader guidelines espoused in those statements[7] are "indicative of deep-seated values and commitments that are not made explicit in the course of everyday life." (Bellah 1967: 2; cf. Purdy 1984: 92)

In consequence, the present study acknowledges the prominence of elite and middle class discourse and the heavy support from officials and authorities in the religious field. This is a typical problematic of Javanese Studies, as the subaltern is often absent in the studies and an official, nationalistic, and administration supported view is reproduced. (Antlöv 2005) In other words, the study employed a top-down oriented approach, for this reason the view reproduced is the perspective of the Hindu elite in the cultural, political, and religious field and may not be congruent with the perception of pupils, parents, students and the general public. As the aim of my study has been to provide a thick description of the institutional context of the Hindu class, I focused on the political and legal context of such a religion class (Heil 2003) and not on classroom pedagogic.

Following process-model of Hindu education evolved during the ethnographic case study. As the first principle of the religious *Pancasila* state, Belief in One Supreme Lordship (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*) commands a monotheistic civil religion, itwas conceptualized as contested yet unchanging constitutional framework to guarantee religious freedom and religious pluralism. Strategic, educational, and religious policies on the national level, and Human Rights instruments on the international level are identified as changing conditions and contexts, which influence the paradigm, aims, and organization of the contemporary Hindu education system and even command its conformity to some extent with those changing contexts. The Islamic framework is to some extent the parameter of religious and educational policies as political Islam and public Islam shape the outcome of any political process in Indonesia. Also, political considerations before elections have to be taken into account, as politicians may adopt laws or support religious or other worldviews in order to gain votes and to secure their share in the distribution of power.

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[7] The present study does not take "at face value" (Bellah 1967: 2) what Indonesian politicians, officials, and Hindu experts and officials people say on specific occasions, but as Bellah (1967: 2; cf. Purdy 1984: 92) suggests, those statements show that "it is often indicative of deep-seated values and commitments that are not made explicit in the course of everyday life."

Pre-state plurality of culture, religion, and law: Austronesian (local ethnic traditions)/Hindu-Buddhist/Islamic

traditons

Colonialism

| Christianity | European school system, monetary system and adminsitartion and professions | political Islam and Islamic education sector | Bali independent until 1846- 1908 |

Unitary Republic of the State of Indonesia

| Grundnorm Pancasila (civil religion: Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa) | political Islam and public Islam | Bali-Hindu political and conceptual struggle (1945-1963) | Human Rights Instruments |

National strategic development plans (1961-2008) and political considerations during crisis and before elections

Policies on religion and education

Hindu education system: *Dwijendra* Foundation, State Hindu Dharma Institute and Hindu University

Representative organs of Hindu Dharma Indonesia: Hindu Dharma Council and Directorate General of Hindu Affairs at the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA)

Theoretical sampling: Experts at those Institutions

1.4. Indonesia: a laboratory for research on spirited politics?

This chapter will present the general background context to the current study.

1.4.1 Plurality and religious education

> The events of 9/11 and beyond suggest that the problem of the twenty-first century is the problem of the religion line (Prothero 2010: 11)

Religious plurality has become an "undeniable fact" in modern societies. (Prothero 2006: 6; Weber 2002) In this context, the point open to controversy is, whether modern societies and nation states are willing to accept this diversity/plurality, and how they organize ethnic-religio-cultural diversity. As far as religious plurality is concerned, these questions constitute important fields of inquiry in all disciplines of religious studies. (Weber 2002) Because religious peace is an important cement of domestic peace (Tibi 1995; Lähnemann 2008), a critical academicchallenge for religious studies today is inquiring into the encounter of religious communities and their relations with the state in order to gain insight intothe dynamics of religious life and identities. (Eck 2006; Lähnemann 2008) A comparative glance at those mechanism in different nation states shows, that actually each state has developed a specific mechanism to manage the plurality of religions. (Stepan 2001; Casanova 1994)

In this light, a distinction between diversity/plurality and pluralism (Skeie 1995, 2003; in Jackson 2003: 3; Skeie 2006) needs to be drawn. Traditional plurality refers to societies in which the origin of religious plurality is either historical or caused by migration, whereas modern plurality refers to the pluralistic intellectual climate of contemporary thought. (Ingram 2004) Thus, traditional and modern plurality refer to a given social condition within a nation state characterized by the contemporaneous presence of groups distinct in linguistic, cultural or ethnic backgrounds, faith traditions, world views or different political attitudes and concepts expressed in competing and probably contradictory assumptions, ideas and values.

Skeie suggests "using the word 'plurality' in cases where a description of diversity is intended, and the word 'pluralism' where the intention is to give a normative valuation of the plurality." (Skeie 2006: 308) With regard to religion, diversity/plurality denotes the concurrent existence of different faith traditions at one place in time, whereas religious pluralism goes beyond mere diversity to active engagement with the plurality of faith traditions. In this light, "pluralism as normative position" (Skeie 2006: 308)refers to the presence and toleration of those diverse groups within the modern nation state, the "protector of religion and religious education" (Moran 2006: 46), because religious diversity will create growing tensions and conflicts in contemporary societies without any real encounter (Eck 2006) between those faith traditions. Diversity or plurality of faith traditions is interpreted here as social reality that may be "studied, celebrated, or complained about" (Ingram 2004), but pluralism (Callan 1998; Weber 2002; Ingram 2004; Eck 2006) is a social construction[8], "a theological, academic, or civil orientation, a theoretical, or political construct seeking to interpret and organize coherently the data of religious diversity". (Ingram, 2004: 136)

"The politics of religion concern not only maneuverings in a religiously plural society but also the way a religion articulates with the authority structure of a nation or particular locale." (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 28) "The context of religious plurality raises issues both of general interest and of specific concern for religious education such as: Questions of power related to the situation of religious and ethnic communities, in particular majority/minority relations and issues of oppression and racism." (Skeie 2006: 312) In this light, the implementation of the religious class, the maintenance of faith based education systems by religious groups, and governmental funding of religious education constitutes sensitive issues worldwide especially in general pedagogy and in public schools. Religious education in public schools remains "a battlefield!" (Pew 2007: 3)

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[8] Skeie (2006: 310-311) suggests that our reactions to and understanding of plurality often rest upon a implicit understanding of plurality, in this "the description of socio-cultural plurality are always in some way marked by certain attitudes towards plurality, even if they are not explicitly articulated as theories or positions". Parekh (1996 in Skeie 2006: 310-311) identifies three types of such attitudes: 1. Naturalist attitudes; 2. Rationalistic attitudes; and 3.) Romantic attitudes. The current study takes a romantic attitude toward pluralism adopting an open view of human nature and – socio-cultural plurality is seen as "a fact of life"; instead of trying to overcome it, "we should acknowledge it". (Skeie 2006: 310) "Plurality is a result of deep-going divisions between humans; it is not a matter of superficial differences that can be overcome". (Skeie 2006: 310) – However, the present study assumes that there is some common human potential and common human creativity (Skeie 2006: 311; Sen 2007; Avruch 1998)

Concerned European, North American, and Australian scholarship has developed the theoretical basis of comparing international approaches to confessional religious education (henceforth RE) and inter-faith religious education in nations of the 'Global North' with religious plurality[9]. Nipkow (2006: 577) postulates that scholarly exchange about theory and semantics in RE is still lacking comparative research on a global scale. With regard to the implementation of the religious class by the state and the maintenance of faith based education systems by religious groups, the present study on Hindu religious education extends the perspective into Southeast Asia, particularly the Unitary Republic of Indonesia and specifically the province Bali.

Both the member states of the European Union (henceforth EU) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (henceforth ASEAN) consider education as key area for development. With regard to the problem of religious education, the bodies follow different agendas. As for compliance with international human rights standards, the 'Oslo Declaration'[10] (1998) and the 'Toledo Guidelines on Teaching about Religion and Beliefs in Public Schools[11],' (2007) constitute watershed events in the juridification of teaching about religion as legitimate topic for public schools in the 'Global North'. (Evans: 2008: 456).

The Association of South East Asian Nations, however, does not interfere in religious issues of its member states and cooperates explicitly not on religious issues. The strictly secular ASEAN organization does not yet propose a systematic approach on the organization and institutionalization of religious education. Despite the secular attitude of ASEAN, religions play a major role in the Indonesian Basic Law, in legislation, education and in everyday life. Religion and religious education are key areas of development and spiritual advancement in Indonesia's strategic planning instruments. In this, the religious sphere is considered as a critical dimension in the religious, moral, and spiritual development of the child.

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[9] Enlisted publications provide a selection of works on comparative international studies of religious education. The years of publishing may be adduced as example of internationally growing interest how to organize religious plurality in schools: Heimbrock (ed.) 2001: Towards religious competence: diversity as a challenge for education in Europe; Heimbrock 2004: Religionsunterricht im Kontext Europa. Einführung in die kontextuelle Religionsdidaktik in Deutschland; Jackson (ed.) 2004: Rethinking religious education and plurality: issues in diversity and pedagogy; Jackson (ed.) 2008: Peace Education and Religious Plurality: International Perspectives; Jackson 2003: International perspectives on Citizenship, Education and Religious Diversity; Jackson (forthcoming 2008) Education and Religious Diversity: The Interpretive Approach in an International Context; Knauth 2008: Encountering Religious Pluralism in School and Society'.

10 In August 1998, an international conference on freedom of religion was held in Oslo, Norway in connection with the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Declaration of Human Rights (henceforth UDHR). For the first time in history, it has been recognized that the existence of human rights transcends the laws of sovereign states. The Oslo Declaration adverts to Articles 18 both of the UDHR and of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (henceforth ICCPR), which have created a universal standard pertaining to 1.) religious education, 2.) protection of equality, 3.) freedom of religion, 4.) rights of states to implement religious education, 5.) rights of communities to maintain faith-based education, 5.) right of parents to have children educated consistently with their own values, and 6.) educational rights of children. This universal standard has been strengthened by passage of the 1981 U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (henceforth 1981 Declaration). Crucial to the present study is the mandate given to scholars and teachers to study and apply the UDHR and the 1981 Declaration as universal standards on freedom of religion or belief and to create educational programs using the 1981 Declaration as a universal standard to build a culture of tolerance, understanding and respect between people of diverse beliefs.

11 Drafted 26 years after the 1981 Declaration, the 2007 Toledo Guidelines constitute the first systematic approach and transnational effort to manage religious education on a European scale in establishing religion as a valuable item in school curricula.

1.4.2 Laboratory

> This profusion of religiously charged political alignments and situations makes Indonesia a superb place for anthropologist and other students of religion to investigate the relationships between religion and society and, indeed, to explore the very definition of religion. Indonesian experience calls into question a number of comfortable assumptions sometimes made in the study of religion in other world areas.
>
> (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 4)

Southeast Asian studies are a part of Area Studies[12]. (King 2006: 23-44) The geographical underpinnings of the Southeast Asian ellipse can be clearly distinguished from a sinicized Asia (Northeast Asia: Japan, China, Korea), the Hindu-Islamic sub-continent (India) and Central Asia. The big three differentiations among the research area of Southeast Asian Studies, comprise Indonesianists, Thai experts, and Vietnamologists. It is not possible within the scope of the present study to describe the complex debates that have been pursued in questions what constitutes Southeast Asia as a region and whether this signifies a distinct territorial and cultural space. In essence, the significance of Southeast Asian Studies lays in its importance for theoretical knowledge production about the area. "As 'epicenter' for such a production, the field has made crucial contributions with analytical categories such as "agricultural involution", "thick description", "theatre state", "imagined communities", "galactic polity", "geobody", "weapons of the weak" and "moral economy"." (Houben/Chou 2006: 1 emphasis in original) Manyrenowned scholars in humanities and social science developed their theoretical concepts, as for example Geertz his "thick description" after conducting field research in Indonesia, especially in Bali[13]. Consequently, the area of Southeast Asia can be understood as theoretical problematic and as an object of inquiry offering new sets of questions and methodologies. (Houben/Chou 2006: 14).

Southeast Asian and Indonesian Studies have acquired a new practical and theoretical relevance in the context of simultaneous processes of localization and globalization[14]. The contextualization of the global into the local and the local into the global or the combination of globalization and localization is called glocal or glocalization[15] (Leganger, 2001: 12-13).

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[12] This section is drawn from Vincent Houben and Cynthia Chou 2006, who have edited a brilliant inventory on the current state of research in Southeast Asian studies. Wilhelm Solheim II (2000: 273) found evidence for a very widespread maritime trading and communication network (*nusantao* network). It presented a communication network that could pass around ideas, tool types, and elements of many different shared technologies. Consequently, I assume that preceding the begin of the Christian Era, people have exchanged ideas and goods from the Mediterranean Sea to the East Asian region, a fact pointing to correlated influence and cross-fertilization but also to limitation of boundaries, ideas and concepts originating in Western and Eastern thought. For centuries the Chinese referred to the region of as '*Nanyang*' and the Japanese as '*Nanyo*', the 'South Seas', while Indians saw it as 'Further India' and the Dutch as 'The East Indies'. 'Southeast Asia' was a twentieth century term invented in the West, which became popular at the end of World War II when the Allies organized the Southeast Asian Command. The Southeast Asians themselves had no common name for the region. (Yamashita, 2003: 8-9) Therefore as the result of its history, Southeast Asia is best understood according to the self-definition of the Association of Southeast Asian (ASEAN) nations which reads that ASEAN comprises a mosaic of ethnicities and cultures; across the seas of the world cultures: Indian, Chinese, Islamic, and Western, one might add. In a celebratory fashion the ASEAN- Committee on Culture and Information (ASEAN-COCI) states that "diversity is a cultural strength and an economic asset which needs to be protected by compatible national legislation". In November 2007, during Indonesia's term as chair of the ASEAN Secretariat, it fostered the establishment of a ASEAN Community, which comprises besides the traditionally developed economic sector, a socio-cultural, and a security sector – as outlined in the draft of the ASEAN Charta. Following the ASEAN Vision 2020, the ASEAN-COCI gives the objective of ASEAN being "(a) community conscious of its ties of history, aware of its cultural heritage and bound by a common regional identity". (ASEAN Secretariat, Strategic review of ASEAN-COCI program, 2005: 4, in: www.aseansec.org (May 2008)

[13] Just to name a few: John Bowen, Roy Rappaport, Frederik Barth, Ruth Benedict, James Boon, Clifford Geertz, Gregory Bateson, Walter Spies, Michel Covarrubias, McPhee/Belo and Mead/Bateson. Yamashita has demonstrated that these scholars not only contributed to the introduction of Balinese culture to the West, but also how Balinese art forms and dances which are now famous, emerged as an outcome of Bali's encounter with the West and were "invented" during the colonial period under the influence of those Western artists, scholars and tourists (Yamashita 2003: 7, emphasis in original).

[14] Appiah (2007: 10) proposes the provisional minimal definition of the term globalization as a global network of trade relations and information. In the present era the accelerating globalization process is thought to increase the frequency of exchange and flow of economic and intellectual items, including goods, knowledge, ideas, habits, values and images, as well as people, on a global scale, resulting in a dual trend of both unity and diversity (Leganger 2001: 53; Hitchcock/Dharmaputra: 2007:2). Therefore no locality remains unaffected by globalization, and it can be observed that globalization results in almost every dimension of life in a creolization or hybridization, and localization of culture. (Yamashita 2003: 5, 15) "Local knowledge seems to be a dynamic form of local culture which is most frequently revitalized by those in the new urban environment as they adjust to such global values as individualism, consumerism, and materialism". (Yamashita 2003: 12) Therefore local societies mediate or acculturate the global influences into particular local forms, making each locality into a global locality.

[15] In the 1991 edition of the Oxford Dictionary to New words the term "glocal" and the related processual noun "glocalization" are defined as being "formed by telescoping global and local to make a blend", the notion is modeled on the Japanese concept of *dochakuka*, which was originally used to refer to the agricultural principle of adapting one's framing techniques to local conditions. (Yamashita 2003:6)

Glocalization presupposes not the opposition of globalization and localization, but their simultaneous occurrence and blending. In this perspective, globalization does not connote a unidirectional homogenizing process, but a dual process of hybridization, because localization is viewed as a process caused by globalization. The history and the present of Southeast Asia demonstrate the mechanisms at work in glocalizing processes.[16] (Yamashita 2003) Early Indian and Chinese influences, followed by the introduction of Islam and European colonialism, blended with indigenous elements to create the contemporary culture of the region. The modernization processes involved extraordinary transformations, where the old traditional structures of polities and communities have been broken up.

In sum, the current events, transitions, and transformations in the region form a laboratory for articulating new concepts for the understanding of the dynamism of the area with relevance also for the rest of the world (Houben/Chou 2006: 2). Since the region of Southeast Asia provides a field of inquiry for the development of theories, John Bowen has shown that the political and cultural history of Indonesia, of the Dutch East Indies, and of the many kingdoms and societies in the archipelago, has given rise to a particular way of studying plurality and pluralism. Following Bowen (2003, 2005) and Munoz (2006), I assume in Southeast Asia one finds a kind of "internalized or internal pluralism", "a consciousness of other societies at the core of each society's self-definition". (Bowen 2003: 12) Such phenomena are most likely the result of the region's outward orientation, its history in commerce, religion, politics, and art of receiving and transforming objects and ideas that have come elsewhere, often across the seas. (Solheim II 2000; Bowen 2003: 12; Chou 2006: 128) "Southeast Asia borrows in order to create what defines it – a paradoxical formulation that one sees across nearly all human domains in the area". (Bowen 2003: 12) In consequence, plurality is a longstanding common phenomenon in the histories of South Asia and in the Indonesian Archipelago, which could provide a tool of inquiry for developing a theory and models concerned with the organization of religious plurality. (Franke 2006; Bowen 2005; Tibi 1995; Madjid 1994)

As Indonesianists comprise the largest groups among researchers on South East Asian, a large body of literature exists on the area. There are several publications on Indonesian religious plurality (Franke 2006, Bowen 2005; Smith-Kipp 1987; Howell 1982). An entire academic field termed Baliology is dedicated to Balinese studies and generations of scholars of all disciplines and schools monitored Balinese culture, Balinese history, and Balinese Hinduism. With regard to Javanese studies, Antlöv (2005: 13) states that certain topics and categories are over studied, while others are excluded. His assessment fully applies to Balinese studies. Besides the abundance of Balinese studies, sparse attention is paid to the broader phenomenon of Hindu religious education, contemporary Indonesian Hinduism as a minority religion, and Hindu ethnic groups. However, there are a few articles and monographs concerned with formal Hindu religious education, of which I like to mention Kelambora 1976, Bakker 1993, Steenbrink 2001, and Nala 2004.

1.4.3. Indonesia: Kaleidoscopic reality

Indonesia is a country with highly heterogeneous features and a "kaleidoscopic reality". (Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 23) The country constitutes a salient research site regarding such complex contemporary social issues as religious diversity, religious pluralism, and RE that have relevance for both the Study of Religion and Southeast Asia. The geographical setting and environmental cornucopia has influenced Indonesia's socio-cultural structure and consequently shapes in an important way the economic and political life. As a result of the geo-strategic location and the resulting deep integration into global trade, Indonesia's history may be emblematized in this context as "a hybrid mosaic or *tenun* of indigenous archipelagic and imported socio-religio-cultural practices" (Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 2) that results in the rich and complex contemporary civilization and society. In 1950, the Ministry of Information gives a vibrant self-description, quoted here in length to elucidate the elegant diction:

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[16] The rise of the lifestyle among the urban middle class is a particular striking feature of Southeast Asia today. Young, well-educated middle-class city dwellers, who only a few decades ago firmly believed that they belonged to national and local communities, now perceive that they may have more in common with the middle-class in the older industrialized countries, than with their own fellow countrymen in the periphery. (Yamashita 2003: 4)

The geographical position of Indonesia on the junction of four main roads of international traffic has brought her into contact with outside influences since the very beginning of her history. As international traffic (around 100 B.C.) developed and increased, these contacts gained in regularity and frequency. Impregnated with these influences, Indonesia became receptive to modern ideas, even if there is a certain measure of conservativeness which increases as one goes deeper inland. It may be that this receptiveness to modern ideas and the innate conservatism are more or less soundly balanced, resulting in certain selectivity towards outside ideas. This finds its expression in all kinds of cultural manifestations, which are in the nature of a synthesis between the original culture and the outside cultural influences. This aspect of Indonesian society must be taken into account (…). (*Kementerian Penerangan* 1950: 45)

The Archipelago was not merely a passive recipient of imported influences, rather than being a one-way affair, cultural exchange led to constant encounters between cultures (faith communities) and to innumerous acculturation processes. (Munoz 2006) In this light, Indonesia constitutes also a research ground for research on cross-cultural fertilization processes between East and West. Preceding the begin of the Christian Era[17], people have exchanged ideas and goods from the Mediterranean Sea to the South East Asian region, therefore one may doubt assumed boundaries between the dichotomist distinction of assumed boundaries between ideas and concepts originating in 'Western' and 'Eastern thought', and further investigate into their correlation, "acculturation", (Sedyawati 2001) "cross-fertilization", (Munoz 2006; Madjid 2004); and "hybridization[18]" (Tschernokoshewa/Pahor 2005). Nurcholish Madjid (2004: 53, author's translation) depicts the situation of diversity as such

> (i)n terms of richness, cultural diversity is comparable with a lavish phyto-genetic growth. By the means of cross-cultural fertilization, diversity can be a source for the development of rich and strong hybrid cultures. Incidentally, as result of the interaction of trade and politics, Srwijaya, Majapahit and Aceh were such hybrid or acculturated cultureswhich emerged through (Southeast) Asian cross-cultural fertilization.

Precolonial and colonial history

For a better understanding how Indonesia organizes religion in the state, one should be aware of the Archipelago's long history in order to recognize the unique solutions (here represented by the five principles) that were found and upheld by those concerned to organize the people of Indonesia.The history of the Island Archipelago[19] is characterized by a cross-fertilization of archipelagic ideas with South Asian, Sinic, Middle Eastern, and Western ideas for two millennia. Archeological evidence indicates the presence of modern humans as early as about 40,000 years ago in the Archipelago, but they may have been present much earlier[20]. By about 5,000 years ago[21], "the circulation of peoples within the archipelago and the absorption of influences from outside had begun to create a diverse but related complex of cultures often identified as Austronesian"[22].

What is today Indonesia lay at or near the center of that *nusantao* complex[23].The widespread maritime trading and communication network Austronesian or *nusantao* (Solheim II, 2000: 273)network begun to exist in eastern Island Southeast Asia, eventually spread east throughout the Pacific, and west as far as Madagascar[24].The early trade, or barter, did not make anyone wealthy, but provided a living for many people of varying but similar cultures. It presented a communication network that could pass around ideas, tool types, and elements of many different shared technologies. (Solheim II, 2000: 273)

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[17] Cloves, found only in Maluku, had made their way to the Middle East as early as 4,000 years ago. Library of Congress, 2004: 2, in: http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Indonesia.pdf, 10.03.2010

[18] Tschernokoshewa/Juric Pahor 2005: Auf der Suche nach hybriden Lebensgeschichten. München/Berlin

[19] Linguistic and archaeological evidence (Adelaar 2005; Bellwood 1996) shows a significant cultural diversity among pre-colonial Western Malayo-Polynesian (especially Malayo-Sumbawan) traditions.

[20] Bellwood 1996; Munoz 2006; Library of Congress, 2004: 2, in: http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Indonesia.pdf, 10.03.2010

[21] Library of Congress, 2004: 2, in: http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Indonesia.pdf, 10.03.2010; Bellwood 1996; Munoz 2006; Solheim II, 2000: 273

[22] Bellwood 1996; Munoz 2006; Library of Congress, 2004: 2, in: http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Indonesia.pdf, 10.03.2010

[23] Solheim II, 2000: 273; Library of Congress, 2004: 2, in: http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Indonesia.pdf, 10.03.2010

[24] The nusantao network covered 'all of the Pacific Ocean, the coastal areas of the China Sea and Japan, the coastal areas of the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean as far as Madagascar, and Island Southeast Asia and the coastal area of Mainland Southeast Asia' Solheim II, 2000: 273; Bellwood 1996; Munoz 2006; Library of Congress, 2004: 2, in: http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Indonesia.pdf, 10.03.2010

The first period encompasses the pre-colonial period (2500 BC until 1550 AD). This period was largely dynamic inside the region. After Austronesian settlers arrived in the Western and Eastern part of the Archipelago, they diversified into thousands of localized Indo-Melanesian cultures, who stood then in cultural and economic exchange with the greater Sinic and Indic cultural traditions. (Bellwood 1996; Kulke 1991; Munoz 2006) Although Indonesian peoples clearly had contact with the outside world at an early date, physical evidence in the archipelago is much later. Sites containing Indian trade goods now date at about 400 B.C., and the first inscriptions (in eastern Kalimantan and West Java) at about 375–400 AD. Early external immigrants originated from India, China, Turkey, Arab, and later then from Portugal, England, and the Netherlands.

The main contributors to the diversity of religion and culture in Indonesia were the geographic character of the Archipelago and immigration from inside and outside the region (Bellwood 1996; Munoz 2006). The geographic location of Sumatra and Java at the sea trade road between China and India made the ships waiting for monsoon winds travel further. Therefore, local polities, and especially their early rulers came in contact with Indian and Sinic concepts of politics, law, and religion. Prior to the advent of Islam (1100 AD) and Christianity (1600 AD), South Asian scholars, adventurers, and traders introduced ideas and concepts of dharmic religions (Hinduism and Buddhism) into the Western part of the Archipelago (Kalimantan, Java, Sumatra) between the second and forth centuries AD- (Munoz 2006; Fic 2003) With the intensification of trade relations, the first Indianized polities and Hindu-Buddhist imperial kingdoms emerged and vanished in the Western part of the Archipelago (400 – 1550[25]). (Kulke 1991; Fic 2003; Munoz 2006)

The cross-fertilization of cultural ideas was not a one-way affair, but a bilateral exchange between indigenous archipelagic belief systems and dharmic religions. The main agents in the transfer of Indian cultural values and concepts were the rulers of the polities in what would become Indonesia. (Munoz 2006) The social organization and cultural structures of the people of the Archipelago, the Malays peninsular and the Indian subcontinent displayed very similar features and met cognate problems around the first centuries of the last millennium to which the dharmic concepts, for example that of a god-king, offered some help concerning the legitimating of kingdom and priesthood. (Kulke 1991; Tooker 1996; Fic 2003; Dellios 2003; Munoz 2006) Chinese mercenaries, traders, and scholars were also proactively engaged in the exchange, testifying to a very early vast regional network. (Dellios 2003; Munoz 2006)

Emphasizing violent, sexual, and magical traits, Shivaite traditions blossomed in Java in the fifth century and merged with Vajrayana-Buddhism, resulting in the early medieval Shiva-Buddhism; Balinese Shiva Siddhanta (Interview Wiyana 2010) and contemporary Hindu Dharma Indonesia – both unique to the Archipelago. Vishnuite and Vedanta traditions were always present in the region, but played only minor or even marginalized roles in Bali from 1300-1999, but they experience a current renaissance (Interview Ida Resi Oka 2004; Phalgunadi 2005; Interview Ida Pedanda Bajing 2006). In the following centuries local dynasties established a series of Hindu, Buddhist and Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms (Kutai, Srivijaya, Mataram, Kediri, Majapahit). (Kulke 1991; Fic 2003; Munoz 2006) The Buddhist temple of Borobodur and the Hindu temple of Prambanan, both built by the *Sailendra* dynasty in the 8th and 9th century AD and enlisted in the UNESCO world heritage list, testify to the former grandeur of those past kingdoms. The Hindu-Buddhist civilization experienced its golden age during the medieval Majapahit Empire (1250-1500) with its heartland or center located in Central Java. The feudal kingdom is assumed to have had maintained corvee-relations stretching across the entire area of contemporary Indonesia (Kulke 1991; Fic 2003; Munoz 2006), and thus it constitutes the common reference point for the self-confident nationalist pride of the later Indonesian independence movement in the 20th century.

> After something like a thousand years of adopting Hindu and Buddhist ideas and influence, Javanese began to adopt Islam. The story of that Islamization is complex, full of surprises and over six hundred years long. It is far from over today. During those six centuries, Javanese have also found much else to adopt, from European, American, Chinese, Middle Eastern, and other sources. (Ricklefs 2006: 5)

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[25] The date 1550 refers to the end of the last Hindu-Buddhist kingdom Majapahit in Java. Only the Balinese Hindu kingdoms continued to exist until 1958, but their traditional structure and the traditional social order has been changed by Dutch intrusion into their native political affairs in the 1910s.

Islamization found its beginning in the 10th century, when Islam was spread by Muslim Indian traders from Gujarat through the west coast of Sumatra and then disseminated Java. "Whether it was Mideastern Islam filtered through the religious experience of India, or preached by Sufis, it appealed greatly to the majority of Javanese and Sumatrans whose spiritual life was influenced by the mystical bent of the cult of the divine kingship promulgated by the leadership of earlier Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms." (Purdy 1984: 38) Islamization led to a new cultural paradigm in the region that slowly replaced the indigenous and Hindu-Buddhist religious practices. In some villages however, local megalithic religious practices continue until today, as in the case of the *Baduy* in Banten and the Bali Aga, for example. Sufism played an important role in the expansion of Islam. In the archipelago, "Islam has flourished as an entity enriching a deep cultural web of local cultures and beliefs, converting the indigenous people without necessarily remaking them according to the Middle Eastern model of Muslims". (Hilmy 2010: 99) Until the upsurge of Islamist activism and religious-related terrorism since the resignation of the authoritarian Suharto regime, "Indonesian Islam has enjoyed the reputation of being a distinctive and tolerant variant of Islam, compatible with democracy, human rights, civil society, pluralism, gender equality, and other traits of modern civilization". (Hilmy 2010: 99)

One of the main reasons for this positive reputation is that Indonesia is one of the few countries where Islam did not supplant the existing religion purely by military conquest. Islam was introduced to the country in a relatively peaceful way, even though it is undeniable that military expansion accompanied its institutionalization. (Hilmy 2010: 99) "(T)he process of Islamization in Indonesia has been what is termed *pénétration pacifique*, mostly by traders cum missionaries" (Madjid 1994: 59). "The result is the widely known Indonesian practice of syncretism". (Madjid 1994: 59) Similarly, Tibi (1995) states "Asia didn't come under Islamic influence by means of armed Jihad but through trade relations." Questioned why political Islam and democracy are compatible in Indonesia, Constitutional Judge Prof Zoelva (Interview 2010) replied:

> This is related with the cultural history of the Indonesian nation, Islam entered Indonesia in a smart (sic!) way not by using weapons and violence but by a slow process of gradual cultural rapprochement. In the beginning, many existing cultural tools were used by the Islamic missionaries. What does this mean? Islam entered without imping the given culture. Thus, since the first Muslims entered the Archipelago, gradual cultural rapprochement has been the applied model.

Likewise, in 2009 Prof Komaruddin Hidayat, then Rector of Indonesia's leading Islamic State University Syarif Hidayatullah[26], argues

> Islam was brought to our shores by traders and traders are known to be hospitable, inclusive and like to befriend people, not make enemies through warfare. Moreover, the content of Islamic expression that was developed here was the more esoteric, Islamic mysticism – *tasawuf* – which was more adaptable to the Hindu-Buddhist culture that prevailed that time. These two factors helped the peaceful spread of Islam in Indonesia, not by the sword or by bloodshed. Because the traders' mobility and networks, the coastal cities all along *Nusantara* – the Indonesian Archipelago – became centers of trade, of the spread of Islam and Malay language and trade networks developed in synergy, becoming the strength of Indonesia's cultural cohesion and identity.

By the end of the fifteenth century, several kingdoms with Islamic rulers had been established (Demak, Pajang, Mataram, Banten, Samudra-Pasai, Gresik, Tuban) marking a cosmological and cultural-legal change in the Archipelago. (Rickleffs 2006) Arab traders, many of Yemenite origin, settled in the coastal trade towns and introduced a more orthodox variant of Islam. By the end of the 16th century Islam was the dominant religion in Java and Sumatra. (Rickleffs 2006) Trade relations slowly brought European adventurers and traders to the region. In this period then, alliances between traditional rulers, the nobility, and stray Western interests prevailed. Following the conquest of Malacca in 1512, the Portuguese (1512-1850) were the first Europeans to arrive in Indonesia with a clear agenda in the early modern period: to dominate the spice trade, start crop growing and to do Roman Catholic missionary work. The proselytizing efforts had sustained success in Flores, the Moluccas, and what was to become East Timor in 2001.

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[26] AsiaViews, September-October 2009: 14-15

The Archipelago underwent a period of transition and social transformation from sovereign rule to a colonial territory from 1602 to 1949. In 1602, after the Dutch founded the Dutch East India Company (VOC), they became the dominant European power in the Archipelago and spread Calvinist and Lutheran Protestantism in eastern Indonesia (Moluccas, North Sulawesi, Sumbawa, Sumba, Papua, and Borneo) and Sumatra. The extent to which Catholic and Protestant missionaries competed with each other in a missionary quest led to the perception on side of the natives that both religions were fundamentally different, leading to the bureaucratic administrative differentiation between Christians (Protestants) and Catholic in contemporary Indonesia. (Ramstedt 2004)

In 1800, the VOC was bankrupt and therefore formally disbanded. Since the Dutch government depended heavily in financial and emotional matters on the region, it established the Dutch East Indies as a national colony in 1802. In the first decades of the twentieth century, a modern Dutch colonial state extended its control to most of the future Indonesia. The introduction of colonial rule led to a period of political and social change. The introduction of modern Western capitalism, a money economy, and the implementation of the color line led to the collapse or the individuation of traditional polities and institutions and the traditional economic systems. (Wertheim 1959) As new-wealthy businessman and Westernized intellectuals challenged the alliance between the traditional aristocracy and the new colonial rulers, the common interest of the people and the will to posses sovereignty in one territory led to Indonesian nationalism. (Wertheim 1959) Political Islam has since then acted as a multifaceted, yet principal ideology of resistance against Dutch hegemony in civil means (education, health) and with militias and guerilla tactics. Prof K Hidayat (2009) notices, "Islam and armed conflict happened when the European imperialists wanted to grab the wealth of our country. The clerics defended their motherland by using religious slogans to stir sentiments of solidarity and the spirit of struggle"[27].

To some extent Islam is therefore less seen as a tradition, but more as a dynamic vehicle of protest and resistance against exploitation, injustice, inequality, and disempowerment. Simultaneously in the early 1900s, the first groups learned about nationalism. The Dutch colonizers always feared civil unrest and opposition to their reign, thus they limited access to education as a control over their subjects intellectual horizon. The handful subjects that succeeded in obtaining Western, that is Dutch, higher education, were then those to train their fellows and to become the leaders of the Independence movement. Then, in the 1920s and 1930s various modern political organizations and leaders made themselves visible in the restricted public sphere.

As socio-cultural diversity in the Archipelago posed a major obstacle in a unified struggle for independence, contesting visions of what kind of state should be founded, began to arise from the time Indonesia emerged as an idea in the early 20th century. The leaders of the supra-regional and archipelago-wide nationalist movement, considered the diversity of Indonesia as the apparent factor to be taken into account. As a result, these leaders swore an "Oath of the Indonesian Youth" (*Sumpah Pemuda*) on the minimal common ground of "one nation, one homeland, and one language". (*satu bangsa, satu nusa, satu bahasa*) The fault lines of their contesting visions, though, have shifted with the vagaries of the nationalist movement. (Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 2)

When the Japanese invasion ended the years of Dutch foreign rule in 1942, the animosities between the Dutch colonial government and political Islam and the Indonesian nationalist movement was in full progress. Although short-lived from 1942-1945, the Japanese occupation forced the Dutch to leave the Dutch East Indies during World War II and enabled Indonesians to organize and arm themselves for the very first time[28].

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[27] Asia Views, September-October 2009, 14-15
[28] The Jakarta Post, Indonesia, A Nation in Transition, www.thejakartapost.com/ (March 2007)

The notion of Local genius

In a previous section, reference has been made to Bowen's paradigm of "Southeast Asia borrows in order to create what defines it" – the paradigm describes how cultural borrowings are filtered and refined during a two-stage process of acculturation according to traditional local values in the Archipelago. Studies on Indonesian cultural history have revealed the fact that elements of foreign cultures which came to Indonesia have always undergone further processes of development or refinement. (Sedyawati 2001) "Indonesian civilization (…) has throughout the centuries kept its peculiar character because of the 'local genius' of the population". (Wertheim 1959) The capacity to process various cultural elements in order to produce creations with specific "archipelagic" characteristics is known as "local genius" or "indigenous/original creativity capacity". (Wertheim 1959; Sedyawati 2001) In this, the layer of the archipelagic socio-religious cultures appears to operate as a conservative filtration device for strong and continuous influences from outside. (Wandelt 1989; Franke 2006; Hooker 1978; 2003; Munoz 2006) This notion of "local genius" (*kearifan local*) has been quite enthusiastically borrowed by Indonesian intellectuals and is frequently used to denote the process of cultural change due to foreign influences (glocalization) but underlying this change is the ability to filter, integrate or/and reject elements that do not fit into the Indonesian pattern.

The capacity of local genius is characterized by the existence of creativity in changing or reworking element(s) of a foreign culture within the normative frame of one's local culture. The term acculturation denotes a "phenomenon which happens, if two communities with different cultures meet directly in a long period of time, that cause changes in the original patterns of culture on one or both communities". (Keesing/Keesing: 1971; in Sedyawati 2001: 435 FN 1) Sedyawati (2001: 435-446) speaks of two stages within the acculturation process: the stage of immediate acculturation, and the post-acculturation stage. Culture is undergoing an acculturation process, if the indigenous creative capacity plays its role in selecting the foreign cultural elements to be accepted in their original form into one's own culture. However, this indigenous creative potentiality reveals itself most prominently at the post-acculturation stage of cultural development and transformation, in which the creative capability has an active role in recreating, reworking, or changing foreign elements according to local cultural matrix. These elements, however, do not blend mechanistically, but there is a more intricate mechanism at work.

Instead of simplifying Indonesian religious thought as segmented into several strata[29], the current study follows a "social processual and holistic perspective" (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 8) The current study proposes three longstanding historical and one recently emerged socio-religious cultures in Indonesia: 1.) archipelagic cultures, which in fact denote the archipelagic Indo-Melanesian megalithic belief practices of animism, pantheism, and shamanism that are characterized by ancestral, earth and mountain cults[30]; 2.) Hindu-Buddhist culture; 3.) Islamic culture, and 4.) national culture/civil religion as represented in the first sila. Those socio-religious cultures do not exist on their own, but there are in encounter, interaction, and exchange with each other and therefore transform each other. "Looking at Indonesian cultures and religions as transformations of each other (…) aims to draw attention to underlying similarities rather than to divide Indonesian cultures into distinct categories. (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 6) These enlisted four socio-religious cultures are not to be thought of as providing essential identities, but they refer to a historical sequence of overlapping socio-cultural encounter. Dharmaputera (1989: 29/30 FN 52/54) states in this context, that those longstanding socio-religious cultures[31] "have never fused and crystallized, hence a central common value and normative system in Indonesia has not been established", – but "it is totally wrong to assume that each of them stands as an independent system totally free from the influence of the other[s]."

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[29] The classical categorization by H. Geertz (1963: 5-77) proposes that three categories of socio-cultural-religious groups could be distinguished across the Archipelago: inland wet-rice areas (Hindu-Buddhist); trade oriented coastal peoples (Islamic), and the ethnic groups of the mountainous interior regions (archipelagic belief practices). H. Geertz observed that the traditional value system of Indonesian culture as a whole would be structured on three basic socio-cultural layers: Indigenous, Indic, and Islamic. As the terminology seems inconsequent to me– because 1.) the layers are not closed units, but overlap and acculturate (Dharmaputera 1989; Sedyawati 2001: 435 FN 1), and 2.) whereas the term indigenous is quite general; Indic refers either to linguistics, script or the Indian subcontinent, and Islamic to Islam as a religion, the people that practice Islam and the civilization developed by those people, I refer to three socio-religious cultures. (H. Geertz, 1963: 5-77; Dharmaputra, 1989)

[30] In a religious studies approach, the term archipelagic layer can be elucidated in two ways, which complement each other. First, a trajectory of megalithic indigenous shamanism and animism is observed throughout the Archipelago at the village level, remarkably, this pantheistic view contradicts Semitic absoluteness. (Stöhr, 1965; Stöhr 1976) Second, the conception of Javanese monism, as important cultural trajectory (Franke 2006) integrates different even inconsistent ways of life or elements and seeks to find convergence of these contradictory elements. The present study hypothesizes that the awareness of religious plurality is rooted in Javanese Monism and the pluralism of Austronesian cultures (Munoz 2006).

[31] Following H. Geertz, Dharmaputera speaks of layers, which I reformulated as socio-religious cultures.

To allege an instance, archipelagic cults often continued to operate even after elements of the local tradition were drawn up into a Hindu (respective Muslim or Christian, A.L.) superstructure (Hefner 1998: 93). Indeed, archipelagic and Hindu-Buddhist thought provides a deep-rooted basis for cultural similarity in the Indonesian archipelago, despite 87 percent of the population embraces Islam – if one follows the official census 2000. Following two tragic tsunami catastrophes that destroyed vast parts of Sumatra, West Java, and Java in 2004 and 2005, these deeply seated layers surfaced abruptly as Balinese Hindu high priests (*pedanda*) and lay priests (*pinandita, pemangku*) were called to the Javanese and Sudanese shore in 2005. They were tasked to assist local Hindu priests and communities, but also the kyai[32] and the local Muslim community in the performance of purification rituals, in which oblations were offered and fowl (animals) and eggs were sacrificed to propitiate the horrendous queen of the South and East Ocean[33]. In consequence, under the condition of restraint, the socio-cultural matrixes can be independently activated in order to cope with disaster and crisis.

In short, the three longstanding socio-religious cultures are compounded in a wide variety of forms, and they have been interrelated in their historically sequences – because they mutually influence each other. In a dynamic process, elements of archipelagic traditional religious practices have been acculturated with Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic, Christian, and Confucian elements, thereby producing localized variants or to a certain degree alternative types and phenomena of religious practices. Likewise, civil religion/national culture has influenced the traditional, Hindu-Buddhist, and Islamic culture in the Archipelago, which in turn to some extend and varying degrees have influenced national culture (Franke 2006).

Considering the geographic expanse of Indonesia, the unification of all socio-religious cultures is a paramount challenge. According to the original 1945 Basic Law, the state shall develop Indonesian national culture, but it gives room to maneuver for local traditions, since the societies have the right to continue and refine their cultural values[34]. As previous scholarship (Hitchcock/Dharmaputra 2007: 3; Interview Ida Pedanda Bajing 2007; Schulte Nordholt 2007) and I found in Bali a conservative and even resilient traditional local cultural matrix working to preserve fundamental units perceived as core elements of Balinese religious-socio-culture, the present work understands the concept of local genius (*kearifan lokal*) as to refer to the unilateral process of acculturation of foreign elements and the ability to filter and even to reject unfitting elements following a conservative, to a certain degree resilient core cultural matrix. In this, the process of acculturation is always a social construction, because specific agents perpetuate the elements they regard as core cultural properties until today.

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[32] A *Kyai* is a Muslim religious teacher. Traditionally they were the most prominent supra village leaders to whom the peasantry could look upon, independent of the local nobility and colonial force. *Kyai*' influence spread by the expansion of Muslim boarding schools (*pesantren*). *Kyai* are linked by ties of descent, marriage and education, creating an Islamic network that extended across Java and the Archipelago.

[33] Personal communication with professional high priest Ida Pedanda Gede Putra Bajing in 2006. Ida Pedanda Bajing has been called for ritual performance by Hindu officials in West Java and has spent 10 days there. Also National Television in August 2005.

[34] Historic Basic Law 1945: article 30; Amended Basic Law Articles 18B (2); 28I (1),(3); 32 (1), (2)

1.4.4. Indonesia: Fact sheet

Throughout the pre-nation-state period, a common religious, cultural, or political identity never existed among the ethnic groups of the archipelago, despite their sharing of certain common features. Accordingly, what had to become the Indonesian nation had to previously imagine her community[35]. From the time when Indonesia emerged as an idea in the early 20th century, contesting visions began to arise on what kind of nation-state it should be and what role religion could play within the confines of that state. Despite the extreme diversity of cultural and religious traditions in the Archipelago, nation-state intellectuals and politicians have been preoccupied with exploring what Indonesian cultural identity actually is, and how it should be developed. Thus, since the early days of the nationalist movement in 1908, conflict over the place of religion in the state has been a constant feature of political life.

Despite traditional and modern socio-cultural diversity, a few general unifying principles may be assumed to operate in Indonesia. "Just as Indonesia itself is not a 'natural' entity, there are no natural or permanent factors that divide it". (Bourchier/Hadiz: 2003: 2) Among others, such unifying principles are 1.) shared Indo-Melanesian cultural traits (Hooker 1978; Bellwood 1996; Adelaar 2005; Munoz 2006); and 2.) nation-building efforts from 1949 onwards. The Indo-Melanesian cultures present basic similarities in more than one respect. Beneath all outward differences, throughout the archipelago an unmistakable unity of basic cultural traits is revealed. A first similarity may be found in the social form of life, the village is thought to constitute the most basic community form. (Darmaputera 1989: 26; Hooker 1978) Albeit rapidly declining, agriculture (wet rice and dry rice fields) forms the very foundation of Indonesia's economy in general. With respect to customary law (*adat*-law) most communities in Indonesia present a congenial pattern (Hooker 1978)[36], whereas from a linguistic point of view all Indonesian languages belong to the Austronesian language family (Wertheim, 1959: 5; Adelaar 2005)

The nation-state relies to a considerable extent on the nation building efforts of the post-1949 period. These have included an opposition to Dutch colonialism (resulting in paranoia of federalism; Hilmy 2010), the invention of one national language, as well as the introduction of the Western-model of schooling; both of which have acted to bind together the otherwise diverse peoples of the region. (Parker 2003; Kingsbury 2001) Although all languages belong to the Austronesian language family, only since 1928 the Malay vernacular (*Bahasa Indonesia*), the former lingua franca[37] of the Southeast Asian region, has been adopted as national language and is continuously advanced through mass education programs, alphabetization campaigns and the national education system. "In plural societies, the linguistic groups typically fail to agree on a national language of instruction, but here Indonesia is an exception". (Sudijarto/Thomas 1980: 51) In effect, "with limited funding and limited personnel" (Sudijarto/Thomas 1980: 52), the task of establishing universal literacy in Indonesian language and maintaining local languages and perpetuating ethnic literature at the same time, is a central concern of Indonesian educational policies up from Independence to the reform era 1999 until consequential legislation to the 2003 educational reform. The complex task of the Indonesian education system has been and is to promote allegiance to the nation as a unit and at the same time to protect ethnicity, language, and religious identity of the separate groups that compose the whole. (Sudijarto/Thomas 1980: 53; Parker 2003)

The enormous task to organize a unitary education system becomes obvious, if we take a closer look at the geographic and demographic situation of Indonesia. The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is located at the geopolitically and economically strategic junction between India, China, and Australia. The country has an area of approximately 700,000 square miles, and its geographic dimension parallels the longitude of the USA or Europe. The Indonesian archipelago compasses 6099 inhabited (of the total of 17.805) islands, (Weck 2009: 1) of which the largest islands are Java, Kalimantan, Sumatera, West-Papua and Sulawesi.

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[35] The term imagined community was coined by Benedict Anderson. An imagined community describes a national culture whose national identity relies on the people's conception of it. Since it proves to be impossible to know all fellow citizens who share this national identity, someone must have a commonly acceptable idea of what this national identity constitutes. These 'imagined communities' are continuously being contested and reconstituted in the contemporary world. (Anderson 1993 in Woodward 1987: 18-19)

[36] In the pre-colonial period the courts developed refined cultures, whereas the villagers continued to live a somewhat culturally divorced existence in the countryside. Although rule of law and the complex legal system are highly problematic issues, the general dichotomy between former Dutch law and a notion of law and justice rooted in the various local traditions (*adat*) and Islam exhibits a commitment to plural law practices and their recognition and utilization in national jurisdiction, indicates a continuing plural understanding of law.

[37] Market Malay (*Pasar Malay*) served as lingua franca in the geographic area between Madagascar, India, the Malaysian Peninsular, the Philippines, the Indonesian Archipelago, Australia, and Western parts of Micronesia and Oceania. The Sultans of Yogyakarta and Banten send letters in Malay to the Portuguese and English kingdoms.

Consequently, Indonesia is a culturally remarkable diverse nation. According to a 2000 census report[38], there were 205, 8 million people living in Indonesia's multi-ethnic society, whereas the Indonesian Country Profile estimates 235 million in July 2004. Although ethnicity is a dynamic and not stable identity, there are more than 1,000 ethnic/sub-ethnic and 350 recognized ethno-linguistic groups in Indonesia. Notwithstanding, the size of most ethnic groups is small, the population census of 2000 listed 101 ethnic groups, and only 15 groups have more than 1 million each[39]. The table on top of the next page shows the geographic location and extension of Indonesia. In addition, the table demonstrates the demographic distribution on the islands of Indonesia.

Province	Population (Million)								
	1930	1961	1971	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005
1. Java and Madura	41.7	63.0	76.1	91.3	99.9	107.6	114.7	121.3	128.5
2. Sumatera	8.2	15.7	20.8	28.0	32.6	36.5	40.8	42.5	46.0
3. Kalimantan	2.2	4.1	5.2	6.7	7.7	9.1	10.5	11.3	12.1
4. Sulawesi	4.2	7.1	8.5	10.4	11.6	12.5	13.7	14.9	15.8
5. Remaining islands	4.6	7.1	8.6	11.1	12.3	13.7	15.0	15.1	16.5
6. Total	60.9	97.0	119.2	147.5	164.1	179.4	194.8	205.1	218.9

Library of Congress – Federal Research Division Country Profile: Indonesia, Dec 2004, in: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/img/id-globe-L.jpg (05.08.2009)

Indonesian Statistical Board, http://demografi.bps.go.id/ (February 2009)

Induced by the archipelago's geostrategic location between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans (east-west) as well as between Asia and Australia (north-south), Indonesia's function as a hub for trade and communication is indispensable for the entire region. The state constitutes the world's

1.) largest archipelagic nation-state stretching across a geo-strategic area,
2.) fourth most populous country (after China, India and the US),
3.) third-largest democracy (Freedom House 2010), and
4.) largest national community of Muslims with a strong presumptive normative consciousness of the majority.

Since Indonesia has the world's largest Muslim population, we can regard Indonesia as a Muslim majority country, characterized by

1) an enormous territory situated in a geopolitical strategic location,
2) abundant resources
3) social, ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity.

The Islamic majority and Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist, Hindu, Confucian minorities as well as local religious systems shape the expression of religious diversity in Indonesia. According to the 2000 census report, (Suryadinata 2003) 88 percent of the population is Muslim, 6 percent Protestant, 3 percent Roman Catholic, 2 percent Hindu, and in total less than 1 percent Buddhist, followers of traditional indigenous religions, Jewish, and other Christian denominations were not registered. Christians, Hindus, and members of other minority religious groups argued that the census undercounts non-Muslims. This seems to be correct, since the Hindu General Directorate of Ministry of Religious Affairs counted around 10 Million Hindus in Indonesia in 2008 distributed in all provinces. The statistic of 2005 reveals following religious composition:

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[38] The population census were conducted in 1971, 1980, 1990, and 2000, while the between population census were done in 1985 and 1995. Currently the sixth population census is being conducted in May 2010. The total of 235 Million is a projection of the population of 2000. In: www.bappenas.go.id (10.05.2010)
[39] The largest ethnic groups are the Javanese, Sundanese, Malay, Madurese, Batak, Minangkabau, Betawi, Buginese, Bantenese, Banjarese, Balinese, and Sasak. (Suryadinata 2003: 7)

No.	Provinsi Province	Agama - Religion							Jumlah Total
		Islam Moslem	Kristen Christian	Katolik Catholic	Hindu Hindus	Buddha Buddhist	Khonghucu Confusius	Lainnya Others	
1	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam *)	3.918.904	39.349	4.658	311	6.683	51	897	3.970.853
2	Sumatera Utara	8.358.192	2.615.014	451.977	12.243	243.382	3.655	4.524	11.688.987
3	Sumatera Barat	4.455.251	59.178	38.308	715	604	1.608	146	4.555.810
4	Riau	4.233.592	189.709	67.024	3.097	61.896	5.333	2.755	4.563.406
5	Jambi	2.523.542	62.457	22.323	324	14.718	3.852	-	2.627.216
6	Sumatera Selatan	6.620.135	44.736	34.954	36.126	30.393	1.064	237	6.767.645
7	Bengkulu	1.515.510	17.562	5.421	6.727	1.066	-	-	1.546.286
8	Lampung	6.779.663	70.833	63.975	152.715	36.882	176	328	7.104.572
9	Bangka Belitung	898.293	11.638	15.012	682	72.849	44.354	-	1.042.828
10	Kepulauan Riau	1.093.678	80.854	41.563	1.771	47.337	7.746	62	1.273.011
11	DKI Jakarta	7.767.369	414.393	361.308	11.367	235.111	45.839	3.860	8.839.247
12	Jawa Barat	38.034.636	472.996	292.367	23.165	51.948	11.739	124	38.886.975
13	Jawa Tengah	30.978.227	502.334	331.017	22.923	48.047	7.451	6.115	31.896.114
14	DI Yogyakarta	3.088.209	89.718	149.927	5.036	3.962	-	243	3.337.095
15	Jawa Timur	35.280.993	369.227	263.526	92.875	40.919	5.578	4.989	36.058.107
16	Banten	8.639.722	135.305	109.773	4.866	92.351	2.916	23.218	9.008.151
17	Bali	394.691	33.968	14.220	2.926.887	7.551	614	161	3.378.092
18	Nusa Tenggara Barat	4.072.265	6.410	8.362	57.879	24.618	161	-	4.169.695
19	Nusa Tenggara Timur	367.495	1.463.969	2.312.817	1.558	1.520	1.228	94.595	4.243.182
20	Kalimantan Barat	2.369.403	363.841	1.040.616	2.048	212.639	53.118	1.152	4.042.817
21	Kalimantan Tengah	1.409.100	335.324	34.275	75.652	-	491	58.184	1.913.026
22	Kalimantan Selatan	3.172.912	23.137	20.251	33.174	16.387	1.430	4.122	3.271.413
23	Kalimantan Timur	2.416.490	269.643	130.179	12.662	9.200	1.819	881	2.840.874
24	Sulawesi Utara	608.192	1.403.512	72.812	25.783	1.932	426	8.360	2.121.017
25	Sulawesi Tengah	1.827.896	348.172	27.311	77.097	5.522	963	4.008	2.290.969
26	Sulawesi Selatan	7.509.495	701.105	132.560	61.483	36.779	2.028	13.673	8.457.123
27	Sulawesi Tenggara	1.871.779	25.901	24.061	38.061	677	218	-	1.960.697
28	Gorontalo	902.133	10.425	1.599	5.239	544	75	-	920.015
29	Sulawesi Barat	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
30	Maluku	570.890	583.654	79.912	3.613	316	696	10.131	1.249.212
31	Maluku Utara	661.722	208.270	11.285	347	95	148	-	881.867
32	Irian Jaya Barat	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
33	Papua	592.540	1.443.119	399.806	1.856	320	1.031	1.166	2.439.838
	Jumlah (Total)	192.932.919	12.395.783	6.563.199	3.698.282	1.306.248	205.808	243.931	217.346.140
	Persentase (Percentage)	88,8%	5,7%	3,0%	1,7%	0,6%	0,1%	0,1%	100,0%

www.depag.go.id, 20.05.2010

Politically, the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia participates among others in international organizations as the ASEAN, the UN, and the UN Security Council. Concerning international relations, the Indonesian presidency uses firmly its South-South, East-West bargaining power, yet it has to do justice to both her majority Muslim electorate and Muslim solidarity, and to international trade relations. In order to manage Indonesia's kaleidoscopic reality, the state is divided into a hierarchy of administrational units. Seven new provinces were established after the downfall of the New Order Regime. Five of the provinces are given the status of special territories, the Capital City of Jakarta, the Exceptional Territory of Yogyakarta, and the Special Territories of Aceh, West-Papua, and Papua; Bali is currently striving to achieve special autonomy, which is much broader than the regional autonomy.

According to the national conception (*wawasan nusantara*), the government has to do justice to religious minorities, whether Muslim or not, and to its Muslim majority electorate and Muslim solidarity. Since the proclamation of Independence in 1945, the potential hazards of Balkanization[40], disintegration, and destabilization constitute a steady menace attested in regular outbreaks of religion-related violence throughout the archipelago. Because the fundamental task of the democratic government is to maintain territorial unity and multi-religiosity, while a threat of separation or balkanization seems to be ever present, many voices are heard during decision-making processes. Also, recent events demonstrate how contemporarily several religious, secular and liberal schools of thought are represented and proactively engaged in democratic bargaining in the public sphere of Indonesian Islam and in Indonesian political and civil society. However, these events also show an Indonesian reality, where a faction of anti-liberals and anti-pluralists reacts with violent means. Thus, when we keep in mind the contested relationship between Islam and the West (after 9/11), while considering that Indonesia's government is under continuous pressure of being understood neither as anti-Islam nor as pro-Islam, the dealing with those centrifugal domestic vested interests may be described as balancing act. Indonesia's striving for national unity, integration, security and stability is the crux of the matter in home affairs, as Indonesia muddles herself through improvisational and short termed solutions. The table on the next page shows the population of Indonesia by province.

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40 Balkanization is a geo-political term originally used to describe the process of fragmentation or division of a region or state into smaller regions or states that are often hostile or non-cooperative with each other. It denotes to break up (as a region or group) into smaller and often hostile units, to divide or to compartmentalize.

Province	Year					
	1971	1980	1990	1995	2000	2005
Indonesia	**119,208,229**	**147,490,298**	**179,378,946**	**194,754,808**	**205,132,458**	**218,868,791**
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam	2,008,595	2,611,271	3,416,156	3,847,583	3,929,234	4,031,589
Sumatera Utara	6,621,831	8,360,894	10,256,027	11,114,667	11,642,488	12,450,911
Sumatera Barat	2,793,196	3,406,816	4,000,207	4,323,170	4,248,515	4,566,126
Riau	1,641,545	2,168,535	3,303,976	3,900,534	3,907,763	4,579,219
Jambi	1,006,084	1,445,994	2,020,568	2,369,959	2,407,166	2,635,968
Sumatera Selatan	3,440,573	4,629,801	6,313,074	7,207,545	6,210,800	6,782,339
Bengkulu	519,316	768,064	1,179,122	1,409,117	1,455,500	1,549,273
Lampung	2,777,008	4,624,785	6,017,573	6,657,759	6,730,751	7,116,177
Kep. Bangka Belitung	na	na	na	na	899,968	1,043,456
Kepulauan Riau	na	na	na	na	1,040,207	1,274,848
DKI Jakarta	4,579,303	6,503,449	8,259,266	9,112,652	8,361,079	8,860,381
Jawa Barat	21,623,529	27,453,525	35,384,352	39,206,787	35,724,093	38,965,440
Jawa Tengah	21,877,136	25,372,889	28,520,643	29,653,266	31,223,258	31,977,968
DI Yogyakarta	2,489,360	2,750,813	2,913,054	2,916,779	3,121,045	3,343,651
Jawa Timur	25,516,999	29,188,852	32,503,991	33,844,002	34,765,993	36,294,280
Banten	na	na	na	na	8,098,277	9,028,816
Bali	**2,120,322**	**2,469,930**	**2,777,811**	**2,895,649**	**3,150,057**	**3,383,572**
Nusa Tenggara Barat	2,203,465	2,724,664	3,369,649	3,645,713	4,008,601	4,184,411
Nusa Tenggara Timur	2,295,287	2,737,166	3,268,644	3,577,472	3,823,154	4,260,294
Kalimantan Barat	2,019,936	2,486,068	3,229,153	3,635,730	4,016,353	4,052,345
Kalimantan Tengah	701,936	954,353	1,396,486	1,627,453	1,855,473	1,914,900
Kalimantan Selatan	1,699,105	2,064,649	2,597,572	2,893,477	2,984,026	3,281,993
Kalimantan Timur	733,797	1,218,016	1,876,663	2,314,183	2,451,895	2,848,798
Sulawesi Utara	1,718,543	2,115,384	2,478,119	2,649,093	2,000,872	2,128,780
Sulawesi Tengah	913,662	1,289,635	1,711,327	1,938,071	2,175,993	2,294,841
Sulawesi Selatan	5,180,576	6,062,212	6,981,646	7,558,368	7,159,170	7,509,704
Sulawesi Tenggara	714,120	942,302	1,349,619	1,586,917	1,820,379	1,963,025
Gorontalo	na	na	na	na	833,496	922,176
Sulawesi Barat	na	na	na	na	891,618	969,429
Maluku	1,089,565	1,411,006	1,857,790	2,086,516	1,166,300	1,251,539
Maluku Utara	na	na	na	na	815,101	884,142
Irian Jaya Barat	na	na	na	na	529,689	643,012
Papua	923,440	1,173,875	1,648,708	1,942,627	1,684,144	1,875,388

Including non permanent residents (homeless people, sailor, boat people and remote area communities)
Source: 1971, 1980, 1990, 2000 Population Census, and 1995 and 2005 Intercensal Population Census
(February 2009, http://demografi.bps.go.id; http://www.bps.go.id/)

Structure and organization of government

The structure and organization of regional and local government follows the pattern of national government. On the national level, the President is the chief executive and works with a cabinet of ministers. In the four successive sessions deliberating the constitutional amendments between 1999 and 2002 the People's Consultative Congress (henceforth MPR) adopted a series of new regulations. The MPR was the supreme institution with unlimited power until 2001. In the revised Constitution (Chapter 1, 1) sovereignty is vested in the 'hands of the people' and shall only be exercised by the MPR. In 2002 the MPR's power were limited to three, to determine the constitution, to compile the Broad Guidelines of State policy (*Garis Besar Haluan Negara*, henceforth GBHN) and to formally install the president-vice-president package[41] after their direct election and to dismiss that package.

The MPR consists of the members of the Indonesian Parliament (People's Representative Council, *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, DPR) and the newly formed Regional Representative Council (DPD). As both the DPR and DPD will be fully elected, there will be no appointed members[42] of the MPR. Constituted as a second chamber in a semi-bicameral system, the DPD will shift the weight from the MPR away from Java to the Outer Islands. Each of the provinces is represented with the same number of representatives. In 2003 the freshly established Constitutional Court (*Mahkamah Konstitusi*) took over the power of juridical review from the MPR. (Crouch 2003: 18-19)

Similarly, the Governor is the chief executive in the province and works with a staff of regional officials. Side by side is the provincial legislative, with whom the regional government cooperates on regional legislation and decisions on the budget. On the regency (*Kabupaten*) and municipal (*Kotamadya*) levels, the chief executives are the regency head (*Bupati*) and the mayor (*Walikota kodya*). Here the regency head/mayor cooperates with the local legislative on matters relating to local government regulation and the budget[43]. Both provincial and regency/municipality governments are granted autonomy. Like the President is the head of state, the governor is the head of the province and represents the central government in his or her region. Similarly, the regency head/mayor is the head of the regency/municipality and represents the governor in his or her district/municipality[44].

Below the regency/municipal level the administrative units are not autonomous: the regency administration (*kecamatan*) and the sub-district (*kelurahan*). The *kecamatan* is an administrative sub-division of the regency/municipality, headed by a district head (*camat*). The office is responsible for the administration of the district, social welfare, and economic affairs. The system of sub-districts (*kelurahan*) is similar to that of the district. The sub-district head is a *lurah*, who is assisted by a secretary and section heads. Both the district head and the *lurah* are civil servants appointed on merit by a district head on behalf of the governor.

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41 In 2001, the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) had decided that the president and the vice-president –as a package- should be elected directly in a nationwide presidential election. This was a consequence of the disgust felt by many at the money-politics that was believed influence the choices of the MPR. It is cheaper to buy half of the votes of the MPR members than those of half of the country's registered voters in a direct election. This legislation provides a strong incentive to form firm alliances before the presidential election and thus lay the foundation for a more stable government. (Crouch 2003: 18-19)

42 Until 199, The Indonesian parliament, the House of People's Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, DPR) consisted of 500 delegates, 400/415 of which were elected under a system of proportional representation every year. A further 100 seats are allocated to military representatives who are appointed on the recommendation of the armed forces. The rest of the delegates were appointed from ranks of the armed forces. During the Suharto regime, the armed forces had a dual function (*dwifungsi*) first, security and second, sociopolitical development (Tap MPRS No. II / 1960; UU No 2 Year 1988 §6), or in other words, the armed forces had the duty to protect the state from external aggression and internal subversion. The justification for the armed forces delegates is that since members of the military cannot take part in elections, their political rights as a sociopolitical and defense force were served through guaranteed DPR seats. The People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat,* MPR) was formally the highest authority of state; it has been the highest constitutional body, which met every five years in the year following the elections to the DPR. The principal legislative task of the MPR has been to sanction the Broad Outlines of State Policy, a document that establishes policy guidelines for the next five years to come, and to elect the President and Vice President. The MPR consisted of 1000 members, comprising the 500 members of the legislative assembly DPR, and a further 500 members appointed by the government – of those seats, the armed forces had again a share of 100 seats. In April 1995, the military agreed to reduce this number to 75 effective 1997. In 2002 the *dwifungsi* was abolished, and there are no appointed members in the MPR. (Riesenhuber 2001: 136- 137; http://countrystudies.us/indonesia/84.htm, August 2011)

43 Regarding regional finance, the budget for regional administration and development is composed of the following revenue sources: Budget allocation from the central government to local governments, Central government grants to local governments, Taxes collected by local governments with the approval of the central government, corporate profits of local government enterprises; e.g. credits secured by local governments.

44 Asianinfo.org. 2008: Politics in Indonesia, www.asianinfo.org (March 2008)

In Bali, villages are then either classified into traditional (*desa pakraman*) or administrative (*desa dinas*) villages. This distinction emerged during the years of the Dutch efforts to administrative the island. The head of a *desa* is elected by the village's adult population. The elected candidate is then appointed by the *bupati* on behalf of the governor. In the office of the village head there is a secretary and several section heads. It is noteworthy that a Balinese village considered as a legal body in Indonesia, and has therefore the right to employ village security. Below the village level, there is the local administrative unit, the *banjar*, the centerpiece of Balinese social order. The table shows the number of administrative units and their population number in 2005.

No.	Provinces	Regencies	Mun.	District	Sub-district	Village	Total population
1	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam	17	4	241	112	5.853	**3.899.290**
2	Sumatra Utara	18	7	326	547	4.924	**12.333.974**
3	Sumatra Barat	12	7	158	256	634	**4.549.383**
4	Riau	9	2	124	190	1.236	**4.546.591**
5	Jambi	9	1	76	117	1.072	**2.698.667**
6	Sumatra Selatan	10	4	149	294	2.428	**6.798.189**
7	Bengkulu	8	1	73	123	1.071	**1.610.361**
8	Lampung	8	2	164	164	1.967	**7.161.671**
9	Kepulauan Bangka Belitung	6	1	36	54	266	**1.018.255**
10	Kepulauan Riau	4	2	41	105	144	**1.198.526**
11	DKI Jakarta	1	5	44	267	0	**9.111.651**
12	Jawa Barat	16	9	568	547	5.231	**39.130.756**
13	Jawa Tengah	29	6	564	744	7.817	**32.952.040**
14	DI Yogyakarta	4	1	78	47	391	**3.279.701**
15	Jawa Timur	29	9	654	785	7.682	**37.076.283**
16	Banten	4	2	130	144	1.340	**9.127.923**
17	Bali	8	1	56	89	602	**3.487.764**
18	Nusa Tenggara Barat	7	2	100	91	711	**4.161.431**
19	Nusa Tenggara Timur	15	1	194	299	2.300	**4.174.571**
20	Kalimantan Barat	10	2	149	80	1.409	**4.078.246**
21	Kalimantan Tengah	13	1	93	133	1.179	**1.902.454**
22	Kalimantan Selatan	11	2	119	121	1.835	**3.245.705**
23	Kalimantan Timur	9	4	122	177	1.201	**2.950.531**
24	Sulawesi Utara	6	3	105	253	984	**2.159.787**
25	Sulawesi Tengah	9	1	99	133	1.369	**2.324.025**
26	Sulawesi Selatan	20	3	244	606	1.964	**7.475.882**
27	Sulawesi Tenggara	8	2	117	271	1.342	**1.965.958**
28	Gorontalo	4	1	46	83	364	**916.488**
29	Sulawesi Barat	5	0	44	47	312	**966.535**
30	Maluku	7	1	57	32	842	**1.330.676**
31	Maluku Utara	6	2	45	80	676	**912.209**
32	Papua	19	1	173	81	2.506	**1.841.548**
33	Papua Barat	8	1	74	41	1.154	**566.563**
	Total	**349**	**91**	**5.263**	**7.113**	**62.806**	**220.953.634**

Source: http://www.depdagri.go.id/; 2005

Bali: 'Indomitable Gauls'

In 50 BC a village of indomitable Gauls, the last hold out against the Roman Empire, sharing mutual respect, harmony and understanding ....

October 2008, www.asterix.co.nz/

April 2009, www.lonelyplanet.com

The Bali land area is 5,632, 86 km² and the population density is 557 km². (For an overview see Bakker 1993, Pringle 2003) The following shows the population distribution from 2002 to 2007 according to Balinese regencies. The data set on the religious demography of Bali from 1930 to 2008 is shown in the second table.

Regency / Municipality	2002	2005	2007	Districts (2007)	Village (2007)	Number of Banjar (hamlet)
01. Jembrana	222.243	224 990	264 865	4	51	249
02. Tabanan	555.717	405 484	414 220	10	123	802
03. Badung	581.913	374 377	377 480	6	62	536
04. Gianyar	348.022	383 591	390 698	7	70	545
05. Klungkung	177.343	170 744	175 430	4	59	244
06. Bangli	190.666	211 186	212 496	4	70	343
07.Karangasem	351.321	395 409	427 747	8	77	581
08. Buleleng	556.851	618 076	643 274	9	148	604
09. Denpasar	371.216	463 915	466 670	4	43	402
B A L I	3.355.292	3 247 772	3 372 880	56	703	4 306

BPS of Bali Province, BPS - Statistics of Bali Province, Bali in Figures 2008, (February 2009, http://bali.bps.go.id), Result of Population Registration, 2007, 2005, 2003, (February 2009, http://bali.bps.go.id)

Year	BALI	Hindus	Islam	Buddha	Protestants	Catholics
1930	1,111,000	1,000,000	-	-	-	-
1971	2,120,322	1,978,000	-	-	-	-
1995	2,895,649	2,631,210	275,100	16,037	10,258	11,957
1999	2,960,966	2,734,912	170,930	16,879	22,294	15,951
2000	2,998,770	2,752,131	180,401	21,287	24,652	20,299
2001	3,063,031	2,823,273	183,977	21,550	22,294	24,306
2005	3.572,965	3,296,155	204,436	21,826	25,290	25,258

Suryadinata: 2003; www.bps.go.id; www.bali.bps.go.id; and www.depag.go.id (April 2004 and February 2009)

A feature of the cartoon series *Asterix* and *Obelix* is the magic potion brewed by the Druid Getafix which has thwarted the Roman conquest of the village in investing the villagers temporarily with invincible vigor. By implication, as long as Getafix stays alive, the indomitable Gauls had strength at their disposal that neither the Romans nor any other tribes were capable to defeat. The villagers have shared intricate disputes and were involved in complex internal rivalry of everyday village life, some of them even being traitors; nonetheless the villagers' majority pushed aside these internal quarrels to stand united against invaders. In some respect, the Balinese remind me of the indomitable Gaul's village, as the traditional religio-cultural "core" of ancestor veneration is maintained and continued throughout the ages. This megalithic tradition is somewhat comparable the indomitable Gaul's potion.

Balinese lived religion as an encompassing, holistic way of life until a hundred years ago. As noted above, "religious belief" has been an entity separate from the rest of knowledge, and local rituals have not been conceptualized as components of a distinct and systematic domain. (Smith-Kipp 1987: 23) In any part of the world, contemporary ideas of political and personal liberty cannot be found in the pre-Enlightenment tradition and have taken their present form only relatively recently. (Sen 1997) In 1908, Dutch forces subjugated East Bali, it was the last territory in the then Netherlands India to be incorporated. Since then Balinese culture is undergoing deep (social) changes from a predominantly primary and agrarian culture to technical and knowledge-based home industries. In adapting foreign ideas to their own culture the Balinese have shown unusual logic and an intelligent power of assimilation (Pringle 2004; Covarrubias 1965) or acculturation (Sedyawati 2001).Balinese culture has proven to be very resilient against outside influences and illicit internal uproar, but this resilience decreases due to rapid social change related to modernization and globalization in the last 30 years. (Hitchcock/Dharmaputera 2005)

During the last century, Bali underwent a dual transition from feudalism to capitalism and rule of law, and a rapid and drastic social and economic transition from an agricultural society to a service economy and knowledge society. The Balinese became for the first time in their independent history involved in power relations largely beyond their control following the colonial occupation of their island from 1846 to 1908. (Picard, 2004: 57-9) From 1949 the Balinese kingdoms were incorporated into the Indonesian republic. In the 1950s, the Ministry of Religious Affairs classified the orthoprax Balinese religious traditions (in 1938 the Balinese agreed to term the religious traditions *Agama Hindu Bali*) as belief system and not as a proper religion. This classification excluded the Balinese Hindu community from state-funding and guidance and they were made target of Christian and Muslim proselytizing efforts, but the community was also existentially threatened in the late 1960s when a person having no proper religion automatically was suspected to be a Communist, a dangerous accusation those days that could lead to imprisonment or death.

In consequence, Hindu policy makers re-invented their religion to meet the MORA's definition of a monotheistic creed. (Picard 2004: 57-9; Geertz 1973) Lasting from 1949 to 1963, the acknowledgement process of Indonesian Hindu Dharma was drawn-out and painful to the Balinese and Indonesian Hindus and their efforts to label their orthopraxis were as much "conceptual as political". (Picard 2004) During the Suharto regime (1966-1998) capitalism, developmentalism, and nationalism were propagated and naturalized into the Balinese citizenry through the vehicle of the national educational system. (Parker 2003) In the last decade, reform and democratization led to regional autonomy and the decentralization of administration and education. The traditional value-systems of religion, culture, and *adat* (custom and customary law) have to be broadened for taking up challenges of the modern society in which the traditional community participates. Therefore they had to broaden their conception and relate it with the *Pancasila* state's constitutional and legal framework and with the international community of nation states. In this sense, Schulte-Nordholt (2007: 9) has stated "Religious arguments were instrumental in formulating a Balinese answer and mobilizing an alliance against unwanted outside intrusions". Today, multiculturalism, pluralism, democracy, and human rights are the key themes in the contemporary Hindu education system. As to justify my personal sentiment expressed in the indomitable Gaul's metaphor, in 2001 the working program of the Indonesian Hindu Dharma Council (*Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia,* PHDI), set itself the task of formulating a *bhakti* (devotion or in the Indonesian context following the commands of God) and *sraddha* (faith in God) nurturing program of '*I am proud to be a Hindu*' at the individual, family, and Hindu community level of all social and societal strata. The program shall help Hindus to perform their religious duties properly, to realize Hindu values, and to show and use their Hindu identity in everyday life without hesitation. It is interesting to note in this context that after the demise of the Suharto regime (1966-1998) the strictly ritualistic oriented understanding of Hindu Dharma Indonesia promoted by the Hindu Dharma Council finally extends into new domains as the social field (charity, gender, drug abuse etc) and environmental protection.

PART A

2. Methodology

This section outlines the methods and materials employed in this study. The subject of the study constitutes the emergence, institutionalization, and organization of the Hindu education system in Bali. Three areas of inquiry were identified that translate into research questions, aims, and objectives: 1.) *Pancasila* as a model?; 2.) Institutionalization process of Hindu Dharma Indonesia and the legal framework of religious education; and 3.) a case study at four selected research sites in Bali and Jakarta. In this, the study focuses on specific aspects of how to organize teaching religion in Indonesia. As the legal framework provided the room to maneuver, in which the Balinese reinvented their tradition and operate politically, the study inquires into four basic fields of research:

1. the Indonesian concept of religion, freedom of religion and religious pluralism;
2. the formalization and institutionalization process of Hindu Dharma Indonesia;
3. the formal organization of religious education in national educational policies, and
4. the emergence, organization and operation of the Hindu religious education system.

In consequence, the subject positions the study in the academic disciplines of Religious Studies and Area Studies. The method applied has been ethnography combined with an emic approach and an intrinsic case study.

2.1. Ethnography

As the present study inquires into impacts of the specific Indonesian cultural and political context on religious education and therefore focuses on the constitutional and legal framework of the Hindu class and the Hindu education system in Indonesia, a qualitative research approach was applied. (Heil 2003: 23) Ethnography is a qualitative method employed for collecting empirical data on human communities, societies, and cultures. Cultures, religions, and ethnicities are internally plural, and the symbols and values of their various constituent groups are open to negotiation, contest, and change. (Jackson, 2003: 11) The values and beliefs a religion as cultural system conveys will imprint themselves on each society and person, and influence the choices to be made. In consequence, ethnography aims to understand cultural phenomena, as for example, the material and spiritual culture of ethnic groups, which reflect emic systems of meanings represented in such culturally and ethnically defined groups.

> The ethnographer participates, overtly or covertly, in people's daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions; in fact collecting whatever data are available to throw light on the issues with which he or she is concerned. (Hammersley/Atkinson 1983: 2, in Flick 2007: 53)

Following Hammersley/Atkinson and Chou (2005), who proposes a heuristic approach of data collection, I applied the method of data source triangulation within the ethnographic method (Denzin 1989 in Pickel 2009: 518). This specific type of triangulation concerns "the comparison of data relating to the same phenomenon but deriving from different phases of fieldwork, different points of respondent validation, and accounts of different participants (including the ethnographer) involved in the setting." (Hammersley/Atkinson 1983: 199, in Flick 2007: 52)

In consequence, data source triangulation refers to the collection of data relating to one and the same phenomena under investigation at different points in time (time axis includes a three-step field work), at different locations in space (five different socially and doctrinally embedded institutions in Bali and Jakarta, and by interviewing several experts following a predefined theoretical sampling. (Denzin 1989 in Pickel 2009: 518; Flick 2004, 2007; Strauss/Corbin 1996) In consequence, ethnographic methods are characterized by the collection of relatively unstructured empirical materials, a small number of cases, a writing style and style of analysis that are primarily interpretive, involving descriptions of phenomena. (Atkinson/Hammersley 1994) Based on preexisting theoretical knowledge of the field, data collection is done through literature review, interviews, participant observation, and a questionnaire.

In an intrinsic case study, the study is undertaken because the case, for example instances of phenomena, or social processes, itself is of interest in all its particularity and ordinariness. (Stake 1994: 236) In a single case study approach the researcher examines in detail a single case or instance or process of the phenomenon in question. With regard to the present study, to case selected was Hindu education in the Indonesian province of Bali. By employing an ethnographic methodology and doing an intrinsic case study, I hoped to be able to arrive at a comprehensive data set and preliminary theory about the Hindu class and the Hindu education system in Indonesia in general and Bali in particular. Thus the methods applied in the case study were chosen before and during the ethnographic fieldwork, to match with data gathered, or in other words, methods were subject to data. The emergent data set finally pointed to theories elaborated in Part B.

In this, the present study aims to give a thick description (Geertz 1973) of second-order problems that is the social and legal context[45] (Heimbrock 2001; Heil 2003) of the Hindu class and the Hindu education system in the province of Bali. In this, the primary focus was laid on the constitutional and legal framework as main unit of analysis, in which the Indonesian Hindu community lives and operates Hindu education, therefore the present study did not focus in detail on specific particulars of Balinese history of religion and culture, on which previous scholarship has already produced impressive works.

2.1.1. Ethno-logic

The culture-nature gap denotes the contrasting of culture with instinctual modes of thought and behavior that are not learned, but rather are genetically inherited. (Geertz 1973; Lohmann 2005: 2086-7) If two persons or people belong to the same culture, this means that they interpret the world in roughly the same ways and can express themselves, their thoughts, and feelings about the world, in ways which will be understood by each other, in the same cultural codes. (Hall 1997:4) Culture is said to appear as a sort of optical or perceptual illusion, although always a presence, it can best be seen, when thrown "into relief by the quality of *difference".* (Avruch 1998: 58, emphasis in original; see Woodward 1997; Hall/Du Gay, 1996)

> When two participants or actors meet who have different models for interpreting and dealing with life-problems and when their respective models are backed up in their eyes by some sort of special authority, authenticity, or feeling of rightness that may range all the way from (…) sacred morality to self-evident common sense, then we may begin to speak of cultural differences. (Avruch 1998. 59)

The definition of culture typically implies a distinctive shared perspective or way of life ostensibly held by a sociologically defined group (e.g. religious communities, citizenry in a nation-state or ethnic groups). Culture becomes widely communicated and shared in social groups, and serves as a foundation for general agreement and common acceptance of certain principles and perceptions as valid, normal, and natural. Once cultural ideas are widely shared, they appear to acquire an added aura of truthfulness, supported by apparent mutual confirmation and elaboration.

In this way, the influences of culture are often masked and it is not automatically apparent that one's own views and beliefs are not simply accurate apprehensions of reality, but are, in fact, artificial and, to a degree, arbitrary. As cultural systems place different interpretative lenses between actors and the world, scholars tend to automatically judge observed ways of life - insofar as the observed ways differ from his or her own - through their own cultural lenses in doing ethnographic research. Or, participants to other traditions or cultures tend to look upon their customs and beliefs using their own cultural assumptions, and they can misinterpret and judge both thought and action according to foreign standards. Consequently, cultural systems are a difficult subject to study, because habitual use makes the cultural lenses that one continually wears disappear from awareness, so that what is seen falsely seems to be objective truth. (Lohmann 2005: 2086) In consequence, humans are born into a specific cultural matrix, which means that the entire world already has a individually and socially distributed specific meaning, the cultural lenses, through which the new born persons will orient him/herself, interpret the world and will produce new meaning. New-born humans have to internalize the prevalent social and cultural representational systems in order to be able to participate in the world.

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[45] Context is a combination of time (duration from a specific point) and space (extension in area). Socio-cultural context is understood as a specific combination of time and place in which an individual or a community exists. Context decides how all the things perceived are interpreted. As long as the context of a phenomenon, a person, a community, a ritual, a book and a political idea remains unknown, it is not understood. (Leganger 2001: 58-59) The present study points to a similarity between the concept of context and the Balinese concept of *desa-kala-patra* as both concepts treat the spatio-temporal-situational setting explicitly as foundational to interpretation. The Balinese dictum explains diversity and variation of content and shape in terms of space (*desa,* village), period (*kala*), and situation (*patra*), as both concepts treat the spatio-temporal-situational setting explicitly as foundational to interpretation.

For if two actors meet, who share the same model for dealing with the power asymmetry evident between them, then culture is invisible, part of and buried in the deepest, and in this case shared, context of their encounter. Of course a Harijan stands, when a Brahmin enters the room. It takes an outsider, on who does not share the same schema of millennium-old social and ritual hierarchy we gloss at "caste", to literally *see* (Hindu) culture here. For Hindus, culture is invisible in this encounter because it is simply the way the world is. If the Harijan political activist refuses to stand (…), or if the Brahmin reformer gently urges him not to do so (…), then it is because either or both have imagined another, alternative world. (Avruch 1998: 58/59)

Culturally specific praxis or ethno-praxis describes all techniques utilized by actors on their own will and perceived as meaningful and possible and is linked to culturally specific logics, or "ethno-logics" (Avruch 1998: 92). All cultural systems define social structure and normative orders in that the members of cultural groups (but also the others) are located.Ethno groups are distinguished from other cultural systems through their recourse on and discourse of the fiction of common origin, constituted through language, tradition, religion, social praxis, and descent. As a result**,** ethnicityimplies some degree of identification with an ancestral tradition or a sense of shared 'peoplehood' (Dashefsky 1972, in Jackson 2003: 7), marked by some form of cultural continuity which distinguishes them from other groups around them. As systems of meanings, ethno-cultures are generally ambiguous and therefore continuously subject to negotiation, interpretation, re-definition, revitalization, and innovation. This dynamic perspective acknowledges - albeit maintaining the feature of a shared ancestry – internal variety within an ethnic group and the possibility of ethnic re-formation. Ethnic re-formations occur if groups hitherto marginalized by more powerful groups rediscover and reinvent religious, cultural or ethnic signs and symbols or if groups "redefine themselves in response to influences or pressures from other social groups or institutions" (Jackson 2003: 7). This process was described for Bali as an internal conversion by Geertz (1973) and by Howell (1978; 1982).

Ethnic identity is not a fixed property, but defined contextually depending on insiders' and outsiders' ascriptions. 'Insiders' may also sometimes have an interest in presenting a closed view of their own ethnic group (Jackson 2003: 6). In consequence, ethnic boundaries are socially constructed and changes of these boundaries occur, if one group influences another either positively or negatively. Therefore ethno-cultures and faith-traditions are evolutionary developed behavior and social constructs, and therefore likewise an adaption to the natural surroundings and institutionalized interaction with the social environment.

2.1.2. Emic approach

Based on the actor-centered perspective, the emic strategy provides microscopic and context-specific in-depth analyses and thick descriptions of the object of study at a certain time, space and situation. By identifying, systematizing and utilizing native/indigenous categories, terms and propositions about the subject under study, the emic strategy deals with crucial ideas, conceptions and institutions plus patterns of meaning and social function inherent to that local culture. Emic approaches aim to acquire the meaning of the inter-culturally untranslatable. Only on that base abstraction, a process of inter translatability can proceed, because distilled, locally bound cultural categories are offered to comparison which are then used to generate a theory grounded in data. The ideal concern of the actor-centered (emic) approach is assumed to overcome ethnocentrism by which a scholar is influenced as a result of his or her cultural lenses through the pluralistic perspective, any judgment or cultural bias is withheld in an attempt to understand other ways of life according to its own perspective (Avruch 1998. 58-59; Lohmann 2005: 2089).

The current study analyzed the emic categories of the Indonesian model of rights-based religious pluralism as expressed in the first principle of the state *Ketuhanan Yang Mahaesa* (Principle of One Supreme Godhead), *agama* (essentialist definition of religion) and faith/belief (*kepercayaan*) in order to describe constant processes of intercultural exchanges about shared meanings and values within both Indonesian Hinduism and the *Pancasila*-State. I differentiate between the category of religion used in academic work, various religious traditions and practices, and the term *agama* used in Indonesian legislation, national rhetoric and daily language to denote what is understood as a 'religion' in Indonesia. However, different groups in Indonesia have different interpretations of the term, but the term still connotes a shared interpretation pattern of Indonesians.

2.1.3. The Study of Religion in Indonesia

Following Atkinson's approach (1983: 685), the current study defined religion in the broadest sense as a cultural system through which fundamental problems of existence are expressed and managed[46] (Geertz 1966).This definition of religion transcends the conventional distinction between world religions and traditional religions. With reference to his emphasis on symbols, Geertz defines religion as 1) a system of symbols which acts to 2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by 3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and 4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that 5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic" (Geertz 1973: 90). Systems of symbols are models in his understanding– both models *of* and models *for* (Geertz 1973d:93). In this, systems of symbols act as models of reality and models for reality.

Geertz regards religions as particular cultural solutions to universal problems of meaning. Since problems of meaning are experienced by cultural actors only in the context of social systems, religions as cultural systems are impressed by the institutional conditions of their construction. Basically, religions as cultural systems are to be understood as adaptation to the environment and as devices for survival and reproduction. "Each religious tradition has been influenced by cultural forces which rest in turn upon a complex of geographical, climatic, economic, and political factors." (Hick 1992: 7) The present study analyzed how national religious and educational policies enable the establishment of state funded and private Hindu education system in Bali.

Whereas Hick (1992) and Swami Sivananda (in Prothero 2010: 2) seem to agree that "The fundamentals or essentials of all religions are the same. There is difference only in the non-essentials", Prothero holds to the contrary that "The world's religious rivals do converge when it comes to ethics, but they diverge sharply on doctrine, ritual, mythology, experience, and law. Those differences may not matter to mystics or philosophers of religion, but they matter to ordinary people". How those differences played out in the Indonesian negotiation of religious pluralism and state funded religious education is exemplified in the current study.

> Something is a religion when it shares enough of this DNA to belong to the family of religions. What makes the members of this family different and (themselves) is how they mix and match these dimensions. (Prothero 2010: 13) The world's religious rivals are clearly related, but they are more like second cousins than identical twins. They do not teach the same doctrines. They do not perform the same rituals. And they do not share the same goals. (Prothero 2010: 13)

Talal Asad (1993) identifies two key problems in the definition of religion: it must be universal, but it might not be too broad. Asad suggests that scholars determine what they mean by religion on a case-by-case basis. That is religion and religious traditions should be conceptualized as emic category to describe their particular belief system bound to its respective locally defined community of practice and social and cultural context in which religion is embedded. Thus, the concept of religion has to be properly formulated in order to observe the required (academic, legal, civic, political) purpose at hand. Consequently, the current study applies an emic (actor-centered) approach to analyze the particularity of the Indonesian fusion between state and religion. In order to operationalize the Geertzian definition, I used Prothero's (2010: 14) four-part approach to the religions. Each religion articulates:

- A problem
- A solution to this problem, which also serves as the religious goal;
- A technique (or techniques) for moving from this problem to this solution
- An exemplar (or exemplars) who chart this path from problem to solution

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[46] As the current study employed the anthropological definition of religion, in order to integrate the socio-biologist argument, religion should be interpreted by reference to biological (Boyer 2001, Atran 2004, 2008, Dow 2007) and cultural factors, since culture overlays biological substructures with meaning systems that are both motivating and to a certain degree arbitrary. The human capacity for religious thought and experience has its foundation in the human biological substructure, but it can only come to full expression with cultural inputs and processes as a social structure. Religions contain derivates of experience and systems of knowledge; in this they provide socially transmitted and inherited solutions to life problems (survival and reproduction) and specific ways of life. Despite scholarly differences, both proponents of the anthropological and the socio-biological definition agree in one central point: culture and religion are to be understood as adaptation to the environment and as devices for survival and reproduction. Survival and reproduction of groups are linked with their ability to transmit and to learn knowledge. In this light, culture, religion, and modern educational systems inherit a common basic feature, namely the human ability of adaptive environmental learning. If considered as environmental learning processes to secure survival, then culture, religion and education approximate and unify in their adaptation quality genuine to the human species.

Thus, I applied Prothero's approach to analyze and describe the basic tenets of Indonesian Hindu Dharma as outlined in the Upadeca (Hindu catechism). In Geertz's (1973) analysis of religious rationalization in Bali, he places "Balinese religious creativity in a social context by exploring its economic and political dimensions." (Atkinson 1983: 694)

> It is evident from his analysis that Balinese religion in the 1950s was taking shape through actors' efforts to grapple not so much with ultimate problems of existence as with proximate issues of cultural hegemony in the context of the Muslim-dominated Indonesian nation-state. The fact that their struggle was constituted in religious terms has cultural, institutional, and historical significance. Just as the symbolic dimensions of that struggle cannot be collapsed to its social ones, so too institutional considerations are critical to the study of religious meaning in that case. (Atkinson 1983: 694)

Thus the case of the institutionalization of Indonesian Hinduism shows how a culturally defined religious system owes its shape simultaneously to the cultural constructs and the institutional context in which it is embedded. (Atkinson 1983: 694; Tooker 1996) In addition, Atkinson points to the fact that the Balinese case suggests that "an inclusive definition of religion as a cultural system must not obscure the significance of religion as a historically grounded institution with profound implications for cultural formulations of religion". (Atkinson 1983: 694) Balinese religion is neither a world religion nor an isolated traditional religion. It is a local cultural tradition in encounter with world religious systems. The case of Indonesian Hinduism shows how religious systems are influenced by wider social and cultural systems in which they are embedded.

2.2. Data collection procedures

2.2.1. Materials collected

The procedures used to collect, record, and analyze data based on personal experience (Denzin/Lincoln 1994) and ethnography (Denzin/Lincoln 1994). Due to the assessed lack of academic literature outside Indonesia and the contemporary actuality of the research topic, the ethnographic research design necessitated in a in-depth intrinsic case study, as a suitable methodological procedure for data collecting and theory generation. Having identified the area of research, the phenomenon to be researched and propositional research questions during a preliminary fieldwork in August 2005, I conducted a three-step fieldwork in Denpasar and Jakarta. The preparatory fieldwork was conducted in August 2006. The in depth-case study was conducted in Bali and Jakarta between February 2007 and January 2008. In the end I conducted the final two-month fieldwork to member-check and evaluate the findings in March and April 2008. The following table summarizes a schematic overview of the research steps:

Preparatory Field work	August 2006	Compilation of a preliminary manual for problem focused biographic expert interviews which resulted in the selection of the research locations and a theoretical sampling defining the experts to be interviewed
Extended Field work	February 2007 - January 2008	Fieldwork at all selected research locations, expert interviews, participant observation, data collections, data analysis, coding, data collection (circular), continuous validation and evaluation in the field with the interviewed experts
Evaluation	(March 2008)	Validation and evaluation of my findings with the interviewed experts

After discovering the phenomenon of five state enacted religion classes, I inductively arranged my description of the emergence, institutionalization, and conception of the state funded Hindu class und education system through systematic data collection and analysis/evaluation. In consequence, the study compiles verbal and written data collection procedures to investigate into organizational mechanisms and state policies pertaining to the state funded Hindu class und education system. Data were gathered through textual analysis, participant observation, expert interviews, by studying written policies and documents related to the state funded Hindu class und education system, and by observing how those policies were carried out. Diverse materials were used in the study (Chou 2005; Strauss 1987). Those materials included:

1. Literature review: primary sources (Indonesian laws and regulations as Basic Law, strategic plans, publications of state agencies, development plans, publications of the Ministry of National Education (*Kementerian Pendidikan Nasional*, MONE), publications of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (*Kementerian Agama*, MORA), publications of Institutions where I conducted my case study, eye witness accounts, other documents as newspapers, curricula; census, statistics and statistical data), secondary sources (technical literature, articles in newspapers, books, internet, and scholarly journals), and tertiary sources as dictionaries.
2. Expert interviews in Jakarta and Bali
3. Participation and field observation
4. Questionnaire

Participant observation and expert interviewing were used as strategies to describe the technical knowledge and process knowledge of the Hindu expert group in order to generate a preliminary theory of the current state of Hindu education in the Indonesian province Bali. In a first step, I identified key agencies and key experts operating in the field of Hindu education. The methodology of a predefined theoretical sampling was used to carry out individual interviews, yet the sample has been previously limited to include only professional experts (executives, lecturers, teachers, priests). As intended in the open and circular research design, additional questions appeared during the research process and to answer those questions, more experts from the selected institutions were selected to be interviewed on particular questions and issues. The individual expert interviews were combined with participant observation. Related to that, I regularly participated in workshops on Hindu religious education held by the Directorate General of Hindu Affairs at the MORA aiming to brief and educate officials, teachers, and docents on the latest developments of educational reform and didactical innovation. The following list gives an overview of the workshops I was invited to:

1. Workshop "Orientation on compiling Hindu Tertiary Education's syllabus", (*Orientasi Penyusunan Silabus Perguruan Tinggi Agama Hindu*), held by The Directorate General on the Guidance of Hindu Congregation, MORA at Inna Hotel, Denpasar 15-18.05.2007
2. Workshop "Orientation on Internal brotherhood of Hindu communities in Indonesia" (*Orientasi Kerukunan Intern Umat Beragama Hindu*), held by The Directorate General on the Guidance of Hindu Congregation, MORA at Inna Shindu Beach, Sanur 23-25.05.2007
3. National Seminar: "Hinduism in Modern Indonesia", keynote speaker Dr. M. Ramstedt, held by the World Hindu Youth Organization, *Mahendradat*ta University, Denpasar 03.06.2007
4. Workshop "Orientation on Workforce Evaluation of Hindu Tertiary Education in the Academic Field" (*Orientasi Evaluasi Kinerja Perguruan Tinggi Agama Hindu di Bidang Akademik*), held by The Directorate General on the Guidance of Hindu Congregation, MORA at Inna Shindu Beach, Sanur 04-06.06.2007
5. National Seminar: "Pluralism and India". Keynote speaker Mrs Navrekha Sharma, Ambassador of India to Indonesia, held at the Indonesian Hindu University, Denpasar, Bali 07.08.2007
6. National Seminar: Multiculturalism, Religion, and Ethnicity, held at the Indonesian Hindu University, Denpasar, Bali, 10.08.2007
7. National Seminar "Comprehension and Application of the Curriculum based on the level of educational units enhances the learning process quality" (*Pemahaman dan penerapan kurikulum tingkat satuan pendidikan meningkatkan kualitas pembelajaran*), Indonesian Hindu University, Denpasar, Bali 12.09.2007
8. Yearly assembly of the Indonesian Hindu Dharma Council (Pesamuhan Agung *Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia* Tahun 2007), held by the Indonesian Hindu Dharma Council at Inna Hotel in Denpasar, Commission on Education 03-04.11.2007
9. National Seminar "Social Philosophy in recent context: Study of the increase of societies social illnesses in Bali" (Filsafat Sosial dalam konteks kekinian, kajian terhadap maraknya penyakit social masyarakat), State Hindu Dharma Institute, Denpasar, 16.11.2007
10. Monthly Assembly of Hindu Teachers (*Musyawarah Guru Mata Pelajaran Agama*), SMA 4, Denpasar, 22.11.2007

Finally, I distributed five-page questionnaires to fifteen officials, religious experts, university docents, and teachers containing 35 questions on Hindu religion and religious education, in which the respondents had to fill in short answers. The questionnaire was designed to analyze the opinions on the main tenets and basic beliefs amongst the Hindu elite regarding the necessity of Hindu education.

In portraying the process of emergence and institutionalization of contemporary Indonesian Hindu Dharma and Hindu education, the textual and historical approach uses primary technical (laws, statutes, statistics, development plans, curricula, and textbooks) and non-technical literature from Indonesia, the UN as well as secondary literature from the disciplines of religious and area studies. Textual documents were obtained through either research in libraries (Frankfurt, Hamburg and Leiden), investigated online (Internet) or in the awkward process of gathering small pieces of information at the research sites in Indonesia during the prolonged field work. The introduction of Hindu religious education in public schools and universities is portrayed by using monographs, articles, and collections of statutes and annals of the *Dwijendra* foundation and both universities. The conception of Hindu religious education is described relying on data of the Directorate for the Guidance of the Hindu congregation at the Ministry of Religion and the Balinese Regional Office of Religion.

2.2.2. Sampling

As the current study employed data sources triangulation, data were collected at different points in time, locations in space, and by interviewing several experts following a predefined theoretical sampling. As every researcher gets into the field and processes of data collection and interpretation with preexisting ideas and conceptions of the problem (Strauss 1987; Strauss/Corbin 1996; Flick 2003;Glaser/Strauss 2005), I had developed a preliminary manual for problem-focused but open-ended interviews for this purpose in 2006. In the first step, I conducted three problem-centered biographic interviews in August 2006 and one interview in March 2007. Two modern, secular educated Hindu experts who have considerable influence on the course of Hindu education, and two traditional Brahmins who after turbulent biographies became professional high priests were interviewed.

Those interviews were recorded, transcribed, and textual units were thematically paraphrased irrespective of the sequentiality of statements made by the interviewee during the interview (Meuser/Nagel 2005; 2009). Thereby I gained a first understanding of the field, which provided the background for the selection of the samples of the case, the emergent theoretical sampling, and the consecutive steps of emic conceptualization and theoretical generalization. (Meuser/Nagel 2005; 2009) The following tables gives an overview of the first four problem-focused biographic interviews used as a starting point to develop guiding codes and categories on the Hindu class and Hindu education before going to the next interview or field observation. The following table gives a schematic overview of the problem-centered biographic interviews.

Name	Position	Interview	Location
Ida Pedanda Gede Telabah	Professional High-Priest	26.08.2006 (58min)	In the priestly family compound
I Gede Sura	Retired, active docent	26.08. 2006 (84min)	in his house, at his open air office in front of his library
Ida Pedanda Bajing	Professional High-Priest	29.08.2006 (58min) Member check: 07.03.2007	In the priestly family compound
Prof. Dr. Ida Bagus Gede Yudha Triguna	Director General of Guidance for the Hindu Congregation in the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and President of the Hindu University in Denpasar	15.04. 2007 Protocol (voice recorder did not function)	At the office in Jakarta

Thus, two interviews were conducted with professional high priests, Ida Pedanda Gede Putra Bajing; Geriyah Tegal Jinga, Denpasar, a former village head and known for his diplomatic and political skillfulness, and Prof med. Ida Pedanda Gede Putra Telabah, Denpasar, who studied in India, worked as medical doctor and Professor and currently teaches Hindu theology at the Hindu University. He is known for his reasonable nature and interest in metaphysics and yoga. The second interview I conducted with I Gede Sura, former rector of the *Dwijendra* Foundation and former Rector of State Hindu Dharma Institute, who is regarded by most experts as a "silent" authority in the matters pertaining to the Hindu class. He and a group of teachers are also the architects of the curricula of the informal Hindu Sunday Schools. Lastly, I interviewed Prof Dr Ida Bagus Gede Yudha Triguna, Director General of Hindu Affairs in the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and President of the Indonesian Hindu University in Denpasar. During this important interview, however, my voice recorder did not function and the interview has not been recorded. Fortunately, I experienced such a devastating malfunction only twice during the whole course of field periods in Indonesia (2006-2008).

Remarkably, questioned why they chose to work on the religion or education sector, all interviewees referred to the central role of their fathers influencing their personal choice of profession. As I was interested in the legal context of religious education, and the technical knowledge and process knowledge of the experts, I did not analyze those interview parts that revealed great parts of personal motivation and interest, because they were less relevant for a description of the institutional context of the Hindu class. However, the personal motivations of those actors certainly constitute an interesting field of future research.

With this first step I identified key agencies involved in the field of Hindu education, in other words, the analysis of the first three interviews defined the not representative sample to be studied. Those key agencies were three research sites in Bali's municipality Denpasar: the *Dwijendra* Foundation (*Yayasan Dwijendra*, hereafter YD), the Indonesian Hindu University (*Universitas Hindu Indonesia*, hereafter UNHI) and the State Hindu Dharma Institute (*Institute Hindu Dharma Negeri*, hereafter IHDN) and the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Jakarta. YD and UNHI are institutions operated by a private foundation, which is responsible to the Ministry of Education, whereas IHDN is state-run und therefore under the authority of the Ministry of Religion. In addition, I inquired into the activities of the representational bodies of Indonesian Hindu Dharma related to the organization of HRE, that is on the one hand the Ministry of Religion in Jakarta and its regional branch in Bali as national decision-maker in the organization of HRE and on the other hand the Indonesian Hindu Council as highest civic representative body of Indonesian Hindu Dharma.

Logically, the next step was to allocate experts within those institutions. Consequently, the selection of experts to be interviewed within the predefined sample was guided by theoretical sampling, as further experts were interviewed following a chain approach – if specific information was needed, the respective expert who had the knowledge, the documents or the competences to provide the information and insight, was located, contacted, and interviewed, often on base of the recommendation of another expert. A critical sample was included. The following list provides a schematic overview of the research sample:

1. **Key institutions:** Directorate General of Guidance of the Hindu Congregation at the MORA, the Indonesian Hindu Council, *Dwijendra* Foundation, State Institute of Hindu Dharma, Indonesian Hindu University
2. **Key agents/Experts**: 1.) Representatives of systematization of Hindu Dharma Indonesia, compilation and implementation of the Hindu class curricula; 2.) Teachers and lecturers as professionals of the Hindu class and Hindu education at schools and universities; 3.) Executives and officials as representatives of governmental agencies; 4.) Professional high priests

After the theoretical sampling has been defined, I compiled a manual for problem-focused but open-ended interviews during the preparatory fieldwork in 2006, which constitutes the base of my empirical research. In general, the manual contained six broad areas of investigation

1.) *agama* (religion)
2.) Hindu class and Hindu education system
3.) Hindu curriculum
4.) monotheism
5.) personal experience
6.) the future of the Hindu class and Hindu education system

To each of these broad areas, I added a selection of detailed questions which I posed selectively paying attention to the expert's respective area of expertise. Experts were interviewed because they represent a specific profession or have specific knowledge at their command which they collected through experience in their working area. Contrary to other interview and coding techniques, not the persons or their subjective motivations, but the technical knowledge and the process knowledge of the experts constituted the primary focus of analysis (Bogner 2005; Meuser/Nagel 2005, 2009). Thus, the focus of analysis was laid on their technical knowledge and the process knowledge which enabled me to reconstruct conceptions of causal relations between national legislation and Hindu implementation of those legislations. Subsequent table gives an overview of the expert interviews and the type of data obtained.

	Name	Sex/ Age	Position, Expert-Area	*Period and type of data gathered*
1	**Ida Bagus Dosther**	Male 76	Retired Freedom Fighter of the 1945 generation, founding member of the Hindu Council, former politician and lawyer (District Head of Jembrana District)	*Documents,* *Interview 15.07.2007 at the Publishing House of the Hindu Council with Ida Bagus Djelantik*
2	**Ida Bagus Gede Wiana**	Male 51	Chairman of *Dwijendra* foundation	*Documents, questionnaire, participant observation, two informal interviews 2006-2008* *Interview 29 07 2010* *At his office at the Dwijendra Foundation with his wife*
3	**I Nyoman Sukerda**	Male 52	Head of *Dwijendra* Junior Secondary High School	*Informal interview, Protocol 18.11.2007* *At his office at the Dwijendra Foundation NOV/DEC 2007*
4	**Ni Ketut Sarwi**	Fe-male 45	Hindu teacher at *Dwijendra* elementary school	*Participant observation in class at Dwijendra elementary school, informal interviews, documents, textbooks, Questionnaire* *NOV/DEC 2007*
5	**Ny Gusti Ayu Kartika**	Fe-male 44	Hindu teacher *Dwijendra* Senior Secondary High School	*documents, textbooks, informal interviews, protocol, questionnaire, participant observation in religion class and teacher assembly* *NOV/DEC 2007,*
6	**I Gede Agus Jaya Negara**	Male 26	Hindu teacher *Dwijendra* Senior Secondary High School	*documents, textbooks, informal interviewing, protocol, questionnaire, participant observation in religion class* *NOV/DEC 2007*
7	**I Gede Rudia Adiputra**	Male 42	Rector at State Hindu Dharma Institute, worked at the MORA in Jakarta	*Interview 16.08.2006; 18.12.2007* *Documents, questionnaire, participant observation, informal interviews* *At his office at the State Hindu Dharma Institute*
8	**Prof Dr I Made Titib**	Male 56	Dean of Brahma Widya (theological faculty) at State Hindu Dharma Institute Studied Hindu theology in India, former PHDI representative	*Interview 03.12.2007; 18.12.2007* *Documents, Protocol, Participant observation at his office at the State Hindu Dharma Institute*
9	**Dr I Ketut Widnya**	Male 43	Head of the IHDN Master Studies program Studied Hindu theology in India, former PHDI representative	*Questionnaire, Informal interviewing 2007-2008*
10	**Dr I Ketut Tanu**	Male 41	Head of Master Studies in Pedagogy of Religion at State Hindu Dharma Institute	*Interview 27.11.2007 at his office at the State Hindu Dharma Institute, documents, questionnaire*
11	**I Made Girinatha**	Male 41	Head of Dharma Duta (Teacher training) faculty State Hindu Dharma Institute	*Interview 3.12.2007 at his office at the State Hindu Dharma Institute, questionnaire*
12	**I Made Suweta**	-	Assistant I to the Dean of Dharma Duta faculty State Hindu Dharma Institute	*Questionnaire*
13	**Prof Dr IB Gd Yudha Triguna Jakarta/Bali**	Male 50	General Director for the Guidance of the Hindu Congregation, MORA; President of Indonesian Hindu University	*1998-2009, Documents, questionnaire, participant observations at MORA, Indoensian Hindu University several informal interviewing during lunch and at campus, participant observation*
14	**Prof Dr Cokorda Rai Sudharta**	Male 68	Head of the Master Study program at Indonesian Hindu University	*Interview 18.07.2008 in his office at Indonesian Hindu University*
15	**I Wayan Sukayasa**	Male 46	Dean of the Faculty of Pedagogy of Religion Indonesian Hindu University	*Interview:07.12 2007 in his office at Indonesian Hindu University*
16	**I Wayan Budi Utama MA**	Male 49	Lecturer at Indonesian Hindu University	*Documents, informal interviewing, discussions at campus UNHI*
17	**I Made Sujana**	Male 54	Director of Religious Education at the Hindu Directorate at MORA, Jakarta	*Interview 26.04.2007; 14.05.2007 (protocol): 07.09.2007, Documents, participant observation, questionnaire, in his office at MORA and workshops*
18	**I Ketut Lancar**	Male 57	Sub-director of Management at the Hindu Directorate at MORA, Jakarta	*13.05.200, Protocol in his office at MORA and workshops*
19	**I Made Santika**	Male 42	Head of the Curricular section at the Directorate of Religious Education at the Hindu Directorate at at MORA, Jakarta	*Interview: 22. 04. 2007; 13.05.2007, 05.09.2007* *Documents, participant observation, informal interviewing, discussions, questionnaire, in his office at MORA and workshops*
20	**I Made Suma**	Male 44	Planning office at the Hindu Directorate at MORA, Jakarta	*Interview:17.03.2008 in his office at MORA and workshops*

21	I Made Sutresna MA	Male 44	Planning office at the Hindu Directorate at MORA, Jakarta	*Interview: 17.03.2008 in his office at MORA and workshops*
22	I Putu Suhartana	Male 37	Official in the Information section at the Hindu Directorate at MORA, Jakarta	*questionnaire*
23	I Gusti Ketut Suka Yasa	Male 52	Head of the Regional Office of Religion in Bali (former Head of the Hindu affairs section at MORA, Jakarta)	*Questionnaire, Informal interviewing during workshops*
24	I Nyoman Suwastika MA	Male 47	Head of the Hindu pedagogy section at the Regional Office of Religion in Bali	*Interview: 17. 12. 2007*
25	Dr. Belen	Male/ 54	Ministry of Education **Jakarta**	*Interview 10.12.2007, during a workshop held by MORA, in his hotel room*
36	Prof Dr Ny Luh Suryani	Female 57	Psychatrist	*Protocol 26.07.2006*
37	Prof Dr Phalgunadi	Male 60	Lecturer at UNHI Indian scholarship, studied Hindu theology in India	*2005 Protocol, Informal interviewing*

2.2.3. Data analysis

The present study employed the 6-step-data-analysis strategy of Meuser and Nagel (2005: 83-90; 2009: 476-477). All interviews were conducted in Indonesian language with individual experts, not with focus groups. In the data set all 18 questionnaires and interviews are included. The interviews have a duration time between 45 and 2 hours. The first step of data analysis is transcription. Whereas Meuser and Nagel propose a partial transcription only of important passages within the interview, the interviews have been transcribed fully by Ny Putu Dharma Sri. Breaks in speech, and non-verbal elements of communication were not included in the transcription. The interviews were conducted and transcribed in Indonesian, but paraphrasing and coding was done in English. Quotations have been translated into English. Paraphrasing constitutes the second step of analysis during which I described the technical knowledge or process knowledge of the expert in my own words. Thereby I ordered the interview transcript sequentially into thematic units. The process of paraphrasing followed the sequentiality of the interview. The paraphrasing process aims to exclude emotional and subjective contents of the interview, in order to filter out the technical and process knowledge and reduce the information to factual knowledge relevant to reconstruct the conceptions of causal relations between national legislation and implementation of those legislations within the Hindu congregation.

The third step is coding of one particular interview. Coding refers to a grouping of the paraphrases I constructed out of one particular interview under certain headings which comprise thematically the contents contained in the paraphrases. In other words, coding refers to a concise summarizing of the paraphrases constructed in one interview under one or more headings/codes in order to achieve increased theoretical sensibility and theoretical saturation of the data material pertaining to the Hindu class. This type of coding provided me with a summarizing account of the legal framework, factual information provided by the interviewees and related conceptual frameworks and terms used by the experts or applied in legislation, operation and institutionalization of the Hindu class. During coding, the sequentiality of the interview paraphrases is eliminated because not the individual experts but their knowledge constitutes the focus of analysis. During this process in-vivo codes (Strauss/Corbin 1996) emerged. In vivo-codes denote the terms the experts used themselves during interviewing or terms which are applied in legislation.

The forth step constitutes thematic comparison between the codes constructed in the process of coding the individual interviews. Therefore, thematic comparison is similar to the process of data analysis during the coding process of individual interviews, but it transcends this process, as thematic comparison groups together the codes of the individual interviews and the particular headings are unified. Thus, thematic comparison constitutes the first step of abstraction from the data material. During thematic comparisons the data set increasingly becomes more dense and saturated, but particular information may be lost or neglected, therefore I paid special attention to the headings constructed and evaluated those codes continuously in the field during member checks. During this step, I remained close to the factual information provided in the interviews and the in-vivo codes.

The fifth step refers to a conceptualizing of the constructed codes and in-vivo codes and a conceptualization of those codes while recurring to my own theoretical knowledge of the field and existing studies. The development of theoretic conceptualizations helps to generate a preliminary theory of the field, but its generalization capacity remains restricted to the empirical data set and the specific research area under investigation. (Strauss 1998) The sixth step refers to theoretical generalization – the empirical data set constructed out of literature, legal documents, interviews, the questionnaire, and participant observation is related to existing theories and is formulated as a preliminary theory of the Hindu class and Hindu education in Indonesia.

2.2.4. Role of researcher

After addressing more specifically the techniques employed, it is relevant to examine the role of the researcher in ethnographic research and conducting interviews. (Bogner/Menz 2005: 47-63) As basic elements of field work, Fontana/Frey (1994: 366-368) enlist following criteria: 1.) understanding the language, 2.) access and entry to the field, 3.) deciding how to present oneself, 4.) locating an informant, 5.) gaining trust and establishing rapport. In this section I discuss in how far enlisted criteria were met.

As minimum requirement, Chou (2006) has recommended, for becoming a researcher on Indonesia, one must necessarily include a good mastery of *bahasa Indonesia*, the Indonesian vernacular, and an extended period of residence among the people themselves. "Intimate knowledge of a people and of a place cannot be gained otherwise". (Chou, 2006: 133) "It is on the basis of such intimate knowledge that meaningful comparison, conceptual innovation, and theoretical sophistication can ultimately be made". (Chou 2006: 133) Observers who place themselves in the same situations as their subjects will gain a deeper existential understanding of the world as the members see and feel it. (Adler/Adler 1994: 386) In this sense, empathy is the skill to share and understand emotions of other human beings by experiencing what the other person is feeling in ethnographic research.

Strauss and Corbin (1985) pointed to the necessity of theoretical sensitivity in qualitative research. Theoretical sensitivity is a personal quality of a scholar, who is well grounded in the technical literature as well as from professional and personal experience in the research area, and this sensitivity is also acquired during the research process through continual collection and analyses of data. As a sworn translator of Indonesian language having graduated in Southeast Asian studies and having long-term field experience, I brought the necessary command of language, theoretical sensitivity, and empathy and did not encounter problems of translation, neither linguistically or inter-culturally.

I agree with Martin Ramstedt (1998: 3), who observes that the prolonged process of enculturation imposed on the child and the outsider to Balinese culture appears to serve as an effective protective mechanism of their cultural capital. In addition, he observes a modern mode or style of the traditional *ajawera*[47] in the Balinese elite, who seems to equate cultural knowledge with power. Ramstedt is right insofar that "insider" Balinese often face difficulties to share socio-religious knowledge with "outsiders" on a mutual and profitless basis. This abyss between *Jaba* (outsider, peasant) and *Jero* (insider, clergy and royalty) among the academia seems to be legitimized by tradition, but also by the continuous exploitation of Balinese culture and religion by international, national and local elites and scholars to attract foreign investment, tourists and enhance expenditures.

Fortunately, I discovered in the previous periods of field work in Bali, that there are four keys to obtain more or less free access to Balinese sources, textual or experts: 1.) mastery of Balinese language, especially the polite language level, 2.) common religious practice, in other words, being Hindu or being able to practice Balinese Hinduism, 3.) possessing a fair amount of intercultural competencies and social capital plus humor in order to display refined proper conduct acceptable to Balinese, - especially in the context of expert interviewing – having mastery of technical terms and professional knowledge (Bogner/Menz 2005: 62-63) and 4.) the will to barter knowledge and information ("*Informationshandel*"; Bogner/Menz 2005: 62-63). I failed to fulfill the first condition, but I consider myself to have fulfilled all subsequent requirements. As I seem able to swap between a Western and an Indonesian identity, this ability gained me access into the corridors of religious power in Jakarta and Bali, as well as into the homes of Balinese nobility and commoners. At the same time, in order not to "go native"; I remained an outsider retaining a degree of skepticism and criticism in keeping balance between the emic and the etic perspective. (Flick 2003; Pickel 2009)

The access to informants is usually somewhat difficult, even impossible in certain cases, because religion is considered to be a hot and sensitive topic in Indonesia, as the following two quotations shall demonstrate,

> It is not that religion is a new topic for academic reflection in Southeast Asian universities, but the widespread view that it is currently a 'hot' topic.(Robinson: 2008, 148)

> Indonesia's Religious Affairs Ministry declined to make the official who is qualified to respond on church permits available for an interview. In general, Jakarta prefers not to comment on the sensitive subject of religion. (Tom Wright: 2008[48])

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[47] In the socio-cultural perspective, *ajawera* denotes the traditional monopolization of textual sources in Bali by 'twice born' Hindus. (Hinzeler 1993)
[48] Wright, 2008, Improbable Houses of Worship, (Nov 2008, http://online.wsj.com)

From the onset with relevance to access and entry to the field, I could rely on a secure academic network in Bali and Jakarta because I had previously studied and done field work in Bali (1998-2006). With Prof Dr Yudha Triguna acting as supervisor an excellent access to the officials in the Ministry of Religious Affairs is given, only at the beginning I encountered minor problems not worth mentioning in gathering data, when not all experts were acquainted with me. As I spent one month at the backroom of Prof Yudha Triguna's office in the Ministry of Religious Affairs, I gained access to the Ministry's corridors and book cases. The study thus was heavily supported by officials of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, who provided innumerous valuable data and invited me to participate in several workshops, without these data this study would not have been possible to conduct. When I was invited to participate in six orientation workshops held by the Ministry of Religion, I had immediate access to all actors in the field.

During one workshop I arrived late, when I entered the meeting room, Prof Yudha Triguna already delivered his opening address. Silently I sat down, took my field notebook and a pen, while paying immediate attention to Prof Yudha Triguna's address. Immediately all eyes focused on me, a white politely dressed Caucasian women, a stray tourist probably? Reacting to the confusion, he interrupted, and pointed at me while saying: "This lady is from Germany, she is my PhD student, and she works on the Hindu class. I guess, some of you might already know her; there is no need to be suspicious, she is no spy, no journalist, and no subversive element. I advise you all, if she has questions, to cooperate and to answer these questions." Thus, after I had been introduced as co-expert from another culture of knowledge (Bogner/Menz 2005: 63), and after attaining several two-day orientation workshops, the Balinese experts became acquainted with me, and information was easily accessible and shared. In consequence, following my introduction as a co-expert from another culture of knowledge (Bogner/Menz 2005) and trust and rapport were established.

During the long term fieldwork, all of the persons I interacted with welcomed me heartily after they had recognized me as co-expert from Europe (Bogner/Menz 2005: 43-63). The participants were open and comforting and seemed just to wait to tell their knowledge and to share information, as it was the case at all institutions. Since I could thus rely on a secure academic network in Bali and Jakarta, all participants agreed to cooperate and were therefore easily recruited but often also informally met on the campus, or appointments were made and then I conducted the interview. Or I contacted experts by phone and conducted the interviews at the educational institutes.

This paragraph gives an example of the interaction between me and my interviewees. Having just arrived at the MORA in Jakarta in April 2007, I was very just eager to grasp some new information or pieces of the Hindu class puzzle. The secretary of Prof Yudha Triguna guided my way through the Directorate toward the Section of the Hindu Education. Requested to sit down in an office, I waited for the Head of the Section, Mr Sujana. Immediately I spotted an overloaded book case and as there was nothing to do except waiting, I explored curiously into its contents. Usually, such overloaded book cases in Indonesian offices and Ministries are an ambiguous case as they contain dusty old information material, but more than seldom recently printed books. In consequence, I was surprised that this very book case contained a few very valuable books for my study which I borrowed, jubilant having found valuable information. After waiting half an hour, I was told that the Head of the Section would be busy today and be back only tomorrow. Therefore I borrowed the books without permission and let them being copied in the evening. The next day, I walked back to the office to interview Mr Sujana. After the interview I remembered the borrowed books and informed Mr Sujana that I am going to return them in the next day. Mr Sujana became a bit nervous asking which books I borrowed and when. So I told him about yesterday's event. Then he informed me that this would be his private well managed book case and he would feel unhappy if the collection would be reduced. Of course I promised to return his books in immaculate shape the next morning, admitting having over reacted out of mere eagerness. This time Mr Sujana was bright and since then ever friendly, attentive and supporting.

Besides problems of translation, access, and entry, my status asfemale foreignerneeds to be addressed. Age, sex, and all other attributes of a person determine the ambit of the researcher's access into the object of investigation. I need to mention that most of the interviewees were male and above 40 years old. This bias is not due to my preference for male respondents, but because 1.) women are underrepresented in the bureaucratic and religious education sector and 2.) I did not pay attention to gender balance in the study. Hence, a slight gendered flaw and bias might be represented in the data.

In general, if my expert sample understood that I am not only entrusted with a research permit and considerable conceptual knowledge plus appreciate their academic expertise and consider it to be exemplarily, they soon "warmed up" because they seemed to feel comforted by the way I presented myself. In locating an informant, I had to ask the experts in detail, - or in other words I had to knew in advance, what expertise and what expert knowledge they must have, and what where the critical issues within their expertise. Then I had to ask specifically whether I did understand a particular fact properly, whether this is the crux of the matter or not, for example, how is funding organized? Mostly in this situation the expert would explain a fact most likely uncritically.

3. Terms and definitions

The applied concept of religion as cultural system shall demonstrate the social particularity of the *Pancasila*-state and its practice of negotiating and constructing national culture. As culture, the academic category of religion, and several different religious traditions are social phenomena, which are socially constructed (Scheifinger 2009: 3) That is, the meanings attributed to both the category of religion and to various religions are not fixed, and instead are constantly negotiated. This is particularly important because the constant renegotiation of meanings is especially the case within both Hinduism and the *Pancasila*-State, because of their particular diversity.

> In the United States, religion matters. (…) Faith remains so vibrant, in fact, that any attempt to understand the nation without understanding its believers is bound to fail. If you want to know what moves America, you need to know what moves Americans. And here a prime mover is God in many guises, religion in its many manifestations. (Prothero 2006: 1)

This observation certainly holds true for Indonesia, as the present study hopes to demonstrate, and therefore, the ethnographic method necessitates an emic approach. To understand how Balinese ideas about religion as a solution to life problems (Prothero 2010) have been formulated in response to national religious principles (civil religion and public Islam), it is necessary to look at Indonesian civil religion and public Islam itself as the outcome of a series of intercultural exchanges. This point is demonstrated here by an examination of implementing state funded religious education among the Hindu community in Bali, Indonesia. As has been demonstrated, Indonesia can serve as example for the continuing negotiation of values and meaning.

3.1. The study of religion as cultural system

What counts as religion remains a fundamental question, because religions hold enormous potential for peace and reconciliation, but they are concomitantly a source of tremendous conflict and tension, thereby exhibiting a "Janus face" (Casanova 1994: 4). The complexity and difficulty of defining religion are illustrated by vivid debates of academics in philosophy and religion. For the purpose of the present study, religion is understood as cultural system. Overlaying biological substructures, religion as cultural system is socially constructed according to human needs in discursive processes in a particular historical context. The values and beliefs a religion conveys will imprint themselves on each society via the channels of cultural transmission and socialization."A religion is a complex of human activity, involving many elements. These elements are sometimes listed as (McCann 2006: 917)

> 1. Creed: what religious people believe
> 2. Cult: how religious people worship
> 3. Code: how religious people live
> 4. Community: how religious people associate with each other
> 5. Consciousness: how religious people experience life
> 6. Culture: How religious people express human, civic, and social identity

McCann (2006: 917) states "Different world religions lay special emphasis on one or other of these elements, though not generally to the exclusion of others".

3.1.1. Definition of Culture

The anthropological definition of culture refers to the universal human capacity to order and communicate experiences materially and symbolically. Geertz (1973: 89) provides a classical definition of culture:

> [A]n historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.

The current study uses the term culture to describe shared meanings of a sociologically defined group and puts emphasis on process and practices. These shared meanings organize and regulate social practices, influence conduct and consequently have real-practical effects, since concerns about meaning typify human behavior far back into prehistory and therefore meaning is related to values. According to the social-constructionist and pragmatic definition[49], in its most basic sense culture is the shared experience and value system of a group, the aspect of thought and behavior that is learned and capable of being taught to others. Values as evaluative standards represent stable, long lasting beliefs that help to structure behavior (Mariappanadar 2005: 31-48).

> Cultures consists of the derivatives of experience, more or less organized, learned or created by the individuals of a population, including images or encodements and their interpretations (meanings) transmitted from past generations to contemporaries, or formed by individuals themselves. (Theodore Schwartz 1992: 324; in Avruch 1998: 17)

Schwartz' pragmatist definition connects culture to experience – to interpreted social action and to practice. The definition addresses the structure, agency, and interaction question by noting that individuals not only inherit and learn these images from the past and from contemporaries, but are able to create new images by themselves (Avruch 1998: 17) and share them with others, thereby changing the images. The ability to learn and to socially transmit information and knowledge has been described as a non-genetic survival strategy for groups or societies (Clifford Geertz 1973; Norris and Inglehard: 2003). In fact, cultural practices may be interpreted as culturally predefined systems of representation that enable to coordinate activities. Avruch (1998; Lohmann 2005: 2087) have identified five inadequate ideas about culture, which are enlisted in the left column, the right column shows the working definition employed.

Five inadequate ideas	Working-definition
culture is holistic, homogenous, coherent	Culture is adaptive, fragmented, contextual, and subject to change, the notion of subcultures is needed
culture is a thing	Culture is a process and a set of practices
culture is uniformly distributed among members of a group	Culture is socially unevenly distributed and never perfectly shared by individuals in a population (socio-genetic and psycho-genetic)
an individual possesses a single culture	Culture is psychologically unevenly distributed. Individuals participate in several sub-cultures.
culture is a custom, functionally integrated and structurally undifferentiated	Culture is functionally in a constant state of flux, integration and disintegration, structurally flexible and responsive
culture is timeless, or ahistoric	Culture is historic and contextual

Avruch (1998) distincts between generic and local culture: Generic culture refers to "universal attributes of human behavior - to human nature; it denotes a species-specific attribute of *Homo Sapiens*, an adaptive feature of human beings for at least a million years". (Avruch 1998: 10; emphasis in original) Generic culture provides for and generates the base of local culture; whereas local cultural matrixes are highly specific. Local culture refers to complex systems of particular meanings (representational systems) created, shared, experienced, and socially inherited by individuals in particular social groups. As a result, local cultures provide different solutions to life problems and consequently produce distinct social practices, thereby deferring to diversity, difference, and particularity. The present work interprets local cultures as socially transmitted solutions to life problems, which are situational, flexible, and responsive to the ever-changing environments.

Culture[50] is involved in all those practices which are not simply genetically programmed into us but which carry meaning and value for us, which need to be meaningfully interpreted by others, or which depend on meaning for their effective operation. Meanings regulate and organize cultural conduct and practices – they help to set rules, norms, and conventions by which social life is ordered and governed.

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[49] The semantic dimension deals with mere meaning and the syntactic dimension with word order and consequences for meaning, hence the pragmatic dimensions of language usage deals with the way a word is actually used in certain speech contexts. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines pragmatism as a 'philosophical movement that includes those who claim that an ideology or proposition is true if it works satisfactorily, that the meaning of a proposition is to be found in the practical consequences of accepting it, and that unpractical ideas are to be rejected'. (http://www.iep.utm.edu/; August.2008)
[50] The subsequent paragraphs draw from Geertz 1973; Wagner/Hayes 2005; Hall 1997: 1-37; Avruch: 1998; Lohmann 2005: 2086 , Mariappanadar 2005: 3-5

The focus on shared meanings and interpretation patterns does not imply a unitary system of meaning, because in any culture always exists a great diversity of meanings about any topic, and more than one way of interpreting or representing it. Meanings (representational systems) are never objective, but are always the result of the instantaneous and creative relation between a person and their environment. Hence, culture is socially constructed and representational systems are cultural and subject to negotiation and change.

The pragmatic approach does not focus on one specific set of practices, instead it tries to grasp how learned representations and values transform into actions and competences, necessary to participate in today's world. Because things in themselves do not have one single, fixed and unchanging meaning, culture depends on its individual members, who give meaning to things, people, objects and events. They interpret the world in broadly similar ways; they constantly produce and exchange meaning in every personal and social interaction.Culture is therefore a process, a set of practices and interpretational patterns. Consequently, culture is seen as simultaneously located outside (sociologically) and inside individuals (psychologically). In emphasizing the concept of experience in understanding human existence, the pragmatist perspective understands culture as derivative of experience and as social practice. Systems of representations are differentially internalized by individuals; thus culture is psychologically and socially unevenly distributed within a population, no matter how this population is sociologically defined.

Cultures and sub cultures mould thevaluesof the individuals and groups and those values influence the individual's and group's perceptions and decisions. Hence a change in the material or economic environment causes a process in which mental representations are negotiated resulting in an adjustment of meaning, values and social order and social institutions. As a result, as mere cognitive structures, representational systems are linked through culture's causal force with the interaction of the actors, with their social practices, because the content of representations motivates actors to act, thus the socially and culturally embedded systems of representation are psychologically motivational. That is to say that culture is rooted deeply in ongoing or past social practice, and the more deeply representations are internalized and affectively loaded, the more they are able to motivate action that is culture is causal. (Avruch, 1998: 19)

Cultures are subject to change, because they are located in a certain context (time and space) and at a specific point in history. Accordingly, Avruch has conceptualized culture not as a single unchanging homogeneous complex, but as consisting of many subcultures[51], to change or redefine subcultures means to change culture's meta-reference frame or the reverse. Culture includes sets of practices (customs, traditions) and worldviews that provide a mental model (representations) of reality and a guide for appropriate and moral action. The system of representation –as derivative of experience - is closely tied up with both identity and knowledge. Precisely because identities are constructed within, not outside, discourse, we need to understand them as produced in specific historical and institutional sites by specific enunciative strategies. (Hall, 1996: 4) Representational systems and discourses produce identities, of whom we are and with whom we 'belong' – so it is tied up with the question of how culture is used to mark out and maintain identitywithin and difference between groups. (Hall, 1997: 3)

In general two possible perspectives on identity can be discriminated: the essentialist and non-essentialist. (Woodward 1996: 11) Essentialist definition of identity would suggest that there is one clear authentic set of characteristics which all Indonesians or Balinese share and which do not alter across time. A non-essentialist definition focuses on differences, as well as common or shared characteristics between two socially defined groups. The non-essentialist claims postulates that identities are fluid, having different elements which can be reconstructed in new cultural conditions (Woodward, 1996: 26). The concept of identity I deploy here is a non-essentialist, 'a strategic and positional one' (Hall, 1996: 3), as identities are assumed to be contextual and contested.

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[51] Thus, no population can be adequately characterized as a single culture or by a single cultural descriptor. (…) (T)he more complexly organized a population is on sociological grounds, the more complex its cultural mappings appear. This is why the notion of subculture(s) is needed. (…) Insofar as two individuals do not share the same sociological location in a given population (the same class, religious, regional or ethnic background), and insofar as these locations entail (sub) cultural differences, then the two individuals cannot share all cultural content perfectly. (Avruch 1998: 18-19)

The concept of identity is relational, and difference is established by symbolic marking in relation to others. Identity is also maintained through social and material conditions (Woodward, 1996: 12; emphasis in original). The social and symbolic refer to two different processes but each is necessary for the marking and maintaining of identities. Identity politics constitute one dimension of the discursive process in constructing social (religious, ethnic, cultural, national) identities. The celebration of the group's uniqueness, which is the basis of its political solidarity, can be translated into essentialist claims. There are different ways of understanding uniqueness: it may involve appeals to biologically given features of identity; to history and kinship. (Woodward 1996: 24)

Representational systems are cultural in consequence. If the relationship between a signifier and a signified is the result of a system of social convention specific to each society and to specific historical moments – then all representational systems are produced within history and culture. They can never be finally fixed but are always subject to change, both from one cultural context and from one period to another. Instead of having a distinct and fixed cultural identity, individuals, and groups identify with elements of culture, or synthesize new culture through bringing different elements together (Jackson, 2003: 10). The internalization of representation systems in societies, subgroups, and individuals varies. The individual may participate in several cultural systems and subcultures, expressed in certain groups, and respective concepts and ideas hold may be contradictory or irreconcilable. This allows for the individual cultural distance to use cultural patterns on purpose.

Although allowing a wide variation of interpretations, these representational systems are not totally arbitrary, because they need to enable practical interactions with the surrounding context. That is to say, as a result culture is adaptive. Yet, all adaptation to reality is induced by human needs. (Wagner/Hayes, 2005: 66, quoting Wygotski, 1971: 46) Because generic and local culture are connected through this adaptation mechanism, the adaptive quality of culture enables humans to adapt to always changing environments and transports socially inherited and tested solutions to life's issues. Then there is no universal logic as basic solution, but context-related logic, a fluid and fuzzy logicof culture (Avruch 1998:36; Wagner/Hayes, 2005: 73; Nesbitt 2006: 389).

The present study conceptualizes culture as underlying cognitive and social reference system providing interpretation patterns for the majority of a given social group. A precondition for these interpretation patterns to function is their compatibility amongst the members of a social group. Only if there is expected reciprocal predictability of acts among members of a group, the social group shares a common predictable interpretation pattern. Therefore, all members of the socio-cultural group under investigation including members of minority, sub-cultural or alternative cultural systems need to equally recognize, accept, and understand the specific predominant interpretational pattern represented. Only under the condition of such compatibility, defined as expected reciprocal predictability of acts among the members of a social group, such interpretation patterns provide the motivation or need for action and likewise the proper understanding of such actions.

3.1.2. The quest for a definition of religion

The complexity and the difficulty of defining religion and belief are illustrated by 1.) scholarly debates, and, at a more pragmatic level, 2.) problems in the definition of religion in either constitutions that regulate the relation between religion and state, or for legal purposes, and 3.) the ongoing history of the protection of freedom of religion in the context of international human rights[52]. With regard to legal purposes, the UN proposes a broad understanding of religion including naturalistic worldviews indicating "no legal definition of religion has yet garnered a consensus" (Gunn 2003: 191, 193) and "no convincing general theory of religion exists" (Gunn 2003: 193). Religion or belief is said to encompass "theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs", as the Covenant reassures unequivocally the right not to profess any religion or belief. Therefore Jeremy Gunn has indicated a difficulty in the term's usage for legal purposes.

The question what is religion has been endlessly discussed, those debates show how both the category 'religion' and faith traditions are socially constructed. (Scheifinger 2009: 3) As culture, the academic category of religion and several different religious traditions are conceptualized here as social phenomena[53]. Following Nesbitt (2006: 389), I use the term religion and faith interchangeably, but since they do not exactly share the same meaning, I employ the terms 'faith traditions' and 'religious tradition' to suggest a less "bounded and reified" property them the term 'religion' commonly denotes. An interpretation of religion must explain the plurality of historical channels of thought and imagination formed by religio-cultural traditions. (Hick 1992: 2) "[T]here is no consensus, perhaps there will never be, as to what counts as religion". (Casanova 1994: 26).

Hick (1992: 5) suggests that "religion takes such widely different forms and is interpreted in such widely different ways that it cannot be adequately defined but only described". According to Talal Asad, it is thus required for scholars to determine what they mean by religion on a case-by-case basis. "There cannot be a universal definition of religion, not only because its constituent elements and relationships are historically specific, but because that definition is itself the historical product of discursive processes" (Asad 1993: 29). Thus, Asad (1993) proposes a description of religion on a case-to-case basis and not a universal definition. The present study conceptualizes religion as cultural system providing solutions to life problems. (Geertz 1973; Prothero 2010)

The modern concept of religion is a European, North American, and particularly a Protestant[54] attempt to negotiate diversity (Alles 2005: 7703), since modern Western thinking derives its conceptions of the category 'religion' and 'religious traditions' mainly from the European post-Enlightenment tradition (Jackson, 2003: 8; Bowen, 2005: 25-6; Alles, 2005: 7703). The concept was used to delineate groups within Christianity and to classify and encompass what were perceived to be equivalent phenomena in non-Christian cultures encountered by the West in the colonial period (Jackson, 2003: 8).

By the eighteenth century, treatises on religions of the world began to appear, thereby introducing the concept of religious pluralism. Consequently, "(t)he plural "religions" is possible only when one thinks of religion as a cultural system rather than a person one" (Bowen, 2005: 26). "(T)he processes of defining 'other' religions reflected the unequal power relationship between indigenous peoples and European colonialist writers". (Jackson, 2003: 8) During the nineteenth century, "the term 'religion' also changed to include the history of 'religions', and most of the modern names for religions were coined". (Jackson, 2003: 8).

The emergence of the idea of religion as a distinct sphere of life having a universal essence (universal core of religion) heralded the beginning of the reification of religion (Jackson, 2003: 8; Alles, 2005: 7703; Bowen, 2005: 25-6). Both concepts of a 'religion' and 'generic religion' were held to embody an essence (Jackson, 2003: 8). This essentialist view of religion was perpetuated in the phenomenology of religion. Thus a methodology emerged for identifying and classifying 'essences' in particular religions and in religion generally. (Jackson, 2003: 8). The phenomenology of religion had a great influence on the development of comparative religion and religious studies in higher education (Jackson, 2003: 8).

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[52] There was one major international effort to explain the underlying rights protected under the concept of religion: The 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. In addition the UN Human Rights Committee issued General Comment No. 22 on article 18 on the scope of freedom of religion and belief within the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1993

[53] For an excellent overview of the genesis of the term religion and the institutionalization of the study of religion in a global perspective see Alles (ed.). 2008. *Religious Studies. A global View*. London and New York: Routledge

[54] In the eighteenth century the Protestant reformist idea of *religio* as personal piety was largely displaced by a concept of religion as systematic, intellectual and 'exterior', in which religions were regarded as belief systems. (Smith 1978, in Jackson 2003: 8) The idea of religion as a system of beliefs, as opposed to personal piety, did not take hold until the seventeenth century. (Bowen 2005: 25-6)

The phenomenology of religion paved the way for the study of religion to enter the broader field of research in the humanities and social sciences (Strausberg 2008). By the late 1930s, the term world 'religions' was being used occasionally, and more widely in the 1950s, to denote distinct major religions with a stable set of key concepts and beliefs (Jackson, 2003: 8). In the 1960s, there are theories of "modern" religions: which specifically modern forms religion may take in the modern world. (Casanova 1994: 26) "Modern" religions refer to religions that are not only traditional survivals or residues from a pre-modern past but rather specifically products of modernity.

Jeremy Gunn (2003: 193)points to two important aspects of definitions of religion. The first involves assumptions about the underlying nature of religion (*what* is being defined). The second aspect involves the type of definition that is to be used (*how* the term is defined). Gunn has identified two principle theories about assumptions about the underlying nature of religion. The first is a religious definition that acknowledges religion in its metaphysical or theological sense: the truth of existence of God, the dharma, and so on. Naturalistic definitions by contrast, interpret religion as 1.) it is psychologically experienced by people (psychological, cognitive, and socio-biological approaches), 2.) a cultural or social force (sociological and anthropological approaches), or 3.) delusionary (atheist approach).

In addition, Gunn (2003: 194) identifies two important types of definition: monothetical and polythetic. The monothetical or essentialist definition identifies the elements necessary for an observable behavior to be designated as a religion. Here the Sacred (Hick 1987; Hick 1992; Alles 2005) and its classifiers dominate the debate. The classic Frazerian definition of religion "religion consists of two elements … a belief in powers higher than man and an attempt to propitiate or please them" (Sir James G. Frazer 1922: 58 in Stark/Bainbridge 1985: 5), or Spiro's definition of "religion as an institution consisting of culturally postulated interactions with culturally postulated superhuman beings" (M. Spiro, 1966: 66 in Alles, 2005 7703) may serve as examples for essential definitions.

The traditional approach has been to treat these constituent parts monothetically: that is, to consider all of them as necessary and, when taken together, sufficient to define religion (Alles, 2005: 7703). Whenever a definition is essentialist, it assumes that religion has one or more specific elements in common with all other religions. In this context the evident plurality of religious traditions imposes problems of extending the properties onto specific religious traditions. Thus, any definition of religion is challenged by the problem of extension, responding to the question if certain forms of Buddhism, Confucianism or certain ideologies have to be included or excluded into the definition. Thus, there might be no essential definition of religion.

In sum, for more than a century, scholars have searched for the essence of religion. "Today it is widely accepted that there is no one essence that all religions share. What they share are family resemblances – tendencies toward this belief or that behavior." (Prothero 2010: 12-13) Philosopher of religion Ninian Smart (1996 in Prothero 2010: 13) has referred to these tendencies as the seven "dimensions" of religion: the ritual, narrative, experiential, institutional, ethical, doctrinal, and material dimensions. Only the cultural and religious dimension of social action might explain why, in response to what appears to be a similar event, people in one setting feel their interests threatened while those in another do not.

The second type of definition, the polythetic does not require that all religions have specific elements in common. (Gunn, 2003: 194) Although scholars occasionally define religion in terms of a single property, they more often conceive of it in terms of an explicit or implicit conjunction of properties. (Alles, 2005: 7703) Wittgenstein had directed scholarly attention to the possibility of conceiving of religion polythetically rather than monothetically[55]. Hick has posited 'there are no characteristics that every member (of the family or the cluster) must have, nevertheless there are characteristics distributed sporadically and in varying degrees which together distinguish this form from a different family'. (Hick 1992: 4) Polythetic definitions see no particular property as necessary to religion and consider the presence of a collection of properties selected from a master set as sufficient to make a specific item a member of the class called religion (Alles: 2005, 7703-4). For example, William Alston (1967: 141–142, in Alles 2005: 7703-4), has suggested that the presence of an unspecified number of any of the following characteristics would make a set of cultural practices a religion:

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[55] Alles 2005: 7703; quoting Wittgenstein, 1953: *Philosophical Investigations*, pp. 66–67

1) Belief in supernatural beings (gods).
2) A distinction between sacred and profane objects.
3) Ritual acts focused on sacred objects.
4) A moral code believed to be sanctioned by the gods.
5) Characteristically religious feelings.
6) Prayer and other forms of communication with gods.
7) A worldview or a general picture of the world as a whole and the place of the individual therein.
8) A more or less total organization ofone's life based on the world view
9) A social group bound together by the above

It may, however, be too simple to see religion as merely a European and North American construct (Alles 2005: 7703). People in many parts of the globe, not just in Europe and North America, have long recognized different religious traditions as belonging to the same broader class, even if they did not explicitly conceptualize that class as religion (Alles 2005: 7703).Hence, religion is a local category that scholars, along with others, have applied beyond the bounds of its origins. Alles concludes that it may not be reasonable to expect the kind of universally acceptable classifications in the study of religions that one finds in a natural science like biology. In any case, a consideration of history can only raise questions about the adequacy of a category like religion. It cannot answer them. The adequacy of a concept depends upon whether it can be properly formulated and whether it serves the purposes at hand. (Alles 2005: 7703)

Jeremy Gunn opines "(w)hile academics have the luxury of debating whether the term "religion" is hopelessly ambiguous, judges and lawyers often do not". (Gunn 2003: 191, emphasis in original). Thus, on the one hand, there exist "important provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights pertaining to "religion", but on the other hand the term itself is left undefined". (Gunn 2003: 191). As a result, misunderstandings about how to define religion and what religion actually is, translate into international and national legal practice, while judges and lawyers "appear to have made assumptions about the meaning of "religion" on the basis of their own experiences". (Gunn 2003: 192). But "judicial decisions about what constitutes religion make a very real difference in the lives of persons" (Gunn 2003: 191), the importance of a serious treatment of religion in politics and law is obvious, as "Asylum-case ad-judicators, (…) may be called upon to decide whether there is a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of . . . religion" regardless of whether the 1951 Refugee Convention offers a definition". (Gunn 2003: 192, emphasis in original).

By considering which properties a religion requires to be defined as religion (as the belief in the supernatural for instance) no understanding of religious freedom in the legal and political context is attained. Thus, legal definitions of religion, Gunn remarks, generally appear in the complicating contexts of either (1) protecting *freedom* of religion, or (2) prohibiting *discrimination* (or persecution) of religion. Other situations where state officials (including judges, administrators, and legislators) are called upon to determine whether something is religious include most notably 3.) whether an entity is a religion or religious association for purposes of granting legal personality, obtaining tax benefits, or limiting the personal liability of the organizers; 4.) whether someone has religious beliefs for the purpose of obtaining conscientious objector status; and 5.) whether someone should be exempted from a law of general applicability on the grounds of religious belief[56]. These situations extend to the legal regulation of religious education in public schools.

> Legal definitions do not simply describe the phenomenon of religion, they establish rules for regulating social and legal relations among people who themselves may have sharply different attitudes about what religion is and which manifestations of it are entitled to protection. Legal definitions, as a result, may contain serious deficiencies, when they (perhaps unintentionally) incorporate particular social and cultural attitudes towards (preferred) religions, or when they fail to account for social and cultural attitudes against (disfavored) religions. (Gunn 2003: 195)

Legal definitions of religion have significant deficiencies as they have to establish international or national standards for regulating the relation between religious communities[57]. Gunn clearly shows an intrigue implication in the attempt to develop a legal definition of religion in state law and international law.

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[56] A Sikh motorcyclist being exempted from a requirement to wear a helmet, or a Muslim, or Jewish slaughterhouse being permitted to kill animals in accordance with ritual laws. (Gunn 2003: 217, Endnote 14)
[57] This paragraph draws heavily from Gunn: 2003 and places weight on his judgment. In the article, the term religion is continuously put into quotation marks. The current study consequently omitted these quotation marks.

Under French law, for example, if a religious organization is recognized by administration officials as a religion, it becomes eligible to receive certain benefit and funding. But in the very process of deciding whether the entity should be so recognized, the courts are confronted with the express language of the law: "The Republic does not recognize (…) any religion" (1905 Law, art. 2). (Gunn 2003: 217, Endnote 14) Thus, the state provides benefits for recognized religions, but concomitantly the state must not recognize religions. However, such a "legal schizophrenia in France is only less apparent in other countries". (Gunn 2003: 217, Endnote 14) As Jackson notes "(a) nation state cannot be entirely neutral when dealing with issues of religious and cultural diversity". (Jackson 2003: 5) Whether or not state institutions are competent to determine what is and is not religion, in the actual world of law, judicial and political institutions are sometimes forced to make such determinations. In other words, while the universal right to religious liberty is acknowledged and self-evident, nation-states' legal systems have to impose limitations on the freedom of religion. These deficiencies and limitations automatically extend to the establishment of religious education systems.

Legal systems may explicitly or implicitly evaluate (or rank) religions. Depending on the attitudes of the persons involved, religions may be described in ways such as proper religion versus deviant religion, or, religion versus non-religion. Probably some persons think of monotheistic religions in terms such as universal, while polytheistic or non-theistic religions may be perceived as primitive or superstitious. Persons with broader sensibilities might expand universal religions to include not only Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and Hinduism — but nevertheless find that other groups (…) are "not really religions" or are "sects" or "cults" and thus are not deserving of the label of religion either for purposes of receiving benefits or being protected against discrimination. (Gunn, 2003: 196) How Indonesia limits religious freedom will be discussed in the next chapters.

3.1.3. International human rights definition of religious freedom

Since the present study assumes multivocality of religious traditions (Stepan 2001; Esposito 2009; Hilmy 2010), all religious traditions include concepts that deal with human rights and religious liberty. To mention four examples, there are the Edicts of Asoka the Great (ca.250 BCE), the Constitution of Medina drafted by Prophet Muhammad (622 BE), the Verdicts of the Ottoman Empire, and the *Din Ilahi* of Sultan Akbar from the Indian Mughul Empire (1555-1605). Today, "The language of international ethics is 'human rights'." (Moran 2006: 43, emphasis in original) With all its limitations, the UN has had some success in establishing the idea of an international ethics. International human rights documents identify two aspects of religious freedom: first, the realm of a person's subjective beliefs (*forum internum*), and secondly an external realm, where beliefs are manifested in many forms, such as teaching (*forum externum*). (Schreiner 2006: 859) Contrary to the first aspect that is interpreted in international human rights documents "as being 'absolute', being an area in which governments are prohibited from interfering in any way" (Schreiner 2006: 859), the second aspect of external manifestation of religion and belief may be limited under specified and narrow conditions. (Schreiner 2006: 860)

During the process of an internationalization of human rights, the freedom of religion and belief evolved as basic right and civil liberty[58]. Indonesian human rights groups and promoters of pluralism refer frequently to the Comment, therefore it frames the parameter of religious freedom used in their reasoning and in the present study. Although no definition of religion is provided, the universal right to "freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief" is acknowledged in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[59] The Declaration distinguishes between religion as the realm of a person's subjective beliefs (*forum internum*; private, individual level) and an external realm, where beliefs are manifested in many forms, such as teaching, practice, and worship (*forum externum;* public, group level). (Schreiner 2006: 859) Thus a distinction is drawn between the individual right to hold and change religion in the private sphere and the right to manifest religious practices in the public sphere and public space. Although religious freedom was historically the first freedom in the evolution of human rights, efforts to develop an enforceable international human rights law pertaining to freedom of religion remain unsuccessful. Marshall (1998: 18) states, "Such freedom may at times have more to do with the growth of democracy than a direct focus on political activity".

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[58] The United Nations issued declarations and conventions pertinent to these rights, additionally there are European, Inter-American and African declarations and conventions on religious freedom.
[59] UNESCO. MOST Program, MOST Clearing House, Religious rights, International legal instruments, (August 2008, http://www.unesco.org/most/rr2dis.htm)

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[60] (henceforth ICCPR) guarantees equality[61] (§2.1) by prohibiting discrimination[62] (§26) and hatred[63] (§20.2) on grounds of amongst others, religion or belief. The instrument had recognized the importance of freedom of religion and belief in article 18, of which paragraph 1, 2 and 3 are quoted here in full length:

§18.1: Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right shall include the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of his or her choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his or her religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and teaching.
§18.2: No one shall be subject to coercion, which shall impair his freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
§18.3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

Here an important qualification to the right to freedom of thought, conscious and religion is mentioned, the rights of states to limit mentioned freedom. But each and any limitation has to follow legal procedure having the purpose either to protect public safety, order, health, morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.An limitation on base of morals, however, must base on principles that do not derive out of one exclusivist understanding. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereafter CRC) imposes analogous to the ICCPR a crucial limitation to the freedom of religion and belief according legal procedure to protect public safety, order, health or moral, or the fundamental rights and freedom of others. Regarding community or minority rights, the ICCPR states that minority groups are entitled to profess and practice their own religion and protects members of minorities from being marginalized or converted. The same protection is enjoyed by holders of all beliefs of a non-religious nature.

(§27) In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.

Within the ICCPR, the UN Human Rights Committee published a General Comment No. 22[64] on Article 18 of the ICCPR on the scope of freedom of religion or belief on a shared basis for all. Religious and naturalistic worldviews are equally permitted and protected, but their manifestation may also be limited. The General Comment 22 (§1) applies a broad definition of religion or belief by including the right not to hold religious but naturalistic convictions, and allows for a manifestation individually or communally.

§1 The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (which includes the freedom not to hold beliefs) in article 18.1[of the ICCPR, XXX] is far-reaching and profound; it encompasses freedom of thought on all matters, personal conviction and the commitment to religion or belief, whether manifested individually or in community with others. The Committee draws the attention of States parties to the fact that the freedom of thought and the freedom of conscience are protected equally with the freedom of religion and belief. The fundamental character of these freedoms is also reflected in the fact that this provision cannot be derogated from, even in time of public emergency (…)

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[60] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Comment 22 on article 18 of the CCPR: http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/9a30112c27d1167cc12563ed004d8f15
[61] ICCPR § 2 (1) 'Each State Party (…) undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status'.
[62] ICCPR § 26. (…) 'all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status'.
[63] ICCPR §20.2. (…) 'prohibits incitement of hatred against others because of their religion: Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law'. The UNHRC General Comment 22 (7) states, 'in accordance with article 20 (of the ICCPR), no manifestation of religion or belief may amount to propaganda for war or advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. As stated by the Committee in its General Comment 11 [19], States parties are under the obligation to enact laws to prohibit such acts.
[64] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Comment 22 on article 18 of the CCPR: http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/9a30112c27d1167cc12563ed004d8f15

(§3) distinguishes between the unconditional right to the freedom of conscience and religion and the right to manifest this freedom.

> §3Article 18 distinguishes the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief from the freedom to manifestreligion or belief. It does not permit any limitations whatsoever on the freedom of thought and conscience or on the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one''s choice. These freedoms are protected unconditionally, as is the right of everyone to hold opinions without interference (…) no one can be compelled to reveal his thoughts or adherence to a religion or belief.

(§5) guarantees the freedom to retain, choose or replace one's religion or belief, or to adopt atheistic views and prohibits forced conversion.

> §5The Committee observes that the freedom to 'have or to adopt' a religion or belief necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one's current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one's religion or belief. Article 18.2 bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to their religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert. Policies or practices having the same intention or effect, such as, for example, those restricting access to education, medical care, employment or the rights guaranteed (…) are similarly inconsistent (…). The same protection is enjoyed by holders of all beliefs of a non-religious nature.

(§8) allows for limitations only if it follows legal procedure and is necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. Limitations for the purpose of protecting morals must base on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition, to ensure manifold climates of thought are represented. The freedom from coercion to have or to adopt a religion or belief and the liberty of parents and guardians to ensure religious and moral education cannot be restricted.

> § 8 Article 18.3 permits restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion or belief only iflimitations are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. The freedom from coercion to have or to adopt a religion or belief and the liberty of parents and guardians to ensure religious and moral education cannot be restricted. (…) The Committee observes that the concept of morals derives from many social, philosophical, and religious traditions; consequently, limitations on the freedom to manifest a religion or belief for the purpose of protecting moralsmust be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition. (…)

(§9) holds if a religion is recognized as state religion, or established or if the followers comprise the majority of the population, may not result in limitations or in any discrimination against adherents to other religions or non-believers. Regarding community or minority rights, the ICCPR states that minority groups are entitled to profess and practice their own religion and protects members of minorities from being marginalized or converted. The same protection is enjoyed by holders of all beliefs of a non-religious nature.

> (§27) In those States in which ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.

The concept of religious liberty used in the present work is the one put forward by the 1981 Declaration and the UN Human Rights Committee's General Comment No. 22 on Article 18 of the ICCPR[65]. Religious and naturalistic worldviews are equally permitted and protected, but their manifestation may also be limited. The right of negative religious freedom (to reject religious claims or force by the state) and the right to positive religious freedom (to adopt religious claims) are thus enshrined equally in the human rights instruments. The General Comment 22 (§1) applies a broad definition of religion or belief by including the right not to hold religious but naturalistic convictions, and allows for a manifestation individually or communally.

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[65] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Comment 22 on article 18 of the CCPR:
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/9a30112c27d1167cc12563ed004d8f15

(§3) distinguishes between the unconditional right to the freedom of conscience and religion and the right to manifest this freedom. (§5) guarantees the freedom to retain, choose or replace one's religion or belief, or to adopt atheistic views and prohibits forced conversion. (§8) allows for limitations only if it follows legal procedure and is necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. Limitations for the purpose of protecting morals must base on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition, to ensure manifold climates of thought are represented. The freedom from coercion to have or to adopt a religion or belief and the liberty of parents and guardians to ensure religious and moral education cannot be restricted. (§9) holds when a religion is recognized as state religion, or established as official or traditional or that its followers comprise the majority of the population, may not result in limitations or in any discrimination against adherents to other religions or non-believers.

There is only one non-binding international directive, which explains the underlying rights protected under the concept of religion or belief. The Vienna Declaration and program of action and the Oslo Declaration emphasize the necessity to put the 1981 'Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination based on Religion or Belief' (henceforth 1981 Declaration)[66] into practice. The 1981 Declaration represents the key document protecting religious rights by constituting a paradigm to advocate for mutual respect and to prevent discrimination based on religion or belief. While lacking any enforcement procedures, the 1981 Declaration remains the most important contemporary codification of the principle of freedom of religion and belief.

The document contains eight articles, of which two (§1, §6) define specific rights of faith communities. The remaining articles act in a supportive role by outlining measures to promote tolerance or prevent discrimination. While human rights are above all individual rights, certain rights related to states, religious institutions, parents, legal guardians, children, and groups of persons are also identified. A distinction between the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and its manifestations in public is drawn. Articles 1 and 6 provide a comprehensive list of rights regarding freedom of thought, conscience, and religion and its manifestation either individually or collectively, in private or public, to realize a religion or belief through worship, observance, practice and teaching. The articles are quoted in full length.

§1.1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right shall include freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practices and teaching.
§1.2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have a religion or belief of his choice.
§1.3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or belief may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

§ 6 In accordance with article 1 of the present Declaration, and subject to the provisions of article 1, paragraph 3, the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief shall include, inter alia, the following freedoms:

(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and maintain places for these purposes;
(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions;
(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief;
(d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;
(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes;
(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals and institutions;
(g) To train, appoint, elect, or designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by the requirements and standards of any religion or belief;
(h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of one's religion or belief;
(i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters of religion and belief at the national and international levels.

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[66] (Augustus 2008, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/d_intole.htm)

Article 2 covers classifications of discrimination and identifies categories of potential discriminators, affirming the right not to be subject to discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief. Potential discriminators include (1) States (national, regional, local government); (2) Institutions (governmental, non-governmental, and religious); (3) Groups of individuals; (4) Individuals. Article 3 declares that discrimination based on religion or belief constitutes an affront to human dignity and a disavowal of the principles of the UDHR, and shall be condemned as a violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms. States and all sectors of civil society are entitled in Article 4 to take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination based on religion or belief. Article 5 covers individual rights of parents, guardians, and children. (§5.5) sets out the parameters for a State to limit practices injurious to child's development or health. Article 7 on national legislation declares that all of the rights at stake in the 1981 UN Declaration need to be accorded in national legislation. However, Article 8 specifies the 1981 UN Declaration is non-binding on States so as to ensure that the Declaration does not negate existing legal protections of freedom of religion or belief, though rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration shall be accorded in national legislation in such a manner that everyone shall be able to avail himself or herself of such rights and freedoms in practice. The Indonesian human rights Charter is discussed in subsequent chapters.

3.1.4 Religion and freedom of religion in the modern nation state

Since the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the nation state is the main agent in world politics, economics, and social dealings. (Moran 2006: 41) The nation state is currently the main protector of rights, including the right to practice one's religion and religious education. (Moran 2006: 43) The debate whether Islam and democracy, are compatible cannot be touched upon here, but as the example of Muslim majority Indonesia shows, the country adopt fully electoral democracy and freedom of religion in a fashion of authoritarian pluralism or delimited pluralism (Howell 2003).

The consensus seems that the precondition to establish religious freedom is the separation of state and church (religion). Developed in modern Western Europe, the idea of separation of state and religion was advocated by John Locke to ensure toleration and religious freedom. According to this view, when the power, prestige and financial support of the government are placed behind a particular belief, indirect coercive pressure is placed on religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion. (Hosen 2005: 421) In this case, the absence of an established religion, and separation of political authority and religious authority, is considered a prerequisite for the right to freedom of thought, conscious and belief. This argument became the basis of the separation of church and state in the United States (secularism) and France (laïcité). Nevertheless the ways of implementation of separation and institutionalized religion vary in Europe. (Casanova 1994; Stepan 2001; Nipkow 2006: 582)

As states are required to regulate the relation to religion within their boundaries in order to secure justice and stability, an investigation in the nature and relationship between religion and the nation-state should be, as I propose, a key element in the field of religious studies and a fundamental item in the study of religious plurality, religious liberty and religious education. Freedom of religion as legal concept is historically related to but not identical with the separation of church (understood as religious institutions) and state, or laïcité/secularism, and religious toleration.

Casanova identifies three basic options for a liaison between political authority and religious authority, but "(n)one of these options (…) can permanently resolve the tension between "religion" and "world". (Casanova 1994:49. The first option of Caesaropapism - secular ruler over church - and the second option of theocracy - church over state - pertain to a pattern that conflates governmental and religious authority. The first option, Caesaropapism refers to the "Alliance of throne and altar" (Casanova 1994: 22), to "the world's control and use of religion for its own purposes, most frequently to legitimate political rule and to sanctify economic oppression and the given system of stratification". (Casanova 1994: 49) A secular leader, who is the prime religious leader, combines spiritual and worldly authority or controls the established institutions of the Church. The second option sees a unity of state and religion, "the power to influence and shape the world according to God's way". (Casanova 1994: 49) Yet, paradoxically, "the more religion wants to transform the world in a religious direction, the more religion becomes entangled in "worldly" affairs and is transformed by the world". (Casanova 1994: 49)The third option, distance, detachment, and separation, "protects the world from religion and religion from the world". (Casanova 1994: 49) It is the predominant option.

Czermak (2008) distinguishes two basic interpretations pertaining to freedom of religion in constitutions: *Einheitslösungen* (alliance solutions) or *Trennungslösungen* (separation). The first type describes the unity between state and religion, and religious truth is the truth of the state. The second model always puts forth the separation of religious and political authority. This institutional dualism, however, in no means implies that political authority might not be religiously justified or a strong normative religious commitment is excluded from political authority. Generally, mixed types between *Trennungs-* und *Einheitslösungen* prevail: on one end of the spectrum, there are state-churches (UK) and at the other end is the laicist separation of state and church (France) (or the communist approach that abolished RE at all)

At all, there seem to be two options pertaining to freedom of religion in constitutions: The first option would be the unity of religious and political authority. In this model, religion functions as integral part of the state, examples are theocracy[67] or an Islamic State[68]. Such a unity between state and religion is held to be deeply discriminatory for adherents to other religions. Within the second option of "separation", we can differentiate two related yet different conceptions with regard to freedom of religion in constitutions: laicism and secularism. The second interpretation maintains that the state should not establish, or fund, religious activities and assumes that governmental practices or institutions should exist independent and autonomous from religion to protect religious liberty.

The term laicité is in fact used to contrast European with American secularism, because the US-Constitution does not mention the term. The first term, laicité[69] or laicism, "refers to an anticlerical worldview and ideology" (Karakas 2007: 7) that rejects establishment state funding of religious institutions and practices. Laicism assumes that governmental practices or institutions should exist independent and autonomous from religious institutions to protect freedom of religion. Laicism accommodates "a strict institutional separation of state and religion, i.e. of political and religious authority" (Karakas 2007: 7f) to guarantee such civil liberty, and the absence of religious interference in government affairs and government interference in religious affairs. Accordingly, at least in theory - the laicist state keeps completely out of all religious matters unlike under secularism.

Contrary to laicism, the third interpretation secularism or secularization (Hosen 2005: 422), sees separation of religion and state as a notion related to, but separated from, freedom of religion. As distinct from theocracy, many secular states officially endorse a state religion, state church or official religion and thus fund a specific national stream of Christianity. Although countries with an official religion, state church or state religion guarantee and practice freedom of religion, critiques from the liberal school of thought sees this model as to threaten freedom of religion. In consequence, secularism denotes a less strict model of separation, and rather a distance or even interpenetration between religious authority and state. Generally, a secular state is held to treat its citizenry equally and not to give a particular religion preferential treatment over other religions but reality shows another pattern. We can interpret this pattern as a residual of former specific historical relation patterns between political and religious authority. (Casanova 1994) In this context, Casanova (1994: 50, emphasis in original) observes "the historically unique character of the modern state cannot be understood unless one sees it as a secularized, "transformed church"".

In this context, a state recognizes and respects cultural and religious heritage of its social groups, „by developing a policy of benevolent neutrality towards religious groups, [which] requires the government to treat religious groups with a policy of impartiality". (Hosen 2005:421) In this sense, religion has its place in the private domain, but it can also play its role in the public sphere. Secularism holds that religion is a fundamental and essential part of many moral and ethical values, and that the removal of public displays of religion from government is a form of religious discrimination in that it prohibits the exercising of religious views in the public sphere (Hosen 2005: 422).

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[67] The theocratic type of government establishes religious authority as secular authority to govern the state. In a monist theocracy the administrative governmental hierarchy is identical with the administrative religious hierarchy. But theocracy may have two wings; the religious hierarchy may be superior to the state administrative hierarchy. Theocracy differs from secular types that either establish a state religion or church, or are influenced by theological or ethical concepts, and monarchies held "By the Grace of God".

[68] In Islamic states, Islam is established as official and only religion, the Islamic State of Iran, the United Emirates of Arab, and Saudi Arabia may be grouped under this type. Islamic law does not distinguish between matters of religion and matters of state; Islamic scholars function as both theologians and jurists. In practice, Islamic rulers frequently bypassed the *Syari'ah* courts with a parallel system.

[69] In 1871, the term laicité was coined by F. Buisson in France who supported public education minus religious education.

Casanova (1994: 55-58) finds several organizational models of separation[70], likewise Stepan found several varieties of democratic patterns of state-religion relations, since every nation may develop its specific pattern. "They show that there can be democratic and nondemocratic secularism, democracies with established churches, and even democracies with a "very unfriendly" separation of church and state". (Stepan 2000:42, emphasis in original). By implication, if we delve into European state-religion relation patterns, the concept of the secular state is highly heterogeneous, and we find that "an apodictic separation of state and religion is not a prerequisite for a functioning democracy". (Karakas 2007: 8). In this light, Alfred Stepan (2000: 43, emphasis in original) argues for the introduction of twin tolerations as "the defining characteristics of democracy vis-a-vis religion, whereas "secularism" and the "separation of church and state" are not an intrinsic part of the core definition of democracy." The notion of twin tolerations denotes "the minimal boundaries of freedom of action that must somehow be crafted for political institutions vis-a-vis religious authorities, and for religious individuals and groups vis-a-vis political institutions"(Stepan 2000: 37). The conclusion that can be drawn from Western European experience is that the first objective is not separation, but it is "the constant political construction and reconstruction of the "twin tolerations"." (Stepan 2000: 42, emphasis in original).

Stepan's argument comprises two points, which we should consider, when observing a specific state-religion-relation. First, "(w)e should beware of assuming that any religion's doctrine is univocally pro-democratic or antidemocratic"(Stepan 2000:44). When analyzing the relationship of non-Christian or non-Western religions to democracy, "it would seem appropriate not to assume univocality but to explore whether these doctrines contain multivocal components that are usable for (or at least compatible with) the political construction of the twin tolerations"(Stepan 2000: 44). This is to say that all religions and belief systems are multivocal, and contain some verses or scriptures supporting democracy while others would reject it. Stepan's second point concerns the fallacy to assume a unique constellation of specific founding conditions "that were present at the birth of such phenomena as electoral democracy" (Stepan 2000: 44), and therefore we should not "confuse the conditions associated with the invention of something with the possibility of its replication, or more accurately,its reformulation under different conditions"[71](Stepan 2000: 44).

Hence, we observe numerous examples of interactions between religious institutions and nation-states in secular nations that confuse the conception of Weber's "wall of separation" (Geertz 1993; Casanova 1994; Stepan 2000; Bowen 2005) between political and religious authority. Virtually no Western European democracy now has a rigid or hostile separation of church and state, thus in most Western democracies a democratically negotiated freedom of religion from state interference emerged. (Stepan 2000:42) and religious groups are guaranteed both aspects of religious freedom: the right to private religious practices (*forum internum*) and to manifest religion in public(*forum externum*).

The absence of an unambiguous definition of religion has important implications in the field of political science, political practice (politics) and legal practice. First, in the field of social science and political science, whereas religion is seen to belong to the sphere of culture, theories tend to ignore religion altogether and "remain therefore incomplete since they neglect the public dimension of modern religion". (Casanova: 63f). In consequence, this stance translates into the field of politics, where first a separation of religion and state and secularism have been accepted as a normative model and integral part of the modern constitutional state – and are widely assumed to be "core features not only of Western democracy, but of democracy itself." (Stepan 2000: 40). The debate on compatibility of democracy to non-Western, non-Christian countries, for instance, identifies state support for religion in any means as a major problem for the consolidation of democracy[72].

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[70] American dualism for instance, prohibits establishment of religion, but at the same time it allows for free exercise of religion. Whereas a strict separationist reading rejects government support and government regulation of religion as represented in radical sectarian, libertarian, or liberal "neutrality" principles, the "benevolent" separationist interpretation demands governmental support of religion as represented in a principle of historical tradition and original intent or functionalist argument of the positive societal forms of religion. A merely secularist reading then, favors government regulation of religion while denying religions any governmental support, since it is suspicious of religious negative functions, accepts formal separation, the interpretation is consistent with caesaropapist principles to fostering both governmental support and government's absolute control of religion. (Casanova 1994)

[71] „We should beware of falling into the fallacy of "unique founding conditions" when we examine whether polities strongly influenced by Confucianism, Hinduism, Orthodoxy, or Islam can emulate or recreate, using some of their own distinctive cultural resources, a form of democracy that would meet the minimal institutional conditions for democracy (…)." (Stepan 2000: 44, emphasis in original).

[72] "In the liberal conception religion is and ought to remain a private affair. The liberal fear of the politicization of religion is simultaneously the fear of an establishment which could endanger the individual freedom of conscience and the fear of a deprivatized ethical religion which could bring extraneous conceptions of justice, of the public interest, of the common good and of solidarity into the "neutral" deliberations of the liberal public sphere" (Casanova 1994: 55).

A recent Pew study and the author, however, consider government support for religious groups a restriction only if it involves preferential treatment of some group(s) and discrimination against others. Second, although human rights instruments guarantee the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, what is actually meant with the term religion remains ambiguous in international human rights conventions and national constitutions.

Concerning a similar debate on the compatibility of specific religions to human rights, Sen (1997: 7-31) claims that modern ideas of political and personal liberty cannot be found in the pre-Enlightenment traditions in any part of the world. In consequence, concepts of individual freedom and equality of freedom are to be found in all faith traditions[73]. Sen discriminates between a general and a legal dimension in the idea of human rights. In the most general form, the conception of human rights builds on our shared humanity and transcends local legislation, and the citizenship of the person affected. In other words, human rights are not derived from the citizenship of any country, but taken as entitlements of every human being. Thus they differ from constitutionally created rights guaranteed by governments for specified people.

Sen (1997: 31) questions the appropriateness of the thesis of a contrast between East and West His study on the genealogy of those values does not sustain the "thesis of a grand dichotomy between Asian values and European values", although "the view has been championed by both Asian authoritarians and Western chauvinists." (Sen 1997:27) Sen finds it hard to make any sense of the view that the basic ideas underlying freedom and rights in a tolerant society are Western notions or traditional commitments of Western cultures, and somehow alien to Asia, or other cultural regions. Important antecedents of those commitments in the form of advocacy of tolerance and individual freedom can be found plentiful in Asian as well Western cultures. In consequence, oversimplifying generalizations like "Western civilization" or "Asian values" only would add to the divisiveness of the world we live in.

However, one still has to remember that China, India, and Indonesia host the largest populations in the world, hence all regional trajectories of political and cultural concepts on diversity and pluralism should be proactively discovered by Western and Arabic countries that propagate universal notions and exclusive worldviews. It is exactly this light, in which a closer look at Indonesia gains its relevance in the study of religion because Indonesia is neither a theocracy, nor an Islamic Republic, nor a laicist, or secular state, but it is defined as a religious state based on belief in One Supreme Lordship.

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[73] This claim is composed of two distinct components, to wit, 1) The value of personal freedom: that personal freedom is important and should be guaranteed for those who 'matter' in a good society, and 2) Equality of freedom: that everyone matters and should have similar freedom. These two components entail that personal freedom should is guaranteed on a shared basis for all. This leads to the idea of universal human rights and the freedom of religion. Another useful distinction is between (1) The value of toleration: there must be toleration of diverse beliefs, commitments, and actions of different people, (2) Equality of tolerance: the toleration that is offered to some must be reasonable ordered to all (except when tolerance of some will lead to intolerance for others). A government can, of course, dispute a person's legal right not to be tortured, but that will not amount to disputing what must be seen as the person's human rights not to be tortured. Sen 1997: Human Rights and Asian Values. [16th Morgenthau Memorial Lecture on Ethics and Foreign Policy] New York, pp.7-31, in www.cceia.org/media/254_sen.pdf, (27.08.2008)

3.2. Religious education: A basic Human Right?

> The fact that religious education varies from country to country and from region to region more than any other academic subject indicates that it is dealing with issues that touch raw nerves. (Levitt and Pollard 1998: 815)

For its controversial status and due to the fact that religion is embedded in all social practices, the organization of RE can evolve into a hotly debated political issue. But public or social disapproval of certain types of faith-based education case can be muted by the thought that people have a right to practice their religion, regardless of its truth or falsity, and that the right properly includes the liberty to teach the faith to one's children. So a wide variety of forms of religious education must be tolerated as a matter of parents' or children's rights. The moral force of the appeal to group rights, as well as the difficulties it may address, can be explored through the example of religious rights and educational policy in a pluralistic society.

National policies and interests beyond the area of education and religion can play a decisive part in constructing or revising RE curricula and laws on RE. Politicians or national policies try to use RE as an instrument for political purposes by demanding that RE's ethical potential be turned against social disintegration. (Heimbrock 2001: 14) Political initiatives that focus on RE can as well be motivated by the date of the next elections and are seen as the best way to gain votes from particular supporters. (Callan 1998: 534)

3.2.1. The religion class and faith-based education in Human Rights

Since the establishment of the modern education systems, any systematic training of the people organized according to age is called education and conceived of as basic right and fundamental freedom. (Moran 1987) It should be kept in mind that the UDHR distinguishes between religion as belief (individual level) and manifestations of belief as teaching, practice and worship (group level). (Schneider 2006) Hence the UDHR introduces discrimination between 1.) individual rights and group right, and 2.) the right to embrace and change a religion and belief and the right to manifest these beliefs in public spaces. Thereby the right to religious education in public and private schools, or in private or in public spaces is established.

In 1960 the UNESCO Convention on Discrimination in Education has statedthat the establishment or maintenance of separate educational institutions for religious reasons is not discriminatory, if it is in keeping with the wishes of parents or legal guardians, and providing that these institutions conform to educational standards developed by competent authorities, and are directed to the full development of the human personality and to strengthening respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is remarkable that the current Indonesian education system is in full compliance with this Article. The former 1989 Education Act still allowed private faith-based schools to provide obligatory participation in their confessional religion class for adherents to other religions. This was the crucial concern for the introduction of paragraph 12 of the 2003 National Education System: to provide each adherent to a state funded religion with religious instruction in the religion taught by a teacher who is of the same faith tradition.

The ICCPR had recognized the importance of freedom of religion and belief (§18.4.) which reads:

> The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.

Interestingly, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereafter CRC) ratified with qualifications[74] by Indonesia in 1990, sees the rights of the child to freedom of religion or belief as to exist independently from the parental right or duty. The CRC (§14, 1) guarantees that "states shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion".

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[74] The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) defines a child as anyone below the age of 18 years.
Reservation of the Indonesian government to the CRC: The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia guarantees the fundamental rights of the child irrespective of their sex, ethnicity or race. The Constitution prescribes those rights to be implemented by national laws and regulations. The ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child by the Republic of Indonesia does not imply the acceptance of obligations going beyond the Constitutional limits nor the acceptance of any obligation to introduce any right beyond those prescribed under the Constitution. With reference to the provisions of articles 1, 14, 16, 17, 21, 22 and 29 of this Convention, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia declares that it will apply these articles in conformity with its Constitution. (August 2008, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty15_asp.htm; http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm)

Remarkably, the CRC (§14, 2) differs from article 5 of the 1981 UN Declaration in that it respects the rights and duties of parents or legal guardians, but places an emphasis on providing direction in a manner consistent with the evolving capacity of the child, and calls on states to limit practices of religions or beliefs that may be injurious to the child, as elaborated in (§ 18, 3)of the ICCPR. For their congenital ability to learn and to process information, children are able to and in need to acquire knowledge and values; consequently, the right to obtain education is regarded as a universal human right and fundamental freedom.

In the context of religious education, Articles 4, 6 and 10 of the General Comment No. 22 are of interest to the present study. General Comment No. 22 (§4) ensures the realization of religious practice and its teaching includes the founding of religious schools.

§4 The freedom to manifest religion or belief may be exercised "either individually or in community with others and in public or private". The freedom to manifest religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and teaching encompasses a broad range of acts. (…) In addition, the practice and teaching of religion or belief includes acts integral to the conduct by religious groups of their basic affairs, such as the freedom to choose their religious leaders, priests and teachers, the freedom to establish seminaries or religious schools, and the freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts or publications.

§6 The Committee is of the view that article 18.4 permits public school instruction in subjects such as the general history of religions and ethics, if it is given in a neutral and objective way. The liberty of parents or legal guardians to ensure that their children receive a religious and moral education in conformity with their own convictions, set forth in article 18.4, is related to the guarantees of the freedom to teach a religion or belief stated in article 18.1. The Committee notes that public education that includes instruction in a particular religion or belief is inconsistent with article 18.4 unless provision is made for non-discriminatory exemptions or alternatives that would accommodate the wishes of parents and guardians.

The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action and the Oslo Declaration emphasize the necessity to put the 1981 Declaration into practice. While lacking any enforcement procedures, the 1981 Declaration remains the most important contemporary codification of the principle of freedom of religion and belief. Article 1 establishes the right to realize a religion or belief through teaching and Article 6 (e) establishes the right "to teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes". Article 5 covers individual rights of parents, guardians, and children as the right (1) of parents or legal guardians to bring the child up in their religion or belief; (2) of the child to education in religion or belief, in accordance with the wishes of parents, and the right not to be compelled to receive education against their wishes; (3) of the child to be protected from discrimination and to receive education for tolerance; (4) of the child's own wishes when not under the care of parents or legal guardians; (5) of the State to limit practices injurious to child's development or health.

§5.1. The parents or, as the case may be, the legal guardians of the child have the right to organize the life within the family in accordance with their religion or belief and bearing in mind the moral education in which they believe the child should be brought up.

§5.2. Every child shall enjoy the right to have access to education in the matter of religion or belief in accordance with the wishes of his parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, and shall not be compelled to receive teaching on religion or belief against the wishes of his parents or legal guardians, the best interests of the child being the guiding principle.

§5.3. The child shall be protected from any form of discrimination on the ground of religion or belief. He shall be brought up in a spirit of understanding, tolerance, friendship among peoples, peace and universal brotherhood, respect for freedom of religion or belief of others, and in full consciousness that his energy and talents should be devoted to the service of his fellow men.

§5.4. In the case of a child who is not under the care either of his parents or of legal guardians, due account shall be taken of their expressed wishes or of any other proof of their wishes in the matter of religion or belief, the best interests of the child being the guiding principle. 5. Practices of a religion or belief in which a child is brought up must not be injurious to his physical or mental health or to his full development, taking into account article 1, paragraph 3, of the present Declaration.

As has been mentioned earlier, ASEAN does not yet provide any regional agreement or approach on religious education. Schreiner (2006: 862) outlines four core areas that can serve as guidelines for an approach on religious education at the national level:

1. the right of parents to decide about the provision of religion education of their children
2. the public educational aim of promoting tolerance and non-discrimination
3. the right of the child to education and to the development of its personality to the fullest extent
4. the right of various groups, including religious bodies, to establish private schools in addition to the public school system

Indonesia provides for six compulsory confessional religion classes in public schools and six private faith-based religious education systems. Not funded religions may not organize teaching in schools but only in private – therefore members of not approved religions must partake in one of the six state funded religion classes and therefore are forced to receive teaching in a religion they do not adhere to. In this the state forces adherence to one of six state funded religions. As according to human rights instruments, a child has the right to receive religious instruction which is non-discriminatory in public schooling, and it may not be forced to attain confessional religious instruction against the wishes of his or her parents, the regulation is in conflict with human rights instruments, but because of its uniqueness it merits attention.

3.2.2. Religion in schools: teaching, models, and classroom methodology

Teaching people religion

As it is difficult to draw a line between educational and non-educational practice, or between living religiously and being educated religiously, a definition, standard form and an encompassing conception of religious education into which the contents of the various religious traditions could be placed cannot be abstracted. (Moran 1987) Since practices of faith-based communities are defined as religious, the instruction in any religious practices of the youth in schooling can be called religious education.

Moran (1987: 318-320) differentiates between two general understandings of RE: a narrow and a broad outlook. Either, religious education is understood as confessional or interfaith instruction confined to schools and communities. This quite recent use of the term religious education in its narrow understanding emerged in the twentieth century, mostly confined to places strongly influenced by modern Western Christianity. (Moran 1987: 318-320) Today, most European nations have worked out a relation between one or several churches and the educational apparatus of the state in the organization of religious education. Or, employing the broad understanding, religious education is seen to embrace the variety of practices in all faith traditions throughout the centuries. As modern societies have discovered the limits of education acquired in youth and have been trying to add adult education to their educational systems of youth schooling, the question is whether religious education is only to be linked with schooling or with life-long training. (Moran 1987: 320) In this light, the statement of the American theologian William Myers, announced in 1925, still proves actuality.

> While religious education, as a separate discipline, is new, it is sometimes forgotten that the practice is as old as the race. People from the remotest antiquity have had and have taught their religion to their own groups at least, particularly to the succeeding generation. .... It aim always is a kind of life, and the problem is to cultivate and develop this life. The ideas of religion may vary as widely as can possibly be imagined, and the methods employed may have no apparent relation to each other, but yet he central objective remains the same. (A.J. William Myers 1925: 277)

In each religion, teaching means to show someone a way of life. The agent of the teaching is the community, which is represented by individuals functioning as teachers. (Moran, 1987: 322) One commonality across religious traditions is thus the nature of teaching. However, the agent of teaching is not necessarily an individual person called the teacher. In fact, every individual who teaches is within a (human) community and a (non-human) environment that are the ultimate sources of teaching. (Moran 1991: 256) Moran clearly points out that "the distinction between religion as area of scholarly interest, as a subject taught in school and the general name for practices that a Buddhist, a Hindu, or a Muslim performs on the one hand, and being religious as an individual in a particular way on the other hand, relies upon a difference in connotation". (Moran 1991: 256)

Following Wardekker and Miedema(2001: 29-30), the present work assumes that the religious domain should not primarily be seen as a separate social practice among other practices but as possible aspect of all human experiences and activities with consequences for other practices. Although religion often develops into distinctive practices, the artificial separation or exclusion of religion from other social and cultural activities is a disturbing and counterproductive factor. This thesis implies that the religion class teaches not primarily participating in a particular faith community, but the way and the quality of participation in all types of socio-cultural activities. A natural by product is the acquirement of religious knowledge and competence. Hence, it might be concluded that the aim of religious education is to pass on the complex set of beliefs, rites, and practices that constitute the religious community's way of life and to enable the individual to participate competently in this way of life (experience and practice) and in all types of socio-cultural activities. In conclusion, religious education is here interpreted as learning to participate in a religious community of practice.

Religion in school: Models and classroom methodology

A systematic overview of religious education in Europe is not easy to establish, since only a few comparative, qualitative, and quantitative studies about the actual position of religious education in schools and universities have been made. (Skeie 2001; Nipkow 2006) If there is an assessed lack in the Western context, one can easily imagine how this difficulty translates into the contemporary situation worldwide. In addition to this, in heterogeneous societies with competing ethical systems that define themselves in opposition to each other, as it is the case in Indonesia, the teaching of values through religious education is problematic and has been tackled in different ways. In consequence, as the system or the organization of religious education depends on the dominant discourses in the field of religion, the religious, political, and educational culture in question. (Levitt/Pollard 1998: 810) Under the condition of religious pluralism, the problem to solve is if only one or all religions are taught in public schools and how religious teachers are trained.

There are broadly speaking two general models of organizing RE in schools, the secular model, and the religious model. (Levitt/Pollard, 1998: 809-812) Another way to systematize models of RE, as proposed by Levitt and Pollard (1998), could be using the confessional or non-confessional distinction. Every nation state offers individual solutions or varieties of this general model. Levitt and Pollard identify four models of RE in school:

1.) Religious education and worship is excluded from schools;
2.) Religious teachings are available as an option in some schools;
3.) Religious education as part of the curriculum; and
4.) Religious education and worship as part of the curriculum

The provision of religious worship in school is rare and depends upon the relationship between the state and the religious communities. Worship is an expression of personal faith and might be regarded as a natural extension of religious education in schools which have children from the same faith background. (Levitt/Pollard 1998) The Indonesian approach corresponds to the forth model: confessional religious education and worship as part of the curriculum, but organized in a pluralistic manner. Nipkow (2006: 583) identifies a few European approaches to religious education following the distinction between the negative and the positive aspect of religious freedom, however, none of these models is followed in Indonesia.

1.) the laicist solution with no RE at all (France)
2.) RE in all schools in a multi-faith approach (England and Wales)
3.) several separated forms of RE combined with mutual exchange and institutional cooperation (Germany)
4.) moral education (ME) as a substitute for religious education in the curriculum or as an alternative option

Aiming to conceptualize the situation of RE in schools, Skeie (2001: 242-243) bases his provisional systematization of different European national solutions on two typical strategies of organizing the relationship between school and RE. According to Skeie, European states are divided into two groups: the first type can be categorized as centralized, uniform, or strong solution. Here the state imposes one solution for all, whether the solution is confessional or not.

TYPE 1: Uniform or 'strong' solutions		
Religion is part of the school curriculum		Religion is no part of the school curriculum
←		→
Religion based system for all	RE as a public school system for all	NO RE in school

The second type represents decentralized, plurifom, or weak types of relationship between religion and school. Here the state provides no common solution to the entire population.

TYPE 2: Pluriform or 'weak' solutions		
Mixed systems		Secular systems
←		→
Parallel system were many or most of the schools are religion-based	Secular system with RE, but also significant private sector of (religion-based) schools	Secular system with religious groups cooperating about RE, or running RE within schools.

Applying above described models to systematize strategies and models of organizing religious education in schools, the present study found that the strategy followed by Indonesia may be identified as pluriform. Indonesia provides a dual option for students. We find a secular system with six compulsory religion classes, or in other words, a public secular school system in which six religion classes and worship are part of the curriculum. In addition to this secular system with religion class and worship, we find a significant private and state sector of religion-based schools and universities. It is interesting to note, that these confessional schools are established by religious communities or by the state. Since 2005, all these confessional schools adopted the national standard curriculum, including the religion class and worship but they offer additional faith-based modules specialized in theology, law and ritual in the religion they are based on. In case more than ten students of a particular religion differing from the confession the school is based on visit this confessional school, the school or university is required by Law to provide a religion classes for those students held by a teacher of the same belief. (Indonesian Education Laws of 1954 and of 2003)

As the present study aimed to generate a thick description of the legal and social context of contemporary Hindu education, a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the methodologies to religious education in general is beyond scope of study. In this context, the issue to solve is rather in how far the curricula of the giant private Islamic school system integrate a pluralist paradigm along Islamic concepts or religious pluralism and values of brotherhood, mutual respect, and tolerance.

Moran (1991: 256) holds that religious education is composed of two sharply contrasting processes. Yet, both processes are described as teaching people in the sense of transferring knowledge to human species with a special ability to learn and transform information.

1.) Teaching people religion;
2.) Teaching people to be religious in a particular way

Remembering Nipkow's (2006: 583) distinction between the negative and the positive aspect of religious freedom in classifying approaches to RE, I differentiate between two general classroom methodologies, 1.) the naturalistic, phenomenological, or interfaith/multifaith approach, that teaches people religion with the aim to understand the various phenomena of religious belief and practice[75]; and 2.) the confessional, religious or faith based approach.

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[75] In the first process, the religion that is studied and taught in classrooms is necessarily abstract and plural. In the process of teaching people religion, the aim is to understand. To understand religion is always to step back and compare religion with religion (even if the comparing is of two versions of the same religion). (Moran 1991: 256) The phenomenological or explicit approach aims "to study the phenomenon of religion in an objective [and descriptive; A.L.] way in order to increase knowledge and understanding of religions, suspending commitment to any particular tradition". (Levitt/Pollard 1998: 809) This approach depends on a distinction being made between seeking to convert children to a faith and giving them knowledge and understanding of faith. (Levitt/Pollard, 1998: 812)

Exponents of the phenomenological approach argue, RE shall not only be descriptive and objective, but also experiential. The experiential approach "aims to recreate (…) the believer's experience in order to facilitate personal reflection and to develop an empathetic response"

In this, the classroom methodology in religious instruction can be structured and organized according to two general approaches: 1.) teaching people religion; or 2.) imparting a particular faith tradition in people. The first approach comprises the phenomenological, experiential, implicit and inter-religious/ multi-faith methodology. The second approach entails the confessional and neo-confessional methodology. (Levitt/Pollard 1998) This is the case in Indonesia. The child-centered methodology is employed by both general approaches. Therefore, methodologies relevant in the context of my study are the confessional, neo-confessional and child-centered methodology.

In the second process, the aim of teaching is the nurturing and enculturation of a religious way of life or being religious in a particular way, that is, observant Buddhist, devout Hindu, or practicing Muslim. The teacher (community and environment) teaches people to pray before explaining what prayer is. "The word before implies that such explanations will be forthcoming, yet throughout history, people have often attained only a limited understanding of their own religion". Here is the crucial change in the modern world that presses the issue of "understanding" on increasing numbers of ordinary people. (Moran 1991: 256-257)

The child-centered approach describes education that begins with the child's own life experiences, taking account of moral and faith development theories. Confessionalreligious education denotes "instructing in one religious tradition with the aim of nurturing agreed upon beliefs, values, and practices". (Levitt/Pollard 1998: 808) The particular religion(s), which are confessed, will depend on the religious map of the country. In most cases of confessional religious education the school takes on the role of a church, mosque, or synagogue and teaches religion as true, in order to strengthen and develop the child's faith. The teachers' role is then to nurture in faith into the child. The success of religious teaching would be measured by the way the child lives or his/her future life rather than by qualifications or knowledge. The teaching of confessional religious education defined in these ways depends upon a supply of teachers committed to the faith which is to be taught, and support from the school community as a whole. (Levitt/Pollard 1998: 811)

Neo-confessional religious education describes an approach that takes into account the children's interests and stage of psychological/moral development in order to make religious education more relevant to them in content and methods, while still holding to the aim of inculcating one religious tradition. Modern versions of confessional religious education take account of changes in educational theory and practice which put more emphasis on the needs and capacities of the child. (Levitt/Pollard 1998: 811) The influence of research on children's religious development has particularly altered the approach with younger children where it was felt that too much cognitive content has been taught too soon. Instead religion must be relevant to the child's development. Therefore acts of religious worship may also be devised especially for children in whom they can take an active part.

Critics of confessional religious education label the approach as indoctrination rather than as education. There are practical and ethical problems in maintaining confessional religious education in societies that are multicultural and multi-faith. Children might be divided for religious education according to their parents' faith or divided into separate schools. And hence the school becomes a ground for the nurturing of distinctness and may impart an exclusive attitude in the student[76]. If the religious leaders do not support a pluralist perspective, and religious education is taught in an exclusive way by eventually sowing hatred, such cases may certainly produce conflicts in the respective society. (Callan 1998: 534)

(Levitt/Pollard 1998: 809) Religious education teachers help children to experience a faith different from one's own and what it means to those who practice it. (Levitt/Pollard, 1998: 813) Children do not only study other religions as academic subject but observe, meet and talk to their members and participate in their rituals. The ideal way to experience might be live for a time in another faith community, to members, and to take part (Levitt/Pollard 1998: 813) In this context, Moran states (1991: 256) a person needs not to participate in any particular religious way for an understanding of religion. However, it is very difficult to see how a person can understand a phenomenon unless he or she has some feeling or sense for it. Especially in regard to religion, the "most inner of experiences, one has to know at least what it would be like to be a practitioner of a particular religious way". (Moran 1991: 256) For those concerned about the effects of studying faiths on children other their own, the experiential approach holds more dangers than other multi-faith approaches, those opponents fear that children will be confused by those alien rituals, or even be led away from their own faith and culture (Levitt/Pollard 1998: 813-4). The implicit approach aims to assist the child in their personal search for meaning in life and therefore focuses on experience and insight rather than information about religious phenomena.

Multi-faith religious education allows the study of a variety of faith traditions either discretely or thematically using common areas or aiming to promote knowledge and understanding without necessarily suspending belief. (Levitt/Pollard, 1998: 815) Multi-faith religious education is an attempt to work with pluralism and difference rather than to combat a multiplicity of religious truth by nurture in one. Such education incorporates the skills of dialogue and conflict resolution, and promotes imaginative visions of peaceful societies. One of the difficulties it must overcome is the deeply felt beliefs of those who hold that the study of a religious tradition outside their own compromises their own faith and dilutes commitment. (Levitt/Pollard 1998: 815)

[76] See Charlene Tan 2011: Islamic Education and Indoctrination. The case in Indonesia. New York: Routledge

However, Nipkow (2006) reminds us that "One must not forget that the pupils will be instructed together in all other subjects and that the separating influence of a two-lessons subject on attitudes and behavior should not be overestimated".

In Indonesia, the historical and social context in the 1960s resulted in the compulsory education class to counter secularization of Islamic values basically based on the transmission paradigm of education. After the downfall of the Suharto regime in 1998, during the reform area, educational reform became a major concern. Then politicians and reformers felt the need to replace the former transmission paradigm of education with the contextual transformation paradigm. The following paragraphs follow Wardekker and Miedema (2001: 25-27; 29-30) in sketching both educational paradigms. Grounded on the premises of an ontological subject-object split, the transmission modelrequires the student needs to master the objective world of meanings, facts or the (cultural) stock of knowledge (accumulated culturally based insights and facts) and the general procedures. Knowledge is viewed as being an objective property. The teacher's role is to prepare information and to act as an mediator of the information that needs to be transferred to the student. The students' role is to receive, store, and act upon this information in a passive and an active mode in order to socialize and participate in society. Students are required to learn these facts and procedures precisely in the way as they are represented in the curriculum documents of the subject matter. This model rests not only on a specific view of knowledge as representation, but also on a specific view of humans as rational beings who act on the basis of properly evaluating existing knowledge. The fundamental value incorporated in this model is the view that humans have the will and ability to act rationally, that is, guided by knowledge. Those elements of culture that are more in the realm of emotions and affects tend to be excluded from the curriculum. Personality development is restricted to the extra-curricular domain.

In contrast, constructivism views learning as a process in which the learner actively constructs or builds new ideas or concepts based upon current and past knowledge. The constructionist transformation model grounds on a holistic or transactional perspective on the acquisition of knowledge, skills, norms, and values. By definition, transformation takes place in a specific social context or setting, which is not to be understood as limiting, but as constitutive for all conduct which is situated and structured through/by society and culture. Knowledge is understood as a mode of experience. The learning processes' core aspect is not the transmission of teachable contents (subject matter) of knowledge, skills, values, and norms, but rather the transformation of these contents into a heuristic base for acting as modes of being, knowing, feeling, and acting. Thereby the transformation of content and student becomes an active process on the part of the student.

The idea of participation is fundamental in the transformation model. Learning is defined as increasing capacity or growing competence of students to participate in culturally structured practices. The teacher acts as a facilitator who encourages students to discover principles for themselves and to construct knowledge by working to solve realistic problems. During the process the subject-matter, being the starting point, becomes the personal property of the pupil. In other words, to demonstrate that one masters the subject matter is not the main criterion for a successful learning process; it is only the starting point for real learning processes in which both the subject-matter and the learner are transformed. It is necessary that the students take this step in order to acquire their own personal identity. In the semiotic view then, the task of education, especially the school, is to assist young people in the double process of socialization and individuation that is becoming competent members of communities of practices. Thus, the aim of school is to built up competence, that is, to enable pupils to participate in socio-culturally structured practices that take place at a certain time and that are located within a particular societal setting (context).

PART B

4. Spirited politics: the fusion of politics and religion

The Introduction and PART A described the methodology applied in this study for selecting the research sample and linking the methodology to the research questions. This section discusses key terms in the context of national unity and religious policies to provide the historical and political background information necessary to fully grasp the dimensions of the emic Indonesian religious, political and socio-cultural thought and discourse which in the current policies on religious education. How did Indonesia integrate religious plurality? It asks further how a non-Western majority Muslim democracy does organize the relation between state and religion? Why does it seem necessary to the Indonesian government via its Ministry of Religious Affairs to define religion at all? In how far can the Indonesian model of organizing religious plurality and religious freedom provide a model and contribute to the global debate on pluralism or religious freedom? What are the limits of the *Pancasila* and such a model function? The present work analyzed the concept of *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*as the core category in the Indonesian strategy of managing diversity. The present work conceptualized religion as cultural system to be path-dependent, and according to the essential definition, the concept of the Sacred discriminates the religious from other social systems, how then is this One Supreme Lordship defined by Indonesian legislation?

4.1. Spirited politics and spiritual education in Indonesia

This chapter is concerned with the role of religion in the public sphere, and the fusion of politics and religion. In the confrontation between political Islam and the "secular" nationalists following the founding of the state, Muslim doctrine and belief (*aqidah* and *iman*) compels Muslims to respond to Indonesia's civil religion or political culture as codified in the five principles of the state in the way as they do. (Purdy 1984: 44)

4.1.1. Religion in the public sphere

Until the "sudden eruption of religion into the public sphere, not only in Europe but Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East" (Furseth/Repstad 2007: 107) in the 1980s, there was relatively widespread consensus in theory that processes of industrialization and modernization[77] would eventually lead to secularization[78], or religious differentiation, decline and privatization[79]. "Only then did many realize that differentiation did not necessarily mean that religion would remain its assigned place in the private sphere and not enter the public arena". (Furseth/Repstad 2007: 97)

Regarding the role of religion in the public sphere in modern societies, Robert N. Bellah and José Casanova argue that "religion can be a force for collective action, social unity, and political mobilization". (Furseth/Repstad 2007: 97) In consequence, rather than being defined as a process of desacralization, secularization is better thought of as a differentiation process of religious and non-religious spheres that naturally need not exclude one another. (Casanova 1994)

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[77] The process of modernization ideally involves two key stages: (1) the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society (2) the development from an industrial to a postindustrial society. The representational system undergoes mismatches between traditional normative systems and the real world, known from first hand experiences. The representational system and the worldview of the established religions are no longer persuasive or compelling as they were in the original setting. These profound changes in people's daily experience lead to changes in the prevailing cosmologies. The move from subsistence rural farming to moderate-income manufacturing generally helps to lift the most vulnerable population out of dire poverty and commonly improves standards of living, bringing urbanization, better nutrition, sanitation, and access to clean water. This development, combined with the diffusion of mass communications, gradually creates a more informed and politically aware public. The stages of societal modernization transform the living conditions for many humans by reducing their vulnerability to sudden, unpredictable risks. Rising affluence has a high probability to bring about important changes in mass belief systems and social structure, because modernization makes it necessary for religions to explain its plausibility on the level of the individual. (Norris/Inglehart 2005: 1-56)

[78] The secularization thesis of Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim postulates that modernization would include a gradual decline in levels of religiosity and a fade of the importance of religious authority. (Norris/Inglehart 2005: 41) The central claim in the argument has been that the spread of scientific knowledge and rising levels of education would bring a universal trend towards an increasingly rational worldview. The process of secularization would then bring about the systematic erosion of religious practices, values, and beliefs.

[79] The notions of the "public" and the "private" spheres refer here to the traditional dichotomous model of social relations that posits a separation between the domestic sphere of the individual, the family, and leisure, and that of dominant institutions, such as economic, legal, and political institutions. (Furseth/Repstad 2007: 97) The present discussion of religion in the public sphere in Indonesia focuses following Furseth/Repstad (2007: 97) mainly on the political sphere, "including collectives that operate at different levels, such as the nation, state, and civil society".

This is substantiated by current trends of repoliticisation and deprivatization of religion in Western society and Christianity, and other religious traditions, such as Islam and Hinduism. (Hosen 2005: 421, Willford/George 2005; Prothero 2006) Casanova notes "the private/public distinction is crucial to all conceptions of the modern social order[80] and religion itself is intrinsically connected with the modern historical differentiation of private and public spheres". (Casanova 1994: 40) Accordingly, functional differentiation of modern secular spheres is the characteristic of modernity, and today, "modern science, capitalist markets, and modern state bureaucracy manage to function "as if" God would not exist"(Casanova 1994: 40, emphasis in original).

> (T)he privatization of religion is intrinsically related to the emergence of the modern social order. To say that in the modern world "religion becomes private" refers also to the very process of institutional differentiation which is constitutive of modernity, namely, to the modern historical process whereby the secular spheres emancipated themselves from ecclesiastical control as well as from religious norms. (Casanova 1994: 40)

Casanova observes a simultaneous process of privatization and deprivatization[81] of religion in the modern world. (Casanova 1994: 231) As a result, theories of secularization can only inadequately answer the empirical fact that "religious institutions often refuse to accept their assigned marginal place in the private sphere, managing to assume prominent public roles; that religion and politics keep forming all kinds of symbiotic relations"(Casanova 1994:41). "[O]nly in modern times and predominantly western societies religion has been categorically separated from the rest of culture" (Beckford 2000: 167 in Scheifinger: 2009: 4), and this may be especially true for what Peter Berger coined the term "Eurosecurity" (Prothero 2010; Casanova 1994). In the US (Prothero 2010), India (Scheifinger 2009), and Indonesia (Hilmy 2010), commonly the life of the citizenry is inextricably bound up with religion – religion is however entirely differently integrated into the state and the constitution (for an overview see Stepan 2001).

Case studies from Christian contexts (Prothero 2006; Casanova 1994) and Southeast Asia (Franke/Pye 2006; Wilford/George 2005) show that thesecularization thesis premised on particular Western historical circumstances referring to the decline of Christianity in its institutionalized form in Western Europe. In this, the thesis is not transferable into Southeast Asian contexts or the contemporary world as a whole (Casanova 1994; Willford/George 2005: 1-32; Norris/Inglehart, 2005). On the contrary, "albeit experiencing constant dynamic transformation processes, religion is an enduring and significant dimension of Southeast Asian politics and public life in general", as religion defines and legitimates contemporary political and cultural orders in Southeast Asia. (Willford/George 2005)

Furseth and Repstadt (2007: 97-109) identify five forms in which religion is represented in the public sphere. Of relevance to the present study are primarily two such forms of religion in the public sphere, as we find those forms in Indonesia: civil religion (Bellah 1967; Atkinson 1983, Purdy 1994; Schindehütte 1996) and public religion (Casanova 1994, Hosen 2005, Hasan 2008, Hilmy 2010).

Civil religion
The concept of civil religion has its origin in Rousseau's "The Social Contract", in which he outlines the basic units of analysis of civil religion: the existence of God, the life to come, the reward of virtue and the punishment of vice, and the exclusion of religious intolerance. (Bellah 1967: 4; Furseth/Repstad 2007: 103) It was then further developed by Bellah (1967) and on this basis Purdy (1994) and Schindehütte (2006) conducted their study on civil religion in Indonesia.

Civil religion refers to a "public religious dimension … expressed in a set of common beliefs, symbols and rituals…a genuine apprehension (on the political level) of a universal and transcendent religious reality" (Bellah 1979: 179 in Purdy 1984: 5, 11) Civil religion is thought to have several functions: it offers legitimation and carries the potential for the renewal of this function (Bellah 1980 in Furseth/Repstad 2007: 103), and it has a potential for both integration and division (Bellah 1976 in Furseth/Repstad 2007: 103)

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[80] "The understanding of religion "as a private affair", is constitutive of Western modernity in a dual sense. First, it points to the fact that religious freedom, in the sense of freedom of conscience, is chronologically "the first freedom" as well as the preconception of all modern freedoms. Insofar as freedom of conscience is intrinsically related to the "right to privacy" – to the modern institutionalization of a private sphere from governmental intrusion as well as free from ecclesiastical control – and inasmuch as "the right to privacy" serves as the very foundation of modern liberalism and of modern individualism, then indeed the privatization of religion is essential to modernity." (Casanova 1994: 4, emphasis in original)

[81] Deprivatization connotes the process of religions assuming and maintaining a role in the public sphere of modern states.

In consequence, the evolution of a viable politico-religious value synthesis attainable through the acceptance of a shared symbolic system called civil religion (political culture) has been hypothesized as likely to emerge in a nation characterized by pluralism[82]. The emergent generalized beliefs and symbols of the civil religion (or political culture) would transcend particularistic religious worldviews, linguistic affiliations, and ethnic loyalties (Purdy 1984: 24) – and thereby tie together diverse social groups and legitimate the authority of the state. Following Berger and Luckmann (1967: 43 in Purdy 1984: 24), civil religion may be identified as a legitimating symbolic universe: "Symbolic universes are socially objectivated systems of meaning that refer, on the one hand, to the world of everyday life and point, on the other hand, to a world that is experienced as transcending everyday life."

Critics of the civil religion concept see it as "socially constructed myth" (Fenn 1974 in Purdy 1984: 27), representing rather a phenomenon responding to episodic crisis of legitimation than an overarching enduring legitimator of power and authority in a polity. Although "partial ideologies may serve the interests of certain groups in modern societies, the possibility of a "total ideology" which could "mobilize the passion and intelligence of an entire population" is remote (Fenn 1974: 16 in Purdy 1984: 28) As a functional claim for civil religion is that of "legitimacy" – the current study critically notes that civil religion in Indonesia does not necessarily function as integrator – more as legitimator of authority or the common *Grundnorm* (Habibie 2011, Zoelva 2010) to cement the power of the ruling elites and to balance the social forces that seem to drift apart at points of crisis.

In 1945, the official stance on religion as codified in the first principle emerged as a compromise between proponents of political Islam and those who had secular-nationalist visions of the state - although they were Muslims as well for the most part. "The compromise entailed making Indonesia an expressly religious nation without making any particular faith the religion of the state." (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 16-17) In consequence, since Indonesian independence, a new element has been introduced into the traditional and colonial religious picture in Indonesia. Atkinson (1983: 686), Purdy (1984), and Schindehütte (2006) call the result of this policy a "civil religion".

For the purpose of this study, I define the *Pancasila*, and especially the first principle, the state motto (*Bhinekka Tunggal Ika*), and all efforts undertaken by the governments to implement the principle in policies, legislation, and education, as civil religion or national culture. As *Pancasila* seems to provide the glue that guarantees public order, the principles have been understood here as a civil religion (national culture) that functions to legitimize the authority of social and societal institutions in the Indonesian nation state. (Atkinson 1983; Purdy 1984; Steenbrink 2001; Schindehütte 2006) However, one has to be aware, that in 1945, 1966 and 1998-1999, "there was a willingness to relinquish one's particularistic religious or regional identity in support of the nation's motto *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, unity in diversity, yet there were and are deviations from this tendency." (Purdy 1984: 19) Purdy (1984) and Steenbrink (1990 in Schindehütte 2006: 75) point to the diverse interpretations of *Pancasila* during national history.

Public religion
There are two different meanings of the concept of public religion: first, as a form of civic faith, and second, as expression of religion in the public sphere. (Furseth/Repstad 2007: 107) Of relevance to the present study are both meanings of the term. Similarly to the American founding fathers, but with an entirely different socio-cultural background and motivation, the Indonesian founding fathers believed that unless moral values were present in society, the constitution would be ineffective. (Furseth/Repstad 2007: 107) As religion is concerned with the common good, this common good was to be part of the public religion, which was to be demonstrated in the education system and in citizens' voluntary actions (Marty 1999: 393-4 in Furseth/Repstad 2007: 107). As the role of religion is "to help form good citizens and shape the common life" (Furseth/Repstad 2007: 107), this function of public religion is exemplarily demonstrated in the first principle and in the educational policies, which set a spiritual and religious goal of education in Indonesia.

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[82] "Until fairly recently, many scholars believed that religious diversity destabilized religious faith and with it the social and political order. Only in societies with a common faith would religion function as a sort of social glue, binding a nation and its people around shared myths, theologies, and rites". (Prothero 2006: 8) In modern societies, where religions compete within traditional and contemporary plurality, any given religion would undergo a crisis of credibility, because "[r]eligions can legitimate the state and stabilize the social order only when they carry with them the transcendent power of the sacred" (Prothero 2006: 8) - in theory, religious plurality results in a crisis of legitimacy. However, Prothero shows how pluralism and plausibility can go hand in hand and that religious diversity does not lead to inevitably secularization.

The second concept of public religion refers to one side of the distinction between public and private in social research. "Public religion has to do with expressions of religious faith or behavior in the public sphere made by individuals, communities, voluntary associations, or governmental agencies (the state)". (Furseth/Repstad 2007: 107) "The novelty of modernity derives precisely from the emergence of an amorphous complex, yet autonomous sphere, the "civil society" or "the social", which stands "between public and private proper", yet has expansionist tendencies aiming to penetrate and absorb both". (Casanova 1994: 42, emphasis in original) Using a historical approach, Casanova (1994) divides society into three spheres – the state, political society, and civil society[83]. (Furseth/Repstad 2007: 107) Those three spheres are characterized by highly porous and constantly shifting boundaries. "Indeed, each of the three spheres may be said to have both private and public dimensions". (Casanova 1994: 42)

In this, a modern polity is conceptualized here as consisting of three differentiated public arenas: the state, political society, and civil society. The public sphere provides a broad arena for action. Because the public space is a constitutive dimension of each of these arenas, we can locate religion in each of the three public spheres of the polity; as a consequence, public religions can perform in every sphere or arena - but this is not necessarily true for all societies. (Casanova 1994; Furseth/Repstad 2007: 107) The term public sphere refers to "the site where contest take place over the definition of the obligations, rights, and especially notions of justice that members of society require for the common good to be realized". (Eickelmann/Salvatore 2004: 5 in Hilmy 2010: 213) This definition assumes the participation of all segments of society, including Islamists, along with the process of defining the common good. However, the concept of the public sphere has been commonly conflated with the concept of civil society. (Hilmy 2010: 213) Civil society entails a public sphere, but not every public sphere entails a civil society (Eisenstadt 2002: 141 in Hilmy 2010: 213)

Christian state religions or churches, serve as well known example of public religions in the sphere of the state, whereas in the arena of political society public religions are institutionalized in political parties competing with other religious or secular parties or are mobilized as a movement against other religions or secular movements. In the economic arena, public religion may protest against exploitation and claim morals to be introduced into the regulation of the free (from God and morals) and capitalist market. And, in the family, religion belongs to the private sphere. (Casanova 1994; Stepan 2001; Furseth/Repstad 2007: 107)

In Indonesia we find at the level of the state a civil religion as expressed in the first principle of *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*. At the level of the political society we find the *Pancasila*, political Islam, institutions of all six state funded religions, whereas in civil society religion went public expressed in public Islam, political Islam, and all associations and institutions of all six state funded religions and not state funded religions. (Smith-Kipp 1982; Howell 1978; 1982; 2003) Whereas "*the* religious remains … a separated area of life in the West" (Pocock 1973: xiii, emphasis in original, in Scheifinger 2009: 4; see also Casanova 1994; Stepan 2001), this separation between the secular sphere and the religious sphere is not to be found in the *Pancasila* State[84]. The idea of making the public sphere more Islamic is driven mainly by the basic nature of Islam as a communal religion. (Hilmy 2010: 217)

In post-New Order Indonesia Hefner (2000) sees an effort reinvigorating the old paradigm of the state with a new spirit of public Islam. (Hilmy 2010: 67) Despite thirty years of authoritarian rule, Hefner emphasizes that "Indonesia can develop a democracy of its own, not a secular or liberal one as it is commonly understood in the Western literature" (Hilmy 2010: 66) Rather than relegating Islam to the realm of the private, Indonesian Muslims use a "middle-path between liberalism's privatization and conservative Islam's bully state. The path passes by way of public religion that makes itself heard through independent associations, spirited public dialogue, and the demonstrated decency of believers." (Hefner 2000: 18 in Hilmy 2010: 67)

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[83] In this context, Stepan (2001) identified five interconnected, mutually supporting arenas to consolidate democracy during democratic transition: Civil society, political society, rule of law, state apparatus, and economic society.

[84] "Although there is the tendency to interpret "the "deprivatization" of modern religion as anti-modern fundamentalist reactions to inevitable processes of modern differentiation"(Casanova 1994:43), Casanova decidedly argues for a role of religion in the public sphere, and the benefit of religious critiques in modern public life "some forms of "public religion" may also be understood as counterfactual normative critiques of dominant historical trends, in many respects similar to the classical, republican, and feminist critiques"(Casanova 1994: 43). Therefore it is insufficient to measure the "public impact of those religious critiques (…) in terms of the ability of any religion to impose its agenda upon society or to press its global normative claims upon the autonomous spheres"(Casanova 1994: 43).

In other words, Indonesia's democracy will be characterized by the integrality of religion and public life. Secular democracy assumes the retreat of religion from the public stage to the privacy of personal belief. Therefore, the political discourse, Muslims are forging is not identical to that of Western liberalism. The questions to be addressed then are according to Hilmy (2010: 68-9), "how or in what ways Islam might be promoted as a source for ethical values in public life", and about "the significance of Islam in forging good governance or democracy at state level".

The emergence of Islamism in post-New Order Indonesia in one way or another signifies the emergence of public Islam. In contrast to what Hefner categorizes as "Civil Islam", which tends to denote civil society, "public Islam" in the context of Islamism refers to the Islamist struggles to put Islam at the centre of the public domain. Central to the notion of public Islam is the Islamists' quest for the implementation of the *Syari'ah* law, believed to be the quintessence of Islam, in the public sphere, either by means of existing political structures, namely the state and its apparatus, or non-political structures, that is, society at large. As far as Indonesian Islamists are concerned, there will always be deliberate efforts by the Islamists to champion Islam as the only blue-print for the whole society amid the various public discourses over what constitutes the common good. (Hilmy 2010: 213; Pepinsky/Liddle/Mujani 2010) Under these circumstances, democratic participation becomes necessary for all elements of society to negotiate and interact with one another concerning the definition of the public good. In this context, civil society can serve as a watchdog element in democratic societies, to give checks and balances and too see that public matters in the public sphere are properly dealt with by government. (Hilmy 2010: 214)

Spirited politics and spirited education

The intersection of religion, ethnicity, and nationalism in Southeast Asia and Indonesian public life shows how religion and politics serve each other and how religious plurality can be constructed retaining credibility and plausibility. "In Indonesia, debates and attempts to reform the state imply a broad and deep-seated view of the state as the desired public arbiter and defender of religious values[85]. (Wilford/George 2005) Religions and people who think that religion has to play a role on the political agenda are provided a room to maneuver in the Indonesian nation state. If seeking room for maneuver is interpreted as attempt to find political footing, it does not naturally imply opposition or resistance, because individuals and groups are calculating or complicit in using the state to advance their interests, when working publicly for legal and cultural change in line with their religious concerns. (Wilford/George 2005)

"Although there is the tendency to interpret "the "deprivatization" of modern religion as anti-modern fundamentalist reactions to inevitable processes of modern differentiation"(Casanova 1994:43), Casanova decidedly argues for a role of religion in the public sphere, and the benefit of religious critiques in modern public life "some forms of "public religion" may also be understood as counterfactual normative critiques of dominant historical trends, in many respects similar to the classical, republican, and feminist critiques"(Casanova 1994: 43). Therefore it is insufficient to measure the "public impact of those religious critiques (…) in terms of the ability of any religion to impose its agenda upon society or to press its global normative claims upon the autonomous spheres". (Casanova 1994: 43).

A common feature of Southeast Asian everyday politics is that the dimensions of religion and religious reform which are used by elites in various public arenas to articulate and re-articulate the hierarchies and boundaries of shifting class and kinship relations. Religious discourse is not only a feature of private life worlds, but a facet of the public sphere and politics, "both in colonial settings and in the "derivative" postcolonial nationalisms". (Willford/ George 2005: 16, emphasis in original) In this light, nation-state and public sphere are proactively used as arenas for religious and social reform. (Hilmy 2010)

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[85] On the integration of political Islam in Indonesia, see Hilmy 2010: Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia. Piety and pragmatism. Singapore: ISEAS; Pepinsky/Liddle R. William/Mujani, Saiful: 2009. Testing Political Islam's Economic Advantage: the case of Indonesia, www.lsi.or.id (25.04.2010); Pepinsky/Liddle/Mujani 2010. Indonesian Democracy and the Transformation of Political Islam, www.lsi.or.id (25.04.2010)

The public sphere of religious discourse is a hierarchical arena in which elite figures attempt to speak for public interests, projects, and values and so install themselves as authoritative class of moral, political, and cultural interpreters. Notably these elites can dominate sites of religious discourse, such as courts, schools, universities, art galleries, publications or broadcast media means that they are able to control the ideological and discursive traffic within and between nation-states and across transnational religious communities. (Willford/ George 2005: 16, emphasis in original)

The politics of religion has a long history in Indonesia (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers 1987: 15), leaders in both the New Order and the old have used religion to legitimize or to attain their goals. (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 20) Spirited politics and spirited education are two salient features characterizing Indonesian contemporary politics. Religionis a dominant factor in the everyday life of Indonesians and the diverging system of values has a long history in which almost all world religions left an imprint. Starting with the Indonesian national movement and independence up to the era of democratization, the process of modernization and social change questions the validity of traditional values and communal conditions. (Howell 1978) Hence, a value-vacuum or/and conflicts of values arise concurrently with an intense quest for answers to such value-related conflicts. This implicates that competing systems of values, public religion, and a religious dimension of education are determining factors in national politics, as the Basic Law and national development plans position religion to be the first national value to be realized in society, nation, and state.

Spirited politics refers to the neat intertwinement of state and religion as basic feature of Indonesian society and its political culture, as religion, tradition, and law do not follow the separation of state and religion as in the European model, but found their own model to organize the liaison between state and religion. (Zoelva Interview 2011) Religion served a central social function of integration in the spirited communal Indo Melanesian cultures, and it plays a significant and vital role in contesting and supporting national unity and integration today. Another feature of spirited politics is a tendency to acculturation in religious issues. It is a well-known topic that Javanese culture assimilated foreign religious influences to a point that it melted with the autochthonous underlying tradition which was pertained in an acculturated manner (Franke 2006). In other words, the encounter of resilient local religious traditions with Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, and the nation state results in contemporary "spirited politics" (Willford/George 2005) or "spiritualized politics". (Häuser-Schäublin 2011) A result of spirited politics is spiritual education as the specific Indonesian conception of education outlined in the Basic Law and legislation pertaining to education and the religion class.

4.1.2. Note on Indonesian Islam

> "We must consider, too, the politics internal to Islam and internal to those ethnic groups that define themselves as Muslims." (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 25)

The current study is not about Islam or Indonesian Islam. Yet, given the religious demography of Indonesia, an understanding of the cultural variants within Islam and Indonesian Islam is crucial to an understanding of religious education. The Islamic *Shafi'i* culture resulted in various interpretations of Islam as the examples of Islamic mass organizations *Nadhlatul Ulama*, *Muhammadiyah* and the Indonesian Council of Ulema demonstrate. Dutch colonialism led to the politization of Islam and religion in general, a tendency that continues until today. The post-1949 nation-building efforts introduced the discrimination between religion (*agama*) and belief (*kepercayaan*). The discrimination is entirely Islamic, as *agama* is a revealed religion and *kepercayaan* is interpreted as man-made. Following years of De-Islamization and depolitization during the Suharto regime, Islam went public again in the 1970s. In the Indonesian political and public space today, we find public Islam and political Islam.

The present study suspects all religions to be multifaceted and multivocal. (Stepan 2000; Hilmy 2010: 30) Esposito stresses that Islam is not a monolithic bloc. (Esposito 2009) According to Esposito, in doing research on Islam, the question "whose Islam" has to be answered first because Islam is presented through the voices and representatives of Muslim groups and individuals. In this light, Moosa (2003 in Hilmy 2010: 30) and al-Azmeh (1993 in Hilmy 2010: 30) note that "there are many 'islams' with a small 'i', and many Muslims with differences in their practices and understandings, since each person or Muslim community appropriates the discursive tradition differently." Thus, Olivier Roy (2004: 9 in Hilmy 2010: 30) holds that "the many Islams (liberal, fundamentalist, conservative) with which we are familiar are more a construction than a reality". However, all Muslims regard the al-Quran to be the central religious text which has been revealed to Prophet Muhammad. So, which Islam do we encounter then in Indonesia?

Since Islam is in itself multivocal, so is Islam in Indonesia. The established liberal Muslim intellectual Madjid notes, Indonesia is in religious terms the largest Muslim nation located at the very East of the Islamic belt stretching from Morocco to South East Asia. But the state is "the least Arabicized of the major Islamic countries, in addition from being geographically farthest from the Holy Lands", (Madjid 1994: 59), thus one may not overlook "the cultural diversity within the unity of Islamic civilization". (Tibi 1995) "Apart from its core center in the Middle East, Islamic civilization has given rise to different cultural zones in West and East Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, Central Asia and Southeast Europe[86]", but all "these cultural zones are religiously and culturally very much influenced by the Middle Eastern core region." (Tibi 1995)

Tibi sees this caused by the fact that the al-Quran was revealed in Arabic language and Arabia was the place where the revelation took place. As a visible sign non-Arab Sunnites (90 percent of all Sunnites) have an Arab or Arabic name. (Tibi 1995, Madjid 1994) The majority of Indonesian Muslims are Sunnite. Most Indonesians belong to the *Shafi'i* school of law/confession of Sunnism[87]. (Tibi 1995) 241 million Indonesians (Lumbard 2010: 50) are Muslims and also part of 300 different ethnic cultures. That is why the great cultural variety is a main characteristic of Indonesian Islam.

To demonstrate the significance of the Indonesian liaison between state and religion, I found it helpful to present Indonesian Islam in a global context. Today, worldwide 1.57 billion Muslims live, who represent 23% of an estimated 2009 world population of 6.8 billion (Pew Oct 2009). Whereas the majority (62%) of the global Muslim population is located in the Asia-Pacific region[88], only 20% live in the Middle East and North Africa, the region with the highest percentage of Muslim-majority countries (Pew October 2009: 1). Of the total Muslim population the majority are Sunnis, while an estimated 10-13% percent belong to the Shiite minority[89]. The graphic gives on overview of the distribution of Muslims on the globe.

[86] Like other religions, Islam is a multivocal religion that can provide institutional and intellectual resources in support of democracy and vice versa (Hilmy 2010: 29; Stepan 2001) This multivocal nature of Islam means at any point in time, the dominant voices in Islam might prove more or less receptive to the basic principle of democracy. (Hilmy 2010: 29) Thus there might be no "Islamic exceptionalism" when it comes to democracy but probably "Arab exceptionalism" (Stepan/Robertson 2004: 140-146 in Hilmy 2010: 29) Stepan/Robertson's (2004: 140-146 in Hilmy 2010: 29) statistical assessment shows that "a non-Arab Muslim-majority country was almost twenty times more likely to be 'electorally competitive' than an Arab Muslim-majority country. Of the forty-seven Muslim majority countries, six (non Arab) were found to be "electorally competitive": Turkey, Senegal, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Mali, and Niger". Given the remarkable achievements in developing its democracy, Indonesia is considered a "semi-democracy in the World Values Survey, a category used to describe forty-seven countries around the globe that have experienced democracy for less than twenty years and have current Freedom House ratings of 3.5 to 5.5. (Hilmy 2010: 65) Freedom House describes them in 2009 as free to indicate that these countries subscribe to "full-fledged democracy". (Freedom House 2009; Pepinsky/Liddle/Mujani 2009: 20) According to Hilmy (2010: 65), the assumption that Islam, as the majority religion in Indonesia, is responsible for the slow process of democratization is theoretically unfounded. (Hilmy 2010: 65)

[87] Sunni and Shiite Islam comprise the two main streams within Islam. Sunni and Shia identities first formed around a dispute over leadership succession soon after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D. Gradually the political divide between both groups broadened to include theological distinctions and differences in religious practices. While the two sects are similar in many ways, they differ over conceptions of religious authority and interpretation as well as the role of the Prophet Muhammad's descendants. For readers seeking more detail on categories commonly used, Sunnis include followers of the Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki and Hanbali schools of Islamic jurisprudence as well as the Wahhabi or Salafi movement. Shia include Ithna Asharis (Twelvers), Ismailis, Zaydis, Alevis and Alawites. There also are a few Muslim groups that are difficult to classify as either Sunni or Shia. (PEW October 2009: 1-2, 8-9; Esposito, John/Kalin, Ibrahim 2009: 11-19)

[88] The Pew Center includes 51 Asian and Pacific countries into the Asia-Pacific region: East Asian countries as China, Taiwan, Japan, South- and Southeast Asian countries, Polynesia and Oceania, but also countries located west as Iran, Azerbaijan and Turkey. For a complete breakdown of countries by region, see Pew October 2009: 12 and 27

[89] Data on sectarian affiliation have been infrequently collected or, in many countries, not collected at all. Therefore, the Sunni and Shiite numbers reported here are expressed as broad ranges and should be treated as approximate. Pew Center finds that most Shiite people (between 68% and 80%) live in just four countries: Iran, Pakistan, India and Iraq. Between 116 million and 147 million Shiites live in Asia, representing about three-quarters of the world's Shiite population (note that Iran is included in the Asia-Pacific region). Meanwhile, nearly a quarter of the world's Shiite (36 million to 44 million) live in the Middle East-North Africa. (PEW Research October 2009: 1)

Muslims Population by Region

Europe
38.1m
2.4%

Americas
4.6 million
0.3%

Sub-Saharan Africa
240.6m
15.3%

Middle East-North Africa
315.3m
20.1%

Asia-Pacific
972.5m
61.9%

Muslim in Asia-Pacific by Subregion

Pacific
0.5 million
<1%

Central-Western Asia
235m
24%

Southeast-East Asia
253m
26%

South Asia
484m
50%

Forum on Religion & Public Life, Pew Research Center's October 2009: 6, 13

Muslim Population of
Indonesia

According to a 2010 Pew Forum demographic study,
205 MILLION
is the estimated **Muslim** population of Indonesia...

INDONESIA

...which is
88%
of the **total** population of Indonesia...

10 Countries with the Largest Number of Muslims (in millions)

...and makes up
13%
of the total **world** Muslim population.

178 177 149 80 76 75 75 35 32

Indonesia Pakistan India Bangladesh Egypt Nigeria Iran Turkey Algeria Morocco

Data from Pew Forum's forthcoming report on the world's Muslim population, 2011.
Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life

Muslims living in the Asia-Pacific region constitute 62% of all Muslims worldwide. About half of the Muslim population within Asia lives in South Asia (50%) and the remainder are somewhat equally divided between Southeast-East Asia (26%) and Central-Western Asia (24%). The six Asian countries with the largest Muslim populations are: Indonesia (241 million (Lumbard 2010: 50[90]), Pakistan (174 million), India (161 million), Bangladesh (145 million), Iran (74 million), and Turkey (74 million). (PEW Oct 2009: 5) Together these six countries are home to about 85% of Asia's Muslim population and more than half (53%) of the global Muslim population. (PEW Oct 2009: 6;13). Indonesia is the nation with the world's largest Muslim population; this is to say that about 13% of all Muslims in the world live in Indonesia. Indonesia's Muslim population accounts for about 80% of all Muslims living in Southeast-East Asia. (Pew Oct 2009: 13)

http://pewforum.org/Muslim/Muslim-Population-of-Indonesia.aspx

In the third edition of the 500 most influential Muslims (Lumbard 2010: 31-33), incumbent president Dr Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono ranks at top 9, among others following the king of Saudia-Arabia, the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, Ayotallah Khomeini, the king of Jordan, and the Grand Imam of the Al Azhar Mosque Prof. el-Thayeb. Top 19 is held by Dr KH Said Aquil Siradj, who "guides millions through his work" (Lumbard 2010 : 70) as Chairman of *Nahdlatul Ulama*[91], Indonesia's movement of traditional Sunni thought with 30 million members. It exaggerates influence in administration, politics, and education.

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[90] PEW (Oct 2009) states 203 million, but the data refers to the 2000 census.

[91] In 1926, the *Nadhlatul Ulama* (Awakening of Ulama) was established as an organization for traditional orthodox Muslims opposed to the policies of the modernist Muhammadiyah organization, which explicitly rejected pre-Islamic Javanese traditions. According to their website, membership amounts to estimated 40 million members. The network covers 30 regions with 339 branches, 12 special branches, 2,630 representative councils, and 37,125 subbranch representative councils across Indonesia. (Lumbard 2010 : 70) This network practices the doctrine of *Ahlas Sunnah w'al Jama'ah*, which is Arabic for "people of the *Sunna* (practices of the Prophet Muhammad) and the community". They base their practices on the traditional sources of Islamic jurisprudence — mainly the Qur'an, *Hadith*, and major schools of law. Therefore the NU is commonly described as the example of Indonesian Islamic Traditionalism. With a mainly rural membership base, the *Nahdlatul Ulama* distinguishes itself from other Islamic organizations in Indonesia by positioning itself as a premier organization of traditional Islam—with an emphasis on education and political engagement based on Islamic principles. (Lumbard 2010 : 70)

The NU may be characterized as "Indonesia's largest independent Muslim organization and one of the world's most influential Islamic organizations". (Lumbard 2010: 70) Dr M Din Syamsuddin, who acts as Chairman of the Muhammadiyah[92], the second largest socio-religious organization in Indonesia, and as vice general chair of the Indonesian Council of Ulama [93] (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, MUI) ranks top 39. MUI is an organization consisting of Islamic clerics and Muslim intellectuals who aim to reach the common goals of Islam in Indonesia. Syamsuddin's opposition to religious pluralism has guided his work, taking the Muhammadiyah on a more conservative track. (Lumbard 2010: 90)

Since the downfall of Suharto, there is ample proof for a quite un-pluralistic fraction or hard-liners in the Indonesian Muslim community splitting the whole nation in factions. The Islamic fundamental movement and its organizations that are working towards an Islamic state in Indonesia constitute a hindering aspect for the development of religious pluralism and delay to some extent the efforts in promoting religious pluralism. (Nahrowi 2005; Yang 2005) In Indonesian Islam a classic distinction is made between traditionalist-contextual and modernist fractions. The traditionalist fractions tend to practice contextual Islam. (Hooker 1978; 2003; Hosen 2005; Hasan 2008; Hilmy 2010) In the modernist Islamic community, *ukhuwah Islamiyah*, there are broadly speaking two fractions, those with pan-Islamic purist to fundamental interpretations (Wahhabites and Salafis) and those with a nationalist or *Pancasila*istic understanding.

The first comprises people that emphasize the priority of solidarity within the pan-Islamic community. They call on the state to protect this community against violations and intrusions that come in the form of efforts to convert Muslims, to urge them to marry outside the community, or to break up Islamic organizations under pretence of antiterrorism actions. (Bowen: 2004) Supporters of the second line of thought, are aware of a critical way of thinking and have an alternative notion of *ukhuwah*, understood as the community of all Indonesians rather than just Indonesian Muslims by referring to the Constitution of Medina of prophet Muhammad, under which Jews and adherents to other religions lived together with Muslims, as a charter for an Islamic theory of religious pluralism. (Bowen: 2004)

Following the peak of religiously legitimated violence after 1998, the government, human agents, and NGOs put the task to redefine "harmony of religious life" (Hasan 2008: 26) or the co-existence of religious communities into action. This effort faces opposition from Islamist understanding. The Indonesian Council of Ulama issued 11 fatwa (religious decrees) in July 2005. These decrees arouse controversies and heated debates because three of these fatwa were highly controversial as they banned secularism, pluralism, and religious liberalism. The Indonesian Ulama' Council considered these things as bad because they only employ rational ways of thinking freely, not religious-based thinking. (Nahrowi 2005) The Council defined secularism as concept that considers religion only to be concerned with the relationship between religion and God, while the relationship among humans is not a religious concern. Additionally, the Council defined pluralism as the concept that every religion is the same, and characteristically relativistic so that no one can claim the truth of the religion. (Nahrowi 2005: 10) A controversial issue is primarily about the definition that the Council uses to define pluralism.

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[92] The Muhammadiyah represents the modernist Sunni school of thought and the organization has over 28 million members. It operates in the health and education sector, maintains 5,754 affiliate schools, and 5 Islamic universities, and runs numerous medical clinics and hospitals across the country. (Lumbard 2010: 90)

[93] To strengthen its hegemony over society and expand its power and control, the New Order attempted to domesticate the social force of religious Muslim scholars (*ulama*) during the early 1970s. They proposed the creation of a semi-governmental body, the Indonesian Council of Ulama (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, MUI) assigned with the function of issuing religious legal opinions (fatwas) and religious advice (tausiyah). In 1970, the Centre for Indonesian Islamic Propagation (*Pusat Dakwah Islam Indonesia*), a body established by the

Ministry of Religious Affairs announced this idea to the public during a national conference. During a second national conference, Minister of Religion Mukti Ali facilitated another conference of Muslim preachers in 1974. "Suharto delivered the opening address at this conference, in which he insisted on the need for a nationwide body of ulama that could serve as, among other functions, the translator of the concepts and activities of development as well as the mediator between the government and ulama". (Ichwan 2005 in Hasan 2008: 26). At this time, MUI was expected to be the representative of Muslims in inter-religious dialogues. Launched by Minister Mukti Ali, those interreligious dialogues aimed to build 'the harmony of religious life', that is, the peaceful coexistence of religious groups (Mujiburrahman 2006 in Hasan 2008: 26). The Indonesian Ulama' Council was founded as an organization on July 26, 1975. The nature of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia as a body whose creation was instigated by the New Order regime was soon visible. It was involved in polemics and issued a number of (controversial) fatwa legitimizing government policies (Mudzhar 1993 in Hasan 2008: 26). On the early fatwa see Hooker 2003; on recent fatwa see Nahrowi 2005.

Practicing contextual Muslims argued, the Council could not ban Muslims from thinking, because pluralism, liberalism, and secularism are not ideologies but ways of thinking and they hold that these fatwa are against freedom of expression and human rights in general[94]. (Nahrowi 2005: 10) On top of that the Council banned Ahamadiyah's doctrine and forbid collective inter-faith prayer[95]. Although these fatwa are not legally binding in Indonesia, they are an important source of guidance for many Muslims and "the inclination to follow these decrees without any critical thinking has undeniably occurred" (Nahrowi 2005) and there is a tendency towards increasing support of Islamic radical groups and even religiously motivated violence.

A tiny but voiced minority of Muslims is involved with fundamentalist organizations that use violence. There are dozens of militia-type organizations, the most prominent have been the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and *Laskar Jihad*. The underground radical Islamic network that allegedly cooperates with the Al-Qaeda network, which is classified as terroristic by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, at the U.S. Department of State, is *Jema'ah Islamiyah* (JI)[96]. (Crouch 2003: 23) Although JI remained underground, in August 2000 Abu Bakar Ba'asyir established the 'above-ground' Indonesian Mujahedin Council comprising various fundamentalist groups, of which nevertheless not all advocate violence. (Crouch 2003: 23)[97] The religious radicalism in society can be explained through a trend to literally interpret the Al-Quran hence ignoring the context, to be *syari'ah* (Islamic law) minded and anti-pluralist. Considering that, it is a tough task to establish religious pluralism within the exclusive Islamic radical community. (Nahrowi 2005; Yang 2005; Hasan 2008)

According to the liberal Muslim Ulil Abshar Abdallah (JIL) the claims to establish a Islamic states are not to be taken to serious, "they are a mouse which roars like a tiger" (Schindehütte 2006: 77; 77 FN 81) Likewise, Zoelva (Interview 2010) whose party advocated the Jakarta Charter (the constitutional obligation for Indonesian Muslims to follow the *syari'ah*) in 1999, rejects my suggestion that Indonesia would drift slowly towards an Islamic State as "Impossible!". First, in 1945 during the foundation of the state, the issue was actually not whether a state based on Islam shall be established, but that a state based on belief in One Supreme Lordship shall be established, which regulates the obligation for the Muslim population to follow Islamic law (*syari'ah*). Second, because Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's "ultra-right" model of Mujahidin only has a few followers and therefore no influence at all. "Even if he travels the country and holds speeches everywhere, still, he has no considerable influence". (Zoelva Interview 201o) The fractionalization of Indonesian Muslims exemplarily shows that "religion is an area of power contestation over religious meanings and truth", as "the process of reconstruction and deconstruction play an integral part in the making of religious dogma. In other words, religious concepts are subject to public contestation" (Hilmy 2010: 31) "The process of confirmation, challenge, and validation of religious concepts will continue as long as an institutional mechanism for such processes exists." (Hilmy 2010: 31)

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[94] The Jakarta Post 2005: MUI's fatwa encourage use of violence, in: The Jakarta Post.com, August 1, 2005 in: Nahrowi 2005: 10

[95] MUI considered that such prayer is *halal* (allowed) only if the leader of the prayer is Muslim. Yet, if another religious leader leads a prayer, it is prohibited for Muslims to participate.

[96] Compare from the terrorism designation list at (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/); for additional detailed information on Indonesian Islamic networks see International Crisis Group reports and briefings (http://www.crisisgroup.org/)

[97] See also Hasan 2008; Hilmy 2010; International Crisis Group reports and briefings (www.crisisgroup.org/); Conboy, Ken 2006: The Second Front. Inside Asia's Most Dangerous terrorist Network. Jakarta: Equinox; Manullang, A.C. Terrorism & Perang Intellijen. Behauptung ohne Beweis. Jakarta: Manna Zaitun; Rohan/Gunaratna2003: Inside Al Qaeda. Global Nework on Terror. New York: Berkley Books; Ramakrishna/Tan 2003: After Bali. The threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia. Institue of Defense and Strategic Studies: Singapore; Liddle, William 1996: The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation, in: Journal of Asian Studies, 55: 3 (Aug. 1999), 613-634; Liddle, William/Mujani, Saiful 2007: Leadership, Party and Religion: Explaining Voting Behaviour in Indonesia, in: Comparative Political Studies 40 (July 2007): 832-857

4.2. Indonesia: Between Public Islam and Civil religion (1945-2009)

The Indonesian government's religion policy stands as a significant example of the diversity that actually exists in the Muslim world in the handling of religion-state relationships, notwithstanding the ideal that for Muslims God's truth as revealed in the Quran should shape every aspect of social life. (Howell 2003: 1)

The religious charter of Indonesia is a cultural model for inclusiveness; but in a profound way its application is exclusive. The policy covers only world religions presumed to be monotheistic, to possess a written scripture, and to transcend ethnic boundaries.
(Atkinson 1983: 688)

This chapter discusses the specific Indonesian pattern of organizing the state-religion liaison. The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*, NKRI) is neither a country based on one religion (Indonesia is neither a theocracy, nor an Islamic republic) nor is it a laicist or secular state that fosters a separation between state and religion. As Islam was important in mobilizing resistance to the colonial Dutch government, this role of Islam has been recognized in the 1945 Constitution, which commits the state to supporting religion.In consequence, Indonesia is a religious state. However, considering ethnic and religious diversity, Indonesia's founding fathers did not use the Arabic term 'Allah' to refer to 'God' in the Constitution, (Howell 2003: 1) and over several decades, 'religion' (*'agama'*) has beenlegally and administratively concretized in six specific religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. Thus, according to Howell (2003: 1), the country implements a policy of what might be called "delimited pluralism" – or authoritarian pluralism - since the inception of Indonesia's New Order (1966-1998), which imposes on citizens the obligation to acknowledge one out of "a limited number of world religions". (Howell 2003: 1)

Whereas Indian law courts have faced difficulties regarding the nature of religion, (Scheifinger 2009: 4) in Indonesia, the Ministry of Religious Affairs had formalized the Indonesian concept of religion in the term *agama* in 1952, Parliamentary Decision in 1960 (*KetetapanMPRS No. II/1960*) defined *agama* as to be universal, Presidential Decision 1/1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and Desecration guaranteed state funding to six religions, and this legislation has been has by the Constitutional Court in April 2010. The debates and discussions evolving around the retaining of the contested legislation to acknowledge only six religions and to propagate a state-sponsored version of each faith tradition, in order to secure public order, show the problems states and law systems face regarding the term religion. In the following, a list of regulations pertaining to the definition and management of religion in Indonesia is provided.

1.) The amended 1945 basic law is the highest law of the Republic of Indonesia. In its preamble five principles (*Pancasila*) are enshrined as national basic norm (*Grundnorm*, Habibie 2011, Zoelva Interview 2010) - all consequential legislation must be in line with those principles. The first principle, faith in One Supreme Lordship, "inspires (*menjiwai*) other four principles" (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 15), and it "lays out the moral base for state and government and guarantees national unity basing on religiousness"[98]; thereby it prescribes national monotheism or monism and a religious, but not a confessional base for the state.

2.) In similar fashion to the first principle, Article 29 (1) on religion of the 1945 Basic Law states "the state is based in faith in One Supreme Lordship" and in this, again national monotheism and a religious base for the state are codified by the Basic Law. During the second amendment, the parliament approved retaining the original language of Article 29 on religion, thereby rejecting efforts to establish a constitutional basis for an Islamic state. Further, as a crucial part of the Basic Law, Article 29 (2) imparts the right to freedom of religion and belief. It states that the state guarantees every citizen (*penduduk*) the freedom to embrace a respective religion (*memeluk agama masing.masing*) and to do religious service according to that *agama*or belief system (*kepercayaan).* The Article, however, introduces a specific Islamic discrimination between revealed religion (*agama*) and man-made faith or belief system (*kepercayaan*). Thereby it limits religious freedom as it is codified in Human Rights instruments. "Religious freedom is guaranteed to all Indonesian citizens who subscribe to an officially sanctioned faith." (Atkinson 1983: 689) Local systems of ritual and cosmology are, with several exceptions, among those the case of the Balinese from 1950-1965, denied the status of a religion. In consequence, freedom of religion entails only positive, but prohibits negative freedom of religion in Indonesia.

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[98] Presidential Decision 1/1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and Desecration of *Agama,* elucidation

The legal process of defining the first principle began in 1952.

3.) In 1952, the Ministry of Religions defined a monothetical Indonesian concept of religion in the term *agama*; (see chapter on *agama*) (Atkinson 2003) The Indonesian word *agama* translates roughly as the English word religion. "The phrase calls to mind the ways people use religious rationales to build unity and loyalty within a polity, to explain conflict, and to legitimate authority." (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 14)

4.) In the 1960s, the national parliament specified the meaning of religion.In 1960, the second decision of the national parliament (KetetapanMPRS No. II/1960)held that "religions (*agama*) deserving full government legitimation were to be understood narrowly as 'religions long recognised by the world'." (Howell 2003: 4) The decision restricted *agama* to those religions already recognized in the world, thereby dissociating religious traditions from particular ethnic group heritages and universalizing them. (Howell 1978; 2003: 4-5) But the decision clarified doctrinal implications of the first principle only by stating a belief propounded by world religions that becomes a source of pure spirituality and noble and pure character. (Howell 1978, 2003: 4-5) This decision and political tension in international and national politics in the early 1960s clearly influenced the Hindu Council's decision to change the name of Balinese religion from Hindu Bali to Hindu Dharma in 1964. (Howell 2003: 5)

5.) The government formally approved of six named *agama* in the elucidation to Paragraph 1, Presidential Decision No. 1/1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and Desecration of *Agama*. Thereby the government removed support and protection from any other groups that might claim to be religions. (Howell 2003: 5)The Decision recognized faith in One Supreme Lordship as expressed in those *agama* of whichthe principal teachings are known to the Ministry of Religions, e.g. the creeds of Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism[99]. Moreover, a separate paragraph advised "each to return to its source [in one of the recognized religions]". (Howell 2004: 3) "Further, 'good' Hindus, Buddhists, Confucians, Muslims, and Christians were to submit exclusively to the requirements of their separate faiths, as defined by their respective religious authorities and approved by the Ministry of Religion." (Howell 2003: 5, emphasis in original) Acknowledgement of a religion is thus a basic obligation of citizenship. The same act rules that those six religions receive state funding, benefits and protection according to 1945 Basic Law Paragraph 29.

Other religions as Judaism, Zarathustrianism, Shintoism, and Taoism were mentioned in the Presidential Decision. Those religions are not forbidden, as they were granted freedom of association, but on the grounds of their small numbers, they are simply not eligible to state-funding and their adherents face social and legal restrictions in spreading their teachings or disseminating their symbols openly. (Howell 2003: 5) Later in 1969, the government adopted Presidential Decision No. 1 of 1965 into Act No 5/1969. (UU No 5/1969) Recently in April 2010, the 2003 established Constitutional Court dismissed a petition for judicial review of the Act and thereby strengthened "the 'high modern' construction of religion that undergirded the formulation of Indonesian law and administration of religion in the 1960s and 1970s". (Howell 2003: 3)

6.) Criminal Code 156a regulates a maximum five years imprisonment for verbal or physical expressions of a) religious hatred against, abuse or desecration of one of the six state sanctioned *agama;* b.) aiming to persuade people to leave a respective faith in One Supreme Lordship (*Tuhanan Yang Maha Esa*)[100].

7.) During the constitutional amendments from 1999 up to 2002, Article 29 and its discrimination between religion and belief system were confirmed. In addition to Article 29 amended Basic Law, Article 28 on human rights manifests the Indonesian interpretation of freedom of religion. For comparison, Article 28 E, subsection (1) states "all persons (*orang*) have the right to embrace a respective religion (*memeluk agama*) and to do religious service according to their respective *agama*". Note, if we consider the wording of Article 29 and 28, it seems the usage of the generic term person (*orang)* in Article 28 on human rights implies that Indonesia formally acknowledges the rights codified under this Article to be universal rights. As Article 29 uses the word citizen (*penduduk*), it implies that the universal application of those universal rights is limited for Indonesian citizens.

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[99] Act 1/1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and Desecration of *Agama,* Elucidation. In contrast, mystical groups claiming to be Islamic, but having a guru and new revelation, would be prosecuted for 'insulting' religion by false representation and syncretic mystical groups could be charged with not accepting the scriptures of one of the funded universal religions. (Howell 2003: 5 FN VI)

[100] On the historical context, see the chapter on Guided Democracy and New Order, but also the educational policies in the 1960s and 1970s.

Then, Article 28 E, subsection (2)reads: "all persons (*orang*) are entitled to freedom of being convinced about a belief system (*kepercayaan*), and to express their thoughts and attitude, in accordance with their conscience." In addition, whereas adherents to one out of six state fundedreligions may freely hold religious service in public, this right is severely restricted for adherents to *kepercayaan*, and relocated to the private sphere as persons may only express their thoughts and attitudes.

8.) The Indonesian Act No. 39/1999 on Human Rights, Chapter III on Human Rights and Freedoms, rules in Section 3 on Right to Self-development, Article 16 that "every person (*orang*) has the right to undertake social and charitable works, to found organizations for this purpose, including organizing private schooling and education, and to raise funds for these purposes, in line with prevailing legislation". This clause provides the legal basis for private faith-based education system.

9.) The second constitutional amendment elaborated in section XA on Human Rights, article 28E on religion that 1.) every person (*orang*) is free to embrace a religion (*memelukagama*) and perform religious service according to his/her embraced religion (*agama*); to choose education and teachings; (...) 2.) every person (*orang*) has the right to adhere to a belief-system (*kepercayaan*) , and to express his or her thoughts and attitude in accordance with his or her conscience (*hati nurani*) and 3.) every person (*orang*) has the right to freedom of association, assembly, and expression of opinion. Artilce 28 I, subsection 1) states: "The right to life, the right not to be tortured, the right to freedom of thought (*pikiran*) and conscience (*hati nurani*), the right to embrace a religion (*beragama*), (...) are fundamental human rights which cannot be diminished under any circumstance. In my view, this legislation allows actually for positive and negative religious freedom and for the performance of religious service which is not limited to state funded *agama*. But, those fundamental human rights are restricted in article 28J, subsection 2) which reads: "In carrying out rights and freedoms, every person is obliged to obey the limitations which are laid down in law with the sole purpose of guaranteeing recognition and respect of other people's rights and freedoms and to fulfill just requirements in accordance with moral considerations (*pertimbangan moral*), religious values (*nilai agama*), security (*keamanan*), and public order (*ketertiban umum*) within a democratic society." This clause is somewhat problematic as limitations based on moral considerations (*pertimbangan moral*) or religious values (*nilai agama*) are not provided for in human rights instruments. It seems that Indonesia limits the freedom of religion by putting congreagtions under surveillance for reasons of public order and to avoid social hostilities.

Since it is approved that all six sponsored religions possess specific teachings and practices according to their respective faith, inter-faith relations in the state's legislation are based on the value that all devotees are equal before God and therefore they are equal members of the human community. The right and duty of every citizen to embrace a sponsored religion and to perform religious service according to his or her faith established in the constitution and the first principle as the right to religious liberty, which is however limited to a freedom of choice between the sponsored religions in order to keep the balance between public order and individual freedom.

In Indonesia's courts and elsewhere, then, a balancing act takes place. (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 20) Indonesia is neither an Islamic state, nor an "entirely secular one" (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 20) as it guarantees freedom of religion while it promotes the belief in One Supreme Lordship. This sets up a logical tension that has surfaced in a number of conflicts. In some of these, arguments about terms and definitions have been central, with a stress on what *agama* is and whether a particular practice cult or belief is or is not *agama*. The world's named religions - Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam -present no definitional problems. Disputes arise, rather, over how to regard beliefs and practices that fall outside these named categories. Two ambiguous situations arise. First there are people who do not have a religion yet, i.e. peoples whose religions are unnamed and uncodified, and who usually live in relatively isolated regions. A second ambiguity arises from people who belong to one of the recognized religions but also carry out practices or hold believes that other adherents of the same faith judge heretical at worst or superfluous at best (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 21) – one might add as too exclusive as in the case of the Salafi community which was attacked in Lombok in 2009 (SETARA 2010).

4.2.1. Construction of a national Grundnorm

What had to become the Indonesian nation had to 'imagine' her community[101] in the first place: It had to assert a proactively constructed political and cultural 'Indonesianess' in the first half of the 20th century. In 1959, Wertheim (1959: 1) observes the assertion of Indonesianness as imagined in the five principles or the state motto "expresses a strong desire, not only among political leaders, but among the broad layers of population (…), to achieve unity despite the heterogeneous character of the newly built state". Wertheim argues this "common will presupposes, in its turn, the existence of common cultural characteristics underlying the apparent heterogeneity". (Wertheim 1959: 1)

Logically, any assertion of an Indonesian identity required some authenticity through reclaiming a great moment in history as a point of common reference, acceptable for all ethnic groups in the archipelago. Interestingly, the largest, but at the same time loose hegemony, the first President Sukarno referred to in order to legitimate the proposed new nation in the 1930s and in his "Birth of the *Pancasila*" speech on June 1st, 1945 was the Sumatran Buddhist kingdom of Sriwijaya (7th-14th century) and the Javanese Hindu Buddhist kingdom of Majapahit (13th-15th century) and not the medieval Islamic sultanate Mataram II. (Purdy 1954: 58) An explanation might be that already during the reign of Amangkurat II (1677-1703), ruler of Mataram II, the dynasty was accused of collaborating with the Christian "Dutchmen" (Ricklefs, 2006: 62) by Islamic rebel Trunjaya, who wrote in response to one of the letters he received from Amangkurat II:

> It is not seemly for Your Highness to reign as king and mix and go about with Christians, for even Your Highness' dignitaries have an uncommon aversion to this. (…) Your Highness' servant humbly requests that you make your court at Majapahit, so that the whole island of Java might know that Your Highness has established his court there and in future you must have nothing to do with heretics." (Ricklefs, 2006: 62-3; Trunjaya to AR II, transl. Surabaya, 11 Jan. 1680, under the date 19 Jan 1680, in VOC 1360 (OB 1681))

Rickleffs (2006: 63) comments the passage as follows "A court at Majapahit would represent the long tradition of Javanese royal grandeur (and would symbolize reconciliation of East and Central Java as well), while an aversion to Christians would demonstrate a firm and exclusive commitment to Islam".

In this, the imagination of Majapahit as the precursor of the modern Indonesian nation-state by the men who shaped Indonesian nationhood, their selection of the five principles (*Pancasila*) and state motto (*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*) intended to promise the overcome of the 'kaleidoscopic reality' expressed in compromises and divisive allegiances to region, religion, or political party by alluding to common and shared cultural traits in the Indo-Melanesian cultures compatible to Javanese and Islamic values. The first principle of the state, Belief in One Supreme Lordship, and the state motto seem to continue a Majapahit tradition, because "(i)n the opening passage of the *Nagarakrtagama,* composed by the Buddhist author Prapanca in 1365 AD, the king was equated to both Siva and Buddha and depicted as "the highest divinity or form or truth, no matter what religions or philosophical school of thought one belongs to"." (Robson, 1994, VKI vol. 169, p. 97 in Ricklefs, 2006: 12) In this context, Kingsbury (2003: 99) notes

> In a state as geographically and culturally diverse as Indonesia, it was always a rhetorical, if not actual, tenet of faith that 'national' cohesion could only be achieved through embracing difference. This led to the nationalist catch-cry of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*. In one sense, Indonesia had little choice but to adopt such a policy if it was to survive united. In another sense, the idea of achieving consensus from disparate cultures well matches a syncretic Javanese world view, which seeks to find a convergence of otherwise contradictory elements.

In consequence, the solution to enforce unity is to cite the Indo-Melanesian tradition and the Hindu-Buddhist pedigree of values as expressed in the *Pancasila* – thereby the *Pancasila* becomes a patrimonial instrument of authority – used by a quite exclusive majority to pacify and propitiate the many minorities of whom the integration and unity of the state depends. In this, the *Pancasila* indeed functions to bind together the people of the archipelago and functions as civil religion.

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[101] The term imagined community was coined by Benedict Anderson (1993). An imagined community describes a national culture whose national identity relies on the people's conception of it. (Woodward 1987: 18-19)

The Hindu-Buddhist Majapahit-connection of *Pancasila* and *Bhinekka Tunggal Ika* is supported and accepted energetically by Balinese Hindus. (Hitchcock/Dharmaputra 2007: 131) As the kingdoms of medieval Bali were closely allied with those of Java, and many elements of their respective cultures have been similar[102] as both were part of the same coastal *pasisir* culture (Schulte-Nordholt 1991 referring to Vickers 1987), their socio-cultural practices share a common heritage from the eleven century onwards (Swellengrebel 1957), "when gods and sages established a new religious cum political order in Bali". (Schulte-Nordholt 1991: 36 FN 31) Only later, those gods and sages were replaced by Majapahit nobles in Balinese manuscripts.

Following Hinzler, Schulte-Nordholt (1991: 36) assumes that the great court of the Gelgel period (1550-1630) made no attempts to trace its descent explicitly to Majapahit, as the "Majapahit fever" as Hinzler calles it, was to come only after 1700. "External threats between 1550 and 1670, combined with an internal reorganization of power relationships between 1650 and 1730, may have helped to develop a new conceptual framework in Bali in which Majapahit became explicitly the point of origin of the Balinese political order." (Schulte-Nordholt 1991: 36 FN 31)

Schulte-Nordholt (1991: 36) and Ricklefs (2006: 50-80) observe that after the fall of Majapahit, Balinese rulers had to cope with the emerging and expanding Islamic power centers in Central Java and Makassar (Sulawesi) that threatened and damaged Balinese economic interests. The tensions between the Balinese and Mataram II resulted in a protracted battle for Blambangan in East Java, while Lombok and North Bali were threatened by Bugis raids from Makassar. However, Balinese and Islamist rebels in Surabaya and Madura fought as cousins against the rulers of Mataram II who collaborated with the Dutch based on anti-Christian and anti-heretic rhetoric (Ricklefs 2006). Despite the anti-Hindu rhetoric among the Islamist Surabayan and Madurese rebels and the "firm anti-Islam sentiments among the Balinese nobility" (Schulte-Nordholt 1991: 36) in the 17th and first half of the 18th century, the former kingdom of Majapahit "became the exemplary model of the old Hindu-inspired order and may have helped to formulate a more distinct Balinese identity" (Schulte-Nordholt 1991: 36), but it was certainly also a exemplary Javanese realm for the Javanese Islamist rebels, as the Trunjaya quotations shows, on which their new Javanese Islamic identity could base. (Ricklefs 2006) In fact, during the period of national awakening both ethnic groups referred to the legendary greatness of Majapahit as a common point of reference.

Indeed, the acceptance of common historical past, may it be constructed or autochthonous, indicates awareness of a shared common history from the Majapahit era onwards, but this awareness is rather obvious in the central regions of the Archipelago, namely Java and Bali, then at the periphery of the nation state. In this context, Kingsbury (2003: 111) notes "(a)s far apart as Sulawesi, Flores, Bali and Sumatra, ordinary Indonesian people resented what they often saw as the Javanese dominance of Indonesian politics, and in most cases identified themselves primarily on the basis of their cultural group". In consequence, the attempts to recall the greatness of the Majapahit Empire have been less successful on a national level, (Kingsbury 2003: 111) but this recall has been accepted by Balinese Hindus. This is demonstrated in a 1968 statement of the Hindu Council, which sets the strategy to reinstall the *Agama* Hindu ritual, as it has been inherited from the Majapahit period, for all adherents to Hindu Dharma according to the contextual concept of *desa-kala-patra*. (location, time, and situation)

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[102] Hildred Geertz (1963, 29-31) states "because Bali has close cultural and historical ties with Java, its present-day social structure may resemble in its general outline the traditional one that Java left behind centuries ago under the combined impact of Islam and colonialism".

Theosophical society and Javanism

To show processes of mutual cross-fertilization of socio-religious cultures in the Archipelago and ideas and concepts originating in Western and Eastern thought, a side note on the influence of the Theosophical Society (henceforth TS)[103] in the Dutch East Indies is made here. The term Javanist was coined by R.W. Hefner, designating those strands of the Javanese population who believe "that even while embracing Islam one should qualify or neglect many of its formal strictures in favor of High-Javanese traditions". (Ramstedt, 2004: 3) According to Hefner, this tradition has been grounded on Javanese court etiquette, ritual, language, aesthetics, which again are rooted in a kind of mysticism (*kebatinan*) that displays Hindu-Buddhist, Sufi Islamic influences, and what have often been called 'animist' traits. (Ramstedt, 2004: 3) The Javanese mystical tradition or Javanese Monism is known for its 'syncretism' or acculturation ability, in other word the contextualization of Indic concepts in Javanese medieval culture. "(I)t is precisely the characteristic of the Indonesian syncretism (…) that no foreign element is allowed to remain in its original form which cannot be reconciled or even molded into its *Weltanschauung*'". (Anderson 1975: 1, in: Darmaputera1989: 26) In the course of its history, Javanese religious culture absorbed elements of all faith traditions that reached Java and gave it its own interpretation. The aim of the Javanese mystical tradition is experiencing unity with the Lordship through self-control and yoga techniques.

Theosophical influence in the Dutch East Indies spread among the Dutch as well as the Javanese, the Balinese and the ethnic Chinese in the East Indies between 1900 and 1916, through informal mediation in Javanist (*kejawen, kebatinan*) circles, Chinese and Buddhist circles, and the Hindu movement in Bali and Java (de Tollenaere 2004: 42) and continued into the 1950s and 1960s. (de Tollenaere 2004: 35-44; Brown 2004: 45-55) The dissemination of and the ideas on Hindu concepts by the TS[104] in the Dutch East Indies from 1880-1942, or the interdependent influence Western mystics extended on Asian concepts of religion and vice versa is remarkable[105]. (Brown 2004: 46)

Albeit Dutch and Javanese East Indies TS members were often nominal Christians or Muslims, (de Tollenaere 2004: 38) they felt a great affinity to Hinduism and Buddhism, due to the common ideal of religious and philosophical tolerance, rather than exclusiveness and orthodoxy. (Brown 2004: 46) It was predominantly through their agency that images of India, Hinduism, and Buddhism were disseminated among the wider population of the Indies. (de Tollenaere 2004: 38) A number of specifically Hindu and Buddhist ideas came to be adopted by the Theosophists, e.g. the laws of karma and reincarnation. The appreciation of Indian philosophy by the TS subsequently inspired not only Indian Hindus or Singhalese and Burmese Buddhists to (re)turn to their own religious traditions; but it also stimulated a new interest of the Javanese learned elite to revitalize and reconstruct their Hindu-Javanese past in what has became known as the Javanese national movement (*Budi Utomo*). (Ramstedt, 2004: 3; Purdy 1984: 52)

Budi Utomo endeavored to realize Javanist aspirations rather than pan-Indonesian ones, emphasizing the pre-Islamic tradition of Java and underlining the continuous Hindu-Buddhist influence in ancient Java. (Ramstedt, 2004: 3) It is in this context that the link between *Budi Utomo* and the TS acquires its meaning. (Ramstedt, 2004: 3) Yet, amongst the members of the TS the radical position of the liberation of the Indies from Dutch colonial rule was not advocated. This 'reactionary' attitude alienated Indonesian nationalist leaders, who had initially been quite close to the TS, like Sukarno and Hatta from the TS. (de Tollenaere 2004: 39-41) This nationalist fervor continued to grow in the 1920s with the establishment of the *Taman Siswa*, an educational organization by KH Dewantoro.

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[103] The term 'theosophy' in a broad sense refers to various ways within different religions to acquire knowledge of God or of 'higher realms'. Theosophy was defined as 'Divine wisdom', an amalgamation of 'ancient Egyptian magic', Brahmanism, Buddhism, Christian mysticism and Social Darwinism. TS' main objectives were the general recognition of the universal brotherhood of mankind without any distinction of race, creed, sex, caste, or color, the comparative study of religions, philosophies, and science; and the investigation of unexplained laws of nature an the powers latent in man. In 1875 the TS was founded in New York by the Russian Madame Blavatsky and the American Mister Olcott. They established 1879 a lodge in Adyar, India and the German Baron von Tengnagell founded the first lodge in Pekalongan, Java between 1880 and 1883. (de Tollenaere 2004: 35-44; Brown, 2004: 45-55)

[104] The first TS-lodges were all located in Java, supporting the participation of educated members of the native nobility in the political affairs of the Indies. A significant part of its membership was drawn from the Dutch upper class, Javanese nobility, and Chinese merchants. (de Tollenaere 2004: 35-44)

[105] Olcott is credited with being the creator of the Buddhist banner. (Brown 2004: 46)

The TS linked the glorious Hindu-Javanese past of the time of the empires of Mataram, Kediri, Singasari, and Majapahit (which was then being reconstructed by the DutchIndologues) to Dutch colonial rule. The representatives attracted to this argumentation, mainly Javanese nationalists and Balinese Hindus, rediscovered Bali as the crucial key to the golden past of their Hindu-Javanese ancestors. The reference to Majapahit during the Youth Congress in 1928, leading to above mentioned Youth Oath, supports this fact. Furthermore, the first two Javanese Theosophists, who visited Bali, viewed Bali as religiously purer than Java and supported 'Balinese religion' as a counterweight to orthodox Javanese Islam. Then an Adnjana Nirmala Lodge had been founded in Singaraja with the Balinese aristocrat I Gusti Ketut Djelantik appointed as president in 1937. During the 1950s the lodge was still active. (de Tollenaere 2004: 39-41; Bakker 1993)

Besides the cross-fertilization of Western and Eastern thought and the agency of the TS, the point is that President Sukarno, Dr Radjiman as well as Prof Soepomo were all linked to Budi Utomo and the Theosophical Society. However, during the constitutional deliberation process, they had to make several concessions to the more orthodox Muslim reformers, in this the conception of state has been more accommodating to the demands of political Islam, then they actually envisaged. (Ramstedt 2004: 3) "Javanese nationalism and political Islam presented two conflicting lines of conceptions of the state. (…) This rift between orthodox Islam and Javanists was admittedly caused by Dutch contrivance, because they used Javanese culture and elite as a buffer against pan-Islamic and Communist ideas". (Ramstedt 2004: 3-4) Hence, the current study likes to underline that the 1945 Basic Law as well as the *Pancasila* and the state motto jointly drew from the (constructed) Hindu-Javanese legacy and actually put forward to some extend Indo-Melanesian and Hindu-Buddhist values.

In essence, ethnic Javanese traditions or Javanism (a Javanized version of the Indic state model) influenced to some extend conception of the state. Since the Javanese constitute the largest ethnic group and a large amount of the government apparatus have been ethnic Javanese, it is safe to say therefore that the ethnic Javanese exaggerate to some extent cultural supremacy in Indonesia. Although most Indonesians are Muslims, and most of the Javanese are Muslims, there is a difference in interpretation between modernists and Javanists.

Modernist Muslims embrace a pure understanding of Islam and *tawhid*[106]. The Javanists' understanding promotes the traditional, archipelagic way of life, continues the tradition of Javanese monism, as characterized by a practice of contextual Islam[107]. At the turn to the twentieth century, those mystical groups were increasingly disassociated from Islam since Muslim Modernists began to repudiate the Sufi traditions of Islam. Under greatest pressure to dissociate from Islam were the heterodox, independent-minded mystics who increasingly incorporated elements of the Javanese Hindu-Buddhist heritage, Christianity, and Theosophical representations of other religious traditions into their teachings. (Howell 2003: 4) After Independence, especially during the 1960s and 1970s those Javanist mystical groups were targeted for surveillance (REPELITA I). (cf. Howell 2003)

Pancasila

From 1945 to 1959, the question of the basis of the state led to a confrontation between political/public Islam seeking to establish an Islamic state, or at least a state basing on Islamic values, and religious minorities together with the majority of Indonesian Muslims which did oppose the idea of a state based on Islam (socialists, secular nationalists and cultural nationalists) - they were concerned that such a decision would alienate Christians and other religious minorities of the Eastern Islands from joining the Indonesian Republic. (Müntz 1965; Mujiburrahman 2006) To guarantee a religiously neutral position of the state, Christians and religious minorities wanted to establish a state in which religious and secular affairs were separated in order be able to bind all ethnic and religious groups in the archipelago into the nation-state. (Mujiburrahman 2006:118-119)

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[106] *tawhid*, Arabic: Unity. The doctrine of the unity or oneness of Allah (God), which is stressed in the Qur'an (there is no God but Allah), refers to a cardinal principle in Islamic theology.
[107] Contextual Islam is used by Hooker to describe Indonesian Islam. Hooker, MB (ed) (1983) *Islam in South-East Asia*. Leiden: EJ Brill; Hooker, MB (1984) *Islamic Law in South-East Asia*. Singapore: Oxford University Press; and Hooker, MB (2003) *Indonesian Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatawa* Sydney: Allen & Unwin; Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press).

The men who wrote the Indonesian constitution realized that national cohesion and integration could only be achieved, if the unity of all ethnic and religious groups was strengthened through a basic consent on common values (*Grundnorm,* Kelsen 2007; Wiratnata 2007; Habibie 2011; Zoelva Interview 2011) understood as autochthonous Indo-Melanesian cultural values supposedly rooted in historically grown traditions of diversity, plurality, mutual help and collegial-consensual negotiation. This *Grundnorm* resulted in a state based on five principles (*Pancasila*) embedded in the Preamble of the 1945 Basic Law. The five principles are,

1. Principle of the One Lordship (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*)
2. Principle of just and civilizedhumanity(*Kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab*)
3. Principle of Indonesian national unity(*Persatuan Indonesia*)
4. Principle of democracy guided by wisdom and prudence through deliberation and representation(*Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan/perwakilan*)
5. Principle of social justice for the entire Indonesian population (*Keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia*)

As it is imperative to the Indonesian multicultural and multi-faith society to find ways in dealing with the traditional and contemporary plurality, the fundamental idea is to manage diversity with the help of *Pancasila*. Thus these principles underwent different stages of interpretation, political weight, popularity, and public awareness during the last decades since their becoming the focal point of Indonesia's Basic Law. (cf. Purdy 1984; cf. Schindehütte 2006) The first principles shall help to structure religious plurality in such a way that peaceful coexistence of the Muslim majority and the religious minorities (Franke 2006: 62) or religious freedom in a Muslim majority state is attained. The first principle demonstrates a sustained cultural continuity with Majapahit. One might say, *Pancasila* is the product of negotiation processes between Indonesian social fractions with sometimes opposing opinions and interests on how to integrate religion in the state, and about the definition of religion itself. The increasing importance of religion in contemporary legislation and national education indicates that those processes are still ongoing. (Hosen 2005; Hasan 2008; Hilmy 2010; Raillon 2011)

While political Islam considered the Jakarta Charter as a compromise between the idea of an Islamic state and a secular one, for Christians and Hindus the compromise was only to be found in the *Pancasila* that still designates a religious nature for the state, but not a specifically Islamic religious one. In order to protect themselves Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists were always strong *Pancasila* supporters, since as religious minorities they fear that their status is not clear in an Islamic state. It has to be recalled that the five principles of the state and the state motto are two key concepts addressing Indonesia's plurality which have important continuities with the Indo-Melanesian and Hindu-Buddhist past. Both concepts recognize the diversity and plurality inherent to the Archipelago, and I interpreted them as guarantors of a normative standard of commitment to pluralism.

But is it important to note that an Islamic framework has been imposed on the *Pancasila* state which led obviously to a narrow definition of religion as promoted by the Department of Religion since 1952. Whereas the legal status of the *Pancasila* has been preserved in the era of reform and the constitutional amendments, the principles are less popular in contemporaneous political discourse, since the ideology of *Pancasila* is still regarded as an instrument of power formerly used to manipulate Indonesian citizens. The Indonesian pluralists currently prefer to refer to *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, as it offers the same substance but a different wrapping: It is regarded politically neutral, truly pluralist and it has never been exploited as the *Pancasila* has been during the New Order. (Triguna Protocoll 2007)

Bhinneka Tunggal Ika

The state motto was introduced in December 1949, passed by Presidential Decree No 66/1951; dated October 17' and implemented on November 28 1951. *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is translated here Diversity in Unity, but it is often referred to as Unity in Diversity. After the demise of the Suharto regime, the notion of *Pancasila* was merely that of a manipulative instrument related to indoctrination and exploitation of meanings. In consequence, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* ascended as immaculate national democratic formula interpreted as minimal consensus. (cf. Raillon 2011: 101) In 1945, 1966 and 1998-1999, "there was a willingness to relinquish one's particularistic religious or regional identity in support of the nation's motto *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, unity in diversity, yet there were and are deviations from this tendency." (Purdy 1984: 19) Religious minorities and Indonesian Muslims of all schools of thought tend to refer to *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* as paradigm of peaceful coexistence.

The ideal of compromise, of seeing and forging unity from diversity (*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*) should be the sustaining principle not only for Indonesia and India but for the human race as a whole. Sharma, Navreka (Ambassador of India to Indonesia)[108]

Just like the State principles and the heraldic animal, the Indian mystical bird Garuda, the vehicle of Hindu God Vishnu, the state motto *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* was drawn from the bubbling resource of Indo-Melanesian and Hindu-Buddhist heritage to inspire national unity. To be precise, it was taken from *Kakawin Sutasoma*, a fourteenth-century Buddhist epic composed by Mpu Tantular, who was one of the foremost poets in the Majapahit kingdom.

Rwâneka dhâtu winuwus Buddha Wiswa,
Bhi bêki rakwa ring apan kena parwanosen,

Mangkang Jinatwa kalawan Siwatatwa tunggal,
Bhi nêka tunggal ika tan hana dharma mangrwa.

It is often said that the eminent Buddha and Siwa are two different essences,
Indeed different from each other at a quick glance,
But the essence of the Jina and the reality of Siwa are identical,
Diverse, yet identical, as there are no two Truths[109]
(Ramstedt 2004: 1)

Of course, the Balinese are in support of the slogan. The Hindu minority tends to refer to the state motto *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, because it does not share *Pancasila*'s history of manipulation and exploitation of meaning. (Triguna Protocol 2007) The recent "Dharma Implementation Pattern for society and state" of the Indonesian Hindu Council" states that the Hindu community proactively supports social solidarity, strengthens national unity, supports intactness of the nation, improves inter-communal harmony between societal congregations with the formula *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* by use of dialog and cooperation basing on the principles of togetherness, equality, mutual trust and mutual respect which are based on the doctrine of *Tri Hita Karana*[110] (the harmonic cooperation between human beings, their environment, and God).

Agama

Turning to Indonesia to consider problems of state-imposed definitions of religion, John Bowen has elucidated despite the fact that there is no essential definition of religion and that religious practices differ in what they include in their particular definition, "many modern states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have drawn their ideas of religion from Western, Christian, and, to some extent, Islamic models". (Bowen 2005: 29) He then suggests that "they adhere to a model of religion that does not fit with local beliefs and practices of some people within their borders, and may place pressure on them to conform to this model." (Bowen 2005: 29)

The Indonesian term for the category religion employed in legislature and national discourse is *agama*. *Agama* is actually a Sanskrit borrowing with a twofold meaning:
1.) it denotes "a traditional precept, doctrine, body of precepts, collection of such doctrines" (Gonda 1973[1952]:499 in Atkinson 1983: 686), "a sacred work in general". (Ramstedt 2004: 9); in short, "anything handed down and fixed by tradition" (Gonda 1973[1952]:499 in Atkinson 1983: 686)
2.) *Agama* is a generic name for certain scriptures or texts associated with the sectarian worship of the Hindu deities Vishnu, Sakti and Siva. (Sarma 1953:7-10 in Atkinson 1983: 686; Ramstedt 2004: 9; Bowen 2005: 29)

When the western islands in the archipelago came to serve as critical junction of the *nusantao* network (Solheim II 2000), a trade network linking China, India, and the Middle East (Atkinson 1983: 686; Ramstedt 2004: 9), the term *agama* had found its way into the Old Javanese language at some point during the Indianization of ancient Java, which began in the first centuries CE (Atkinson 1983: 686; Ramstedt 2004: 9). The use of the word *agama* in Old Javanese was still general enough "to apply to a body of customary law or a Dharma-book and to religious or moral traditions". (Gonda 1973: 499, in: Atkinson 1983: 687)

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[108] Sharma, Navreka (Ambassador of India to Indonesia). Pluralism and India. Speech delivered at UNHI, Denpasar, at the national seminar on Multiculturalism, Religion and ethnicity. Denpasar, 07.08.2007
[109] . Ramstedt's Translation of Kakawin Sutasoma, Canto CXXXIX, 5
[110] In the anthropocentric Balinese world view, the concept of *Tri Hita Karana* denotes three dimension of life and their possible interactions: the sphere of the divine (*parhyangan*), the sphere of humanity (*pawongan*) and the sphere of earth (*palemahan*). (Triguna 1997)

(…) during this period an awareness of something called *agama*, an attribute of a rich and foreign civilization, took hold in insular Southeast Asia. *Agama*, one may speculate, had associations with literacy- a new and probably impressive introduction. It was associated as well with power, wealth, sophistication, and a tradition beyond the experience of local peoples. (Atkinson 1983: 687)

In sum, in Sanskrit and Old Javanese *agama* implies a textual source as the basis for ritual and worship. The *agama* of a person was the set of texts from which he or she derived teaching and religious direction: the books of Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and others. (Bowen, 2005: 29) However, the idea of a central text does not require that the religion have exclusive boundaries (Bowen, 2005: 29); that idea came during the Islamization of Sumatera and Java from the 9th century onwards[111]. Likewise, Atkinson (1983: 687) states that proponents of both, Islam and Christianity (and their variants) have adopted the term *agama* and thereby have shaped some new associations for it, while reinforcing others, until the term has "taken on the qualities that Indonesians today associate with that word". (Atkinson 1983: 687)

Islam, like Hindu-Buddhist traditions, entered the archipelago along trade routes with the West, and had been present in pockets of Sumatera for several centuries before in the fourteenth to sixteenth century many rulers began converting to Islam. In this period, the term gradually lost its Hindu connotations and acquired a more Islamic understanding. Islam does insist on absolute exclusivity and on the idea of one and only true foundational text, the al-Qur'an. As "People of the Book", the Muslim reformers most likely reinforced the association of *agama* with learning and literacy. Further, as long-distance traders, those Muslim reformers probably "consolidated notions of *agama* as an attribute of both the wealthy and the cosmopolitan. The link between *agama* and political authority may have been strengthened as local rulers found conversion to be politically and economically expedient". (Atkinson 1983: 687)

Christianity arrived at about the same time shares these ideas. (Bowen 2005: 29) Christian reformers likely carried similar associations of *agama* with foreign powers, economic and political privilege, internationalism, and education. Certainly an emphasis on a Supreme Deity and the absolute necessity of conversion to a foreign doctrine were features of both Christianity and Islam in Indonesia. Another association that may trace its roots to the latter period of Dutch rule is a link between *agama* and societal progress. (Atkinson 1983: 687) Religion is associated in Indonesia's political culture with education, cosmopolitan orientation, sophistication, and progress. (Atkinson 1983: 689)

The 1945 Basic Law accorded legitimacy to any religion other than Islam. (Howell 2003: 4) However, what those other religions might be was not specified within the Basic Law. In consequence, this left the definition of *agama* with the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In 1946, this Ministry had been founded principally bind orthodox Muslims into the young republic and to advance Muslim interests. Accordingly, most of the Ministry's operations served the Muslim community, but there were two separate directorates general offices established for Protestantism and Catholicism. (Howell 2003; 2004) In the absence of clarifying provisions in the Basic Law, the structure of the Ministry of Religious Affairs implies that the understanding of *agama* referred to Indonesia's major 'religions of the book' (Howell 2004: 3): Islam and Christianity.

The Ministry could extend limited financial support on religious groups or targeted those groups it branded 'animists' or heretics for proselytizing. (Howell 2003: 4) Those religious traditions targeted for proselytizing included mystic groups and other religious traditions of non-Muslim and non-Christian ethnic groups like the Balinese and Indonesian Chinese. (Howell 2003: 3-4) "While the majority of ethnic groups associated with non-state societies in past times could do little to resist the discrediting of their religious traditions, the Balinese and Indonesian Chinese, as well as Javanese proponents of heterodox mystical and other metaphysical groups, organised to promote their traditions and identities, and even to claim the status of 'religions'."(Howell 2003: 4)

> Those that succeeded in gaining recognition as religions formed organisations that constructed their traditions with a number of common features strongly resembling Islam and Christianity: highly rationalised (that is, codified) beliefs relating to a transcendent deity; exclusive membership open to people of any ethnic background; congregational organisation with regular weekly services in a public place of worship; and formally organised governing and representative bodies. (Howell 2003: 4)

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[111] According to Prof Tauchmann, personal communication in 2005, the Islamization of Java began in the late 9th and early 10th century.

In the 1950s, the MORA undertook to catalogue other beliefs and practices to determine where proselytizing activities needed to be directed and where surveillance of deviant groups was required. Amongst the former was Balinese religion, which the provincial government of Bali managed to save from state-sponsored proselytizing activities by establishing a Hindu section in the Ministry of Religion in 1958 (Geertz 1973; Howell 1978, 1982: 513).

In the early 1950s, the Ministry of Religious Affairs equated the term *agama* with the full meaning of the Arabic word *din*[112] as used in the al-Qur'an. (Atkinson 1986; Howell 1978, 1982, 2003, 2004; Ramstedt 2004: 9; Bowen 2005: 29; Abalahin 2005: 121) Hereupon *agama* was defined in a narrow sense, as religious system *agama* must fulfill following catalogue of criteria: It must have codified a

   a. a sacred book (*kitab suci*);
   b. a monotheistic substructure, that is teach belief in the existence of One Supreme Lordship; a codified law system for its followers that is exclusive boundaries;
   c. have a prophet (*nabi*),
   d. have international recognition,
   e. its congregation must not be limited to a single ethnic group, that is transcends ethnic boundaries and not being essentially an aspect of a hereditary culture

As the duty of the MORA is to impose an official model of religion and to implement programs to raise public awareness of the first principle, this official model translates into implications for (non-Islamic) religious practices as well as for currents inside the officially sanctioned religions. Eventually, this model caused an *Agamanization* (Abalahin 2005: 122) of indigenous religious practices and traditions. Indonesia makes a specific Islamic distinction between officially funded and supervised "revealed" religions (*agama*) and non-funded "man-made" belief-systems (*kepercayaan*) on legal grounds. During the amendment of the Basic Law, Indonesian executives and officials continued to exclude the local archipelagic beliefs and practices from the category of religion.

The Indonesian government adds a transnational dimension required for the category religion in drawing a distinction between proper or universalistic religion (*agama*) and particular belief practices (*kepercayaan*). An officially approved religion may neither be limited to ethnic religious practices defined as belief systems nor to Indonesia. For a citizen, it is not sufficient to adhere to a belief system, but his or her religious affiliation must be confirmed by declaring adherence to one of the universal state-funded religions. In addition, this religious adherence must be accounted for in identity documents. For all the belief systems the government does not consider as *agama*, official jargon employs the term *kepercayaan*, 'belief-system'[113]. (Abalahin 2005: 121) "These "wild" religions are considered, in the classical Muslim distinction between "peoples of the Book" and "religions of ignorance", as threats to true piety and fair game for conversion." (Geertz 1973: 187)

> The sharp distinction that certain authorities seek to draw between *agama* and *kepercayaan* extends even to the terms covering their adherents: an *agama* has *penganut* (those who submit [to it]) or *pemeluk* (those who embrace [it]), while *kepercayaan* has *penghayat* (those who comprehend or practice [it]). The further distinction reinforces the notion that an *agama* is transcendent, coming from some higher source outside the individual, outside humanity, while a *kepercayaan*[114] is subjective, arising from within the individual, within humanity. (Abalahin 2005: 121 FN 7)

This distinction is entirely Islamic, as only Islam is considered to be the true religion. "In its definition of an *agama*, the state through the Ministry of Religious Affairs adopts the Islamic notion of tolerating "Peoples of the Book" (*ahl al-kitab*) and "invites" religious communities to define *themselves* as "Peoples of the Book" or risk falling outside the *Pancasila*'s version of the *dhimma*" (Abalahin, 2005: 121, emphasis in original), the "indefinitely renewed contract through with the Muslim community accords hospitality and protection to members of other revealed religions, on condition of their acknowledging the domination of Islam". (Abalahin, 2005: 121) He concludes that "(t)his is *only a partial* restoration of the *dhimma*, as the *Pancasila* state accords *theoretical* equality to all the religions it recognizes. (Abalahin, 2005: 121-122, emphasis in original)

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[112] True religion, religion of the books (Torah, Bible, Koran): Arabic din, Indonesian *agama*.
[113] Ramstedt (2004) propose the translation of *kepercayaan* as inner conviction, faith.
[114] Kebatinan is a generic term for the, different strands of Javanese, syncretistic mysticism. *Batin* is an Arabic loanword: inner feeling, mystic connection with one's inner self, or inwardness. (Abalahin 2005: 134)

To sum up, *agama* is explicitly defined along the lines of the Islamic conception of religion. However, the political and cultural context in Indonesia resulted in an Indonesian advancement of the *dhimma*, as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism are not recognized as religion of the book in classical Islam. (Tibi 1995)In essence, *tawhid* was made the base of the religious state grounded-on-the-Belief-in-One-Supreme-Lordship, and all acknowledged religions have to reinvent their belief system according to the MORA' Islamic understanding of the first principle. In consequence, as Hindu, Hindu-Buddhist, and Buddhist religious practices never were fully codified in a sacred text body as the abrahamitic religions, those religious systems faced serious problems to receive state funding in the first place. Those congregations founded modern organizations, which were given the mandate to reinvent and rationalize their religious practices to comply with the MORA's catalogue of criteria for *agama*. It could be further said that the 1945 Basic Law only recognizes Islam, but tolerates certain other religions by funding them. Still this is only partially true, as the image of One Supreme Lordship may be conceptualized as immanent or transcendent, which is not compatible with Islamic *tawhid*. However, the Islamic discourse serves as a standard setting tool in the management of the remaining six sponsored *agama* after Suharto's Islamic turn in 1989 and the transition to Indonesian Islamic democracy. (Liddle 1996; Mujani/Liddle 2009)

Kutuhanan Yang Maha Esa

Unlike the US, where the First Amendment prohibits the federal government from establishing religion (Prothero 2006: 1-2), the first state principle of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia has established faith in One Supreme Lordship as the noblest statutory obligation of the Indonesian citizen. The concept of One Supreme Lordship is said to be the Indonesian answer to religious plurality (Wandelt 1989; Tibi 1995; Dharmaputera 1989, Franke 2006: 75). The Indonesian model of religious pluralism as manifested in the first state principle merits much attention, as it is a specific political answer of Southeast Asian, particularly Indonesian, Islam to the social condition of religious plurality. The Indonesian model is unparalleled in other Muslim majority countries and reflects the stance on religious freedom and tolerance of the traditional Ottoman Caliphate. (Abalahin 2005)

The term for God in the *Pancasila*, *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*[115], has provoked various translations – belief in the One and Only God (Bolland 1971 in Smith-Kipp 1987: 17), the Divine Omnipotence (Howell 1978: 274), the Absolute Lordship (Hadjiwijono 1967 in Smith-Kipp 1987: 17), One High God (Howell 2004: 5) and All-Embracing God (Mahadi 1987 in Smith-Kipp 1987: 17). Scholars have also debated whether this term for God represents a "de-confessionalized" Muslim concept (Niewenhuisje 1958) or a neutral (although monotheistic) concept for God (Sid*jaba*t, cited in Boland 1971)." (Smith-Kipp 1987: 17)

Presidential Decision No. 1/1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and Desecration of *Agama* formally approved of six *agama* in the elucidation part. The Decision recognized faith in One Supreme Lordship as expressed only in those *agama*, of whichthe principal teachings are known to the Ministry of Religions[116], e.g. the creeds of Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. The same act rules that those six religions receive state funding, benefits and protection according to 1945 Basic Law Paragraph 29. Later in 1969, the government adopted Presidential Decision No. 1 of 1965 into Act No 5/1969. (UU No 5/1969) Recently in April 2010, the Constitutional Court rejected judicial review of the Act and strengthened the official religious policy[117]. Confucianism was recognized as faith from 1946 to 1967, but then banned under Suharto. The ban was lifted by Wahid in 2001. In 2011, the Confucian congregation is under the supervision of the Buddhist Directorate General[118]. Therefore, all the major world religions - with the exception of Judaism[119] - in addition

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[115] The Indonesian language makes use of the circumfix "ke-an" to achieve an abstract noun formed from a substantive root. *Tuhan* means God, and *keTuhanan* means "Godness" in an abstract sense. (Purdy 1984: 61 FN 2)

[116] Act 1/1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and Desecration of *Agama,* Elucidation

[117] The debates and discussions evolving around the retaining of the contested legislation to acknowledge only six religions and to propagate a state-sponsored version of each faith tradition, in order to secure public order, show the challenges the Indonesian state and law system faces regarding the term religion and the issue of religious traditions. Two examples of such a renegotiation of the national values in consequential legislation were two decisions of the Constitutional Court to retain discriminative legislation concerning religion. The prohibition to disseminate the religious teaching of the *Ahmadiyyah* interpretation of Islam, increasing social hostilities towards the group and numerous violation of religious rights under Blasphemy Law 1/1965 led to the petition of promoters of pluralism and human rights organizations, among them the former president Abdurrahman Wahid, to abrogate or revise the law. The law was considered by the petitioners to be outdated and in conflict with the amended 1945 basic law. The Constitutional Court however decided to maintain the Act, in order to secure public order and morals. In March 2010, the Constitutional Court rejected a petition to repeal the controversial anti-pornography and porno-action law. The court considered both Laws to be indispensable for public morals, provoking a raged and disappointed outcry within society.

[118] The problems the Confucians community faces in the interaction with the state are described by Abalahin: 2005 and Yang: 2005.

to a wide range of archipelagic belief practices are notably alive and vividly represented in the Indonesian society. (Howell 2003)

Other religions as Taoism, Shintoism, or Judaism are not forbidden, they are simply not eligible to state-funding and their adherents face social and legal restrictions in spreading their teachings or disseminating their symbols openly. It is noteworthy, that Indonesia does not officially fund Judaism - despite the fact that Judaism is historically acknowledged by Muslims to be a proper religion and that its adherents are people of the book, but it funds the Asian religion Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism.

Remarkably, Indonesia does not discriminate between Sunni and Shiite Islam[120], but due to colonial past betweenCatholics and Protestants. Although Indonesia does not discriminate between Sunni and Shia, those very same authorities who declare Mohammed to be the final prophet ban the *Ahmadiyyahh* faith who believes Mohammed was not the final prophet. This fact indicates that Indonesia does not succeed in getting any basic tenant of Islam ratified. Or, that all these debates are due to their crescendo manipulated by certain interest groups fighting or struggling over resources and contracts. Another point to note is, in Indonesia there is a dual administration for Muslims and others, Muslims are required to register with the Bureau of Religious Affairs (*Kantor Urusan Agama*, KUA) whereas all others have to register birth, marriage, divorce, and death at the civil registry office (*pencatatan sipil*). The regulation that religious affiliation must be mentioned in identity cards has been retained in 2006.

Indeed, it is surprising, how reformers of Hinduism, Mahayana Buddhism, Theravada Buddhism, and especially Confucianism defined their One Lordship. (Bowen 2005) In this context, Wandelt (1988: 168) has drawn attention to how the idea of monotheism and the image of Godhead (*Gottesbild*) are conceptualized in Indonesia. Unlike transcendental images of Godhead, based on separation between the sacred and the profane, the ambiguous principle of One Supreme Lordship combines the absolute with the relative perspective as well as immanent or transcendent understandings. Absolute monotheism based on transcendentalism is represented in the Islamic theological doctrine of *tawhid* that considers the Oneness of God as absolute and transcendent and therefore as opposed to polytheism, pantheism, or animism. Relative monotheism is based on immanence that considers the God as represented in creation or the creation itself to be Divine. This argument provides the link to integrate Balinese ancestor worship as a form of the immanent Divine. (Triguna Protocoll 2007)

The absolute interpretation of the principle refers to the Islamic understanding of *tawhid*. By contrast, the relative concept of monotheism denotes the concept of One Supreme Lordship, which is divided into its constituent parts without losing its holistic character at the same time (parts of the ensemble). This line of interpretation combines contradictory views, thereby mirroring the integrative ethos of Javanese monism. Despite the notion of Islamic *tawhid* found its way into the Basic Law, contrary to the Islamic transcendental concept of God based on a separation between God and the world, the Indonesian concept of monotheism makes a distinction between relative and absolute.

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[119] The indigenous Jewish population is microscopic and I am not aware of any academic research on Jews in Indonesia. The World Jewish Congress states that Dutch Jews played an active role in the development of the so-called Spice Islands. In the 1850's, at least 20 Jewish families of Dutch and German origin lived in Jakarta and other parts of the country. In successive years Jews from the Netherlands, Baghdad and Aden settled in Indonesia. By the 1920's there were several thousand Jews in the country and communities were established in Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung, and elsewhere. In the 1930's Jews fleeing the rise of Nazism also found sanctuary in Indonesia. Jews, particularly those with Dutch citizenship, faced political surpression during the Japanese occupation. After the war, and later, upon the country's independence, nearly all Jews left the country. A few Jewish families, all of Iraqi origin, live in Surabaya. They continue to maintain a small synagogue, but there is neither a rabbi nor a teacher. There are also individual Jews living in Jakarta. The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute publishes that about 25 families still live in Indonesia.
(http://www.worldjewishcongress.org/communities/asiaoceania/comm_indonesia.html)
Another reason is that to a certain degree, anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism play a role in contemporary political debates and climate. Sabili, a widely read Islamic magazine, continued to publish anti-Semitic articles. An account of a possible interest in investing in Aceh by the well-known financier George Soros prompted some Muslim political parties in Jakarta to issue statements about a 'hidden agenda' and warning the government against Jews enticing the country to be weak on the Palestinian struggle. One Member of Parliament was quoted as saying: "Tell the Jews there is no place for their investment in Indonesia." (US Dep. of State 2007: Indonesia Country Report on Human Rights 2007, in: http://www.state.gov (June 2008)
[120] Which has left her being derided and insulted by the rest of the Muslim world; as for example in Saddam Hussein's famous speech, in which he insulted Muslims outside his party as 'Asians'.

Depending on the position taken, if the first principle is interpreted as a call to monotheism, it imposed an Islamic framework on all faith communities. Despite the concept of Christian Trinity is heavily criticized by Islamic theologians as apostatizing from the doctrine of *tawhid*, Christianity faced minor problems with the Department's catalogue of criteria as they have been immediately approved as proper religions – a reason might be the strong role of Christianity in the colonial period and the Christianization of certain elites. (Howell 1987) During the colonial period, Christian thought and Western enlightenment traditions shaped "the forms the new religious constructs assumed and the fortunates of the groups that espoused them" (Howell 1978: 272), whereas during the republican period and in the contemporary democracy political Islam and public Islam influence those constructs and their proponents. If the first principle is understood as a call to integral monism, it imposes a Javanese framework on all faith communities. The Javanese framework allows ethnic communities to integrate monistic, deistic, dualistic, pantheistic, and animistic concepts into the first principle – and in this the practice of ancestor worship. The case of ethnic religions (Smith-Kipp 1987) and the Balinese case demonstrate that in both periods state policies also had considerable impact on transformations of religions in Indonesia.

In consequence, religious minorities have to shape their theology and practice along the lines of Islamic *tawhid* and Javanese monism, that is to say, Hindus, Buddhists, adherents to ethnic belief practices (*kepercayaan*) and recently Confucians are obliged to give the first principle a meaning that first, corresponds to their own understanding and second, is in line with the catalogue of criteria of the MORA. Accordingly, modern Indonesian Hindu Dharma underwent a process of re-invention, rationalization and systematization to meet that definition which will be described in detail in the current study.

Buddhists, Confucians, and Hindus most likely understand '*Ketuhanan*' as basic principle of religious pluralism in order to protect their right to freedom of religion. (Bowen 2005) In their view, the Indonesian history has culminated in the neutral and inclusive concept of *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa,* which includes not only Islamic but also Hindu, Buddhist and Indo-Melanesian traditions. Therefore it should not be understood primarily in terms of the Islamic concept of monotheism (*tawhid*) but rather as a universal, inclusive, and neutral concept. Actually, the original perception of the principle would enable all religious communities to interpret the concept in terms of their respective beliefs, but also gives them the right to do so. (Bowen 2005) In consequence, in the first place the notion of *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* did not refer not to a narrow and particular image of Godhead, but rather to the commonality of veneration and worship of One Lordship according to individual religious tenets among varying religious practices in an esprit of pluralism, and was imagined to sum up the traditional Indonesian attitude in the sphere of religion. This understanding has been limited by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, as one of the tasks assigned to it was to define and promote the understanding of the image of Lordship, necessitating a conscious re-definition of faith communities along the lines set forth by the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist conceptions interpret One Supreme Lordship as the absolute principle, transcending its creation and being immanent in its creation at the same time. In other words, the first principle combines immanent and transcendent perspectives, as *Ketuhanan* differs from the Islamic concept of God based on transcendentalism, for the reason that *Ketuhanan* may as well incarnate in its creation at will in any shape and at any time. Indonesian Hindu Dharma speaks of *Trimurti* (*Brahma, Vishnu,* and *Shiva*) that is unlike the vertical Christian trinity a horizontal concept of the Lordship's functions observable in the material world, thereby integrating "megalithic" traditions of ancestor worship and blood sacrifice into the conception. Both Hinduism and Christianity perceive *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* as the solemn principle of creation and therefore there is no difference between the primordial absoluteness and the subsequently emanated relativity of that Omnipotence. Hinduism announced *Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa* as One Supreme Lordship, Buddhism solved the issue in declaring *Adibuddha* to be that One Lordship. (Bowen 2005: 29; Wandelt 1989)

In conclusion, since a concept of absolute religious truth is not stipulated in legislation, the principle of belief in One Supreme Lordship left loopholes for religions other than Islam to define their interpretation of that Lordship. In consequence, how a religious community arrives at this definition is up to the creativity of the faith community in question. To be officially approved, each a congregation had to codify the *Kutahanan Yang Maha Esa* and become institutionalized in an representative organization and a state office. Here, intellectuals and religious experts rule out what is and what is not to be included in the reinvention, rationalization and systematization of their faith practices and how their image of Lordship is represented, thereby creating a gap between theological dogma and everyday practices. However, the institutionalization of religious congregations has been frozen with Presidential Decision No. 1/1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and Desecration of *Agama* and the decision of the Constitutional Court to retain Presidential Decision 1/1965. Thereafter all strategic developmental plans purport the ambiguous strategy to fund and guard acknowledged religions, whereas all other belief systems are not funded, and guarded, in order to avoid that new religions may be formed. In my view, the institutionalization of new congregations would lead to organizational and administrational issues, problems of public order, and increased social hostilities. In addition, as the Ministry of Religious Affairs has a very large budget, ranking at top 4 or 5 of the state expenditures, this also involves large amounts of financial support to the acknowledged religions, which would then be severely curtailed.

4.2.2. Historical tipping points

The Birth of Pancasila (1945-1949)

In 1928, the Second Indonesian Youth Congress met in Jakarta and formulated its solemn vow: One Nation, One People, One Language, "which was to become the rallying cry for independence" (Purdy 1984: 52). During Dutch rule, Islam had been viewed as a rallying symbol for anti-colonial resistance, remained under strict control, and was viewed with unrelenting suspicion." (Purdy 1984: 53) In 1942, the Japanese forces defeated the Allies and occupied the Indonesian archipelago. Between 1942 and 1945 the Japanese strengthened the Muslim position through three organizations: an office of Religious Affairs (which came to be the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1946), a Muslim council (*Masyumi*), and a sort of military organization for young Muslims (Hizbu'llah). (Purdy 1984: 54)

Independence seemed to be within reach at the very end of Japanese occupation. On April 29, 1945, the Japanese had established the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence[121] to specify the common terms to be enshrined in the constitution of a future independent Indonesia. The 62 Committee members (henceforth Committee of 62) were intended to represent all major political and ideological factions of the Independence movement. In fact, they had been all selected and appointed by Sukarno (Ramstedt, 2004: 2). As result, political Islam was underrepresented in the Committee of 62, because Sukarno had ensured that the values of the like-minded intellectuals[122] were to form the ideological basis of the state and of the education of its people by appointing them in key position during the early years of the republic (Ramstedt 2004: 13). The deliberations on the philosophical foundation of the state were heated and tedious. They show in an exemplarily way how Muslim politicians' understandings of Islam inform the process of state formation and the role of Islam in the state or the Islamization process of the five principles.

In general, there were two basic fault lines on the nature of the future Indonesian state and the role religion should play in it. The first debate, two camps maintaining mutually exclusive concepts on the political and legal system of the nation-state competed for dominance. That is, the camp around M. Yamin and M. Hatta supported the concept of *rechtsstaat*[123], while the camp around Prof. Supomo advocated the (Javanese) organic or integralist*staatsidee* (*machtstaat*)[124]. The system outlined by Yamin and Hatta included a number of the *rechtsstaat* principles as laid down in international human rights instruments. Although Prof. Supomo's integralist conception of state was backed by Sukarno, the Committee of 62 did not opt for it, and a constitutional democracy, even though with a strong presidency, was endorsed. **(**Mujiburrahman, 2006; Stockmann, 2004, Kaelan, 2004)

The second debate concerned the religious dimension of the state: Islam had been used to varying degrees in different regions as a weapon against the Dutch colonial state, and had also played a significant role in grass-roots education and empowerment of rural areas during colonial rule.

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[121] *Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (BPUPKI). The committee built subcommittees to work on special tasks and details on the Constitution. The chairman was Dr Radjiman Wedyodiningrat, one of the leaders of the Javanese nationalist movement Budi Utomo and member of the Theosophical Society. Sukarno and Dewantoro had also close links to the Theosophic society. (Ramstedt 2004: 2; Purdy 1984: 53)

[122] Yamin and Supomo, who were together with Sukarno the most enthusiastic proponents for a national Pancasila state. All three have been influenced by the Theosophical society.

[123] Concerning the *rechtsstaat* (rule of law), the Elucidation of the 1945 Basic Law reads: I.1. The Indonesian state is based on law (*rechtsstaat*), it is not merely based on power (*machtstaat*). II.2. Government is based on a constitutional system (*basic law*) which is not absolutist in nature. (Stockmann 2004: 27)

[124] For a discussion see the chapter on organicism and Asian values. According to the integralist understanding of the state, "there is basically no dualism between 'state and individual', no conflict between the state and organization on the one hand and the legal order of individuals on the other, no dualism of state and society-without-state (*Staat und staatsfreie Gesellschaft*). There is no need to guarantee the fundamental rights and liberties (*Grund- und Freiheitsrechte*) of the individual against the state, because the individual is an organic part of the state, with its own position and obligation to help realize the state's greatness (…)." (Stockmann 2004: 27; Parker, 2004: 8. Stockman translates from Supomo 1945: 191. Parker quotes Bourchier 1996: 81-82. I have merged both slightly divergent translations here)

Representatives of political Islam wanted to establish an Islamic state or at least see a strong role for Islam in the independent state, whereas the nationalists pleaded for a secular nation state, either modeled after a *rechtsstaat* or an integralist *machtstaat*. "Hindu Bali surely would have been adverse to governance by an Islamic state. Much of Eastern Indonesia, especially the Moluccas, Timor, Sumba, Flores, would have rebelled." (Purdy 1984: 66) Political Islam, however, had difficulties to befriend with the idea of nationalism since it was seen to contradict pan-Islamic sentiments and was associated with fascist regimes in Germany or Japan. (Madjid 1994) This ideological split in the Committee of 62 is referred to as the *golongan kebangsaan* (nationalist group comprising nationalist Muslims, cultural Javanists, Christians, Hindus) vs. *golongan Islam* (Muslim group). (Purdy 1984) In essence, the debates of the foundation of the state led to the confrontation between Islamic and Islamist groups which sought to establish an Islamic state or at least a state basing on Islamic values, whereas the secular and cultural nationalists and the socialists, concerned that such a decision would alienate Christians and other religious minorities, wanted to establish a state in which religious and secular affairs would be kept separate in order to maintain a religiously neutral position of the state. (Mujiburrahman, 2006:118-119)

Between May 29 and June 1, 1945, the Committee of 62 summoned its first meeting. During the session, five proposals on the philosophical base, intended to be written into the preamble of the constitution, were deliberated. There is considerable controversy over exactly who made the first formulation of the five principles. (Purdy 1984: 57, 64) M Yamin proposed the state of Indonesia should have a religious basis. It seems that M Yamin proposed two proposals, each having five principles, on May 29. In his first proposal, the formula "pertaining to Lordship" (*peri ketuhanan*) ranked third after nationality (*kebangsaan)* and humanity (*kemanusiaan*), whereas his second suggestion was using the formula One Supreme Lordship (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*) as first principle. He proposed a draft Constitution which later emerged as the 1945 Basic Law. Article 29 on religion reads as follows: "(1) the state shall be founded on the Belief in *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*; (2) the state shall guarantee the freedom of every inhabitant to profess his own religion and to worship according to his religion or faith". (Purdy 1984: 64) On May 30, Prof Soepomo made a differentiation between the school of thought which advocated an Islamic state, and that which advocated a "national unitary state". In his proposal he suggested as the third principle a relation between state and religion (*hubungan negara dan agama*) that is in favor of the multi-religious nature of the state.

On June 1 1945, Sukarno proposed a solution to the controversy on the basic principles of the state. Today, this address to the Committee of 62 is recollected as the 'Birth of *Pancasila*' key note speech. Sukarno is credited with the invention of the term *Pancasila*. (cf Purdy 1984: 57 FN 1) Searching for a neutral term to label a collectively acceptable ground, Sukarno followed the advice of a linguistic expert to denote the five principles: Instead of Panca Dharma, Sukarno employed the Sanskrit term *Pancasila*[125], (Wandelt 1989: 15-16; Franke 2006) because he fathomed Dharma as duty or obligation and regarded this connotation to be inadequate. In this, Sukarno himself most likely conceived of *Pancasila* not as a compromise but rather as a collectively acceptable rational consensus on a philosophical ground, in other words, an agreement in principle, a common term, or a national *Grundnorm* which all delegates in the Committee of 62 could endorse. (Wandelt 1989: 15-16; Madjid 1994)

In this way, the *Pancasila* were to be understood simply as basic principles of the state (*Pancasila* state). In this address, he enunciated five fundamental concepts (*dasar pikiran*) as a ground of the future Indonesian state (*dasar negera*). First and foremost, the nation-state should root in values and ideals genuine to the Archipelago, which should form a congruent national thought and value system, the *Weltanschauung*[126]of the state, and could be collectively accepted as the state's philosophical ground. (Wandelt 1989)

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[125] '*Panca*' is the Sanskrit word referring to number five. '*Sila*' can either mean base, fundament, or principle (*syila*), or rules for proper conduct (*syiila*). The term *Pancasila* is rooted deeply in early Buddhist doctrine and explored in the sacred Buddhist scriptures *Tripitaka*. Buddhism was spread in Indonesia from the first century onwards; the University of *Sriwijaya* in Sumatra was particularly renowned for its Buddhist exegesis. The *Pancasila* is mentioned in the chronics of *Negarakertagama* written by Javanese Mpu Prapanca in 1365 (translated by Slametmulyono). Since Buddhism strives to raise the moral standards of society and to teach people to live rationally, *Pancasila* denotes five moral standards that laypeople have to meet in their lives: refrain from killing, theft or robbery, committing adultery, lying, and psychotropic substances. Similarly, a Buddhist Theravada monk has to observe ten moral standards. During and after the Islamization of Indonesia, these moral standards underwent an acculturation process and are still remembered in Java as the five interdictions (*lima larangan* or M5: do not kill, do not rob, do not commit adultery, do not drink hard alcoholics or smoke opium, do not gamble). (Hirakawa, 1990: 39; Kaelan 2004: 22; Franke 2006; Wandelt 1989)

[126] Sukarno used the German word *Weltanschauung* in the Birth of Pancasila Speech on June 1, 1945.

The five principles were: Nationalism, Internationalism, Democracy, Social Justice, and 'a civilized Lordship' (*ketuhanan yang berkebudayaan*). (Purdy 1984: 57; Stockmann, 2004: 30) Sukarno indicated in the *Pancasila* speech, that the five principles could be further reduced to three principles (*Trisila*): socio-nationalism, socio-democracy, and belief in One Supreme Lordship. These three principles could be further simplified as one single guiding concept (*Ekasila*) of *gotong-royong*, or mutual cooperation, "all for one and one for all". (Stockmann, 2004: 30; Müntz 1965: 81- 82; Purdy 1984: 62; Franke 2006)

The fifth principle 'a civilized Lordship' (*ketuhanan yang berkebudayaan*) (Stockmann, 2004: 30) made representatives of political Islambelieve that the role of Islam would be neglected in the future constitution. Sukarno made use of the abstract generalized notion of *Ketuhanan* "which is actually an untranslatable term that incorporates a sense of divinity, the Godhead, Lordship-concepts" (Purdy 1984: 61). Because of the abstraction, the term should have appealed to all religious traditions in the archipelago. "Sukarno thus explicitly invested a political statement with religious authority, but his choice of terminology was not to the liking of Muslims representatives who would have preferred a more specific reference to the Islamic term, Allah." (Purdy 1984: 61)

> Sukarno then emphasized that both the Prophet Mohammad and Jesus Christ had shown sufficient proofs of tolerance and challenged the nation to likewise exhibit mutual respect for all religious views. He proposed an era of religious tolerance in independent Indonesia, a proposal which has met with only qualified success and which continues to be a major concern in the political and religious arena to this day. (Purdy 1984: 61-62)

The Islamic/Islamist group's protest of Sukarno's *Pancasila* yielded a temporary victory, as a Committee of Nine was formed to solve the debate between the nationalists favoring a *Pancasila* state and the advocates of an Islamic state. Then the Committee of Nine went revise the principles in order to find a compromise formulation. (Stockmann 2004: 30; Ramstedt 2004: 4; Purdy 1984: 66) On June 22, 1945 the Committee of Nine "managed to come to an agreement" (Purdy 1984: 66) and drafted the Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*) including the obligation of the Muslim citizens to observe Islamic law (*Ketuhanandengan kewajiban menjalankan syari'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya*). Certainly, the compromise was to be found in those seven words "including the obligation of the Muslim citizens to observe Islamic law". Moreover, the document stipulated that the future president has to be a Muslim, and it proposed a reformulation of the *Pancasila* starting with the Koranic formula in Arabic, whereas the first concept – and not the last, as intended in Sukarno's draft, introduced 'Belief in One Lorship'. (Stockmann, 2004: 30; Ramstedt, 2004: 4)

The Committee of 62 held its second meeting between July 10 and 16, 1945. On July 11, Sukarno appointed a sub-committee (*panitia kecil*) with Supomo acting as chair, to work out the details of the statutes of the Basic Law. Having accomplished this task, the Jakarta Charter constituted the preamble in the final drafted constitutional statues. Concerning religious freedom, article 29 of the drafted statues read the state would guarantee religious freedom for every citizen in the sense that everybody would be free to choose his or her religion (*agama*), and to hold religious services according to one's religion (*agama*) or religious conviction (*kepercayaan*)[127]. (Ramstedt 2004: 5). The whole article, which put syncretistic mysticism (*kebatinan, kepercayaan*) on a par with religions of the book, arose again fierce protests from the Muslim representatives. (Ramstedt 2004: 5; Mujiburrahman: 2006) Article 29 was therefore to be amended and according to its new version, the state would guarantee that the adherents of each religious community would be free to practice their religion in accordance with its respective rules.

This draft of the Basic Law was presented to Committee of 62 which met again in pleno from July, 14-16 1945. While Islamic groups considered the Jakarta Charter as a compromise between the idea of an Islamic state and a secular one, for the religious minorities the compromise was only found in the five principles and a constitution that designates a religious nature for the state, but not a specifically Islamic one. When during the month preceding the Declaration of Independence, representatives from outside Java (Bali, and the Eastern islands of Indonesia) arrived in Jakarta, it became increasingly clear that the provisional Basic Law with the Islamic formulas contained in it were "from the point of view of many non-Muslims, too extreme." (Purdy 1984: 68)

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[127] *Negara menjamin kemerdekaan tiap-tiap penduduk untuk memeluk agamanya masing-masing dan untuk beribadat menurut agama dan kepercayaannya itu.* (Ramstedt 2004: 5)

Resulting out of the negotiation of the state's structure and constitution between the secular and the Islamic factions, especially the discussions about the Jakarta Charter, the order in which the five principles are listed today varies from that used in Suakrnos original Birth of the *Pancasila* address, the fifth principle 'belief in One Lordship', to wit, ranks first today. In the controversy between nationalists and political Islam, the third principle of "nationalism" was amended to run "Unity of Indonesia", considered to be more a "neutral but dynamic term than a solution" following the objections of political Islam to the term nationalism. (Madjid 1994: 57) For political Islam, the term "contradicted Islamic universalism and cosmopolitanism, and reminded them of the chauvinistic types of nationalism that have existed in Germany and Japan". (Madjid 1994: 57) "Democracy led by wisdom through deliberation and representation", the fifth principle, should be understand as a common term between secular-national and Islamic ideas of statehood or nation. (Madjid 1994: 58; Zoelva Interview 2011) "Wisdom through deliberation" is a paraphrase of an adage (*hikmah*) ascribed to Prophet Muhammad[128]. M Hatta (the first vice president), H Agus Alim (prominent Muslim intellectual), Ki B. Hadikusumo (*Muhammadiyah*, modernist organization), 'Abd al-Wahid Hashim (*Nahdatul Ulama*, traditionalist Muslims) were the delegates most accredited with an Islamization of the *Pancasila*, thereby it was eventually made acceptable to Muslims. (Madjid 1994: 58)

Then in August 1945, on August 6 and 9 respectively, two U.S. atomic bombs marked the defeat of Japan in World War II. Seizing the opportunity of the US American bombing in Japan on August 17th, Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed the Indonesian Independence on behalf of the Indonesian people. Both are therefore credited as the founding fathers of the *Pancasila* state. Precisely one day after, on August 18, the Basic Law was passed; the unbridgeable discrepancies in opinion on the nature of the state between the two major lines of conflict between political Islam and the broader national discourse found thus their expression in the world's "shortest constitution". (Stockmann, 2004: 29) It is noteworthy, however, that the 1945 Basic Law promotes religious freedom and women's suffrage.

One day later on August 18, the Preparatory Commission of Indonesian Independence (PPKI, *Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*), ratified the 1945 Basic Law. As Hatta read out the Basic Law in public, the previously ratified provisions of the Muslim delegates had been omitted. The Preamble of the Basic Law introduced *Pancasila* as national philosophy, but it did neither contain the Koranic formula in Arabic, nor the obligation for Muslims to follow the Islamic law, nor was the religious affiliation of the future president regulated. Instead, the preamble began with a supplication to God Almighty (*Tuhan Yang Maha Kuasa*) and Sukarno amended his initial proposal of the principle of 'Belief in Lordship' (*ketuhanan*) into 'Belief in One Supreme Lordship' (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*) - "a slight but crucial change". (Hefner 2000: 42f. in Stockmann 2004: 30; Ramstedt 2004: 4; Mujiburrahman, 2006: Chapter 3; Kaelan, 2004: Chapter X, Ramstedt, 2004, 3-6) This principle appears to be line with the core principle of Islamic faith *tawhid*, the belief in the indivisible oneness of God, or in other words monotheism, without making Islam the official or even privileged religion, but implicitly sanctioning principally monotheistic religions as being in accordance with the philosophical basis of the state. (Hefner 2000: 42f. in Stockmann 2004: 30; Ramstedt 2004: 4)

Thereby the temporary success of political Islam was defeated, and one might rightfully ask, why the Islamic representatives put aside their own principles on the philosophy of the state and accepted the 1945 Constitution despite the omission of the crucial parts in the Jakarta Charter.

First, in view of the Japanese control, with the Allied Forces landing[129], allowing Dutch colonialist to re-colonize the country, "the dangers threatened (…) state and nation"[130], therefore the days of revolution were neither the appropriate time for the Islamic group to press on the realization of Islamic ideas, nor for a deep discussion of the matter. Second, both representatives of the nationalist and Islamic lines wanted to avert a separation of the Christian Eastern Islands and Bali, since they threatened not to join the Indonesian Republic, (Anshari 1985; Ramstedt 2004: 5; Mujiburrahman 2006; Zoelva Interview 2011) if the basis for the state would be Islamic. Third, political Islam was waiting for a secure and safe future, when the situation would permit to deliberate on the Constitution again, if the climate would be more conducive to Islamic claims. (Zoelva Interview 2011) Forth, the principle of *tawhid* had indeed become the basic principle of the state expressed in the first principle and Article 29 of the 1945 Basic Law. (Ramstedt 2004: 6; Mujiburrahman, 2006)

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[128] *Ra's al-hikmah al mashúrah* (the trunk of wisdom is deliberation) (Madjid 1994: 57)
[129] Allied Forces (mostly Bristish and British Indian troops) arrived in late September 1945
[130] Letnan-General H. Soedirman in Zaini Z. 1971 in Anshari 1985: 221

The 1945 Basic Law thus was seen to have temporary character with a preliminary status, and the international recognition of Indonesia as sovereign state was first ranking. Sukarno himself has emphasized the temporary character, and his thoughts were held by the Islamic group as a national promise (Anshari 1985: 221; Zoelva Interview 2011) Hence, it was hoped that in later times there were more options to amend or change the Constitution according to Islamic requirement, since national sovereignty, independence, unity, and stability were the primary objective to be realized and to fight for. (Anshari 1985: 221; Zoelva Interview 2011)

Between the proclamation of independence in 1945, and the final transfer of sovereignty in 1949, the young Indonesian nation was a heavily contested one: it had to safeguard independence against external (Dutch troops, British troops) and internal (*Darul Islam*[131]) factors. When Dutch and Allied troops arrived in late September 1945, the Dutch tried to reinstall themselves in Kalimantan, the Moluccas, Sulawesi, Bali, and the remaining Lesser Sunda Islands, retaining control over large parts of Sumatra and Java. But by then "the Republic had begun to establish itself and nationalist pride had burgeoned"[132]. When the Dutch returned and tried to reestablish colonial rule between October-December 1945, armed Indonesian guerillas resisted. The period was "filled with violent conflict in which Indonesians made it clear they would defend their independence with their lifeblood"[133]

Since the Islamic provisions were left out, this did not support national unity and the nationalist's cause and representatives of political Islam were left with discontent about the loss of the Islamic provision and the absence of a Ministry of Religion claimed during the meetings of the Committee of 62. To counter Islamic resurgence, these feelings of Muslim discontent were channeled into support for the national cause through the establishment of the Ministry of Religion on January 3rd, 1946. The Cairo-educated modernist Muslim H.M. Rasjidi had been appointed the first minister. This move enabled the revolutionary government in Yogyakarta[134] to bind or co-opt factions of political Islam into the government. In contrast, the Ministry of Education remained under Javanese secular nationalist influence. The first appointed Minister in 1945 was the founder of the *Taman Siswa* movement Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, therefore the Ministry and the Minister were influenced by ideas of Budi Utomo, the Theosophical Society and the pedagogic concepts of the *Taman Siswa* movement in early years. Today, the Ministry of Religious Affairs remains oriented towards more orthodox Islamic values and the Ministry of Education appears to be rather secular.

Prior to their withdrawal in late 1946, the British forced the Dutch to negotiate with the Indonesian revolutionary government for an end to hostilities. After four years of revolutionary war and guerilla tactics against the Dutch and an internal communist rebellion, The Hague formally recognized the sovereignty of a Federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia on December 27, 1949[135]. In the new Constitution of 1949, article 18 granted every citizen the right of freedom of thought, conscience, and belief, including the right to change one's religion. "Everyone has the right of freedom of thought, conscience, and religious belief; this right also covers the freedom to change one's religion and conviction". (Ramstedt 2004: 7)

Having won formal independence from the Dutch, Indonesians made big concessions to their former colonial emperors. The new Indonesia adopted a federal system of governance comprising 16 federal states, since the Dutch ensured federalism would form the overall framework of the political organization rather than the format of a Unitary-Nation State as opted for by Indonesians. To protect the non-Muslim population of their former strongholds, the Dutch made sure that the Jakarta Charter would not be implemented. (Ramstedt 2004) This Dutch intrusion in national and religious affairs left the concept of federalism tainted until the present day (federalism trauma) as either something which furthers foreign imperialist interests to the detriment of the Indonesian people or lies in discrepancy with asserted 'cultural' traditions and Islam. (Parker 2004; Hilmy 2010)

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[131] The Darul Islam movement had an orthodox Middle East oriented understanding of Islam. The *Darul Islam* movement was ignited by S.M Kartosuwirjo, who had proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia in West Java on August 17th 1949. The Darul Islam movement refers to the spread of Islamic dissident groups in Central Java, Aceh, and South Sulawesi, which were seen as not loyal to the young republican government. The government was only able to crack down those groups by 1965, after they shot Kahar Mazakar, leader of the South Sulawesi branch of the movement.
[132] Library of Congress, 2004: 2, in: http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Indonesia.pdf, (March 2010)
[133] Library of Congress, 2004: 2, in: http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Indonesia.pdf, (March 2010)
[134] The revolutionary government was forced out of Batavia and the exile capital was located in Yogyakarta from 1946 to 1949. In this, the young republic and its revolutionary government had with the exception of some areas in Java and Sumatra no territory.
[135] Only in 2005, The Hague finally acknowledged Indonesian Independence from 1945.

As first consequence, political Islam continued to feel that they had not achieved full independence, because the Dutch had been instrumental in preventing the Jakarta Charter to be included in the 1949 Constitution. Second, the foundations were laid for the existence of a phenomenon which "actually exists alongside and rather clearly differentiated from the churches (and the mosques): an elaborate and well-institutionalized civil-religion" (Purdy 1984: 69; cf. Bellah 1967).

With regard to the fusion of religion, politics and state or the role of Islam in the Constitution, Mujiburrahman (2006: 118-119) differentiates three stages of Muslim ideological struggle to illustrate the triple failure of political Islam in implementing an Islamic state. However, members of the more radical Muslims factions have been unsatisfied with the constitution and the *Pancasila,* and they continue to argue for a state, which is based on Islamic values. (Hosen 2005; Hilmy 2010) First, the idea to make Islam the ideology of the state has been eventually opposed by the nationalists and was rejected. Second, the Islamic groups tried to negotiate a compromise with the nationalists, as agreed upon in the Jakarta Charter, but the obligation for Muslims to observe Islamic Law was dropped in the Preamble. (Mujiburrahman, 2006: Chapter 3; Kaelan, 2004: Chapter X, Ramstedt, 2004, 3-6) The issue of the Jakarta Charter and debates whether to implement the obligation for Muslims to follow the *syari'ah* did resurface during the Sukarno presidency and rather prominently in the recent constitutional amendments after the downfall of the Suharto regime. The ratification of the Charta was three times rejected. In 1956, 1958 and 1959 the *syari'ah* issue emerged again, Islamic groups tried to implement the Charter but failed as in 1945. From 2000- 2002 four amendments to the 1945 constitution were passed; yet in a People's Consultative Assembly session the proposal to introduce the Jakarta Charter was not even put to the vote. (Crouch, 2003: 23; Hosen 2005; King Blair 2005; Zoelva Interview 2011) Yet, since 1959 the Jakarta Charter is recognized as an historical document, this recognition was upheld in 2002. (Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 5; Ramstedt 2004: 13-14; Zoelva Interveiw 2010)

Third, Muslims gave an Islamic meaning to the *Pancasila* by re-interpreting '*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*' as the Islamic theological concept of monotheism or *tawhid*. In other words, as Muslim delegates in the parliament "care for religion" (Sukarno Birth of the *Pancasila* Speech, in Purdy 1984: 59), they automatically issue "Islamic laws" (Sukarno Birth of the *Pancasila* Speech, in Purdy 1984: 59) as for example, the Presidential Decision 1/1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and Desecration, or the 1974 Marriage Act, or the Anti-Pornography and Porno-action Act. All these consequential legislation can be said to base on an exclusive understanding of Islam. In consequence, the question of religion remains a vital source of controversy today (Picard 2004: 56; Mujiburrahman 2006: 106-109) and in this context, the importance of religion in politics and education achieves its relevance.

Parliamentary democracy (1950-1959)

The just formed government of the Federal Republic needed one year to bring about the desired unitary nation state[136]. Having been assigned the third time president, the unitary nation-state was proclaimed by Sukarno on August 17, 1950. The state adopted a new Constitution of 1950 and a liberal system of government. (Zoelva Interview 2011) The Unitary State put in place a parliamentary democracy in which a plethora of large and small parties competed for support. The period of parliamentary democracy was remarkably open and religious affiliation was dealt with quite laxly. Article 18 of the 1949 Constitution was likewise included in the 1950 Basic Law, and runs "everyone has the right to freedom of religion, conscience, and thought". (Ramstedt 2004: 8) The part which granted the right to change one's religion had been omitted, leaving the issue somewhat lingering in the air. (Ramstedt 2004: 8)

Again, the 1950 constitution was not accommodating Muslim demands, because the image of the loyal Muslim groups was considerably tainted by what was commonly interpreted as the betrayal of the *Darul Islam*. The nationalists saw a major threat to national unity in the *Darul Islam* movement that had spread over parts of Java, South Kalimantan, Aceh, the Moluccas, the Lesser Sunda Islands, and South Sulawesi. The powerful Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) in which Javanists were prominent, was entertaining close links with the *kebatinan* groups that practiced a kind of mysticism based on a Javanese interpretation of the *Pancasila*. (Ramstedt, 2004: 8) This mysticism did not accord at all with *Darul Islam's* orthodox Middle East oriented understanding of Islam. The *Darul Islam* movement was ignited by S.M Kartosuwirjo, who had proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia in West Java on August 7, 1950. *Darul Islam* refers to the spread of dissident groups, which were seen as not loyal to the government. They were using a quite premature rhetoric of an Islamic state and *syari'ah* to justify their anti-national and separatist objectives. Only in 1962 the National Army was able to crash down on the outspread movement.

The first democratic general election Indonesia ever had was held in 1955. Political Islam gained 43 per cent of the total vote. (Ananta 2005: 21) The Islamic parties obtained 230 seats, while other parties (nationalist, protestant, catholic, socialist, and communist) obtained 284. Since the ratio between two groups was, therefore, around 4 to 5, Anshari argues, therefore it would be evident, that "the Islamic faction was not properly represented in either the 1945 Investigative Committee (25%), or in the Preparatory Committee (12%)". (Anshari 1985: 222) It would have been "only in the Committee which had composed the Jakarta Charter that the Islamic group has been represented adequately". (Anshari 1985: 222)

In November 1956, Sukarno inaugurated a newly elected Constituent Assembly to renegotiate the philosophical basis of the Republic. Remembering the heated debates on the degree of conflict, similarity and tolerance between Islam, its fundamental teachings, and *Pancasila* within and between the Islamic and nationalist groups in the public sphere between 1945 and 1955, it was consequently a hot atmosphere in which the Assembly began its work of writing a new democratic constitution between 1956 and 1959.

At the beginning three proposals for the basis of the state came to fore: *Pancasila*, Islam, and the Social Economy, since politicians were divided into three main ideologies: nationalism, Islamism, and communism or socialism. (Anshari 1985) The nationalists and minorities argued for *Pancasila* as basic principles, the Islamists were in favor of the idea of an Islamic state, and the communists imagined a Marxist state modeled after the Soviet Union. The first proposal was supported by 273 representatives, the second by 230 members, whereas the third proposal had 9 supporters only. (Anshari 1985: 224) It is therefore fair to say, that the debates on political and philosophical principles related to a writing of the Constitution were split into two major camps: One seeking an Islamic basis for the state, the other claiming the acceptance of the *Pancasila*[137]. (Anshari 1985 224)

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[136] The founding fathers' drive to build a Unitary Nation may be derived out of a Islamic general assumption of Oneness, the communal nature of Islam, and/or a Javanese cultural concept that Oneness eventually expresses human nature, as outlaid in the integralist model.

[137] "By Pancasila here were meant all forms of Pancasila, except the Jakarta Charter, despite the Charter being the first official formulation of the Pancasila. Not only do we see in the discussion of the Constituent Assembly's references to several different forms of the Pancasila, but also a variety of interpretations of specific terms and widely different emphases." (Anshari 1985: 224)

The content of the first principle '*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*' was the most problematic one. Proponents of the Islamic group problematized the place of God and revelation in the Constitution, since the first principle does not specifically reflect the Islamic concept of God (*tawhid*). As Sukarno argued for a relative concept of God according to the development of social (and individual) life from one stage to another, it seems that he had an secular-scientific-enlightened understanding of the principle, holding that one who still lives in the phase of the agrarian, needs God, whereas after becoming industrialized, the same person would not need God anymore. (Anshari 1985: 224)

Further, since national territorial integrity (*wawasan nusantara*) was his first objective, he wanted to include all religious traditions. The following chapters show that this tradition is followed up until today. Sukarno's stance was presumably confusing for an orthodox Muslim, and this confusion is reflected in the heated debates on the principle. The question asked by M. Natsir (Masyumi) was certainly paradigmatic for Muslim concerns and doubts "How can we maintain in this way the idea of revelation which is independent upon any temporal influences (…)?"(Anshari 1985: 224) Since in the eyes of a secularist, the principle of *Ketuhanan* would merely be a man-made principle, it is subject to change and has nothing to do with *wahyu* (revelation). (Anshari 1985: 224) On the contrary, supporters of *Pancasila* expressed their view, religion would be something supreme and sacred, which they held in high esteem, and exactly for these qualities, Soewirjo, President of PNI argued "we do mind whether religion is to be used as the basis of the state "[138]. (Anshari 1985: 225) "Then he quoted a statement signed by Soekarno and Hatta on September 14, 1957: That the *Pancasila* which is inserted in the Preamble (…) is the real guarantee for whole people of Indonesia to live continuously, freely, justly and prosperously"[139]. The Islamic group was of the opinion that "the *Pancasila* is an empty formula which still needs contents. If (…) the first Sila (…) is filled by the people who consider a stone as God, the Lordship in the *Pancasila* then will be filled in with a stone. If it is filled in by tree worshippers, it will be filled in with a tree[140]." M Natsir elucidated Islamic discontent and appealed to the supporters of *Pancasila* as follows:

> *Pancasila* as a state philosophy is for us obscure and has nothing to say to the soul of Muslim community which already posses a definite, clear, and complete ideology, one which burns in the hearts of the Indonesian people as a living inspiration and source of strength, namely Islam. To exchange the Islamic Ideology for Panca Sila is, for Muslims, like leaping from the solid into empty space, into a vacuum. (…) Your intended *silas* exist in Islam, not as a sterile 'pure concept' but as a living value which has real and distinct substances. By accepting Islam as the philosophy of the state the defender of Panca Sila will not lose anything at all. Both the supporters of the Panca Sila and the adherents of religion will have a living philosophy with distinct and strong contents. No one of the five *silas* formulated in the Panca Sila will fall and be lost by your accepting Islam as the basis of the state[141].

The Assembly then tended to seek points of agreements, as both *Pancasila* and Islam seek to realize "a just and prosperous state, a democratic government, a life of a world economy which is formed in a family spirit, a happy life of the nation's household having high ethical values"[142]. The balance of power between the nationalist group and Islam, also reflected in the election results, made it an absolute necessity for the General Chairman of the Assembly Wilopo "to produce a compromise, a resultant of parallelogram of strength within trends which is existing in our society"[143] "Since both Islam and *Pancasila* desire our nation to be happy, is it impossible to find points of meeting?"[144] In the third session in 1957, the Assembly established a Formulating Committee on the Basis of the State, consisting of 18 members that presented a concrete proposal for a new compromise formula[145], a draft a mixture between Islam, *adat*, and *Pancasila*. It seems, that after three years of deliberation, a great degree of unity seemed to have existed between the two faction in the Assembly, and if "it were given the chance to finish its task to form the permanent Constitution, it would have been accepted and sustained by all living groups in Indonesian society". (Anshari 1985: 226)

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[138] Soewirjo 1959 Tentang Dasar Negara II, in Anshari 1985: 225

[139] Soewirjo 1959 Tentang Dasar Negara II, in Anshari 1985: 225

[140] Soewirjo 1959 Tentang Dasar Negara III, in Anshari 1985: 225

[141] Natsir 1957 Islam sebagai Dasar Negara, in Anshari 1985: 225

[142] Soewirjo 1959 Tentang Dasar Negara III, in Anshari 1985: 224

[143] Soewirjo1959 Tentang Dasar Negara III, in: Anshari 1985: 225

[144] Soewirjo1959 Tentang Dasar Negara III, in: Anshari 1985: 225

[145] Soewirjo1959 Tentang Dasar Negara III, in: Anshari 1985: 225

Beginning in 1956, Sukarno was deeply dissatisfied with the parliamentary system. Opposing unrest, rebellions, and separation efforts triggered by political Islam and the Darul Islam movement, Sukarno feared national disintegration and gave the central military command wide martial law powers in 1957. Thereafter, the centre of political gravity shifted away from the parties and the parliament to the Army.

In 1959, president Sukarno, backed by the military, disbanded the Constitutional Assembly and forced the return to the 1945 Basic Law and *Pancasila* as national philosophical principles, which he declared shall be seen as the historical continuation of the Jakarta Charter. At this time the Communist Party of Indonesia (*Partai Komunis Indonesia;* henceforth PKI) gained strength in Indonesia's political realm, growing from a small organization in the early 1950s to an enormous mass movement in 1965, the PKI was at first associated with the Soviet Union, but in the mid-1960s became bound far more intimately to mainland China. (Sudijarto/ Thomas et al. 1980: 53, 58)

Guided Democracy (1959-1965)

When Sukarno developed the Guided democracy, he often emphasized that liberal democracy would be not in line with Indonesian culture, somewhat supporting Supomo's integralist perspective on the nation-state. (Mujiburrahman 2006: 144) Some foreign and Indonesian observers believed that the PKI would gain control over the parliament by legal constitutional means in 1959. (Parker 2003: 69) Thus the Army requested the election to be postponed. On July 5th, 1959 Sukarno replaced the parliamentary system with an authoritarian regime with the active backing of the Army and proclaimed 'Guided Democracy', a system in which he held wide-ranging executive powers and in which the parliament would comprise representatives of 'functional groups', such as workers, woman, youth and farmers. Feeling that the nation was still unstable, Sukarno declared the 1950 Provisional Constitution void and reintroduced the 1945 Constitution. The pending issue of the Jakarta Charter was solved by recognizing it as a historical document. (Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 5; Ramstedt 2004: 13-14)

The 1945 Basic Law provided ample opportunity for Sukarno to balance and appease three political powers - the PKI, the Army and himself[146]. During the period the Guided democracy (1959-1965) Sukarno announced his 'synthetic ideology' of nationalism, Islam and Communism (NASAKOM), and as result the *Manipol Usdek*[147], the PKI could introduce Communism at every level of society. As the government was further determined to deprive local elites from wealth and power who had co-operated with the Dutch, political polarization between the PKI and the Indonesian Nationalist Party (*Partai Nasional Indoensia*), henceforth PNI) also developed apace in rural areas, especially in Java and Bali. (Bourchier/Hadiz, 2003: 5-6; Robinson 1995; Parker 2003) In consequence, the early 1960s era was one of hot politics, open class conflict, and eventual mass violence.

In the first half of the 1960s, Sukarno leaned toward the left. The PKI increased its power and influence, giving way to a left-right polarization mirroring the Cold War struggle, in which Indonesian politics became increasingly involved. On domestic politics, Sukarno was trying to balance the communists and the Army; on the international stage he was establishing himself as leader of a new world, free from Cold War antagonism. But economic decline and mounting conflicts, especially those between communists and non-communists, the latter was backed by the Army, causing him to lose control over the situation[148]. By the mid-1960s political tensions increased between 1) left-wing forces gathered around the PKI and 2) their opponents among the military, the PNI, religious parties and college students and staff members. (Sudijarto/Thomas 1980: 58)

As the Army moved into an increasingly hostile relationship with Sukarno, it appropriated the corporatist mode of organization and made the 'functional groups' (*golongan karya*) the basis of its own political vehicle, Golkar. In 1964, Golkar was established as an umbrella organization of anti-communist civilian associations and trade unions in order to balance the increasing influence of the PKI. In 1965, the Army, fearing the powers of the PKI, the third largest communist party in the world, developed an alliance with the anti-communist forces in Indonesia and also the US Administration, which saw the military as their strongest guarantee against the growing power of PKI. (Bourchier/Hadiz, 2003: 4-6)

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[146] The Jakarta Post. Indonesia: A Nation in Transition, in: www.thejakartapost.com/ (August 2007)
[147] Starting in 1959, Sukarno reiterated the five central concepts of the Indonesian revolution: First, Basic Law of 1945; second, socialism ala Indonesia; third 'Guided Democracy', fourth 'Guided Economy' and fifth, Indonesian character. Combining the first letters of these five concepts, the acronym USDEK evolved. Manipol is the acronym of Indonesian Political Manifest, the new state doctrine hence became known as Manipol Usdek.
[148] The Jakarta Post. Indonesia: A Nation in Transition, in: www.thejakartapost.com/ (August 2007)

Under Sukarno, Indonesia increasingly reduced the role of foreign investment in Indonesia, accusing European and American imperialists to be responsible for the exploitation of Indonesian human capital and natural resources. Over the decade 1955-1965 the Indonesian economy declined at accelerating pace. Between 1964 and 1965, the tension between the PKI and the Indonesian government, along with some Islamic organizations, resulted in the worst mass murders of the twentieth century.

New Order (1966-1998)

Significant changes in the area of religion happened during the New Order era. Religious affiliation became a matter of life and death, since the government supported by Muslim groups tried to suppress the supporters of PKI, by applying a policy that everyone must choose a religion and thereby identified the idea of being anti-religious with being a communist, which could threaten a person's existential security. As a result, every Indonesian citizen was required to carry personal identification cards indicating their religion. The policy resulted in mass conversions. The compulsory religious class became established after the abortive coup of 1965 and the rise of the New Order.

In the month between September 30, 1965, and March 11, 1966 precise, Suharto rose to power in the midst of a bloodbath of incomprehensible scale. (Stockmann 2004: 28) September 30, 1965 was a watershed in Indonesian history: Under unclear circumstances Major-General Suharto had used his troops from the Army Strategic Reserve to assert control in Jakarta. In one of the worst episodes of mass murder, hundreds of thousands of members of the PKI and its mass organizations were killed by parts of the Army hostile to Sukarno. The abortive coup took the lives of seven high-ranking Army generals, followed by a pogrom of communists, a moderate estimate ranges between 300 thousand and 500 thousand alleged members of PKI. The PKI and dozens of its affiliates were completely destroyed. The official Army version insists that the PKI was behind the coup attempt, while the communist version asserts that the coup was an internal matter of the Army. In fact, several members of the PKI central bureau were involved, as well as many Army officers and personnel[149].

Again under unclear circumstances, on March 11, 1966 Sukarno put his signature to a document (March 11 Letter of Instruction) reportedly transferring wide-ranging state power to Suharto[150]. On March 27th, 1968 Suharto was finally assigned full presidency, after having been appointed acting president the year before. Consolidating his power under a new regime called the New Order, Suharto launched a regime cleansing against the Old Order[151]. Suharto himself was steeped in Javanese mysticism and was known to meditate at different historical sites, to collect powerful magic heirlooms (*pusaka sakti*) in order to accrue power (*kesaktian*). (Ramstedt, 2004. 16) The New Order in its early years is best thought of as an alliance between the military and a range of civilian groups that included students, secular intellectuals, professionals, anti-communist party leaders, and large numbers of rural and urban Muslims. These groups had been united by their fear of communism and by their perception that Sukarno was to blame for the economic crisis that had been eroded their material interests. (Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 11; Ramstedt 2004: 15) By glorifying the 1965-massacres as a heroic mission, the Suharto regime demonized Communism to the extent that it was not possible for young people to see Marxism or the PKI in a positive light, "they have been brainwashed". (Parker 2004: 68)

During the purge in 1965-1966 approximately 50.000 teachers lost their lives, and a second lack of teachers (the first appeared in the founding years and the 1950s), not to speak of qualified teachers, emerged. (Müller 1974: 324) In the beginning of Suharto government, about 60 percent of the adults could not read or write and close to 65 percent of the country's population lived in absolute poverty, since the average Indonesian earned only roughly US$50 a year, and over 80 percent of the population lived on tiny, fragmented, and scattered farms. They had little or no access either to rudimentary health care or to basic amenities of life such as safe drinking water or adequate shelter. Therefore the Suharto government began economic rehabilitation by reassessing economic objectives[152]. (Tambunan 2004)

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[149] The Jakarta Post, Indonesia: A Nation in Transition, in: www.thejakartapost.com/ (March 2007)

[150] Bourchier/Hadiz, 2003: 7; The Jakarta Post, Indonesia: A Nation in Transition, in: www.thejakartapost.com/ (March 2007)

[151] The Jakarta Post, Indonesia: A Nation in Transition, in: www.thejakartapost.com/ (March 2007)

[152] Economic stability, economic growth and equity in distribution of wealth, which became known as the 'Trilogy of Development', were to be achieved through a series of five-year development plans known as Repelita; and the first plan (Repelita I) was launched in 1969. The implementation of these plans was accompanied with the 'open door' policies towards the West and liberalization policies in capital account, international trade, banking and investment. Tambunan 2004; www.gdnet.org/, (October 2006)

During the beginning of the New Order era there were serious debates on the Jakarta Charter versus *Pancasila*. Then communism was banned and *Pancasila* was implemented as basic principle of the state and supreme base of jurisdiction[153] in 1966. In consequence, as the Suharto regime arose to power the times of dealing laxly with religious affiliation were definitely determined. The Suharto regime forced the population to affiliate itself clearly to one of the acknowledged religions. Adherents to traditional religious belief systems, those 'who did not have a religion yet' (*belum beragama*), were suspected to be atheists and consequently probably communist. To be suspected of being a communist, put a person into mortal danger. Separatist inclinations based on ethnicity, religious fundamentalism, race or any other kinds of factionalism[154] were strictly prohibited. Suharto was determined to bring about economic development by modernizing infrastructure of the country and to create the necessary manpower in form of the so-called *Pancasila* human (*manusia Pancasila*). He set up the trilogy of development: political stability, economic growth, and equality.

The New Order's main political machinery, Golkar, operated legally not as a political party, but as an association of functional groups, although in fact the Regime developed it into a government sponsored party. Society was highly depoliticized as mass organizations were disbanded into this state-backed corporatist bodies purporting to represent such broad 'functional groups'. In accordance with the regime's organicist ideology, all components of Golkar were expected to subordinate their particular interests to the national interest. While the regime was generous with grants to Muslim schools and mosques, it soon made clear its opposition to any attempt to reassert Islam through politics (Bourchier/Hadiz, 2003: 12-13; Mujiburrahman, 2006: 140) and from 1966-1989 political Islam has been silenced.

During the 1970s, Islam emerged as the most potent opposition force. By 1973 the New Order has finally taken shape, and Suharto tightly controlled politics; not even the slightest room was available for opposition[155]. A large-scale reorganization of the political system was introduced in 1974, nine oppositional parties were fused into two government sponsored bodies, PPP (United Development Party) which brought together four Muslim parties and the PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party) which was an amalgamation of the remaining Christian, socialist, and nationalist parties There were several cases of serious opposition[156], but in 1978 Suharto enjoyed an incontestable position. Muslim discontent intensified in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the government launched a major campaign to indoctrinate Indonesians with the state ideology of *Pancasila*. (Bourchier/Hadiz, 2003: 14)

In 1978 Suharto's personal assistant Ali Murtopo has established a think tank, called CSIS (Centre of Strategic Studies Institute) that should resemble the RAND Corporation. Murtopo then published the book 'Strategy of Culture' introducing the integralist-organicist view on culture by claiming that the archipelago had one single history, destiny, culture, territory and spiritual foundation, therefore Indonesian culture could be traced back to the early history in which people believed in animism and already in One Supreme Lordship. In brief, the core of the original Indonesian culture survived, even though enriched, through manifold acculturation processes and is embedded in the *Pancasila*. The advent of the Westerners caused a cultural dualism eventually paving the way for Indonesian independence. In this context, *Pancasila* is the true manifestation of Indonesian culture in the sense that the principles of family-ism, cooperation, and harmony are embodied in it. (Mujiburrahman, 2006: 147)

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[153] Communism ban: Ketetapan MPRS no. XXV/MPRS/1966; Pancasila: Ketetapan MPRS no. XX/MPRS/1966

[154] Then referred to as SARA, an acronym of *suku* (ethnic group), *agama* (religion), *ras* (race) and *antargolongan* (intergroup action)

[155] The Jakarta Post, Indonesia: A Nation in Transition, in: www.thejakartapost.com/ (March 2007); Bourchier/Hadiz, 2003: 10

[156] In January 15th, 1974 when students protested against Japanese investments in Jakarta, added by political rivalry between Gen. Sumitro and Maj. Gen. Ali Murtopo, their protests turned into serious riots, known as Malari disaster, led to a crackdown marked by the final break between the pluralists and the organicists. The second serious opposition movement came in 1978; again students protested Suharto's bid for a second term in office. In 1978 several retired Army officers backed the students, while factionalism was apparent within the Armed Forces. Suharto moved fast to crush the movement. Hundreds of opposition and student leaders were arrested; dozens of newspapers and magazines were closed down. The movement lost its momentum, and after that Suharto enjoyed an incontestable position. The Jakarta Post, Indonesia: A Nation in Transition, in: www.thejakartapost.com/ (March 2007)

But the indoctrination efforts were apparently not enough, controlling the People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat*, MPR[157]), the regime produced a Broad Guideline of State Policy (GBHN) in 1983, which specified that all political parties have to acknowledge *Pancasila* as their sole foundation. (Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 14; Mujiburrahman 2006: 149) In consequence Law No. 8/1985 on Societal Organization stipulated that all social organizations were required to accept *Pancasila* as the sole basis (*azas tunggal*) in their societal, national, and political activities. Non-compliance resulted in disbanding. Undoubtedly, Law No. 8/1985 can be seen as the "apex of *Gleichschaltung* in the civil society realm". (Stockmann 2004, emphasis in original)

When his *azas tunggal* policy became law, Suharto saw it as a great, even an epoch-making, achievement of its administration. Uniting all political forces under the *Pancasila*, he believed, enabled Indonesia to put behind it the ideological and religious conflict that had torn at its fabric in the past. No longer would it be acceptable to advocate any ideology that conflicted with the *Pancasila* as defined by the government. The Islamic party (PPP), the Indonesian Hindu Council and the Christian associations therefore had to take *Pancasila* and not the doctrines of their particular faith as their basis. There has been much criticism of the law of 1985 by representatives of faith communities and liberal democracy. The forced acceptance of *Pancasila* as the single basis in their statutes and constitutions was felt as an attack on their self-understanding by religious organizations. Yet, the law refrained from demanding a "*Pancasila* theology" or anything along that line. It was limited to the societal, national, and political spheres, and did not trespass onto theological or religious ones. (Schumann, 2001: 31) King Blair (2004: 16) comments critically:

> President Soeharto and the military held the 1945 Constitution essentially sacred, not least because it granted broad powers and tremendous flexibility to the president and created a weak legislature and judiciary, facilitating their authoritarian project. Proposals to amend the Constitution were considered tantamount to treason and all political and social organizations were required to include loyalty to the Constitution in their charters. This sacralization of the 1945 Constitution was especially ironic given that originally it was meant to be a provisional, emergency document whose main function was to help generate some modicum of legitimacy and structure for the Indonesian state in the aftermath of the hasty declaration of independence.

From 1973 to 1988, Indonesia was able to steadily expand the state spending on education, health, infrastructure projects, the armed forces and the bureaucracy. This facilitated an increase in employment opportunities and a rising standard of living for both urban and rural dwellers. A prolonged period of economic growth and stability had produced a substantial middle class and a rapidly expanding urban working class. This processes caused society to change; compared with the late 1960s, Indonesians were more educated, healthier, more mobile, and more prosperous than ever. But, while the economy grew, the period was marked by an increasing concentration of political power and an attenuation of civil and political rights (Bourchier/Hadiz, 2003: 13) resulting in a depoliticized and demobilized civic society. As Parker pointedly noted, the younger generations were free of the 1965 trauma but they were indoctrinated with the paranoia of Communism and that open democracy is dangerous because it can lead to blood in the streets. (Parker 2004: 99) In brief, during the New Order, diversity was sacrificed in favor of uniformity or conformity to protect Indonesian unity. (Canonica-Walangitang 2003; Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 16-17; Mujiburrahman 2006: 221)

Following a regime split in 1988, Suharto's absolute dominance eroded, thereby causing the character of the New Order to change. All things considered, the New Order began to lose its coherence because its political architecture could no longer accommodate the tremendous social changes, which had taken place over the past two decades. (Canonica-Walangitang 2003) In an attempt to regain the initiative, Suharto reached out to the Muslim community his government had marginalized in the 1970s and 1980s, as the establishment of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI) in 1990 illustrates. The new orientation portrayed Islam not as an ideology opposed to *Pancasila*, but as the spirit within the national culture. Consequently, nationalism and Islam were seen as compatible. In 1989, which marked the Islamic turn (Liddle 1996) in Indonesian politics, the Suharto clan went to Mecca to perform the hajj.

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[157] The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) was the supreme institution with unlimited power until 2001.

With the ending of the Cold War, Suharto eventually signaled his support for increased political 'openness and transparency' (*keterbukaan*) analogous to the Soviet *glasnost*, and democracy was a favorite topic of debate in this period. In 1993, the National Commission on Human Rights was set up, yet Indonesia maintained that 'Western' standards could not be applied in the Indonesian 'integralistic state' inspired and guided by the indigenous Indonesian values of harmony and cooperation. The ability of a small core of 'radical' activists to organize large student/worker protests during 1989-1994 helped to revive mass protest, which had been suppressed by terror in 1965 as legitimate political action. Another sign of the New Order's waning authority and of the increasing relevance of mass politics was Megawati Sukarnoputri's[158] surprise election as the chair of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) in 1993. (Bourchier/Hadiz, 2003: 18) The PDI as successor of the PNI has its national stronghold traditionally in Bali. The openness of the political space did much to pave the way for the demonstrations that weakened the Suharto regime between 1996 and its end in 1998. It also helped convince a wider circle of activists of the efficacy of mass action. (Bourchier/Hadiz, 2003: 17)

Organicism and Asian Values

Organicism

The organicist model of thinking accords well with the Asian value debate. Certainly, this cultural relativist model of thought has enjoyed a very bad reputation and is more or less in disgrace in the 'West', since it is associated with patrimonalism, exploitation, and fascism. But reminding the significance of Indonesia as a laboratory for social research, there is the responsibility to take claims for indigenous political models seriously, which may not suit liberal Western sensibilities. (Bowen 2004:153; Parker, 2004: 8 FN 15, 9; Houben/Chou 2005) Both integral and pluralist lines of thought are in my understanding represented in Indo-Melanesian traditions and the Hindu-Buddhist legacy and Javanese monism. Those lines of thought are vital and creative in contemporary discourse in Indonesia, accounting for their effective repercussions in the public and political arena. In general, the integralist model emphasizes the communal and ethical element and does not only grant rights but imposes also duties on the community members, or in other words communal rights are given the same weight as individual rights. These lines of thought also accord with the more orthodox Islamic notion of monotheism and communalism.

The integralist model backs the Constitution of 1945, which had been drafted largely by the trained constitutional scholar and Javanese aristocrat Prof Supomo[159]. Prof Supomo had found three main concepts of state: liberalism, emphasizing individual rights, Marxism basing on class analysis, and the integralist approach, in which individuals or class do not matter, because state and people are considered as organic parts and united as a family. Prof Supomo preferred the integralist approach, because it was the most suitable system to the given Indonesian socio-political culture to him. "In that system the attitude of a citizen is not 'what is my right' but 'what is my duty as a member of the large family"[160]. According to the integralist understanding of state "there will be no dualism between state and individual's, (…) there will be no dualism between state and stateless societies (*Staat und staatsfreie Gesellschaft*), there will be no need to guarantee basic rights and human rights (*Grund- und Freiheitsrechte*) for the individual against the state, because individuals are organic parts of the state, with its own position and obligation to help realize the state's greatness (…)"[161].

The Suharto Regime fully developed Supomo's idea that Indonesia was an integralistic state, inspired and guided by indigenous Indonesian values of harmony and cooperation, and that Western standards could not be applied in Indonesia. In 1968 the New Order referred to Prof Supomo's integralist ideas as the appropriate source for understanding the 1945 constitution.

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[158] Megawati Sukarnoputri is the daughter of the first Indonesian president and architect of Pancasila, Sukarno. She is of Sumatran-Javanese-Balinese descent.
[159] Born 22.01.1903 – died on 12th September 1958. Supomo was influenced by Javanese ethics and admired the Japanese and German totalitarian regimes. His doctoral project was conducted at the law faculty of the Universiteit Leiden, The Netherlands. His promoter has been Cornelius van Vollenhoven, who was not only the ,architect' or father of Indonesian *adat* law, but also an renowned expert of international law as he was one of the legal advisers to the League of Nations, the precursor of the United Nations. Supomo was appointed first Indonesian minister of Justice. (http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soepomo)
[160] Supomo as quoted in Reeve 1990: 158, in: Parker 2004: 8
[161] Stockmann 2004: 27; Parker 2004: 8, Speech by Soepomo, 31.5.1945, Parker quotes Bourchier 1996: 81-82. Stockman translates from Supomo 1945: 191. I have merged both slightly divergent translations here.

Governmental promotion of religion and revitalizing useful traditional values and culture were to provide a bulwark against destructive foreign ideas, as Liberalism (Sukarno situation), Federalism (Federalism, out of traumatic experiences from first the revolutionary period with Dutch colonialism from 1945 to 1949), Marxism-Leninism and Communism, partly also Islam, that were considered by the New Order ideologues to be opposed to *Pancasila*. (Parker 2004: 8; Antlöv/Hellmann 2005: 12) The New Order state ideology then developed its "idea of the individual (or particular) being dependent on the family (or a whole)" into the vision of an integrated nation and state within the ideological framework of *kekeluragaan* (family principle). (Parker 2004: 8; Antlöv/Hellmann 2005: 12) The new state was a family, an organicism, a village, a gamelan. (Parker 2004: 8)

The organicist/integralist perspective led to criticism of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in several points during the Suharto regime (1966-1998). The main point of concern has been a presumed lack of codification of basic human obligations (KAM, *kewajiban asasi manusia*) – this point has been made most recently by former President B.J. Habibie during his honorary speech of the birth of *Pancasila* on 1.06.2011. In this context, it is central to note that obligation, mutual help, and ritual are main features in traditional Indo-Melanesian judicature. (Hooker 1978) The emphasis laid on obligation instead of individualism may refer to a shared trajectory of legal practices and concepts in the Archipelago.

As the UDHR does not codify the equality between right and obligation, and only individual rights but no shared duties are proclaimed, the Suharto regime (1966-1998) regarded the treaty as a mere commitment to the equality of human beings before God. The preamble of the 1945 Basic Law recognizes sovereignty of the state and implements equality of the people before law and the legitimate government. (Kaelan 2004: 132-136; Wandelt 1989: 166-169) But, the underlying anthropology of human nature is constructed as bi-polar (*dwi-tunggal*) in the document, because humans are seen as related to and dependent of their social and natural environment. Because human nature is defined by expansion and boundaries, the state may constrain or limit its citizenry's rights in order to facilitate their advancement according to their specific nature. Because the institution of sovereign states regulates the rights and obligation of the people in their territories, human rights may therefore only be formulated in particularistic, nation-state specific that is cultural relativistic concepts and models. (Wandelt 1989: 170) This necessary limit or restrain was seen as God-given by the Suharto regime, and society and state have to take responsibility for it.

To exemplify the persistency of organicist thought in post-Suharto Indonesia, the current study has analyzed two recent editions of reformed textbooks on post-Suharto *Pancasila* instruction at the tertiary level, compiled by Prof Dr Kaelan in 2004[162]. Pertaining to the relationship between God, individual and/or society and the state, in essence, the textbook outlines the integralist perspective of the relation between humans/society and state.

In the Indonesian perspective thus, a state is neither the manifestation of mere individual interests imperatively bound by a system of legislation as it is proposed by liberal countries, nor a societal group totality which is neglecting individual rights at all as it is the case in socialist-communist countries. Consequently, Indonesia bases neither on the declaration of individual liberty as it occurs in liberal countries, nor on communism as it is the case in socialist-communist countries.

What is the Indonesian nation state then? Since the underlying (Javanese) anthropology understands human beings as structured bipolar: as mono-dualistic, mono-pluralistic or *dwi-tunggal* (two-unitary) (Kaelan 2004: 132-136; Wandelt 1989: 166-169), human beings are endued with a physical and psychical body structure, characterized as individual and social beings expressing the status of God's creatures and as individual persons at the same time. Being created by One Supreme Lordship, humanity has the bi-polar nature of being an individual and a social being at the same time (*dwi-tunggal*). As a result human beings can neither exist nor survive on their own behalf; it is intrinsic to their nature that they always need others. In consequence, nation-states manifest this characteristic human nature in realizing human standards and values. Therefore, the Indonesian nation state manifests both, namely the true nature of its citizens as individuals and as social beings, which all have been created equally by One Supreme Lordship.

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[162] Kaelan 2004: 126-127. Senior Professor of Philosophy at the Philosophical Faculty of the Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, author's translation of parts of his textbook on Pancasila Education at tertiary level

This fundamental anthropology is expressed in the five principles of the state, in the amended 1945 constitution and in the state motto 'Diversity in Unity'. As far as society and state are concerned, the *Pancasila*-based Indonesian nation state is an integral unity characterized through brotherhood, family, and religiosity.

The essential idea of the *Pancasila* state's basis is represented in One Supreme Lordship as creator of the entire existence, thus the fundamental underlying characteristic of the state has to be faith in One Supreme Lordship. The innateness of nature - that is the harmony between micro and macro cosmos - sets up God's entire creation as indivisible, interrelated, and interdependent unity or in other words integral unity. Consequently any individual as a society member is God's creature, therefore society and nation-state as their natural extensions built an integral totality obliged to believe in One Supreme Lordship. In conclusion, the state principles and motto foster the synthetic concept of reciprocal assistance or mutual cooperation (*gotong royong*) in order to integrate linguistic, ethno-cultural, and religious diversity as national asset and divine characteristic of the *Pancasila*-state. The graph shows the structure of human nature according to Sunoto:

Wandelt, 1989: 169. Structure of human nature according to Sunoto

In context of national values, the pivotal virtue of Indonesian citizens is defined repeatedly as *akhlak/susila* or moral/ethics. This virtue is then interpreted either vertically or horizontally. In its horizontal interpretation it is concerned with encounters between human beings and related to social norms or morals represented in a specific community, whereas the vertical perspective focuses on encounters between human beings and One Supreme Lordship and points to universal imperatives or ethics represented in religion. (Agung: 1991)

Interestingly, Prof Amitav Acharya (2007: 87) has called for Western nations to strengthen Indonesia's organic capacity: "(A)s a developing country, Indonesia is making a painful transition to democracy facing a myriad of problems. If handled properly, Indonesia can become a model for other Islamic countries by demonstrating that democracy and Islam are not incompatible". He opines a "way of engagement for the 'West' would be to help Jakarta with development and governance assistance to strengthen its organic capacity to deal with its internal problems, including threats from terrorism". Bourchier/Hadiz (2003: 23) argue that the organicist impulse is still clearly present among some of the most powerful groups in contemporary Indonesia.

The integralist model has shaped political discourse for about one century and ever since then has been remodeled by executives, politicians, and lobbyists in discourse to cement their authority. The genealogy of the integralist model traced organicism either back to Asian trajectories as the Indic theory of *varnasramadharma*, the Indic *mandala* concept and the Javanese Kaula-gusti relationship or back to European trajectories as the Leiden Law School, Nazi German and the German romantic movement. (Parker 2004: 17 FN 13; Stockmann 2004: 30- 34) Therefore I propose that organicism is neither an indigenous concept nor a foreign-import but the outcome of a drawn out discursive cross-fertilization process used by Indonesian politicians to manipulate values and exploit human and environmental resources in order to gain and cement personal and group profits and privileges.

Asian Values

The historical background of the Asian Values debate dates back into the early 1990s and to developments culminating in the 1993 World Conference in Vienna. In the 1990s the former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, and the PM of Malaysia, Mohamad bin Mahathir, started a debate whether human rights are universal or a pivotal Western idea and whether democracy as political system is viable in Asia. They proposed a culturally autonomous set of Asian Values to legitimate either a difference between the Western model of Universal Human Rights or universal inapplicability of international norms of Human Rights. Their cultural relativist argument claimed Asian Values would not only significantly differ from Western values, but that notions of power and politics in Asia radically differ from European or Christian conceptions. Consequently, Asian Values would place a greater emphasis on the communal and ethical element in religion; therefore they do not only grant rights but also impose obligations upon their people and communities. Indeed, foregoing to personal freedoms, Asian values would allegedly include a sense of communal loyalty for the sake of social stability and prosperity. As result, in Asia the authoritarian style of government was supposed to be more appropriate than democracy. (Bowen 2004: 3; Parker 2003: 8 FN 15)

In the run-up to the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, several regional meetings had been held. The results of the Asian regional meeting have been laid down in the so-called Bangkok Declaration[163], which positions have been frequently criticized. The signatories of the Bangkok Declaration acknowledge the universality of human rights, but qualify that statement by adding a relativist clause

§8 'human rights must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds'.

The Bangkok Declaration reaffirmed the Asian commitment to principles contained in the UDHR (§1), but simultaneously expressed "concern that these mechanisms relate mainly to one category of rights" (§ introductory remarks) and thereby the "non-use of human rights as an instrument of political pressure" (§5) and "any attempt to use human rights as a conditionality for extending development assistance" (§4) is emphasized. Here the Bangkok Declaration critically comments on the allocation of developmental aides and on a perceived ambiguous double standard promotion of human rights on the globe referring to asymmetries of power between the West and "the rest". Further the Bangkok Declaration (§7) stresses "the universality, objectivity and non-selectivity of all human rights and the need to avoid the application of double standards in the implementation of human rights and its politicization". Applying the specific integralist style, the Declaration points further to the "interdependence and indivisibility of economic, social, cultural, civil, and political rights, and the inherent interrelationship between development, democracy, universal enjoyment of all human rights, and social justice, which must be addressed in an integrated and balanced manner".

In context of religious education the Declaration recognizes in Article 23 "the rights of the child to enjoy special protection and to be afforded the opportunities and facilities to develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity". Interestingly, the Bangkok Declaration sees the spiritual or religious sphere as a critical dimension in the development of the child. In human rights instruments, the child has the right to religious education, but a spiritual dimension of education is usually neglected. In consequence, one might suppose the spiritual dimension of education to be a highly valued one in Asia.

Adopted by the 171 participating states by consensus, the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action (henceforth VDPA) has sought to reaffirm human rights as universal and relevant standard. Nation-states are duty-bound to "respect (…) the principle of equal rights and self -determination of peoples, peace, democracy, justice, equality, rule of law, pluralism, development, better standards of living, and solidarity".

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[163] There are two Bangkok Declarations. The first is the founding document of the ASEAN, also named ASEAN declaration, issued in 1967. The document the currents study refers to here is the 1993 Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights. The Ministers and representatives of Asian States met on a regional meeting for Asia at Bangkok from March, 29 to April, 2 1993 to prepare for the World Conference on Human rights, and adopted the Bangkok Declaration, which contains the aspirations and commitments of the Asian region. (Stockmann 2004: 201-202) For the full text of the Declaration access: http://law.hku.hk/lawgovtsociety/Bangkok%20Declaration.htm (March 2009)

The document (I, § 5) accepts national and regional particularities, in other words, historical, cultural and religious backgrounds but negates cultural relativism.

> I, § 5. All human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural, and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic, and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The relativist qualification of the Bangkok Declaration that somewhat enunciated Asian Values was attenuated in the VDPA, particularities must be borne in mind, but it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. In short, the VDPA embraces the universality concept without the qualifications mentioned in the Bangkok Declaration. (Stockmann 2004: 202)

4.2.3. Muslim Majority Democracy in Indonesia

Given the fact of the parallel processes of democratization and decentralization, a dramatic reworking of Indonesia's administrative, political, and educational landscape has been under way since the demise of the Suharto regime in 1998[164]. The decentralization process, regional autonomy, and the education system are three formative components of a contextual shift in Indonesia's plural management of authority that much burdens the regions in financial means. The enactment of Law No. 24/2003 on the establishment of the Constitutional Court (*Mahkamah Konstitusi*) enables individuals to seek the review of the constitutionality of any act, including on matters relating to discrimination. In the arena of education, the reform era introduced a shift from the transmission model to the transformation model.

The downfall of the authoritarian Suharto regime initialized the era of reform (*reformasi*) and the country's "kaleidoscopic reality" reasserted itself. (Bourchier 2003: 23; Aspinall/Fealy, 2003: 2) As the currency crisis wrought havoc across Asia in late 1997 and in 1998, Indonesia turned out to be the most vulnerable of the Asian economies. The crisis worsened with the scheduling of the People's Consultative Assembly's General Session in March 1998, with the main agenda being to elect a new national leadership[165]. Nationwide protests and mass demonstrations arose following the appointment of incumbent President Suharto to the Presidential office and B.J: Habibie to the office of the Vice President.

From March to June a number of student activists were kidnapped and never reappeared. Then, inciting nationwide bewilderment, six students of the elite Catholic University *Trisakti* were shot dead following a peaceful demonstration in Jakarta on May 12. Immediately hundreds of thousand students, the impoverished urban youth, and members of the public poured into the streets, propelled by either democratic ideals or manipulated through certain elites by monetary means who then wished to retain or cement their position and vested interests. Thereafter, for three days, from May 13 through to May 15 six of the largest cities were hit by massive riots, killings, and rapes of ethnic Chinese, and the burning down of entire city districts. Many ethnic Chinese and Christians fled from Java and Jakarta to Bali, frightened, terrified, and deprived (own observation in 1998). Days later, thousands of students demanding total reform (*reformasi total*), marched to the parliamentary complex in Jakarta, and occupied it for five-days[166]. The basic demand of the reform-movement was democratization of the political structure.

Following two weeks of violence in the capital Jakarta and vast mass protests, on May 21, 1998 Suharto agreed to resign and handed over power to his vice-president and long time close friend B.J. Habibie. (Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 19). Hence, what brought the New Order down, was neither "the memory of the 1965 massacre, nor the discovery of mass graves in Aceh, or the murder of independence fighters in the mountains of New Guinea, nor the attempted genocide of two-hundred-thousand Timorese, but the shooting of six University students in Jakarta." (Aspinall/Fealy 2003: 2) Since I have been in Indonesia during the reform era, I agree with Aspinall/Fealy (2003: 2): "the New Order government shot six children of its own middle-class and asset to the future and lost the loyalty and faith of a nation".

The sameness of (Indonesian) identity was a product of lived experience and the commonalities of everyday life, which Indonesians have shared during the Suharto regime. The disjuncture between the unity of a national identity and a regional one in daily lives creates some confusion for the citizenry. Hence, Suharto's fall triggered a dramatic and at times chaotic transformation by contesting the political order in almost every sphere: the cultural expression as expressed in the trend towards ethno-nationalism has flowered and the formal separation of Islam and the state was being challenged. (Aspinall/Fealy 2003: 1) Beginning with Suharto's fall, vast communal violence has broken out in several regions of the archipelago and a tendency of ethno-nationalism or ethno-religious-nationalism emerged. National unity was at stake, political scientists and regional observers feared Indonesia would experience a process of Balkanization and simply disintegrate and fall apart. In consequence, the current government regards the four pillars (1945 Basic Law, *Pancasila*, Unity of the State [*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*], and the nationalconception [*wawasan nusantara*]) multireligiosity and to be crucial tools in order to maintain unity and avoid separatism and the outbreak of violent conflicts.

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[164] This chapter draws from asianinfo.org: Politics in Indonesia, in: http://www.asianinfo.org, (March 2008)
[165] The Jakarta Post, "A Nation in Transition", in: www.thejakartapost.com (March 2007)
[166] The Jakarta Post, "A Nation in Transition", in: www.thejakartapost.com (March 2007); Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 19

As a result of the New Order politics, the Armed Forces were split into roughly spoken two major camps. On one side the nationalist oriented camp around General Wiranto, an officer with nationalist learning, and on the other side the Islamic oriented camp around Suharto's son in law, Prabowo Subianto[167], who entertained relations to radical Islamic groups. A few hours before Habibie was sworn in as President, Susilo B. Yudhoyono[168] and F. Tanjung[169] struck a deal that would provide a crucial power base for the political weak Habibie: Armed Forces support for Habibie, who was disliked by the nationalist faction inside the Army because of his Islamic modernist learning, in exchange for keeping General Wiranto in the position of Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief.

Almost immediately the new democratic Habibie Administration of the reform era (May 1998 – October 1999) diffused opposition to its government and consolidated support by opening up political space with the continuation of the *keterbukaan* policy (policy of openness and transparency) thereby demolishing at a stroke some features of the New Order system. Furthermore the Habibie Administration revoked laws governing the licensing of the press as well as most restrictions on forming political parties, unions and professional bodies and manifested press freedom and the right for information. In addition to it, Decree No. XVIII/MPR/1998 revoked the 1978 Decree on the compulsory Comprehension and Practice of the *Pancasila* (*Program Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*) by ruling that the government must stop the compulsory P4 propagation program, finally causing the retraction of *Pancasila* as sole basis for all social and political organizations in Indonesia in 2000. (Kaelan 2004: 10; Interview Triguna 2005) These laws triggered immediately the mushrooming of political parties, interest groups, and other civil society organizations (Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 20; Aspinall/Fealy 2003: 2; King 2004: 24-25) and fostered thereby an open political and public space for discourse. This opening of political space finally stabilized the weak Habibie presidency, because Indonesians founded parties and organizations, instead of fighting the regime they struggled with each other over programs, support and then finally over funds. (Stockmann 2004: 72)

The regions had neither influence over national government policies nor the power to control their own affairs during 40 years. "Local politics and power constellations reflected the interests of the centre rather than those of the regions". (Aspinall/Fealy 2003: 2) With adopting Act No. 22/1999 on Decentralization and Actr No. 25/1999[170] on Regional Autonomy, the Habibie-administration then introduced the most radical decentralization program attempted anywhere in the world. (Aspinall/Fealy 2003: 3) It radically changed the relationship between the central government and the regional governments. Under the new structure, the central government transferred full autonomy not to the first tier of regional governments that is provinces but to the second tier, sub-provincial regency-levels (*kabupaten*) to manage vital areas as education, health, the environment, labor, public works and natural resource management, local investment and local transportation. (Prasetyo 2005: 21; Aspinall/Fealy 2003: 3-4)

The role of provinces is confined to such areas as mediating disputes between districts, facilitating cross-district development, and representing the central government within the region. (Aspinall/Fealy 2003: 4) The central government is to focus on certain key areas: foreign policy, defense and security, monetary policy, the legal system and religious affairs. (Aspinall/Fealy 2003: 3) As a result, extensive powers have been devolved to regional governments, new struggles for political and economic power have erupted at the local level and novel forms of politics based on local identity are emerging. (Aspinall/Fealy, 2003: 1)

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[167] Prabowo is accused to be responsible for various human rights violations: he is suspected to be mastermind behind the May riots and the operation that instigated violence in the hope that martial law would be declared. Prabowo himself admitted to be responsible for the kidnapping of activists during the last month of Suharto rule. Wiranto sacked him from his Strategic-Commando-Command and disarmed him as he tried to march in the Presidential Palace (Stockmann 2004: 66-67; Stockmann: 2004 66 FN 7)

[168] Currently holding the office of the 6th president in his second term, former Lieutenant General, SBY acted as Assistant Chief of Staff for Political and Social Affairs in 1998, Minister of Mines and Energy in 1999; and was appointed minister for security from 1999-2004. In 2001 he was proposed as vice president by secular nationalists in the MPR. For further reading see Ananta 2005: 123-128

[169] General F. Tanjung, former Armed Forces Commander, appointed as Co-ordinating Minister of Political Affairs, Security and Defence in 1998-1999. (Stockmann 2004: 67)

[170] Both laws were passed by the national parliament in August 1999 and came into effect on January 1 2001. Law No. 22/1999 deals with the devolution of political authority and Law No. 25/1999 on fiscal balance set out a new system of fiscal arrangements under which the regions would gain a far larger share of the revenue generated within their borders. Both new laws promoted decentralization of power and decision-making, as well as a shift towards greater autonomy and authority to the regions, and increased power and responsibility is granted to the regional governments to administer laws and enact policies, as the central government maintains responsibility for drafting new laws, yet it is up to the regional governments to determine how the laws will be implemented. (Aspinall/Fealy 2003: 3)

Habibie provided Indonesia's first free general election after 44 years on June 7th, 1999. In terms of ideological orientation out of the fourty-eight parties contesting parties to the 1999 election, eighteen or more than one third were Islamic parties, and the rest were *Pancasila* parties.(Ananta 2005, 10) Megawati Sukarnoputri's PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) gained the most votes in the election (33, 7 per cent). After PDI-P, Golkar, which had survived the reform era, ranked second (22, 4 per cent) and the Muslim parties favoring the introduction of *syari'ah* obtained only about 14 per cent of the vote. (Ananta 2005: 13) The fourth largest party was the PPP, a loyal opposition party which managed to survive the New Order, chaired by Hamzah Haz[171] and having support from non-Javanese Muslims (10, 7 per cent). The PPP declared it was an Islamic party and not longer based on *Pancasila*. (Ananta 2005: 12) After much backroom deal-making, the Muslim parties teamed up with sections of Golkar to defeat Megawati, who some feared would promote a secular nationalist agenda at the expense of Islam. Instead they chose Abdurrahman Wahid[172], who took over as Indonesia's first democratically elected president on October 20th 1999, while Megawati had accepted the role as vice-president.

On July, 23 2001 Wahid was voted out and Megawati was sworn in as Indonesia's fifth and first female president. (Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 20-21, Crouch 2003: 15) The Megawati-Administration had been stable, Crouch has remarked, but she had failed to provide effective leadership and seemed to have little mastery of the complex issues facing the government. (Crouch 2003: 15) Megawati included all major political groups in her cabinet[173], gave special attention to the loose Muslim grouping Central Axis (*Poros Tengah*)[174] and supported the election of Hamzah Haz, as vice president in 2001. The cost of this inclusiveness was a lack of cohesion in the cabinet. Furthermore, in the absence of strong leadership from the president, Crouch elucidates, policy differences quickly appeared, and many issues[175] were announced and then revised or even abandoned a few months later. The parties and the cabinet were deeply divided. (Crouch 2003: 16)

Moreover, during the Megawati presidency the government did not take firm action against violent Muslim radicals because they had influential sympathizers in the government, particularly vice-president Hamzah Haz, who himself often denied that terrorists were operating in Indonesia and openly met leading radicals as Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Ja'far Umar Thalib. Megawati dreaded to alienate political Islam and wanted to gain voters and support from Muslim parties and lobbies. Eventually, Megawati admitted Indonesia's radical Islamic terrorism threat publicly only after the first Bali blasts in October 2002, saying "once again remind us that terrorism is a real danger and potential threat to national security".[176]

The election April 2004 has been the most complicated election as Indonesians had to vote for their representatives in the national (DPR), provincial (DPRD I) and regional (DPRD II) parliaments. This was a first step in a series of votes that culminated in the country's first direct election of the president and the vice president. In terms of ideological orientations, out of the 24 parties that contested in the 2004 elections, 16 parties were based on the *Pancasila*, 5 on Islam, and 3 parties had other orientations. Of interest to the question of the commitment to pluralism is the proportion of votes between the *Pancasila* parties and the Islamic parties. In the 1999 and 2004 elections, the majority was always *Pancasila* parties, as Ananta has stated, and a comparison between the numbers of Islamic parties in 1999 and 2004 shows a relative stability – political Islam remains a minority in the Indonesian political scene.

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[171] Hamzah Haz, a Kalimantan-born Muslim, chair of the Muslim United Development Party (PPP, P3) campaigned with General Syaifrudin Syamsul against Megawati in 1999, first, because as a woman she may not lead a nation and second, she would attend prayers in Hindu-temples, both facts that are regarded as not proper by a certain interpretation of Islam in Indonesia. Hamzah Has also retained a public relation to Ba'asyir, alleged leader or Amir of the Jemaah Islamiah, and visited him in jail. Jemaah Islamiyah is said to be the responsible cell behind the Bali bombing. For further details see ICG reports on http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/

[172] Once Wahid acted as general chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, under his leadership NU opposition to Pancasila decreased, and he is quoted as saying that Pancasila was the last form of Indonesian ideology. The PKB (National Awakening Party) was only established in 1998 and evolved as the third largest party in the 1999 election, a political organization with the NU as main constituent, embracing Pancasila as ideological basis, and having mainly (East)-Javanese voters. (Ananta 2005: 11-12)

[173] She appointed only three senior leaders from PDI-P, three from Golkar, 4 from Muslim parties, two NU members, the military was represented with 4 retired officers, the rest consisted of non-party professionals. (Crouch 2003: 15-16)

[174] *Poros Tengah* was a Muslim grouping headed by the Javanese Dr Amien Rais, who was a major figure in mobilizing the masses to force Suharto to step down and became a reform leader. The Poros Tengah had played a decisive role both in having Wahid elected in 1999 and bringing him down in 2001. Amien Rais acted once as chairman of the Muhammadiyah, and his party PAN (7,1 % in 1999) with Muhammadiyah as main constituent declared it was based on Pancasila rather than Islam, as it was interested in getting support from Muslims and Non-Muslims alike. But it appears that the support gained was due to Muslim voters. As result of the 1999 election, Rais was elected and served as chairman of the MPR from 1999-2002. (Crouch 2003: 15; Ananta 2005: 12-13)

[175] Draft on Anti-terrorism Law, Draft on Anti-Pornoraphy and Pornoaction Law to name just two examples.

[176] LaMoshi, Gary. Indonesia bombed into awareness. (February 2002, www.atimes.com/)

Note, PAN and PKB officially declared themselves as *Pancasila* parties, but because their main constituents were Muslims, these two parties are often seen as Islamic parties. In the 1999 election, the combined votes of Islamic parties was only 17, 7 per cent, or, if the PKB and the PAN are included, their combined votes were 37, 4 percent, still lower compared to the 1955 election during which the combined votes for Islamic parties were about 43, 5 percent. While in 2004, the combined vote of the 5 Islamic parties formed 21, 2 percent – or 39, 4 percent if the PAN and the PKB are included. In brief, nationalist and secular parties are still more favored by the voters, and the domination of political Islam remains to be seen[177].

With the formation of the National Coalition (*Koalisi Kebangsaan*) supporting the Megawati-Hasyim nomination and the formation of the People's Coalition (*Koalisi Kerakyatan*) backing the Yudhoyono-Kalla team, the binary divide between the *Pancasila* and Islamic parties became blurred, as both coalitions consisted of both types of parties. This may be interpreted that *Pancasila* as a pluralist ideology had been accepted by a majority of the Indonesian voters. (Ananta 2005; Zoelva Interview 2011) However, due to the process of De-*Pancasila*-zation, the commitment to *Pancasila* and to *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* as national *Grundnorm* needs to be renewed and actualized individually and in society as the minimal consensus of values in a continuous process of negotiation. (Yudhoyono 2006; Habibie 2011)

On July 5, 2004**,** the first directly elected team of Susilo B. Yudhoyono (SBY) and Jusuf-Kalla[178] was sworn in as president and vice-president. In 2009, SBY has been inaugurated as President for his second term.

Order of Priority of Law

Indonesia has established a hierarchy of law or an order of priority of Law in order to simplify the understanding of the legal system. The higher-level law must be followed by the lower-level one and the lower-level law shall not contradict the higher-level one. As rule of thumb, Thomas and Soedijarto (1980: 22, in: Wandelt, 1989: 201) have stated that "High-level statements usually describe values, ideals, and general purposes. The lower the level of a statement, the more specifically it tells how the policy is to be carried out, and the less it allows for varied interpretations about what practice should result from it". Their rule of thumb may be still applied today, as the five Principles continue to be the "source of all sources of Law" and the 2003 established Constitutional Court decides on fundamental basic values or "*Staatsfundamentalnormen*" on a high profile level. Those fundamental basic values are then realized in strategic plans and implemented practical policies in the lower tiers of national administration. (Wiratraman 2007[179]; Zoelva Interview 2011) In this, Indonesian legislation and order of priority of Law follows Kelsen's Stufenmodell[180] (1945; Wiratraman 2007; Zoelva 2011)

> A norm the validity of which cannot be derived from a superior norm we call a "basic" norm. All norms whose validity may be traced back to one and the same basic norm form a system of norms, or an order. The basic norm constitutes, as a common source, the bond between all the different norms of which an order consists. (…) The quest for the reason of the validity of a norm (…) is terminated by a highest norm which is the last reason of validity within the normative system (…). (Kelsen 2005/1945: 111)

> The basic norm of a religious norm system says that one ought to behave as God and the authorities instituted by him command. Similarly, the basic norm of a legal order prescribes that one ought to behave as the "fathers" of the constitution and the individuals – directly or indirectly – authorized (delegated) by the constitution command. (…) This is schematically formulated, the basic norm of the legal order of a single State, the basic norm of a national legal order. (Kelsen 2005/1945: 115)

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[177] This paragraph is drawn from Ananta 2005: 13; 15; 21

[178] Jusuf Kalla, a Golkar veteran from South Sulawesi, and under Megawati the Coordinating Minister of Social Welfare.

[179] Those Laws order the Indonesian hierarchy of Law: 1.) 1945 Basic Law; 2.) Congressional Decision No XX/ 1966 on the order of priority of laws and regulations in the Republic of Indonesia, (TAP MPRS No. XX/MPRS/1966 *tentang Tata Urutan Peraturan Perundangan RI*); 3.) Congressional Decision No III/ 2000 on Sources of Law and Order of Priority of Laws and regulations (TAP MPR No. III/MPR/2000 *tentang Sumber Hukum dan Tata Urutan Peraturan Perundang-undangan*); 4.) Act No 10./ 2004 on the establishment process of laws and regulations (UU No. 10 Tahun2 004 *tentang Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang-undangan*); 5.) Congressional Decision No I/ 2003 on consideration of material and status of Congressional Decisions 1960- 2002 (TAP MPR No. I/MPR/2003 *tentang Peninjauan terhadap Materidan Status Hukum* TAP MPRS & TAP MPR RI Tahun1960-2002) (Wiratraman: 2007)

[180] "The basic norm merely establishes a certain authority, which may well in turn vest norm-creating power in some other authorities. The norms of a dynamic system have to be created through acts of will by those individuals who have been authorized to create norms by some higher norm. This authorization is a delegation. Norm creating power is delegated from one authority to another authority; the former is the higher and the latter the lower authority. The basic norm of a dynamic system is the fundamental rule according to which the norms of the system are to be created. A norm forms part of a dynamic system if it has been created in a way that is – in the last analysis – determined by the basic norm." (Kelsen 2007: 113)

Revising Congressional Decree No XX/1966 on the hierarchy of laws, Congressional Decree No III/2000 on the Source of Law and the Hierarchy of Law and Regulations adopted on 18 August 2000 by the parliament (People's Consultative Congress, MPR) regulates the hierarchy of law in Indonesia (Wiratraman 2007; Congressional Decree No.III/2000):

1. Preamble of UUD 1945 (*Pancasila*) [181] (*Staatsfundamentalnorm*)
2. 1945 Constitution (basic norms of law, *Verfassungsnorm*)[182]
3. The People's Consultative Assembly's Decrees (Congressional Decree) (Ketetapan MPR, Tap-MPR);
4. Laws (*Undang-Undang*);
5. Government Regulations substituting a Law (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang, Perpu)
6. Government Regulations (*Peraturan Pemerinta*h, PP);
7. Local regulations (*Peraturan Daerah*, Perda)

International commitments: Human Rights

The concept of human rights is not new to the Indonesian society who had to wage a protracted struggle in the course of 350 years of colonial rule in order to exercise their right of self-determination, one of the most fundamental human rights. In this context, it is noteworthy that Indonesia's 1945 Constitution predated the adoption of the UDHR. At first Indonesia ratified the UDHR on September 28, 1950. Yet, by letter of January 201955, Sukarno announced its decision to withdraw from the United Nations "at this stage and under the present circumstances".[183] It must be kept in mind that he was one of the founders of the Non Aligned Movement. One year after the Coup d' Etat on September, 19th 1966, Suharto announced by telegram its decision "to resume full cooperation with the United Nations and to resume participation in its activities"[184]. On September 28 1966, the General Assembly of the UN took note of this decision and the President invited representatives of Indonesia to take seats in the Assembly. After resuming full cooperation with the UN in 1966, the Suharto Regime finally set up a National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM, *Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia*) to demonstrate some compliance with the Vienna Declaration and Plan of Action in 1993[185].

The Presidential Decree No. 50 Year 1993 on the National Commission on Human Rights considers in the prologue "(a) indeed the human being, as a creature of God, lives in a society, nation and state, and is naturally endowed with inalienable rights so that he can develop his personal self, and role and contribution to his society, country and the world"[186]. The government agreed to cooperate with the newly founded United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights in 1994. (Stockmann 2004: 202) Complying with the recommendation stated in the Vienna Declaration, the Suharto government formulated the first National Human Rights Action Plan for the period 1998-2003, which was enacted by the Habibie-administration in August 1998[187]. (Stockmann, 2004: 203)

The era of reform had put forward the human rights issue as a central topic, and the Habibie administration was called upon to bring about reform, and to put an end to corruption, collusion, and nepotism. This call was addressed during a Special Session of the People's Consultative Assembly, held in Jakarta on November 10-13, 1998. The session adopted 12 decrees, among them Congressional Decree No XVII/MPR/1998 on Human Rights - with the exception of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Stockmann observes "while its members were giving the last polish to a document called 'Human Rights Charter' outside the gates of parliament people were killed while exercising some of those very rights". (Stockmann 2004: 203)

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[181] Congressional Decree No.III/2000 on the Source of Law and the Hierarchy of Law and Regulations, Chapter I, Article 2 reads: Pancasila is the source of all sources of Law. (*Pancasila merupakan sumber dari segala sumber hukum negara*)

[182] Congressional Decree No.III/2000 on the Source of Law and the Hierarchy of Law and Regulations, Chapter I, Article 3 (1) reads: the 1945 Basic Law of the Republic of Indonesia constitutes basic law of Laws and Regulations. (*Undang Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 merupakan hukum dasar dalam Peraturan Perundang undangan*)

[183] (www.un.org/members/list.shtml);(www.indonesiamission-ny.org/issuebaru/HumanRight/nataction.htm)

[184] (www.un.org/members/list.shtml);(www.indonesiamission-ny.org/issuebaru/HumanRight/nataction.htm)

[185] Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 17; OHCHR (http://www.ohchr.org/EN/countries/AsiaRegion/Pages/IDIndex.aspx)

[186] Asian Legal Resource Centre Internet Site, http://hrli.alrc.net/mainfile.php/indonnhriact/

[187] It must be critically recognized that the implementation of human rights programs in Indonesia is organized by the Department of Foreign Affairs and therefore a critical junction between the planning of such implementation and foreign aid must be assessed, as financial support by the OHCHR amounted US$ 952,000. (Stockmann 2004: 203 FN 1)

In consequence, one of the first official acts undertaken by the Habibie Administration was passing a Human Rights Charter that requires 1.) all state institutions to enforce and respect human rights; and 2.) the President and House of Representatives (DPR) to ratify all United Nations conventions on human rights. Attached is, however, the qualification clause, "as long as they are not contradictory to *Pancasila* and the Constitution". (Stockmann 2004: 203 FN 6; MPR Decree XVII/1998, §2)

Congressional Decree No XVII/MPR/1998 on Human Rights acknowledged the universality of Human Rights, but the formulation in the action plan accords with the qualifications of the Bangkok Declaration, which are not adopted in the Vienna Declaration. (Stockmann 2004: 207, 208) The first Humans Rights Action Plan has covered four different areas[188]. Concerning the third point of "implementation of human rights that are considered a priority", Stockmann restates her impression that the first action plan appears to be aimed to a considerable extent at an international audience.

"(A) number of measures can be interpreted as having been taken *also* with an eye on the international donor community" (Stockmann 2004: 70-71, emphasis in original) as "the Action Plan shows that the expenses arising from the plan are covered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs budget". (Stockmann 2004: 207) She argues that the authors of the action plan believed that non-compliance with fundamental human right could be classified by observers as gross violations of the HR and could in turn damage the nation's image. She concludes that the "concern about the violation of rights as such does not seem to worry the authors of the Action Plan as much as the possible consequences resulting from the fact that gross human rights violations taint the nation's image". (Stockmann 2004: 212)

Act No. 39/1999 on Human Rights has been ratified and enacted on September 23, 1999. Protection, promotion, and implementation of human rights are primarily the responsibility of the central government. A few passages out of the Indonesian Human Rights Charter are quoted here in length to demonstrate the specific dictum of the Indonesian formulation[189]:

> CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS
> WITH THE MERCY OF ONE SUPREME GOD
> THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA,
>
> Considering:
> a. whereas human beings, being creatures of God Almighty charged with the task of managing and protecting the universe, following the commands of God (*ketaqwaan*) and responsibility for the welfare of humanity, are bestowed by their creator with basic rights to guarantee their human dignity and worth, and harmony with their environment;
> b. whereas human rights are basic rights which stick to human nature, universal and eternal in nature, and for this reason must be protected, respected and upheld, and may not be disregarded, diminished, or appropriated by anyone whosoever;
> c. whereas besides basic rights, humans also have basic obligations to one another and to society as a whole, with regard to society, nation and state;
> d. whereas as a member of the United Nations, the nation of Indonesia has a moral and legal responsibility to respect, execute, and uphold the Universal Declaration on Human Rights promulgated by the United Nations, and several other international instruments concerning human rights ratified by the Republic of Indonesia;

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[188] (1) Preparation for ratification of international human rights instruments, (2) Dissemination of information and human rights education, (3) Implementation of human rights that are considered a priority, (4) implementation of already ratified HR instruments (Stockmann 2004: 208)

[189] All translations from text documents in Indonesian are translated into English by the author. Some were compared to translations done by other scholars, the World Bank or Asian Development Bank, the Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC). Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC): Republic of Indonesia Law 39/1999 on Human Rights, in: http://hrli.alrc.net/mainfile.php/nhriacts (May 2008); Original document in : http://www.depkumham.go.id/attachments/article/170/uu39_1999.pdf; (March 2011)

Chapter I: General Provisions

Article 1

Terms used in the Act have following meanings:

(1) Human rights mean a set of rights bestowed by God Almighty contained in the nature and reality of humanity as creations of God which must be respected, held in the highest esteem and protected by a *rechtsstaat* (*negara hukum*), the Government, and all people in order to protect human dignity and worth (*harkat dan martabat manusia*).

(2) Human basic obligations refer to a specific type of obligations. If those obligations are not carried out [first], then the accomplishment and assertion of human rights cannot be achieved.

(3) Discrimination means all limitations, affronts or ostracism, both direct and indirect, on grounds of differences in religion, ethnicity, race, group, faction, social status, economic status, sex, language, or individual or collective political belief, that results in the degr*adat*ion, aberration, or eradication of recognition, execution, or application of human rights and basic freedoms in political, economic, legal, social, cultural, or any other aspects of life.

Chapter II Basic Rights

Article 2

The Republic of Indonesia acknowledges and respects the rights and freedoms of humans as rights which are bestowed by God and which are an integral part of humans, which must be protected, respected, and upheld in the interests of promoting human dignity, prosperity, contentment, intellectual capacity, and justice.

Article 3

(1) Everyone is born free with equal dignity and status, bestowed with intelligence and conscience to life in society, nation, and state in the spirit of brotherhood.

(3) Everyone has the right to protection of human rights and obligations without any discrimination.

Article 4

(…) the right to freedom of the individual, to freedom of thought and conscience, the right to have *agama* (*beragama*)

Article 7

(2) Provisions set forth in international law concerning human rights that have been ratified by the Republic of Indonesia, have to be implemented in national legislation. [that is, they are recognized under this act as legally binding]

Chapter III Human Rights and Freedoms

Section 3: Right to Self-development

Article 12

Everyone has the right to protection of their personal development, to receive education, to educate their selves, and to improve their life quality in order to become a faithful (*beriman*) human who follows the commands of God (*bertaqwa*), is responsible, has high morals (*berakhlak mulia*), is content, and prosperous in accordance with human rights.

Article 13

Everyone has the right to develop and benefit from scientific knowledge and technology, arts and culture as befits human dignity, in the interests of their personal, their national and global welfare.

Article 16

Everyone has the right to undertake social and charitable works, to found organizations for this purpose, including the operation of education and schooling, and to raise funds for these purposes in line with prevailing legislation. [this sanctions legally the private education sector, and provides a strong legal basis for private faith-based education]

Section 5: Right to freedom of the Individual
Article 22
(1) Everyone has the right to freely choose their specific *agama* and to perform religious service (*beribadah*) according to their religion (*agama*) and beliefs (*kepercayaan*).
(2) The state guarantees everyone the freedom to choose their respective *agama* and to perform religious service according to their religion (*agama*) and belief (*kepercayaan*).
Article 23
(1) Everyone has the freedom to choose and hold their political convictions.
(2) Everyone has the freedom to hold, express, and widely disseminate their opinions according with their conscience, orally or in writing through printed or electronic media, taking into consideration religious values (*nilai-nilai agama*), morals (*kesusilaan*), order, public interest, and national unity (*keutuhan*).

Section 10: Children's rights
Article 55
Every child has the right to perform religious service his religion (*agama*), and to think, and to express himself as befits his intellectual capacity and age under the guidance of a parent or guardian.
Article 60
(1) Every child has the right to receive education and schooling as befits his interests, talents, and intellectual capacity.
(2) Every child has the right to seek, receive, and share information as befits his intellectual capacity and age in the interests of his own development, insofar as this meets moral values and appropriateness.

Chapter IV: Basic Human Obligations
Article 67
Everyone within the territory of the Republic of Indonesia is required to comply with Indonesian legislation and Indonesian Law, unwritten law, and international human rights law ratified by Indonesia.
Article 69
(1) Everyone is required to respect the human rights of others, morals, ethics, and the order of society, nation, and state.
(2) Every human right gives rise to the basic obligation and responsibility to uphold the human rights of others, and it is the duty of government to respect, protect uphold and promote these rights and obligations.
Article 70
In executing their rights and freedoms, everyone shall observe the limitations set forth in the [national] legislation, in order to guarantee that rights and freedoms of others are acknowledged and respected, and in the interests of justice, taking into account the moral, security, and public order of a democratic society

The Human Rights Act 39/1999 includes the freedom to have, express, and spread opinion as well as the freedom to have a political conviction. The freedom to express an opinion in public and the freedom of information are codified as rights. Stockmann (2004: 249-250) concludes other than in the constitutional amendment, the freedom of expression is in the HR Law qualified by the stipulation that one has to take into consideration religious values, morality, order, public interest and the "intactness of the nation" (§23.2). The corresponding article in the ICCPR also allows for certain restrictions on the right to freedom of expression, which includes the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas. Reference to religious values and national unity are not *expressis verbis* covered by ICCPR provisions (Stockmann, 2004: 249-250), though as those only allow for a limitation based a morals if they are not exclusively rooted in one religion. Interestingly, in the Indonesian Law here no mention of national security is made.

The legally binding right to freedom of the individual (II §4) grants everyone the freedom to adhere to one's religion and to worship according to one's religion and faith. This is in a weakened form the constitutional article on religious freedom, as the latter explicitly states that the state guarantees every resident the above mentioned freedoms. The explicit freedom to change one's religion or belief or not to adhere to a faith as stipulated in the corresponding UDHR article is not included in the Indonesian Charter, nor is the freedom to teach one's religion. (Stockmann 2004: 233) The freedom to teach one of the approved religions is enshrined in Law 20/2003 on National Education System and in the 2008 Law on the religion class and faith-based education systems. Subsequent HR regulation include Law No. 26/2000, which has established the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court, and it states in a similar fashion as the constitutional article (§ 21, 23) that the Attorney General appoints the ad hoc investigators at the Human Rights Court, who all shall take an oath or pledge in accordance with their embraced religion. Stipulated in Presidential Decree No. 40/2004, Indonesia formally launched the Second National Plan of Action on Human Rights on August 25, which contains concrete programs and plans the Government will undertake during the period from 2004 to 2009[190].

In 2005, Indonesia ratified all human rights conventions (with the exception of the ICMWR), then in 2008 she ratified the International Convention on Discrimination and passed an act on racial and ethnic discrimination, of which articles 3 and 4 prohibit discrimination based on belief, values or rituals that characterize a specific group. So, in principle, the religious freedom of the individual has always been and still is strongly enshrined in the legal foundations of the Indonesian state. But in practice the state via legislation and MORA approves of six religious communities only and thereby limits the civil rights of adherents to religions not funded by the state. Democracy experienced several outbreaks of religious-related violence, terrorism, and events in which those laws and policies were not respected or even contradicted.

Indonesia succeeded in securing membership of both the UN Human Rights Council and the UN Security Council in 2006[191], and these would be the signs, as Human Rights Watch interprets, that Indonesia wants to be accepted as a rights-respecting member of the international community[192]. Officially the government declares that the promotion and protection of HR are essential to build a peaceful, secure, and equitably prosperous social welfare state and world. Hence, the promotion of HR principles is central to the mission and vision of the Indonesian Government and people. In sum, with regard to norm-setting and legislation on HRs and their institutionalization, Indonesia has ratified and acceded to a number of international HR instruments and has enacted several national HR laws, one of which created the Human Rights Court while another ensures the independence of the National Human Rights Commission. Indonesia has also established independent national commissions the rights of women (*komnas perempuan*) and child protection (*komnas anak*).

As Prof Dr Triguna is responsible for the implementation of state policies within the Hindu community, it is interesting to consider his opinion about human rights. Because humans are created and liberated by One Supreme Lordship, all human beings share the same ability to develop ethical systems of which particular values are indeed universal, whereas others are generated in terms of local socio-cultural abundance. Contemplating on the Indonesian situation, he continued, that there would be no need to be "afraid" of universal values as formulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, because neither are these universal values in conflict with Hindu Dharma nor the Indonesian nation-state. But, no society or nation should disguised behind these universal rights or manipulate them unlawfully in order to pursue own interests[193].

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[190] Under the second action plan, regional administrations are to set up human rights committees that will disseminate information and educate bureaucrats and professional groups on human rights. In addition, in a White Paper titled "Vision, Mission, and Programs", President SBY and Vice- President Kalla outlined their program for justice, law, human rights, and democracy. The Department of Social Affairs, the Department of Law and Human Rights and other related institutions are tasked with enhancing to eliminate all forms of discrimination on racial, ethnic, religious, and cultural grounds and undertake efforts to harmonize domestic laws with international human rights instruments. [Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 2008: Consideration of Reports submitted by state parties under article 9 of the Convention. Concluding observations of the CERD. Indonesia. CERD/C/IND/CO3, in: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/CERD.C.IDN.CO.3.pdf (August 2008); United Nations: www.undg.org/archive_docs/8086-Indonesia.doc (August 2007); http://www.indonesiamission-ny.org/New Statements/3c110404.htm (August 2008)]

[191] Human Rights Watch's World Report 2007: Indonesia, pp. 277-283; in: http://www.hrw.org/wr2k7/wr2007master.pdf (August 2008)

[192] Human Rights Watch's Submission to the Human Rights Council 2008: Universal Periodic Review of Indonesia, (April 7th, 2008) in: http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/04/10/global18495.htm (August 2008) United Nations 2008 (January 7th): Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption. United Nations CAC/COSP/2008/13 http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/COSP/session2/V0850069e.pdf (August 2008)

[193] Protocol of the interview on 14.07.2008

Amendment of Basic Law and provisions relevant to freedom of religion

After more than four decades of authoritarianism and dictatorship, Indonesia has completed a successful transition to democracy. (Prasetoyo 2005: 17; Mujiburrahman 2006: 144; Ananta 2005: 135; Hilmy 2010) From 1999 to 2002 the appointed People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* or MPR) has endorsed four constitutional amendments to the 1945 Basic Law. In October 1999, August 2000, November 2001, and August 2002, the Assembly passed the First, Second, Third and Fourth Amendments, respectively. The Assembly is the sole body empowered by the 1945 Constitution to amend it. (King Blair 2004: 4) "The amendments were (…) noteworthy for what they did *not* include; the most important proposed change that failed to garner significant support was an attempt to assert the primacy of Islamic law for Indonesian Muslims". (King Blair 2004: 4)

With regard to religious freedom, the first principle *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* and Article 29 of the original version of the 1945 Basic Law have established the "framework of the state's stance with regard to the relationship between the state and religions". (Yang 2005: 6) Notwithstanding, the religious question remains a vital source of controversy until today, and consequential legislation as the strategic development plans and the Act on the Indonesian Education System continue an "Islamization" of Indonesian policies. Constitutional Article 31 sets out the strategy of promoting science and technology in order to improve humanity's civilization and welfare by holding values of religion and national unity in high esteem.

In 1959, the five principles have been recognized by Sukarno as a historical continuation of the Jakarta Charter, which itself was recognized as an historical document, (Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 5; Ramstedt, 2004: 13-14) and this recognition was upheld during the constitutional amendments in 2002. "(T)he People's Consultative Assembly Decree on the order of the legal system displays notable continuity with the New Order", Stockmann 2004: 200) because *Pancasila* is still accorded the status of a "source of all sources of state law[194]" side by side with the Body of the Constitution – "reduced in status from being the "source of all sources of law" only by degrees it seems." (Stockmann 2004: 200). Note that current legal framework rules that "a maximum penalty of 20 years in jail is stipulated for any person who publicly and unlawfully, in written or spoken word or via any other media declares to wish to annul or substitute *Pancasila* as the basis of the State, which results in social unrest, loss of life or damage of property". (Stockmann, 2004: 246)

Prior to its amendments, the 1945 Basic Law, Section XI, article 29 on religion, subsection (1) prescribes a sort of (Islamic)national monotheism or integralist monismand subsection (2) guarantees religious freedom – albeit limited to the Belief in One Supreme Lordship[195]. As can be seen, religion (*agama*) and belief (*kepercayaan*) have been separated in the article. In the amended Basic Law, Article 29 has been retained.

> (1) The state is based upon Belief in One Supreme Lordship [196](Principle of monotheism)
> (2) The state <u>guarantees</u> the Indonesian citizen the freedom to embrace a respective religion and to perform their religious duties according to their embraced religion or belief (the right to embrace and worship according to their embraced religion)[197](Principle of religious freedom)

The first principle and Article 29 (1) confer the absolute obligation on every citizen to embrace an *agama*- any one of the funded *agama* - and to believe in One Supreme Lordship. This principle indicates therefore that nothing is absolute, except God and humans are not totally free. Article 29 (2) allows for religious freedom of the individual and groups, and for manifestation of one's religious service in private and public. The government generally respected the former provisions, yet, religious freedom is limited by the state, and six religions receive official recognition in form of a representative body at the Ministry of Religious Affairs. It is noteworthy, that 1945 Basic Law (§9) regulates that prior to taking office, the President and the Vice President shall take an oath according to their religion, or to make a solemn pledge before the People's Consultative Congress (MPR) or the House of Representatives (DPR).

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[194] In general, there can be four sources of Law identified in Indoensia: *Adat* (tradition, custom and customary law); Hindu-Buddhist prescriptions and Law Code (Hukum Kawi), Islamic Law and European Law. (Zoelva Interview Feb 2011)
[195] All translations from text documents in Indonesian are translated into English by the author. Some were compared to translations done by other scholars, the World Bank or Asian Development Bank, but the author's own translations were used.
[196] *Negara berdasar atas Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*
[197] *Negara menjamin kemerdekaan tiap-tiap penduduk untuk memeluk agamanya masing-masing dan untuk beribadat menurut agamanya dan kepercayaannya itu.*

A highly contentious issue during the deliberations on the second constitutional amendment was the issue of religion. In 2000, the MPR modified and inserted articles from the MPR Decree No XVII/MPR/1998 on Human Rights as a part of the Second Amendment. The debate on the formulation of these right and freedoms was linked to a heated debate on the amendment of constitutional article 29 (2) on religious freedom which could not be accomplished during the 2000 MPR session. (Stockmann 2004: 234; King Blair 2004; Hosen 2005)

> It is essential to note that during the constitutional debate none of the Islamic political parties proposed the adoption of a caliphate system, thus acknowledging the nation-state, nor did they propose the establishment of an Islamic state like those in Iran, Egypt or Saudi Arabia. However, some of them made it clear that they wanted a constitutional guarantee that their rights to observe *syari'ah* would be fully implemented. In this case, they held the views that the amendment to Article 29 was necessary for the new constitution. (Hosen 2005: 420)

The details of the entire debate shall not concern us here (see Stockmann 2004; King Blair 2005; Hosen 2005). Only two Islamic parties (PPP and PBB) advocated the introduction of the crucial stipulations of the Jakarta Charter into the 1945 Basic Law. This would have implied a change of one of the foundation of the Indonesian state principles. For the amendment of article 29 on religious freedom, the Draft Second Amendment included a whole range of alternatives. During the debate on Article 29, four main opinions were advocated. (Hosen 2005: 428) There was one faction which proposed the reinsertion of the crucial stipulations of the Jakarta Charter; another faction suggested modifying Article 29 by mentioning not only Islam, but all religions; another faction tended to believe that all five pillars in *Pancasila* should be added to Article 29; but "the majority of Members of Parliament took the view that Article 29 should not be amended". (Hosen 2005: 428) This means that the PPP and PBB, which proposed introducing the *syari'ah*, were not asking for Indonesia to establish an Islamic state; they only advocated the implementation of Islamic law for Muslims. (Hosen 2005: 429; Zoelva Interview 2010, 2011) Other political parties and appointed police, military, and functional representatives, who together held a majority of the seats Assembly, rejected in committee meetings proposals to amend the Constitution to include *syari'ah*, and "the measure never came to a formal vote". (Hosen 2005: 427; Crouch 2003: 23; King Blair 2004; Stockmann 2004) With only 71 combined seats, it was understood that the two parties (PPP and PBB) did not want members of the People's Consultative Assembly to vote for their proposal "since it would be an embarrassing loss" (Hosen 2005: 427), or to avoid "hurting the feelings of those party members". (Zoelva Interveiw 2011[198])

Unsurprisingly, these alternatives "are mirrored in the positions on the corresponding provisions in the Constitution's new human rights article'. (Stockmann 2004: 235) The wording was still unresolved when it came to be debated in the Parliament. With regard to religious freedom, the Second Amendment passed on August, 18 2000, amended article 29 in section XA on Human Rights, article 28E, but the article has actually not added a new dimension. (Stockmann 2004) The relevant articles are cited in full length; however, subsections which have no relevance to the focus of the study are omitted.

Article 28E
(1) Every person (*orang*) is free to embrace a religion (*memelukagama*) and perform religious service according to their embraced religion (*agama*); to choose education and teachings[199]; (…)
(2) Every person (*orang*) has the right to adhere to a belief-system (*kepercayaan*), and to express thoughts and attitude in accordance with their conscience (*hati nurani*)[200].
(3) Every person (*orang*) has the right to freedom of association, assembly, and expression of opinion

Article 28I
(1) The right to life, the right not to be tortured, the right to freedom of thought (*pikiran*) and conscience (*hati nurani*), the right to embrace a religion (*beragama*), the right not to be enslaved, the right to be recognized as a person before the law, and the right not to be prosecuted on a retroactive legal basis are fundamental human rights which cannot be diminished under any circumstance.
(2) Everyone has the right to be free from acts of discriminatory treatment on whatever basis and the right to obtain protection against such discriminatory treatment.

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[198]Zoelva has been Chairman of the *Partai Bulan Bintang* (Crescent Moon Party, PBB) that advocated the introduction of the Jakarta Charter. He has been member of the parliament from 1999-2004. See Hosen 2005 on his earlier statements.
[199] *Setiap orang bebas memeluk agama dan beribadat menurut agamanya, memilih pendidikan dan pengajaran*
[200] *Setiap orang berhak atas kebebasan meyakini kepercayaan, menyatakan pikiran dan sikap, sesuai dengan hati nuraninya.*

<u>Article 28J</u>
(1) Everyone is obliged to respect human rights of another person in the orderly context of living in a society, a nation, and a state.
(2) In carrying out rights and freedoms, every person is obliged to obey the limitations which are laid down in law with the sole purpose of guaranteeing recognition and respect of other people's rights and freedoms and to fulfill just requirements in accordance with moral considerations (*pertimbangan moral*), religious values (*nilai agama*), security (*keamanan*), and public order (*ketertiban umum*) within a democratic society.

The discrimination between religion and belief has been upheld in the amended article. The freedom to embrace a religion – definition is up to the Ministry of Religious Affairs – is guaranteed in private and in public and to manifest this right in practice and teaching is likewise permitted. Religious freedom on an individual and communal basis is therefore guaranteed for adherents of funded religions. Thus Indonesians have to identify their religion, probably even forced to have a religion, but free to choose between the offered ones (authoritarian freedom-of-choice policy), adhere to it and perform their religious worship and receive religious teaching according to the adhered to religion. This is noteworthy for a Muslim majority state – because not only the people of the book but also Hindus, Buddhists, and Confucians are considered as a religion (*agama*). (Tibi 1995; Howell 1987)

Whereas the freedom to be convinced about a belief-system has been strengthened, probably as a concession to Human Rights instruments, the right to manifest this belief in practice or the freedom of worship according to one's belief is omitted. (Stockmann 2004: 236) In other words, adherents to funded religions enjoy religious freedom either alone or in community, in private and in public, in thought, teaching and in practice. But adherents to belief-systems (*kepercayaan*) which are not represented in the Ministry of Religious Affairs, have the right to be convinced about and to express a belief system only. That is to say, they have the right to belief and conscience only as they may not manifest this in public, in teaching, and in worship. However, as anyone has the right to association, assembly, and expression of opinion, the gathering of adherents to belief-systems and religious service of non-funded religions are not interdicted *per se*. Because unfunded religions are not forbidden, they are simply not financially supported and their adherents face social and legal restrictions in spreading their teachings or disseminating their symbols openly.

In contrast to the UDHR, which promotes the freedom of thought conscience and religion, the right to freedom of thought (*pikiran*), and conscience (*hati nurani*), and the right to embrace a religion (*beragama*) are separated in Indonesia, the right to embrace a funded religion is guaranteed, whereas the right to thought and conscience as expressed in the right to comprehend a belief-system is severely limited. Religious currents that are not acknowledged shall register to a General Directorate at the Ministry of Religious Affairs and may be included into the administrated religious body; however, traditional religious communities and modern religious movements do not have to register anymore with the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. (Howell 2003).

Interestingly, in the context of permissible limitation on human rights, in Article 28J the term general welfare of the UDHR is exchanged with the term security, "giving the paragraph an entire different meaning that might result in restrictive and oppressive legislation". (Stockmann 2004: 269, 271) Besides, in a last minute amendment, religious values have been added as one base on which limitations of human rights may rest. Reference to religious values as a ground for the limitation of rights had been among the few provisions the Reform faction had proposed. Concerning the amendment of limitations to the right to freedom of association, assembly and expression of opinion enshrined in the original article 28 of the 1945 Basic Law, their proposal read: "The freedom of association, of assembly and of expression of opinion in spoken word and in writing may not contradict religious and moral norms, the norms of courteous behavior nor legal norms". (Stockmann 2004: 271) Therefore Stockmann (2004: 271) criticizes

> (…) the religious value part of the restricting formulation that the Reform faction wanted to see attached to the original article 28 of the Constitution has now been attached not only to the troika of freedoms, but basically to all rights and freedoms. Religious values are so broad a notion that the danger is - similar to the employment of the notion of security - that this is yet another rubber paragraph open to abuse".

It seems that the Indonesian management of religion is in conflict with ratified human rights conventions, because negative religious freedom is interdicted. This prohibition is legitimized by the clause to "protect public order and morals" – here religion becomes finally politicized, politicked and the morals referred to seem to imply the normative values consciousness of the majority, and this again is in conflict with human rights instruments, which only allow for a limitation based in morals if they are not exclusively rooted in one religion.

The Acts on Regional Autonomy and Decentralization and the Act on the National Education System prescribe the national education system to be regulated, organized, and operated by the state and the regions alike. In this context, Chapter XIII of the amended Basic Law, Article 31 (3) on Education and Culture, sets out the broad objective of the national education system to be realized in the governmental, ministerial, and regional strategic plans of long-term, middle-term, and short-term development, which are implemented throughout Indonesia. The agenda followed seems to aim at balancing intellectual capital with spiritual values and the use of modern technology[201]. The amended Basic Law states in Chapter XIII on Education and Culture, Article 31:

> (3) The government organizes and operates a national education system which is ordered by Law and increases faith in God (*keimanan*), obeying the commands of God/piety (*ketakwaan*), and noble moral (*akhlak mulia*) in order to educate (*mencerdaskan*) the nation.
> (5) By holding values of religion and national unity in high esteem, the government promotes science and technology in order to improve mankind's civilization and welfare.

The Indonesian state is religiously neutral, one may say, but as the first principle mandates Belief in One Supreme Lordship, the state follows a religious, yet pluralist approach on religion. In other words, as the majority's religion shapes the policies of the state, the state is based on Belief in One Supreme Lordship and prohibits negative freedom of religion. Contrary to classical Islam, the Asian *Pancasila* state recognizes the Asian religions and implements a pluralictic but confessional model of religious education. Whereas the right of negative religious freedom (to reject religious claims or force by the state) is restricted severely, positive religious freedom is enshrined strongly in the five principles and the 1945 Basic Law. Positive religious freedom is then delimited, as Act 1/1965 and Criminal Code §156 delimit the expression of religious freedom and officially acknowledge six religions to be funded and protected by the state. Further delimitations of the expression of faith have been stipulated by the Ministry of Religious Affairs' interpretation and support to those officially acknowledged religions. But Indonesia respects the right of the approved religions to "their public self-representation and self-interpretation" (Nipkow 2006: 585) and organizes a pluralistic school system. Approved religions are financially supported and have the same legal status, in this they have at least formally the same rights, whether minority or majority. Since 2005, the Act on the National Curricular Standard unified the curricula of both courses of education, the public and the private faith-based and additional subjects in religion are taught extra-curricular. Thus the legal framework provides the opportunity to organize confessional religious classes at all levels in state education and private faith-based education at all levels.

4.2.4. The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA)

History

Apparently in a move calculated to counteract the growing influence of the nationalists, the Japanese attempted to aggregate support from Islamic leaders by establishing a Bureau of Religious Affairs in March 1942 and the Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations (*Masyumi*) in November 1942. (Bunge 1982: 40) A conference held in Surakarta from March 17 to 18, 1945, should prepare the grounds for setting up branch offices of a Ministry of Religion throughout Java and Madura. The aspiration of the Islamic group to continue the Japanese policy and to establish the Ministry failed, because only six of the twenty-seven members of the Committee expressed their consent on this proposal[202]. During the preparation of Independence, the Committee of 62 had successfully kept aside Islamic elements from being enshrined in the Basic Law. In consequence, the loss of the Jakarta Charter and the absence of the Ministry of Religion left the Islamic groups with considerable discontent. In consequence, K.H. WahidHasyim, one of the NU leaders and Masyumi member, who had previously supported the Islamist demand that *syari'ah* forms the base of the 1945 constitution (Ramstedt 2004: 8), was appointed unofficialMinster of Religion from August to November 1945 – although he had no official Ministry.

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[201] How this constitutional amendment has been implemented in subsequent Acts and regional legislation and then has been introduced into the strategic plans of schools and universities is demonstrated here by the Dwijendra foundation.
[202] The subsequent paragraphs are largely drawn from Mujiburrahman, 2006: 125-127, who summarizes Deliar Noer 1978: The Administration of Islam in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project: p. 12-33; Ramstedt 2004: 6-8

The political situation changed rapidly in 1946,as the republican government needed the full support of the Islamic groups against the Dutch invasion. It was hoped that Islamic support for the national cause could eventually be consolidated through the official establishment of a Ministry of Religion (*Kementerian Agama*). Thus, less a compromise between nationalist and Muslim parties, but more the outcome of pragmatic political bargaining (Stepan 2001) and consolidation of support for the nation state under the republican government to counter Dutch intrusion, the Ministry of Religion was set up by Governmental Regulation Nr.1/1946 on January 3, 1946.

With its establishment, Islamic aspirations were eventually comforted. Needless to say, in the decades to come, the Ministry became the domain of Islam. (Kelambora 1976: 236) Its tasks were assigned basing on governmental regulations issued in March and April 1946. The MORA was authorized to take over certain works previously carried out by other departments during the colonial period, and authorities of the district government (Mujiburrahman 2006: 125-127):

1. the works of the Department of Home Affairs with regard to Islamic marriage and Islamic pilgrimage (*hajj*)
2. the execution of Islamic law (*syari'ah*) under the authority of the Islamic High Court (*Mahkamah Islam Tinggi)* from the Department of Justice
3. the section on teaching religion in schools from the Department of Education
4. the regional religious offices (*jawatan agama daerah*)
5. the appointment of religious advisers for the native courts (*landraad*)
6. the appointment of Muslim officials (*penghulu*) for mosques

Cairo-educated H. Muhammad Rasjidi, who came from a reformed, modernist Muslim background (*Muhammadiyah*), a fierce adversary of the *kebatinan* groups, which he regarded as contextual and therefore not Islamic, was the first officially appointed Minister (March-October 1946), but he did not succeed in developing the structure and function of the Ministry. (Ramstedt 2004: 8) At the Surakarta Conference in March 1945, Rasjidi had expounded that the Ministry would concern itself with everything that is in the widest sense related to religion (*agama*) in order to make sure that every member of a religious community would be able to carry out his or her religious duties. Rasjidi claimed the MORA would not intervene in the internal religious affairs of the people.

The structure of the Ministry became clearer, when K.H. Fathurrahman Kafrawi was appointed Minister from October 1946 to June 1947. Kafrawi came from a traditionalist, orthodox background (*Nahdlatul Ulama*), and had studied in Cairo, Leiden, France, and England. On November 20th, 1946, he issued a decree about the structure of the Ministry of Religion consisting out of three sections: one for the Muslims, one for Protestants and one for Catholics[203]. This division of Christianity as mentioned above followed the Dutch colonial perception of Christianity by the indigenous population as two different religions. In other words, the Ministry sponsored only universal monotheistic world religions of the book and their universal message with the exception of Judaism.

Due to the changing cabinets during the revolutionary war, the Ministers were appointed and soon replaced. Under the second and third term of Hasyim's office from 1949 to 1952, the distinction between revealed religion (*agama*) and a man-made belief system (*aliran kepercayaan*) was fully developed with all its practical consequences. Minister of Religion Regulation No 9 in 1952 Article III section H continued colonial regulation which had became popular as H-Regulation. The regulation introduced a differentiation between Islam and Christianity and all other local religions. This regulation made all religious belief system of the group H the target of Christian mission or Islamic *dakwah*. For this reason, Regulation 9/1952 governed that group H had to establish relations with non-religious institutions and other religious/spiritual systems, and give considerations about their religious politics/policies.

Article VI of the regulation defined a 'belief system' as follows: "A belief system is a dogmatic opinion, which is closely connected to the living tradition of several tribes, especially of those tribes that are still backward. The core of their belief is everything which has become the customary way of life of their ancestors over time." (Ramstedt 2004: 9)

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[203] According to the holy Quran all religions of the book can be viewed as legitimate religions. Fire-worshippers and polytheists are considered to be heretics.

As result, all ethno-religious traditions in the archipelago including Balinese religious practices, *kajawen* and *kebatinan,* who still practiced their traditional or contextual religion*,* were classified as belief systems (*aliran kepercayaan)* and ascribed to the residual category of "people who do not yet have a religion" (*orang jang belum beragama*), a label associated with primitive backwardness and parochialism.

According to those drastic preconditions, the Balinese did not profess a proper *agama*, but possessed only a belief system, which not only were limited to their island, but did not even form a coherent and unified ensemble valid for the whole island. (Picard 2004: 56-57) In order to bring religion to them, the Ministry empowered its growing number of branch offices to encourage Muslim and Christian missionaries to convert all the "heathens" throughout the archipelago. (Ramstedt 2004: 9)

The threefold reasoning that adherents to *aliran kepercayaan* were not sufficient to be full Indonesian citizen was in line with politically correct thinking in the early 1950s: 1.) the first principle of *Pancasila* required all citizens to have a monotheistic faith; 2.) adherence to backward ethnic customs and belief systems was seen an obstacle to the progress of the Indonesian society. Identification with *adat* as an ethnic tradition formerly used by the colonizers to prevent the growing of nationalism displayed now disloyalty with the nation state.

Hasyim defined the work of the MORA as covering twelve items. Besides the Islamic portfolios, the MORA was also responsible for supporting religious (not only Islamic) teaching in schools and prisons; and to grant material help for building places of worship for religious groups. In addition it was stated, that the first two tasks of the MORA were

1. to introduce*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* as operative principle in public life
2. to safeguard that every citizen has the freedom to embrace his or her own religion and to worship according to that religion

Thus, according to its definition, the duty of the Ministry was to put national monotheism to practice in society, which in fact committed the religious minorities to shape their beliefs along the lines of Islamic *tawhid.Agama* was seen as a counterpart to superstitious *adat*, and served to rationalize the religious practices in order to create progress and social welfare.

When Darul Islam was contesting the unitary nation state during the 1950s, the Ministry of Religion remained the only forum through which loyal Muslim politicians could legitimately advance their interests, while the Ministry of Education and Culture has been dominated by Javanese secular nationalists (Ramstedt 2004: 8) – this split in ideological orientation is largely maintained until today. In 1951, Hasyim said the Ministry was in a difficult position because it had to face three different groups:

1. the Islamic group, generally being happy with the Ministry but frequently not understanding its true position in the state, therefore expecting too much
2. the secular group, never being happy with the Ministry, because religion to them was an obstacle to on the way to reach freedom and development
3. The religious minorities, basically happy with the Government's support for religious life but afraid of discriminative policies against them

The Minister explained further that the Indonesian government would not be an Islamic government and MORA not an Islamic Ministry.

Ironically, albeit the 1950 Indonesian Constitution guaranteed the Indonesian citizenry to profess and practice their own religion, the MORA, controlled by Muslims, was to severely restrict the official acceptance of religions by stipulating the catalogue of categories for a religion to receive state funding in 1952. In accordance with its definition of *agama*, MORA initially recognized Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism. The existence of *Agama* Hindu Bali was not automatically recognized, as it was not considered to be a book-religion.

In 1959, Sukarno forced the return to the 1945 Basic Law including a statement that the Jakarta Charter inspires the Constitution. From 1959 to 1965 then, the two succeeding Ministers of Religion, KH Wachid Wahab (1959-1962) and KH Sjaifuddin Zuchri (1962-1967), both NU leaders, were actively lobbying to reformulate the work of the Ministry in favor of the Jakarta Charter, but their efforts did not succeed.

Profile

From its establishment[204], until 1966, the Ministry of Religion Affairs was located in the yellow building in the Merdeka Utara Street. In 1966 it was moved to the Thamrin Street in central Jakarta. Until 1985, it moved to West Lapangan Banteng Street in the government quarter close to the central station Gambir and national monument (MONAS).

All state departments have regional offices at the provincial level. The MORA's regional representative is the Regional Office of Religious Affairs (*Kantor Wilayah Urusan Agama*). MONE maintains the Regional Office of Education (*Kantor Wilayah Pendidikan).* ThoseRegional Offices represents the ministries' policies and agenda on provincial level. Some ministries have established branches at the regency/municipality level, as the Agency for Religion (*dinas agama*) or the Agency for Education (*dinas pendidikan*) in Denpasar. At the local administrative sub-regency level, the ministries do usually not have branch offices.

Appointments of officials in the MORA or MONE are influenced by group affiliations, vested interests, and political bargaining. Political organizations established along ethnic or religious lines often seek to ensure that their group is favorably represented in the officialdom of education – in the central ministry, in the school inspectorate, and among headmasters. When its own adherents are in key administrative positions, the political organization can ensure favorable or fair treatment of their viewpoint and of their constituents. (Postlethwaite/Thomas 1980: 25)

The strong position of Islam in education, or generally religion in politics, culture, and education, ascribes immense influence, authority and power to the MORA. There were some debates during the 1960s - most heated in the late 1960s- on the necessity of the existence of the MORA, which included debates on its abolishment (Mujiburrahman 2006). Following the era of reform and the increased politization of *agama* in Indonesia, the author is not aware of such debates.

On the contrary, my findings show that the MORA is vested with remarkable resources and power– its annual budget ranks fourth or fifth under the assigned annual budgets of all ministries approaching almost 900 Million Euro in 2007. Certainly, this assignment has to be linked to processes of national strategic development planning. In the young Indonesian democracy, concepts of inter-faith harmony (*kerukunan agama*), national stability (*stabilitas nasional),* unity and uniformity (*kesatuan dan persatuan*) and integration promoted by the authoritarian Suharto regime are continued in order to guarantee "public order" and minimize the outbreak of social hostilities. Those programs and the task of administering 13% of the global Muslim population (Pew 2009) allocate substantial resources, power and influence to the MORA. But those programs and the financial support that goes with it lead to an increasing compartmentalization and politization of religion. Ironically, those inter-faith harmony and religious pluralism policies result in the discrimination of faith-based groups as the authoritarian style of managing religious plurality works against the appreciation and practice of religious pluralism in Indonesia. (cf. Nahrowi 2005; cf. Hasan 2008)

The democratic development plans set out the first obligations of the citizen. The statutory obligation of all citizens is to have faith in God (*iman*) and to follow the commands of God (*takwa*). In consequence, the production of a citizen who has faith in God (*beriman*), follows the commands of God (*takwa*), and has noble ethics/character (*akhlak*) is the pivotal aim of such contemporaneous strategic policies.

Related to such policies, Minister of Religion Decree Nr 8 in 2008 outlines MORA's vision and mission. Its vision targets the creation of a society that has faith in God (*iman*), follows the commands of God (*takwa*), is prosperous, and well-trained. In such a society all faith-based groups shall mutually respect each. The mission sets out to

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[204] As all Ministries, the MORA is structured analogously to central and regional administration. Structure and organization of Indonesian Ministries are uniform; a Ministry requires five constitutive components: 1.) leadership, which is in the hands of the minister; 2.) a secretary-general heads the administrative services; 3.) operational services, each headed by a director-general; 4.) institutional control, to be exercised by an inspector-general; 5.) the research and development division, to be headed by a director-general. All these executives are appointed and dismissed by the President on the recommendation of the minister. In the exercise of their duties, however, they are answerable to the minister only. Ministry officials are guided by the principles of coordination, integration, and synchronization within their own department as well as in relation to other departments and institutions. The secretariat-general is divided into bureaus with a maximum number of five. Each directorate-general is divided into directorates numbering no more than five, and the inspectorate-general is divided into inspectorates, also numbering five at most. The research and development division may have a number of centers, each with a specific task in research and development to meet the growing requirements of the department. (Asianinfo.org. 2008: Politics in Indonesia, www.asianinfo.org; March 2008)

1. raise the quality of guidance, regular practice, experience and service for faith-based[205] life (*kehidupan beragama*)
2. increase the comprehension of religious moral and ethics (*moral dan akhlakkeagamaan*)
3. advance the quality of education of religious communities (*umat beragama*)
4. increase the quality of the organization of the hajj
5. empower faith-based communities and religious institutions
6. strengthen inter-faith harmony (*kerukunan umat beragama*)
7. **develop conformity of religious interpretation according to the national Indonesian conception (*wawasan nusantara*)**

Ministerial activities focus on (1) increasing the quality of faith-based life, (2) manifesting a clean and prestigious governmental structure, (3) increasing society's access to qualified education, assessing deficiencies, and empowering educators, (4) revitalize the hajj and (5) managing inter-faith harmony.

Consequential Minister of Religion Decision Nr 2 in 2010[206] reformulated MORA's vision and mission. Its vision targets the creation of a society which obeys *agama* (*taat beragama*), lives in harmony, is educated, autonomous, and prosperous in physical and spiritual matters (*lahir batin*). The mission than targets to

1. raise the quality of faith-based life (*kehidupan beragama*)
2. advance inter-faith harmony
3. increase the quality of *raudhatul athfal* (kindergarten), *madrasah* (modernist Islamic schools), faith-based higher education (*perguruan tinggi agama*), the religion class (*pendidikan agama*) and faith-based education systems (*pendidikan keagamaan*)
4. increase the quality of the organization of the hajj
5. manifest good, clean, and prestigious governance

Of interest to the current study is, that among its many functions, the MORA has the task to

1. organize the religion class in all types of schools at all levels of schooling (public, private faith-based, and state faith-based elementary or secondary schooling)
2. organize the religion class in undergraduate public higher education.
3. operate state faith-based schools and state faith-based higher education,
4. compile of religion class curricula for primary, secondary, and to undergraduate education at public and state faith-based schools
5. compile the curricula for state faith-based higher education

During the reform era, the national development program (*Program Pembangunan Nasional*, *Propenas*) mandated a restructuring of the MORA's institutional set up. Minister of Religion Instruction 1 in 2001 put that requirement into practice. The figure gives the organizational chart of MORA in 2007.

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[205] The document uses the term *beragama*, (faith-based). It is the task of the MORA to guide faith communities. If the document refers to doctrines of the approved faiths, it uses the term *keagamaan* (religious).
[206] http://www.kemenag.go.id/index.php?a=artikel&id2=visimisi, 26.11.2011

Expert Team

Minister of Religion
H. Muhammad M. Basyuni

Special Staff

General-Inspectorate
(Inspector General)

General-Secretariat
(Secretary General)

Director General for Islamic community Affairs

Director General Islamic Education

General-Director for Islamic pilgrimage organisation

Director General for the Guidance of the Protestant community

Director General for the Guidance of the Catholic community

Director General for the Guidance of the Buddhist community

Director General for the Guidance of the Hindu community

Research & Development - education and training Board

Regional office of the Department of Religion at provincial level

Agency of the Department at regency/municipality level

Expert team:

1. Expert on Interfaith Harmony
2. Expert of Religious Institutions Relations
3. Expert on Religious Consideration and Understanding
4. Expert on Law and Human Rights
5. Expert on social affairs and empowerment of religious communities

PART C

5. The road from *Agama* Hindu Bali to Hindu Dharma Indonesia

As an immediate impact of modernization, developmentalism, and recently democratization, the Indonesian political culture of spirited politics evolved out of similarities in archipelagic socio-cultural practices, governmental initiated nation-building efforts and cultural engineering processes as well as participation in the global culture; that has nothing to do with a "synthesis of the existing traditional cultures into a single cultural system". (Darmaputera, 1988: 29-30) In previous chapters, three longstanding and one recently emerged socio-religious cultures were identified:

1.) Archipelagic Indo-Melanesian megalithic traditions
2.) Hindu-Buddhist cultures
3.) Islamic culture (public Islam, political Islam)
4.) Civil religion or national culture as represented in the first principle of the state.

Contemporary transformations of religions in Indonesia only begin to become intelligible, if we take into account Indonesian politics. "These politics shed light, too, on the shift of attention from ritual practice to doctrine in Balinese religious thought (…)." (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 30) As Atkinson (1987, 2003) and Smith-Kipp/Rodgers (1987: 22) suggest, some Indonesian examples of religions (Dayak, Wana, Bali) may be located between the Weberian distinction of traditional and modern/historic religions as "local cultural traditions in dialogue with world religious systems." (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 22)

5.1. Institutionalization of religion in Indonesia

5.1.1. Transformation of tradition

Following Smith-Kipp/Rogers, I suggest that "[r]eligious phenomena in different Indonesian cultures may be helpfully seen as transformations of each other and perhaps of other, seemingly nonreligious domains of culture", further "religious phenomena shift form (from trance to meditation, for example[207]) as one goes from Indonesian culture to culture or as an ethnic religion takes the symbolism of Islam or Christianity". (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 6) In consequence, many religious phenomena can be studied in Indonesia: transformations of religions, civil religion, public religion, political Islam, or public Islam, to mention only those relevant to the current study.

Sissions (1993: 98-99) offers a model which recognizes the "complex interplay" between four processes involved in the transformation of (religious) tradition. A great variety of terms have been used to describe transformations of (religious) tradition in the colonial and post-colonial Pacific. Sissions model aims at systematizing the variety of used terms: He offers a distinction along a rationalization-politicization axis and along a systematization-reactive objectivation axis.


Figure 1: Transformations of tradition

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[207] On this specific issue see Hornbacher in Picard 2011.

The terms of invention, reinvention, and construction all refer, albeit in different ways, "to a politicisation of tradition within an arena of identity politics (ethnic or nationalist)". (Sissions 1993: 98)Politicization is defined here as the use of (religious) tradition to articulate national, ethnic and regional (religious) identities (Sissions 1993). The politicization of tradition, when pursued by national elites, is normally tied to the enhancement of distinctive national or regional identities in a post-colonial, or neo-colonial context. (Sissions 1993: 99) The terms codification and formalization can be equated with the rationalization of tradition occurring during an imposition of state power (colonial or national). Geertz (1964) identified the Balinese reformers' activities as attempts at religious rationalization[208]. Rationalization, at the systemic level, is normally tied to administrative interventions by a state, often in response to formalizations of tradition outside the state or colonial structure. (Sissions 1993: 99) Both these general processes of politicization and rationalization result in an objectification (substantivization, reification) of tradition. (Sissions 1993: 98)

Accordingly, as one aspect of national, sub-national and regional identity politics, politicization of tradition requires objectification of culture, whereas the strategic rationalization of tradition objectifies traditional culture either for the purposes of colonial and state administration, or as local alternative in response to such interventions.When ethnic leaders pursue a politicization of tradition in opposition to state policies and actions, these efforts may take the form of a reactive objectification of culture. (Sissions 1993: 99) In the context of classical and contemporary Bali, this has been described by Schulte-Northolt (1991, 2007). The process of systematization includes, as component process, politicization (the use of tradition to articulate national, ethnic, and regional identities) and rationalization (the explicit formulation and codification of tradition).

The rationalization of the religious cultures of the archipelago has been induced by two processes that triggered a cultural crisis and social change: 1.) the establishment of colonial rule over sovereign local polities in the archipelago by "an industrializing state for rational economic exploitation", (Howell 1978: 266, 271) and 2.) "the transformation of the colony into an independent nation-state". (Howell 1978: 266, 271) The colonial and republican governments pursuit of economic development and the "political integration of units of the state" (Howell 1978: 271) were responsible for the rationalization of local religious traditions, because these factors triggered the local reformers' concern and interest in "reconstructing local religious practice in a more systematic and doctrinally justifiable form". (Howell 1978: 266)

> Today, the "local ethnic religions", so to speak, are in important part *social creations* of the interaction of world religions and village ritual, for both intense contact with Islam and Christianity, local rituals in many ethnic homelands may not have been conceptualized as components of a distinct and systematic domain. Moreover, "religious belief" may not have been an entity separate from the rest of knowledge. In the same process, Islam and Christianity have been refined and reinvigorated in a number of social contexts throughout the archipelago. (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 3)

Religious reform has been stimulated by all changes that disrupted the traditional social structure and organization of life in the colony as those changes "required local intellectuals to search for more generalized solutions to spiritual concerns than traditional religious institutions could offer". (Howell 1978: 272) In consequence, Christian influence caused the Balinese reformers' to systemize their local religious traditions into a transcendental and scriptural religion and organize their community into a congregation. (Geertz 1973, Howell 1978, 1982) In pursuit of development and integration the republican government also stimulated the rationalization of religion, but it constrained the evolution of the forms the religions assumed. (Howell 1978: 273) Islamic reformism led to the purification of religious beliefs, local tradition, and practices from superstition as represented in *adat* and to a general understanding of religion in terms of orthodoxy and piety. All modernizing elites took a hostile stand towards traditional religious orientations, which they felt stand in the way of progress. In consequence, the central government attempts to limit the proliferation of "new" religions (Howell 1978: 273) – until today, as the Constitutional Court's Decision to retain the controversial Act 1/1965 on the Desecration of *Agama* demonstrates.

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[208] Social context of Bali is local, national, and international. At the local level throughout Indonesia, religious qualities often infuse and legitimate local power structures. (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 30) At the national level, the government embraces religion in the generic, but no religion in particular, both to legitimize its exercise of power and also to mollify those who resist the idea of a wholly secular state and society. (Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 30)

Government standards which affected the transformation of the Asian religions were released by two branches of the state: its representative organs and the Ministry of Religious affairs (MORA). The rationalization of the Balinese faith (Atkinson 1987, 2003; Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 22) has come out of the interaction with a powerful nation state in which civil religion, public Islam, and the politicization of religion occupy to varying extent and to varying degree an obvious place in the political sphere.

5.1.2. Institutionalization of religion

As has been shown in previous sections, the MORA defined the One Supreme Lordship as transcendent following the Islamic understanding of *tawhid* beginning in the 1950s. Contemporary state-funded congregations (Hindus, Buddhists, Confucians, Muslims, Christians) were to submit exclusively to the requirements and doctrines of their particular creeds, as defined by their respective religious authorities and approved by MORA. (Howell 2003: 5) Several ethno-religious groups and their reform organizations in the young Indonesian nation state were successful in their struggle for official recognition. It is interesting in this context, how the Hindu community managed to become a state funded congregation in a Muslim majority stat, as this is an exceptional case and probably unique the Southeast Asian or Indonesian Islam[209]. "The official model of religion reveals its Near Eastern roots. While Hinduism and Buddhism are officially recognized as religions in Indonesia, it is an open secret that they do so by conforming in public dialogue to a Middle Eastern monotheism." (Atkinson 1983: 688) But, "While national law reinforced the trend among reformists to develop a universalistic rather than a particularistic definition of their religious communities, the representative organs of government exercised only slight influence on the evolution of religious doctrine." (Howell 1978: 274)

"By the early 1970s, 'religion' (*agama*) had been constructed through reform organizations and their interactions with government on a particular, mid-century model of respectability in modern world religions: Indonesian religions were to be exclusivist, congregational, heavily scripturalist and universalist." (Howell 2003: 5) In this, this process shows exemplarily the Weberian rationalization of cultural heritages through formal organization and a judicious adaptability of minority leaders.

> It reflected a widely shared concern that Indonesian religions be disentangled from 'irrational' traditions that stood in the way of progress and be reconstructed according to current standards of modern thinking to support reliable citizenship and economic development. (Howell 2003: 5)

In other words, belief systems (*kepercayaan*) were to a large extent disenchanted, marginalized, and put under surveillance, because ethnic groups who did not belief in the first principle, were easily alleged to be Communists. "The construction of all 'religions' (*agama*) as congregational and exclusive was also useful for exercising surveillance over religious action at a time when unorthodox, folk or lax practice was equated with 'atheism' and so, like Chinese traditions, associated with Communism." (Howell 2004: 4, Sudharta Interview 2008) This process reinforced the construction of *agama* as mutually exclusive creeds largely defined by an orthodox understanding in contrast to their more orthoprax predecessors, and a close affiliation of the religious authorities with the Suharto regime (Sudharta Interview 2008). This political situation explains the predominant interest of the Hindu Council in matters pertaining to piety, scripture, and ritual. Only following the era of reform, the Hindu Council began to actively engage in social and educational issues, an engagement that even led to the splitting up of the Council into two camps**.**

Geertz's (1973) analysis of religious rationalization in Bali stresses that "Balinese religion in the 1950s was taking shape through actors' efforts to grapple not so much with ultimate problems of existence as with proximate issues of cultural hegemony in the context of the Muslim-dominated Indonesian nation-state. The fact that their struggle was constituted in religious terms has cultural, institutional, and historical significance." (Atkinson 1983: 694) In the mid 1950s, Balinese reformers, some of them represented in the Hindu council lobbied the MORA and began to represent Balinese religion as a monistic, congregational kind of Hinduism until in 1958 they were allowed by President Sukarno to open up a Hindu Bali section in the MORA (Bakker 1993; Howell 1978, 1982, 2003, 2004).

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[209] It is significant that of the Indonesian religious groups sprung from the Asian traditions, only Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism, which strongly emphasized the transcendental aspect of their high god, are now legally recognized and supported by the Indonesian government. The other three religions recognized are transcendental faith, and belong to the Islamic category of people of the people (*ahl al-kitab*) (Howell 1978: 269)

The administrative recognition of *Agama* Hindu Bali led to the legislative recognition of Hinduism in "the first clear specification of legitimate Indonesian religions by Sukarno in 1965" (Howell 1978), Presidential Decree 1/1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and Desecration of *agama*, promulgated in 1969. Howell relates the Modernist Muslims' discrediting of the mystical Sufi path and prescription of a scripturalist that is orthodox focus on basic prayers and legal observances to the Hindu reformers efforts to systematize worship, doctrines and the emphasize on morals and piety[210]. (Howell 2003: 4) The Balinese formulated their own heritage from the ancient Indic kingdoms, first as an ethnic religion, and then, in the early 1960s as a universal Hindu religion. Remember in this context, that the Balinese have been cut off from direct contacts with India for approximately 1000 years.

Common to religious reformers of all cultural backgrounds in the 1920s-1960s was the concern to adapt their long-cherished traditions to the "modern" world."[211] Howell (1978: 262) states that the reformers of all these different movements attempted to accomplish that purpose by similar methods. First, all reformers chose "from among their religious traditions certain elements that they considered essential and of perennial values" (the revelations of the Koran or the monistic Hindu theology of the Ancient palm-leaf manuscripts, for example) to adapt their religious tradition to the modern world. To achieve this end, they used the "intellectual equipment and social institutions" (Howell 1978: 263) of the European models they encountered in their interaction with the Dutch colonial government or while studying abroad and "incorporated elements of western institutions in their reconstructions" of their particular religious tradition (Howell 1978: 264). Following quotation exemplarily describes the process of religious reform in Indonesia and Bali and it is therefore stated at length:

> Reformers arranged what they considered the essential elements of their traditions in logically ordered expositions of religious principles designed to reconcile belief with reason and with enterprise in their changing world. They justified these conceptions with references to newly examined literary sources of the great traditions and to recent European writings on the. They offered their formulations to the general public with the hope of raising the level of spiritual and ethical conduct in their communities. The concern of reformers of various traditions with popular piety and with adaptation of their religion to the modern world also led them to reorganize on much the same principles the social institutions through which their diverse religious heritages had been preserved. Thus each of the reform movements (…) crystallized around formal bureaucratic organizations. Those organizations instituted contractually based religious education and eventually administered congregational religious activities. (Howell 1978: 262-263)

Interestingly, the Indonesian history of religion took a course that the Weberian model of rationalization did not predict. It brought forth new religious institutions. As already assessed in the previous section, the Balinese followed a model of religious rationalization which Geertz terms "a process of "internal conversion"." (Geertz 1973: 182) In this context, Geertz identifies three interrelated processes:

1. intensification of religious concern/ religious reason(ing)
2. religious literacy/systematization of doctrine
3. social organizational institutionalization of religion

With regard to the intensification of religious concern Geertz observes that among "the educated or semi-educated young men of eighteen to thirty who formed the ideological vanguard of the Revolution, there have appeared scattered but distinct signs of a conscious interest in spiritual issues of a sort which still seem largely meaningless to their elders or their less engagés contemporaries." (Geertz 1973: 183, for a description of discussions in the early sixties see Geertz 1973: 183-184, cf. Bakker 1993, cf. Covarrubias 1965)

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[210] Howell (1978: 261) describes how "the rationalization of Indonesia's Brahmanic, Buddhist, and Confucian traditions[210] brought forth novel institutions that Weber's model of change did not anticipate". Howell explains this "discrepancies in terms of the distinctive social pressures and facilities of colonial and nation states". (Howell 1978: 261) During the 19th and early 20th century people under Dutch control began to reform their religious traditions. Sumatran, Sundanese, and Javanese scholars introduced a new kind of Islamic reformism characterized by efforts to purify local traditions that were not justified by the Koran, and to rebuild "their religion around novel, Western-influenced institutions." (Howell 1978: 261-262) "Similar movements to revitalize Indonesia's religious heritage from the Shiva-Buddhistic kingdoms of the islands' past began in Java in the late 19th century (Drewes 1966) and in Bali in the 1920s. (Ngurah Bagus 1969)" (Howell 1978: 262)

[211] According to Howell (1978: 262) the reformers themselves used the phrase modern world (dunia modern).

Regarding the systematization of doctrine, Geertz describes the translation of traditional palm-leaf manuscripts (see also Hinzeler 1993), and Indian texts and mass publishing efforts which led to a

> (…) spreading of religious literacy beyond the traditional priestly castes--for whom the writings were in any case more magical esoterica than canonical scriptures--to the masses, a vulgarization [secularization], in the root sense, of religious knowledge and theory. For the first time, at least a few ordinary Balinese are coming to feel that they can get some understanding of what their religion is all about; and more important, that they have a need for and a right to such understanding. (Geertz 1973: 185)

Thus, he observes how the tradition of *ajawera* became democratized and secularized as social groups not belonging to the *jero* (Brahmins and royalty) were allowed to understand matters of religion. (cf. Hinzeler 1993) However, he notes, "Against such a background, it might seem paradoxical that the main force behind this religious literacy and philosophical-moral interpretation movement is the nobility, or part of it, (…) younger members of the aristocracy who are collating and translating the manuscripts and founding the firms to publish and distribute them." (Geertz 1973: 186) This is interesting to note, as it has also been the nobility we founded and financed the first peoples' schools in Bali and thereby supported the opening up and change of tradition. Geertz explains this with the nobility's interest in maintaining their status quo,

> if they persist in basing their right to rule on wholly traditional grounds they will soon lose it. Authority now demands more than court ceremonialism to justify it; it demands "reasons" - that is, doctrine. And it is doctrine that they are attempting to provide through reinterpreting classical Balinese literature and re-establishing intellectual contact with India. What used to rest on ritual habit is now to rest on rationalized dogmatic belief. The main concerns upon which the content of the "new" literature focuses (…) all serve to set the traditional hierarchical social system in an explicitly intellectual context. The aristocracy (or part of it) have cast themselves in the role of the leaders of the new Bali-ism so as to maintain their more general position of social dominance. (Geertz 1973: 186)

Geertz attributes the activism of the nobility to their political motivations. It is worth mentioning that Geertz (1973: 189) already notes "the regenerative potential of a triangular alliance of troubled youth, threatened aristocrats, and aroused priests should not be underestimated." Thus my observation is supported by Schulte-Nordholt (2007) and Geertz (1973), who remarks that transformations which the Indonesian nation state brought to the Balinese

> (…) have hit the old élite as hard as any other group in Balinese society by questioning the foundations of their belief in their own vocation and thus their view of the very nature of reality in which they conceive that vocation to be rooted. Their threatened displacement from power appears to them as not just a social but a spiritual issue. Their sudden concern with dogma is, therefore, in part a concern to justify themselves morally and metaphysically, not only in the eyes of the mass of the population but in their own, and to maintain at least the essentials of the established Balinese world view and value system in a radically changed social setting. Like so many other religious innovators, they are simultaneously reformists and restorationists. (Geertz 1973: 187)

The third component to this process of rationalization is the social-organizational. This component refers to the social organization of the Hindu congregation within the *Parisada* Hindu Dharma and the MORA. In the early 1950s the Balinese founded their own independent, locally financed Autonomous Bureau of Religion. With help of this Bureau, they tried to reorganize their religious institutions. Developing Geertz observation, Howell (1978: 266-271) outlines three dimensions of religious reform in Indonesia, which are congruent with the author's findings.

1. Belief and Practices relating to One Supreme Lordship[212]
2. Congregational organization
3. Agents of religious construction

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[212] I expanded Howells concept of practices relating to a transcendental God, as God may be in discrepancy to Islamic orthodoxy conceptualized as immanent.

In the 1960s, Hindus summarized their doctrines, which adherents to Hinduism were required to profess. They invented their One Supreme Lordship (*Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa*) "despite its previous lack of ritual importance" (Howell 2003: 4; cf. Bakker 1993), and systematized their rituals. Hindu reformer published an ethical code, the *Upadeca*, and cast adherence to it as an essential part of religious practice[213]. (Howell 1978: 268, Sudhanta Interview 2008) All the reform movements, both those based in Semitic and in Asian traditions, "produced congregational religions, that is, religions with clearly bounded communities, including lay adherents, organized on a localized basis for regularly scheduled activities. (Howell 1978: 269) Howell (1978: 269) observes the reformers of Indonesian Hinduism did formulate their Asian tradition as ethical religion. They did not only compile a code of ethics but they standardized religious practice for the laity and outlined basic tenets of faith.

As the traditional cultures and Balinese polities were incorporated into colonial institutions of Western style schools, colonial administration, and technical professions, the Balinese reformers were challenged to reassess their values. (Covarrubias 1965/1937, Howell 1978: 270) The establishment of the nation state and the emergence of its civil religion in dialogue with political Islam pressed the need to understand religion on the laity and reformers laid an increasing stress on orthodoxy (scriptualism and formalization) and piety and on the systematization of the shared orthoprax village-based communal ritual practices to comply with the standards set out by the MORA. Howell (1978: 270) observes that congregational life in Asian religions was also facilitated by the organizations around which those religions crystallized. "The organizations drew non-specialists into religious activities on a regular basis and coordinated the distribution of religious services." In the Balinese context, the present study made the same observation and therefore differentiates between the old, traditional Brahmanic and royal elites (old*jero*) and the new, modern educated elite (new *jero*) in central positions within the government or education system. (cf. Bakker 1993: 35)

The new religious conceptions were formulated by "priests, scholars, and layman acting in concert with like-minded thinkers." (Howell 1978: 270) The foundation of the *Dwijendra* foundation exemplarily demonstrates that fact. These reformers identified their conception with the ancient world traditions and offered their programs as reforms but the outcome of their activities was a radical departure from traditional patterns of religious life. (Howell 1978: 270; Triguna 1997, 2009, Parker 2003) My assessment is, however, what has been continuously defended as is the ancient Indo-Melanesian concept of ancestor worship and the blood sacrifice as those practices seem to form the kernel of Balinese religion, *adat*, and culture.

> The formal organizations afforded procedures for the collective determination of values and goals, including those at variance with traditional values. The collective nature of the decisions taken by the organizations, moreover, was itself a source of legitimacy for these decisions. While the formal organizations facilitated the specification of group values, and hence facilitated the definition of dogma and the standardization of religious practices, the very specificity of decisions taken through formal organizations tended to bring to light differences among the participants and to cause the reformists organizations to fissure. That tendency was apparent both in the early history of Balinese organizations (…) (Howell 1978: 270-271)

and - one must add, in contemporary history. In my judgment, this process happened repeatedly: 1.) in the 1920s as the clerical class has been given solemnly the mandate to explain their religio-cultural system to the Dutch colonial officers: 2.) in the 1950s, as the old and new elites were jointly striving for the recognition of their religion within the nation state, 3.) in 1965 as Communism threatened to collapse traditional values and the social structure based on ancestor veneration, and 4.) after the Bali bombings in 2002, when the slogan Ajeg Bali became a crucial motto of reorganizing Bali in an open fortress (cf. Schulte-Nordhold 2007) During all these times of crisis, the old and the new elites managed to maintain their status quo by legitimizing their hegemony and social dominance. Using religious "reasoning" they adapted to the new social situations, while using tradition as a source of answering the social transformations that were challenging them. (cf. Bakker 1993; Picard 2004; 2011; Triguna 2003)

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[213] This Hindu catechism, first published in 1967, is still the main reference for contemporary Hindu Dharma Indonesia. After my Hindu marriage 1998 in Indonesia, my sister in law presented to me the Upadeca.

5.1.3. Hinduism in India and Indonesia

This chapter gives on cursory overview of the history of Hinduism and the term itself. The shared trait of communal religious practice is related to the traditional social form of life based on village ritual and agriculture as main its form of subsistence. (Hooker 1978) Those local ethnic cultures nurture a supernatural dimension and orthopraxy (Staal 1986a; 1986b; 1989). Oversimplified they focus on the primacy of society over the self, whereas secular cultures tend to be individualistic and insist on the primacy of the self over society. (Ruth-Heffelbower 2003) Briefly, those were the characteristics of the Archipelagic Indo-Melanesian megalithic traditions. This assumptions with is supported by my research on the Baduy in South Banten.

As the section on pre-colonial history demonstrates, Hindu and Buddhist traditions superimposed ethnic or traditional Indo-Melanesian traditions and practices from 400 AD onwards characterized by ancestor veneration, blood sacrifices, and animism (earth, mountain, and tree veneration). In consequence, Hefner (1998: 93) argues "non-Hindu-cults often continued to operate even after elements of the local tradition were drawn up into a Hindu superstructure". Even more remarkably, in the following centuries, whereas in India a schism between both ways of life occurred, in early medieval Java a unique Shiva-Buddhism emerged. (Fic 2003, Munoz 2006) It is my assumption that those Hindu and Buddhist traditions were received as *paksa* (skt. wing, way of life) and coexisted simultaneously in the Western part of the Archipelago.

This is demonstrated by the early inscription found in Bali, which testify to the simultaneous existence and practice of tantric Hinduism and tantric Buddhism. With reference to Bali, Coedes (1932 in Pringle 2004: 46) states "These inscriptions reveal a Hindu-Balinese society, independent of Java, making use of a dialect particular to the island, and practicing Hinduism and Buddhism at the same time." In consequence, it is often impossible to make a sharp distinction between Hindu, Buddhist, and Indo-Melanesian traditions and practices in ethnic or traditional religions in the Western part of the Indonesian archipelago (Malayo-Sumbawan linguistic group, Adelaar 2005).

Similarly, many Buddhist teachings are translucent to traits of contemporary Indonesian Hindu Dharma, and following the advice of Indonesian senior scholars, (informal Interview with Sudharta 2008, Ida Pedanda Telabah 2011, Edy Setyawati 2011) the author indicates that there is manifold need for comparative research in this area. Tantric Shivaism and tantric Buddhism are ways considered to lead to release from the cycle (*samsara*) of rebirth/reincarnation (*punarbhawa*) and recognize such a release as ultimate goal - only does tantric Buddhist practice differ from the tantric Shivaist practice. In the unique and particular Indonesian synthesis of Shiva-Buddhism, Shiva and Buddha are conceptualized as identical in nature, as *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*. The literary apex of this religion is the medieval *Kakawin Sutasoma*, source of the State Motto *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*. (Ramstedt 2004; *Upadeca* 1967: 38)

Early Hindu and Buddhist and medieval tantric Hindu-Buddhist cultures have not been uniformly distributed in the early and imperial polities throughout the archipelago. The courts maintained a more refined version of the religion than the villagers who largely continued their shamanist and animist religious practices and the megalithic ancestor worship. Hindu-Buddhist culture and Sanskrit language were certainly "the civilization of the elite and not that of the whole population" (Coedes 1968: 16 in Smith-Kipp/Rodgers: 1987: 15) Also, the rural populations were legally, religiously, socially, and culturally divorced from the court elites. Several versions of Hinduism and Buddhism have been practiced by different dynasties at different localities and historic periods. (Kulke 1991; Fic 2003; Munoz 2006) Some of those local ethnic traditions are represented today by the state funded religions Buddhism, Confucianism, and Hinduism. Others which were not integrated into one of the sanctioned universal religions are labeled as belief system (*kerpercayaan*). Those belief systems do not enjoy the same rights as citizens who adhere to one state funded *agama* (see part A and B).

As has been discussed earlier, at the time Europeans began to study religions, they tended to use the religions most familiar to them, namely Judaism and Christianity, as a general model (Bowen 2005: 26). They assumed all religions would have three central elements: a central text[214], exclusivity[215], and separation[216] (Bowen 2005: 26).

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[214] The central text was assumed to be a collection of doctrines or beliefs that all adherents shared, ideally written in a sacred book that had been inspired by a god or gods. (Bowen 2005: 26)
[215] Exclusivity meant that a person was a member of one and only one religion, at least at any one time. (Bowen 2005: 27)
[216] The idea of separation developed in modern Western Europe. John Locke advocated the separation of State and religion as a way of ensuring toleration and religious freedom. This argument became the basis of the separation of Church and State in France and USA. (Bowen, 2005: 27)

While this model of religion worked well to describe European practices, it poses problems in the understanding of traditional religions or Asian religions in India, China, and Japan. (Bowen 2005: 27) Only today we know those collections of texts and teachers under the general rubric of Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, or Shinto, but "these labels are modern inventions". (Bowen 2005: 27) In consequence, "Any attempt to conceptualize Hinduism is a difficult undertaking from the outset because the term 'religion' itself is contested and does not have a universally accepted definition." (Scheifinger 2009: 3)

First and admittedly oversimplifying, in those Asian societies there is not a singular scripture which provides a shared creed for practitioners of religion - instead, each of those traditional religious systems contain large bodies of manifold scriptures written on diverse aspects of life, on teachers and on organizations of followers. Second, the idea of exclusivity does not fit with the traditional norms in those societies. Third, it is important to note that the idea of a separate religious sphere is unfamiliar to those religious systems and many other religious traditions. Whereas Muslims, for example, argue that all of life should be conducted according to God's commands (Bowen, 2005: 27), and the prophet serves as prototype of proper conduct, Hinduism involves ideas of purity and pollution that permeate the all spheres of social life (Jackson, 2003: 8). This is of particularly interest, as in the Indonesian case, Islam and Hinduism are bound up with everyday life, thus religion matters and may not be seen as separate from a public space, a fact, which has been concisely described in the previous chapters. (cf Casanova 1994)

In the late 19th century, European scholarship has drawn up a chronology for the history of Hinduism. According to this theory, the roots of Hinduism are situated within the Aryan migration into India around 1500 BCE, and the composition of the first Vedic collection of hymns (*Rig Veda)*. This theory has been "controversial from the start"[217] and many contemporary Indian scholars "consider it an example of colonial-missionary interpretation — a predominant culture projecting it own ideas, values, and biases onto the politically dependent"[218].

In brief, the timeline of a history of Hinduism assumes seven periods of ancient to contemporary history, which the current work only briefly sketches, as 1.) the focus of the study is on the Hindu class in the context of Indonesian religious and educational policies and not on the history or periodization of Hinduism in general, which is also far beyond the scope of the present study, and 2.) the encounter and exchange between India and the Indonesian Archipelago with relevance to the transmission of Indian Hindu ideas to the archipelago has been terminated by around 1050 and only revived in the 1940s.

1. 3,000–1500 BCE: Indus Valley Civilization (Old Chronology) or
   6,000–1900 BCE: Indus-Sarasvati Civilization (New Chronology)
2. 1500–500 BCE: Vedic Period (beginning with the Aryan migration)
3. 500 BCE–500 CE: Epic, Puranic, and Classical Ages
4. 500 CE–1200 CE: Early and Middle Medieval Period (Early development of *bhakti* (esp. in South India). Formation of *sampradayas* contesting internally and externally. Theological establishment of Vedanta)
5. 1200–1757 CE: Muslim Period (*Bhakti* saints and the cultivation of personal piety, Development of the theistic traditions)
6. 1757–1947 CE: British Period (The reform movements and birth of neo-Hinduism)
7. 1947 CE–present: Independent India (Hinduism established as a world religion) [219]

Notwithstanding the given periodization, the current work recognizes several reasons which turn the effort to construct a reliable chronology of Hinduism into a challenging academic task. First of all, there is not a homogenous religion that can be referred to as Hinduism. Instead, Hinduism encompasses a diverse range of traditions, practices, beliefs, and groups that can be subsumed under the term Hindu. (Scheifinger 2009: 3) This may be said for India as well as for Indonesia. Second, those traditions, practices, and beliefs are of such an antiquity that they date back far into pre-history. Third, the earliest use of the term 'Hinduism' by an English professional soldier in India is reported in 1808. (Jackson 1996 in Jackson 2003: 8, emphasis in original) By 1917 'Hinduism' was being used by certain 'insiders' and subsequently there have been competing representations of true or false Hinduisms. (cf. Jackson and Killingley1988 in Jackson, 2003: 8)

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[217] http://hinduism.iskcon.org/tradition/1001.htm
[218] http://hinduism.iskcon.org/tradition/1001.htm
[219] http://hinduism.iskcon.org/tradition/1001.htm

In consequence, it is safe to assume that the sets of practices and traditions which are contemporarily called Hindu Dharma, Sanatana Dharma, or Hinduism in India and Indonesia are modern inventions, which have been born out of the encounter with Islam, Western colonial administration, Christianity, and the modern nation state, and they are only recently conceived of as a single, distinct religion.Forth, the traditions and practices labeled Hindu recognize no identifiable human founder, nor is there a specific point of origin in history. (Prothero 2010) Fifth, the Hindu traditions and practices lack traditionally a central authority and institution (Scheifinger 2009: 5; Bowen 2005: 27; Prothero 2010), and a central text. Hinduism is therefore heterogeneous; moreover, some traditions regarded as Hindu are actually "vehemently opposed to one another in terms of beliefs and practices"[220] (Svarupa-dasa 1996: 101 in Scheifinger 2009: 5; Prothero 2010)

As a result, to put all the groups that are regarded as belonging to Hinduism in this all-encompassing category is comparable to "lumping together religions such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam and calling them the "Semitic religion"." (Svarupa-dasa (1996: 101 in Scheifinger 2009: 5, emphasis in original) Nevertheless, after having briefly pointed to the limitations of the term or label Hindu, for analytical reasons the current work applies the term Hindu Dharma as analytical category in order to label the various traditions and practices subsumed under the term, even if they might hold contradictory views or sport internal differences of opinion. As the present work is dealing with Indonesian, not Indian Hinduism, the meta-framework of Indonesian Hinduism as outlined by the *Upadeca* is described in a following section. In consequence, with relevance to the case study the current work assesses four important distinctions between those traditions now labeled Hindu Dharma in Indonesia or Sanatana Dharma in India. We need to differentiate between

- The early and classical traditions in India and Indonesia and their transformations following their interaction with 1.) Islam (Christianity) and 2.) the nation state
- Early, classical and contemporary Indian manifold Hindu traditions and practices and early, classical and contemporary Indonesian Hindu traditions and practices
- Indonesian Hindu Dharma as normative national framework (normative framework) and Indonesian ethnic Hindu traditions and practices that are monitored by the Hindu Directorate General (actual practices)
- Balinese Hinduism and other Indo-Melanesian Indianized traditions

The first and second discrimination simply refers to differences between Indian and Indonesian Hindu and Buddhist traditions. The ethnic groups in the Archipelago acculturated some Indian concepts (the Godking for example, Munoz 2006) to legitimate dominance of some clans over the others. Thus, Indian Hindu traditions and practices differ from Indonesian Hindu traditions and practices in history and in the contemporary nation states. In this, historical traditions and the unitary political and conceptual framework of Hindu Dharma Indonesia, under which all Indonesian Hindu traditions cluster for administrative convenience, differ from historical and contemporary Indian traditions. The third discrimination refers to the difference between the unitary political and conceptual framework of Hindu Dharma Indonesia as normative national framework (normative framework and actual practices) and the various Indonesian "Hindu" traditions and practices that are monitored by the Hindu Directorate General – remember the Sikh community has chosen to be included under the Hindu. However, following ethnic religions, ethnic groups and belief systems are administered and monitored under the Hindu Directorate General at the MORA: *Karo Batak* (Sumatra), Indians in Medan, Banten, and Jakarta, Sikhs in Medan, Banten and Jakarta, Hindu *Tenggerese* (East Java), Hindu Kaharingan (Kalimantan), *Toraja, Aluktodolo, Mamasa* (Sulawesi), Lombok Hindu, Balinese in transmigration areas, Hindus Ambon, Madura and the Javanese Hindus (*wongso weton, wongso kulon* nearby Gresik).

In consequence, the fourth discrimination refers to the difference between Balinese and other Indonesian Hindu traditions and practices (Hindu Bali – ethnic Hindus). Note therefore the difference between *Agama Hindu Bali*, and other ethno-religious traditions and practices labeled Indonesian Hinduism. As already stated in previous sections, the construction of contemporary Indonesian Hindu Dharma relies upon the protracted struggle of Balinese reformers to protect and continue their socio-religious identity in the *Pancasila* state. Yet, 'in order to create what defines them', the Balinese and other Hindus consulted not only their inherited sacred scriptures, but also borrowed theology from India and ideas from the Theosophical Society thereby weaving an intriguing framework to maintain their way of life relevant for their cultural meaning system.

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[220] Hindus did not feel compelled to unify their many traditions, or define the common ground that distinguished them from "other faiths" — not, at least, until these "others" threatened to impose their own doctrines. Tis might be demonstrated by the history of Bali. As Balinese were classified as not having a religion yet, they became the target of Christian proselytizing and Islamic dakwah, therefore they organized and began to formalize and systematize their religion.

Consequently, HDI was and is influenced by Indian Hindu religions, Western ideas about Eastern religions, by Christian and Muslim doctrines, and by national standards.

Let us now take a closer look at the global distribution of Hindu Dharma, and then turn to the Indonesian context. The Malaysian Mamandram Magazine[221] gives an overview of various sources providing data of the number and distribution of Hindus around the world. According to the Magazine, consensus places the figure at around 885 million Hindus in July 2008. In this context, the CIA World Factbook[222] places the percentage of Hindus in the world at 13.26 out of the total world population of 6,677,563,921 (July 2008 est.). The graph shows the distribution of world religions on the globe.

World Population by Religion (Source: CIA Factbook 2008 in
http://www.mamandram.org/magazine/2008/10/world-hindu-population/) assessed October 2011

The table shows the Distribution of Hindus on the globe.

Country	Population (millions)	Percentage of Country
India	811	80.5
Bangladesh	24.6	16.0
Nepal	23.8	80.6
Indonesia	4.28 11. 4 (Hindu Directorate General MORA, 2008)	1.8 4.7
Pakistan	3.03	1.02
Malaysia	1.59	6.3
Sri Lanka	1.50	7.1
United States	1.22	0.4
United Kingdom	1.09	1.8
Mauritius	0.61	48.0
Fiji	0.32	34.0
Guyana	0.22	28.4
Suriname	0.13	27.4

Hindu Populations by Country (Source: CIA July 2008 est. in www.mamandram.org/magazine/2008/10/world-hindu-population/) assessed October 2011

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[221] (www.mamandram.org/magazine/) October 2011
[222] (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html) October 2011

This graph shows the age of the world religion[223]

Comparitive Age of World Religions
(IN 100S OF YEARS)

5.1.4. Orthopraxy

> (...) Balinese religion, even among the priests, is concrete, action-centered, thoroughly interwoven with the details of everyday life, and touched with little, if any, of the philosophical sophistication or generalized concern of classical Brahmanism or its Buddhist offshoot. Its approach to the problems of meaning remains implicit, circumscribed and segmental. (Geertz 1973: 175)

It is my assumption, that one should not take too serious such "labels" as Hinduism or Buddhism because in early and classical Asian religions, what counts is orthopraxis (from Greek *orthos*, right and *praxis*, action) (Staal 1989: 116-117) rather than doctrines and scripture. In this context, Geertz (1973: 177) writes "Beyond a minimal level, there is almost no interest in doctrine, or generalized interpretation of what is going on, at all. The stress is on orthopraxy, not orthodoxy--what is crucial is that each ritual detail should be correct and in place." And even more sound, Geertz (1973: 176) states, "The Balinese, perpetually weaving intricate palm-leaf offerings, preparing elaborate ritual meals, decorating all sorts of temples, marching in massive processions, and falling into sudden trances, seem much too busy practicing their religion to think (or worry) very much about it." As a result, following Geertz and Staal, Picard (2004: 62; cf. Bakker 1993) argues "Balinese ritual is a classic case of ritual without religion", a view which is supported by Ketut Waspada.

> Das höchste für sie (die Bali-Hindus A.L.) ist nicht die Vereinigung mit dem Absoluten, sondern die Erhaltung der Harmonie im Kosmos, wodurch das Wohl des Menschen erhalten wird. (...) Um die religiöse Lehre brauchen sie sich nicht zu kümmern (das ist traditionell Aufgabe der Priester, A.L.). Es kommt nur auf die Praxis an. Diese Gemeinschaft aufgrund der Orthopraxie erhält sich solange aufrecht, wie die äußerlichen Lebensbedingungen intakt sind. Aber wenn (...) [die Harmonie, A.L.] nicht mehr zustandekommt, dann wird der einzige Halt verloren gehen, und dies bedeutet eine religiöse Katastrophe. (...) Das war es, was um das Jahr 1930 geschah. (...) Schuld daran sei die Tatsache, dass die hindu-balinesische Religion keine einheitliche Lehre hätte. (Waspada 1988: 121)

In Bali (as elsewhere), ritual relates specific social groups to each other, to their ancestors, and to their territory. As the relevant ethnographic details are readily available in the literature, a description of these complexes is beyond the scope of my study. In consequence, observers in the 19 and 20century found traditional Balinese religion to be defined by "ritual affiliation, lineages, initiation, cults, and practice" (Staal 1986b: 206) in the local context, the complexes of temple systems, the sanctification of social inequality, and the cult of death and witches (Geertz 1973: 1976).

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[223] (http://www.hindupedia.com/en/Who_is_a_Hindu%3F)

But the conceptual side is of much less moment: the worshippers usually don't even know who the gods in the temples are, are uninterested in the meaning of the rich symbolism, and are indifferent to what others may or may not believe. You can believe virtually anything you want to actually, including that the whole thing is rather a bore, and even say so. But if you do not perform the ritual duties for which you are responsible you will be totally ostracized, not just from the temple congregation, but from the community as a whole. (Geertz 1973: 177)

The relevant concern is not right belief (orthodoxy) but appropriate behavior (orthopraxy). As result, orthopraxy has become a basic feature of all religion in India and Bali, and we should refer to the orthoprax, as expressed in "ritual affiliation, lineages, initiation, cults, and practice" (Staal 1986b: 206) instead of referring to the faithful or the orthodox. (Staal 1989: 116-117)

Thus, in any one village a man and his neighbor will ordinarily be dependent upon different priests for their religious needs, the most important of which is the obtaining of holy water, an element essential not just for temple ceremonies but for virtually all important rituals. Only a Brahmana priest can address the gods directly in order to sanctify water, as only he has, as the result of his ascetic regimen and his caste purity, the spiritual strength to traffic safely with the tremendous magical power involved. The priests are thus more professional magicians than true priests: they do not serve the divine nor elucidate it, but, through the agency of ill-understood sanskritic chants and beautifully stylized sacred gestures, they utilize it. (Geertz 1973: 179)

The clerical class has been responsible for the proper conduct of the ritual, thus the community was not concerned with theological questions, which were entirely the duty of the priests and their families. In consequence, the elitist systematization of Hindu Dharma is a modern phenomenon and a characteristic feature of the process of reinvention, rationalization, secularization and democratization of Balinese orthopraxy. Further, it is an entirely modern phenomenon that the Balinese laity needs to understand religion. Those processes began in the 1920 as Dutch colonizers mandated the collaborating elites to codify their religion, customs (*adat*) and law (*adat* law). Insofar, the "Hinduization" of Balinese religions is a singular process (Picard 2004: 58). In consequence, Geertz (1973) coined the term "internal conversion" to denote the ambiguous phenomenon that the Balinese had to reinvent themselves as Hindus that they already were assumed to be by Dutch observers acquainted with classical Hinduism. (Swellengrebel 1960: 25; on the Western image of Bali as Hindu museum see Schulte-Nordholt 1986)

5.2. Consolidation of Indonesian Hindu Dharma

This part discusses the consolidation processes of tailored or invented Hindu Dharma Indonesia (henceforth HDI). In general six periods of consolidation of contemporary HDI can be identified. My periodization displays a reconstructed version of history, which the participants to my study and the sources they gave me referred to. In consequence, my periodization does not claim historical accuracy. (cf. Schulte-Nordholt 1991) Basically, the classification focuses on Balinese history, as the Balinese were the agents within the process of internal conversion that shapes the contemporaneous curricular content of the Hindu class and the Hindu education system. It was Balinese reformers struggling for their religion's recognition by institutionalizing it into congregation. Likewise, they made the first and successful systematization efforts.

Java/Sumatra/Kalimantan	BALI
400 Indianized King Purnavarman in Kutei (East Kalimantan) and King Mulawarman in West Java	Probable direct contact between India and Bali, certainly trade relations between Indianized Java and Bali
700-1100 Buddhist kingdom of Sriwijaya in Sumatra	**First consolidation:** prehistory - 1846
800 -1100 Hindu and Buddhist Kingdoms of Central Java and East Java	914 first inscription in Sanur
1250-1450 Hindu-Buddhist kingdom of Majapahit 1100-1700 Islamization of Sumatra and Java, Islamic Sultanates in Java, Sumatra and the Archipelago	Threefold Hindu-Buddhist Javanization of Indianized plural cults in Bali throughout the middle ages: Rsi Markandeya (probably 800) Empu Kuturan (around 1050) Dang Hyang *Dwijendra*/ Dang Hyang Niratha (1550)
1600-1945 Dutch colonization	**Second consolidation**: 1846-1949 Colonial conquest (1846-1908): Exchange between local ideas about religious practices (orthopraxis) and Dutch efforts in administration and social science, systematization of religious practices by clerical elite and first academic descriptions of Balinese religion and culture

Third consolidation (3 contemporary constructions)1945-present
Incorporation into the nation state: Re-systematization of local belief systems into an exclusive and congregational system of *agama*, construction of One Supreme Lordship according to MORA regulations

1st construction (1949-1965)
Several Hindu cults conceptualize their orthopraxis in *Agama* Hindu Bali (on the naming cf. Bakker 1993 and Picard 2004). Balinese agents organize in foundations, and instituonalize their religion successively in the Hindu Council and the Hindu Directorate General at MORA

2nd construction (1965-1998)
Following the Suharto take over after 1965, *Pancasila*ization of the religion, universalization, increasing ritualization of Hindu Dharma Indonesia

3rd construction (1998-present)
Following the era of reform, opening up of the ritualism and scriptural piety of the Hindu Council. After the bombing conservative reactive objectification of Balinese religion and culture (*Ajeg*) and modern diffusion into *sampradaya* (cults) of Dharma Hindu Indonesia.

5.2.1. First consolidation: Guru-personalities of Balinese religious traditions

According to historical research, several Hindu, Buddhist and Shiva-Buddhist cults coexisted and were practiced simultaneously in Bali until the 11th century. Remember, in the 1950s the orthodox Muslims represented in the MORA decided on a catalogue of what features a religious system must have if its adherents want it to be recognized as *agama*. One of the crucial problems the Hindu traditions in Bali met was first having prophets (*nabi*) and second that its adherents must not be limited to one single ethnic group. (Dosther Interview 2007, Sudharta Interview 2008) With respect to the prophets, Balinese participants to my study, the *Upadeca* (1967: 36-42) and the sources they gave me, enumerate several sages which are credited to have laid the base for religious traditions and practices that shaped the embryo of *Agama* Hindu Bali (on the naming see Bakker 1993 and Picard 2004, 2011) from approximately the 8th to the 15th century[224] and are revered as guru-personalities in a retrospective view: the mythical Resi Agastya (said to have sailed from India to the Archipelago, credited with the Indianization of Java and Bali), Resi Markandeya (800), Empu Kuturan (1000), his younger brother Empu Bharada, Dang Hyang *Dwijendra* (1550) and his nephew Astapaka[225]. (cf. *Upadeca* 1967; Bakker 1993: 172; Sudharta 2006) In consequence, it is safe to assess – if we consider the first inscriptions dating from the early 9th century - that the first persons to systematize and unify a common practice of worship among those Indianized cults in Bali and practices arrived between the 9th and 16th century.

Agastya has been pictured as Shivaite Ambassador of Dharma (Dharmaduta), who came to Java in the 8th century to spread the Shiva traditions. Therefore he is given the title *Maha Resi Agastya* (Great Prophet Agastya) and *Bhatara Guru* (*Patron Guru*), as he is perceived to have been a manifestation of Shiva, who spread the Dharma in the Archipelago (Java, Bali, Lombok, South-Sulawesi, Kaimantan). Archeological evidence supports this thesis. (*Upadeca* 1967: 36-37)

Another person to spread a systematic Hindu lore in Bali was Resi Markandeya, who travelled from East Java to Bali and seems to have disseminated a Vishnuite cult in the 8th century. He is credited with the foundation of the Besakih temple, which is regarded as the central and most important temple in Bali today. Prior to the temple erection, Markandeya has buried five metallic elements (*panca dhatu*: gold, silver, iron bronze, and an amalgam of all four metals) as substructure in the ground.. Those elements are regarded as sacred today, and Balinese reiterate that it is Markandeya's merit to strengthen and protect Balinese soil with this primary sacrifice. Today, new constructions of a Balinese house begin with the ritual of burying those five metallic elements in order to protect the house.

Next in spiritual genealogy of Javanese founders of religion is the East Javanese Empu Kuturan. As has been mentioned previously, several Indianized cults coexisted and were practiced simultaneously in Bali: *Siva Siddhanta, Pasupata, Bhairawa, Waisnawa, Bodha (Sogata), Brahmana, Resi, Soa (Surya)* and *Ganapatya*. Empu Kuturan is credited with 1.) the attempt to reduce those cults into three: *Shiva Siddhanta, Bodha (Sogata)*, and *Waisnawa (Resi)*, 2.) the introduction of the *Tri Sakti/Murti* (manifestation and veneration of Brahma as creator, Vishnu as maintainer, and Shiva as dissolver). Thereby the contemporary tripartite priesthood (*Tri Sadhaka*), the Shiva and Buddhist professional priesthood and the *Bhujangga Waisnawa*, the Vishnu-worshipping priesthood, emerged[226] among the variety of priests. Empu Kuturan introduced the tripartite village temple-system followed up to the present, and the priestsof Besakih are seen as his spiritual descendants. (Interview with a priest at Besakih in 2007)

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[224] As the periodization and systematization of Hindu scriptures is a a recent phenomenon, a difficult academic task and probably a Western effort continued by Asian scholars - as the debates about the periodization of Hindu scriptures in India demonstrate - the present study aknowledges that the decades after 1920 and especially after the mid 1960s witnessed an enormous increase in activities in research and publication concerning the progenitors of clans and the founders of the religion. The authenticity of those efforts needs to be qualified, because of several political and social pressures. On pre-nation state periods see Schulte-Nordholt 1986, 1991 and Ramstedt 1991. With refernce to the nation-state period, I like to mention 1.) provisions of the MORA, and 2.) the search for ancestors after the massacres in 1965. My analysis does not ask after the factual historical authenticity of these guru-personalities, but as my emic approach allows for, reiterates the current Balinese construction of their religious history, therefore it is in my view academically responsible to describe this certainly constructed view.

[225] The Upadeca enlists Rsi Agastya, Rsi/Bhagawan Wyasa, Resi/Empu Tantular (the composer of the Suta Soma, in which the Bhinneka Tunggal Ika verse is contained), Kuturan, Bharadah, Markandeya, Dwijendra and Astapaka.

[226] Those priests represent the roles of Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva in ritual. In the 1600s century, the Bhujangga were marginalized by the dominant Shiva and Buddhist Brahmin priesthood out of conflicting interests. Their traditional role in ritual was given to the kings represented. This situation continued until 1999. Following a mysterious incident in Besakih in 1999, the *Bhujangga Waisnawa* priesthood was allowed to carry out the *Panca Wali Krama* (five year cycle purification ceremony at Besakih temple) ritual jointly with the Shiva and Buddha priests for the first time in national history. Only in 2003, the status of the *Bhujangga Waisnawa* has been elevated by *Tri Sadhaka-Bhisama* of the Parisada as they were then given the right to perform all rituals along with the Shiva and Buddha priesthood. (Interview Ida Resi Oka 2004)

His brother Empu Bharada was probably a Vishnu priest at the East Javanese court. He was involved in the conflicts of succession between the descendants of the East Javanese king Airlangga whose spiritual teacher he is assumed to have been.

From the 11th to 13th century, the king (representing Vishnu, and thereby replacing the *Bhujangga* in ritual) resided at a palace assisted by a Shiva and a Buddhist priest. This unity of Shivaite and Buddhist clerics was termed *dwi tunggal* and the Shivaite tradition was named *kacewan* and the Buddhist tradition *kasogatan*. (Agung/Musta: 1991-1992: 3; Santeri, 1992: 102-103) The basic core of Balinese religion is assumed to rest on belief in

1. A diversified or created reality (*sekala*) and an undiversified or uncreated reality (*niskala*);
2. Life after death (ancestor world), Cycle (*samsara*) of reincarnation (*punarbhawa*);
3. Ancestor veneration (the souls of the ancestors that dwell in the mountains. (Santeri 1992: 98-117) The living humans beg their ancestors for help and support, and with the power of *niskala*, these ancestral spirits can bestow boons on their descendants. Thus security, fertility, welfare and progress are essentially tied up with the veneration and service to ancestral spirits. In consequence, cremation ceremonies and the continuiation of the purusa line constitute are situated at the very core of Balinese religion and culture. In this, the educational aim of the Hindu class is to build an suputra, who understands about the obligations towards the ancestors and the community.

The Central Javanese Brahmin Dang Hyang *Dwijendra* or Dang Hyang Nirartha, who is assumed to have fled the perishing Central Javanese Majapahit kingdom, is credited to be the progenitor of the contemporary Balinese brahmin class. Moving east *Dwijendra* came to Bali and Lombok. Prior to the advent of *Dwijendra*, there were various priestly groups, among them the *brahmana* probably did not form a continuing dynasty or descent group, and were just one of many groups of priests. (Vickers 1989) The major tool by which the diversity of groups of priests pre-dating Dang Hyang *Dwijendra* was displaced was the idea of an exclusive priestly caste, the *brahmana*. It was *Dwijendra*, who was responsible for the inauguration of the genealogical lineage as it is now known in Bali and for the elevation of the priests who perform worship to Siva and carry out rituals for the court, as the major priestly group. (Vickers 1989: 49 – 52; Interview Ida Bagus Wiyana 2011) The four descent groups of *Dwijendra*, the *Brahmana Manuaba,Brahmana Kemenuh, Brahmana Keniten* and *Brahmana Mas,* clans, became the *brahmana* high priesthood, a priesthood complemented by the smaller group of high priests, who directed their worship to Buddha. In the retrospective accounts the ancestor of all the Buddhist priests was *Dwijendra*'s nephew Dang Hyang Astapaka, "so the structure was kept within family". (Vickers 1989: 49 – 52) All the other categories of priest which have survived have been relegated to the lower lineages. (Vickers 1989: 49 – 52; Interview Ida Bagus Wiyana 2011, Interview Ida Resi Oka 2004)

In consequence, Astapaka is the progenitor of the Buddha priests and is said to have founded the village Budakling, the hatchery of all Buddhist Brahmins in Bali. In consequence, the system of contemporary Balinese social order and lineage (*varna* or clan (*dadia* and *soroh*)) emerged in the 1600 century. As the framework of social order and lineage was meaningless without some kind of everyday practice to support it, *Dwijendra* introduced the present day Balinese ritual order, particularly the making of holy water (*tirtha*), which is the key rite for the *brahmana* priesthood and the temple system. (Vickers 1989: 49 – 52) In consequence, he systematized the Indianized religions in Bali through codification of worship style and introduction of the *padmasana* (shrine in each temple or family temple dedicated to the worship of One Supreme Divinity, cf. Stuart-Fox 1996). The constant element of Balinese society before and after the Majapahit conquest was that it was held together by social networks and personal relationships. The spatial dichotomy between thecore and the periphery of the village was translated into the social and spiritual distinction between *jaba* (outsider) and *jero*(insider) denoting the proximity to royal or priestly descent, which in turn was tied to the proximity between human and creator, and residence. (Vickers 1989: 49 – 52)

5.2.2. Second consolidation: Dutch conquest, Wangsanization, and modern education

The pace and course of colonization took its own and singular shape in Bali. The island was the last region to be subjected to Dutch rule in the Indonesian archipelago. It had the status of a *residentie* and not of a colony, as the royalty had the right to self-rule (*swa-praja*). Launched in the north coast in 1846, the conquest of the Southern and Eastern parts was only completed in 1908. Predating Dutch invasion, the image of Balinese was that of a savage, violent, belligerent and deadly tribe. Balinese were described as fierce, proud, and

occasionally running amok. The nobility led a life of luxury and financed such a sumptuous life-style by selling their subjects as slaves to Batavia (contemporary Jakarta).

The royal power of the king was traditionally linked to the mobilization of labor force for ritual performance and warfare. The Dutch government utilized that negative image to justify their invasion of the island. The continuous quarrels and feuds amongst the nobility stopped them from forming a unified diplomatic and military front line against Dutch supremacy. From 1908 to 1942 the Balinese experienced social tensions, tensions regarding social hierarchy, conflict, rationalization and secularization of their religious traditions and practices. (Bakker 1993: 31-48; Triguna 1997) Despite the Dutch attempt to insulate Balinese society from foreign influences, Bali underwent rapid and profound changes as a result of increasing interference in native affairs by the colonial state and later the nation state. The introduction of a monetary economy, the imposition of taxes and forced labor, the enlistment of former rulers in the bureaucracy, and the access of a tiny minority of Balinese youth to European education undermined the relationships that had prevailed between the commoners and the nobility (Picard 2004: 59)

After Dutch forces crushed a fierce resistance of poor armed Balinese guerillas, they occupied the North and West parts of the island in 1846. In 1882, the harbor town Singaraja in the North was made the Dutch administrative capital of Bali and Lombok as it became the seat of the colonial government and the strategic headquarter. The local regent of Gianyar asked for Dutch support in 1899 and thus had been forced to accept Dutch supremacy in the regencies of Gianyar and Karangasem. Only the South (Badung, Tabanan, and Klungkung) remained independent. In 1904 a Chinese trading vessel had been looted in Sanur, the quarrel about the reparation payment between the Dutch and the regents of Denpasar and Pamechutan led to the final Dutch take over.

The royalty and their priesthood jointly decided to fight for independence and respectability and to accept death in order to defend honor and liberty. Those people gave preference to death over disgrace which they equated with the loss of liberty. Together they swore a pledge on *puputan*[227]and carried out the related ritual to prepare them to wage war. On November 11th, 1906 the royal and the clerical families of Denpasar, dressed up in ritual clothes and armed with traditional weapons and they clashed with a superior force of Dutch troops armed with rifles. Those Balinese which survived the deadly Dutch bullets stabbed themselves to death in the vicinity of the king. In the same year, the regent of Tabanan together with his son and heir had to surrender and were taken into custody. Humiliated, they cut their throats with a pestle. In 1908, the last Hindu-regency of Indonesia, Klungkung, had to surrender to Dutch supremacy. In the *puputan* of Klungkung, the Dewa Agung, the supreme king, had been murdered and the capital looted[228]. The chief minister of Bali informed the Dutch that the king's subjects numbered 300,000, which made Bali one of the most densely populated islands in the world at that time, a reputation it was to maintain until the nineteenth century. (Vickers 1989: 51)

In consequence, the colonial war had successfully swiped and pocketed Bali. But, the colonial power too registered losses at a moral level, resulting out of the successive invasion's immense cruelty there were national protests in their homeland and vast concerns about the morality of that invasion. (Vickers 1989: 51) The Dutch conquest had made Bali part of the Dutch East Indies, and this meant strengthening the ties with the other islands in the archipelago, especially with Java – this reactivation of a close tie with Java, which had been neglected for 200 years, became of importance for the nationalist movements later on. (cf. Bakker 1993: 33-34) Karangasem, Klungkung, Bangli, Gianyar and Tabanan were added to the residency of Bali and Lombok formed in 1882, with Singaraja as its capital. (Bakker 1993: 34) In 1922, Buleleng and Jembrana were absorbed into the department of Singaraja. (Bakker 1993: 34)

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[227] Interconnected with ancestor veneration, ideas of the soul and the cycleof rebirth, the Balinese religio-culture classifies distinct types of death. The main categories are natural, not natural and exceptional. Not natural deaths are suicide, slaughter, and accidents. The warrior's death, while performing duty, or a selfless death to save other lives, is classified as exceptional. In modern words, the conscious decision to accept death in order to defend the own notion of truth, life-style, and individual or communal liberty is classified as honorable. This kind of death must not be equated with committing suicide - which is stigmatized - as it is commonly interpreted in academic literature on Bali, because there is no such notion of death in Balinese culture. But it is a highly honorable and respectable way to accept death probably in a collective state of trance by facing a vastly superior enemy in order to stand up for one's own conviction and values and does not necessarily lead to death. Hence the practice of puputan is closely related to the idea of freedom. (Landmann: 2004)

[228] So we can provocatively conclude that all contemporary priesthood compounds (*geriya*) and palaces (*puri*) are the descendants of collaborators. First, they collaborated with or came from Majapahit, Next, they collaborated or evaded conflict with the Dutch (otherwise they would have died in the *puputans*).Probably, the pre Majapahit indigenous Balinese nobility is already extinct and undulates in the margins. Or as they had been renedered to lower social startas, this might explain the continous conflicts between local clans and the Brahmins. Interestingly, both main temples, Besakih and Batur have no high priests and puris as patrons, but are themselves the patrons of the *puri* and religious service is exclusively conducted by ordained lay priests (*pemangku*) originating out of a certain set of villages and not by lowland Brahmins – with exception to the cyclic purification rituals.

As the kings and princes of Karangasem, Bangli, and Gianyar had not offered armed resistance to the Dutch conquest, those dynasties were allowed to retain their positions of authority, though under the supervision of Dutch administrative officers. (Bakker 1993: 34) The remaining principalities were placed under direct Dutch rule. The noble families thus became district heads over clear-cut areas. (Bakker 1993: 34) The Dutch maintained the traditional social hierarchy of Balinese society, assuming its abolishment would have let to unrest and undermining the position the Dutch eventually attained in Bali.

> On the contrary, the Dutch even reinforced the Balinese hierarchy by using the knowledge of the traditional Balinese *brahmana* judges in the administration of justice. They also had pub-lished a number of law books with Hindu leanings, in which the Hindu caste system was stated much more explicitly than in traditional Balinese society. Because the Dutch believed that the nobility was the exclusive vehicle for the Hindu religion and because they wanted to protect Hinduism, the position of the nobility was later reinforced. (Bakker 1993: 35)

Following a devastating earthquake in 1917, which let to great terror among the Balinese, who believed the earthquake was a consequence of the disruption of hierarchy caused by the changes brought by the Dutch conquest, the Dutch thought that their authority would be best guaranteed by a restoration of the traditional dynasties and by leaving intact as much as possible of traditional Balinese society. (Schulte-Nordholt 1988: 245 in Bakker 1993: 37) The Dutch then adopted local kings to nominally head the Balinese social order, and gave the priesthood a special role in explaining Balinese religion and society (Vickers, 1989: 51) which has been perceived as Hindu by Balinese, Indians, and colonizers alike. In 1938, the former princes were restored to their old positions of independent governors (*swapraja*), each in their own territory. At the same time, the Dutch set up a council of princes known as *Paroeman Agoeng* (Great Council), which was made responsible for governing the whole island of Bali – if course it was under supervision by a Dutch official.

Just as the Dutch adopted kings to nominally head the Balinese social order, so they gave the priesthood a special role in explaining Balinese religion and society[229]. The Dutch saw the whole nature of religion, class, and lineage as a big mystery, and were satisfied with simplified explanations which fitted into their administrative structure. In consequence, it were the clerical class itself who set up a rigid and ritual oriented social order to perpetuate their hegemony and social status and the system of religion we encounter today. In order to administrate the social system, the Dutch needed the help of the *brahmana* high priests to explain and simplify the system. So, it was Balinese clerical elite, and not the Dutch, who determined the practical details of colonial policy in Bali. (Vickers 1989: 146 – 148) The priests had great freedom within the confines of Dutch rule to determine how Balinese society should be organized according to their ideal model of *varna* (class). But as has been shown, the transition to Dutch rule and the subsequent imposition of the priestly ideal of *varna* was not bloodless; several cases of resistance occurred. To settle the disputes, a new, revised version of the three upper classes, the *triwangsa*, was constructed from 1910 onwards.

Basically, it was the contemporary old elite who gained enormous influence in political, spiritual, and economic affairs. In consequence, the Dutch administration concerns paired with the old elites' willingness to reorganize society according to their ideal image ascertained genealogical lineage on Bali. This in turn created a struggle for status as people jockeyed to be classified as the highest class. This struggle sometimes converted into a physical one, because the issue of class created an alliance between Dutch colonial interests and the ruling group of Balinese, an alliance which was challenged by educated commoners (*new-jero*), who saw their education as being at least as important as the old status titles, which they now saw as feudal (*old-jero*). Here the importance ascribed to education by the reform organizations is intimately linked with the opportunity of vertical mobility through education. (Vickers 1989: 146 – 148; Parker 2003)

Starting with the colonial subjugation of Bali from 1846 to 1908 onwards, the Balinese ruling elite and the colonizers alike "attempted to give the local orthopraxis a common name, while arguing about how it should be named".[230] (Picard 2004; see Bakker 1993 and Picard 2004, 2011 on the naming) There was a heated debate between Balinese ruling elites and colonial administrators arguing in favor of or opposing Christian proselytizing in Bali. F.D.K. Bosch and Dr. R. Goris[231] argued Balinese society had already been hit by various Western influences such as government, education, and tourism, out of this reasoning they opposed Christian missionary work.

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[229] This chapter draws heavily on interpretation and findings by Vickers (1989) and places weight on his judgment. Vickers consistently uses the term caste of which I do not approve as elaborated in a section of this thesis. Therefore I employ the term class and lineage.
[230] On the process of naming see Bakker 1993 and Picard 2004. This study does not elaborate further on the naming.
[231] F.D.K. Bosch was head of the Archeology Department in Batavia and Dr. R. Goris specialist of Old Javanese and Balinese language.

In their view, religion and social order form an inseparable whole in Bali and missionary work would bring about the collapse of the entire culture. To prevent the march in of Christianity, the religion of Bali should be considered a legitimate part of the world religion Hinduism. (Picard, 2004: 58-59)

In 1927, Rabindranath Tagore spent two weeks in Bali. Tagore wanted with his visit to restore the contacts between India and other populations influenced by the religious lore of India. He thought, if some of those people would stay at his Santiniketan ashram in Bengal, he would make an important contribution (Bakker 1993: 36) Several Balinese influential in the process of reinvention, rationalization and systematization of Balinese religion, among them Ida Bagus Mantra, later governor of Bali, studied there for some time after 1949. Following his visit to Bali, Tagore declared that the Balinese were real Hindus, "but that while the Indians had worked out the old Hindu belief philosophically and metaphysically, the Balinese had opted for an aesthetic elaboration of their religion." (Bakker 1993: 36)

The Dutch colonizers and the Europeans visiting Bali were acquainted with classical Hinduism and they wore 'Hindu spectacles[232]' and albeit vast differences in practices and beliefs, the Western imagination was that of Bali as a 'living museum' of Hindu-Javanese civilization, the one and only surviving heir to the Hindu heritage swept away from Java by the coming of Islam. (Picard 2004: 58; Schulte Nordholt 1986) In this context, Picard (2004: 58) remarks sophisticatedly that the story of the Western vision of Bali as a Hindu island in a sea of Islam remains to be written. But even the Indians who visited Bali came to this insight. In consequence, this view had been partially adopted by the Balinese ruling elite (*old jero*) as early as 1910 (Picard 2004: 58) and also by the new Balinese educated elite (*new jero*) in the 1920s and 1930s (cf. Bakker 1993) By classifying Bali as Hindu, the imperative was to protect the local religious practices from Christian proselytizing attempts (Picard 2004, Covarrubias 1965/1937), and in the 1950s from Islamic *dakwah*.

Because Bali underwent a different process of colonization as other parts of the Archipelago, it also underwent a different implementation process of secular education devices. Schools were established by interests of three agents:

1.) Dutch imperatives to train a local bureaucracy or to train an educated technical labor force;
2.) Sponsorship of local ruling elites (old-*jero*), largely aiming to perpetuate their status quo with modern means of patronage
3.) Efforts of local reformist organizations.

Requirements related to modern administration were instrumental in the emergence of the Balinese educated elite, since the colonial state needed bilingual educated locals to mediate between the population and their European overlords. In 1875, the first village school had been opened by the Dutch in their capital Singaraja. (Agung/Musta, 1991-1992: 12) It was the sole school until the conquest of South and East Bali in 1908. Until 1914 there were only 13 of those village schools established, and more village schools were opened across Bali eventually after 1914, while the Dutch-Native School (*Hollandsch Inlandsche School*, HIS) and the Dutch-Chinese School (*Hollandsch-Chineesche-School)* were established for the Dutch, Eurasians, local nobility, and Chinese communities in Singaraja. (Parker 2000) In 1918 two other HIS were opened in Denpasar and Klungkung, the pupils were trained in reading, writing, calculating, Dutch, and Malaysian language. All these schools were using Dutch architecture and Dutch as language of instruction, thereby infringing Balinese standards of architectural and etiquette. (Covarrubias 1965/1937; Parker 2000)

The new ideology that education was seen as attribute of a civilized person increasingly gained foot in Bali and the East Indies from 1910 to 1945. In the arena of education, the local desire for literacy, numeracy, and modernity overlapped with the local *jero*'s understanding of their responsibility to modernize, to urge patronage and to upkeep personal relations, and social networks, and thereby their traditional social domination. Balinese royalty and other classes came to understand mass schooling as the means to acquire modern competencies and skills for a future post-agricultural economy. (Parker 2004: 265) Founded by Balinese old and new elites, private and community based schools were taking more than half of all pupils in Bali in 1920. (Parker 2004: 211) In consequence, private patronage by the royalty rather than colonial sponsorship of mass schooling was frequent in the colonial era.

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[232] A term coined by Swellengrebel, 1960: 25, cf. also Picard 2004: 69 FN 4

Since there were obviously not enough schools to educate the young generation in Bali, a very small number of privileged Balinese had attended school in Java and Sulawesi in the 1910s and 1920s, mostly the teacher training school (*kweekschool*). (Intervie Cok Sudharta 2008) Those schools were located in Banyuwangi, Probolinggo, Surabaya, Malang, Yogyakarta, and Batavia (Jakarta)[233]. (Agung/Musta 1991-1992: 52, author's translation) As a result, Balinese graduates had gained a new understanding of progress, and the emergent Western educated elite in Singaraja and Denpasar were inspired by that understanding and believed in the utility of the intellectual Western school system. (Interview Gede Sura 2007; Cok Sudharta 2008; Parker 2004) Those graduates harbored "a strong will to develop Balinese society through education and religion and to change customs and traditions that did not conform to the spirit of age". (Agung 1986: 3 in Parker 2003: 210)

The graduates from Java were employed as teachers or civil servants first in Singaraja and later in Denpasar and many of them started to found the first modern organizations aiming to bring education to the still backward Balinese society. (cf. Bakker 1993) It is my assumption that this started a process still ongoing today which established the educated middle-class (*new jero*) as the major agent in the institutionalization and organization of Hindu religious education. In consequence, the introduction of modern mass schooling was simultaneously revolutionary and conservative, since it aimed to modernize the impoverished and backward population and to conserve the position of traditional authority and power of the elite at the same time. (Parker 2003: 210) But this process radically changes the relationships that had prevailed between the commoners and the nobility (Picard 2004: 59; cf. Bakker 1993, Parker 2000, 2004)

In consequence, a number of non-profit organizations concerned with educational and religious issues made their appearance in Bali. The joint objective of all these associations was to raise the standard and quality of life in the Balinese society in enlisted areas: social life, economy, politics, culture, and education. The main aim was to evenly distribute and provide access to education in Bali. Influential organizations were: *Setiti Bali*[234] in Singaraja, *Suita Gama Tirtha* (1921) in Singaraja, *Shanti* (1925)[235] in Singaraja, *Satya Samudya Bau Danda* (1925)[236] in Bali and Lombok, *Bali Adnyana* (1925), *Surya Kanta* (1925), *Catur Wangsa Gama Gndu Bali* (1926), and *Bali Dharma Laksana* (1926). In 1939 the *Tri Murti* association was founded, which then evolved into the Hinduism Council (*Majelis Hinduisme*). Afterwards the *Wiwada Shastra Sabha* and the *Pandita* club appeared in 1949 and in 1952 *Panti Agama Hindu* was founded. (Bakker 1993: 32-45; Parker 2000; Sudharta 2006; Arsada 2006: 52;)

Therefore, two factors motivated Balinese reformers to adopt a secular school system that communicated regionally specific knowledge, because local practices and elements were part of the curricula. First, secular schooling provided the opportunity to vertical mobility as Western thought and culture were part of curricular contents necessary to obtain an office in colonial administration. Second, as Catholic and Protestant proselytizing efforts caused irritation in society, local elements in the curricular content should help to counteract those efforts by strengthening local identity. (Agung/Musta 1991-1992: 54, author's translation) In addition, in a reactive move in the 1920s, the official Dutch policy of *Baliseering*(Balinization policy; cf. Parker 2000: 56-57) tried to mandate the use of traditional Balinese dress, traditional architecture, and Balinese language in schools and society, to counteract nationalist interests, as Malay had become the vehicle of communication of the much feared nationalist movement in Java. (Interview Ida Bagus Dosther 2007) In addition to local interests, the Dutch pedagogue and teacher at HIS Klungkung, H. te Flierhaar, introduced Balinese local art, writing, and chanting into the secular class. These local contents were taught by Balinese '*adat gurus*' - traditional artists. In 1939, the policy of *Baliseering* in the arena of education aimed to (Agung/Musta 1991-1992: 54, author's translation; Parker 2000):

1.) Increase the number of school buildings that apply the local style and pattern of architecture
2.) Return to traditional style/methods of painting and drawing
3.) Return to traditional style/methods of chanting
4.) Collect traditional reading material to publish new books
5.) Impart Balinese dance into sports

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[233] In 1927 the distribution of Balinese at schools located outside Bali was as follows: MULO 35 students, AMS 1 student, kweekschool 9 students, Ambaachtschool 8 students, NIAS 1 student, OSVIA 4 students, HKS 1 student and in OSVIA Makassar 10 students.
[234] Founded in 1917, the organization aimed to further the state of the Balinese society in the arena of education, religion and *adat*, and economy. The organization was disbanded in 1920.
[235] The Shanti group even opened a school for women to train mothers in reading and writing.
[236] Founded in Karangasem in 1925, this group was active in the field of study-fonds. The group had the function to safe money, to administrate and raise money, and to place funds in a study fond (account).

In the 1930s these educated Balinese aimed to advance the Balinese society in the educational sector, by providing a study-fund and in preparing national independence. Since the situation of education in Bali was perceived to be backward compared to the one in Java, the Balinese educated elite made various efforts to improve the educational sector in the 1930s up to the 1950s: Journals were published (*Bali Adnyana* and *Suryakanta*), study clubs and frequent assemblies were held to discuss the future of the Balinese kingdoms and the national revolution. (Parker 2000) On the initiative of I Nyoman Pegeg, the *Taman Siswa* School opened in Denpasar in 1933, the Jembrana branch opened in 1936 and the *Taman Siswa* School in Karangasem was founded in 1939. (cf. Parker: 55-56) There were several other private schools that were established in the 1930s, amongst them was the *Putri Bali Sadar* group (Aware Balinese daughters) founded in Denpasar in 1936. (Agung/Musta, 1991-1992: 57, author's translation; Parker 2000: 52-56) The aim of the group was to increase the literacy and numeracy of Balinese girls and women by opening morning and afternoon courses, providing a study-fund and "creating harmony between Balinese daughters in promoting a basic Balinese civilization which conforms to the changing spirit of age". (Agung/Musta 1991-1992: 58, author's translation)

Historical animosities between the Javanese Islamic Sultanates and the Hindu kingdoms of Bali are responsible for the distrust of Balinese elites towards Muslim Java. This historical distrust most likely led to the protracted traditional Balinese elites' support of Dutch colonizers until 1949. But it is noteworthy, that the modern elites not only attended school in Java, but from the beginning they also participated in nationalist organizations in Java in the first half of the 20th century – despite their traditional disaffirmation of Muslim Java. Some Balinese had participated in the second Congress of the *Java Jong* (Java Youth) group in Yogyakarta in 1919. (Interview Ida Bagus Dosther 2007) It is my hypothesis that as in the 17th century (see previous sections), the retrospective view on a common historical past as represented in Majapahit helped to bridge conflicts in domination and religion in order to cooperate against Dutch colonial intrusion.

The large numbers of nationalists and the anti-colonial political engagement of the young Balinese nobility alarmed the Dutch, they did not only establish the Baliseering policy (Balinization policy; cf. Parker 2000: 56-57), but they restricted the freedom of the Balinese to attend school in Java. Then Balinese attended school in Makassar, Sulawesi. (Parker 2000: 52) One of the graduates from Makassar, who then went to study in India was Ida Bagus Mantra (1928-1995), later Indonesian ambassador to India, member of the national parliament and governor of Bali from 1978-1988. (Interview Cok Sudharta 2008) As Balinese were engaged in the independence movement forming a tight anti-colonial opposition, parts of the Balinese citizenry were involved in the process of producing and designing the newly gained independence through several organizations (mainly reform religious), and they participated in shaping the structure of independence with great enthusiasm.

During the Japanese occupation (1942-1945), there was no change in the educational sector. The only difference in the shift from Dutch to the Japanese colony was that all schools were made state schools, and the order was given to burn all Dutch textbooks. Preceding the proclamation of Independence, there were 245 schools at the primary level in Bali.

5.2.3. Third Consolidation: From Feudalism to the *Pancasila* state and modern education

From 1908 to 2008 in the passage of a century only the traditional agrarian community transformed itself into a knowledge-based stratified society. The ancient traditional order of the social system had twice been secularized, and the erosion of the vertical as horizontal hierarchical stratification of the social and religious-cultural groups is imminent. Therefore, the spiritual revitalization movement (*Ajeg Bali*) set out by Balinese urban intellectuals' attempts to work out strategies to develop Bali into an open fortress[237]. The awareness of being Hindu amongst the Balinese society arose out of political and conceptual concerns and due to a limited dialectical exchange with Indian scholars. The name *Agama* Hindu Bali gained ground as the Balinese religious community moved from an ethnic community towards a universal community exposed to international political, social, and economic influences. In Bali the advent of modernization, the establishment of an educational system and Hindu identity are closely linked.

This following illustration shows my process model of social and cultural change in Bali.

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[237] I gratefully borrow this expression from Schulte-Nordholt (2007).

MODERNIZATION

GLOCALIZATION

BALI 1930
religious and cultural homogeneity
traditional agrarian based social order

BALI 2008
Religious, ethnic and cultural heterogeneity
post-industrial service sector (export/tourism)

Social constructions and reforms:
processes of nation- building, identity politics, rationalization and systematization of religions as cultural systems

East Indies Colony 1930
Ethno-religio-cultural diversity
traditional, agrarian

„COMPROMISES"/Pragmatic points of common terms: *PANCASILA, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA)

INDONESIA 2009
Ethno-religio-cultural diversity
Agrarian – industrial, modern, Islamic secular Democracy

1945
Independence

The institutions of modernity – mass education, taxation systems based on control of land not labor, impersonalized, individual-based democratic forms of government, public-health systems had been introduced by the Dutch colonial regime and Indonesianized after Independence. (Parker 2004: 267; Wertheim 1959) Following Japan's surrender in August 1945, Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed the Republic of Indonesia and the Dutch promptly landed heavily armed troops to reinstate their pre-war colonial administration (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration, NICA) in key centers in Indonesia, including Bali.

The challenge to class or traditional social hierarchy arose under the Dutch, but emerged again after the proclamation of Independence. In Bali some members of the traditional elite welcomed and supported the Dutch as protectors of what they saw as hegemonic moves on the part of Muslim Java. One reason for that sympathy can be identified as in protecting their own physical and psychical safety as well the one of their subjects from Islamic proselytizing and domination efforts. Actually, the Balinese kings were in favor of the Republic of Indonesia, but due to resentments against the strong Javanese Muslim-dominated tones in Java, the republican sentiment was not as strong amongst the feudal Hindu elite, as it has been in Java and Sumatra.

Since the inauguration of the royal houses by the Dutch in 1938, those traditional elites displayed some loyalty with the Dutch. Since centuries, the Muslim sultanates of Java had been the enemies of the Balinese kings, who regarded themselves as the "descendants and heirs of Majapahit" and the Balinese were highly suspicious about what they saw as Javanese-Muslim efforts to gain control over the archipelago. (Ramstedt 2004: 7, emphasis in original) This mutual suspicion is still reflected on side of the capital and some Muslims which fear mass conversion to Hinduism in East and Central-Java that would shift entirely the proportional distribution of faith-based communities or religious demography in Indonesia. (cf. Geertz 1973) Notwithstanding, several Balinese participated in those Youth Congresses which paved the way for the Youth Oath in 1928. Most of the Balinese seem to have supported decolonization in favor of national independence. The famous last anti-colonial partisan, Colonel I Gusti Ngurah Rai and his freedom army of co-partisans died after a fierce fight for independence in the *Puputan* of Margarana in November 1946.

Between December 7 and December 24 1946 in Denpasar a conference was held at which it was decided to establish a federal republic of East-Indonesia (*Negara Indonesia Timoer*). (Bakker 1993: 47) The Balinese Cokorda Gede Raka Sukawati was appointed federal president and the king of Gianyar, Anak Agung Gde Agung, was its prime minister. (Bakker 1993: 47)

NIT encompassed most of eastern Indonesia, and Bali was incorporated into the administrative Lesser Sunda Islandsprovince (*Sunda Kecil*) with the capital in Singaraja. Bali was to be administered by a Dutch resident in cooperation with the *Dewan Radja-Radja Bali* (Council of Balinese Kings), previously known as *Paroeman Agung*. During this period the religion of Bali had obtained full recognition and the *Dewan Radja-Radja Bali* was expected to take responsibility for its development. (Bakker 1993: 47) One of its first initiatives was the establishment of a *Paruman Para Pinandita* (Council of Priests) in Singaraja on February 2 1947. Its task was to organize the education of priests and Hindu teachers, to compose a holy book (which never materialized – only in 1963 the *Upadeca* was written on own efforts of the Balinese), and to establish councils of priests in the various principalities. (Bakker 1993: 47; 226) The Dutch returned to their prewar policy of *Baliseering* that is to reinvigorate Balinese culture, arts and religion in education, while strengthening the political authority of the loyal Balinese aristocracy.

Year	Amount of death fighters	Schools built
1945	30	19
1946	802	5
1947	383	8
1948	135	7
1949	20	22
1950	2	29

From August 1945 to December 1946 the educational situation in Bali was problematic. Agung/Musta (1991-1992: 77) link the stagnating expansion of the school system to combats between Balinese anti-colonial guerilla and Dutch forces, as demonstrated in the following table. The bigger the losses of the Balinese, less schools were built. One reason the authors adduce why so many teachers and nurses where involved in the anti-colonial war is that if they were seen to carry letters or big amounts of sheets, this seemed to be less suspicious to Dutch intelligence and administration.

Another problematic issue has been that the founders of schools and teachers, who had disseminated anti-colonial propaganda, were persecuted by the Dutch colonial apparatus. Eventually, the traditional kings and the new elite eventually supported the republican and not the colonial cause. "After the Dutch had reconquered Bali peace never returned to the island." (Bakker 1993: 47) Dutch soldiers were combing ruthlessly the island for independence fighters and pro-nationalists to put them to death[238]. Hence, a historical reason for the strong commitment to nationalism among the modern elite is that Bali was made part of the *Negara Indonesia Timur*. (cf. Bakker 1993: 95, 96) In the anti-colonial upsurge from 1946 to 1949, the Balinese strived for independence from Dutch administration of which mostly the Dutch inaugurated elites profited. Enthusiastically Ida Bagus Dosther (Interview 2007) remembers "during the anti-colonial war, all class differences and power struggles between the *triwangsa* and the *jaba* clans faded and they united their forces against the Dutch!"

After the contracts of the Dutch-Indonesian roundtable in The Hague in December 1949, the Dutch government unwillingly transferred the sovereignty over the Dutch East Indies to the federation of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (*Republik Indonesia Serikat, RIS*). In August, 1950 the sovereign Unitary Republic of Indonesia was established and the Balinese were incorporated into Indonesian Nation State. In 1950, the *Dewan Radja-Radja* was disbanded and Anak Agung Bagus Suteja became governor of Bali. Gusti Bagus Oka was appointed vice-governor of the province of Sunda Kecil. The *Paruman Para Pinandita* continued its existence until 1959, when it was dissolved into the Hindu Council. (Bakker 1993: 47) The various forces which had emerged in Balinese society clashed over the direction Balinese identity, culture and religion should take. (Vickers 1989: 147) In 1958, Bali was made a province and the capital moved from Singaraja to Denpasar in 1960.

From 1945 to 1950, among the subjects taught in the Balinese village schools or people's schools was the *Taman Siswa* concept of moral and character building (*budhi pekerti*). But there was not any systematic approach of Hindu instruction. (Interview I Gede Sura 2006, 2008) In the 1940s, handpicked Balinese obtained grants to study in India, among them were the "fantastic three": Ida Bagus Mantra, Oka Puniatmaja, and Cok Rai Sudharta. (Interview Cok Rai Sudharta 2008)

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[238] Personal communication with PHDI representative at PHDI's yearly meeting 8.11.2007, I Nyoman Mayor. I asked the wherefores of his naming and he told me that after losing his father in the battle, he and his siblings had been hidden away from these units down in a ravine in a river. But because he was crying the major found them and returned them to a village. That's why he is named mayor. The story gave a elucidating picture of the circumstances leading to the national incorporation of Bali and answered my question why Balinese (new) elites are that nationalist, which mere protection could not explain, because they could argue for secession. The deeper reason might be that these generations are traumatized being integrated into the federal state after fighting the Dutch and Japanese.

Besides short-term visits of a few Indian scholars, one Indian intellectual, Prof Dr Narendra Dev Pandit Shastri settled permanently in Bali from 1948 onwards probably to do Hindu missionary work for the Arya Samaj (Interview I Gede Sura 2006, 2008; cf. Ramstedt 2004; Bakker 1993). He was the first and singular Indian cultural engineer in Bali who received financial support from the Indian government in order to build up Hinduism in Bali. He was the first to introduce Hinduism in a structured that is systematized and standardized way to the Balinese community. (Interview I Gede Sura 2006) For that reason, he brought a lot of books on teaching Sanskrit with him from India. (Interview I Gede Sura 2006)

Admittedly, Balinese read *lontar* before he arrived, but all these scriptures were not yet systematized. Influenced by Pandit Shastri's amongst other things, Balinese reformers decided to found the *Dwijendra* foundation in Denpasar, and Pandit Shastri was actively involved in teaching at the *Dwijendra* foundation and the Saraswati School. (Interview I Gede Sura 2006) Before Pandit Shastri arrived in Bali, Dr. Goris and other Dutch scholars taught Dutch and German language to Balinese ruling or educated elites, but they did not teach the peasants. He taught the community in school speaking Sanskrit and Old Javanese and reading Dewanagari script as well as Old Javanese for the first time, for the simple reason that these languages are the source of Indonesian Hindu religious scriptures and teaching. (Interview I Gede Sura 2006) Pandit Shastri introduced facing east while praying and he was the first to teach school children how to pray the *Tri Sandhya*. After his pioneer work the idea was born to establish a school to train teachers in Hindu religion with standardized, regulated and systematized teaching methods. (Interview I Gede Sura 2006)In the early 1950s, the political and religious situation contained several challenges to the Balinese (Yayasan 2003: 53):

1.) The society's knowledge of Hindu religion was severely limited, as became obvious during rituals and religious holidays
2.) From village to village, style and performances of rituals in Balinese Hindu communities were at variance with each other.
3.) Terminology and the name of the adhered to religion was at variance (*Agama Bali, Agama Shiva, Agama Tirtha; Agama Hindu Bali* and so forth)
4.) Since Balinese religion was not yet officially recognized, it played no role in the life of state, nation, and society and it was therefore not regulated and protected.
5.) In its function as state philosophy, *Pancasila* guaranteed every community the freedom to fully embrace their practiced religion, thus each *agama* community (*umat beragama*) or religious current (*aliran keagamaan*) enjoys freedom to be practiced and its adherents to give explanations to the community and to adherents to other religions.

Balinese reformers realized two challenges during the Sukarno regime, one challenge from outside Bali, which was related to the foundation of the Republic of Indonesia with the Ministry of Religion as main institution to administer religious affairs, and the other related directly with the social condition in Bali itself. (Yayasan 2003: 53) The first challenge faced was that each *agama* or *kepercayaan* was forced to unite under an organizing institution in order to facilitate internal communication and the exchange of information. Likewise, it had to establish and maintain communication and interaction pertaining to religion and belief with the republican government. The second challenge denoted the pressure from within Bali, as the Balinese spiritual organizations felt the necessity to provide the community with an overarching organization to develop the educational and cultural sector. (Yayasan 2003: 28) This meant practically, that the kings as patrons of Balinese rituals and social order were forced to organize communication with the Muslim republican government in Jakarta. In 1958, the self-government of the feudal kingdoms (*swapraja*) was abolished. In consequence, their role in ritual was diminished as their authority was transferred to the regional government. As a result, there was no spiritual institution any more to safeguard ritual and to protect and represent the Balinese community. Basically, this fact has been perceived as a threat to the continuation and reproduction of Hindu Dharma, and the Hindu Council has been founded in 1959. (Interview Ida Bagus Dosther 2007, Cok Sudharta 2008)

Oversimplified, Guided Democracy (1959-1965) triggered political polarization between feudalism and communism leading to radical politization and mobilization of the peasantry and women in Bali. The nation state attempted to redistribute resources via egalitarian new laws supported by the socialists and communists and opposed by the feudal elites. The feudal rulers, allies of the Indonesian National Party (PNI), and its mass organizations PETANI (*Persatuan Tani Indonesia*, Indonesian farmers' union) and *Tani Marhaen* opposed the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its mass organizations BTI (*Barisan Tani Indonesia*, Indonesian Farmers' Front), *Pemuda Rakyat* (The People's Youth) and GERWANI (*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia*, the Women's movement). (Parker 2004; Robinson 1995)

Political polarization over land issues and traditional social order carried increasingly class messages colored with morality. For example, the PKI's general anti-feudal-privileges-attitude and anti-*triwangsa* incitement mobilized the uneducated peasantry to organize in its mass organizations, and inflamed a sense of injustice and grievance. The traditional political and clerical Balinese elites perceived Communism and its political orientation and opposition to religion as a tremendous threat to Balinese religion, culture, and social order. Many Balinese, especially women, however, took enthusiastically part in the Communism movement. (Parker 2004; Robinson 1995) Throughout 1964 and 1965 there are newspaper reports of disputes over land distribution and sharecropping arrangements involving PKI and PNI members. (Parker 2004; Robinson 1995) In this context, the polarization between different groups in Balinese society took the form of a political struggle between Right and Left, "a fight in which the Left lost in the bloodiest of ways". (Vickers: 1989, 147)

The gendered aspect of the massacres, sophisticatedly elaborated by Parker (2004:76-77), supports the argument that the status-quo had to be preserved in 1965. As in fact since the proclamation of independence men and women were given equal status, many women were organizing themselves in the Communist Indonesian Women Movement (GERWANI*, Gerakan Wanita Indonesia*). In Bali, women are responsible for the ritual offerings, for rough labor, and bringing up the children. The GERWANI women put a real threat to the feudal gender model of patrilineal kinship displaying traditional male supremacy in "virilocal residence pattern and patrilineal inheritance of land" and women's usage as complimentary labor force, objects of sexual desires, modus of forging alliances, and mode of payment. (Parker 2004:76-77) Of course such a deviation from the social order could impossibly be tolerated. During the massacres many women were cruelly slaughtered, as the prominent place of women in the dead lists shows. In the aftermath, these women have been described as having "behaved like men". (Parker 2004:76-77) Parker states, "with the massacres men won the case". The visible and obvious concern of women today with "bread and butter issues", ,their extraordinarily apolitical conduct, and their husbands' "different interest in patrilineal family, political loyalty and status maintenance (and perhaps long-term security)" is striking. (Parker 2004: 72; cf. Robinson 1995: 266-270) The resulting apolitization of women, their political silence, and the abuse of female labor force reconfirmed the feudal role model, left power and wealth in male control thereby securing their patriarchal status-quo

Due to the importance of the massacres in 1965 and 1966 for the construction of a peaceful Hindu Balinese identity in contrast to the historical reality of wild savages, the events leading to the rise of the New Order will be discussed here in relation to Hindu identity construction and the religious class. The massacre was amongst the worst slaughter in the twentieth century, the total number killed is unknown, estimates range from 100,000 to one million victims in Indonesia. (Parker 2004: 75) Mass violence in Bali was largely preceded by violence in Java, as people "tried to sense where events in Jakarta were leading the country". (Parker 2004: 75 citing Cribb 1990 : 241; Ida Pedanda Bajing Interview 2007) Following the events on 30 September 1965, the Balinese elite and the population were alarmed and in a state of paralyzation because the traumatic events from 1942 to 1949 were still in the collective memory. Even more as Jakarta is far away, and Balinese governor Sutedja were reported missing in Jakarta. (Ida Pedanda Bajing, protocol 2007) The massacre in Bali was committed by external and internal perpetrators in about only two month from December 1965 until January 1966. Besides violence against members of the PKI, which broke out in Bali, it was particularly NU's youth organization *Ansor* that gained notoriety for its participation in the massive killings of Communists. (Ramstedt 2004: 15) The Army, especially the RPKAD units (Army Para Commando Regiments), vigilante Islamic youth-groups (*Ansor*) coming from Java and from Jembrana, local gangs (*tameng*) and PNI youth groups set out to extinguish whole neighborhoods of PKI members or sympathizers, killing an estimated 80,000-100,000 people in Bali. (Parker 2004: 75; Vickers 1989: 172)

The present study holds that the massacres were not an expression of Balinese culture reasserting its centuries' old traditions of religion, harmony, order, and social equilibrium, which was a colonial and elitist construction and actually never has existed. They were also unconnected to cultural traditions as that of *puputan* and of the renowned ferocity of Balinese front-line troops in the past, because they occurred in a perfectly distinct context. I endorse the view of Robinson (1995) in arguing that the massacres of 1965 were caused by rational human agency.

Military, party, and religious authorities in Bali actively shaped and encouraged a popular discourse of violent anticommunism based on existing religious ideas and cultural analogies. The fact that massive violence could somehow be justified or plausibly portrayed in terms of Balinese religious beliefs or cultural analogues undoubtedly contributed to the dynamics of the killings. But this should not be permitted to obscure the fact that the victimization and the physical annihilation of the PKI were *not* simply or even primarily the consequences of a spontaneous or natural religious impulse, but the products of political and historical processes in which human agency played a central part. (Robinson 1995: 279)

It is my hypothesis following the two hours interview with Ida Pedanda Bajing that the massacres were not incited by the high clerical or royal class, but more by certain agents, who aspired to increase their social position and expand their influence, dominance, and wealth[239]. Those agents effectively wrote and distributed death lists to extinguish their rivals out of personal, not religious motivation. Throughout the changing political regimes, the survival of the status quo of the Balinese social order was maintained, but concessions were successively made towards a more egalitarian organization. As example may be adduced that local *jero* were not involved in Banjar activities prior to 1965, yet, since then they take part in all Banjar assemblies.

As proposed by Lyn Parker, the massacre in Bali should be seen in two contexts. On the one hand, the preceding years of radical politization and popular mobilization under Sukarno were coupled with rising expectations among the landless and poor that the land reform would redress the economic inequalities and exploitation of the class system. (Parker 2004: 67) On the other hand it can be understood as reaction to the agonizing dual shift from feudalism to capitalism incorporation into the nation state. The murders were motivated by revenge on the PKI attacks on traditional power, outrage about the attempt to dismantle social hierarchy, and to settle wrongs perceived right. (Parker 2004: 67) On side of the PKI, the effort to disparage the image of the conservative local status-pro elite resulted in the accusation they would try to hinder the implementation of the land-reform to protect feudal traditions. In turn, this triggered the defensive stance of the local status-pro elites and their PNI supporters, who denied the grasping claims of '*wong cilik yang ambisi*' (ambitious little people) and implied that the PKI was anti-Hindu, anti-dharma (social order) and therefore destructive of the cosmic order. (Parker 2004: 74; Robinson 1995: 270) In consequence, the heated discourse was on archaic rights to land and opposition to feudal privileges. According to Parker, the exponents of the traditional social order became "emotional" (Parker 2004: 78) and as answer to the insubjugation of their opponents simply eradicated them. It can be argued that the massacres were the violent aspect of the transformation or incorporation from feudal Bali into the nation state.

Today, the justification of the 1965 massacres sounds that these crimes were not committed out of mere emotion, but that it was 'Balinese-ness' that had to be defended against social rupture and division, improper conflicts within society and the abandonment of religious devotion. (Parker 2004: 81-82) The PKI did not object Hinduism or religion *per se* but the established hierarchical social order, which legitimized the injustice of unequal access to wealth, power, and knowledge. In turn, opposition to traditionally vested power and wealth were seen as insubordination not as sacrilege. The massacres were seen as pollution of Balinese soil, but the pollution was due to the occurrence of murder and the shedding of blood, not to the PKI affiliation of the victims. The after-the-fact-rationalizations and psychological self-justification by the guilty pay tribute to religiosity, purity and cleanliness, to the rightness of the stratified society as already expressed in Vedic times, as well as to proper loyalties in, albeit transformed, *kaula-gusti* relations and of social and religious duties and obligations. (Parker 2004: 81-82) The rhetoric of cleansing, Parker continues, is most pertinent if examined as an effect rather than a motivation of the massacres. (Parker 2004: 82)

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[239] One of those agents was the leader of the Balinese PNI. His son declared himself to be the king of Majapahit in 2011 without having the legitimate ancestral lineage. This Napoleonic self inauguration incited protest from all palaces in Bali which held an assembly and do not accept this inauguration. The Hindu Council likewise does not support this action. As he has royal status now, he has been invited by the king of Thailand, and probably will participate in the next royal marriage in Europe. In the next step, he legitimated Sukmawati Sukarnoputri as queen of Majapahit after an mystical incident in the palace of Tampaksiring. Sukamawati has been given the Majapahit stick of a General to rule over the Majapahit kingdom. This provoked hysterical laughter from some of my Balinese colleagues who suppose that this would be a political move to position them as future governor team or probably even targeting for presidency. This is a splendid example how lineages that are relocated to the lower levels of power aim by traditional and organizational means to obtain a higher status in society. Asked about his opinion, the priest of the UNHI temple stated (Communication 11 2011):" A king without kingdom, bondsmen, influence, and realm. His home is his palace, bondmen, country alone!"

In conclusion, the murders in Bali occurred only two months after the generals' assassination in Jakarta and the heat of the moment was past, therefore the killings in Bali were an expression of class struggle inflected with the preservation of the traditional social hierarchy. The idea of the mass killings was facilitated, even normalized, by the predating violence in Java and legitimized by statements in the press and the activities of supra local political and military forces. (Parker 2004: 84)

Under the New Order then, as Lyn Parker impeaches, there was no talk of punishment, crime, justice or moral judgments upon murderers. These crimes could not be talked about, because murder is still murder, but those who committed such acts have to live with themselves and with the surviving family members of their victims. Murderers have resumed a normal life, having gone unpunished, and have been allowed to avoid public responsibility for their violence. (Parker 2004: 67) Only recently in 2005, Indonesians started to carry out a kind of *Aufarbeitung*.

The apolitization of the Indonesian public during the New Order is a well documented fact. Opposition was anything that threatened the unity of the nation or *Pancasila*. (Parker 2004: 99) The Indonesian Hindu Dharma Council engaged in issues of proper ritual performance and acted only in the field of individual spirituality. The overweight importance given to harmony, tolerance and peace in the construction of the post-1966 Balinese identity, as a harmonic and peaceful one, has to be interpreted as aftermath of that never '*aufgearbeitete*' trauma. The coronation of the *Tri Hita Karana* –concept has to be seen in the same light. This casts a slur on the recent introduction of the new tourism-branding *shantishantishanti.*

5.3. Hindu Dharma Indonesia: Modern Institutions and Meta-framework

Part D presents the historical and ethnographic description of the cases studied.

5.3.1. Fireworshippers or ahl al-kitab?

This chapter describes the drawn out and tedious process of institutionalization, *Agama* Hindu underwent, until it been was recognized as a state funded *agama* with at the central MORA. Established in 1946, the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) had three sections, one for Muslims, one for Catholics, and one for Protestants, but there was no section for Hinduism. Balinese religion was thus not officially acknowledged in the young republic. In accordance with its definition of *agama*, MORA initially recognized Islam, The existence of *Agama* Hindu Bali was not automatically recognized, as it was not considered to be a book-religion. The administrative recognition process of *Agama* Hindu began in 1950 and was only completed between 1964 and 1967. Picard (2004: 56-57) gives a moving synopsis:

> Stressing the theological importance as well as the moral implications of religion, the Balinese reformers attempted to restrain the ritualistic propensity of their co-religionists, while interpreting their Hindu-Javanese heritage in reference to Islamic (and Christian) doctrines and institutions. They enjoined the Balinese to come back into the fold of Hinduism, which they presented as the source of their rites, by renewing their contacts with India, whose freshly acquired independence had increased its international prestige. This combination of political lobbying and religious reformism was to prove efficient, as the Balinese religion was indeed eventually recognized as a legitimate branch of Hinduism.

From August 1950 onwards, a number of Balinese reformist organizations put tirelessly pressure on the MORA. They called for the recognition of *Agama Hindu Bali*. Several proponents of the ruling elite and members of the reform organizations - all with distinct educational and social backgrounds - gathered spontaneously and irregularly in Denpasar and Singaraja. During those meetings, they discussed their thoughts and ideas and identified strategies how to face the phenomena of ongoing political and radical social change. During this time, they forgot about the class conflict between *triwangsa* and *jabawangsa* (Ida Bagus Dosther Interview 2007; Yayasan 2003, 2005). In consequence, during those meetings they developed strategies how to introduce good relations with the independent central government and the MORA in Jakarta, in "Muslim Java".

On December 28, 1950, a delegation from the Ministry of Religion officially visited the Council of the Bali-region Administration (*Dewan Pemerintahan Daerah Bali*). The delegation inquired into the state of faith affairs on Bali and the difficulties the Balinese congregation faced in connection with religious affairs. The delegation met with I Gusti Sugriwa, member of the Council.

Sugriwa showed the delegation that in the past the princes of Bali had been responsible for the rituals (…). Now that the *Dewan Pemerintah Bali* had assumed the position of the princes, the council was responsible und thus needed financial support from the central government in order to be able to fulfil its responsibility. Sugriwa hat three more requests: support for translating into Indonesian the Old Javanese literature still used on Bali: a contribution to the costs incurred by the *pedandas*; representation of the Balinese religion in the capital of Indonesia, in every province and in every *kabupaten*[240]. Only the first of those requests – a contribution to translation costs - was granted. (Bakker 1993: 226)

In addition, the delegation inquired into the official name of the religion, the contents of its philosophy, its views on God, the style of worship, the sanctuaries, religious schools, and finally if there were a sacred scriptures. I Gusti Bagus Sugriwa answered all questions exhaustibly – "but the delegation was not convinced that the religion of Bali deserved recognition" in the young republic. (Bakker 1993: 226; Yayasan 2003: 2005) "The Balinese were quick to realize that a satisfactory answer to these questions was essential." (Bakker 1993: 226) Soon this discussion became popular in the Balinese community and Sugriwa's claims got strong civil support from Balinese Hindu organizations.

In the meeting between Sugriwa and the delegation of MORA, it became clear "that there could be no recognition of the religion of Bali without knowledge of its official name, its holy book, its festivals, and its philosophy". (Bakker 1993: 227) In consequence, members of Hindu organizations met in Denpasar on June 10, 1951. (Yayasan 2003; 2005; Bakker 1993: 226-227; Sudharta 2006) Those organizations were *Panti Agama Hindu Bali*(represented by Ida Pedanda Gde Ngenjung), *Majelis Hinduisme* (represented by I Gusti Ngurah Ananda Kusuma (Sri Resi Anandakusuma) and Ida Bagus Raka), *Paruman Para Pandita* (represented by Ida Pedanda Made Kemenuh) and *Wiwadha Shastra Sabha* (represented by Ida Bagus Raka Keniten. After intense deliberations, they developed a joint declaration. The joint declaration in form of a written petition was submitted to Minister of Religion Hasyim (Yayasan 2003; 2005), the Hindu members of the national parliament, and the governor of the province Sunda Kecil. (Bakker 1993: 227) The petition requested (Yayasan 2003; 2005):

1. Establishment of a Hindu Bali representative body and Hindu representatives in the organizational structure of the MORA on national, provincial, and regional level.
2. Setting up of a special committee, which is paid by the central government, whose task it is to compile *Agama* Hindu Bali text books that can be used in elementary and secondary schooling
3. Regulation of a salary package of assigned professional high priests (*pendeta*), lay priests (*pemangku*), and a budget for the maintenance of temples following a previous regulation in 1948 which applied to village heads (*penghulu*).
4. Payment of annual subsidies and one-off payments to set up a fund for the restoration and maintenance of important temples, to develop Balinese art and the cultural field.

On August 23, 1951 the Ministry denied the petition. In consequence, the Balinese reformers continued to exercise civil pressure on the government to recognize *Agama* Hindu Bali. As reaction to the denial of the petition, a strong movement emerged which sought the official recognition of Hinduism as state-funded religion.

In compliance with the H-Regulation, the MORA established branch offices throughout Indonesia with the target to disseminate the proper understanding of *agama* and *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* among the population. Muslim *dakwah* and Christian missionaries were encouraged to spread modern *agama* throughout Indonesia, to convert the groups that did not have an *agama* yet, and to rationalize backward practices of *adat*. (Picard 2004: 56-57; Ramstedt 2004: 9) This was also the case in Bali. Therefore the Balinese were alarmed as they were made target of the open and hidden Muslim and Christian proselytizing efforts. During colonial times, the Dutch limited proselytizing on Bali, and now for the first time since Dang Hyang *Dwijendra* arrived in Bali, the doors were wide opened for proselytizing – a situation of which the Balinese community did not approve.

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[240] In 2007, this call for representational bodies at all administrative levels of the MORA in Indonesia still retains actuality, as at some kabupaten, and even provinces, there is no representational body within the structure of the MORA. The Hindu Council executes the Hindu Directorate's function at those districts and provinces.

Minister of Religion Decree 40 in 1952 established a Central Religion Office (*kantor pusat jawatan agama*) in Singaraja, which was able to open up branches throughout the Balinese kingdoms (that were to become regencies after 1958). Its structure was conformed to MORA, because it accommodated only Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism. Its assigned tasks were elucidation, dissemination, information in matters of religion and culture.

To prevent the relentless march in of Islam and Christianity, Balinese reformed their religion in order to make it eligible for the status of *agama*. Albeit the 1945 Basic Law and the 1950 Constitution guaranteed the freedom of religion and its public practice, the Muslim-controlled MORA severely restricted the interpretation of freedom of religion during Hasyim's term of office. In 1952, it established a catalogue of criteria, which a religion had to have, in order to be recognized as *agama* and receive state-funding (Yayasan 2003; 2005):

1. a sacred book (*kitab suci*);
2. a monotheistic substructure, that is teach belief in the existence of One Supreme Lordship;
3. a codified law system for its followers that is exclusive boundaries;
4. a prophet (*nabi*),
5. international recognition,
6. the congregation must not be limited to a single ethnic group, that is transcends ethnic boundaries and not being essentially an aspect of a hereditary culture

This catalogue of provisions reveals unequivocally that the Muslim-controlled MORA applied a modernist Islamic understanding and ascribed this understanding to their definition of *agama*. This interpretationobviouslypromptedthe ministryto takeits negative attitude against *Agama* Hindu Bali, because the MORA came to the conclusion that under a thin varnish of Hindu and Buddhist concepts, Balinese religious life predominantly consisted of heterogeneous local animist and polytheistic practices. (Ramstedt 2004: 10)

According to IB Dosther (Interview 2007), the major point of critique which substantiated MORA's denial to recognize *Agama* Hindu Bali was 1.) the unclear naming of the religious practices, because the Balinese reform organizations could not agree on a common name (*Agama* Tirtha, *Agama* Hindu Bali, Hindu Dharma). Minor points of critique were 1.) the religion did not have a founder or prophet, 2.) it did not have international recognition, and 3.) it was not distributed in more than one ethnic group.

Geertz (1973: 188) gives a vivid description of the problems Balinese faced while dealing with this catalogue. The description is quoted in full length and to some extend it is still actual despite Hinduism became a state funded religion in 1963.

> The Muslims say that the adherents of Balinese Hinduism are all in one place, unlike the Christians who are scattered all over Indonesia; the Balinese point out that there are Balinese communities in Djakarta and elsewhere in Java, as well as in south Sumatra (transmigrants), and instance the recent erection of Balinese temples in east Java. The Muslims say, you have no Book, how can you be a world religion? The Balinese reply, we have manuscripts and inscriptions dating from before Mohammed. The Muslims say, you believe in many gods and worship stones; the Balinese say, God is One but has many names and the "stone" is the vehicle of God, not God himself. A few of the more sophisticated Balinese even claim that the real reason why the Muslims are unwilling to admit them to the Ministry is the fear that if "Bali-ism" were to become an officially recognized religion, many Javanese, who are Islamic in name only and still very Hindu-Buddhist in spirit, would convert, and "Bali-ism" would grow rapidly at the expense of Islam.

On February, 14 1953, the General Secretary of the MORA held a meeting with the Council of the Government of the Bali-Region and the Governor of Lesser Sunda Islands Province in his official residence in Singaraja[241]. To the annoyance of the Balinese elite, the General Secretary of the MORA still continued the colonial legacy of the 'H- regulation'.

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[241] From 1950 to 1958, the islands of Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores, West-Timor and Sumba formed the province *Sunda Kecil* (Lesser Sunda Islands). The capital was Singaraja in North Bali. In 1958, Bali was made a autonomous province, and in 1960 the capital moved to Denpasar.

This regulation governed that with the exception of Islam and Christianity, all belief system were to be classified as group H, which turned them into a battle ground for Christian proselytizing and Islamic *dakwah*. Deeply shocked and frightened, the local government of Bali unilaterally proclaimed the island as an autonomous area pertaining to affairs of religion. On March, 24 1953 the Council of the Government of the Bali-Region met and adopted DPRDS Decree Nr. 2/S.K./DPRDS/1953 on the Agreement to form an Autonomous Bureau of Religion for the Bali Region (*jawatan agama otonoom daerah bali*).

In order to comply with the criteria outlined by MORA, several officials appointed to the Central Religion Office of the Lesser Sunda Islands Province, held a meeting with concerned officials from the *Dewan Pemerintahan Daerah Bali* and members of the religious organizations in Tampaksiring on May 25, 1953[242]. "This was the first so-called *Pesamuhan Agung*, where prominent Balinese discussed accommodations to be made in rituals (…) and how they should one more apply for government recognition." (Bakker 1993: 228) They reached agreement in subsequent crucial points (1) the proper name of the religion is *Agama* Hindu Bali, (2) its sacred scriptures are the Vedas (*Shruti*), the quatrology of Divine revelation (*wahyu*), and *Smriti* (tradition) as its exegetical textual corpus, (3) the profession of faith, which resembles the Islamic *shahada*, is the compounded *Om Tat Sat, Ekam Eva Adwityam Brahman.*[243] "For Sugriwa the importance of the meeting lay in the fact that it represented the first feelings of unity among the participants." (Bakker 1993: 228)

The Balinese religious reform organizations agreed to turn to India and to renew their contacts with Indian scholars to arrive at a common redefinition of their religious philosophy and practices along the lines of the criteria outlined by MORA. A few Balinese were taking advantages of scholarships of the Indian government at R. Tagore's Vishva Bharaty University and the Banaras Hindu University. (Sudharta Interview 2008; Bakker 1993: 227; Ramstedt 2004: 11) The three most meritorious Balinese to study in India were Ida Bagus Mantra, Ida Bagus Oka Puniatmaja, and Cokorda Rai Sudharta, which I call the "fantastic three", as their thoughts and decisions came to shape Indonesian Hindu Dharma until today.

The Indian Arya Damaj missionary Pandit Shastri settled permanently in Bali and some other Indian scholars were placed temporarily in Bali. (Sura Interview 2006, Bakker 1993: 227) Pandit Shastri, who brought many books with him, wrote the book "Essence of Hindu Dharma" (*Intisari Hindu Dharma),* in which the complete philosophical framework of Hindu Dharma was outlined. (Ramstedt 2004: 11) The heavy weight put on the importance of the *Bhagavad Gita* (previously unknown to the Balinese) should be seen in connection to the Theosophical Society, which considers the *Gita* as most important book of Hinduism. (Ramstedt 2004: 11) The leaders of the several religious reform organizations agreed to this basic framework in 1958, among them the graduates from India, who compiled the Upadeca in 1963.

A second resolution was drafted on June 14 1954[244]. It called for the establishment of a Hindu-Bali unit within MORA on the grounds that *Agama* Hindu Bali was not in conflict with the first principle of the *Pancasila*, since its creed is essentially rooted in the Sanskrit mantra "*Ekam Eva Adwityam Brahman*". (Ramstedt 2004:11) The Balinese term for this "Undivided One" equivalent to the Indonesian One Supreme Lordship (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*) was to be *Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa.* (Ramstedt 2004: 11) Protestant missionaries used this term for the translations of "God" in the Bible the 1930s.

On November, 1 1954, the Balinese regional government (*DewanPemerintahan Daerah Bali*) finally was able to implement the 1953 Decree and to establish an Autonomous Bureau of Religion for the Bali Region (*Kantor Dinas Urusan Agama Otonom)* for Balinese citizens and adherents to Hinduism. Here everyone could apply for help concerning questions pertaining to the *agama* Hindu. (Bakker 1993: 228) After succeeding to establish this body, the Balinese Hindu community relaxed, but continuously exercised pressure on the central government and the MORA to provide the Hindu community with a suitable body to represent their faith in the Ministry (Yayasan 2003, 2005).

In order to realize their claims, representatives of eight Hindu-based organizations held a conference in Denpasar on June 26, 1958. (Yayasan 2003, 2005; Bakker 1993: 229)

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[242] Bakker (1993: 228) mentions Denpasar.

[243] "Om, thus is the essence of the undivided One". The Balinese formula would be *Sangkan Paraning Sarat*. (Upadeca 1967: 15; Ramstedt 2004:11; Sudharta 2006: 26)

[244] Bakker (1993: 229) dates this resolution on June 26 1958. Probably, the resolution has been drafted in 1954 and renewed in 1958, prior to being presented to President Sukarno.

These organizations were *Panti Agama Hindu Bali* (represented by I Ketut Kandia), *Majelis Hinduisme* (represented by Ida Bagus Tugur), *Paruman Para Pandita* (represented by Ida Pedanda Made Kemenuh), *Satya Hindu Dharma* (I Gusti Ananda Kusuma), *Yayasan Dwijendra* (Ida Bagus Wayan Gede), *Partai Nasional Agama Hindu Bali* (Ida I Dewa Agung Oka Geg), *Angkatan Muda Hindu Bali* (Ida Bagus Dosther) and*Eka Adnyana Dharma Sempidi* (Ida Bagus Gede Manuaba). During the conference, they consented to adopt a resolution. It stated that:

- the Balinese will exercise constant pressure on the government to establish an *Agama* Hindu Bali section at MORA, which enjoys the same organizational level as all other religions
- the Balinese call for the amendment of Minister of Religion DecreeNr 9 in 1952 (H-regulation) to include *Agama* Hindu Bali as religion in part III
- The government of the Bali region constantly upholds the Independent Religion Office for the Bali Region (*Kantor Dinas Urusan Agama Otonom)*

The resolution was submitted to the central government. It was sent to the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Religion, the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Chairman of the Parliament, the Chairman of the National Assembly, the Central Warfare Commissioner, the Warfare Commissioner of the Region INusa Tenggara, the Chairman of the Bali region, the Chairman of the local parliament, to ethnic-Balinese members of the national parliament, and the National Assembly. (Yayasan 2003, 2005)

On June 29 1958, I Gusti Putu Metha, Chairman of the Balinese parliament (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Peralihan Bali*) accompanied five delegates representing religious and social organizations, Ida Pedanda Made Kemenuh, I Gusti Ananda Kusuma (Sri Resi Anandakusuma), Ida Bagus Wayan Gede, Ida Bagus Dosther and I Ketut Kandia to meet President Sukarno at his palace in Tampaksiring. Sukarno himself was influenced by Theosophy and the thoughts of Rabindranath Tagore. He appreciated the Bhagavad Gita, which he regarded as gospel of action (Bakker 1993: 229), and he represented contextual Islam, since he had always combined various ideologies and systems of thought in a typically Javanese manner. The institutionalization of the *Pancasila* and its Buddhist background displays that fact exemplarily. (Ramstedt 2004) Apparently he hesitated to recognize *Agama* Hindu Bali, as he did not want to further alienate the loyal representatives of political Islam in the Ministry during the 1950s. (Ramstedt 2004)

Those Hindu delegates called for the recognition of *Agama* Hindu Bali and the establishment of a representative unit of Hindu religion at MORA. Following the 1954 resolution's line of thought, they argued that the religion was compatible with the first principle of the nation, *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*, because "there is only one God - there is no second (*Ekam Eva Adwityam Brahman*). (Upadeca 1967: 15; Bakker 1993: 229) "In other words, *agama Hindu Bali* is not polytheistic". (Bakker 1993: 229) Eventually supported by Sukarno after an eight years lasting struggle with the officials at the Ministry from 1950 to 1958, the reforms of the Hindu-Balinese tradition were received favorably at MORA in Jakarta. On September 5 1958, a division for *Agama* Hindu Bali was established at the regional office of religion in Singaraja. I Gusti Gede Raka was appointed director. "Now that the recognition of Balinese religion had become a reality (…), the *Parisada* Dharma Hindu Bali was to play a central part, its activities extending over three areas: the rituals, education, and the organizing of Hindus in Indonesia." (Bakker 1993: 232)

On August 14 1958, the province Bali has been established. In the past, the kings were the dharma-guarding authority in their function as *guru wisesa*, they were the guardians and leaders of the temples, religious community, religious rituals and *adat*. As the *Dewan Raja-Raja* and the *Dewan Pemerintahan Daerah Bali* (*swapraja*) had been disbanded in 1958, there was no institution responsible for religion and the rituals. "(…) the task of the government is limited to creating space and facilities for the religions of Indonesia and does not include active participation in the rituals". (Sr Resi Anandakusuma in Bakker 1993: 59) A modern organization, Hindu-based in outlook, had to replace this royal function. In consequence, the idea was born to set up a Hindu Bali Council (*ParisadaHindu Bali)*[245]. We may assess a drastic secularization process in the late 1950s – note the increasing influence of the PKI in Indonesia at that time.

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[245] In 1959, the Council was named Parisada Dharma Hindu Bali. In 1964, the name was changed into Parisada Hindu Dharma for political reasons, to "safe the Hindu brethren outside Bali" (Sudharta Interview 2008). From 1959 to 1986 its central office was located in the Ratna Street in Denpasar. In 1986, it was renamed into Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia.

5.3.2. Directorate General[246] for Hindu and Buddhist congregations

In the period from 1946 to 1958, Hinduism and Buddhism (for Buddhism only in 1967) had no representative body in the organizational structure of the MORA in the capital Jakarta. Bali was integrated into the Lesser Sunda Islands province comprising Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores, Timor and the girdling islands with its capital located in Singaraja. The Regional Office of Religion had only sections for Islam and Christianity, but no section for *Agama* Hindu Bali. Moreover, the Balinese were declared as target for Christian and Muslim proselytizing for the first time since 1550. The Balinese were outraged as they had been classified as people without religion. During their incorporation into the Dutch established *Negara Indonesia Timur*, their religion had been recognized, and the Kings' Council and the Priests' Council were responsible for the development of the religion. In order to prevent the march in of Muslim and Christian missionaries sponsored by the Regional Office of Religion, the Balinese had set up an Autonomous Bureau of Religion for the Bali Region to represent the community and to struggle for the approval of their religious practices. The table shows the acknowledgement process and the institutionalization of Hindu Dharma Indonesia at MORA.

Jakarta/Yogyakarta (1946-1950): Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) Established in 1946 in Jakarta	Bali (1938-1959): Paruman Pinandita (Council of Hindu Priests)
Bali (Province Sunda Kecil) Regional branch office *(kantor jawatan agama)* of the MORA in Singaraja and the regencies established in 1950, Islamic/Christian mission In 1960, move of the capital from Singaraja to Denpasar	Bali (Province Sunda Kecil) Autonomous Bureau of Religion for the Bali Region *(jawatan agama otonoom daerah bali)* established from 1952-1966 *Agama* Hindu Bali had the status of '*aliran kepercayan*', people who do not yet have a religion
	Bali (Province Bali established 14.08.1958) Traditional function of Kings' Council and Priests' Council abolished Hindu Bali Affairs Unit at the regional branch office of religion in Singaraja/Denpasar established from 1958-1961 (I do not know when the Kantor Wilayah *Agama* was opened in Denpasar) Unit head: I Gusti Gde Raka
MORA/Jakarta: 1961-1963 a Hindu Bali Affairs Section was established in Section J at the central MORA	Unit head I Gede Pudja
MORA/Jakarta 1964-1967 *Agama* Hindu Bali Affairs Bureau	Unit head I Gede Pudja
1967-1969 Directorate General for the Guidance of Hindu Bali/ Buddhist Congregations	Director General IB P Mastra (1967-1970)
1969-2001 Directorate General for the Guidance of Hindu and Buddhist Congregations (as other ethnic groups joined into the fold of *Agama* Hindu, the Directorate was renamed from Hindu Bali to Hindu. The Hindu Bali Council (*Parisada* Hindu Bali) was renamed into *Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia* in 1986. Interestingly the Directorate does not use the term Dharma)	Director General I Gede Pudja MA (1970-1985) Director General I Gusti Agung Gede Putra (1985-1994) Director General I Ketut Pasek (1994-1997) Director General I Wayan Gunawan (1997-2001)
2001-2006 Directorate General for the Guidance of Hindu and Buddhist Congregations	Director General I Wayan Suarjaya (2001-2006)
2006-2009 Directorate General for the Guidance of the Hindu Congregation	Director General Prof. Dr. IB Gde Yudha Triguna

Following those developments, *Agama* Hindu Bali gained some semi-official recognition, when Suharto approved of the delegates' call for having a Hindu section introduced into the structure of the Ministry, and the Hindu Bali Affairs Section (*Bagian Urusan Hindu Bali)* was established at the Regional Office of Religion in Singaraja in 1958. To comply with regulation H and to take concerted actions, the formation session of a Hindu Council were held in December 1958 and February 1959. Headed by Ida Pedanda Gde Jelantik and Putu Serangan, the Hindu Bali Affairs Unit extended its influence until Sulawesi by including the Aluktodolo and Toraja ethnic groups into their administration, thus Hinduism were not longer restricted to one ethic group.

The controversies between Sukarno and political Islam were drastically resolved in 1959, when Sukarno proposed to return to the 1945 Constitution and proclaimed Guided Democracy. In consequence, the weakening impact of political Islam after 1959 had facilitated the full recognition of *Agama* Hindu Bali from 1961 to 1964, when Minister of Religion Decree 40 in 1960 set the stage for the formation of a Hindu Bali Affairs Section in Section J at the central MORA in Jakarta.

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[246] Note, Directorat Jenderal is translated as Directorate General, since General (Jenderal) refers to a rank and not to general as adjective (umum). The chapter is drawn from Departemen Agama: 1997/1998, 2003/2004, 2006.

In 1961, as KH M Wahib Wahab was appointed Minister, he passed Minister of Religion Decrees 86 and 87 in 1961, which accommodated a Hindu Bali Affairs Section into 'Section J' in the central Ministry in Jakarta. I Gede Puja was appointed Head of Section J in the central Ministry. (Bakker 1993: 102) In 1956, on the advice of Pandit Shastri Gede Puja departed to India in order to study Indian philosophy, religion, architecture and arts at the Indology College of the Banaras Hindu University in Varanasi. (Bakker 1993: 102) In India, Puja's companions were Ida Bagus Oka Puniatmadja and Cokorda Rai Sudharta. (Bakker 1993: 102) Ida Bagus Mantra has studied in India as well, but at another University. Only in 1964[247], the Hindu Bali Affairs Bureau was officially set up. In consequence, the first political development steering the recognition of *Agama* Hindu Bali was the return to the 1945 Basic Law and the proclamation of Guided Democracy, which put a sudden end to political Islam in 1959.

In accordance with the Departments catalogue of criteria, the final recognition was based on following reasoning: 1.) the Balinese religion was indeed Hindu, and 2.) Hinduism was monotheistic. During Wahab's term, the government paid considerable attention to *Agama* Hindu Bali, and national holidays were introduced in Bali and Lombok at certain Hindu holy days (*Saraswati, Galungan,Kuningan,* and *Pagerwesi*). Minister of Religion Decree 96 in 1961 regulated the national holidays for the region Bali and for Balinese Hindus, who settle outside Bali. The following table shows how the rationalized and systematized *Agama* Hindu Bali met with the MORA's catalogue of criteria:

	1952 Regulation	**Codified and systematized *Hindu Dharma Indonesia***
1.	Monotheism (*tawhid*)	Monotheistic One Supreme Lordship: *Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa* (Bali)
2.	Religious law and social order (*syari'ah, fiqh*)	Religious Law *Manawa Dharmasastra, Nithi Sastra (India) Adat, Dresta, Awig2* (Bali)
3.	Sacred, revealed scripture (Quran)	Vedas, *Dharmasastras*, Upanishads, Bhagavad Gita (India) *Sarasamuccaya; Sanghyang Kamahyanikam* (Oldjavanese) Balinese *Lontar*
5.	Prophet and Sages (*nabi*, Arabic)	*Rishis* (India) *Maharesi, Empu, Bhagawan* (Java - Bali)
6.	Places of worship/ sanctuaries	Temples, nation- and island wide classified system of temples (Pura; Padmasana; Pelinggih: Bali)
7.	Pilgrimage (hajj)	*Tirtha Yatra*
8.	Religious service (*sholat*)	*Panca Yadnya* (five ritual types); *Tri-Sandhya* (three times a day prayer designed in 1952, Gayatri Mantra, hitherto unknown to the Balinese), *Pancah Sembah* (fivefold prayer using flowers)
9.	Officials (*Ulama, Kiayi*)	Professional High priests and lay priests (*Sulinggih, Pinandita, Pemangku*),
10.	International recognition	Hinduism is internationally recognized as world religion Unclear naming: *Agama* Hindu (IB Dosther)
11.	Followers are not limited to an single ethnic community	Several ethno-cultural communities also joined into the fold of Hindu Dharma Indonesia (Balinese, Javanese, Tenggerese, Toraja, Alok To Dolo, Karo Batak, Ngaju, Dayak et al.)

1964 seems to be the year of the administrative recognition of *Agama* Hindu Bali, as Minister of Religion Instruction 47/1963 (II, §12) stipulated the establishment of an *Agama* Hindu Bali Affairs Bureauat the central MORA, which has been realized in 1964. The Bureau comprised three units: General unit, education unit, and information unit. In 1964, the *Parisada* changed its name from *ParisadaHindu Bali* into *Parisada Hindu Indonesia*. (Sudharta 2006) The full legal recognition of Indonesian Hindu Dharma was only one year later, when Sukarno passed Act 1/1965 on the Desecration of Religion, in which six *agama*, among them *Agama* Hindu and *Agama* Buddha, were mentioned.

[247] According to Bakker (1993: 102), in addition to the Hindu Unit, a separate section for Buddhism was established in 1963. The Year Books of the MORA, however, mention the year 1967. Bakker (1993: 102) and the Year Books of the MORA state the Hindu Bali Section was established in Jakarta in 1961.

In my view, the final official recognition of Indonesian Hindu Dharma by Sukarno and the equality in administration – however, influenced by discriminative practices – by Suharto has to be unambiguously brought in relation to the contemporaneous political tension between Communists and Islam, and thus with Suharto's rise to power, because the Suharto regime aggregated and utilized all aspirations and groups in society to consolidate its base for power in the late 1960s and during the 1970s. In consequence, as sadly as it is, the recognition of Hindu Dharma Indonesia and several of its harmony and peace supporting concepts should be brought in relation with the mass killings in 1965-1966. Only after the violent takeover of the Suharto regime, a Directorate General for the Guidance of Hindu Bali/Buddhist congregation equal in status to the Christian and Islamic Directorates has been established at the MORA. This Directorate, however, never received funding comparable to the other Departments.

In 1966, the *Agama* Hindu Bali Affairs Bureau was restructured into a Directorate General for the Guidance of Hindu Bali/Buddhist Congregations by Presidential (!) Decree 170/1966 – thereby eventually achieving the same status as the Islamic and Christian Directorates. However, as the Hindu congregation and the Buddhist congregation were lumped into one Directorate with one and the same minimalist budget, one finds the normative equality of religion in Indonesia betrayed by practices within the Muslim-controlled MORA.

Minister of Religion Instruction 56/1967 regulated the organizational structure of the Directorate General for the Guidance of Hindu Bali/ Buddhist Congregations. It consisted of three sections:

1.) General Unit of Hindu/Buddhist Affairs, responsible for *aliran* (currents), religious organizations, pilgrimage affairs (*tirtha yatra*), sanctuaries, weddings and training of clerics.
2.) Hindu/Buddhist Affairs Education Unit, responsible for educators and experts training, guidance and counseling in education, and development of tertiary institutions.
3.) The Hindu/Buddhist Affairs Information Unit, in charge to subsidize, guide and supervise private and state Hindu/Buddhist education institutes, to translate, interpret and supervise Hindu scriptures and books, and nurture in *Pancasila* doctrine.

In 1966, the Ministry was renamed to Department of Religion (*Departemen Agama*)[248], the first appointed Minister was KM KH Mohamad Dahlan (1967-1973). It may be assessed, since all decrees pertaining to the organizational structure of the MORA were passed by the President Suharto, religion had become a matter of the boss. During the early years of the Suharto regime, a strong pluralist aspect was introduced. This perspective found its expression in the exhaustive inter-faith harmony (*kerukunan hidup beragama* or *kerukunan agama*) legislation aiming to contribute to national stability, unity, and integration, which is still maintained and developed during contemporary Indonesian democracy. Religion was to be reformed and modernized by abnegating both fundamentalism and primitive superstition as represented in *adat* traditions. (Parker 2004: 246)

When the co-existence of all recognized religious communities is based on inter-faith harmony (*kerukunan hidup beragama*), religion was understood as playing an important part in creating a prosperous, stable and modern Indonesian society. Modern education and religious classes were seen to balance the promotion of religion and the revitalization of useful traditional values. These traditional values were no longer identified with *adat*, but with local culture (*budaya*). The ensuing folklorization of local ethnic traditions in turn provided the capital for cultural tourism and thereby contributed to the economic development of the whole country. (Ramstedt 2004:17)

In the beginning of the New Order era, there were debates on the Jakarta Charter and strong Christian opposition to the MORA, the debates faded and the Suharto Regime never decided to dissolve it. In 1966, communism was banned. The *Pancasila* was implemented as supreme base of jurisdiction. Ethno-religious communities without religion were under the suspicion of being atheists. As atheists, they could be Communists, and therefore they lived in mortal danger. As result, the official promotion of religion on basis of reinforced religious tolerance[249] forced the population without religion to seek affiliation with a proper *agama*.

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[248] In 2010, the Department of Religion again was renamed into *Kementrian Agama,* thus I consistently use the acronym MORA.

[249] During the Suharto regime, the principle of believe in One Supreme Lordship coexists with three other basic principles: 1.) the freedom to embrace religion; 2.) the responsibility to develop an attitude of respect towards those, who embrace another religion; and 3.) the recognition of a link between society and God. The accommodation of those four principles was called tolerance in school books, in teachers' oral teaching, and in general social conversation. Almost invariably, tolerance was associated with religious tolerance. The

In consequence, all *agama* congregations increased in size, including the Hindu community. In Java, many million followers of *kebatinan* and *kejaven* were classified as Muslims, and they are counted as Muslims until today.

From 1967 to 1970, The Directorate General for Guidance of the Hindu Bali and Buddhist Congregation pioneered the introduction of Hinduism and Buddhism into society and education in those religions. Presidential Decree 56/1969 fully acknowledged Hindu Dharma as sponsored religion by establishing the Directorate General for the Guidance of Hindu and Buddhist Congregation. In 1967, Ida Bagus Putu Mastra, was appointed Director General of the Directorate, and I Gede Pudja remained responsible for the Hindu subdivision. As the Suharto regime attempted to integrate and use all aspirations of all societal groups, during Mastra's term (1967-1970), the organizational structure was adjusted to real needs of the Hindu congregation as shown in the increase of the number of employees at the Directorate. Mastra defined the function of the Director General as formulator, operator/manager, and supervisor of technical policies in guiding and empowering the Hindu community. In cooperation with the Hindu Council, he bought land for the establishment of schools, and his efforts in the educational sector were successful.

During Gede Pudja's third term[250] (1970-1985), the Directorate witnessed a fast development, and an incredible amount of Indian and Old Javanese scriptures focusing on Hindu Law were translated and compiled, as the Catur Vedas, the Law of Manu, the *Sarasamuccaya, Silakrama, Upadeca*. (cf. Bakker 1993) Pudja may be named the king of Hindu publishing or the chief poet of modern Hinduism. Gede Pudja laid great emphasis on education. During his time in office, he was closely involved in the development of educational programs for various types of Hindu religious education or for subjects directly related to it, especially those subjects in which he himself was an expert. He composed various text books for education in Hinduism and also several subjects directly related to Hindu religious education. (Bakker 1993: 142)

In relation to this, and as a result of national development policies, the number of educators at the teacher training colleges was increased, many text books were compiled for elementary to secondary education and for the teacher training colleges, printed, and distributed. The first curriculum for the teacher training colleges was also provided. (cf. Bakker 1993: 142 -144 for a detailed discussion) In 1968, the Directorate nationalized the *Dwijendra* teacher training college in Denpasar and established one Hindu-based Educator Training School in Singaraja and in Mataram, Lombok. Then those colleges were nationalized and renamed into State Hindu Educator Training Colleges in 1973. During the 1970s, private *Agama* Hindu-based Educator Schools were established in Java (Blitar, Klaten, Boyolali), Sumatra (Lampung), Central Kalimantan (Palangkaraya) and Bali (Negara, Amlapura, Tabanan, Bangli). The graduates were employed as Hindu educators at the elementary level throughout Indonesia. During this period several Indian Hindu scriptures were translated into Indonesian and were distributed free of charge throughout Indonesia. It is noteworthy in this context, that there are no translations into Balinese, pointing to a deep commitment to the adherence to the *Pancasila* state.

> (…) Pudja was a major influence on developments in Indonesian Hindu religious education, so it would not come as a surprise to find that many people involved in Hindu religious teaching has based their philosophy on the thoughts and methods of Gede Puja, and that gede Pudja had contributed greatly to the renewal of formal education in Hinduism in the schools of Indonesia. (Bakker 1993: 153)

Again, the structure and tasks of the Directorate General became clearer with Presidential decrees 22 and 68 in 1980. The Secretariat General was responsible for Hindu and Buddhist Affairs. It was structured into three sections and respective sub-sections: 1.) the program and law compilation section, 2.) the financial section, and 3.) the general section. All Hindu affairs were to be managed by the Directorate of *Agama* Hindu Affairs, whereas Buddhist Affairs were administered by the Directorate of Buddhist Affairs. The general section was responsible for administration, compilation of statistics, reports, and general public relations. The sub-Directorate for *Agama* Hindu information was responsible for data and information compilation, guideline compilation, matters pertaining to marriage, sacred arts and rituals, training and appointment of Hindu 'street workers' (*penyuluh*). A development section was responsible for sanctuaries, Hindu scriptures, paraphernalia, and ritual materials for priests.

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teacher explained that having five religions, Indonesian citizens had to have respect for all for the sake of stability and security. There had to be this tolerance between religious communities, and there was no excuse for religious conflict. (Parker 2004: 246)

[250] See Bakker 1993, the chapter on I Gede Pudja, for a detailed study of his thoughts and works.

The Sub-Directorate for Education was structured into four units, responsible for the execution of tasks in the field of education, educators, education material, education assessment and reports. It organized the operation of Hindu education, the quality improvement of Hindu education, the improvement of textbook quality, improvement of the Hindu education infrastructure, assessment and supervision of Hindu education, and compilation of statistical data of Hindu education.

On November 8 1985, I Gusti Agung Gede Putra succeeded Gede Puja as Director-General of the Directorate General for Guidance of the Hindu Bali and Buddhist Congregation. Previously, he officiated as appointed director of the provincial office for Hindu and Buddhist Affairs of the province Bali in Denpasar. During the second Mahasabha or congress of the Hindu Council in 1968, he was appointed member of the *Paruman Welaka* (the committee of laymen). For years he was dean of the Faculty of Religion and Culture at the Institute Hindu Dharma (since 1993 Universitas Hindu Indonesia), and from 1976 to 1979 he was director of the Institute[251]. His scholars recorded his lectures and several books with the title "*Cudamani*" were published passing on his ideas. (Bakker 1993: 157)

During I Gusti Agung Gede Putra term (1985-1994), publishing efforts were continued, yet the focus shifted from educational materials (textbooks, teacher training curricula) to Hindu philosophy and Vedanta teachings. Putra seems to have been mainly concerned with systematizing an orthodox understanding of Hindu concepts. However, he published two books on the content of Hindu lectures at higher education in 1985 and 1986. (Bakker 1993: 168) The book published in 1986, has been reworked and the last publication was in 2005[252]. During his term, the unwritten rule that every publication on Hinduism is hoped to be facilitated with a prologue of the Hindu Directorate was introduced. This rule is intended to show the conformity of thepublicationswith the official version of Hindu Dharma promoted by the Directorate General. Putra has served concurrently as Head of the Regional Office of Religion in Bali, as Head of the Traditional Architecture Faculty at *Dwijendra* University, and as Dean of the Religion and Culture faculty at IHD, which has been established as the full-fledged Indonesian Hindu University during his term.

Concerning with improving the quality of education and upgrading teachers' quality, the 1989 Education Act and Act 60/1990 on Higher Education introduced that religion teachers at the elementary level are required to be at least diploma II graduates. Educators at secondary schooling were required to hold at least a diploma III degree. This policy translated in a unfavorable situation for the Hindu education sector, as there were no Hindu institutions of higher education, which produced graduates holding bachelor, master, or doctoral degrees. As a consequence of this policy, the State Hindu Educator Training Colleges at the senior high school level in Denpasar, Mataram, and Singaraja were disbanded in 1990. In order to face this unfavorable condition and to comply with the requirements set out by the new educational policy, the Directorate General took immediately countermeasures to avert the dearth of teachers in organizing and operating a long-distance open-university upgrading program (KUTE, *kuliah terbuka*) to improve quality and provide qualification for all elementary educators.

The Directorate assessed and calculated the future need of teachers and lecturers for the Hindu class and for all Hindu teacher training institutions based on the number of 10 Hindu students. It aimed thereby to guarantee the quality of the Hindu class and Hindu education. Further, the Hindu education sector should be given equal status compared to general or other faith-based state institutions, and in the second step, those educational institutions were to be nationalized. As there were many Hindu students, but not enough qualified teachers, State Hindu Teacher Academies and Institutes were to be opened, which could train the calculated Hindu teacher workforce. In order to improve quality and provide the necessary qualification of Hindu educators in schooling through teacher upgrading programs, institutions of higher education were set up in Bali, Lombok, Kalimantan and Java. As first concrete step, the State *Agama* Hindu Educator Training Academy (APGAH, *Akademi Pendidikan Guru Agama Hindu*) was pioneered during the early 1990s. Based on Minister of Religion Instruction 58B/1993, the academy was set up in Denpasar. Its Hindu pedagogy faculty offered study programs in diploma II and in diploma III. I Gede Sura had been appointed first rector, and the former facilities and materials of the disbanded State Hindu Educator Training Colleges (*Pendidikan Guru Agama, PGA*) in Denpasar were used to allow for its operation. At the same time, new curricula for the *Agama* Hindu Educator Training Academy were compiled.

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[251] Here, the close connection between UNHI, the Hindu Council and the Directorate General in Jakarta becomes obvious. As Gede Pudja and Gusti Agung Gede Putra, Professor Triguna also is involved with all three institutions.
[252] The edition from 1991, 2002, and 2005 were used in the current study.

I Ketut Pasek, former official at the Regional Office of Religion in Bali, was appointed Director General from 1994 to 1997. During his term, the publishing activities and the effort to compile a unitary Hindu curriculum were continued. Hindu sanctuaries were given loudspeakers in order to socialize the proper chanting of *Tri Sandhya* – those loudspeakers resemble the Islamic practice of *azan* (call to prayers). The upgrading programs for teachers run well. The first Hindu educators' classes holding Diplomas II or Diploma III certificates graduated from the State *Agama* Hindu Educator Training Academy. For the first time in history, the State *Agama* Hindu Educator Training Academy in Denpasar and the remaining private institutions throughout Indonesia were given a consistent format of certificates and format of educational achievement by Director General Decree H/16/VII/1994 in 1994.

The basic content and curricula of Hindu pedagogy in the learning process of higher education was unified by Director General H/24/SK/1996 on the Establishment of the Guidelines for the Teaching and Learning Program (*Garis Besar Pendidikan dan Pengajaran,* GBPP), theGBPP syllabus, and course instruction outline/course syllabus (SAP, *satuan acuan pembelajaran*). All Hindu educators were required to participate in the Diploma II program, which was operated by the Directorate. The program targeted to guarantee the minimal qualification standard as required by the 1989 Education Act. It should improve Hindu educator's knowledge and the overall quality of Hindu education.

In 1996, numerous private Islamic colleges were nationalized. Contrary to those mass nationalizations, the Hindu congregation only had one State *Agama* Hindu Educator Training Academy authorized to provide Diploma II and Diploma III study programs and to issue respective certificates. Replying to continuously improved quality standards in education, educators holding a bachelor decrees were required. In consequence, I Gede Sura, Principal of the State *Agama* Hindu Educator Training Academy proposed upgrade the academy into an State Institute authorized to issue bachelor degree certificates.

The first Director General with a military and not a civilian background, I Wayan Gunawan, former Infantry Brigadier General, improved not only the administrational structure of the Directorate considerably but also its working discipline. The directorate's tasks were then exercised following the pattern of coordination, integration, and synchronization. Following Sura's proposal, he successfully lobbied the democratic Habibie government.

In the era of reform and during Indonesian democracy, the Hindu education sector has boosted and the budget has increased considerably. Thus, the Hindu education sector and the Hindu congregation in general profit from the compartmentalization and politization of religion in Indonesia. Presidential Decree 20/1999 set upthe State *Agama* Hindu School for Applied Science (STAHN, *Sekolah Tinggi Agama Hindu Negeri*). It was structured into four faculties providing undergraduate study programs and Diploma and Bachelor certificates. The State *Agama* Hindu School for Applied Science has been officially and ceremonially opened by Minister of Religion Prof Malik Fajar, while Wayan Suarjaya has been appointed the first rector. Suarjaya then was appointed the forth acting Hindu/Buddhist Director General.

During Wayan Suarjaya's term of office, the State Agama Hindu School for Applied Science Gede Puja in Mataram was officially and ceremonially established by Minister of Religion KH M Tolchah Hasan on April 24 2001. In addition, the State Agama Hindu School for Applied Science Tampung Penyang in Palangkaraya, Central Kalimantan was officially established by Suarjaya on July 26, 2001. A significant triumph of the Hindu education sector was the opening of the first Hindu-based postgraduate program concentrated on Hindu theology (*Brahma Widya*) at STAHN Denpasar, which was authorized to issue Master certificates. This provided an epoch-making equalization and recognition of the Hindu education sector that put the Hindu sector on a par with Christian and Islamic education institutions - at least theoretically. In addition, Suarjaya pursued the nationalizing of Hindu-faith based schools (*Widyalaya*) from elementary to higher education. Compared to the complex Islamic education system, the Hindu education system was not only insignificant, but literally invisible. Unlike the Islamic course of education, where from the basic levels onwards profound knowledge of Islam is taught, qualifying for teacher training or the profession of an Islamic Law expert, in the Hindu education system, there are only a few faith-based schools providing basic education, which do not qualify for the teacher profession or teacher training. (Arsada 2006: 53) The pioneer of Hindu *widyalaya* was set up in Bangli in 2001.

Minister of Religion Instruction 1/2001 on the Position, Tasks, Function, Authority, Organizational and Working Structure changed the organizational structure of the Hindu Directorate General. A new milestone in the arena of Hindu education was the formation of the State Hindu Dharma Institute in Denpasar with Presidential Decree 1/2004 dated November 82004 on the Status Change of the State *Agama* Hindu School for Applied Science in Denpasar. Minister of Religion M Maftuh Basyumi officially opened the Institute on Mach 232005.

The opening of the State *Agama* Hindu School for Applied Science is celebrated as a countermeasure to face the dearth of Hindu teachers, to speed up the implementation of Education Act 20/2003 for Hindus, and to answer the uneven distribution of Hindus teachers in the Archipelago. In 2005 the Directorate transferred authority to the *Parisada* to operate *pasraman* (Hindu Sunday Schools) for Hindu students, who do not receive formal Hindu religious instruction at schools and to grade the students. Thereby it is warranted that all Hindu pupils receive a mark in the religion class necessary for promotion to the next level of schooling. The *pasraman* are facilitated by the Directorate, yet grading of pupil's performance is carried out by the *Parisada*. The following table shows thenumber of *Pasraman*, Hindu students and teachers in Indonesia in 2006 and 2007

Level	*Pasraman* 2006	*Pasraman* 2007	Pupil 2006	Pupil 2007	Educators 2006	Educators 2007
Elementary education	1.207	3.025	152.532	152.532	11.038	9.075
Junior secondary	1.207	2.943	167.572	136.595	2.045	8.829
Senior secondary	1.207	2.979	137.613	134.435	1.542	8.937
TOTAL	1.207	8.947	457.717	423.562	14.625	26.841

Source: Hindu Secretariat General

In general, it can be assessed that the consolidation of Hindu Dharma Indonesia has been executed by middle-class Balinese Hindu professionals, religion-experts, teachers and civil servants, who were western-educated or Indian-educated. The urban middle-class in Singaraja, Denpasar, and from 1967 onwards in Jakarta is the central agency in the recognition process of Hindu Dharma and in the consolidation of the Hindu education system. The Indonesian middle-class is not identical to the European middle-class. Because the middle-class is not categorized by income, but by high levels of education and access to strategic position in the governmental, religious, cultural, and educational sector.

The Hindu higher education sector has been in an unfavorable situation since its integration into the nation-state. Despite the engagement and enthusiasm of a few reformers, low human resources and discriminative policies led to a very small, sometimes even inexistent, and poor qualified Hindu education sector. It is my hypothesis, that the education sector for Hindus has systematically received discriminative funding in order to limit an equal development and distribution throughout Indonesia. With bad qualified teachers and almost no teacher training institutions, it must be seen as a major success of the Directorate and Hindu reformers to have established higher Hindu-based education institutions authorized to issue bachelor, master and doctoral certificates for its graduates and to be able to raise enrollment at those study programs.

From 2001 to 2005, the major challenge faced by the Directorate General for Guidance of the Hindu and Buddhist Congregation were the poor quality of its human capital. Only 121 poor educated employees at the MORA in Jakarta were responsible for the administration, organization and guiding of approximately eight million adherents of Hinduism and Buddhism (official statistics). Problematic issues were correct data acquisition and compilation of statistics and calculation of demands for both congregations. As exact data on the number of adherents was difficult to collect, it was impossible to compile correct statistics on adherents, students, and in turn the demand for text books, and educators. As a result, a correct calculation of the demand for teachers, text books and students has been a difficult task and remained often a mere guess. Related to this, funding and subsidies of education evolved as central problem. Because with an estimated number of adherents, and an estimated number of students, the exact demand for teachers and text books remained unclear, and it has been difficult to compose reports on how much funding and subsidies are actually to be retrieved from the Planning and Finance Bureau of the General Secretariat at MORA. This situation resulted in an unclear picture of the state of Hinduism and Hindu education in Indonesia.

### 5.3.3. The Directorate General for the Guidance of the Hindu Community

Presidential Decree 63/2005 and Minister of Religion Decree 3 in 2006 restructured the Directorate General for the Guidance of Hindu and Buddhist Congregations. The Directorate General for Guidance of Hindu and Buddhist Congregations has been split into a Hindu Directorate and a Buddhist directorate. This separation aims to improve the exercise of the Directorates' tasks in the educational sector related to matters pertaining to 1.) retrieving adequate funding and subsidies, and 2.) implementing educational policies complying to the paradigm shift in education. Since its establishment, the Hindu section is under-staffed. In 2006, the Directorate General for the Guidance of the Hindu Congregation employed 88 officials. In 2007, the Directorate had 82 employees. Of the total, 41 were employed at the Directorate General, 20 at the Hindu Affairs Directorate and 21 at the Hindu Education Directorate. One might imagine that administrating the affairs of around 10 Million Indonesian Hindus with 82 employees is a tiring task to execute.

Since the development of religion is an integral part of national progress, the Directorate General for the Guidance of the Hindu Congregation plays a strategic role in the political and conceptual administration of Indonesian Hindu communities reflecting the principle of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*. The contemporary documents of the Hindu Directorate speak of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* instead of *Pancasila*. The Indonesian pluralists therefore currently prefer to refer to *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, as it offers the same substance. It is regarded politically neutral, truly pluralist, and it does not share Pancaisla's history of exploitation of meaning. (Triguna protocol 2007) Probably homage is paid to Empu Tantular, the Majapahit sage and poet, who composed the *Sutasoma* poem from which the slogan originates. Despite the legal status of the *Pancasila* has been preserved, the five principles are less popular in contemporary political discourse. This is most likely the result of the *Pancasila* being interpreted as an instrument of power formerly utilized to manipulate Indonesian citizens. (Habibie 2011) The shift from the term One Supreme Lordship (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa)* to God Almighty (*Tuhan Yang Maha Esa)* in all legal documents in the last twenty years indicates that the majority religion attempts to impart their understanding of the representation of God (*tawhid*) on the religious minorities.

The Hindu Directorate is tasked with organizing and managing policies and the technical standardization in the area of guiding the Hindu Community basing on policies stipulated by the Minister. (Directorate General Hindu 2006: Strategic Plan) The Directorate has following functions: it

1. formulates the vision and mission statement, the strategic plan,
2. plans the standardization, norms, models, criteria and procedures to be exercised at the Directorate,
3. subsidizes, improves and supervises the Hindu community and
4. reports and assesses on the outcome of the strategic development strategies.

The chart shows the planning process at the Hindu Directorate General as of 2006 to 2008 (Hindu Education Directorate 2006: 6, own translation)

The vision statement of the Hindu directorate concerns two major areas:

1.) 'prima' service quality (*pelayanan prima*) and Hindu practice as vehicle to achieve a prosperous nation,
2.) application of inter-faith harmony as expression of the Indonesian multicultural society to realize a safe and peaceful Indonesia.

The mission statement sets out amongst others to increase the quality of guidance, understanding, realization, and regularly practice of *agama* Hindu, to improve the Directorates service quality, to raise the quality of Hindu education and to empower Hindu faith-based social organizations and Hindu faith-based educational institutions.

In 2006, Prof Ida Bagus Gede Yudha Triguna, had been appointed Director General. Since 2005, he acts as President of the Indonesian Hindu University. In 2011, he is still holds both offices. Yudha Triguna may be described as a professional academic, a brilliant lobbyist with management capabilities, who wields enormous power in the fields of politics and religion by virtue of his traditional authority, personal charisma (*taksu*) and simultaneous bureaucratic power as Director General and president of UNHI. Prior to Yudha Triguna's appointment, the Director-General did not have an official car. Thus, he asked the Minister of Religion to recognize the officials of the Hindu congregation in the same way as other religious communities are respected in Indonesia, and has been provided with an official car. He even was given an official residence in the district of Kelapa Gading, Jakarta. The official residence moved in 2008 to Salembah, Jakarta.

As a result of Yudha Triguna's lobbying efforts, the budget allocated to the Hindu Directorate General also steadily increases. The diplomatic strategy used, is called by Yudha Triguna "the ant and the elephant strategy". (Interview, protocol 2007) In this metaphor, the Minister of Religion, heading the MORA and its resources, is compared with the elephant, while Yudha Triguna is compared with the ant.

> If an ant tries to talk to an elephant, it is very likely that the ant is not answered. If the ant tries to attack the elephant, the elephant might not even recognize being attacked, or worse, he did not even notice that he just trampled the ant. But, if the ant climbs on him, to sit between his eyes, and starts to tickle the elephant, while plucking his fur, most likely the elephant will start giggling, and feeling comforted. Then and only then, the elephant will notice the ant and will eventually listen to the ant's demands.

Another problem faced by Indonesian Hindus is the scarce distribution of regional Hindu officials, since the MORA maintains three structural types of regional offices (I a-f; II, III a-c). Only the province of Bali is structured according to type II having two Hindu sections: one Hindu Affairs section and one Hindu Education Section. Another Hindu Affairs section is established in the West Nusa Tenggara Province Office of religion in Mataram, Lombok. In consequence, the Hindu community has only three sections throughout Indonesia, as in all other regional offices there is only one unit representing the Hindu community. As a rule, there are one to three officials employed at those units. If there are more Hindu employees, they do not receive fixed salaries but are paid by honorarium.

There are even regencies without a Hindu section, and the regional official of the Hindu Council coordinates the section's task. This is especially of concern to the qualification of Hindu teachers. According to educational legislation, at the regency level a supervisor for the teacher's certification program must be provided. For Hindu population living in specific Indonesian regencies, the regional government must provide the Hindu class and the Hindu teacher, if there are more than ten students. The teachers are required to hold a bachelor degree. Since the quality of Hindu teachers is mostly poor, they must participate in the upgrading program supervised by an official of the Regional Office of Religion.

Since mostly there is not even a Hindu section at some regencies, the Hindu Council has been authorized to act as supervisor, and the State Hindu Dharma Institute in Denpasar, the Indonesian Hindu University in Denpasar, and the *Dwijendra* University are authorized to offer long-distance courses to guarantee the teachers' certification. Therefore, one of the first official acts undertaken by Yudha Triguna has been to allocate 100 Million Rupiah to each section or official at the regional offices in the provinces in 2006. Yudha Triguna also implemented a program with study grants to certify the teachers.

The following graph shows the organizational chart of the Regional Office of Religion in the Province of Bali.

The Directorate of Hindu education

The broad mission statement related to the Hindu educational sector are (1) strengthening the understanding, implementation, and regular practice of *Agama* Hindu in individuals, families, communities, and state organs to strengthen the inter- and intra-faith harmony and to build social harmony in social and national life, (2) omitted; (3) strengthening the understanding, implementation, and regular practice of *agama* Hindu in order to build *sraddha, bhakti*, virtue, and morals in students, (4) empowering and improving the quality of Hindu faith-based social organizations and institutions to provide educational services to peasants with low economies.

Each of these aims is then formulated into a target. The achievement of the targets is diversified into annual and five-term strategic plans. The 2006 strategic plan of the Directorate then sets out the target and program of mission statement 3 and 4, which concern the education sector, as follows:

Mission 3 Target	Program
decrease deviations and violations of ethics and morals by students, either at school/campus or in society. raise the number of educators meet the target and operate the program	implement the 9 years compulsory school attendance improve and increase higher schooling improve and increase higher education
Mission 4 Target	Program
increase the role of Hindu based social organizations and institutions in the field of education, foundations, *pasraman*, Sunday schools raise prominence of religious values in social change improve the quality of employees at Hindu based social organizations and institutions facilitate educational material and infrastructure (*pasraman*, Sunday schools)	increase the development of Hindu based social organizations and institutions in the field of education

In order to put those missions into practice, the Hindu Directorate formulated three broad tasks on the sector of religion, education, and general service for the period between 2005 and 2009. With context to the field of religion, following programs are stipulated: 1.) the program to increase understanding, realization, regular practice and progress of Hindu values, 2.) the program to increase Hindu religious instruction and faith-based education, 3.) the program to improve the quality of Hindu life, 4.) the program to develop Hindu faith-based social organizations and institutions in the field of education, the religion research and development program, and 5.) the program to raise inter-faith harmony. In the sector of education, the strategic plan stipulates an ambitious program. On the formal stream of education from pre-school to the higher education, the Hindu class shall be implemented as expressed in the implementation of the nine-year compulsory school attendance program. On the informal stream of education following programs shall be implemented: 1.) an educator's and employee quality upgrading program; 2.) a program to socialize reading culture and to foster libraries, 3.) an education service management program to exercise by the Hindu Education Directorate.

Minister of Religion Decree 3 in 2006 regulated the current structure and tasks of the Hindu Directorate: the fifth section (§56-75) of the document outlined the structure and duty assignments of the newly introduced Education Directorate headed by the Director of Education Made Sujana. The Hindu education Directorate is structured in to four units. The chart shows the organizational chart of the Hindu Education Directorate in 2007.

Following the era of reform and the education paradigm shift, general tasks assigned to the Hindu Education Directorate pertain to the operation and guidance of Hindu education. Those policies are based on technical policies passed by the Hindu Director General, which in turn follow the parameters of national and international conventions in education. The tasks executed by the Education Directorate are

1. preparing materials to formulate the educational strategic planning instruments,
2. formulating the national standards and operational policies for Hindu education in instruction, curriculum, accreditation, supervision, in media and technologies,
3. implementing, monitoring and evaluating technical Hindu educational policies, and
4. planning and approving the educational budget and subsidies.

Its vision aims to mould a Hindu, who has *sraddha (iman*, faith), practices *bhakti* (*takwa*, follows the commands of God), and morals (*susila, akhlak*) and knowledge acquired in the Hindu class and Hindu-based education, and puts them regularly to practice in social and national life. Its mission is to:

1. improve the quality of Hindu education by reforming the education system as to emphasize cognitive, affective, and psycho-motor aspects
2. improve the role and function of Hindu-based education institutions in the efforts to anticipate the impact of social changes, which occur in all field of life in order to strengthen the national identity and personality and thereby cementing existential harmony in society, nation and state
3. increase the Hindu human capital quality through education, trainings, seminar, orientations and research
4. increase media and infrastructure of Hindu instruction and education

Then the Hindu Directorate Generals ambitious mission 3 is concretized in a program aimed to implement the compulsory school attendance and to raise the quality of Hindu education at all levels. The Hindu Directorate General and the Hindu Council currently join forces to nationalize Hind-based institutions at all levels of education, which have been previously operated by private Hindu foundations, by proposing the Hindu-based *widyalaya* as an equivalent to the Islamic-based *madrasah*. In other words, general but Hindu-based state run education institutions shall be established at all levels throughout Indonesia. This effort conforms with article 12 of the National Education Act 20/2003, in which the *widyalaya* are listed as equivalent school type to the *madrasah*.

During the era of reform, the proposal of a Hindu education concept equivalent to the *madrasah* system was brought to the Minister of Education, the parliament and the Indonesian president. Eventually National Education Act 20/2003 and subsequent regulations accommodated the Hindu proposal to implement a Hindu-based education system comparable to the Islamic *madrasah*. It is safe to say that together with the Muslim fraction the Hindu community represented by the Hindu Council supported paragraph 12 of Law 20/2003 and subsequent regulations on faith-based education. (Interviews I Made Sujana, IB Yudha Triguna in 2007, informal interview IB Gunadha).

Related to those developments on the education sector, three tertiary institutions were nationalized in 2005, the Institute Hindu Dharma in Denpasar, the State School of Applied Hindu Science (STAHN, *Sekolah Tinggi Agama Hindu Negeri*) *Tampung Penyang* in Central Kalimantan, and the State School of Applied Hindu Science *Gede Pudja* in Mataram, Lombok. Due to the concerted action of incumbent Balinese Governor I Mangku Pasti Pastika and Prof Dr Ida Bagus Gede Yudha Triguna, who both have vast political and social networks with donors from inside and outside Indonesia since 2006, educational management and provision of facilities are continuously improved on the Hindu education sector. In 2006 and 2007, Hindu tertiary institutes were opened in Lampung and Manado, and it is safe to say that the era of reform, but especially the Yudhoyono presidency, brought an increasing room to maneuver for Hindus on the educational sector.

Teacher demand

The subsequent tables show the population distribution by province, the share of the Hindu population, the amount of Hindu educators and pupils, the number of supervisors, and the amount of *pasraman* in 2006 and 2007. The numbers clearly indicate that the previous data on the number of Hindus in Indonesia has been inaccurate. The statistic is compiled by the Directorate General. The number of the Hindu population in 2005 is compiled by the National Statistic Board, whereas the 2007 record is compiled from statistics of Hindu Council, the officials at the regional offices of religion or its regional agencies.

If one compares the numbers of the Hindu representatives at the provincial level with the number of the community, the under-staffing of Hindu officials at all levels becomes evident. The assigned tasks cannot be exercised satisfactorily and sometimes even not completed. The table shows the Hindu population and its representatives at the provinces.

Provinsi/Province		Hindu Population		Hindu representatives[1]					
				Pembina		Penyelenggara		Peny uluh (PNS)	Juru penerang
		2005	2006	2001	2005	2001	2005	2006	2007
1	**Bali**	**3.296.155**	**3,296,155**	**2**	**2**	**0**	**0**	**54**	-
2	Bangka Belitung	994	5.178	0	0	0	0	2	2
3	Banten	35.601	67,719	1	1	0	0	1	2
4	Bengkulu	4.241	53,289	1	1	0	0	2	2
5	DI Yogyakarta	6.141	16.917	1	1	0	0	1	3
6	DKI Jakarta	28.508	140.420	1	1	0	0	2	3
7	Gorontalo	3.145	10.054	0	0	0	0	2	-
8	Irian Jaya Barat	*)	3.949	0	0	0	-	0	-
9	Jambi	1.768	9.010	1	1	0	0	2	2
10	Jawa Barat	184.987	120.065	1	1	0	0	2	2
11	Jawa Tengah	27.297	998,426	1	1	0	0	3	4
12	Jawa Timur	214.824	943.652	1	1	0	3	2	4
13	Kalimantan Barat	8.559	60.641	1	1	0	0	1	2
14	Kalimantan Selatan	9.514	135.814	1	1	0	0	5	3
15	Kalimantan Tengah	199.805	840,385	1	1	0	1	3	3
16	Kalimantan Timur	32.848	93.748	1	1	0	0	3	3
17	Kepulauan Riau	*)	6.200	0	0	0	0	0	2
18	Lampung	97.532	998,683	1	1	0	1	6	5
19	Maluku	3.858	6.455	1	1	0	0	0	2
20	Maluku Utara	120	581	0	1	0	0	0	1
21	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam	815	795	0	0	0	0	-	-
22	Nusa Tenggara Barat	114.702	521.352	1	1	0	1	2	4
23	Nusa Tenggara Timur	10.458	60.294	1	1	0	1	2	2
24	Papua	6.869	30.120	1	1	0	7	1	3
25	Riau	10.768	30.976	1	1	0	0	3	2
26	Sulawesi Barat	*)	120.252	0	1	0	0	0	5
27	Sulawesi Selatan	53.406	201.632	1	1	0	1	1	2
28	Sulawesi Tengah	77.292	180,890	1	1	0	2	1	3
29	Sulawesi Tenggara	39.300	963.283	1	1	0	1	5	4
30	Sulawesi Utara	28.200	84,231	1	1	0	1	1	3
31	Sumatera Barat	238	1.954	1	1	0	1	1	2
32	Sumatera Selatan	67.480	71,215	1	1	0	0	1	2
33	Sumatera Utara	21.329	53.145	1	1	0	0	3	3
Total		**4.586.754**	**10.496.181**	**21**	**29**	**0**	**20**	**111**	**80**

Data obtained from the planning bureau of the Hindu General Directorate, Jakarta in 2008

[1]Agents of Hindu Affairs with different tasks assigned, competences required and salaries paid, *pembina* is a coach, *penyelenggara* an operator, *penyuluh* a street worker and *juru penerang* an information clerk

The following table shows the state of Hindu religious education in numbers. Based on 10 students per class, the last column gives the calculated demand for teachers, which are needed to operate the Hindu education system successfully. It shows that 28.387 Hindu teachers are needed. Remarkable is the lack of 820 Hindu teachers in Bali.

	Province	2007 Population	2006 Hindu	2007 Hindu	2007 Teacher (civil servant)			2007 Teacher (non permanent)			2007 Pupils			2007 Teachers needed
					PS	JSS	SSS	PS	JSS	SSS	PS	JSS	SSS	
1	Bali	3.572.965	3.296.155	3,296,155	1.615	226	152	25	20	24	13.280	12.505	12.574	820
2	Bangka Belitung	954.810	994	5.178	-	-	-	15	14	12	3.340	3.240	3.140	835
3	Banten	8.089.376	35.601	67,719	11	1	2	40	56	42	3.580	5.101	5.017	1.345
4	Bengkulu	1.561.831	4.241	53,289	14	2	1	12	10	8	3.227	3.231	3.021	807
5	DI Yogyakarta	3.394.382	6.141	16.917	17	8	3	15	17	12	1.192	1.244	1.573	298
6	DKI Jakarta	8.336.589	28.508	140.420	21	2	-	93	87	82	15.031	15.116	15.469	3.758
7	Gorontalo	919.802	3.145	10.054	-	-	-	14	17	17	137	57	46	32
8	Irian Jaya Barat	*)	*)	3.949	9	1	1	2	2	2	80	40	24	-
9	Jambi	2.568.598	1.768	9.010	-	-	-	17	14	10	7.280	6.101	6.117	1.820
10	Jawa Barat	36.329.940	184.987	120.065	17	1	-	56	65	53	5.280	4.648	4.485	1.320
11	Jawa Tengah	30.911.475	27.297	998,426	328	34	-	110	109	98	18.258	18.381	18.155	4.565
12	Jawa Timur	35.009.452	214.824	943.652	271	25	9	44	15	10	13.270	12.602	12.574	3.318
13	Kalimantan Barat	3.797.599	8.559	60.641	19	1	-	43	54	46	3.220	3.350	3.349	3.365
14	Kalimantan Selatan	2.961.739	9.514	135.814	22	5	-	10	12	15	182	143	136	46
15	Kalimantan Tengah	1.869.579	199.805	840,385	141	5	-	16	19	13	3.280	1.506	1.574	820
16	Kalimantan Timur	2.966.504	32.848	93.748	15	5	-	46	56	53	5.321	5.161	5.110	1.330
17	Kepulauan Riau	*)	*)	6.200	1	-	-	40	38	35	808	417	468	3.202
18	Lampung	6.646.323	97.532	998,683	110	3	-	35	40	43	5.190	5.608	5.475	1.298
19	Maluku	1.145.442	3.858	6.455	2	1	-	10	9	8	119	65	41	30
20	Maluku Utara	880.683	120	581	-	-	-	3	5	3	77	55	26	-
21	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam	4.075.594	815	795	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	21	12	- (pasraman)
22	Nusa Tenggara Barat	3.989.668	114.702	521.352	125	7	-	26	24	21	3.317	3.121	3.021	839
23	Nusa Tenggara Timur	3.950.840	10.458	60.294	12	-	-	8	6	4	134	165	141	42
24	Papua	2.345.798	6.869	30.120	13	3	-	11	8	7	176	142	147	44
25	Riau	5.308.702	10.768	30.976	1	1	-	35	29	25	808	108	275	3.048
26	Sulawesi Barat	*)	*)	120.252	-	-	-	-	12	5	5.300	1.600	515	-
27	Sulawesi Selatan	7.767.786	53.406	201.632	85	9	-	18	20	21	870	541	449	218
28	Sulawesi Tengah	2.005.264	77.292	180,890	99	6	-	12	9	10	1.746	1.216	1.254	437
29	Sulawesi Tenggara	1.776.272	39.300	963.283	20	3	-	9	10	8	132	95	80	33
30	Sulawesi Utara	2.151.019	28.200	84,231	20	3	-	9	7	6	126	116	117	32
31	Sumatera Barat	4.240.810	238	1.954	2	-	-	9	7	6	182	104	101	46
32	Sumatera Selatan	7.800.565	67.480	71,215	24	2	-	18	20	21	2.015	1.312	1.303	504
33	Sumatera Utara	11.490.453	21.329	53.145	22	3	-	15	10	7	8.119	7.599	5.205	2.030
	Total	208,819,860	4.586.754	10.496,181	3.036	283	168	813	799	705	144.802	136.595	134.435	28.387

Data obtained from the planning bureau of the Hindu General Directorate, Jakarta in 2008

The following table shows the amount of public and private schools, students (all religions), and the state Hindu teachers appointed either by the Department of Religion or the Department of Education in compulsory schooling in Bali in 2005/2006. As the table demonstrates, even in Bali there is a lack of Hindu religion teachers, whereas Islamic education units and teachers are overrepresented.

| 2005/2006 | Schools | | | Pupils | Hindu religion teacher | | | | | |
	public	private	total	total	Nip 15 (DepAg)	Nip 13 (Depdiknas)	total	demand	needed	ratio
Elementary school	2369	34	2403	350.561	224	2827	3051	4803	1752	Each school two teachers
Junior high school	177	116	293	122,797	109	361	470	1,333	863	One teacher for 90/100 students

Hindu budget and Hindu education budget allocation

According to Presidential Decree No 165/2001 and Minister of Religion Decree No 1/2006, the administrative structure of the MORA is financed entirely by the annual national revenue and expenditure budget (*Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara*, APBN), which is approved by the parliament. The annual operational budget allocated to the MORA is among the highest budgets in Indonesia. Usually, it ranks fourth or fifth under the assigned annual budgets of all ministries. In 2007, the largest annual operating budget was allocated to the MONE. The annual budget of the General Labor Department ranked second and the Health Department third. In 2006 and 2007, the MORA received an annual budget approaching 900 Million Euro.

The annual budget is distributed proportionally to the percentage a faith community holds of the population's total number. The population of Indonesia amounted 220 million in 2006, of which 10, 5 million were Hindus. Consequently, the proportion allocated to Hindus should be between five and six percent, yet usually it the allocated budget is below one percent[253]. But, the allocated annual operating budget to the Hindu Directorate is insufficient and not in proportion with the work load. In the past, it was even impossible to allocate budget to some Hindu sub-divisions and/or regional offices or agencies. In order to realize the outlined vision and mission statements, unfailing Prof Triguna is lobbying all thinkable instances to steadily increase the Hindu budget. The table shows the annual operational budget of the MORA and annual operating budget allocated to the Hindu Directorate.

YEAR	Annual Budget MORA	Annual Budget (Hindu-Buddha)	Euro
2000 Hindu Buddha	-	IRD 4,039,264,000	-
2001 Hindu-Buddha	-	IRD 6,430, 225, 000 EUR 643,022,5	Exchange rate (July 7) EUR 1 = IDR 10,000
2002 Hindu-Buddha	-	IRD 8, 310, 353, 000 EUR 923,594,8	EUR 1 = IDR 9, 000
2003 Hindu-Buddha	-	IRD 11, 891, 885, 000 EUR 1,251,777,37	EUR 1 = IDR 9, 500
2004 Hindu-Buddha	-	IDR 16, 781, 332, 000 EUR 1,452,929,2	EUR 1 = IDR 11, 500
2005 Hindu-Buddha	-	IDR 20,103,000,000 EUR 1,675,250,0	EUR 1 = IDR 12, 000
2006 Hindu-Buddha	IDR 9.720.931.700.000 EUR 810.077.642,0	IDR 34.637.876.000 EUR 2,886,490,0	EUR 1 = IDR 12, 000
YEAR	Annual Budget MORA	Annual Budget (Hindu)	Euro
2007 Hindu	IDR 10.775.882.200.000 EUR 862,070,576,0	26,049,951,000 EUR 2,083,996,1	EUR 1 = IDR 12, 500
2008 Hindu	-	IDR 36.309.629.000 EUR 2,593,544, 90	EUR 1 = IDR 14, 000

Source: Direktorat Jenederal Bimas Hindu dan Buddha, 2005: 62-63, personal communication with Prof Dr Yudha Triguna

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[253] Interview Made Sutresna, Planning and Data Division; I Made Suma, Finances and State Property Division, and Ketut Lancar, Management and Staff division, April 2008.The data here presented are obtained from those Interviews.

The Hindu Director General sets out the vision and mission statements. The Director of Hindu education specifies those statements into strategies and programs. Based on real demands, an annual education budget plan for the coming year is calculated by the officials in the planning division of the education directorate. Thus, the Hindu education directorate plans how much budget it will need in the next year to realize its strategic program and drafts an education budget plan list (DIPA, *daftar isian perencanaan anggaran*). This list registers all expenditures necessary to achieve the target of the strategic plan. The budget plan is submitted to the planning and data division of the Hindu Directorate, which drafts the entire budget plan list of all units at the Directorate. The Director General then approves of the definitive budget plan list, signs it, and the list is submitted to the finance division at the Secretariat General. Here the whole budget plan list of the MORA is compiled. The whole budget plan list is now turned in to the Department of Finance, which presents the whole budget plan list to the parliament. The parliament approves of the annual budget of all ministries. After the parliament's approval, an annual budget is allocated to the account of the MORA, which is managed by the finance division at the Secretariat General. The planning division then distributes and allocates the budget to the respective Directorates[254]. The following illustration shows the organizational chart of the Hindu Directorate General in 2006. The arrows denote the procedure followed to estimate the demand for subsidies and funding within the Hindu Directorate and apply for those subsidies and funds described in the next chapter.

The arrows show the procedures of application for annual budgets needed in the coming fiscal year. The graph shows the organizational chart of the budget planning process (2001-2006).

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[254] Interview Made Sutresna, Planning and Data Division; I Made Suma, Finances and State Property Division, and Ketut Lancar, Management and Staff division, April 2008.The data here presented are obtained from those Interviews.

Organizational chart of the budget planning and consent process from (2001–2006)

Source: Hindu Sekretariat General, 2007

I found a major obstacle to the generally neutral and pluralistic position and policies of the MORA are situated in actual practices. Hindu educational planners may be as motivated and spirited as possible, yet, if the head of the planning unit does not approve of the Hindu directorate's annual budget plan list, the directorate is not allocated the necessary amount of money needed to realize its targets. In the field of education, the national educational targets are even contravened, as the programs for pre-school Hindu education, for the *widyalaya* and for Hindu inter-faith harmony policies have not been subsidized by the MORA in 2007.

According to my informants, usually there is a drawn out argument on the Hindu budget allocation between the head of the planning unit at the Secretariat General and the Hindu Director General. Prior to Prof Trigunas appointment, the budget might be influenced by the political and religious orientation of the head of the planning unit. Depending on the orientation of the planning divisions' head – whether he is a nationalist or a 'greenish' – an orthodox – Muslim, the allocated budget is insufficient or minimal, but still below the optimal amount to complete the targets. The Hindu Directorate criticizes its marginal budget, less than one percent of the actual six percent are allocated based on the argumentation that the Hindu community would not have many Hindu institutions, as there are only three state funded higher education institutes, and therefore it would be sufficient to have a small budget.

To counter this line of argument, the Hindu Council and the Hindu Directorate conducted a census of all Hindus in Indonesia. Instead of approximately 4 Million Hindus, more than 11 Million adherents to Hindu Dharma Indonesia were counted. So Yudha Triguna argued that for such a number of Hindus a sufficient budget has to be allocated. As we can see in the following table, a growing amount is allocated to the Directorate. The table below shows the allocated education budget for the formal educational path.

Educational program	Elementary	High	Tertiary level	Total
2000-2005	4, 276, 100, 000	1, 726, 600, 000	4, 856, 500, 000	
2005	6, 050, 000, 000	2, 800, 000, 000	3, 000, 000, 000	11, 850, 000, 000
2006	3.606.993.000	1.947.284.000	1.834.977.000	
2007	3.768.000.000	2.100.000.000	2.670.000.000	

5.3.4. Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia

I did not explore in depth on membership, structure, and organization, as I focused on the analysis of the guidelines on religious instruction set out in Council's decrees and *bhisama (*a legal statement binding for all Hindus issued by the council on a specific issue). Still, I like to note that the council has shifted from a spiritual into a social organization after its organizational structure was changed in 1996 and 2001. (see Picard 2011) Certainly, the old elites, or the 'Brahmana Gang[255]' was not in support of this restructuring - as always, if the status quo is open to controversy. Indeed, the shift towards a more secular management is a point of open controversy between Indonesian Hindus.

From a local to a global conception

This section describes the Council's conceptional shift from a local into a global representative organization of the Indonesian Hindu Community. (Dana 2005, 2005a; Sudharta 2006, *Parisada* 2006) The Hindu Council has been established in 1959 and continued the work of the Balinese *Dewan Raja-Raja* and the *Paruman Pinandita*. On October 7 1958, a meeting between the executives of the provincial and national parliament, the Independent Religion Office of the Bali Region[256] and leaders of the Hindu organizations was held in the great meeting hall (*Balai Agung Mayarakat*) in Denpasar. It was decided to establish a Hindu Council designed to assist the Hindu division at the branch office of MORA in Singaraja.(cf. Bakker 1993: 230) For this purpose, it was agreed to build a committee for the preparation of a Hindu Bali congress (*Panitia Perancang Hindu Bali Sabha)*. The committee members were *Paruman Para Pandita* (Pedanda Made Kemenuh), *Panti Agama Hindu* (I Ketut Kandia), *Angkatan Mudah Agama Hindu* (Ida Bagus Dosther and Wedastra Suyasa), Dr. Ida Bagus Mantra, and I Gusti Bagus Sugriwa (national parliament member).

On December 6 1958, the committee held a meeting in *Pesanggrahan, Bedugul*, deciding that a Great Assembly (*Pesamuhan Agung*) was to be held in January 1959, which came to be known as formation session of the *Parisada Dharma Hindu Bali*. On February 21, 22 and 23 1959, the *Hindu Bali Sabha* conference was held at the *Airlangga* Literature Faculty (today the Udayana University) in Denpasar and adopted the *Parisada* Charter (*Piagam Parisada*)[257]. On the suggestion of Ida Bagus Dosther (Interview 2007), the *Parisada* should be structured following the model of the *Nahdlatul Ulama* and the national parliament. It should consist of two chambers, one for the priests and one for laymen[258]. The Charter has been signed by 28 signatories, comprising 8 delegates from the Balinese provincial government, eight representatives of the eight districts, eight heads of the provincial and regional religion offices, and 12 religious organizations. *Perhimpunan Buddhis Indonesia, Bali Dharma Yadnya, Partai Nasional Agama Hindu Bali, Majelis Hinduisme, Wiwadha Shastra Sabha, Satya Hindu Dharma, Perhimpunan Hidup Ketuhanan, Angkatan Muda Hindu Bali, Yayasan Dwijendra, Eka Adnyana Dharma, Persatuan Keluarga Bhujangga Waisnawa, Paruman Para Pandita.* (Yayasan 2003, 2005; Sudharta 2006: 230; Bakker 1993: 230)Sudharta also mentions *Kumara Bhuwana.*

In sum, all Hindu reformist organization united in the Hindu Council. As also a Buddhist organization participated in the meeting, it is very likely that they did so in order to discuss a common strategy. From 1963 (Bakker 1993) or 1967 (MORA Year Books) until 2006, the Buddhist congregation and the Hindu congregation were represented in one directorate general at MORA in Jakarta. Article 11 of the Piagam *Parisada* mentions the tasks to be exercised research, education, information, and social welfare. The *Parisada* was charged with the task of coordinating all the religious activities of Balinese Hindus by regulating, promoting, and developing *agama* Hindu Bali in order to strengthen the awareness of Hindus about their religious and social life. (Bakker 1993: 231)

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[255] Personal communication with Dr I Gusti Komang Aryana, October 2007. ‚You', he said, ‚you continously hang out with the brahmana gang'. The brahmana gang denotes the circle of Brahmins and intellectuals that centre around the PHDI and UNHI, as its cadre training unit or elit school, which display a organicist and feodal or status-quo oriented attitude.

[256] Recall the existence of a branch of the central Ministry of Religious Affairs in Bali and the simultaneous establishment of an Independent Religion Agency of the Bali Region by Hindus. The central Ministry's branches were suspected to be Muslim and Christian missionaries, preparing and initiating big mass conversion, therefore the Balinese countered these approaches by establishing an Independent Religion Agency.

[257] Bakker (1993: 230) and Yayasan (2003, 2005) mention the Dwijendra secondary high school building, whereas Sudharta (2006) and other sources mention the Airlangga Faculty. Most likely, the *Bali Maha Sabha* had been held at both buildings.

[258] After intense deliberations, the Hindu Council is structured as council of brahmins (Vipra Council) (Law of Manu XII 110-114). The eleven Brahmins of the Vipra Council were to be assisted by twenty-two laymen. The membership amounted thirty-three, a number regarded as sacred and auspicious.

During the first years great assemblies were held frequently to discuss aspects of religion and to decide on future decisions. During the first assembly on October 31959, held at the *Dwijendra* high school, the book *DharmaPrawerti Sastra*[259], the first book compiled the Council's secretariat, was discussed. It should be used as textbook in schools, and distributed to those who wish to deepen their knowledge of Hindu Dharma. The second Great Assembly was held at *Dwijendra* high school on October 21 1961. This assembly debated the preparation of the *Eka Dasa Rudra* Ritual, which was planned to be performed in 1963. Also, it was decided to organize a retreat (*pangasraman*) for high priests, Hindu experts, and community leaders. The retreat or *Dharma Asrama* was held in the district of Gianyar from November 17 to 23 1961 and adopted the *Campuhan* Charter (*Piagam Campuhan*). The document calls for the establishment of a Hindu-based institution of higher education, the Institute Hindu Dharma.

It is noteworthy, that the *Campuhan* Charter is the first national Hindu document. It is structured in two parts: *Dharma Agama* (religious duties) and *Dharma Negara* (state duties). Dharma *Agama* denotes a dharmic life style oriented on the basic meta-framework of *Agama* Hindu (*Tatwa, Susila, Upacara*). Here the organicist understanding accords well with the Hindu Bali anthropology and concepts of governance. A Hindu has religious duties (*swadharma*), but as a citizen and social creature a Hindu has duties towards the community and the state. Hindus shall respect the *Pancasila* and the 1945 Basic Law. Hindus shall position themselves as to play an active role in national life. The confident style of argument and demand expressed in the document is remarkable. The *Parisada* used the public space to maneuver, and the first national *Eka Dasa Rudra* Ritual was carried out in 1963, playing a crucial role in the modern attempt to construct an Indonesian Hindu identity[260]. In 1969, the second *Eka Dasa Rudra* Ritual drew large attention from national and international media, therefore reconfirming the national and international recognition of Hindu Dharma Indonesia.

As the Balinese do not constitute the single Hindu community in Indonesia, the council made consistent efforts to open branches in all regions. In October 1964, the name was changed into *Parisada* Hindu Dharma for political reasons, to "safe the Hindu brethren outside Bali" (Sudharta Interview 2008). "More than ever before the general Hindu character of the religion of Bali was emphasized, whereas the specifically Balinese element was becoming less important". (Bakker 1993: 238) At the congress in 1964, the *Parisada* proclaimed five creeds (*panca sradha*) to be the theological foundation of Hindu Dharma, these five creeds parallel not only the principles of the state, but also the tenets of Indian neo-Hinduism and the Islamic pillars. As a result of the political tensions in Indonesia, many ethnic groups in Java, Sulawesi, Sumatra and other islands had joined the council. Thereafter the council began to represent all Hindu communities in Indonesia.

During the advent of the New Order, atheism and communism were interpreted either as threat to Islam or national unity. Therefore the adherence to an officially sanctioned religion was essential for survival, at the same time the management of religion gained more weight in the political arena. Linked to the ban of communism, one was in mortal danger, if one was reckoned as atheist. Especially in Java, the polarization between Islam and Communism, and the unease between orthodox ad contextual Muslims led to the perception that one either is a Muslim or a Communist, and unverified stories circulated announcing an assault on non-Muslims. (Sudharta 2006: 72; Sudharta Interview 2008) Affiliation with an officially recognized *agama*, at any rate, became crucial for all people classified as not having a religion yet.

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[259] The booklet comprises the topics of Dharma, Widhi Tatwa, Atma, Samsara, Karmaphala, and Moksa.

[260] In 1963, the first national *Eka Dasa Rudra* Ritual was carried out, which played a crucial role in the modern attempt to construct an Indonesian Hindu identity. According to some priests, the performance of that major ritual over several weeks was allegedly stage-managed by Sukarno, mistimed, and corrupted, in order to attract overseas travel agents and foreign investment. (Parker, 2004: 85 FN 14) During the performance of the ritual, the holy volcano *Gunung Agung* erupted. According to the local interpretation, the incorrect performance of the ritual caused the volcano to erupt. The eruption disturbed the performance of the ritual and damaged the crops, causing starvation, and this catastrophe was followed immediately by a rat plague. After those natural disasters (interpreted in local scriptures as divine sanctions), and the mass killings in 1965 and 1966, the performance of a purification ritual was required, as the island was contaminated and spiritually polluted due by the bloodshed, piling of corpses and mass graves. In 1969, the second *Eka Dasa Rudra* Ritual drew large attention from national and international media, therefore reconfirming the national and international recognition of Hindu Dharma Indonesia. After 1969 a big search (*ngereh soroh*) arose to find the appropriate ancestor line and basing on local genealogies (*babad*) several clans (*Pasek, Pande, Dukuh*) claimed descend from former Balinese nobility and don't accept the supremacy of the *Wong Majapahit*.

By the end of the 1960s, the Suharto Regime had developed the joint secretariat of the functional groups (*Sekber Golkar*) aiming to utilize all aspirations of the Indonesian citizenry positively. Fearing Christian and Islamic missionary work and accusations of communism, Cokorda Rai Sudharta and Ida Bagus Oka Punia Atmaja, two Jakarta-based *Parisada*' functionaries filed a petition for the admission of the *Parisada* to Golkar (*Golongan Karya*, functional groups) as a joint secretariat (Sekber, *Sekretariat bersama*) without knowledge of the entire council on July 6 1968. The *Parisada* was officially affiliated to Golkar on July 23 1968. The final official recognition of Hinduism, and interrelated to this process is the provision of the Hindu class and State Hindu institutions, has to be unambiguously brought in relation with the New Order's assumption of power and the rescue maneuver initiated by Balinese Hindus. With the affiliation to Golkar however, the *Parisada* was not anymore an independent Council, but a wheel in the Golkar machinery, it as a consequence Hinduism increasingly became indonesianized by the New Order regime. This affiliation has been severely criticized by 'subaltern' Balinese intellectuals.

In 1971, the *Besakih* temple was inaugurated as the central Indonesian Hindu sanctuary. Rituals conducted there are perceived to disseminate their respective energy benevolently across the entire archipelago and the world. In addition, the Hindu New Year *Nyepi* was proposed as national holiday and is since then a red-letter day and the dictum of *Desa-Kala-Patra* was made the contextual paradigm to adjust contingent tensions between *adat* and *agama*. In 1980, the discrimination between profane and sacral was formally introduced, to end and avert the inordinate sell-out and touristic exploitation of Balinese religion and culture. In the same year the inauguration of the *Tri Hita Karana* as basic pattern of life was introduced with the first long-term work program (*program kerja jangka panjang*)[261]. Echoing the national development plans, the program universally and programmatically defined *bhakti* (*keimanan*, faith) and *sradha* (*ketakwan*, following the commands of God) as Hindu method to attain the twofold soultion of *Moksartham Jagathita* to the problem of Hindu Dharma Indonesia. In the first step, physical well-being in this life (*jagadhita*) on the individual and communal level shall be attained, and in the next step spiritual bliss and the union of individual soul and the universal soul. The strategy adopted to realize this twofold aim on an universal and programmatic level is to enable national and civil organizations to strengthen *sradha* by improving a faith-based life based on the triangle of *satyam* (truth), *siwam* (purity), and *sundaram* (beauty, aesthetics).

In 1984, the council's short-term program outlined in the long-term program adopted the *Pancasila* as sole basis of the organization and implemented the *Pancasila* Comprehension and Practice Program (*Program Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*, henceforth P4-program) for the Hindu community using the administrative structure of Indonesia. This shows exemplarily the top-down process of implementing national guidelines into all the segments of the nation-state. Using the administrative structure, those programs were socialized into all groups and individuals. The P4 program resulted in the Pancasilzation of Hinduism and its increasing gradual Indonesianization afterwards. As extension of this policy, the Council gave its active support to the decision taken by the Suharto regime to require all students to attend the religion class from primary to higher education. (cf. Bakker 1993: 240)

During the 1970s, and 1980s the *Parisada* set up branches in almost all provinces and regencies. The council complied with the Suharto regime's state-building efforts and the culturalization of politics. During Suharto's presidency, several ethnic religions became Hindu and joined the *Parisada* and the Directorate General of Hindu Affairs. In consequence, the increasingly multi-ethnic composition of the Hindu congregation resulted in the universalization and global contextualization of Hindu Dharma Indonesia. In 1986, the council changed its name into *Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia*. In addition, it was decided to move the principal office from Denpasar to Jakarta. (Bakker 1993 238; Sudharta 2006)

The integration of ethnic groups into the fold of Hindu Dharma was accepted by the government, who saw in it a way of preserving the ethnic religions without violating the principle that every citizen had to embrace one of the state funded *agama*. (cf. Bakker 1993: 241) And of course, for the ethnic religions the possibility of being registered as Hindus while at the same time preserving some of their own religion was very attractive: "(…) their temples and rituals remained unchanged; the only thing expected of them was that they should take cognizance of the *Upadeca tentang Ajaran-ajaran Agama Hindu*, far less than would have been required had they become Muslim or Christian. (Bakker 1993: 241)

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[261] VI/TAP/M.SABHA/PHDP/1980

In consequence, Hindu Dharma Indonesia is monistic, and has five central creeds (*Panca Sradha*) as central element of *tatwa* (Philosophy). Whereas *tatwa* is identical for all Indonesian Hindus, ethics (*susila*) and ritual (*upacara*) may vary according to *desa, kala*, and *patra* among the Hindu groups in the archipelago[262]. As has been shown, there was "a world of difference in the experiences" (Bakker 1993: 241) of the Balinese and the ethnic religions with regard to their religious conceptualizations – Balinese Hinduism and the separate traditions of the ethnic religions.

Replying to economic, social, and political transformations in the 1990s, the *Parisada* changed its mere spiritual orientation and became increasingly involved into social issues after 1996[263]. Related to the increasing public space and room to maneuver during the tradition to democracy, the council's agenda moved away from its traditional focus on ritual and theology and began to focus on ethics and the active achievement of social welfare (*lokasamgraha*)[264].

As a consequence, its structure shows mechanism of participatory democracy. The current vision and mission statement focused on respect of plurality, social welfare, gender equality, the challenges of globalization, education, and the role of the young generations. (Dana: 2005) Continuing the thoughts of the early reformers, the twofold solution to the problem of Hindu Dharma Indonesia (*Moksartham Jagathita ca iti Dharma - Dharma* is the way to attain individual and communal physical-well, bliss and release from the cycle of rebirth) is maintained. (Dana: 2005) As Hindus live together with other religious communities without conflict in Bali and Indonesia since centuries, Hindus approve of intra-faith and inter-faith plurality and pluralism. (Dana: 2005)

Beginning with its formation, the *Parisada* has been structured bi-cameral, as its architects followed the organizational model of the Indonesian parliament and the Nahdlatul Ulama. (Dosther Interview 2007) Starting with the organizational restructuring in 2001, the council is now structured into a high priest 'chamber' (*sabha pandita*) headed by a *Dharma Adhyaksa* (Dharma prosecutor) and its vice prosecutor consisting of thirty-three professional high priests coming from all Hindu groups in Indonesia. With this restructuring the equal representation of Balinese, other ethnic groups, and *sampradaya* (currents) shall be guaranteed. The second chamber, the lay-men 'chamber' (*sabha walaka*), constitutes the administrative body and the management board. It comprises fifty-five lay Hindu members from all Hindu.

In 2001, the central Hindu council in Jakarta set out the strategy to re-actualize the interpretation of charity (*dana punia*) and four social groups (*catur varna*) in the community. In 2002, these new interpretations were codified in three *bhisama* (a legal statement binding for all Hindus issued by the council on a specific issue).

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[262] Concerning plurality, *Parisada* has published following considerations (Parisada 2006: 106-107) Agama Hindu is a religion that truly respects diversity. The multicultural Indonesian society and its various cultures are seen as a mosaic – a divine grace harboring affluent diversity. This diversity comprises ethnicity, race, religion, regions, which all are a given. Indonesia's multicultural social condition is interpreted as an exceptional cultural abundance. Naturally, diversity comes with the potential of conflict, if the citizenry or the state mismanages diversity. As shown in history, the Hindu-Bali community outside Bali and the non-Balinese Hindu communities feel comfortable with their experience of diversity as long as practices conform to the five basic creeds. Inherited from the ancestors, all Hindus apply their respective ritual system in their particular region of origin. Remarkable is here, the Parisada admits out of aforementioned reasoning that the standard of sanctuary ornamentation does not have to be identical with Balinese temples style.

[263] An Analysis of the monthly journal *Warta Hindu Dharma* was initially planned but then neglected, because it is not concerned with formal education in schools. There were virtually no articles on formal Hindu religious education in the years from 1998 to 2002. One of my informants even giggled amused as I have told him that I had considered using the WHD as a source. It sees itself mainly as a media to spread a certain conservative or super-*jero* understanding of Hinduism among its readers, but it appears to be quite apolitical until 2008. Since it is similar in style to Catholic tabloids, I consider it to be the propagation media of the *Parisada* and the traditionalist fraction of the *Brahmana Gang*. Its target group is the educated society interested in ahistoric and purist Hindu exegesis, but it appears as if the journal excludes contemporary issues and opinions which are considered to not benefit the system. During the monetary crisis, the fall of Suharto and the reform area criticism of the social situation remained quite subtle, afterwards it became more pronounced, but the journal is still mainly concerned with spiritual-philosophic questions and *usada*, less with economic, social or cultural pressures.

[264] The ideal of *lokasamgraha* is said to be understood following Dr Radhakrishnan as denoting '(t)he maintenance of the world stands for the unity of the world,* [and, AL] *the interconnectedness of society*'[264]. *Lokasamgraha* denotes universal well-being and social welfare. The concept of universal welfare is narrowed down and focused on the universal well-being of the Hindu community as part of the global community. Because all members of the world community are part of the global ensemble, if one community feels unwell, in this case the Indonesian Hindu community, global stability and welfare will not be achieved. Well-being is defined as a condition in which all Hindus can achieve an appropriate standard of life and are free from material and spiritual poverty. In essence, social welfare is interpreted as a target to be realized, and this is achieved by broadening the conception of *manusia yadnya* to include not only life-cycle rituals, but also charity (*dana punia*). (Interview Titib 2007; Dana 2005: 234) On base of compassion and cosmopolitism, contributions shall be made by Hindus for Hindus which will be used strategically for the long term benefit of the Indonesian Hindu human capital. Women shall be given the same opportunities as men, for that they together can drive forth the progress of Hinduism. This avowal of gender equality seems to be more than mere lip service, as there were many young woman given administrational tasks by Dana in 2007.

Those new interpretations are specified in the Strategic Socialization Plan and are to be implemented using following channels: 1.) education, 2.) Hindu social organizations, 3.) state institutions (MORA, Center for Clerics at the National Police and the National Army), 4.) mass media, and 5.) art. The 2001-2006 working program has the following arenas of activities: 1.) religion (*tatwa* and its realization), 2.) information and education, 3.) organization and management, 4.) economics and contributions, 5.) social and cultural sphere, and 6.) research and development.

In conclusion, the Hindu Council as modern organization lobbies for the rights of Balinese and Indonesian Hindus influencing the consolidation process of Indonesian Hindu Dharma since its inception. The *Parisada* is the highest independent Indonesian Hindu Dharma representative organization in the Indonesian nation-state. It is authorized by the government to administer Hindu Dharma affairs, and to monitor Hindu Dharma law. As official independent representative of the Hindu community, the council works closely together with governmental bodies, as the MORA, the Directorate General for the Guidance of the Hindu Congregation and other ministries to maintain a multicultural conception. The council's outreach is still insufficient as result limited human and financial resources. Therefore *Parisada* admits a lack of Hindu professionals in all sectors, which are central to increase the role of the *Parisada* in its relation with the state. *Parisada* representatives participate in numerous international, national, and regional meetings and conferences on community-building, inter-faith dialogue, inter-faith cooperation, and inter-faith harmony, as in the 1st ASEM Interfaith Dialogue that launched the "Bali Declaration on Building Interfaith Harmony with the International Community".

Participation in politics

In 2004, the *Parisada* criticized the Hindu community's tendency of either being apolitical - as result of being traumatized or even allergic to politics - or avoiding politics at any rate because ofpolitics image as dirty or high risk. Consequently, the *Parisada* calls for a new paradigm of "participation in politics" in order to eradicate the practices of collusion, corruption, and nepotism. Politics are seen as related to power and the functioning of the state, and thus politics are seen to be a noble profession, community assignment, and sacrifice, and not linked to personal greed and wealth. Therefore the PHDI proposes that

1. The Hindu community shall engage actively in daily politics while respecting the incandescence of Hindu morality and ethics
2. The Hindu community may have divergent political opinions, yet these controversies shall not cause the disintegration of the Hindu community
3. Hindu politicians struggling to forward the interest of their party shall remember the interests of the Hindu community.
4. The Hindu community in general shall be guided always and in every activity by the doctrines compiled in the Catur Veda.

In addition, the *Parisada* distributed an information and motivation letter to all regional branches to socialize its new paradigm.

1. Taking actions in the arena of politics is a responsibility of the community (*niatam karma*)
2. While doing politics one should orient oneself on Hindu vales, moral and ethics in line with the *Lokasamgraha* Vision
3. Differences in political opinions and aspirations shall not cause conflicts or the disintegration of the Hindu community
4. The overture to engage actively in politics shall not influence the autonomy of the *Parisada* (this pertains to the *Parisada* functionaries in the regions)

As the PHDI is an independent Hindu Council and a faith-based/moral institution, it is not engaged in party politics and elections[265]. It does not recommend the Hindu community to vote for a certain party, because this would contravene the concept of democratic, free, direct, public, and secret elections. However, the *Parisada* encourages Hindu voters to elect a '*kebhinekkan*' party promoting plurality. That is not to say that Balinese are democratic, but the study likes to point out, that centralistic and authoritarian as well as pluralistic and democratic trends and traditions have existed and blended in Bali. Since the formation of the state, Balinese intellectuals support and back the plural and multicultural conception of *Pancasila* and *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, which are deeply rooted in the pre-Islamic Hindu-Buddhist legacy.

Hindu Council Policies on Hindu Education

The *Parisada* currently attempts to evaluate the quality of the Hindu education system, its content and the curriculum. The council aims to invent creative pedagogy and teaching methods. Besides strengthening faith, the Hindu class and Hindu education is considered to promote economic, political, scientific, and technological progress in this world. This section describes the recommendations and regulations on the Hindu class and Hindu education issued by the *Parisada* chronologically.

1961 Campuhan Charter

In the founding document, the Piagam *Parisada*, education is mentioned as a field of activity. The 1961 *Campuhan* Charter has invoked in section A Dharma *Agama*, first article the Indian Vedas (*Weda Sruti*) and the *smriti* texts (*Dharma Sastra Smirti)* as basic sacred scriptures, however, listed are Javanese medieval and Balinese scriptures and not the standard Indian systematic. In its second article, the section demands the establishment of an *Asrama Pangadyayan* (religious tertiary institute), a place to study dharma. This aspiration was realized on October 3rd, 1963 with the opening of the Hindu Dharma Institute (now UNHI[266]) in Denpasar. Referring to the nation state's pluralistic Basic Law, the council shows its nationalistic orientation, while at the same time it insists on providing Hindu education at all levels of schooling and higher education. Section B, *Dharma Negara*, article 3 of the *Campuhan* Charter states:

> Espousing the first principle *Belief in One Supreme Lordship*, the *Pancasila* is well-thought-of and the council is of the opinion that every citizen shall obey this principle. The council votes for the provision of instruction in *Dharma Agama* at schools and urges the governmental bodies to draft and adopt regulations that implement the religion class in the embraced faith and explanations on the fountainhead of One Supreme Lordship as compulsory class for students at public and private schools and in higher education and urges the MORA to implement the council's decree in order to provide the Hindu Bali religion class in schools, where Dharma Hindu Bali adherents attain class. (Sudharta 2006: 52, own translation)

The fourth point of section B, *Dharma Negara*, reads:

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[265] During the transition to democracy criticism of the social situation remained quite subtle in the Warta Hindu Dharma, afterwards it became more pronounced. The editions of 1998 and 1999 do reflect on a spiritual crisis in Indonesia, but are not critical at all, at best they engage in a subtle criticism as it was common under the Suharto regime for the reason not to lose the publishing license. Probably the editorial board feared a situation like in 1965 and remained therefore silent and observant. There are a few articles on the use of Hindu concepts in intercultural conflicts and about clean government, but they are philosophically oriented towards Hindu scriptures and their exegesis and mention no implication for practical concerns. In august 1998 the WHD published an article, criticizing a high priest (*pedanda*) for actively engaging in the then political uproar. (Madrasuta 1998: Pedanda Demonstran. WHD, Agustus 1998, 377: 8-9) A high priest is described as holding a religious office that is bond on certain conditions and rules, obligations and competencies that are termed *Sasana Kawikon*. Traditionally, *Sasana Kawikon* is related to the performance of Hindu rituals. The duty of a high priest is to point on auspicious days (*dewasa ayu*) for rituals and to decide on the complexity of *upakara* used to perform the ritual. The Kawikon also contains rules of conduct or a code of conduct. Outside the field of religion, a high priest cannot do much. He can express himself on the field of art, architecture or literature, but may not be indulge himself in the field of economics. A high priest may be concerned with science, but may not engage in research which uses animals in tests. The author is then further of the opinion that a high priest may not participate in politics. A high priest may not use the obedience or relationship of his subjects (*siwa-sisya*) to influence or manipulate the direction or the political choice of the community, because this would diminish individual freedom. Then the protest-priest is named: Ida Pedanda Gede Sebali Tianyar Arimbawa has participated in discussions on social, societal and religion problems. He also participated in the mass demonstrations and protests against Suharto in Jakarta. Accompanied by some Hindu exponents he went to the parliament and expressed his sorrows about the present situation in Indonesia. Curiously this criticized high priest was Ida Pedanda Gede Sebali Tianyar Arimbawa, who was appointed *Dharma Adhyaksa* or Chief Dharma prosecutor of Indonesia from 2001-2006 and was re-appointed from 2007-2011. He then also signed the 'participation in politics' – paradigm of the *Parisada* in 2004.

[266] Between employees and graduates of UNHI, the Parisada as its founding and operational organization, the local government, the national government the MORA, the Hindu Directorate, the Army and Policy (graduates are employed at the Centre for Clerics) close links are entertained. UNHI was established explicitly as a Hindu cadre training centre, since the Parisada needed educated Hindus and Hindu experts to place them in strategic positions in the government or in the army, expert capable to systematize Hinduism and teachers to be employed all over Indonesia.

Considering that the establishment of a Hindu Bali section in the central MORA has not been achieved, and the fact that the position of the Independent Religion Office of the Bali Region has been not revised, and in line with the claim of the Bali regional government, the Council urges the central government to end this intolerable condition immediately which cannot continue into the present. And, in addition to it, in all areas where Hindus settle, such as Lampung and Lombok, the government shall pay attention to these communities by establishing a Hindu Bali section to cultivate inter-faith life. (Sudharta 2006: 57, own translation)

Only after the Suharto take-over, as Sudharta (2006: 57) remarks, a triangle meeting between representatives of the *Parisada*, the regional government and the Independent Religion Office of the Bali Region had been hold.

1968 Decree

Then the Great Assembly held by the *Parisada* adopted the second decree in December 1968. Its consented areas of operation were in fields of *adat*, developmental economy, education, culture, priesthood, sacred scriptures, and ritual. With regard to education, it was consented to continue the strategy of *baliseering*: Hindu religion and philosophy shall consequently inspire all subjects in school and efforts shall be made to strengthen moral and character (*budhi pekerti*) and faith. (Sudharta 2006: 72) This had an immediate impact, as the first official curriculum on Hindu religious education was established by the second decree in 1968. The table shows the content of the Hindu class at all levels of educational:

(a) Elementary level (age 7 – 12)	(d) Higher education (age 19 +)
Traditional folk songs containing educational and religious elements	(1) Tatwa/ Philosophy
(2) Regional language and script	(2) Ethics (Susila *Agama*)
(3) Religious fairy tales	(3) Ritual and Ritual materials (Upacara/Upakara)
(4) Religious duties (Dharma *Agama*)	(4) Dharma *Agama*
(5) Ethics (Susila *Agama*)	(5) Religious Science
(b) Junior High level (age 13 – 15)	
(1) Ethics (Susila *Agama*)	
(2) Ritual and Ritual materials (Upacara/ Upakara)	
(3) Basics in Tatwa/ Philosophy	
(4) Dharma *Agama*	
(c) Senior High level (age 16 – 19)	
(1) Ethics (Susila *Agama*)	
(2) Tatwa/ Philosophy	
(3) Ritual and Ritual materials (Upacara/Upakara)	
(4) Dharma *Agama*	

1973 Decree

The third decree in 1973 set out the strategies to be followed. Thereby the targets to be achieved in the arena of in-school (material) and out-of-school (non-material) education became clearer. Concerning formal education, subsequent agenda is outlined:

1. The *Parisada* is responsible for the compilation of a synchronized, systematic and normative curriculum for Hindu instruction at all levels of the education system and to submit it to the responsible institution.
2. The *Parisada* is responsible for the compilation of a curriculum for the training of the professional priesthood
3. The *Parisada* is responsible for the standardization of text books that can be used as manual at every grade and level of education
4. The *Parisada* is responsible for increasing the efforts made to help Hindu schools thereby guaranteeing their continued existence
5. If funds are available, the *Parisada* is responsible for increasing the number of Hindu-based schools. Failing that, courses shall be held at the Hindu teacher colleges. The *Parisada* shall establish Hindu faith-based schools and general schools with a Hindu ethos.
6. The *Parisada* shall open '*Pengasraman*' in addition to existent schools, thereby advancing the efficiency of Hindu instruction and education for the community.
7. The *Parisada* shall urge the government to increase the appointment of Hindu educators across Indonesia, whether permanently employed, non-permanently employed, or paid by honorarium.

1980 Decree

Subsequent sixth degree in 1980 on community structure has laid out more carefully the targets to be achieved within the scope of the formal education system. The decree mentions the allocation of grants and scholarships as a necessary means for the production of a cadre in the arena of religion. In the context of socializing the *Pancasila* Comprehension and Practice Program (*Program Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*, P4-program), the Hindu community shall ensure the continuous orientation on P4 as the national standard (Pancasilaization and Indonesianization of HDI).

1. **Infrastructure**

In the arena of formal education, the establishment of Hindu-based Teacher Training colleges, public schools at all levels of the education system and teacher training colleges shall be developed

The quality of education and training at the IHD shall be increased and the infrastructure and materials shall be improved

The *Parisada* shall continuously exercise pressure on the government to nationalize teacher training colleges across the country, especially outside Bali and the nationalization of the IHD shall be prosecuted as additional teacher training colleges shall be established in regions where the Hindu community is booming as in Central Kalimantan.

2. **Educational Staff**

The *Parisada* shall continuously exercise pressure on the government to appoint state religion instructors at all levels of the education system. This shall be done especially in regions where the Hindu community is a scattered minority.

In the assignment of religion instructors to a region the dedication or will of the instructor in question to be assigned to that certain region shall be considered.

3. **Curriculum**

A systematic, normative, synthesized and structured curriculum shall be compiled and put to practice at all levels of the education system, therewith a reasonable and effective HRE system will be offered, that is capable to nurture in Hindu faith sustainably.

The curriculum shall be compiled according to the level of age, education and development of the child

Hindu faith textbooks have to be compiled and published as teaching aids to support such a curriculum. The textbooks have to be structured in a consistent pattern.

The long-term program passed in 1980 repeated the council's call to 1.) nationalize the Hindu teacher training college (PGAH) in Denpasar, 2.) establish Hindu-based schools in all regions where a demand for Hindu-based educational units exists, 3.) appoint Hindu teachers and supervisors for Hindu teachers to schools, where Hindu students attain class, and 4.) improve the function and role of the IHD as research, interpretation, and development institution for Hindu doctrines. With regard to parents, their role in the religious education of their children shall be increased in the family context, that is to say more attention shall be given for appropriate religious nourishing. The call to nationalize the IHD were repeated in 1991 and reiterated until its realization in 1999. In addition, the decree set out the following strategy in the educational sector (formal and non-formal education): 1) complying with national development targets, the functional transfer of the State Hindu Teacher Training College (PGAHN) into an Institute of Teachers' Education (LPTK, *Lembaga Pendidikan Tenaga Kependidikan*) that has a status, role, and function in the training of Hindu teachers shall be achieved, 2.) the establishment of a Hindu university shall be accomplished (this was achieved in 1993), and its role and function as Hindu studies center in research, interpretation, education, training, and information shall be strengthened 3.) and the quantity and quality of *pasraman* shall be increased across Indonesia.

In 1996, the council set itself the task to formulate a model and plan for out-of-school religious education by inaugurating the family as the central agent in religious education. For the first time in its history, the council engaged in social and political means by undertaking a census of all religion instructors from elementary to tertiary level across Indonesia and actively engaged in political efforts to realize the appointment of Hindu religion teachers at all levels of schooling. In addition, it investigated and reported on the number, quality, and status of all Hindu teacher training colleges and institutions should be investigated and reported.

Working Program 2001-2006

In the information and education sector, the working program of the *Parisada* sets out the strategy (point 4 and 6) for the period 2001-2006 to formulate a proper standardized Hindu education concept and its subject matter for all ages and social strata in all from kindergarten to higher education. This program shall be annually assessed and evaluated in order to report on the program's level of effectiveness and success. Furthermore, the provision of Hindu education material shall be improved for all educational streams at all levels (Sunday schools, *pasraman*, ashrams, formal, and non-formal education). In consequence, a periodic *sraddha*-deepening program for all age groups and social groups in the Hindu community shall be implemented, as a week-end *ashrams* for children at the pre-school and elementary level, youth-camps for the higher education levels, discussion forums for students and the youth, and pilgrimages for their parents.

Efforts to be realized were 1.) compilation of a comprehensive data set of Hindu education institutions at all levels (the program was successful, as the data on the Hindu population and Hindu education show), 2.) building new schools and renovating the existing school buildings, 3.) increasing the Hindus education systems academic status, quality and teaching management. The working program then identifies steps to be taken (many of them have been realized in 2007 according to my judgment, as I have visited the central secretariat four times from 2007-2009):

1. Formation of an archive and data management center at the central secretariat, which powers a representative internet presence
2. Enhancing the quality and distribution of the Journal Warta Hindu Dharma, organizing discussions on Hindu development
3. Increasing the amount and quality of Hindu broadcasting by utilizing mass media through the community
4. Establishing a *Parisada* Publishing House
5. Launching and operating an Hindu based radio
6. Providing continuously trainings and assigning *Dharma Duta* (Dharma delegates) to the Hindu pockets in the regions
7. Collecting data on and improving the welfare of Hindu teachers across Indonesia
8. Collecting data on and advancing the cooperation with Hindu *Widyalaya* education institutions from kindergarten to higher education
9. Compiling and preparing a Hindu religion instruction curriculum for all educational levels and types
10. Deepening the understanding of *bhakti* and *sradha* in all levels of formal, non-formal and informal education, youth camps, religious discussion forums and *Dharma Sadhana*
11. Establishing a *Parisada* Center Library and pushing the regional offices across Indonesia to establish libraries focusing on Hindu literature.
12. Offering various training to the young generation in order to nourish and strengthen *bhakti* and *sradha*.

The program's responsibility report enlists 130 activities that have been exercised in the sector of education and information. Because the recommendations of the *Parisada* are included into effective law, it is safe to assess that the *Parisada* is successfully lobbying for its interests realizing its targets.

2002 Bhisama: Education a crucial vehicle

The 2002 *bhisama* introduces education as a crucial vehicle to disseminate the council's renewed interpretation of Hindu Dharma Indonesia. In 2002, for the *Parisada* launched a Hindu education institute[267], which is given manifold tasks in the educational sector and in curriculum compilation. When I visited the *Parisada* central office in Jakarta, the institute has not been operational – due to insufficient funding and expert staffing. Educational institutions at the formal (schooling and higher education) and non-formal level (families and society) are interpreted by the council as efficient channels for the socialization of the new *bhisama*. The content of the *bhisama* have to be disseminated in such a form that it befits the respective (evolving) intellectual and acculturation capacity. The implementation of the *bhisama* is not required to follow literally the high priest council's interpretation. But it has to correspond to the essence contained therein, which in turn shall motivate the Hindu congregation to follow and practice it. The methods (*Sad Dharma*) to nurture in the new competencies used in formal and non-formal education are:

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[267] Executive Board Decree No 030/SK/ParisadaPusat/X/2002, October 14th 2000

1. *Dharma Wacana* (method of speech/lecture)
2. *Dharma Tula* (discussion method: panel, sarasehan, symposium, seminar)
3. *Dharma Santi* (reading Vedas communal approach method, networks and clubs, silaturahmi/maintaining family ties; *anjangsana*/ philanthropic visits to orphanages)
4. *Dharma Gita* (Vedas reading method in *pesantian* mode, from club to national level)
5. *Dharma Yatra* (pilgrimage method in order to attain enlightenment)
6. *Dharma kanti* (method of cooperation with social organizations and state institutions)

Those methods are very effective in the nurturing in of religion and religious competencies and are applied for all Hindu communities (Sujana Interview 2007) Those methods are used to achieve the twofold solution to the problem of Hindu Dharma: *Moksartham Jagathiaya ca iti Dharmah*, dharma is the path to achieve bliss and release. Since the *Parisada*, the Head of the Hindu Education section at the Directorate General, and the Head of the Curriculum Subdivision refer to those methods as specific Hindu methodology of instruction, it is safe to assess that the *Parisada* conception is not only implemented in law, but also in textbooks, curricula and syllabi. In consequence, it shapes life and conduct of the contemporary and the next young generations of Indonesian Hindus.

Parisada Recommendation Letter 5 /2003

In the section pertaining to consequential actions to be taken in defining the National education Act 20/ 2003, the *Parisada* recommendation letter 5 /2003 to the national government proposed that during the drafting process of the new law on religious instruction and faith-based education (passed in 2008) there will be explicitly recorded that in particular areas which have sufficient Hindu communities, the government will establish general faith-based state elementary schools (*AdiWidyalaya*) with an Hindu ethos, junior high schools (*MadyamaWidyalaya*) senior high schools andhigher education (*MahaWidyalaya*). (Dana 2005: 241-243) Note, borrowed from India (*vidyalaya*: (Hindi) school and *vikasa*: school), the brand new Hindu term '*Widyalaya*' denotes a formal general faith-based school system, likewise the term *Bala Wikasa* is used to identify out-of-school formal education at the *Pasraman*. Furthermore, the council has introduced a discrimination between material (formal) and non-material education (non-formal), referring to an earlier discrimination in 2007. At the non-formal education path, which is managed and operated by a specific Hindu community, the subject matter of the curriculum is focused on Pesantian or the art of reciting sacred scriptures (Vedas, Mantras, *tembang*) by use of the methods of Sad Dharma. The contents of education are reciting, preparing offerings, praying, and yoga.

In context of *Widyalaya*, it is the task of the government to compile the organizational and technical guideline on the procedures of establishment, management and *Widyalaya* curriculum at each level of the education system. In the case of conditions which do not allow for the organization of *Widyalaya*s on all levels, it shall be guaranteed that Hindu students are able to attend the Hindu class at the level of compulsory schooling and higher education. In line with Act 20/2003, article 12, paragraph 1a, it shall be stated in public policies in an affirmative and clear manner that every Hindu student at any educational has the right to attend the Hindu class. In addition, a qualified Hindu teacher, who embraces Hindu Dharma, shall be appointed to the respective educational unit. As this call of the *Parisada* is difficult to implement in all regions for various reasons (ideology, access, budget), the *Parisada* has been authorized by the Hindu directorate in 2006 to provide long-distance and online Hindu classes and to issue certifications which will be included in the report to ensure the promotion of Hindu students at all levels of education.

The *Parisada* recommendation letter 5 /2003 to the national government introduces three types of life-long systematic formal and non-formal educational units. It mentions *pasraman, pesantian* and express *pasraman*. Those types of Hindu education units are already successfully operated in the Hindu congregation. Their objective is nurturing in (implant in original) *sradha* and *bhakti* for *Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*. The *Pasraman* operate formal religious education at all levels (from *Adi Bala Wikasa* to *Maha Bala Wikasa*). The *pasraman* strengthen the skills and capacities of the students to become a religious expert as postulated by the national educational objective. Next, *pesantian* are operated for the participants at all ages and social strata of the Hindu congregation. *Pesantian* provide Hindu-based religious education in form of applied spiritual education as reading Vedas, *Dharma Gita* (sacred songs), sacred art, and. The express *pasraman* organize society-based religious education in national vacations. The call for *pengasraman* was voiced as early as 1971, to allege an example, but only put to practice in 2005.

The management board of the *Parisada* is given the mandate to coordinate relations with the government and related institutions. It shall guarantee that the council's recommendations will be included in the draft of the Act on the religion class and faith-based education (passed in 2008). This has been achieved successfully, as all new conceptualized types eventually were included in the Act. In addition, the council shall formulate a proposal on the subject matter of the organizational and technical guideline on the procedures of establishment, management and curriculum of *Widyalaya*, *Bala Wikasa*, *pesantian* and express *pasraman* and at all educational levels. The council's task is to socialize the Act and its implementation guidelines by organizing training in management and teachings for the administrative and educational staff of the respective *pasraman*. Until 2005, there were out of the total sum only 23 Hindu faith-based foundations registered with the *Parisada*, amongst them the *Widya Kerthi* foundation, which is the legal body to operate education at UNHI.

2005 Education Operation Scheme

In 2005, the *Parisada* adopted an Education Operation Scheme[268] which in essence reiterates the contents of the recommendation letter. The introductory paragraph describes the educational condition of the Hindu community as the worst in Indonesia. To demonstrate this fact, the state of illiteracy of the Hindu community from 1980 to 2000 is referred to as the lowest among the faith-based communities. The illiteracy rate among the Hindu congregation amounted 38 percent in 1980, 25 percent in 1990, 16, 9 percent in 2000 and finally 15, 56 percent (9, 70 male and 21, 39 female). In comparison to this, the Muslim illiteracy rate is at 11, 2 percent, the Protestant rate is at 10, 2 percent, the Catholic illiteracy rate is at 10, 4 percent and the Buddhist illiteracy rate was the lowest, only 6, 6 percent. The overall illiteracy rate of Indonesia was at 10, 21 percent in 2005, 6, 52 percent for the male population and 13, 84 percent of the female population. (Departmen Pendidikan 2007: 293, 298) Considering that the female illiteracy rate of Balinese women is more than twice as high as the national rate, the gender equality program of the council becomes self-evident.

The second paragraph summarizes that the backward and marginal educational condition of the Hindu community causes low standards of well being and social welfare and results in low participatory activities in the economic as well as in the social and the political domains of national progress. This condition transfers in turn a negative image on the Hindu community, as if the Hindu community could not create a working ethos that conveys well being and welfare on its members, since its members are overwhelmingly peasants with low standards of education and economy. Thus the Christian and Muslim communities then would prejudice Hindu religion as to be primitive, polytheistic, and superstitious, thereby locating the Hindu community in a difficult position within the nation. The young Hindu generations would increasingly convert to Islam and Christianity, because Hindu religion is considered by them to provide less effective answers to their evolving intellectual and spiritual needs.

In connection with the rapid pace of globalization, the primary strategy of the council must aim at educating a qualified and competitive Hindu human capital capable to answer the challenges of globalization thereby averting that the already marginalized position of the Hindu community will increasingly mingle around the margins of society. Therefore a Hindu-faith based education system as outlined in the *bhisama* and working program must be immediately realized and established. Formal faith-based in-school and out-of-school education (*vidyalaya, bala visaka*) and non-formal education (*pesantian, sadharma*) shall constitute the structural embryo of a universal Hindu human resources character building in contemporary times and in future, and the growth of the embryo must be focused on in order to equip the Hindu community for international competition. The online version of the *Parisada*'s Dharma Duta *Widyalaya* may be accessed on http://www.*Parisada*.org/.

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[268] No 11/Kep/P.A.Parisada/VII/2005, July 13th 2005

5.3.5. Megalithic to modern religion: Core concepts

The following list gives a tentative summary of the main traits of Balinese religious practices from prehistory to contemporary Hindu Dharma Indonesia. Swellengrebel (1960: 28-29) differentiates between indigenous cultural elements and cultural elements of Hindu or Hindu Javanese origin. I synthesized the pre-Majapahit and post-Majapahit elements in my approach, however, the summary follows a chronological order ranging from Indo-Melanesian (Malayo-Sumbawan; Adelaar: 2005) elements to Indianized, Javanized, and finally modern elements.

1. The temple system evolved out of the megalithic sanctuaries of the Malayo-Polynesian tribes settling in Bali. The sanctuaries were open spaces surrounded by walls, where big stones were placed. At this place, all religious ceremonies were held. In contemporary Bali and in the past, priests invoke the invisible Gods and ancestors to sit on stone seats or contemporary on shrines. (Liefrinck 1934 in Swellengrebel 1960: 28-29)

2. Belief in *Rwa Bhinneda*) (dualism or bipolar division of existence, *dwaita*) expressed in (1) a undiversified (*niskala*) and a diversified (*sekala*) realm (Suka Yasa Interview 2007; Triguna protocol 2007)

3. Anchestor worship (Liefrinck 1934 in Swellengrebel 1960: 28-29; Sudharta Interview 2008) and the centrality of cremation ceremonies (Ida Pedanda Bajing Interview 2006, 2009; Titib Interview 2007; Sukerda Protocol 2007)

4. Belief in life after death and cycle of rebirth (Santeri 1992: 98-117)

5. Centrality of megalithic bronze gongs and five-tone music (*angkluh, gamelan*) in rituals

6. Agriculture based religion: central function of wet-rice cultivation

7. Patrinlinear descent groups and the *purusa* line (Howe 1987: 143; Parker 2004: 77): the male line of the descent group is prominent, traditional "viri-local residence pattern and patrilineal inheritance of land". (Parker 2004: 77) The task of a *Suputra* (noble descendent) is to set out the cremation rituals for his elders and the rituals for his ancestors), in order to place or revere them in the ancestor shrine where they become '*bhatara*' or divinized ancestors, believed to protect their descent group. The *triwangsa* and *purusa* system enforces male supremacy and female subordination. Female uproar could endanger this social order. This system proscribes hypogamy[269], encourages polygyny[270], supports male-only inheritance, prescribes marginal position for women in genealogical lines, discourages divorce, and has many ramifications that in daily life place woman in a position of dependency and inferior to men. (Parker 2004: 113)

8. Veneration of the Earth, related to this is the element of the blood sacrifice (*caru, tawur*) and game-cock breeding, which are used as animal sacrifice (Geertz 1973)

9. Veneration of Mountains, where the ancestors souls reside (All ancestors reside in Besakih) (Santeri 1992: 98-117)

10. Veneration of Trees. Appreciation and love of nature and environment (as expressed in the ideal paradigm of *Tri Hita Karana*, but often neglected for economic reasons)

11. Complex networks of social relations that are related to temples and ritual or social meta-systems, in which membership and relations or duties are overlapping. Family clan system (*dadia, pamaksan, soroh;* Howe 1987) and genealogical descent group system (*Triwangsa/Sudra; Jaba-Jero*) often confused with Indian caste system; democratic community systems (one man, one vote; Howe 1987: 143) and the pattern of *gotong royong* (mutual help): *Banjar* (neighborhood communities), *desa* (village systems, boundaries are defined by temple maintenance, the annual purifying ritual, each *desa* has its own specific and distinctive set or corpus of laws (*awig awig*). *Sekaa* (specific voluntary interest groups, membership is defined by age or activities like *gamelan* (music), dancing, kites etc), *Subak* (community of wet-rice-farmers)

12. Preparation of holy water (*tirtha*) by priests

13. Complex offering system

14. Brahmin rituals

15. Religious writings and mystical speculations

16. The *triwangsa* system (Swellengrebel 1960: 30; Howe 1987)

17. Hindu *paksa* or internal pluralism (Tantrayana, Yoga, and Samkya; modern: Sai Baba, Hare Krishna and other '*Sampradaya*', terminus technicus for spiritual cults oriented at Indian Hinduism. Internal Hindu currents now register with MORA, if they fulfill the prescription of the Department, as the Sick community for example)

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[269] Hypogamy: the marriage of a *triwangsa* man to a woman of lower social class or status.
[270] Polygyny: a form of polygamy, where a man has more than one female sexual partner or wife at the same time.

5.3.6. Upadeca: Hindu Dharma Indonesia's meta-framework

> I am very proud to be a Hindu, since all basic principles and concepts exist in Hindu religion. The objective of existence is to achieve composure (serenity, tranquility and bliss), and composure is only to be achieved in Hinduism. My *agama* provides far ranging latitude of styles to face God, either through *bhakti, karma, jnana, yoga marga*. 'I Love Hindu' not only since I work as an official [...], but merely due to my Hindu self-conception.
>
> (Triguna, 2007)

Prothero's (2010) four-part approach to the religions was used to analyze and describe the basic tenets of Indonesian Hindu Dharma as outlined in the *Upadeca* (Hindu meta-framework) published in 1967 and by analyzing my questionnaire I distributed[271]. Thereby I was able to confirm the basic tenets of Hindu Dharma Indonesia outlined in 1967.

Since its establishment in 1959, the Hindu Council[272] published books on Hindu Dharma in Indonesian language. The fact that the early *Parisada* published in Indonesian language indicates that the members were mostly western-educated and nationalist in orientation. The "fantastic three", Ida Bagus Mantra, Ida Bagus Oka Puniatmaja, and Cokorda Rai Sudharta translated Indian scriptures as the *Bhagavad Gita* and the Law of Manu (*Manawadharmasastra*) into Indonesian language. I call them the "*fantastic three*" as they shaped to great extents the course of HDI and the life of the Hindu congregation.They also took the initiative to compose the *Upadesa*.

> Their work was highly efficient, because they composed the content in one week only, the conceptual outline was arranged and written by Cokorda Rai Sudharta. The *Upadesa* was the first short standard reference volume covering the raw essence of Hindu teachings in Bali. There have been several books before the *Upadesa* aiming to deliver a basic reference standard, but the Upadesa was the first book to introduce Hindu teaching in a systematic way. (Sura Interview 2006)

Most likely in 1963[273], following the first Assembly (*Mahasabha*) of the Hindu Council the *Upadeca* has been compiled. During the *Mahasabha* in 1961*,* the Council decided that the basic framework of *Agama* Hindu should be presented and compiled systematically in one book – a book, in which all the basic creeds and convictions – the meta-framework (*kerangka agama*) of the young religion were contained. (Sudharta Interview 2008)

> Ida Bagus Mantra, who studied in India, assembled 7 people in his house. We compiled the *Upadesa*. Seven people were coordinated by Ida Bagus Mantra, to stay at his house and compile the *Upadeca*. We were not allowed to leave or to go home. We had to eat there so that our thoughts were concentrated and focused on our task. All our knowledge and opinions were discussed and poured into the *Upadeca*. The seven people were Bagus Oka Punia Atmaja, Pedanda Wayan Sidemen, Ida Bagus Mantra, Ida Bagus Dosther, Ida Bagus Alit, Mertha from the MORA, and me- Cok Rai Sudharta.

In consequence, the meta-framework of Hindu Dharma Indonesia (henceforth HDI) which is followed until today has been constructed in a conscious effort by seven Balinese reformers – three of them studied in India: Oka Punia Atmaja, Cok Rai Sudharta, and Ida Bagus Mantra. The book is written in form of a dialogue between the teacher Rsi Dharmakerti and the disciple Sang Suyasa – a characteristic style of Upanishad Hindu literature.

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[271] This chapter is based on an analysis of the Upadeca and the evaluation of my questionnaire. In my view it is amazing in how far the Upadeca shapes the understanding of Agama Hindu in the following generations. The analysis of the questionnaires gave me to almost congruent information about HDI as they have been comnpiled in the Upadeca, 40 years ago.

[272] The *Parisada* published the first book on Agama Hindu *Dharma Prawerti Sastra*. Pandit Shastri had composed the book *Intisari Agama Hindu*, but it was too difficult to understand for the broad Balinese community, probably for the fact that he was an Indian he did not have a proper or a limited understanding of Balinese religion. (Sura Interview 2006) Ida Bagus Oka Puniatmaja composed the book *Pancasradha Silakrama*. Other published works were the *Sarasamuscaya* I and II, the Balinese Calendar, and the monthly journal *Warta Hindu Dharma*. In Gede Suras opinion, until today there is no continuance to further develop and broaden the paramount effort in publishing conducted in the 1960s. Contemporary, the council operates several foundations, as the Paramita and the Ma*bhakti* foundation, to publish books on Hindu themes.

[273] Cok Rai Sudharta could not recall exactly the year during the interview, at this time he was employed at the Literature Faculty at the Udayana University and had just been appointed as Head of the local Office of Religious Affairs in Denpasar.

The problem and solution of *Agama* Hindu Indonesia, is in my view, the existence of eternal and immutable bliss and truth. Or in other words, the problem refers to the blindness of the human about their true nature. Caused by the circle of reincarnation (*punarbhawa*), humans experience attachment to worldly matters, the wrong perception (*maya*) and suffering. The problem's solution constitutes attaining knowledge and comprehension of the true human nature, which detaches and releases humans from the circle of rebirth (*moksa*). The techniques (ethics, prayer) and exemplars (*resi, guru*) provide the way and practice how to obtain such eternal bliss and truth. All humans may achieve such eternal bliss and truth, if they pursue *agama* as provided by the sacred Veda with pure hearts and sincerity. (*Upadeca* 1967: 11)

According to the participants in my study, the contemporary Indonesian Hindu community is characterized by the specific Hindu formula of greeting, gesture and parting, the "Hindu salute". The Hindu salute has been invented by the authors of the *Upadeca*, as the fantastic three felt the need to invent a uniform salute similar to the Indian *namaste* after their studies in India. The primary verbal formal greeting and salutation is OM SWASTYASTU, meaning "I hope you experience a good condition as grant from Hyang Widhi Wasa". Like the most sacral Swastika symbol (卐), the Hindu salute symbolizes the basic power and welfare of the macrocosm and microcosm. (*Upadeca* 1967: 11) The reply to the Hindu salute or verbal closing of prayer and religious speeches is OM SHANTI SHANTI SHANTI, which means "I hope you experience peace as grant from Hyang Widhi Wasa". (*Upadeca* 1967: 12)

Agama is understood as faith in the sacred teachings revealed by the immortal and immutable *Sang Hyang Widhi* (One Supreme Lordship). The faith the Balinese adhere to is *Agama* Hindu or Hindu Dharma. *Agama* Hindu has been revealed to Sang Hyang Widhi, who has descended to earth. It has unfolded around the holy Sind river for the first time. (*Upadeca* 1967: 13) The basic understanding of HDI is delineated in subsequent motto: "*Agama* is to us the Dharma and eternal truth which covers all human ways of life". (*Upadeca* 1967: 13) In consequence, HDI is not a dogma, but a way of life amongst others. (cf. Sarkar 1922)

The solution of HDI is to attain *Moksartham Jagadhitaya Ca Iti Dharma.* Dharma or *agama* help release (*moksartham*) the soul (*jiwatman*) from the cycle of rebirth and to achieve individual and communal spiritual and physical or material wellbeing and bliss *(jagadhita)* (*Upadeca* 1967: 13) – during this life and for the lives to come prior to release. The participants to my study are congruous in their view that *agama* Hindu is flexible, open, and replies tospatio-temporal-contextual requirements(*desa, kala, patra*). It is written in the Veda that contents may be neglected, which are not congruent with epochal needs. As Hindu teachings correspond to the changing conditions of each four eras (*yuga*), *Agama* Hindu is always up to date and in line with the changing epochal needs. Therefore *agama* Hindu requires not to be changed, but to be deepened (educational aspect)and actualized to the requirements of location, time, and situation (*desa, kala, patra*). (Questionnaires)

The four Vedas (*Catur Veda Samhita)* are acknowledged by the authors of the *Upadeca* as sacred scriptures. They are held to be a divine revelation heard by ancient seers (in case of the *Upadeca* by *Ida Sang Hyang Widhi*, the Hindu Supreme Lordship). In consequence this collection of sacred scriptures presents the absolute ultimate textual authority. Indigenous local scriptures are held to be sacred as well, but they perform at a much lower level of the hierarchy of scriptural heritage, which ranges from Indian scriptures to Javanese Shiva-Siddhanta scriptures, and to Balinese *Lontar*. According to my interviews and the questionnaires, the controversial question at hand is, to which scripture one should refer to in the first instance. As indicated earlier, this controversy developed into a full-blown quarrel between all elites about textual sources and their interpretation ('*Quellen* and *Exegesestreit*'). As Balinese traditions are systematized into the framework of Hindu Dharma Indonesia, the Hindu Council's and the Hindu Directorate's monopoly of textual exegesis and the related power to shape religious practice are controversial. The Bali centric fraction and the old elite maintain that Balinese and Javanese sources must remain the primary pool and source of Balinese religion, and only then the Veda may be consulted, whereas the Indian modernist fraction tends to refer first to the Vedas, the Dharamsastras, the Mahabharata, the Ramayana, the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gita and only then to local scriptures. (cf. Bakker 1993: 89)

Following the *Upadeca* (1967: 14), all subsequent scriptures on Hindu Dharma which have been approved by the Hindu Council or the Hindu Directorate, and all curricula and textbooks, are uniform in describing a threefold basic framework (*kerangka dasar*) of Hindu Dharma Indonesia:

1. Tatwa (philosophy)
2. Susila (ethics)
3. Upacara (ritual)

Those three elements are interrelated and have to be practiced together. Philosophy without ethic and rituals remains empty, whereas ritual without proper motivation as provided by ethics and purpose as given by philosophy is meaningless. (*Upadeca* 1967: 14) The basic framework is compared to an egg: The egg yolk refers to philosophy (*tatwa*), the albumen is susila (*ethics*) and the eggshell is ritual (*upacara*). In this description, we find a radical departure from the traditionally orthoprax Balinese religion. (*Upadeca* 1967: 14) In sum, the basic framework of the HDI way of life is holistic as its three core elements encompass all aspects of Hindu life. Thus, an important distinction should be made between Dharma as way of life and *tatwa*, philosophy or metaphysics, because they are not identical: Dharma is the Hindu way of life, and there are various Hindu ways to attain bliss and welfare, whereas *tatwa* are the core teachings and the basic philosophy derived out of the sacred scriptures, which need not to be congruent, but they all offer the same solution to the same problem.

Tatwa refers to the proper comprehension of the core philosophy and teachings compiled in the Vedas and *Agama*s. If one rightly comprehends and practices *tatwa*, then *susila* (proper conduct) emerges automatically. In other words, *tatwa* lays out the norms and values, which proper conduct reflects. Finally, *upacara* refers to the obligatory and punctual rituals, performed to strengthen and realize *tatwa* and *susila*. In maintaining relations with One Supreme Lordship, the rituals have an impact on spiritual and emotional health as they develop the strength and force of human logical reasoning. (Questionnaire)

As integral part of *tatwa*, the five basic creeds (*Panca Sradha*) are now outlined. (*Upadeca* 1967: 14-36; Questionnaires) The life of an Indonesian Hindu is based on the *Panca Sradha*. The practice and manifestation of the *Pancasila* is expressed in the first basic creed within the framework of HDI. The Panca Sradha encompasses:

1. Faith in Sang Hyang Widhi[274] (One Supreme Lordship (*Upadeca* 1967: 14); One Supreme Lordship and its functions or manifestations including ancestors (Questionnaires))
2. Faith in Atman (ancestors souls (*Upadeca* 1967: 14); individual souls, the true self (Questionnaires))
3. Faith in Karma phala (Karma Law)
4. Faith in Samsara (Purnarbhawa) (circle of rebirth and reincarnation (Questionnaires))
5. Faith in Moksa (release from circle of rebirth, self-realization, bliss and welfare (Questionnaires))

The current study will describe the first creed in detail, as it is the realization of the first principle of the state in Hindu practice. It is interesting to note, that the pillars of Islam, the *Pancasila*, and the Hindu creeds all comprise the basic five principles. The remaining four principles will be discussed only briefly.

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[274] Non Balinese Hindus express concern that One Supreme Lordship is given a Balinese name and opinions vary about the term and its justifiable use in Hindu contexts.

Reciting Vedic mantra, the first creed is conclusively explained by the *Upadeca* (1967: 15-24). It is stated that Sang Hyang Widhi is *Maha Esa* (Supreme One). There is only one God - there is no second (*Ekam Eva Adwityam Brahman*)[275]. (*Upadeca* 1967: 15) This formula should resemble the Islamic *Shahada*, "there is no god but God". Oversimplified, HDI describes with *advaita* philosophy (referring to the identity of God and the Soul) the essential identity in the existence of all creatures. In consequence, HDI believes in the *Maha Esa*-ness or doctrine of Oneness (compare to Islamic tawhid) of *Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa*, who is the origin of all that which exists - both diversified, concrete and visible (*cetana, sekala*) or undiversified, abstract or hidden (*acetana, niskala*).

The *Maha-Esa*-ness is manifested in sacred rays or gods (*Deva*, Sanskrit *div*) emanating from *Sang Hyang Widhi* and in patrons or protectors (*Bhatara,* Sanskrit *bhatr*, patron/protector). (*Upadeca* 1967: 17) The three most important manifestations or functions of *Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa* are *Tri Sakti*: Brahma as creator (*utpeti*), Vishnu as protector, loving and caring maintainer of creation (*sthiti*), and Shiva as dissolver of creation (*Pralina*), who also transforms creation back to its origin (Old Javanese: *Sangkan Paran*), so that creation may begin anew. (*Upadeca* 1967: 16) *Bhatara* may refer to gods, or men of prowess as deceased virtuous kings or ancestors which are given the title *bhatara*. Besides *Sang Hyang Widhi*, Hindus venerate their ancestors as patrons and as manifestations of God. All participants to my study are convinced that their ancestors act as mediators between humanity and God. Their ancestors are thought to be Divine rays, which are highly sensitized for the aspirations, obstacles, and needs of their descend group. (Questionnaire) Prof Triguna (protocol 2007, Questionnaire) supports a functional-integrative perspective. In his view, the conception One Supreme Lordship is transcendental and impersonal. When emanating into its creation, the transcendental and abstract *Maha Esa*-ness becomes immanent and personal, and divides itself into manifold functions (*bhatara, dewata*) without losing its holistic character.

In this context, the *Upadeca* (1967: 21) describes the process of creation referring to the Taittriya-Upanishad and tantric Samhkya, one of the oldest systems of the six classical schools of Hindu philosophy. (Suka Yasa Interview 2007) It is very interesting to see how the authors of the *Upadeca* synthesize *advaita* (monism) and *dwaita* (dualism) concepts. Oversimplified, Samkhya is a strictly dualist *dwaita* philosophy, which denies the existence of a transcendent creationist God. It enlists how creation emanated out of the meeting between two realities: *Purusha* (consciousness or self) and *Prakriti* (empiric realm of matter).

> *Hyang Widhi Wasa* made a conscious and focused effort of self-control undertaken to achieve a goal (*tapas,* Sanskrit *heat*). After this meditation, the universe has been created, and all things contained therein. Following the process of creation, Hyang Widhi united with creation. (Taittriya-Upanishad in *Upadeca* 1967: 21, own translation)

In short, after *Hyang Widhi* meditated, two elementary powers came into existence: *Purusha* (consciousness or self) and *Prakriti/Pradhana* (empiric realm of matter). (*Upadeca* 1967: 20-24) Whereas Purusha is uncaused, undiversified, uncreated and does not create, *Prakriti* is unconscious and the first cause and principle (*tatwa,* therefore it is named *Pradhana*) of the universe, with the exception of *Purusha*. Following their liaison, step by step the universe came into existence moving from fine elements to coarse elements. First mind (*cita*) emerged, already influenced by three basic features (*trigunas*) which compose *Prakriti*: *satwa* (fineness, illumination, and joy); rajah (dynamism, activity, and pain); *tamah* (coarseness, and sloth). Then everything what is in the universe emerged, until the coarsest elements as earth. During the process of creation, the seven spheres emerged: *Bhur-Loka, Bhuwah-Loka, Swah-Loka, Maha-Loka, Jana-Loka, Tapa-Loka* and *Satya-Loka*. According to the *Upadeca*, we live in the *Bhur-Loka*, our ancestors live in the *Bhuwah-Loka* or *Pitra-Loka*, and the *Dewa* live in the Swah-Loka. Each of those spheres is composed of a specific mixture of elements. Those three spheres are called the *triloka*. There are to my knowledge, variations from this conception.

Manu, the thinking creature, is the progenitor of humanity. In consequence, the solution to the Hindu problem of life as conceptualized in the circle of rebirth and ignorance is humanity's utilization of their mind and thoughts under the rays of *Sang Hyang Widhi* to advance the quality of human and other creatures' lives. (*Upadeca* 1967: 24)

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[275] Bakker (1993: 229) translates:"the Lord who penetrates everything, who establishes everything, who is eternal and infinite, omniscient, in relity He is one, without a second". Ramstedt (2004: 11) translates "Om, thus is the essence of the undivided One". The Balinese formula would be *Sangkan Paraning Sarat*. (cf. Sudharta 2006: 26)

The *Atma-tatwa* states that every individual human soul is a small particle of the *Parama –Atma* or *Sang Hyang Widhi*. (*Upadeca* 1967: 25-26) In reality, the individual atman (*jiwatman*) which animates the human body is identical with the universal Sang Hyang Widhi. The atman is compared to a carter, who steers the carriage (body). The problem of *Agama* Hindu is, that the meeting of atman (*purusha*) and body (*prakriti*) results in *awidya* (darkness) – the unproduced atman forgets about its immutable characteristics. Blindness and oblivion cause the human mind's attachment to the created and diversified world, and to engage in deeds or acts (*karma*). Those acts cause effects (*phala*) according to their quality; a specific action is followed by its equivalent reaction. *Karma* -defined as action in thought, speech, and deed - has its equivalent karmic results (*phala*). All actions produce results and effects which correspond to the nature and quality of that very action. Residues of those actions will stick to the *jiwatman*, which is not aware of its own reality caused by karmic defilement. (Questionnaire) *Jiwatman* will be reincarnated again and again (*punarbhawa*) for its karmic energy until based on its own efforts, the discrimination between dharmic and adharmic lifestyle is made. The atman is then released from the circle (*samsara*) of rebirth/reincarnation (*punarbhawa*) and unites with its origin (*moksa*). (Questionnaire) In consequence, by engaging in actions that are provided by the techniques and exemplars of the Hindu ways of life, humans can burn their karma and attain bliss and release (*Moksartham Jagadhitaya Ca Iti Dharma*). In consequence, the solution to the problem is that the immutable *jiwatman* becomes conscious of its true nature after countless cycles (*samsara*) of rebirth and reincarnation (*punarbhawa*) and attains release (*moksa*) from the cycle of reincarnation.

In the context of susila (ethics), *Tat Twan Asi* teaches social contact or dedication without limits. The *advaita* (monism) philosophy implies that the general motivation of HDI is given in the *Chandogya Upanishad's* teaching of *Tat Tvam Asi* (You are that). This teaching implies that helping fellow men or creatures is identical with helping one's self and the reverse, to harm or hurt fellow men or creatures implies harming one's self. (*Upadeca* 1967: 51; Questionnaire)

The *Upadeca* (1967: 53 – 63) then outlines the basic practices, concepts and the social order to be followed by a Hindu, which will be briefly sketched here. The five core creeds (*Panca Sradha*) develop into the Hindu theory of values, norms and social order, which result in the main axiological concepts of *Tri Rnam,Panca Yadnya*, *Tri Kaya Parisudha*, and *Tri Hita Karana.* The basic order of life is the *Varnasramadharma* (see chapter on *varna* and *jati*). The Rg Veda, the Law of Manu, and the Bhagavad-Gita reveal that God has created the world with a devout sacrifice, thus, "The one who eats alone, without considering the Yadnya (sacrifice), sins" (*Upadeca* 1967: 52) Every newborn Hindu has automatically a threefold congenital obligation or debt: the *tri rnam*. The graph illustrates the three debts (*tri rnam*).

These three debts result in the duty to perform the rituals (*panca yadnya,* five rituals).

1. *Dewa Yadnya* venerate the functions of One Supreme Lordship (Dewata)
2. *Pitra Yadnya* venerate *bhatara* and ancestors
3. *Bhuta Yadnya* placate and pacify the chthonic energies and transform them into benevolent forces
4. *Rsi Yadnya* are carried out for the benefit and boon of seers and sages
5. *Manusia Yadnya* denotethe life-circle rituals and charity (Titib Interview 2007).

Then the theory of the *caturasrama* and *caturvarna* is outlined (see chapter on *varna* and *jati*). In the following the ethical concepts of what is advised and what is permitted are outlined. All those concepts are a major part of all curricula at all educational levels. As the focus of the present work has been how the Hindu class emerged in the context of national policies on religion and education, a discussion of this specific curricular contents has been outside the scope of the present study. Therefore the present study indicates that there is a need for future research in this academic field. One might analyze how the concepts outlined in the *Upadeca* were included into the curricula of 1974, 84, 94, 2004, and 2006, and how they were formulated into educational aims and competencies, how they were formulated in the textbooks, and what methods the teacher use in instructions.

Essential to *susila* (meta-ethic) are the *panca srada* (*tatwa*). Hindu conduct is both the communal obligation to mutual cooperation (*gotong-royong*) and the individual obligation of mental and spiritual purification. In order to attain the solution of the specific Hindu problem of life (circle of rebirth, reincarnation, and karma), a Hindu must practice the technique of self-control and learn how to control thought, speech, and deeds (*Tri Kaya Parisudha*). *Tri Kaya Parisudha* (three basic human techniques of self-control, own translation; *Upadeca* 1967: 58) denote the Hindu core concept of orientation; they probably originate in the Buddhist eightfold path. In order to achieve the solution (*moksa,* release) to the Hindu problem of life (circle of rebirth, reincarnation, and karma), first of all the *jiwatman* must arrive at a spiritual level, which makes *moksa* possible. In consequence, Hindus should always control their thoughts, speech and deeds in order to defeat the six enemies (*sad ripu*) within human nature that lead to ignorance and oblivion.

1. Manacika is the way in which a HDI practitioner controls and makes best use of thoughts:Right intention or thought – self-control grounded in intention, thought and reasoning (to aspire only things one is eligible for, freedom from ill will and prejudices against fellow beings, to obey karmic law)
2. Wacika is the way in which a HDI practitioner controls makes best use of communication:Right speech - self-control grounded in speech and communication (abandoning abusive speech, divisive speech, defamatory speech and keep promises)
3. Kayika is the way in which a HDI practitioner controls makes best use of actions and is identical with Eightfold path:Right conduct or right action - self-control grounded in conduct and deeds (non-violence and abstaining from taking life (ahimsa), from stealing, and from sexual misconduct) (*Upadeca* 1967: 57-59; Questionnaire)

The six enemies (*sad ripu*) within human nature leading to ignorance and oblivion of true nature are *kama* (lust), *lobha* (greed), *krodha* (anger), *mada* (use of psychotropic substances), *moha* (indecisiveness), *matsarya* (malevolence).

In conclusion, Hindu Dharma Indonesia is interpreted by the participants to my study as device, which provides the manual for existence, the manual how to understand the true meaning, nature, working mechanism and objective of existence. The main characteristic is its flexibility and the dynamic adjustment to changing situations and epochs. Like two sides of the same coin, religion teaches us that there are positive and negative aspects (*rwa bhinneda*). In consequence, life must be interpreted as providing options. Hindu Dharma Indonesia instructs humans how to choose dharmic options. It gives humans the techniques and exemplars how to solve the Hindu problem of life by achieving physical and spiritual bliss and welfare. Hence studied properly and in holistic fashion, Hindu Dharma Indonesia and other ways of life help humans to control negative qualities (*sad ripu),* because the dharmic option controls the influence of the five senses in the human body. By controlling emotions as lust (*kama*), wrath (*krodha*), greed (*lobha*), envy (*matsarya*), which are components of human nature, all *agama* provide ways for humans to realize harmonic and tolerant relations in the encounter between humans, God, and nature. In addition, Hindu Dharma Indonesia guides, controls, and motivates humans to pursue physical and spiritual progress and good deeds. By leading a dharmic life, one is thought to procure patience, serenity, firm faith in God and by following the commands of God ignorance and oblivion (*awidya*) is caused to vanish. The pious is awarded with inner peace, prosperity and friends. "*Agama* Hindu teaches spiritual practice and self-discipline to achieve the ideal aim of establishing paradise (*surga*) on earth." (Questionnaire)

5.3.7. Bali Jaya Dwipa

In order to build a physical and spiritual wealthy Balinese human and community (*jagadhita*), the strategic plan[276] of the Balinese provincial government implements the vision and mission of regional development. The vision outlines the concept of *Tri Hita Karana* as base for the creation of *Bali Dwipa Jaya*. *Bali Dwipa Jaya* means the glorious island of Bali, mentioned in medieval stone inscriptions. *Bali DwipaJaya* points to a revitalization trend of Balinese religio-cultural traditions. In this context, Bali will be capable to cope with future challenges by utilizing socio-cultural, economic, and environmental opportunities to achieve the targeted progress. It aims to construct balanced and permanent social welfare (*jagadhita*) based on values, norms, tradition, social order and local wisdom (*kearifan local*, local genius) of Balinese culture, which is inspired by *Agama* Hindu.

The concept of *Tri Hita Karana* is interpreted symbolically as three causes for human welfare in the Hindu Balinese community's way of life. The term was coined by the Administrative Region I Conference of the Board of the Hindu Bali Congregation Struggle (*Konferensi Daerah 1 Badan Perjuangan Umat Hindu Bali*) on November 11, 1966. Based on Hindu Dharma faith, the Hindu community held this conference in order to participate in the New Order nation-building. The concept became more popular after 1966, and it is agitated today as one of the leading concepts of social and environmental encounter and the prime parameter to achieve *Bali Dwipa Jaya*. *Tri Hita Karana* pursues a harmonizing and stabilization policy between encounter of God and humanity, in social relations, and between humans and their environment. Hindu Dharma Indonesia refers to the Bhagavad Gita III, 10 as textual source, which described a causal triangle between the creator and progenitor, the created man, and the environment, which feeds man and progenitor.

> In performing the *yadnya*, the creator and progenitor *Prajapati*, a title of Brahma, created human kind, and said: By this you will multiply (10) and if you foster the gods by this, the gods then foster you in turn; then, each the others fostering, you shall attain highest welfare (11). From food all beings are produced: And from rain all food is produced: from sacrifice there comes down rain; from action is born sacrifice. (14) Action arises from Brahma, Brahma from the' Imperishable. Hence the all-pervading Brahma is established in sacrifice. (August 2008, Vedanta spiritual library, Bhagavad Gita, http://www.celextel.org/Gita.html)

In this context, it becomes evident again, that Hindu Dharma Indonesia anthropology borrows from Indian universal sources and continues Indo-Melanesian religion that locates human beings right in the centre of existence, as it is a typical feature for ethnic religions. In fact, HDI emerged out of an ethno-religion and has been consolidated into a national religion less out of theological matters, but rather out of political and administrative reasons. The figure shows the concept of *Tri Hita Karana*:

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
[276] Bali province government. Strategic plan 2003-2008. (February 2009, http://www.baliprov.go.id)

The holistic concept encompasses God, society and their natural environment as parts of an intact unit, or parts of one ensemble, analogously to *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*. The mission of the Bali strategic plan[277] provides the strategies to put the vision into practice. Of seven strategies set out five are enlisted here:

(1) to create a Balinese human and community, which has the qualities of *Sradha* (faith), *bhakti* (following the commands of God, devotion) and *yasa kerthi* (dharmic action),
(2) to create Bali as one intact and balanced unity,
(5) to manifest awareness regarding the rule of law and human rights thereby creating dynamic and conducive peace and order,
(6) to empower and safeguard traditional Balinese institutions, and to
(7) create a stable regional autonomy.

In the second chapter internal factors are divided into strengths and weaknesses and external factors are categorized in opportunities' and challenges. Referring to the internal environment, Balinese culture which is inspired or animated by *Agama* Hindu is interpreted as strength**.** Culture in the region of Bali is alive, grows and flowers and is composed of a physical, structural, and cultural core. These parts compose the cultural value ensemble, which is animated through the spirit of *Agama* Hindu. This implies that *Agama* Hindu inspires Balinese culture and Balinese culture colors *Agama* Hindu. The globalization process is interpreted as impact of foreign culture causing social changes and shifts in the value orientation of society, primary in the negative cultural transformation towards commercialization, individualism, materialism, and consumerism which are accompanied by the superficiality and fragility of moral basics. In the next step, the strategic plan has outlined targets to put its vision statement and mission strategies to practice.

The strategy to manifest *Tri Hita Karana* as base for *Bali Dwipa Jaya* is to create Balinese individuals and community, which have the qualities of *Sradha* (faith), *bhakti* (devotion) and *yasa kerthi* (dharmic action). The first aim is to realize harmony in faith-based life by

(a) Advancing religious education
(b) Stabilizing inter-faith harmony, and
(c) Stabilizing the understanding, realization, and application of religious teachings for Hindu-Balinese (*krama Bali*).

Practical steps to be taken in raising religious education are to better the quality of religious education by improving the quality of Hindu educator's training and fostering literature. The second and third aim refers to the creation of professional human resources through health care and education and by providing sufficient labor and application of technology.

5.4. Modern education and Balinese elites

5.4.1. Excursus: Varna, Jati, and Dharma

The effort to understand Balinese social order, rank and kinship system makes it necessary to introduce first a short and superficial side note on the terms *casta*[278] (caste)*, jati*(birth, origin)*,* and *varna (color,* class) as distinct concepts. (Cf. Sarkar 1922: 213) Whereas "casta" is a foreign inscription, the term *jati* describes a corporate group. In addition, Hindu scriptures mention four colors[279], the *catur varna*, which denote an ideal Indian type of class. Whereas the concept of *jati* denotes specific corporate communities or specific sub-groups in the Indian subcontinent, *varna* refers either to skin color or to human and spiritual quality (*guna*) and their action or deeds (*karma*). In the Rig-Veda and the Law of Manu, *varna* refers to an individuals' social function and/or the organic model of society, because each group fulfills a particular function in sustaining the social body. By describing those four *varna* as originating from different parts of one single body, the Law of Manu indicates the *varna* system to be non-hereditary, thereby implying congeniality of all four *varna*.

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[277] Bali province government. Strategic plan 2003-2008. (February 2009, http://www.baliprov.go.id))
[278] The term casta is a twofold foreign ascription. "When the Portuguese arrived in India in 1498, they found what was to them, a perplexing system of stratification and discrimination prevailing amongst the people of India." (http://www.colaco.net/1/caste.htm) Unable to explain this system to their rulers, those first Portuguese sea-farers to India called it "casta", which literally means "breed or lineage". The British colonial administrators then continued to apply the term in mapping the population of the Indian sub-continent and for administrative interests.
[279] The Mahabharata describes the *varna* of the Brahmana as white, Ksatriyah as red, Vaisyas as yellow and *Shudra*s as black.

The Purusha Sukta (Rig-Veda X: 90)[280] introduces the cosmological substantiation of the ideal social order and the ritual. The different *varna* were designed to promote the harmonious functioning of society. In consequence, the four *varna* as mentioned in the Purusa-Sukta cannot be said to denote "caste" in the sense in which is understood in modern times. In this context, Sarkar (1922: 212) remarks, "communally speaking, the *prakriti* or members of a society naturally fall into economic and professional groups, classes or orders, the so-called castes of India". Sarkar (1922: 212) holds that "orders of *praja* or classes of members of the state" are known as *varna*, but "the alleged classification of a society into four occupational groups (…) is however a conventional myth, at best, legal fiction"[281].

With the passage of time, occupation-based social rank became hereditary, as a son usually followed his father's profession, and concepts of purity and pollution were associated with profession. This system acquired the title *jati,* because one belonged to one's *jati* right from birth. Remarkably, the term is employed across faith-based groups in India. Affiliation to a group was determined by interaction; in consequence it was relational in nature. Traditionally, in India and Indonesia, social networks serve as integrative frame, because the evolution of the Indian society has been based on the integration of diverse ethnic groups through these networks. Although *varna* and caste/*jati* denote the classification of society based on social functions which one performs, *varna* is determined by individual profession, deeds and spiritual quality In contrast, the term *jati,* literally meaning birth, is associated with heritage, tradition, and profession. Both concepts of *jati*and *varna* were thus originally fluid functional groups. Only in 1901, the British fitted the *jati* system into the *varna* system promoted by the Law of Manu in order to conduct a population census.

In addition, in India and Bali, descent has not always been traced to consanguinity; often the lineages were based on spiritual descent from sages of the past. Outside the kinship system there is the *guru-shishya* relationship that is based on spiritual descent, the disciple traces his spiritual birth from a master who stands in the lineage of other spiritual masters. This system of spiritual descent is still practiced in Bali, the phenomenon may be observed in the traditional training of Brahmin high priests.

Purusha's self-sacrifice (Purusha Sukta, Rig Veda X: 90) creates the ideal social order of *varnashramadharma* (the particular duties (*sva-dharma*) of the classes and the stages of life). There are at least five senses in which dharma is used both in scientific treatises as well as in social conversation (Sarkar 1922):

- religion, a category of theology, e.g. Confucian Dharma, Islamic Dharma, Christian Dharma, Hindu Dharma etc.
- virtue, as opposed to vice or sin, a category of ethics
- law, as a category of jurisprudence
- justice
- duty

The members of the society must perform their duties (*svadharma*) and observance of these duties implies the organization of the people into a unified state or a country (*rastra*). Both "movable and immovable things" are indicated by the term state. "There is no dharma in the non-state, i.e. the condition of men is left to themselves". Sarkar (1922: 206) elucidates, "Dharma only comes into existence with the state, as dharma is created by the state or rather by its sanctions (*danda*, stick) or authority". In essence, if there exist no states, there is no dharma. Likewise, a group can have no dharma, when its state is abolished, e.g. through the loss of freedom, revolution, or anarchy (compare the *puputan* ritual in the next sections). In conclusion, the existence of the state was primarily dependent on two factors: authority (*danda*), and social order (*varnasrahmadharma*). The need for a social contract between ruler and subjects is therefore absolute, as the king has to protect the dharma in order to secure the social order, as long as the intactness of the social order is protected, the non-state condition will not triumph.

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[280] According to the Purusa-Sukta, Rig-Veda X, 90, progenitors of the four ranked *varna* groups sprang from various parts of the body of the primordial Purusa, who has been fabricated from clay by Creator Brahma. Brahmins (men of intellect, clerics, and scholars) were created from the mouth. They were to provide for the intellectual and spiritual needs of the community as teachers, therefore learning and teaching denoted their prime function. Kshatriyas (warriors and rulers) were derived from the arms. Their duties were adjudication, strength, action, the selfless and just protection of the population with arms, in other words, their role was to rule, adjudicate, and to protect others. Vaishyas (landowners and merchants) sprang from the thighs, were associated with desire and were entrusted with the care of commerce, trade, cattle breeding, and agriculture. Shudras (servants) came from the feet. Their task was to perform all manual labour and to serve the three other.
[281] Students of *Realpolitik* (…) are aware that the actual number of these orders or castes is "unlimited". The reason (…) is (…) the "intermixture of blood through marriages". (Sarkar 1922: 212)

From the standpoint of the individual then, people pass through well-marked physiological and social stages. Those stages or periods of individual life are called the catur *asramas*. They are known to be four in the span of human existence: student (*brahmacharya*), parents/householder (*grihastha*), retirement (*vanaprastha*), and renunciation (*sannyasin*). The total population with all its interests and problems of all the different periods of life is then comprehended by the two categories, *varnas* (classes) and *asramas* (stages). If therefore any group is to constitute a state, every member of each of the *varnas* (no matter what their numbers and their occupations) must have to perform the duties (*sva-dharma*) of his "station" at each of the four *asramas* or periods of life. (Sarkar 1922: 213)

> As soon, therefore, as the *praja* [social group, members of a state, AL] is organized into a state, be it in any part of the world or in any epoch of history, a *varnashrama* spontaneously emerges into being. It is inconceivable, in this theory, that there should be a state but no *varnashrama.* To say that the state has been born and yet the various orders or classes of the people do not follow dharma would indeed be a contradiction in terms, a logical absurdity. *Sva-dharma* leads inevitably to *varnashrama*, the two are "relative" terms. They indicate coexistent phenomena in the social world. In other words, the doctrine of *varnasrama* is a corollary to that of *dharma* as duty, *varnasrama* is but *sva-dharma* "writ large". (Sarkar 1922: 213)

Sarkar (1922: 214) concludes thatthe theory of *varnasrama*, the fourfold social order and the stages of life, "though obviously a socio-pedagogic and ethno-economic term is thus fundamentally a political concept. It is an indispensable category in an organic theory of the state".

5.4.2. Jero and jaba

The system of social stratification in Bali is often described as caste (*kasta* or *varna*) system. The only systemic comparison between the Indian and Balinese classification of hierarchy and rank, the author is aware of is Howe (1987), who states: "Although Bali is often designates a caste system and although its religion is regularly referred to as 'Hindu', there has been (…) no systematic comparison of India with Bali in respect to these social and cultural domains." (Howe 1987: 136) He gives some "tentative remarks" concerning those "very complex issues". (Howe 1987: 137) Comparing the conceptual, institutional, and interactional level, he comes to the conclusion that the concept of caste could be applied to the Balinese case, but the "present interests and the burgeoning reaction to positivism inhibit this sort of simplistic classification." (Howe 1987: 150) However, it is safe to assume that in Bali there is no caste system as there is in India.

The Balinese social order is vertically and horizontally highly stratified and the history (and architecture) of Balinese kingship, clans, and social order is very much "a story of origins, of kinship, of hierarchy and of relations of asymmetry". (Parker 2004: 41 FN 5) In addition, in medieval Bali status and rank depended also on social networks and interpersonal relations between social groups, clans and the traditional democratic village-based society. The most significant of these relations is the division of architecture and society into *jero* (insider) and *jaba* (outsider).

The adoption of a genealogical descendant system (*triwangsa*) began with the occupation of Bali through the Javanese Majapahit Empire in 1343. Prior to 1343, there is no evidence for a genealogical descent system in Balinese village-based society, in which core groups of villagers, living in the core part of the village, were most important, from whose the council of elders were elected. (Vickers 1989: 47) Other groups lived in the surrounding part of the village (*jaba*). After the conquest of Majapahit, the Javanese nobility were placed in administrative posts in Bali and forced the local nobility to accept minor posts and many of the priests and royalty preserved their roles only by being relegated to the status of commoners. *Wong Majapahit* denotes therefore the Javanese royalties, their descendants and the Balinese local rulers which became Javanized. *Bali Aga* refers to the Balinese tribes that were living in the inaccessibility of the mountains, therefore became never Javanized or subjugated to Javanese administration. (Vickers 1989: 49-50) Thus society was organized into a hierarchy from villagers (*kaula*) to king (*gusti*), (Vickers 1989: 47), therefore dyadic patron-client ties prevailed between villagers and palace (*puri*)[282]. (Parker, 2004, 28)

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[282] Javanese mysticism emphasizes the all-pervading unity of existence, and the logic of the traditional Javanese concept of power required a central focus, synchronistic and absorptive in character; this centre was usually realized in the person of a ruler, who personified the unity of society. (Canonica- Walangitang 2003: 50-53) The Javanese state model and the relations between king and his subjects are exemplified in the ruler-subject (*kaula- gusti*) principle. Originally master and bondsmen, the king and his subjects are in an asymmetrical, but mutually dependent relationship. The main feature is the ability of the master to concentrate power, to bind it in his body, and to absorb outward power. In consequence, kings were then viewed as "receptacles of cosmic potency" and their worldly power reflected their

The *triwangsa* system was consolidated under priest Dang Hyang *Dwijendra* in the 1550s, when Bali moved to being a far more king-and-priest-centered society, organized into the four *varna* of Hinduism. Most likely, the term *varna* was known more as an academic term than a descriptor of social organization. *Varna* had no "validity in actual life" in ancient Java or Bali prior to the fifteenth century, but it did exist in theory in the model of the World Ruler. In the model, the semi-divine or divine status of the ruler and the spiritual basis of the kingship depended on his relationship with the priesthood. (Vickers 1989: 50) This caesaropapist (Casanova 1994) model has already been described in the Ramayana, where priests were meant to serve kings through running rituals for the proper functioning of the realm. As a rule in this caesaropapist model, the king's power and divine mandate to rule was substantiated by a priest, acting as his counselor and securing the spiritual security of the kingdom. The palace was situated at the (spiritual or spatial) centre of a small kingdom, which boundaries were defined by overlapping social networks responsible for the maintenance of temples, the performance of rituals and for jurisdiction, thus a kingdom had never a bounded territory, nor was there a stable and homogenous population. (Parker 2004: 31) This function of the kings became to be known as *guru wisesa* in the national period.

In general, the power of a king was judged by how many people he was able to mobilize by corvée bonds in order to perform a ritual; in turn this corvée secured his bondsmen spiritual and material health and welfare. This new system introduced a massive transformation process of the social order[283], as the councils of elders were replaced and the ancient binary divide between core villagers and newcomers shifted towards a new separation in inner and outer maintained until today. (Vickers 1989: 47) The original spatial dichotomy between the core and the periphery of the village was translated into the social and spiritual distinction between *jaba* (outsider) and *jero* (insider) denoting the proximity to royal or priestly descent or spatial differentiation between the innermost part of the temple and the outer parts, which in turn was tied to the proximity between human, creator, and residence. (Vickers 1989: 49 – 52)

Varna and lineage have worked as an ideology to the advantage of the Brahmins and the descendants of the kings, who were the second *varna* or lineage or warrior-kings. (Vickers 1989: 50) However, in Bali the three high *varna* are commonly known as *triwangsa* or *jero,* they are twice-born *(dwijati)*[284] and distinguished from the *wong jaba* (outsiders), as a rule in everyday life the binary divide between royalty and priesthood (*jero*) and commoners (*jaba*) is more pertinent than the three-way division into *Brahmin, Khsatriya*, and *Wesia*. (Vickers 1989: 47) Inside and outside mark major social as well as spiritual categories of ethnosociology[285], (Wiener 1995: 153 in Parker: 2003 42 Fn 5: Vickers 1989: 48) as the pre-eminent position of the palace (*puri)* and the high status of the priestly houses (*geriyah*) created a social system composed of two components: the members of royal or priestly houses are insiders (*jero*) since they were close to the inner world of gods and rulers, but everyone else was an outer person, a *jaba*. (Wiener 1995: 153 in Parker 2003: 42 FN 5)

charisma or "reception of a divine mandate to rule". (Canonica- Walangitang 2003: 50-53) Power should be concentrated in the power-holder and the society in which he wields his power. If this condition is met, the power-holder is thought to have the *wahyu* (divine radiance). (Canonica- Walangitang 2003: 50-53) This concept corresponds with the Indian concept of *sakti* or the Balinese *taksu*. The evidence of such concentrated power in the power-holder was societies' fertility, prosperity and stability, order and glory, whereas the diffusion of power resulted in manifestations of disorder in the natural world and in inappropriate modes of social conduct. (Canonica-Walangitang 2003: 50-53) Javanese people tended to believe that a ruler who still had this power would prevent such natural and social disturbances from appearing. Order as prevailing condition symbolizes harmony with the cosmic purpose and in its deepest sense it means unity, the oneness of all, of creator and created, of servant and master. In this context, Shiraishi (Shiraishi 1997 in Parker 2004: 95) points to the congruence between the *kaula-gusti* relationship and Suharto's fatherly patron-client relationship with his children and clients, a triangular hierarchy which had been repeated throughout society. She has identified two contrasting traditions: that of the modern *organisatie* (rational Dutch bureaucratic machine) and that of the sometimes idiosyncratic, personal power of the *bapak* (father). There was a continuing tension between the first style interpreted by economic rationalist and technocrats as Western, modern and desirable and the *bapak's* so called "Asian" way of running the state as the source and the remedy of arbitrary power.

[283] The unity of the formerly semi-autonomous villages was broken down into smaller units called *banjar* in the 14th century which grouped households according to corvée obligations. Each *banjar* carried out its obligations under a court appointed head or *klian*. (Vickers 1989: 47)

[284] The Law of Manu X: 5 draws a distinction between *Ekajati* (Onceborn) and *Dwijati* (Twiceborn). Only the first three *varna* were classified as *Dwijati*: They were believed to have two births, one from their mothers' womb and one from the initiation rite for studying the Vedas (*Upanayana*). During the course of history, the study of the Veda became prohibited for the *Shudra*, because as *Ekajati* those people were not initiated and not legitimized to receive spiritual knowledge correlating to mundane and spiritual power. (Notice the practice of *upanayana* rituals prior to receive education in ancient and medieval India and in classical and contemporary Indonesian Hinduism). It is unknown to me, when the concept of *Ekajati* and *Dwijati* became popular in Java or Bali.

[285] The high king (Dalem) in Klungkung was the ultimate "insider". Aristocrats were called *anak jero*, inside people. Royal brothers "went out" from the puri to establish branch line houses – lesser "insides", *Jero*s, to the wider social "outside". Commoner officeholders, whose homes were known as *jeroan* and who were addressed with the title *Jero*, were also "inside people", and the same position was extended to court retainers and servants. The honorific title *Jero* was given to commoner wives of royalty or priests, but commoners of either sex who became temple priests, shadow play puppeteers and traditional architects or healers were also addressed as *Jero*. (Wiener 1995: 153 in Parker: 2003 42 Fn 5: Vickers 1989: 48)

The population's majority are outsiders (93%). Commoners occupied a vast range of ranks in state and religious offices, and in recognition of their status received the title *jero*. In consequence, it is possible for a commoner to move from being an "outsider" (*jaba*) to being an insider (*jero*)[286]. (Vickers 1989: 48-49) The *puri* and *geriyah* have built complex social networks, based on blood and affinal ties. They must keep these ties alive by inviting and being invited to a large number of social and ritual events (Parker 2004: 33) thereby strengthening their social networks, personal relations, and social capital. The *puri* by virtue of wealth, status, and political power have been and are important actors in the creation of communities and political networks, (Parker 2004: 31) as are the *geriyah* in religious matters.

In the 1910s, the *triwangsa* system had been strengthened by the Dutch colonizers. (Pringle 2004: 123) Dutch colonizers mandated the Brahmins in the 1910s to explain their social system. Thus, the Brahmins reintroduced and ascertained the ideal model of *triwangsa* for Dutch administrative interests. To complicate the situation, there are many groups of descendants, particularly in highland interior Bali, but also in lowland and urban Bali, which either do not acknowledge or do not fit themselves in *varna* or *triwangsa* affiliation. (Parker 2004: 43-44 FN 12) Educated, modern individuals may also reject the *triwangsa* system. (Vickers 1989: 50)

In conclusion, Howe (1987: 142-143, paraphrased) points to six important differences between the systems of hierarchy and rank in India and Bali.

1. In Bali there is no concept of untouchability and no notion concerning the accumulation of pollution for those at the bottom of social hierarchy.
2. Whereas in India Brahmin priests rank lower than non-priestly Brahmins, in Bali the situation is reverse.
3. Balinese religion is better described as an ancestor cult than a peculiar version of Hinduism.
4. While Balinese society does display patrilineal descent groups practicing preferential endogamous marriage, by no means all Balinese are members of such groups. In general, kinship institutions and marriage practices differ from those in India.
5. Whereas in India sub-castes are general corporate groups, in Bali people holding the same title form groups only under specific conditions, and are more aggregates of similar kinds of people. The Balinese word for title, *soroh*, has the same range of referents as does the Hindu word *jat*.
6. The Balinese form functionally specific voluntary social groups, which are open for all to join and which are democratic. Organs of local government in village Bali are similarly organized, though membership is often compulsory and more permanent.

He finds that ranking within the Balinese *varna* is only important for the *triwangsa*, the upper three *varna* constituting less than ten percent of the population whereas ranking is less important among the *shudra varna*, with the example of the *pande* (metal smith) clans and the *pasek* clans, who rank highest among the shudra. At the level of the village, he even finds a democratic egalitarian system. Howe (1987: 143-144) then enlists six crucial factors, which provided the Balinese system of hierarchy and ranking with its own particular characteristic, which I will quote at length.

> First, the available evidence points clearly to the fact that it was Sanscritic culture rather than Hindu social structure that was adopted by the Javanese and Balinese, and that it was brought to Java both by Hindu priests and by Indonesians who travelled to India (…). Second, such a culture eventually arrived in Bali via Javanese intermediaries. Third, it is probable that Bali already possessed a fairly well developed ancestor cult and ranked status and titles on which this suitable culture could settle; and it is worth noting the complete absence in Java of any kind of caste-like groups now and in the past. Fourth, whatever was the nature of the culture adopted, there were in it significant strains of Buddhist influence. Fifth, there probably existed in Bali, prior to the advent of Hindu culture, a system of family, village and regional temples with its associated ritual and ceremony. Sixth, (…) it is likely that there already existed the practice of wet rice agriculture and its associated irrigation organizations.

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[286] By rising in wealth, rank and status, commoners tied to the courts could elevate their whole family and their ancestors. The rewards were entry to heaven after death, and a good incarnation in later lives. All of this could be achieved through devotion to the king, and through the possibility of studying worthy literature under the guidance the priests. (Vickers 1989: 48-49)

The usage of the term caste is therefore not justified in Bali, as I propose, and *varna* and lineage has remained merely an ideal used to describe Balinese social order from the sixteenth century until the present day out of political interests for social dominance and maintaining the constructed social order for reasons of freezing power relations. As there are various differences between the Indian and Balinese societies, "it is the substantial nature of some of these which should caution against any dogmatic assertion that Bali constitutes a caste society." (Howe 1987: 143) In consequence, the *varna* model has always been an ideal which worked for the *triwangsa* or the top two *varna*, priests and warriors, but which was full of inconsistencies for everyone else. (Vickers 1989: 50-51) During the colonial conquest, Dutch anthropologists ascribed the term caste to the local genealogical lineage (*wangsa*) system and inaccurately equated both systems. Later, most Balinese reformers adopted the term and used it uncritically over decades. In recent years a Balinese debate on the appropriateness of this foreign ascription arose, as a result, the Hindu Council has passed a *bhisama* (legal pronouncement in Hindu Dharma Indonesia, issued by the Hindu Council on a specific issue) on the correct interpretation of the *varna* borrowed from India. This appears to be the first effort to introduce a revitalized understanding in favor of the social equalization of the *jabawangsa*.

5.4.3. The impact of modern education, *Ajawera*, and modern elites

Modern education has affected the pre-colonial social order to a considerable extent. Main criticism espouses that after having received a little of Western education, the generations of the 1920s up to the 1960s forgot about their own culture. This in turn undermined the traditional society and created division between the older and the younger generations, as the emergence of the new elite shows. John Coast (1951 in Parker 2004: 22-23, FN 4) warned "if modern education, which is an urban product, ever tends to make the modern Balinese generation discontent with working on the rice fields, then the whole basis of Bali's economic as well as social fabric will be destroyed". This is exactly the problem, modern reformers, elites and the society currently has to cope with. The participants to my study assess uniformly that Balinese religion and culture is endangered from influences outward to Bali, emerging either from inside or outside of Indonesia. Not only the old-*jero* complain that "the contemporary youth doesn't care about the future, doesn't consider how future life will be and how Bali will be tomorrow, they just know how to enjoy themselves and imitate foreign lifestyles without criticism" (Ida Pedanda Bajing Interview 2006), but also the Strategic Development Plans, the Strategic Plan of the Hindu Directorate and the new elite complain about the moral distortion of the Youth by assessing low standards of values and morals.

Indeed, social change brought by colonialism, trade, tourism, modern education and the economic change to a post-industrial service society has resulted in the erosion of the substructure of pre-colonial socio-religious social order which is based on the cooperation of villagers characterized by agrarian rice cultivation. Whereas in the pre-colonial period, the Balinese kings were the guardians and authorities of the inseparable complex of religion, culture, and ritual, the Brahmins became more influential during the colonial period and under the New Order (1965-1998). The "cultural transformations" of social relations and political efforts of elites to construct and reconstruct national or sub-national life, culture, and religion necessitated a constant negotiation process of "cultural engineering". (Antlöv 2005: 47; cf. Vickers, 1999: 383)

To investigate on the share of education in that social change, let's go back to the year 1937 and listen to a witness of the times, Miguel Covarrubias (1965/1937: 394)[287], who assessed "the younger generation is rapidly being cut off from a cultural environment which they have learned to regard as below them, considering their parents, formerly their model of behavior, as rude peasants who have not gone to school"[288]. Covarrubias (1965: 394-395) argues in an unrivaled polemic style:

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[287] Covarrubias was a Mexican artist and ethnographer, who had married in Bali in 1930. He regularly contacted the father of one of my informants, Ida Pedanda Telabah, who in turn called my attention to Covarrubias work, especially the last chapter.

[288] Covarrubias (1965: 394) delivers a gripping illustration of one facet of the delineated change, namely clothing, and tensions between the traditional way of life and the new lifestyle brought to Bali by modern educated Balinese, who received education in Java or Makassar. "The young gurus look upon the graceful and healthful costume of the island, so well suited to the climate, as indecent and primitive and demand that their little pupils wear shirts in school" He (1965: 395) tells the dramatic story about a boy who was shamed by his teacher because he didn't wear a shirt in school, but the father, "who had never owned one (nor had any of his ancestors), refused to buy it for him. He felt so thoroughly disgraced that one night he hanged himself from the tree in front of the schoolhouse". Today, all pupils wear school uniform, but at religious festivals as fullmoon or new moon they wear the modern Balinese "ritual uniform".

> …(t)he old-fashioned teachers were the reservoirs of the science and poetry of Balinese culture, but those young Balinese who have gone to Java to become teachers for the Western-style Government schools have returned convinced, that what they learned in Java is the essence of knowledge and progress. They have become conscious of the contempt of Europeans for the native cultures and have been influenced to believe that the philosophy, arts and habits of their country are signs of peasant backwardness (…) The teacher forces his half-digested jumble of European ideas on the little pupils, who from the beginning of their education learn to look down on everything Balinese. They are taught about what a European child learns in elementary school; they learn to speak and write in Malay, a language foreign to Bali, which most of their parents ignore, and some even have a smattering of Dutch, so when they come out of school they make good, cheap clerks, totally uninterested in their own culture. Since there are so few jobs available on the island in which such education would be required, making clerks of the Balinese seems to make European education have a negative and even detrimental effect.

The introduction of the modern education by the educated new elite secularized and democratized the patriarchic, patrimonial, and feudal pre-colonial etiquette in Bali as the equality in access contravened the traditional class system and gender relations. (Parker 2000: 51; 2004: 210) As first Dutch and later Indonesian were the language of instruction, in using foreign languages in school, the Balinese reformers alienated their fellow Balinese at first, but thereby they provided the ground for equal schooling. Traditionally, *anak jero* were to be seated in a higher position than commoners. The royal class was assumed to be closer to the realm of Gods, and purer than commoners. Therefore, their social and spiritual status was higher. In consequence, royalty and brahmins had to be seated in an elevated position, with their servants and bondsman to their knees and feet. But with modern education, this code of physical separation which regulated class hierarchy was gradually secularized and democratized. (Parker 2004: 210) In the early days of schooling all children sat on the floor, later on chairs and tables, they all used the egalitarian *Bahasa Indonesia* at school and they were "rubbing shoulders with commoners". (Parker 2004: 210).

A salient feature of social change is therefore that the attitude of respect towards the *triwangsa* has dramatically declined. The old-*jero* have become increasingly impoverished and powerless, many of them working as servants now, though they still maintain some traditional "spiritual" status, whereas their social status has declined. In turn, commoners who underwent longtime education occupy excellent jobs, and have increasing influence and prestige. The focus on individual merit seems to be revolutionary to the agricultural Balinese social order and culture, which is organized hierarchically, determined by faith and all activities are carried out in groups (cooperative ethos). Even the nomenclature directs to a lack of individuality, because the name changes after parenthood or grandparenthood. Formerly, even artists would not sign their paintings.

Traditional Balinese religion, culture, ritual, and social order had no religious teaching for all children. And there has been certainly no sermons or catechetical addresses in temples, nor even readings from the scriptures. (Parker 200: 49; Steenbrink 2001: 20) Teaching was given according to the classes children were born into. Whereas the majority of the commoners and peasants were left without any education before the Dutch conquest, the access to historical and ritual knowledge was restricted to the upper classes *(triwangsa)*, the *jero*(insiders), or *dwijati* segment of society, who lived in the priestly compounds and the palaces, which had been initiated ritually to study traditional textual sourceswritten on palm leaf manuscripts (*lontar*). (cf. Hinzeler 1993: Parker 2000: 49-50) Similar to the medieval monopoly of the European monasteries on sacred scriptures, in the study ofsacred scriptures(*agama*) the doctrine of *ajawera* denotes the upper classes' (*jero*) monopolization of traditional textual sources(*lontar*). To put it differently, in the socio-cultural perspective the *jabawangsa* were not allowed to study sacred palm leaf manuscripts (*lontar*) and were left without education in religion. (Parker 2000: 49)

Related to the introduction of modern education after 1846, Dutch-Native Schools (*Hollandsch-Inlandsche Scholen*, HIS) were established in Singaraja and Denpasar. Instruction was held in Dutch, giving the pupils access to Dutch East-Indian secondary education on Java. At the same time, a number of people's schools were established, where instruction was given in Balinese. (Bakker 1993: 35; Parker 2000) At the onset the Balinese upper classes did not voluntarily attend the village schools or the HIS; the colonial clerks rather had to force the parents to send their children to school. After 1914 a few members of the Balinese nobility registered their sons at these schools, since they hoped to increase the possibility of their children's vertical mobility, as positions in the bureaucracy and the government, or clean, white-collar jobs in the city were appreciated. After the popularity of modern education increased, the Balinese set up schools themselves, where instruction was given in Dutch. (Bakker 1993: 35)

Due to the social pressure of the *jabawangsa*, who had begun to articulate and discuss religious issues, the access to study these sacred scriptures was opened for them in the 1920s. (cf. Hinzeler 1993; Bakker 1993) Founded in 1921, headed by I Gusti Putu Djelantik, the *Suita Gama Tirtha* reform organization targeted at educational and religious progress by studying the knowledge on religion, literature, ethics and philosophy contained in the *lontar*. (on the reformist organizations see Bakker 1993: 35-48) An important event was the founding of the *Kirtya Liefrink-Van der Tuuk* library (now called *Gedong Kirtya*). Here many copies of old law texts and religious text which had previously been a close-guarded secret by the *pedandas*, had been assembled. (Bakker 1993: 36) Now they became more widely known, especially to a number of western-educated Balinese. (Bakker 1993: 36) Ida Pedanda Gede Pameron was one of the trustees. In 1932, Ida Pedanda Gede Pameron founded the *Sekolah Agama* in Tabanan which taught religion. (Bakker 1993: 42) One objective of many of those organizations was to abolish the tradition of *ajawera*. The tradition interdicts commoners (the Eka*jati* segment of society) to study *lontar* unless they took part in a *mewinten* ritual (purification ritual to obtain sacral knowledge especially for Brahmins and Ksatriya). (cf. Hinzeler 1993) Djelantik, member of the *Raad Kerta* (colonial administrational body) in Singaraja initiated *lontar* readings and reading courses for the interested young generation, thereby secularizing and even democratizing the tradition, as all classes of society were eligible tolontar study.

In consequence, viewed from the social and political perspective, knowledge was not freely disclosed prior to the 1920s; it was valuable and a source of power. The tight control or release of historical and ritual knowledge and information conferred upon the palace or priest compounds considerable advantage, by not sharing information freely both could to an extent direct ritual and kinship networks and were vested with a source of power. (Parker 2003: 31) In the theological perspective, *ajawera* denotes the interdiction to transmit sacred knowledge to people who are not prepared or initiated yet. Because knowledge is conceived to include a magical connotation, it might, if misapprehended and misapplied, not reach the intended target, but result in negative implications, which in turn endanger the individual, the social system, and the environment. It is very interesting, that in the Hindu education institutions, an initiation ritual (*upanayana*) is carried out prior to taking up studies and after graduating from studies a closing ritual is held. Contrary to secular India, where this tradition originated but is not continued anymore, in contemporary Bali, this tradition is continued until present times.

The shift from a traditionally exclusive understanding of accumulating knowledge towards the modern universal concept of schooling for all Balinese demonstrates the secularization and democratization of tradition towards an understanding of education as a universal right, which is not restricted to birth-right privileges. Religious scriptures were after the 1920s no longer restricted to the *triwangsa*. Those scriptures were translated into Indonesian, are printed in school books, and thus made available to all people, regardless of their origin, class, or spiritual status. These modern developments created a reformist neo-Hinduism, thereby bringing a drastic turn to classical Indian sources. Nowadays, in schools and temples the Bhagavad Gita and parts of Vedic and Upanishad scriptures are read, texts which were hardly known amongst Balinese religious specialists just two generations ago. (Steenbrink 2001: 20) In consequence, the integration of the Hindu class into the modern school system and the Hindu education system may be considered 1.) as one of the greatest democratic renewals of religion in Indonesia (Steenbrink 2001: 20; Parker 2000) and, 2.) as a singular case of religious pluralism in Muslim majority nation-state.

"The effect of these new institutions based on the Western model was the creation of a new elite parallel to the old elite. The new elite often had better prospects of a job as an official in the colonial administration or as a teacher at one of the schools." (Bakker 1993: 35) Those emerging educated new elites constitute the middle class of Indonesia. This middle class is the agent of change away from traditional systems of thought towards more egalitarian societies. Increasingly educated middle classes are a significant democratizing force as they demand predictable, safe, rational, legal, socio-political contexts. In Indonesia, a clear-cut differentiation of who was already in and who was still out of the Indonesian middle-class was hard to draw with parameters used for developed economies in the 1980s and 1990s. (Gerke 2000: 145) Membership in the Indonesian middle-class is not necessarily dependent on income, but it is largely defined by education, social networks, social behavior and lifestyle. (Gerke 2000: 145; Suwitha 2000: 223-249; Triguna, protocol 2007)

The shift from a peasant to middle-class status in Bali was most likely to occur through education and employment in the towns and tourist centers. (Parker 2004: 98) High social status and wealth operate through the education system in Bali: high status and wealthy groups reproduce their privileged position through education. Frequently, the sons, but also girls (Bakker 1993: 195-222) of the royal and priestly houses (*triwangsa*) benefited from their inherited positions of privilege and power, reproducing traditional hierarchies within the colonial and modern state. (Parker 2000; 2004: 215-222; Suwitha 2000: 223-249, Triguna, protocol 2007) Some old elites (*triwangsa)* successfully protected their status quo, whereas the educated new elite comprising segments of the old elite*,* marginalized members of the old elite (*triwangsa)* and *jabawangsa*, endeavor to reform the religion sector. (see Bakker 1993 and Triguna 1997) In the beginning, it was only the *jero* girls and boys, who were automatically steered into high school and beyond, as privileged admission to elementary and secondary schooling was given to the *triwangsa*. Those *jero*whose status coincided with wealth were best able to utilize educational facilities, drawing not only on their wealth to finance long years of schooling, but also on extended family ties in towns and cities for contacts and accommodation in Bali or outside Bali. (Parker 2004: 215-222; Suwitha 2000: 223-249, Triguna, protocol 2007)

Remember, after initial resistance, modern schools became popular amongst the Balinese, because they provided the possibility of vertical mobility, as graduates were able to alter their social status. (Bakker 1993; Parker 2004) In context of the colonial period, Bakker (1993: 35) remarks "It was noticeable that children from the higher classes gained admission to these schools more easily than the great majority of the lower classes, again showing the extent to which the Dutch wished to maintain the Balinese hierarchy". Remember, it has been the Dutch who gave the mandate to the Brahmins to explain their complex social order for colonial administrative interests. This pattern continued in the nation state, "The state-building impetus of independent Indonesia created its own slipstreaming effect", Parker has noted, "sucking in first the elite sons and daughters, then gradually peasants' sons and even daughters" (Parker 2004: 265) – with the result that now without difference in gender all children are obliged to go to school.

In the 1930s, the small old and new modern elite came to occupy numerous strategic positions in society as teachers or civil servants. But only since the 1960s and the expansion of service related industries such as the tourism and export sector, education and the health system, the Balinese middle class has grown steadily. During the nation state period related to development plans and compulsory schooling, a mentality of progressiveness was fostered through school attendance and school attendance affected that mentality in turn. But only since the economic boom in the 1980s, the expansion of the tourism sector and export industry related service economy on cost of agriculture, the bureaucratic and service jobs have been available more widely for all Balinese.

In the last decades, education is an important factor in giving the young generations the confidence and incentive to leave the villages. The young generation are not attracted to rural village life anymore or their villages do not have the capacity and enough labor to feed them, as a consequence most young individuals and families of all descent moved to the cities (*Kuta, Denpasar, Gianyar*) apply to underpaid and overtime work in the tourism industry and export sector, thereby causing rampant urbanization, linked with this process is the rationalization and secularization of religion. Research in the 1980s showed that Balinese high school students aspired to the modern jobs publicized by school and government and did not want to follow traditional-village based occupations such as stone masons, farmers and even priests. Overwhelmingly young people saw their future in modern occupations requiring education and skills. (Parker 2004: 250-254) Therefore education has been radically transformative and dramatic shifts in social status have been achieved through education and employment. (Parke, 2004: 215-222, Suwitha 2000: 223-249, Triguna, protocol 2007) Today, such concerned urban middle-class intellectuals position themselves at the forefront of new identity politics (Schulte-Nordhold 2007: 5) - some desperate and probably last-ditch efforts and attempts to safeguard what is vaguely perceived as the core of Balinese religion and culture, from secularization.

I found following types of elites belonging to the Balinese elite actively engaged in systematization and conceptualization efforts in the sector of religion and the Hindu class.

1. *Old Jero*: traditional royal and priestly elite.
2. *New Jero*: new elite represented in educated middle-class experts, who are seen by some old elites and their bondmen in the villages as lacking traditional authority or breaching traditional sanctified contracts.

The new elite can be categorized into three camps:

1. *Super-jero*, these are old-*jero* or traditional royal and priestly elite, who reproduced their status through secondary and higher education, wealth and offices in the Hindu Council, MORA, education sector, government, political system, and bureaucracy, and who influence and shape the top-down construction of the Hindu education class and system and Hindu and Balinese identity policies.
2. *New jero,* those commoners (*jaba*) or marginalized or empoversihed members of the old elite, who used education to move vertically upward and who hold positions in the Hindu Council, MORA, education sector, the national and regional government, and bureaucracy, which enable them to participate in the top-down authorization process of Balineseness and Hindu identity.
3. 'subaltern' *jero*, either new or old elites who do not share the top-down construction of Balinese and Hindu identity, but argue for a participatory and bottom-up approach. These elites argue for subaltern and an alternative approach to identity policies.
4. Foreign researchers, whose intercourse with Balinese academics fertilize consciously or unconsciously future developments.

There is a recurring tension between Bali-centric conservative reformers trying to appropriate Hinduism on their own terms, and modernist reformers aspiring to universalize their religious traditions according to their conception of what Hinduism is really about, (Picard 2004: 57) as portrayed in Indian scriptures. Religion and social order are perceived by the conservative Balinese elites as an inseparable unity. Religion, culture, and art are seen as an organic unity (Pedanda Bajing Interview 2006), and to secularize religion implies to destroy the tradition of ancestor veneration and the social order of Hindu Bali. In this context, Schulte-Nordholt (2007: 5) has noted, "the discourse of urban intellectuals in Bali is deeply rooted in New Order concepts with which they were brought up". "As such, their thinking is heavily influenced by an interesting mixture of colonial categories, New Order bureaucratic concepts and recent modernist Hindu ideas". (Schulte-Nordholt 2007: 5) In this, the implementation of the organic philosophy in the population by means of education proved to be very efficient as those models are still adhered to today. But if we recall the persistence of the Indic state model and the Javanese *kaula*-gusti relationship, one might argue following a cultural relativist argument, that the Balinese indeed display a preference for organic models.

There are also repeatedly tensions between the super-*jero* and the old-*jero* about privileges, and competencies of ritual performances. As a rule, I found the super-*jero* to be rather represented at UNHI, whereas the new *jero* are mainly employed at the IHDN. Based on Balinese nomenclature (see Parker 2004; Geertz 1963), I counted course membership of all students registered with UNHI or IHDN from 2006 to 2008. I could not validate a public prejuidce that at UNHI only the *triwangsa* would gather, whereas at IHDN the commoners study. Though, the students reflect a strong loyalty to their respective campus ethos, are proud to study at the respective tertiary unit and campus life is vivid.

Today, the textual sources of Hindu Dharma Indonesia and *Agama* Hindu Bali are disputed in a quarrel over textual sources and their interpretation ('*Quellen* and *Exegesestreit*')[289]. The Bali-centric faction at UNHI (Sudharta Interview 2008) and the old elite (Pedanda Baing Interview 2006, 2007) maintain that Balinese and Javanese sources must remain the primary pool and source of Balinese religion, and only then the Veda may be consulted, whereas the Indian modernist fraction tends to refer first to the Vedas, the Mahabharata, the Ramayana, the Bhagavad Gita and only then to local scriptures. In this context, the Hindu Council has regulated the hierarchy of Hindu scriptures analogues to the hierarchy of law according to the concept of a *Stufenmodell*. The high priest chamber of the reformed Hindu Council has pronounced three *bhisama* (a legal statement binding for all Hindus issued by the council on a specific issue) in 2001 and 2002. The Hindu Council is given authority on issues of Hindu Law. Those *bhisama* are passed and implemented by the lay-men chamber and the management board. The mechanism promoted and used by the reformed council to reform and consolidate traditions by passing new laws continues the mode of filtering set out in 1968.

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[289] In 1968, the Hindu Council adopted its second decree. It inaugurated the concepts of *Tat Twam As*i (Thou art that), *Atma Aupamya* (Bhagavad-Gita: equality of others with oneself) and *Moksartham Jagathita*. In addition, the decree introduced a hierarchy between *agama* (as represented in the Vedas and the smriti), *adat* and *awig-awig*. As long as the local *adat* supports the strengthening of agama Hindu, it may be cultivated according to *Desa, Kala,* and *Patra*. The regulations on the sublevel of social units as *banjar, subak* are termed *awig-awig*.

Usages and customs are reformed following three strategies: *utpati* (to invent a new tradition which is based on the Vedas), *stihti* (to maintain appropriate traditions) and *pralina* (to abandon traditions which do not befit the development of the soul (*jiwa*) or modernity). Concerning the legal hierarchy, regulations on the lower level may not be in conflict with the higher levels, and a *bhisama* must follow subsequent legal sources in order to be valid:

1. Sruthi (Catur Vedas)[290]
2. Smrthi (Dharma Sastra)
3. Sila (ethics of sages)
4. Sadacara (sacred traditions: *adat*, awig-awig)
5. Atmanastusti (contemplation)

All fractions are extraordinarily devout in ancestor service. (Titib Interview 2011) This debate also extends into the Hindu class and teachers' training. In general, the Hindu educators' curriculum contains Sanskrit and Old-Javanese in reading and writing at the tertiary level, because educators' shall be able to read the sources of Hindu religion in their original version. This is heavily criticized by some experts of pedagogy (Tanu Interview 2007), who demand the future educators to be trained in pedagogical science and less in dead languages.

It is important to note, that most of the Balinese elites (old-*jero*, new-*jero* and super-*jero*) certify the uneducated Balinese community (*masyarakat awan*) limited capacity to the particular importance of reproducing the constructed Balinese identity. But they all note the thirst (*haus*) (Interview Bajing 2006, Sura 2006) of the community for deepening knowledge in religious questions. In other words, the new and old elites detect an interest, appetite, and need in the Balinese community to understand religion. (Sura Interview 2006, Pedanda Bajing Interview 2006, Suryani Protocol 2005) As Moran (1991: 257) has illustrated, this is the crucial change in the modern world that presses the issue of understanding religion on increasing numbers of ordinary people. (Parker 2000) A net effect of the rapid urbanization is that the religious and value education of the youngest generation is endangered, since first young core families live in cities dependent on child care institutions and therefore the larger family cannot socialize the traditional values. For this reason, Hindu reformers attest the Hindu class and the Hindu education system an important position in nurturing in Hindu religion and values, even if the role the Hindu class plays is still insufficient. (Sura Interview 2006, Pedanda Bajing Interview 2006, Suryani Protocol 2005) In other words, the educated elite criticizes that social systems and the family are insufficiently nurturing in Hindu knowledge and competence into children and society as a whole, hence the government and elites have the mandate to organize a system of religious education.

Prof Triguna (protocol 2007) sees the task of Balinese political and social agents in developing a commitment to protect the Balinese and the Hindu community. Therefore Balinese politicians and academics have to display goodwill and have to offer the whole community the same opportunities on equal grounds. In consequence, motivated by their Hindu literacy thirst and based on the own efforts and interest, the Balinese community reproduces and continues their cultural-religious heritage. Given the mandate to reform, the motor or agency of such a systematization and reproduction is the Balinese educated middle class, and the religious experts, the former ruling elite, and the priesthood. The educated elite represented in Hindu reformers and Hindu strategic planners design programs to facilitate the dynamic expression of faith and saving the very core of Balinese Hinduism in a traditional but updated way (*Ajeg* revitalization movement) at the same time. This process is intimately linked with the question whether there is a core of Balinese Hindu identity, what constitutes this core, and what the role of Hindu-based education is in this concern. Since the Dutch conquest, and the classification of the Balinese orthopraxis as Hindu, there is a debate among Indonesian and foreign specialists concerning the "authenticity" of Balinese culture and Hindu Dharma Indonesia. It remains controversial, to what extent traditional religious practices and beliefs pertain to universal Hindu Dharma, or are a variant of the Indian prototype or are local traditions.

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[290] The *Catur Vedas Samhitas* (Sankrit: four knowledge compilations) are a large compilation of ancient metrical texts originating in India. Their exact age is unknown. The verses contained in the Vedas are known as Mantra. Those four compilations constitute the most ancient texts of Sanskrit literature and the highest authority of Hinduism. According to Hindu traditions, those Vedas are not of human agency (*apaurusheya*: eternal and authorless) and are perceived to been directly revealed. In consequence, they are called *sruti* (what is heard or listened). The Vedas are the Rigveda, the Yajurveda, the Samaveda, and the Artharvaveda. The large body of commentaries to those four compilations (Brahmanas, Aranyakas, Upanishads, and Vedangas) also belongs to the category of *sruti*. Besides the *Vedas*, the *Agamas* (a text containing a specific traditional doctrine, or system which commands faith) belong to the class of *sruti* texts. The Vedas are said to be general, whereas the *Agamas* are specific, as they give instructions on the details of worship, yoga, mantra, tantra, and temple building. The secondary texts known as smirti are a vast collection of texts which are remembered, as the *Itihasas* (epic dramas and history—specifically the Ramayana, Mahabhrata (which contains the Bhagavad Gita), the Puranas (history), and the Law texts as the Law of Manu for example. (Upadeca 1967: 41-43; http://www.hindupedia.com)

Interestingly, the megalithic tradition of ancestor veneration and the male *purusa* line of descent seem to constitute the core of Balinese religion by the old, new, and subaltern elites. The oldest son and grandson have important obligations during the three-steps-cremation ritual and during the regular rituals of ancestor worship (*pitra yadnya*). If they fail to perform those rituals and to exercise their obligations, the security and welfare of their families and clan are perceived to be endangered. The ancestors protect the island and the families; if they are not revered anymore, the spirit of Balinese religion and culture will be destroyed. In this abolishing ancestor veneration is seen as to cause the social order to erode. (Ida Pedanda Bajing Interview 2006, 2009; Titib Interview 2007; Sukerda Protocol 2007)

PART D

6. Emergence, conception, and organization of the Hindu education system

6.1. The legal base of the religion class in Indonesia

This section examines in detail the current legal framework of the religion class from elementary to tertiary level. Due to the demographic composition of Indonesia, the topic of the religious class in public schools and the sector of faith-based schools remains a source of controversy since the early days of the nationalist movements and the foundation of the state.

Beeby (1979: 263) clearly identifies the choice between secular schools and education controlled by religious organizations as a cause of tension in the educational policy of Indonesia. From independence until 1964, the confessional religious class was a non-compulsory subject in public schools and universities testifying to a quite open climate of thought and a more secular value orientation during the Sukarno years. Attendance of the religion class was optional in the sense that the students or the parents of the students had the freedom to decide, if students attend or not attend the class. In consequence, the religion class did not affect student's promotion to the next level of education.

By 1965, the confessional religion class was made a compulsory subject. The current Indonesian legislation requires that six confessional religious classes are provided in public and private schools at all levels of the education system (with the exception of master and doctoral studies at state universities). The findings show a specific peculiarity of the Indonesian case. First, the ultimate ambition of Indonesian strategic and educational policies is to mould an Indonesian citizen who has faith in God (Islam: *imam* or Hindu: *sradha*), follows the commands of God (Islam: *taqwa* or Hindu: *bhakti*), and has morals (Islam: *akhlak* or Hindu: *budhi pekerti*). In this context, the dimension of spiritual intelligence (UNHI 2007: xxv, Belen 2007) in education is a dimension of education, which is given particular importance by Indonesian educational planners regardless to the religion they adhere to. Thus, Indonesian national educational planners add this peculiar dimension of spiritual intelligence to the UNESCO standards of student-centered learning throughout life. Second, and related to the first point, students are required by law to attend the religion class in the religion they adhere at all educational levels instructed by a teacher of the same *agama*. In addition, the religion mark is a compulsory item in the school report, and whether a pupil/student stays back or is promoted to the next level depends amongst others on how the religion teacher grades the student. It is thus interesting to assess, in Indonesia, the organization of religious education is strictly confessional, but at the same time pluralistic. Therefore it is safe to assume that Indoensia has advanced an own and unique model of the religion class.

6.1.1. Precursors of the National Education System

This section gives a cursory and incomplete overview of the main four historical precursors which have contributed to the nature of current national education system. The first stream refers to informal training that children receive from their families and communities. In the ancient past as in the present, the core of what young people know about the nature of their world, the tradition of their ethnic group, social roles, and their occupation has been learned through direct participation in family and village life. (Sudijarto/Thomas et al. 1980: 59) In the context of traditional archipelagic "religious education"[291], education took place amidst the social environment in the nuclear family, clan, community, and village transferring religious knowledge and socio-cultural skills to the child. "A main channel is religious learning by face-to-face contacts and via imitation. In modern societies, the former religious ecology of the family is more or less broken." (Nipkow 2006: 579)

Buddhist and Hindu religious instruction constitutes the second stream. Speculatively, the type of archipelagic Hindu education was similar to the Indian model[292] as represented in a Hindu or Buddhist scholar's centre (*gurukula*) where education was conducted in an individualistic fashion.

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[291] I put religious education in quotation marks, because until the advent of Dutch secular education, presumably, there was no distinction between religion, culture, and profession.
[292] On the Indian education model see Scharfe 2002.

Those Indian educational units developed over time and the more elaborated the teaching, the more prestigious such a school has been valued. In India, Hindu teachers (*guru, pandit*) gathered a few students (*shishya*) to study Sanskrit, memorize sacred scriptures, and to do some disputation at their homes (*acharya-kula*), a brahminical settlement or hermitage in forests (*ashrama*), or a "Hindoo school of learning" (*tol*). (Scharfe 2002; transliteration omitted) There the students lived together with their teachers or returned home, if they lived in the vicinity of the educational unit. Scharfe (2002: 6; 127; transliteration omitted) comments on the Indian context:

> It was the duty of every "twice-born", i.e., member of the three upper social orders, to continue the *arya* traditions, and especially of the brahmins to teach "what had come down" (*agama*) as a link of "passing on" (*sampradaya*) of sacred texts and customs. In spite of the important role that this "passing on" of the sacred tradition played in Indian society, no full-fledged theory of education was developed. (Scharfe 2002: 6)
>
> (…) there is no indication of organized structures within the hermitage, let alone state imposed regulations. The goal was personal improvement, the capability to meet one's religious and social duties, not preparation for government service – at least not directly. (Scharfe 2002: 127)

The *ashrama* model seems to have been popular in the archipelago. The students (commonly male descendants of the upper social order) learned the religious lore from India which has been acculturated in the Archipelago. It is crucial to note in this context, that neither Hinduism nor Buddhism – although Buddha has been the ultimate authority on conduct – developed a central religious or educational authority that could have enforced unity or uniformity. "Education was decentralized and it saw modest centralization only much later when large institutions developed administrative structures." (Scharfe 2002: 145) In consequence, only with the kingdoms of Sriwijaya (7th - 13th century) (Kulke 1986, 1993a, 1993b, 1995, 1999; Munoz 2006) until Majapahit (11th – 15th century) (Slametmuljana 1976; Munoz 2006) exclusive, formal and religious oriented education had been invented. In the kingdom of Sriwijaya, an international renowned Buddhist University had been operated from the 7th century onwards. This university has been in vivid exchange with the University of Nalanda in India. The University of Nalanda (located in the contemporary state of Bihar in India) had been founded around 400 AD. (Scharfe 2002: 143-147) It was one of the first Universities with an integrated boarding school (*ashrama*), where around 11 thousand students were instructed in Buddhist teachings. The 'Indonesian' students even had their own *ashrama* there. After its destruction by Muslim conquerors in 1193, Nalanda was reopened in 2007.

The relationship between teacher and the male student of the upper social order had been intensive, individualistic, and subjected to strict rules. "The initiation to Vedic study (*upanayana*) seems to presuppose some elementary knowledge, while no recitation of Vedic texts was allowed before formal *upanayana*." (Scharfe 2002: 86) The initiation is considered a second birth, where the Vedas are the mother, the teacher the father. Only after this rite, the student, who has been a descendant of the upper social order, is considered a real "twice born" (*dvijati*). In consequence, a student had to perform an initiation or rather a purification ritual prior to taking up studies and after graduation a closing ritual (*samavartana*). This tradition can be traced from early Vedic and Zoroastrian texts times to modern times, but its character has changed.

Interestingly in contemporary Bali, Hinzeler (1993: 458) observes "Anyone who wishes to read manuscripts regularly needs to undergo a consecration (*mawinten, madiksa* […]), which must be performed by a brahmin priest." Informal training of professional priests requires those ritualsbefore consecration *(diksita)*, but on a much more elaborate and complex level. T is my observation, that at formal educational units as the *Dwijendra* Foundation, the Indonesian Hindu University, or the State Hindu Dharma Institute this tradition is continued[293]. Students are required to participate in those initiation rites, or rather purification rites (*apodgala, abebersih*) prior to taking up studiesand before graduation. At UNHI, the *upanayana* ritual is called *mawinten* or *mahasisya upanayana* (as *madiksa* refers to the inauguration of a professional priest) performed by one professional Siva priest (*pedanda shiva*) and one professional Buddhist priest (*pedanda shiva*)[294].

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[293] Personal participation in five of these rituals in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2011.
[294] On the roles and functions of the priests see C. Hooykaas (1964) Weda and Sisya, Rsi and Bhujangga in present-day Bali. In: Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 120 (1964), no: 2, Leiden, 231-244; C. Hooykaas (1977) A Balinese temple festival. The Hague : Nijhoff Balinese; C. Hooykaas (1973) Bauddha Brahmans / [texts with transl., ed. by C. Hooykaas] Amsterdam et al. : North-Holland Publishing Company ; T. Goudriaan and C. Hooykaas (1971) Stuti and stava (Bauddha, Śaiva, and Vaiṣṇava) of Balinese Brahman priests / [Sanskrit texts; ed. with introd., translation and notes by T. Goudriaan and C. Hooykaas] Amsterdam et al. : North-Holland Publishing Company

Likewise, at the end of the studies, a closing ritual is held (*mejaya-jaya*)[295]. Taking up studies and graduation is divided into two steps: the first step is accepting or releasing the students in matters pertaining to the undiversified or uncreated (*niskala*) and the second step is formally registering or graduating them – that is in matters pertaining to the diversified or created (*sekala*). With those rituals the balance between the students' intelligent quotient (IQ), but also the emotional intelligence quotient (EQ), and the spiritual intelligence quotient (SQ) shall be created. (UNHI 2007: xxv; BaliPost 13.10.2011)

From the 8th to the 15th century Bali, a few *Vihara* (Buddhist monasteries) were founded located at rivers, and it is very likely that they also provided Buddhist education in the ashram-model. Since only a few stone inscriptions mention those *pasanggahan* (study centers), Agung and Musta (1991-1992: 1-15) assume there was only a slight formal institutionalization of education prior to the Dutch conquest in Bali. Presumably, prior to the Majapahit invasion, education was organized in the *guru-kula* system, and it was differentiated into four pillars: *Asrama*, *Vihara*, and profession-based education at the palace (*paguron kraton*), and the family compound. The *paguron kraton* system denotes education in the subject matters of religion, statecraft, philosophy and law that the younger nobility received by an appointed priest or teacher at the palace. In consequence, the palace became a center for the production of knowledge and literature. Following the conquest of Bali by Majapahit in 1343 but preceding the introduction of secular education by the Dutch around 1846, traditional education had been differentiated into vocational areas based on kinship and social order. This differentiation model has a long tradition as Scharfe (2002: 86) observes in the Indian context. With regard to the upper social order (*jero* – insiders), the brahmins would have provided their sons with education centered on literacy, theology, philosophy, law and ritual performance located at the *geriyah* (Brahmin premises). The priests held a central and important position in the traditional educational types and in the production of literature. Yet, all these educational types were strictly limited to the social groups they aimed to educate. Similarly, nobility provided their sons with education oriented on statecraft, martial skills, and law located at the *puri* (palaces). Both strata of the upper social order provided elitist education. Yet, the lower social orders (*jaba* – outsiders) as peasants, craftsmen, traders, were left without any spiritual or formal education (On a detailed account of literature and literacy in Bali from 18th to the 20th century see Hinzeler 1993; Parker 2000). At the family compound children were taught the traditional profession as art and craft that displayed some status and skills, it were the peasants, who had no tradition, no education, and no knowledge in religious matters. The sons of peasants would have helped in the fields and in tending farm animals, sons of craftsmen would have learned their fathers skills by learning and doing in the manufacture, whereas sons of traders would have helped in the storehouses. The remaining clans in society, as the *pande* (smiths), educated their offspring in the skills they needed in order to pursue their profession.

The third stream is Islamic religious instruction. As stated earlier, Indonesian Islam developed on a substructure of shamanist and Hindu-Buddhist elements that preceded its arrival. With the advent and dissemination of Islam from the 10th to the 13th centuries, informal teaching units (*langgar*) were attached to the first mosques, and the Hindu scholar's centre was transformed into Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren, padepokan* or *surau*). In the early 20th century, Islamic modernist organizations recorded their dissatisfaction with the traditional *pesantren* type. Those organizations reformed the Islamic educational sector and curriculum by establishing schools with a combined curriculum of secular and Islamic subjects. These new learning centers were named *madrasah*, a term imported from the Middle East. (Sudijarto/Thomas et al. 1980: 60-61) Concerning the Islamic model, the traditional type (*langgar* and *pesantren*) as well the modernist Islamic type of school (*madrasah*) were initially restricted to religious teaching only, that is Arabic (*arabiyah*), Theology (*tawhid*), and Law (*fiqih*). In 1931 the curricula of the *madrasah* adopted subjects in general education. Today, Islamic education is offered either at small prayer houses (*langgar*), non-graded schools (*pesantren*) operated by a Muslim scholar (*kiyai* or *ulama*) or a graded school (*madrasah*) operated by the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

The forth stream is Western-style education. Portuguese and Spanish traders were the first to open catholic schools in the Moluccas in 16th century. Starting with the expansion of Dutch control by the advent of the 17th century, Protestant schools were opened in the Moluccas and other islands. Then the Dutch introduced the intellectual Western-style secular school system. But this system was not egalitarian; it displayed a highly stratified pattern. At top of the system ranked Dutch schools, fully funded by the colonial government, using Dutch as medium of instruction and identical in curricula and staffing to those in the Netherlands.

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[295] Bali Post 13 October 2011, UNHI Gelar Prosesi Ritual "Majaya-jaya".

Those schools offered restricted access only to families of the colonial administration officers and wealthy businessmen. At the medium level were schools for Dutch, Chinese, Eurasians, and a few handpicked locals using Dutch as well as medium of instruction. At the lowest level, village elementary schools provided a small range of subjects for the local population using local languages as medium of instruction, but those schools were established and funded by the local aristocracy. (Sudijarto/ Thomas et al. 1980: 60-65)

Established in 1901, a central concern of the Ethical Policy was education. The arena of education and culture left an open space for to-be Indonesians to express their ideas against the restrictions of the colonial government. In consequence, the beginnings of the nationalist movement leading to Independence concurred with the establishment of the Ethical Policy. Advisor on Native Affairs to the Colonial Government of the Netherlands East Indies, Snouck Hurgronje[296] came to believe that the adoption of enlightened policies, particularly in the field of education, would enable Indonesians to develop rational reasoning in order to shed both Islamic and *adat* (local traditions, customs and customary law) preoccupations, as Islam and*adat* were perceived to be contradicting a modern rational world view[297]. This would enable the locals further to develop a modern consciousness necessary for self-government. Hurgronje promoted European education in Dutch limited to the Westernized elite only in order to provide the colonial administration with fairly educated civil servants. Because colonial officers were uneasy about the idea of Indonesians entering the same educational system as the Dutch, other Europeans and Chinese, those receiving Dutch education remained a small elite, who came to have a tremendous influence over the course of Indonesian affairs in the coming decades. Only in the 1920s, a handful of locals had the advantage to gain tertiary education in the Netherlands. As secondary schooling was all in Dutch language, thereby the possibility that any youth, who had not mastered Dutch, would rise beyond the lowest primary grades in the secular school structure, was severely limited. (Sudijarto/Thomas et al. 1980: 65) Only a small number of Javanese *priyayi*[298] and Balinese nobility attended European elementary schools where they had the opportunity to study Dutch - the key to gain modern skills and achieve an awareness of the outside world.

In 1900, there were about 1,500 elementary schools in the entire archipelago for a population of over 36 million people (only one was located in Bali) and only some 1,545 students visited Dutch schools. (Frederick/Worden 1993; Bunge 1982) In consequence, "public education was virtually nonexistent" (Frederick/Worden 1993) until the government finally established a 3-year village school system in 1906. As those schools needed to be staffed, teacher training schools (*Kweek schools*) were also established. Although the Dutch colonial government subsidized the construction of school buildings, the responsibility for maintenance and paying teacher salaries was left to the local population. Then in 1914, seven-year schools were established in order to enable the locals to qualify for higher education without having to pass through the Dutch system. Enrolments in those Western-type schools increased tremendously in the 1900-1930 period (from 265,940 in 1900 to over 1, 7 million in 1930) yet the literacy rate for adults remained low even by 1930, averaging 7, 4 percent overall. (Bunge 1982: 31) Even though many locals resented the schools as a new government-imposed burden – they had to finance the schools and the staffing, there were some 3,500 village schools in 1913 and 18,000 in 1940. (Frederick/Worden 1993)

At the beginning of the 20th century, education opportunities were highly limited for the archipelagic locals, even for the local rulers collaborating with Dutch colonizers. Even though the amount of formal education of a Western type that was available to the local population was severely limited, those young locals who did progress through the school system produced then a small corps of nationalistic leaders, who adopted secular Western-type schooling. Generally, Indonesian leaders in the first decades of the twentieth century devoted a great deal of attention to educational reform, and a number of experimental schools were established outside the government and missionary systems in the 1920s and 1930s. In relation to the very late educational opportunities for the vast population, educated elites of all political groupings subscribed a central meaning to education, thereby the basic conflicting lines of politics and over the shape of the future nation also played out in the education system. Therefore, if we look at the current education system, we can see that the ideological conflict about the shape of the nation and its culture is manifest in it.

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[296] Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (8 February 1857 - 26 June 1936) was a Dutch scholar of Oriental cultures and languages and Advisor on Native Affairs to the colonial government of the Netherlands East Indies.
[297] Somewhat modified, this line of thought is continued until today as the strong emphasis laid on religion in the education system has the implicit purpose and ultimate ambition not only to rationalize superstitious beliefs and *adat* in order to purify *agama*.
[298] The *Priyayi* are defined both by descent from ancient Javanese royal families and by the vocation of government service.

There were two general efforts made by the local reformers themselves in the educational sector: the cultural-nationalist (*Taman Siswa*) and the Islamic (see previous paragraph in this section). The *Taman Siswa* program was founded by the Javanese Ki Hadjar Dewantara. He was appointed as first Minister of Education and Culture, and later he was declared "National Father of Education" and his birthday, May 2nd, to be the National Education Day. The *Taman Siswa* movement was strongly influenced by the pedagogic ideas of the Indian Rabindranath Tagore. (Ramstedt 2004: 6) This model supported a rather alternative approach of education to the mere intellectual Western approach, in which intellectualism was combined with a religious dimension and a strong moral commitment -as expressed in the subject of moral education (*budhi pekerti*). The movement established several schools throughout the archipelago, and environment and nature were part of a contextual curriculum. The key feature was Dewantara's promotion of Javanese cultural values as part of moral education (*budhi pekerti*) The influence of those Javanese ethics – which are intrinsically linked to Javanese mysticism – arose protest from proponents of the orthodox Islamic model as the Minister of Religion, Rasjidi, who worried that those cultural values on Muslim children might conflict with orthodox Islamic values and norms.

The cultural-nationalist and the Islamic model are two ideological ends of the spectrum ever present in the national education system and each has its own vested interest to protect at all costs. (Kelambora 1976) The local elites understood education as a means first to achieve equality, dignity, and progress, as both the national and the Islamic line of thought saw education as the way to obtain the same standard and status as the Dutch colonial power. Second, education was a means to abscond from either being underestimated or treated as a second class human by Dutch colonizers. Therefore in Indonesia national education is assessed as a feat, as victory above colonialism. In Indonesia, the education system is seen as opportunity of vertical social mobility, or as vehicle for conveying the students to a higher social-class structure. (Kelambora 1976, Parker 2003) In sum, from the onset of the National Movement and Independence throughout all political epochs, all groups considered education to be the key factor in national development despite their contesting lines of thought. All groups have always posed great weight on education as the constitutional link between education and culture shows. Education is a vehicle to develop Indonesian spirited culture and identity necessary to maintain national unity, stability, and public order. Thus we can understand the crucial role *agama* is ascribed to in national development plans.

6.1.2. Note on strategic planning instruments in education

In order to realize the objectives of education on a large-scale and in a short period of time the young republican government launched a comprehensive mass education program to enhance correct understanding of *Pancasila* during the period of national consolidation (1950-1960). The mass education program[299] included an alphabetization campaign aiming to eradicate illiteracy for the entire population including adults and women, spreading out education amongst the population, expansion of the school system (primary schooling and the teachers training), creation of a democratic and *Pancasila*istic in nature political consciousness, rehabilitation of the youth and empowerment of women. Certainly, the program targeted the building up of political and critical awareness, especially for the uneducated militarized youth, which could have been easily manipulated by anti-republican forces, may it be the Dutch or Islamists. It was one ambition of the mass education program to accelerate the integration process of an Indonesian society in order to consolidate national and cultural unity crucial for the survival of the young republic. The government made following efforts in education: 1.) increasing the Peoples' school attendance from 3 to 6 years, 2.) improving the standard and quality of education, and 3.) increasing the number of schools to meet the people's need towards education and schooling by building new schools, contracting houses, and implementing a morning and afternoon schools. The government faced following difficulties: 1.) the dearth of teachers, 2.) the lack of school buildings, and 3.) the insufficient equipment situation. In order to make the 1954 Act on Education and Schooling operative, the government tried to overcome all those challenges by implementing a ten years strategic program from 1950 to 1960. (KPD 1950: 45-46)

In view of the population size, distribution, and annual growth rate, the task of Indonesian educational planners is immense. In the 1950s, the magnitude of their goal to furnish universal elementary schooling and large amounts of secondary education is even more impressive (Sudijarto/Thomas 1980: 50), when we consider the total population, the dearth of teachers, and the limited finances. In 1950 the illiteracy rate amounted to 90 percent of a total population of 70 million. This rate his been decreased to 57 percent in 1961.

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[299] In 1950 the Ministry of Information in Jakarta (*Kementerian Penerangan Djakarta*, KPD) published its Scheme for Mass Education, the 57 years old text runs as it would had been written only recently, similar issues and problems are discussed, with the exception of illiteracy. (KPD 1950: 45-46)

Concurrently intensive supportive measures were taken to improve secondary and tertiary education. As tertiary education was simply inexistent, it had to be set up from the start. Two days after the Proclamation of Independence an Association of Tertiary Education had been established, which evolved into the public University of Indonesia in 1950. In 1949, the public Gadjah Mada University has been established in Yogyakarta. The first private tertiary facility was the Indonesian Islamic Academy established in July 1945 in Yogyakarta. In 1948, the Academy changed its name to Indonesian Islamic University. Its Institute of Religion was taken over by the Ministry of Religion and was re-established as State Islam Religion Institute (*Institute Agama Islam Negeri*). Private tertiary facilities in the 1950s included amongst others, Islamic facilities in Yogyakarta, Solo, and in Bandung as well as Christian Universities.

Politization and polarization of the population and economic decline characterized the period between 1959 and 1965. Bad macroeconomic management, war with Malaysia, the isolation from the Western world, and domestic political instability caused poverty and stagnation in economy and education. The only positive advance Sukarno's first development plan (1961-1968) achieved in its educational component was the establishment in each of the nation's 21 provinces of a public university and a public teacher's college. (World Bank Report No. 26191-IND. 2003: 4) In this context, in 1962, the State University in Bali, Udayana, was launched and in 1963 the first private Hindu Dharma Institute (now the Indonesian Hindu University).

Ever since the first 5-year-development-plan (*repelita*), which is part of the Broad Guidelines of State Policy (*Garis Besar Haluan Negara, GBHN*), was published in 1967 by the Suharto regime, the country underwent planning cycles. In order to facilitate development, planning and administration were the central government's key control mechanisms to facilitate education and engineer scarce resources in the regions with little regard for local priorities. The major instrument of these planning processes was *repelita*, which decided much on the development spending, whether central or local. (Sudijarto/Thomas 1980: 54) The first long term development plan (*pembangunan jangka panjang*, RPJP I) has been enacted from 1969-1994. Then the second long term development plan (*pembangunan jangka panjang*, RPJP II) has been launched from 1994-2019.

In the era of reform from 1998 to 2002, there were important changes made to the planning instruments, including significant changes in the levels of decision-making, with a major move towards decentralization and a greater focus on regional issues. This process triggered in turn the demand to reform, restructure, and decentralize the educational sector as well as the curricula. The Broad Guidelines of State Policy issued by the People's Consultative Assembly in 1999, called for a restructuring of the entire national education system and the drafting of a new bill on education and a new curriculum. The second long term development plan (*pembangunan jangka panjang*, RPJP II) 1994-2019 has been aborted and replaced with the national development program (*Program Pembangunan Nasional, Propenas*) put into effect with Act No 25/ 2000. There is considerable continuity between the first, second and third long term development plan. Within the first RPJP, the development trilogy of political stability and security, economic growth, and equality (*pemerataan*) formed the developmental priorities, whereas in the second RPJP those priorities became equality (*pemerataan*), economic growth, and political stability and security. Then in 2000, the *Propenas* sets out five broad objectives to be achieved continuing the strategies and line of thought of previous planning instruments. In 2004 then, the Consultative Assembly enacted the national long-term development plan (*Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Nasional*, RPJPN) for a 20 years period from 2005 to 2025. The key element of reform in the education sector was a shift from the transmission to the transformation paradigm. Prior to decentralization, administration and planning had been dominated by the center Jakarta as top-down structured processes, but decentralization has added a number of planning instruments at the regional levels. However, "Although participation of civil society and the village level has much increased, the process is still much like the *repelita* process, and can be thought of consisting of a top-down process and a bottom-up process". (World Bank, Report No. 26191-IND. 2003: 4)

6.1.3. The religion class from 1950 to1965

During colonial times, the curriculum was secular and scientifically oriented. In 1871 the colonial government decided that "Religion was not to be taught as a school subject in the Government schools". (Kelambora 1976: 233) Thereby the colonial administration signaled neutrality in matters of religion. In consequence, the question of religious education had been dormant from the 1870s up to the early month of Indonesian independence and it quickly became a great political, ideological, cultural, religious, and educational controversy. (Kelambora 1976: 236) The expansion of the secular education system directly corresponded with the intensification of the conflict between the colonizers and the Islamic elite. Naturally, the Islamic elite strongly opposed the expansion of the secular system, while the Western secular educated elite drifted further away from their traditional roots and formed a significant social force by the proclamation of Independence. (Kelambora 1976: 235)

Besides the first principle of One Supreme Lordship, the original and the amended 1945 Basic Law embodies two basic rights, which form the legal framework of (Hindu) religious education: 1.) the right to religious freedom in private and in public, however, public display has been restricted by consequential legislation, whereas the individual right of freedom of religion and conscience is maintained, and 2.) the universal right to education.

By the Dutch capitulation to Japanese occupation in March 1942, Indonesia had a literacy rate of 10 percent and about 1000 fully trained academics. (Müller 1974: 164) In their three years lasting occupancy (1942-1945), the Japanese introduced Indonesian as instructional and national language and they established a socially equal school system for the people. The multi system of schools was dissolved into a single 6 years'-elementary school system (Peoples' School, *Sekolah Rakyat, Kokumin Gakkoo*). The contemporary structure of the school systemis therefore a remnant of the Japanese period: Schooling was used to disseminate Japanese propaganda and the *Hakko Ichiu* ideology, the ideology of collective prosperity of greater East Asia. This ideology of the Eastern spirit should be promoted in schools to achieve following aims: 1.) sacrifice one's own interests for the sake of the collective interest, 2.) respect God, parents, teachers, and community figures, 3.) develop skills in children in providing in-school training that benefits mental and physical self-confidence, and 4.) education has to be oriented towards the outcome. Instruction in class was added by practical out-of-class training, thereby education gained a military connotation, as military skills, discipline, and the spirit to defend one's country was also nourished.

Because of the geographic expansion and socio-cultural diversities, Indonesia has the largest educational system with the most complex problems to be solved among the Southeast Asian nations. Dutch colonialism had inherited Indonesia an unfavorable and disadvantageous education system; following the proclamation of independence in 1945 and the ending of the revolutionary war in 1949, a nation-wide education system had to be built up from the ground. (Müller 1974: 168; Sudijarto/Thomas 1980: 49) The table shows the increase in participation in Western schooling from 1940 to 1950. As many Indonesians participated in the revolutionary war 1945-1949, the number of students and teachers decreased in those years.

Period	People's schools	Number of students	Number of teachers
1940/1941 Dutch colony	17.848	2.259.245	45.415
1944/1945 Japanese occupation	15.059	2.253.410	36.287
1950/1951 Indonesian Republic	23.801	4.926.370	83.850 (Tilaar 1995: 67)

In December 1945, the Central National Committee of Indonesia issued a Declaration on Education that made mention of the religion class in public schools. It was stated religion should be given appropriate attention without reducing the freedom of those groups who want to follow their respective faiths. This idea of freedom later colored the provision of the 1950 Education Law on religion classes. (Mujiburrahman, 2006: 227)

The first Minister of Education appointed in 1945, Ky Hajar Dewantoro, promoted Javanese cultural values as part of moral education (*budhi pekerti*) in the national school system. Exactly this influence of Javanese ethics – which are intrinsically linked to Javanese mysticism – on Muslim children seemed to particularly worry orthodox Muslims as the Minister of Religion, Rasjidi. (Ramstedt 2004)

Later on, the impact of the Christian religion classes in private faith based schools from the primary to the tertiary level led to constant worries in Muslim orthodox, but also in Hindu circles, as Muslim or Hindu students had to participate in the Christian religion classes in Christian schools and Universities. This practice resulted in accusations of hidden Christian missionary efforts. (Interviews Sujana 2007)

The then second Minister of Education, Schooling and Culture, Soewandi (1946-1947), instructed the Investigating Committee for Education and Schooling that was chaired by KH Dewantara to reconsider all efforts in the educational sector and to formulate a plan of objectives and strategies in education and schooling. The plan comprised ten paragraphs and paragraph 4 on the objective of education reads:

> In the civilized lines of humanitarianism as contended in all religions teachings, the national education and schooling bases on religion and national culture and is directed towards the hail and bliss of society. (Ahmadi 1987: 71)

Dewantara had successfully pleaded for religious education to be provided at public schools in order to take the monopoly of religious education out of the hands of private Muslim schools (*madrasah* and *pesantren*) and under the surveillance of the state. (Ramstedt 2004) Thereby the state could influence the curricula of the schools and prevent a spread of anti-nationalist Islamic teachings. At the same time, he had demanded that the quality of teaching at the private Muslim schools be improved by including even more secular subjects into the curricula. (Ramstedt 2004; Mujiburrahman 2006)

Even with its liberal and Western value orientation, the government recognized the fact that religion is a significant element in society and it must be accorded at least some place in the school curriculum. (Kelambora 1976: 237) Originating in the efforts of the Minister of Religion, KH Kafrawi (1946-1947), religious education was introduced according to Dewantara's proposal. The initial struggle on the administrative location of religious education, whether within the Ministry of Education or within the Ministry of Religion, was decided as Minister of Religion Haysim (1949-1952) defined the work of the Ministry of Religion as responsible for supporting religious (not only Islamic) teaching in schools. The second congress on education in Yogyakarta held from 20 to 24 July 1949 under the chair of Dewantara produced a bill of a draft law on education, and submitted it to the Central National Committee of Indonesia. Immediately a commission was formed to elaborate on the content, but it brought no outcome. Initially, the legal range of the Act was restricted to the Indonesian Republic with Yogyakarta as its capital, because the East parts of Indonesia were under Dutch control until 1949.

In 1951, the Ministry of Culture and Education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs jointly governed that the religion class has to comprise two teaching hours a week which starts at grade IV. In order facilitate special regional interests and to allow for regional variation, the religion class also could be provided from the first grade onwards and the teaching hours could be extended to four hours maximum. To Balinese Hindus all that regulations did not matter for two reasons, 1.) they were only part of the Republic after 1949, and 2.) their religion was not yet acknowledged from 1950 to 1963. Balinese reformers, however, organized a Hindu religion class and moral education (*budhi pekerti*) in the private *Dwijendra* foundation and the public Saraswati School (Bakker 1993, Titib 2006; Wiyana Interview 2010; Sura Interview 2007)

Only after the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia was formed, the 1949 draft law on education was enacted as Act 4/1950 on the Principles of Education and Teaching at Schools[300] and was endorsed as Act 12/ 1954 on the Principles of Education and Teaching at Schools. March 18th, 1954. (Ahmadi 1987: 71) It contained 17 sections and 30 articles and concerns education and teaching in schools only, as education in faith-based schools and community education are regulated in own laws[301]. (Ahmadi 1987: 71) In the following, I will summarize the crucial regulations of Act No. 12/1954 on the Principles of Education and Teaching at Schools. The translations are my own.

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[300] *Undang-Undang tentang dasar-dasar pendidikan dan pengajaran di sekolah*
[301] Section 1: General rules, Article 1. Subsection1 (I.1, 1)

Education and schooling is organized, if there are 10 or more pupils. The aim of education and teaching is to build a moral human[302] who is a skilled and democratic citizen having a sense of responsibility for the welfare of society and nation. Education and schooling base on the principles written down in the *Pancasila*, the Constitution, and national culture. The instructional language is Indonesian. In the kindergarten or the first three grades in school the regional language may be used. Compulsory school attendance is regulated as follows: Children from the age of six years onwards have the right and children at the age of eight years are obliged to attend school for a minimum of 6 years.

Section VIII on the establishing and organization of schools introduces two types of responsible bodies: state or private. Schools entertained by the central or regional government are state or public schools (*sekolah negeri*) and schools entertained by individuals or groups are private schools (*sekolah partikelir*). The responsible body for state schools is the Ministry of Education, Teaching, and Culture. A minimum requirement to establish a school is the attendance of at least 30 pupils. In school girls and boys collectively join a class. Only if the situation requires it, divided education and teaching is held.

Of interest to the present study are subsequent sections. First, with regard to compulsory schooling, the required compulsory school attendance is met if the student attends a faith-based school that is registered with the Ministry of Religion. Second, the noteworthy section IX on private schools gives faith communities the right to establish and organize private schools as enshrined in on the principle of the liberty of every citizen to embrace a religion or belief systems (*keyakinan hidup*). Private schools that meet the requirements may apply for subsidies by the Ministry of Education. Remarkable is an article governing that teachers must respect all religious traditions or belief-systems in school. The 1954 elucidation of this article reads that it is prohibited for teachers to criticize, insult, or otherwise diminish the esteem of a religion or a belief-system. The term belief-systems is said to comprise the political orientation. In this, it seems that in the 1950s, an era in which *agama* and belief systems were considered by the government to have the same rights, there have been some educational opportunities provided for belief systems.

Finally, section XII concerning religious instruction states the religion class has to be held in all state schools; but the parents decide whether their children have to attend the lessons or not. Thus, attendance at religion class is optional in the sense that the either the parents, legal guardians of the student or the adult students themselves had the freedom to decide whether they attend or not attend the religion class. The method how religious instruction has to be carried out will then be regulated further by a joint decree of the Minister of Education, Teaching and Culture and the Minister of Religion. The 1954 elucidation of article 20 of Act 4/1950 on the Principles of Education and Teaching at Schools states: (Kelambora 1976: 241)

→ Whether or not a type of school provides the religion class depends on the age and the intellectual level of its students;
→ Mature students can decide to or not to follow the religion class
→ The nature of the religion class and its teaching hour will be determined in regulations for the type of school in question
→ Religion class does not affect the promotion of a child

In July 1951, the Minister of Religion and the Minister of Culture and Education released a Joint Regulation on the Religion Class at Schools. The regulation stated: (Mujiburrahman 2006: 243)

→ The religion class is provided according to the religious adherence of the respective students (only achieved in 2003)
→ The religion class is only provided if there are at least ten students of the religion in question in the class
→ Students who adhere to a religion different from the one taught in the class, or students who adhered to the religion in question, but whose parents do not allow them to follow class, are allowed to leave the religion class
→ Religion teachers are forbidden to teach something that could hurt the followers of another religion and belief

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[302] *Manusia susila*: moral or ethical human being

This regulation was applicable to public and private schools - to private schools only, if their respective authorities were willing to do so, or the parents of more than 10 students wanted their children to be provided with a specific religion class. The elucidation of the regulation stated that in this case, the Government would provide a religious teacher for the religion in question and help to find a place to carry out the class, if the authority of the private school does not allow its school building to be used for the class. (Mujiburrahman 2006: 243)

After failing to implement the Jakarta charter in the late 1950s, Islamic leaders argued that the optional religion class was nothing but efforts to secularize the country, because *Pancasila* without religion was empty. (Mujiburrahman 2006: 230-250) In line with the 1950 Act on Education and Schooling, the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara*) decided that the religion class was to be carried out in public schools and universities, and at the same time, the Assembly reaffirmed its non-compulsory character in 1960. Even if the student decides to attend, the mark obtained for this subject should not in any way determine promotion. (Kelambora, 1976: 244) The sketched policy appears to be a compromise between the Muslim demand to have compulsory religion classes, and the view of the secular oriented groups that the Government schools had to be free from that class. (Mujiburrahman, 2006: 228)

Up to 1960, besides the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) and the Christians, the two other strong political powers in the 1950s, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the army, also supported the non-compulsory religion class policy. It is reported that Sukarno was of the opinion that the issue of the religion class has the potential to disintegrate the nation. (Belen Interview 2007)

The political development after 1959, however, paved the way for a realization of the Muslim aspiration for the compulsory religion class. This change was not because of the increase of the Muslim intellectual power but due to the serious political rivalries between the army and the PKI. The clash between a naturalistic and a religious approach on the religious class is shown in this paragraph, which is also exemplarily for the pluralistic style of forging alliances. (Mujiburrahman, 2006: 227-230)

Based on Sukarno's "synthetic ideology" of Nationalism, Religion, and Communism[303], and the Manipol Usdek[304], the PKI could introduce Communism at every level of society and in most educational institutions of the country since 1959. In response to this development, the army encouraged religious groups to fight against the PKI. In Muslim majority areas in Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan, the army supported the Muslim demand for compulsory religion class. Behind this background we can understand why the Hindu Council (*Parisada*) joined the functional groups secretariat (Sekretariat Bersama Golkar) in 1964. As Hinduism was only yet officially acknowledged in the early 1960s, and the Hindu community could be easily held to be Communists, that could be assaulted by militant Muslims, the Balinese religious authority thereby protected their Hindu brothers in the majority areas in Java, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan. (Sudharta Interview 2008)

During its fifth plenary session in Bandung in the end of 1960, the Provisional People's Consultative Congress reaffirmed the non-compulsory character of the religion class in public schools and universities in Decree No II/MPRS/1960 on the Broad Outlines of Planned National Development First Step 1961-1969. In chapter II on general provisions, article 2 on Mental Sector/Religion/Spirituality/Research, Paragraph 2 introduces *Pancasila* and Manipol as subjects at all levels of education, whereas article 3 reads:

> It is stipulated that religious education becomes a subject in schools from public elementary schools to state universities following the understanding that the students have the right not to attend class, if legal guardians/adult students express their objection.

These provisions should allow the citizens to develop Indonesian character and cultureand to reject negative influences from foreign cultures.

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[303] *Nasionalisme, agama,* and *komunisme*. The acronym is NASAKOM.

[304] Manipol is the Indonesian acronym of Political Manifest. Starting in 1959, Sukarno reiterated the five central concepts of the Indonesian revolution, combining the first letters of these five concepts, the acronym USDEK evolved. First, Basic Law of 1945 (**U**UD 45); second, socialism ala Indonesia (**S**osialisme Indonesia); third Guided Democracy (**D**emokrasi Terpimpin), fourth Guided Economy (**E**konomi Terpimpin) and fifth, Indonesian character (**K**epribadian Indonesia). This new state doctrine hence became known as Manipol Usdek. Sukarno even compared the Pancasila, Manipol, and Usdek to the al-quran and the Hadith, because both would constitute a unity. (www.id.wikipedia.org).

In 1960, the Marxist Prof Prijono, Minister of Basic Education and Culture, who controlled elementary and high education, introduced the so-called *Pancawardhana* (five principles of development) and later in February 1963 he linked his five principles of development with the PKI's principle of *Pancacinta* (the five loves). While the *Pancawardhana* still mentioned religious morality, the *Pancacinta* did not include it. For the opponents of the PKI, both 'Pancas' were a PKI strategy to eradicate the religious dimension of education in the country. The Muslims, both traditionalist of the Nahdlatul Ulama and reformists of the Muhammadiyah followed by Christians and Hindus opposed both 'Pancas'. (Mujiburrahman, 2006: 227-230, Kelambora, 1976: 243, Murray 1981: 371)

On August 25, 1965, Presidential Decree No. 19 on the Basis of the National *Pancasila* Education System (*Penetapan Presiden Republik Indonesia No 19 Tahun 1965 tentang pokok-pokok system pendidikan nasional*) presents the national education system as to constitute a categorical element (*unsur mutlak*) in nation- and character building. Education functions as vehicle of revolution and constitutes an integral part in the revolutionary process. Education means the gradual nation- and character building which allows the nation to complete its revolution understanding that *agama* constitutes a categorical element in order to foster nation building and character building. Interestingly, the Decree introduced *Pancasila* and Manipol-USDEK as bedrock of the education system, whether public or private and as the moral content to be taught in the education system. Then within this education system, the citizens could receive specialization according to their ideology (*aliran*) or religion (*agama*): Pancawardhana, Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Pancacinta - as long as these ideologies were compatible to *Pancasila*-Manipol/USDEK.

The first objective of the national education system was, however, to educate a "New Indonesian Human" who possess high morals and a religious dispositions/character (*berakhlak tinggi*). Certainly, the educational aim too was formulated in accordance with *Pancasila* and Manipol Usdek; the moral socialist human being, fair and prosperous in spiritual and material matters, expressing the spirit of *Pancasila* became the pivotal aim of education, thereby superseding the moral democratic human of the 1950s. (Yayasan *Dwijendra* 2003: 42) *Pancasila*-Manipol/USDEK contained the basic principles of education as mentioned in Chapter I, Paragraph 1. These combined principles "constitute the morals and philosophy of the Indonesian nation and constitute the manifest of national and territorial consolidation (*persatuan*), likewise they are a distillation of the unity of soul (*perasan*[305] *kesatuan jiwa*) as the *Weltanschauung* of the Indonesian nation (…) as result, these combined principles must inspire all aspects of national education." But as Suharto rose to power in Jakarta in October 1965, Presidential Decree No. 19 has never been implemented.

In essence, although *Pancawardhana* and *Pancacinta* survived due to the protection of Sukarno until 1965, the debates on the issue paved the way for the compulsory religious class policy in elementary and high schooling. Since the PKI was the arch enemy of the Army, the Army persuaded Christians, Hindus, and Muslims to participate in the fight against PKI. In return the Army gave strong encouragement to the growing Islamic demand for the compulsory religion class in secular schools. (Kelambora, 1976: 243) In 1963 then, the new Minister of Education, General Sjarief Thajeb, who brought into his portfolio a rare combination of unquestionable loyalty to the Armed Forces and a profound Islamic background (Kelambora, 1976: 243), enabled the army and religious groups to develop a policy of compulsory religion class at the tertiary level. For this, they created the Institute for developing religious teaching of higher education *(LEPPA, Lembaga Pembina Pendidikan Agama Pada Perguruan Tinggi)* headed jointly by the Minister of Higher Education and the Minister of Religion. LEPPA's achievements were particularly responsible for making religion a compulsory subject at the tertiary level. It was able to make religion a basic subject in the curriculum and to develop an intricate syllabus for instruction in Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, and Hinduism. (Kelambora 1976: 243-244)

In 1964, religion was made a compulsory basic subject in elementary, junior and senior high schools, but it was not explicitly stated that the mark obtained for the religion class affected the promotion of a student, "it was understood that it did since all basic subjects are usually taken as prerequisites or other subjects". (Kelambora 1976: 247) Thus, by 1965 religion was no longer an optional and non-compulsory subject as stated in the Education Act of 1950. The Ministry of Education abandoned its policy of the non-compulsory religion class and accepted the Moslem's demand for compulsory religious instruction. It changed its attitude from passive involvement in religious instruction into an active commitment to the teaching and promotion of the subject. (Kelambora 1976: 247)

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[305] The original document states *perasan*, distillation; however, I doubt, what is meant here is perasaan, feeling. Then it would read the feeling of united souls

6.1.4. The Religion class from 1966 to1998

The compulsory religious class became more strongly established after the abortive coup of 1965 and the rise of Suharto's New Order. The strong emphasis laid on religion in education has to be interpreted against the backdrop of the pre-eminent importance religion played in the Indonesian society. Implicit is the objective to structure the affiliation to religion more rationally in order to develop this factor for national progress (Müller 1974: 377) against traditional and cultural values (as represented in *adat* for example). Here is the origin of the important Indonesian triad of development – education – religion to be located.

The New Order government's basic educational development strategy was set in 1969. (Beeby 1979: 8-9) Three broad problem areas in education were identified: curricula, infrastructure, and financial resources. Other important issues included the growing number of students, the quality of education, and the relevance of education to the labor market, low government spending on education, efficiency, and unclear educational objectives. Under the New Order policies and with the success of economic growth, the next three decades saw a dramatic expansion in Indonesia's education system. (Prijono 1999: 159) The success of the Suharto economic-development plans during the 1970s has influenced education in several ways. The infusion of funds into the government treasury from exports, loans, and grants permitted to the country to finance educational expansion and quality improvement at a level never before possible. The growing health of the economy in general enabled the supporters of private schools to improve private education as well. (Sudijarto/Thomas 1980: 54)

During the New Order, school-uniforms and a nationwide calendar of national holidays, events, and ceremonies were introduced, which are imposed on all school children. In each schoolyard the national flag is flagged and on Monday the national anthem is sung. Thus participation in school forced the ethnic communities to acknowledge and adopt a nationally regulated calendar, but also to collectively participate in the rituals of state-making. (Parker, 2004: 226)

Decree No. XXVII/1966 on Religion, Education and Culture

After the coup d'etat in 1966, religious affiliation became a matter of life and death, since Muslim groups and the government identified the idea of being anti-religious with being a communist, which posed a deadly threat to someone life. Prior to 1966, an option for parents, who did not subscribe to a religion, was to excuse their children from the hour of religious instruction provided each week. As the option was partially supported by the PKI and others, it became altered after 1966 and each student was required to participate in religious education as offered by an advocate of the student's faith who specializes in religious instruction. (Sudijarto/Thomas et al. 1980: 53)

In 1966, the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly released Decree No XXVII/1966 on Religion, Education, and Culture. (Ahmadi 1987: 97-105) This decree became the guideline of curricular contents in education, thereby replacing the never operative Presidential Decree No 19 Year 1965. The Decree states that *agama*, education, and culture constitute categorical elements (*unsur-unsur mutlak*) in order to build the nation and national character. The first Chapter on *agama*, Article 1 amends the dictum of Decree No II/MPRS/1960, chapter II, article 2, Paragraph 3 that established a religion class from primary to tertiary education at public schools and universities by removing the clause "(…) following the understanding that the students have the right not to attend class if legal guardians/adult students express their objection (…)" and replacing it with "establishing the subject of the religion class beginning at primary up to tertiary level at public schools and universities." As bedrock of education, article 2 introduced the doctrine of the *Pancasila* state. The objective of education aimed at building the true *Pancasila* human, and in order to achieve the objectives of education, the mental and moral character shall be increased and religious convictions shall to be strengthened. In the elucidation of chapter one on religion, the decree sets out to systemize the hajj in order to raise participation in pilgrimage, to increase the budget of the State Islamic Institutes, to approve of the Hindu Bali pilgrimage (*tirtayatra)*, to raise the status of the Bureau of the Catholic and Hindu community to a Directorate, and to pay special attention to the *pesantren*.

Related to this legislation, the Hindu education sector boosted from 1966 until Suharto's Islamic turn in 1989 (Wandelt 1989: 208; Yayasan *Dwijendra* 2003: 42-43; Ahmadi 1987: 99) – a second boost has started with the transition to democracy and is still underway. Decree No. XXVII/1966 on Religion, Education, and Culture has been withdrawn with People's Consultative Assembly Decree No V/MPR/1973 that changed legislation prior to the 1973 GBHN.

Decree No XXVII/1966 introduced the religion class as a compulsory subject from elementary to tertiary level: all students had to attend - willingly or not - the religion class. This even implied a freedom of choice, because the elucidation of the Decree stated that that

→ all religions recognized by the government will have the same opportunity
→ for the sake of tolerance and human rights, every student is free to choose a religion class according to personal conviction and will (Mujiburrahman 2006: 242)

This decree seems to indicate that, although the religion class was compulsory, if the school in question provides different religion classes (supposed that there were 10 Christians and 10 Muslim students in the class, so the school could provide two religion classes according to the joint regulation) the students were free to choose one of them. (Mujiburrahman 2006: 242) In practice the students barely choose another than the religion they already adhered to. Moreover, the teaching hour and the target of the religion class were extended in 1967, when the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Culture ruled religious instruction should be started at grade I of the elementary school with two teaching hours for grade I and II each week; three hours for grade III, four hours for grade IV to VI and all subsequent grades of higher schooling, while the religion class for universities was two hours per week. In addition, the status of religion was elevated further to the position of a primary subject, one of a group of six basic subjects designed to develop the spirit of *Pancasila*. (Mujiburrahman 2006: 229; Kelambora 1976: 248)

In October 1967 the first implementation of the Consultative Congress Decree on Religion, Education, and Culture was implemented in Instruction No.1/1966 of the Directorate of Tertiary Education at the Ministry of Education and Culture. A conference held in October 1967 developed a structure of a *studium generale* (basic study) for all tertiary institutions in accordance with the decree. The *studium generale* comprised (Wandelt 1989: 208-209):

→ Instruction in *Pancasila*-Philosophy (Pendidikan Falsafah *Pancasila*)
→ Confessional religious instruction (Pendidikan *Agama*)
→ Instruction in military skills/ideology (Pendidikan Kewiraan)
→ Instruction in Culture/Arts (Pendidikan Kebudayaan/Keseniaan)
→ Sports (Pendidikan Olahraga)

Broad Guidelines of State Policy and Five-Year Development Plans (1969-1988)

In the section on religion, the first Five-Year Development Plan[306] (repelita I) (1969/70-1973/4) Book I, Chapter I on Aims, Targets, and Policies formulated the scope of education to comprise a broad understanding of advancement of skills and intellect, religious education, and others. Attention is paid intentionally to *agama* in order to develop the value and character of Indonesian citizens based on the *Pancasila* philosophy.

Referring to the five principles of the state, Book II, chapter IX on *agama* obviously ascribes an important status to *agama* in the state. *Agama* is seen as to fulfill two functions: it is a form of religious service towards the Creator (*Chalik*) and it allows the citizen to develop the quality of a noble character (*budi luhur*). This mental attitude is considered to be a necessary item providing for the success of development. It is stated (this formulation reappears in the GBHN 1999 and the contemporary Propenas in similar fashion and rhetoric) "it is proven by reality that the spirit of *Pancasila* and the spirit of *agama* - understood as fundamental items in the formation of morals, a noble character (*acklak*) and a strong mental attitude which is the main vehicle for a successful development program - is not yet properly implanted in all strata of society." (Repelita 1: 9) Moreover*, agama* is said to constitute a strong fortress against the poison of Atheism-Communism that wishes to overthrow the Indonesian Republic based on *Pancasila*. Then the main strategy in the authoritarian management of religion is outlined which is actually broadly followed until today.

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[306] MPRS Decree No. XLI/MPRS/1968 ruled that the compilation and implementation of five-year development plans is one of the duties of the Development Cabinet (Kabinet Pembangunan), thus Presidential Decree No 319/1968 enacted the first five-year development plan. (http://www.bappenas.go.id/) Since the first REPELITA until the current Propenas, all development plans follow a congenial pattern: They comprise between one and five books, structured in chapters. The first Book and chapters comprise general aims/vision and targets/missions. Their implementation is then structured according to several sectors of which agama, education, Culture, and One Supreme Lordship are some.

The government has the responsibility to provide guidance and funding to accelerate the development of *agama* in accordance to their specific religious teachings and to carry out supervision to guarantee that every citizen can follow their religious teachings and that efforts to develop their *agama* according to their respective belief (*kepercayaan*) may proceed swift, orderly and in an atmosphere of harmony. (Repelita 1: 9)

In order to illustrate how first the ambiguity of the contemporary authoritarian religious pluralism as the main agenda, followed until today, evolved out of a specific historic situation, within Indonesia, that answered the political situation induced by President Sukarno; and second the dangerous situation of adherents to non-recognized religions, and the pressing need to systematize and develop a Hindu theology as result thereof, I cite the three strategies outlined in the first *repelita* to achieve a betterment of assessed problems of Atheism-Communism, because it is stated that former PKI members and their affiliated organizations as well as their families will meet special attentiveness. (Repelita 1: 5).

a. [Concerning the] groups (*golongan*) which have not yet (*belum*)/ have no *agama* (*tidak beragama*) / do not believe in One Supreme Lordship (*tidak berke –Tuhan –an Jang Maha Esa*) including the atheist and animist groups; there will be efforts that they will believe in One Supreme God following their own conviction and choice;
b. [Concerning the] groups (*golongan*) which embrace *agama* (*sudah beragama*) / believe in One Supreme God (*berke –Tuhan –an Jang Maha Esa*); there will be efforts that they will increase their faith (*keimannya*) and noble character according to the religious creed they adhere to;
c. Guidance/development and growing the spirit of *agama* tolerance between adherents to different [state acknowledged] *agama* (Repelita 1: 10)

In the sector of religious education, following problems were identified 1.) the religion class and the development of the soul of *agama* (*jiwa agama*) are not yet carried out smoothly in public schools and faith-based schools, 2.) there is not yet a solid curriculum, 3.) there is a lack of professional teachers and 4.) there is a lack of other material facilities. To resolve these problems, efforts are undertaken to improve the curriculum, content, and methodology of the religion class, besides efforts to increase the number and up-grading of religion teachers at state education institutions and at private faith-based institutions. Remembering the extension of the private Islamic education sector and its history as a vehicle of resistance, such legislation was aimed to exert state-control over the *pesantren* and *madrasah* and to include secular objects in their curricula in order to put Islamist anti-state rhetoric under state surveillance. The Hindu education sector however, profited from this legislation and it began its first "boom" from 1966-1989.

Repelita I, chapter IX on *agama* outlines four sectors of development of religious infrastructure: 1. Holy Books; 2. Places of Worship; 3. Religious education; 4. Hajj/pilgrimage. This chapter and Book II, chapter X on education states with special reference to education in the sector of religion that the institutions of State Religion Teacher Colleges (*Pendidikan Guru Agama Negeri*, PGAN) and State Islamic Institutes (*Institute Agama Islam Negeri*, IAIN) and the curriculum shall be improved. The responsible governmental institution is the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

In essence, the first Five-Year Development Plan stated that part of the efforts to enhance the facilities needed for the development of religious life was the inclusion of a religion class in the curriculum of state education from elementary schools up to universities. In the 1960s and 1970s, religious education and the religion class must be seen as a political vehicle in Indonesia, because the state tried to fight two fronts in the late 1960s: On one side against Atheism and Communism, and at the other side against radical Islamism and its preachers who wanted to establish an Islamic state. In consequence, public education increasingly acquired a religious dimension after 1973.

During the Consultative Assembly's Congress session in 1973, Golkar and other secular oriented groups, who controlled the Government, wanted to weaken their main political rival, the Islamic groups by abolishing the religion class from state education and replacing it through *Pancasila* Moral Education, but they failed as the Islamic party PPP and other Muslim leaders in the Parliament opposed Golkar's proposal. The Muslims argued that it was nothing but efforts to secularize the country because *Pancasila* without religion was empty and this would lead to the re-emergence of communism. (Mujiburrahman 2006: 230-231) It seems that education in state-funded and guided religion at one side and *Pancasila* at the other side represented the outcome of the two lines of thought of nationalism and Islamic interests.

The 1973 Broad Guidelines of State Policy[307] Chapter II on basic patterns of national development, Subsection D on the basic modalities and dominant factors (of development), sub-section e.) reads: the spiritual and mental modality of belief in and following the commands of God (*kepercayaan dan Ketaqwaan kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*) is the moving spirit of inestimable value to fulfill national aspirations. Likewise, national belief and faith in the *Pancasila* philosophy constitutes the modality of a mental attitude crucial for the nation to realize its vision. In Chapter II, subsection E the national conception (*wawasan nusantara*) outlines four broad objectives to be realized in the creation process of the Indonesian Archipelago (*kepulauan nusantara*) as 1. a political unity; 2. a cultural and social unity; 3. an economical unity; 4.) a defense and security unity.

In Chapter III, Section B direction of long-term development, sub-section 15 b. on the Religion, Belief in One Supreme God and Social-Cultural Sector, it is stated "based on the Indonesian nation's belief in the principle of One Supreme God (*Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*) it follows that human existence must maintain really harmonious relations with One Supreme God (*Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*), with each other and the natural environment (…)"(author's translation)Interestingly, the section on Religion, Belief in One Supreme God (*Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*) and Socio-Culture, point 1, mentions that religious life and belief in One Supreme God is in harmony with the comprehension and practice of the *Pancasila* (*penghayatan dan pengamalan Pancasila*). Here first mention is made of the later *Pancasila* indoctrination program. The sector aims to develop harmonious life (*terbina hidup rukun*) between *agama* and *kepercayaan* in order to strengthen national unity and consolidation and to increase good deeds (*amal*) in order to jointly build society. Development of *agama* and belief in One Supreme God must be increasingly practiced in the private sphere and in public. Efforts are continuously made to increase facilities needed to develop the life of *agama* and *kepercayaan*, including the fact that religious education is included in the state curricula from primary to tertiary level. The 1973 GBHN draws a clear line between *kepercayaan* and *agama*, in stating literally (author's translation):

> Belief in One Supreme God is no *agama*. Guidance for Belief in One Supreme God is executed in order to avoid first the formation of new *agama*, and second to make effective the necessary measures to be taken in order to guarantee that Belief in One Supreme God (*Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*) is really practiced according to the provision of the first principle Belief in One Supreme Lordship (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*), based on fair and civilized humanity.

Then the second Five-Year Development Plan (*repelita II*)[308] (1974-1979) laid out in the 1973 Broad Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN) introduced the 1945 Basic Law and *Pancasila* doctrine as national value base. *Repelita* II, Book I on the basic policies of development, Chapter I Aims and Direction of Development does not mention the term *agama*. It is stated that the aim of development is the creation of a fair and prosperous society balanced evenly in materialism and spiritualism (*merata materil dan spiritual*) which is based on the *Pancasila*. However, Book III, chapter 21 on *agama* and faith in One Supreme God (*Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*) interprets *agama* as crucial vehicle in national development processes, because universal and eternal values contained in *agama* are said to form one vital aspect in national life and culture. In this, those values of *agama* as one source of national enthusiasm/motivation (*kegairahan bangsa*) are required to develop and improve national fate. In consequence, it is stated, the enthusiasm of religious life is one absolute requirement to realize the targets of national development.

Reiterating the objectives of the 1973 GBHN, *repelita* II has the aim to increase and raise awareness, comprehension, and practice of *agama* and Belief in One Supreme God with the purpose to create an Indonesian citizen who follows the commands of God (*bertaqwa kepada Tuhan Yang Esa*) and loves the Indonesian state, nation, and country. The objective of *repelita* II was the integral development of the *Pancasila* human. The striking stress on religion and faith in One Supreme Lordship aimed at utilizing religion as a vehicle of development. (Müller 1973: 378-380), as *agama* is seen as factor to trigger development and to overcome social problems. "The general statements on religion reveal that the architects of the development plans were aware of the function that religious education and moral education fulfills in development, but these functions have been understood entirely as indoctrination". (Müller 1973: 444, author's translation) Another point to note is the problematization of the equality of curricular content in state *madrasah* to public curricula. Their curriculum should contain a 70 percent curricular load of secular content and 30 percent religious content.

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[307] Consultative Assembly's Decree No IV/1973 on the Broad Guidelines of State Policy (Ketetapan MPR No. IV/MPR/1973 tentang Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara) (http://www.bappenas.go.id/)
[308] Presidential Decree No 11/1974 on the second five year development plan 1974/75 - 1978/79 (Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No 11/1974 tentang rencana pembangunan lima tahun kedua (repelita II)) 1974/75 - 1978/79 (http://www.bappenas.go.id/)

Repelita II identifies five problem areas of which religious education and training of religious officials is one[309]. In the field of education and training for religious staff the main problem identified pertains to how to coordinate and adapt the guidance of religious education with the pattern of national education in general. The plan sets out the strategy to collect a database on religious education facilities in order to base future policies on those data. The purpose of development and guidance of religious education is enhancing the quality of religious education in order to achieve the targets of education and religious life. Primary focus is laid on the organization, curriculum, development of utilities and infrastructure. The improvement of the teachers' quality is done with an upgrading program (*penataran*) of religion teachers following the development, technology and demands of society.

As already stipulated in the 1973 GBHN, repelita II states that the religion class is included into the curriculum at all levels of public education. In this context, the standardization of the religion class shall be adapted to the level of education and the spirit of the pupil or student. Likewise, Book III, chapter 22, subsection1 on the foundation of education and development of the youth states in order to achieve the objectives of education, the curriculum of all levels of education from kindergarten to tertiary level at both public and private institutions must contain *Pancasila* Moral Education and enough curricular content to transmit to the young generation the spirit and values of 1945. Similarly, religious education is introduced into the curriculum at all levels of public schooling and universities; thereby REPELITA II strengthened the position of religious education and *Pancasila* Moral Education in schooling and universities.

The 1978 Broad Guidelines of State Policy[310], identical in text with the 1973 Broad Guidelines of State Policy, again defined one educational aim as to mould human qualities, including the religious quality of believing in and following God's commands (*kepercayaan dan Ketaqwaan kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*). Since the establishment of the religion class, Islamic leaders in favor of a spiritual dimension of education oppose optional religious instruction and reiterate arguments that without compulsory religion classes, education would lead to secularization or to the re-emergence of communism. Hindus argue along similar lines for the compulsory religion class, but they are motivated by different interests.

After its inception in 1978, the Commission for the Reformation of National Education began to collect ideas for educational reforms. In July 1979 a provisional draft of an educational reform was published to encourage feedback from different groups in society. Concerning differing views on education, the Government's educational policies were opposed by Islamic groups as there were plans to abolish the Islamic educational sector – so deeply ingrained was the distrust of the Suharto regime towards political Islam which had been suppressed and silenced until the era of reform when Islam again went public. However, the 1973 established Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) stated that one of the goals of education was to cultivate '*takwa*' (Arabic: *taqwa*) that is to follow the orders of God and not break His prohibitions. In the Council's perception therefore the Guidelines of State Policy dictated that education had a religious goal. (Mujiburrahman 2006: 219)

In 1978, the New Order developed the Guide to Comprehension and Practice of the *Pancasila* (*Program Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*, henceforth P4-program) as an organicist philosophy for almost every part of society. The P4 Program has been introduced by *repelita* III. The regime began to promote its integralist ideals and specific interpretation of *Pancasila* through the P4-indoctrination-program passed by the MPR, as well as the 1978 school curriculum on Moral *Pancasila* Education (PMP, *Pendidikan Moral Pancasila*). (Bourchier/Hadiz 2003: 12-13; Mujiburrahman, 2006: 140)

The P4-program defines *Pancasila* as twofold, first as the *Weltanschauung* of the Indonesian nation and second as the juridical-normative base of the State. Further *Staatsnormen* that is ethical, ideological, and moral teachings naturally emanate out of the five principles. In order to limit aspirations of political Islam, the Guide to Comprehension and Practice of the *Pancasila* interpret the first principle as the nation's intrinsic avowal of faith and devoutness towards God.

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[309] The others concern 1. Improving guidance of religious life; 2. Increasing interreligious and interfaith in One Supreme God harmony; 3. Increasing the facilities and infrastructure of *agama* and *kepercayaan*; 4. Religious education and training of religious staff; and 5. Perfection and efficiency of the operational apparatus.
[310] Consultative Assembly's Decree No IV/1978 on the Broad Guidelines of State Policy (Ketetapan MPR No. IV/MPR/1978 tentang Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara) (http://www.bappenas.go.id/)

These programs appear to have been extraordinarily effective, first because organicist themes are still debated today, even bringing up the question about a possible common threat to Indonesian culture[311], and second because civics are a compulsory subject from the primary to the tertiary level of the Indonesian education system.

Reiterating the objectives of the 1973 GBHN, the 1979 REPELITA III[312] puts religion on a par with the comprehension and practice of *Pancasila*. This indicates that *Pancasila* slowly evolved as national civil religion. It is noteworthy that the term *agama* is not mentioned in Book I, Chapter I Aims and main Targets of Development. However, in Book II, Chapter 16 on Religion it is stated (author's translation):

> The development of *agama* in private and in public triggers religious harmony, which is crucial for national unity and consolidation and for increasing the joint practice to build up Indonesian society. In this the policies on religion shall create interfaith harmony (*kerukunan agama*)which provides for stability and unity and in this guarantee the welfare of the nation – welfare is the aim of *agama* and the state. Therefore the efforts to increase and build out the *agama* sector including the integration of the religious class into the public school and university sector.

Consequently, in Book II, Chapter 17, Section 2 (a) on education, and the young generation it is stated (author's translation):

> National education is based on *Pancasila* and its aim is to increase devotion to (following the commands of) God **(***ketaqwaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa***)**, intellect, skills, to enhance moral character (*budhi pekerti*), strengthen personality, and to consolidate the spirit of nationhood in order to create developed humans (*manusia pembangunan*) who are able to develop their individuality and are jointly responsible for nation building.

The present study did not find the text of the Broad Guidelines of State Policy 1983 that have been enacted with Consultative Assembly's Decree No II/1983. It seems that they are quite identical with the 1973 GBHN. Continuing and refining prior legislation, 1983 REPELITA IV[313] makes mention of the term *agama* in Book I, Chapter I Aims, and main Targets of Development. This repelita introduced the *asas tunggal* policy which stated that all social and political organizations must have the *Pancasila* as their sole base. Development in the sector of religion shall continue the creation of interreligious harmony. The cultivation of *Pancasila* in the religious congregations is one condition to protect national stability in the proceeding process of national development. Schooling and tertiary education in religion shall be made to conform to public education at all educational levels and shall foster an atmosphere of scientific thought in order to achieve the national educational aims.

The sector of tertiary faith based education shall be improved to provide scientific staff and experts in the sector of *agama* which are capable to translate the doctrines of *agama* for an Indonesian modern social life which is grounded in the *Pancasila* and the 1945 Basic Law. Book II, Chapter 20 on Education assesses in Section II on situation and problems that due to the increase of students at elementary schools 370,300 teachers are needed, of which 63,400 are religion teachers. Finally, in Section III on policies and strategies, 10 broad strategies are outlined for the guidance of the young generations. In familiar fashion, the first strategy claims an increase in the quality of following the commands of God (*ketaqwaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*), whereas strategy four demands the strengthening of personality and discipline and the improvement of a noble character (*budi pekerti luhur*). Those strategies have the ultimate ambition to mould cadres in the developmental fields of economics, social-culture, *agama*, politics, and defense and security.

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[311] Ingo Wandelt identifies an attitude of fundamental suspicion toward the West and the USA as Indonesian civil-military elite consensus, entertained by elites since the referendum on Timorese independence and the Iraq invasion. Since the Australian operation in East Timor in 2002 and the USA led invasion of Iraq the 'Coalition of the Willing' is suspected to infiltrate Indonesian politics. It is widely assumed that every separation movement is backed up by the West, the inherent logic is unsurprising, for the fact that the coup d'etat in 1965 was CIA-head mastered.

[312] Presidential Decree No 7/1979 on the third five year development plan 1979/80 - 1983/84 (Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No 7/1979 tentang rencana pembangunan lima tahun ketiga (repelita III) 1979/80 -- 1983/84 (http://www.bappenas.go.id/)

[313] Presidential Decree No 21/1984 on the forth five year development plan 1984/85 - 1989/90 (Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No 21/1984 tentang rencana pembangunan lima tahun keempat (repelita IV) 1984/85 - 1989/90 (http://www.bappenas.go.id/)

In April 1985, the Minister of Education and Culture Nugroho Notosusanto and Minister of Religion Munawir Sjadzali[314] issued a joint decree on the implementation of religious education at elementary and high schools replacing the joint decree of 1951. The 1985 joint decree stated (Mujiburrahman 2006: 247):

→ at public schools, the religion class should be given for at least two teaching hours a week
→ the students are obliged to follow the religion class according to their respective religions
→ the students who follow Javanese mysticism or belief systems (*aliran kepercayaan*) must follow the religion class of one of the five religions that the student chooses
→ if there are at least 10 students of the same religion in a class, their religion should be taught in the class
→ if there is no teacher to teach a certain religion in a school, then a temporary teacher of the religion in question can be appointed
→ a religion class for the students whose religion is not taught in the class is to be given by a religious master (*pembina agama*) of that religion (Mujiburrahman, 2006: 247)

This joint decree was not applicable to private schools. This is indicated by the fact that during the Consultative Congress' session of 1988, the Muslims wanted to include in the Broad Guidelines of State Policy that the regulation on religion classes should be applied in private schools. (Mujiburrahman 2006: 247) This has been a concern of Hindu educational planners as well out of fear of conversion efforts, as students of other religions were forced to participate in the particular religion class and worship of the faith-based school.

Consultative Assembly's Decree No II/1988 changed and broadened the scope of the Broad Guidelines of State Policy 1983. However, I was not able to find the text of the 1988 GBHN. Continuing and refining prior legislation then, the 1988 REPELITA V[315] makes mention of the term *agama* in Book I, Chapter I Aims and main Targets of Development.

Development in the sector of *agama* constitutes an integral part in the efforts to provide a strong moral, ethical, and spiritual base for national development as *Pancasila* practice. The ultimate ambition in the *agama* sector contributes to the creation of human and social qualities of having faith in God following the commands of God (*beriman dan bertaqwa kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*) and thereby manifesting conformity, concord, and harmony (*keselarasan, keserasian dan keseimbangan*) in individual and societal life and in the exchange with nature. (Repelita V: 95-96)

Strategies outlined are the reactualization of *agama* functioning to increase the understanding of *agama* doctrines and their relevance in the context of societal, scientific, and technologic advancement. Financial support is given to the expansion and building of houses of worship, the distribution of 10 Million scriptures of the state funded *agama*, and the improvement of the religion class. Public elementary schools shall be provided with 8 million textbooks and teacher manuals and 45,000 religion teachers shall be upgraded. The junior secondary level shall be provided with 3 million books and 4,000 religion teachers shall be upgraded, whereas 2,5 million books are provided and 2,000 religion teachers are upgraded at the senior secondary level. All private faith-based tertiary units shall be given financial support for research, teacher upgrading, books and other facilities. Likewise, the educational quality of state faith-based institutions shall be improved by distributing textbooks, docent manuals and upgrading programs for docents and lecturers. Education is considered as the leadoff gateway in advancing human resources for developmental purposes. In sum, Repelita V strengthened not only the implementation of the *Pancasila* Comprehension and Practice Program (*Program Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*, henceforth P4-program), Moral *Pancasila* Education (PMP, *Pendidikan Moral Pancasila*) but also most noteworthy, the religion class in public educational units.

Very interesting is the following statement: "The belief-systems (*kepercayaan*) shall be continuously guided and advised to strengthen the unity and unification of the nation and as a good deed (*amal*) in jointly building society. This guidance shall not lead to the formation of new *agama* and shall be done in cooperation with the responsible authorities. The efforts to inventory, document, and evaluate those belief systems shall be continued." (Repelita V: 110)

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[314] Sjadzali (1925-2004) held a Master of Arts in political philosophy from Georgetown University in the USA, served as official in the Embassy to the USA (1956-1959-1963), as Ambassador to Sri Lanka (1965-1968), Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Qatar (1976-1980), Minister of Religion (1983-1988; 1988-1993) and the first chairman of the Indonesian HR Commission (1993-1998).
[315] Presidential Decree No 13/1989 on the fifth five year development plan 1989/90 — 1993/94 (Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No 13/1989 tentang rencana pembangunan lima tahun kelima (repelita V) 1989/90 — 1993/94 (http://www.bappenas.go.id/)

This line of argumentation is in my view, essentially Islamic, as belief systems which are not considered as people of the book, are under state surveillance and targets of proselytizing efforts in order to avoid the formation of new congregation. This line of thought surfaced clearly in the decision of the Constitutional Court in April 2010 to retain the controversial Presidential Decision 1/1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and Desecration.

Act 2/1989 on the National Education System

The issue of the religion class became topical again when the Government proposed an education bill in 1988, because it did not mention religion as a compulsory subject. The Islamic leaders opposed the bill and reiterated the old arguments that without religious lessons, education would lead to secularism and that the 1988 Broad Guidelines of State Policy (as it had been the case since 1978) already stated that one of the goals of education was to develop human qualities, including the religious qualities of having faith in (*iman*) and following the commands (*takwa*) of God. (Mujiburrahman 2006: 230) The draft on the education bill issued by the Commission for the Reformation of National Education did actually not accommodate Muslim educational interests, because it neglected the state *madrasah* and the authority of the Ministry of Religious Affairs to administer it. (Mujiburrahman 2006: 230)

When the parliament responded to the bill, not only PPP, but also Golkar and the army (ABRI) supported the inclusion of religion as a compulsory subject in the Law, while the PDI, into which the Christian parties had fused, did not explicitly oppose it. The Hindu Council (*Parisada*) and the National Council of Catholic Education had recommended that the religion class should be included as one of the articles of the drafted Education Act. The bill was finally amended and introduced as Law 2 in 1989. The religion class was included as one of the compulsory subjects, *madrasah* education was mentioned and the authority of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in its administration was affirmed. However, furnishing a suitable religion instructor at private and state institutions when only a few children in a class or in a school are of a minority faith remained a crucial problem for the Hindu minority, whereas the facilitation of a religion teacher who embraces the same faith as the student, were a point of concern for the Islamic majority and the Hindu minority alike in Christian institutions.

Act 2/1989 on the National Education System provided the educational aims for schooling and tertiary levels and set the structure of the education system. Social equity requires equality of opportunity to obtain education, regardless of socio-economic status, religion, or geographic location (Article 7). Article 11, subsection 6 defines faith based education (*pendidikankeagamaan*) as the type of education that prepares the student to perform a function which demands a special knowledge of the respective doctrine of *agama*. Article 39 introduces a *studium generale* in *Pancasila* education, civics, and religious instruction at all types and levels of the education system, thereby religious education was made a compulsory subject at all grades and levels. Religious instruction is defined in the elucidation of article 39 as the effort to strengthen faith in One Supreme Lordship (*iman*) and following the commands of God (*takwa*) according to the commands and prohibitions of the respective *agama* the student adheres to while at the same time attention is paid to the need of respect for other religions in interfaith encounters in order to create national unity[316].

Besides holding a qualification as teacher, chapter VII on teachers, article 28, subsection 2, rules in order to be appointed as teacher, someone has to have faith in God (*beriman*) and must follow the commands of God (*bertaqwa terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*), has to have insight into *Pancasila* and the 1945 Basic Law. Against Christian and PDI opposition, the Muslim faction supported by ABRI and Golkar factions in the Parliament had further successfully inserted a phrase into the elucidation of article 28, section 2 of the Education Law. The phrase stated that the religion teacher has to embrace the same religion as the students[317]. Thus the Islamic groups successfully defended the compulsory religious class policy during the New Order.

Government Regulation No. 29/1990 on secondary education, article 11, subsection 2 affirmed that faith based schools are operated by the Ministry of Religious Affairs; article 15, subsection 2 confirmed the *studium generale* in *Pancasila* education, civics, and religious instruction at this level of the education system, and article 17, subsection 2 affirmed the right of students to attain the religion class in the religion they adhere to.

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[316] *Pendidikan agama merupakan usaha untuk memperkuat iman dan ketaqwaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa sesuai dengan agama yang dianut oleh peserta didik yang bersangkutan dengan memperhatikan tuntutan untuk menghormati agama lain dalam hubungan kerukunan antar umat beragama dalam masyarakat untuk mewujudkan persatuan nasional.*

[317] *Tenaga pengajar pendidikan agama harus beragama sesuai dengan agama yang diajarkan dan agama peserta didik yang bersangkutan.*

Notwithstanding, the elucidation of the article reads that faith-based junior and senior secondary high schools are not bound to provide the religion class in another religion than the embraced one[318]. In consequence, the government followed consistently the policy that the phrase should only be applied to public schools, but not to private schools. (Mujiburrahman 2006: 249) Unsurprisingly, the Islamic groups opposed this regulation, claiming it deviated from the Education Law and demanded that the Government review it. Yet, the New Order never changed it. Consequently, the efforts of the Islamic groups to implement the phrase never succeeded during the New Order.

Broad Guidelines of State Policy and Five-Year Development Plans (1993-1999)

Religion became a crucial item in the Consultative Assembly's Decree No II/1993 on the Broad Guidelines of State Policy. The GBHN 1993 is quite identical in its text with the strategic aims outlined in Repelita VI, thus I give a brief synthesis of both documents. Practice of the first principle of *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* denotes the first aim which is said to be the responsibility of all groups, those with an *agama* and those with an *kepercayaan* (*golongan beragama dan kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*) who shall continuously and jointly lay down a strong spiritual, moral, and ethical base for national development as practice of *Pancasila*.

The first principle and aim then logically translates into the strategic planning progress and shall be firmly adhered to in the national development principles, of which the first principle mandates faith and following the commands of One Supreme God (*Keimanan dan Ketaqwaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa)*. All efforts and activities of national development shall be inspired, propelled, and controlled by faith and following the commands of One Supreme God as noble value which constitutes the spiritual, moral, and ethical base for national development as realization of *Pancasila*. The documents mention two sources for the nation to realize a strong spirit and mind, that is first, faith and following the commands of One Supreme God (*Keimanan dan Ketaqwaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa)* which constitute the propelling force with priceless value in channeling national aspirations, and second, the belief and certainty in the truth of the philosophy of the five principles as national unity.

In consequence, the first aim of national development shall be realized and practiced by raising the standards and support of education in religion and the religion class beginning from pre-school age to tertiary education. The religion class, the *Pancasila* class, and civics shall be developed in the efforts to strengthen faith and following the commands of One Supreme God (*Keimanan dan Ketaqwaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*), moral values, noble character, and the spirit of leadership.

In conclusion, the education law of 1989 did not make any substantial change to previous policies since 1966 (Mujiburrahman 2006: 230, 248), and religion remained a compulsory primary subject. After Suharto's Islamic turn in1989[319], the Hindu education system was in a difficult position in the *Pancasila* state, and only with the era of reform and democracy, the new governments tried to accommodate to a certain extent the Muslim, the Christian, but as well the Hindu, Buddhist and Confucian interests. It is interesting to note, the religion teacher in private schools was and remains a crucial problem in the selection and attendance of education between 1989 and 2003. The phrase "the religion teacher has to embrace the same religion as the students" (elucidation article 28, subsection 2) most likely aimed at the allegedly hidden mission and proselytizing efforts carried out in Christian-based schools. (Santika Interview 2007) Since Christian schools have higher quality standards, Muslim, Buddhist and Hindu students alike are registered with them and were forced to attain Christian instruction, since under the law private faith-based schools need not offer religious instruction other than their own, if less than ten students attend class. (Santika Interview 2007)

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[318] *Sekolah menengah yang memiliki kekhususan atas dasar agama tertentu tidak berkewajiban menyelenggarakan pendidikan agama lain dari pada agama yang merupakan kekhususan sekolah yang bersangkutan.*

[319] At the end of the 1980s, "Suharto began to recognise the emotive and familiar message of Islam by introducing a policy of accommodating Islam, focusing particularly on the accentuation of Islamic symbols in public discourse. Islam was thus systematically incorporated in the frame of reference of the state to offset the increasingly plausible challenge to the legitimacy of Suharto's political leadership." (Hasan 2008: 27) This political move is known as Islamic turn (Liddle 1996) In this context, the Directorate General of Elementary and Secondary Education, for instance, issued a new regulation on student uniforms, lifting the ban for female students to wear headscarves (*jilbab*) at school. Suharto himself and his family went to Mecca to perform the hajj pilgrimage in 1991. (Hasan 2008: 28)

Hindu students outside Bali were instructed in *pasraman* or Sunday schools, but the *pasraman* were not systematized then, and were not authorized for grading. Therefore, Hindus had to attend Christian religion instruction. After attaining school and learning the Christian prayers and credo, the Hindu community students feared that students would identify with Christian religion and then convert to it. (Sujana, Protocoll 2007) After the fall of Suharto, the issue of the religion teacher became the centre of controversy during the debate on the drafting of the bill of the new education law of 2003. Despite strong opposition from the Christians, (Mujiburrahman 2006: 250), the Islamic groups supported by the Hindu Council successfully included in the bill a provision stating that students are entitled to religious education in their own religion and to be taught by a teacher of the same religion.

In short, religious education is a continuous point of concern in Indonesian policies of education and religion. Since the endorsement of Law 20/2003 on the National Education System, the government has taken a few concrete steps to implement the controversial provisions of the education law that require schools to provide religious instruction to students in their own faith, instructed by a teacher who embraces the same faith. This provision is a result of discriminatory practices by private faith-based schools in providing religious instruction to students who embrace a different faith. The lenient implementation of the law also applies to the holding of Hindu religious education, even if the students were more than ten pupils, some local district heads (*bupati* or *camat*) refused to offer Hindu religious education in public schools and Hindu children were forced to attend Sunday courses. Teaching material is then obtained by the religion instructor through the PHDI, either from the district office, by mail or via the internet, in order to assess the grading necessary to promote the student to the next level.

6.2. Religion class 1999 – 2009

6.2.1. Strategic planning instruments 1999-2009

The strategic planning instruments present a fairly clear picture of the general direction in which the Government wants the school system to move. In April 2000 Indonesia committed to the Education for All (EFA; *Pendidikan untuk semua, PUS*) goals and in September 2000 Indonesia assigned to the Millennium Development Goals. Indonesia is currently under the second human rights action plan. In fact, until 2005 the policies on religion and education are mainly based on national development objectives defined under the 25-year long-term development plan (PJP, *pembangunan jangka panjang*) implemented from 1994 to 2019. These objectives are further detailed in five-year medium-term development plans under which the national objectives are directed to economics, environment, religion, culture, national defense, security, and politics. In 2005, this long-term development plan (PJP) has been redrawn and replaced by a revised version, which is discussed in detail below.

As the authoritarianism of the Suharto regime resulted in the indoctrination paradigm of education[320], the reformed development plans indicate the reformer's interest to bring about a paradigm shift from the transmission to the contextual and student-centered educational transformation paradigm of education. But they also indicate the instrumentalization of religion in education and politics, as "secular" educational reformers are motivated by the idea of changing the educational paradigm, whereas religious reformers are driven by the idea to islamize education. (Belen Interview 2007) In this, the legislation of the religion class increasingly became a battlefield for politicizing religion. In this context, Hasan (2008: 24) critically remarks, "The growing tide of religious conflicts after Suharto seems dissociated from the failure of Reformasi to touch upon the fundamental issue of reforming the state's management of religious diversity. In the changing political landscape arising from the opening of political opportunity, religion has increasingly been caught between political forces that are fighting for their own political interests." Hasan (2008: 24) argues that

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[320] In Indonesia, the principal ingredients of the Suharto regime were: "a military deeply enmeshed in politics and business, the rigorous indoctrination of schoolchildren to trust in the wisdom of the state, and a political structure based on enforced "consensus," designed to look democratic but to serve and approve the actions of a single leader. Backed by terror and a patronage system that guaranteed a lifetime of riches for every compliant minister, general and tycoon, the New Order ensured former President Suharto 32 years of uninterrupted power." (Colmey/Liebhold, The case against Suharto. Behind Indonesia's economic and political chaos, a familiar figure is pulling some strings. February 8, 1999; Time Asia, in: http://www.angelfire.com/rock/hotburrito/suharto/timeasia080299.html; (22 08 2011)

In this context, Hasan (2008: 24) argues "Through the indoctrination program called the Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (P4) [Guide to Comprehension and Practice of the Pancasila], as well as other instruments, the Pancasila was systematically embedded in the minds of Indonesia's citizens. The spread of the Pancasila doctrine served to isolate dissidents from the 'left' and the 'right' and ensured the constant threat of surveillance (…)". (Hasan 2008: 25-26)

the Reformasi's failure to reform the management of religious diversity has disrupted the democratic consolidation and the reform direction itself. For religion is at the intersection of a struggle between state, society and political forces. Individuals, groups and political forces thereby compete to represent the right to define boundaries in support of their organised claims and to delegitimise the rights of others.

However, with regard to the Hindu class and Hindu education system, this opening up of space led to a significant increase in Hindu educational opportunities, which culminated in the 2008 Act on the religion class and faith-based education systems that put Islamic education on a par with all other faith-based education systems.

On October 19th, 1999 the Consultative Assembly brought the 1999-2004 Broad Guidelines of State Policy (henceforth 1999 GBHN) in effect with Consultative Assembly's Decree No IV/MPR/1999. The 1999 Broad Guidelines of State Policy state in Chapter II, General Condition that the challenge faced in the educational sector would be located in the education system itself. "(…) the current education system is insignificant in the development of a student's person and character and causes the loss of personality and awareness about life's intrinsic meaning". In familiar fashion, the 1999 GBHN states, that it is based on the 1945 Basic Law by the Mercy of One Supreme God (*berkat rahmat Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*). Continuing the 1978 provision that education has a religious goal, one of the stated objectives of education is to develop human qualities, including the religious qualities of having faith in God (*imam*) and following the commands of God (*taqwa*).

It is criticized that the subjects of ethics (*akhlak*) and morality (*moralitas*), and the religion class would not be taught by using participative methods which aim to materialize the subject matter as a pattern of daily life. This would be the reason behind a tendency of the citizens' and society's lack of sensitivity to develop tolerance and togetherness, especially in the context of plurality[321]. Faith-based life would not yet guarantee the raising of the quality of faith in (*keimanan*) and following the commands (*ketakwaan*) of One Supreme God (*Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*) in society. On top of this, the guidelines reckon a gap between the formal conduct of faith-based life (*perilaku formal kehidupan keagamaan*) and real everyday life behavior (*perilaku realitas nyata kehidupan keseharian*), as the outbreak of social diseases, corruption and the like, criminality, drug abuse and conduct deviating from and violating morality, ethics and decency would attest.

The vision and mission set out in chapter III of the plan are cited in so far as they pertain to the religion class (*pendidikan agama*) or faith-nbased education (*pendidikan keagamaan*). Among 12 strategies to be accomplished, the 1999 Broad Guidelines of State Policy purport the vision of realizing an Indonesian society that observes peace, democracy and justice, possesses competitiveness, progress, and prosperity in the institution of the Unitary State of the Indonesian Republic (NKRI) supported by citizens who are healthy, independent, faithful (*beriman*), follow the commands of God (*bertakwa*); possess morals and noble religious dispositions (*berakhlak mulia*); love the country, observe the law, conserve the environment; master science and technology; and possess work ethos and discipline.

To accomplish this outlined vision, the 1999 Guidelines comprise following missions: 1.) consistent practice of *Pancasila* (*pengamalan Pancasila*) in society, nation and state; 2.) enforcement of citizens' sovereignty in society, nation and state; 3.) advancement of *agama* doctrines' practices (*pengamalan ajaran agama*) in everyday life to create the qualities of faith in and following the commands of God (*kualitas keimanan dan ketaqwaan kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*) in life and [thereby consolidating] a brotherhood of religious communities which possess morals and a noble religious dispositions/character (*berakhlak mulia*); act tolerant (*toleran*), harmonious (*rukun*) and peaceful (*damai*).

In chapter IV, section D, the 1999 Guidelines set out the agenda of religion and section E covers education. Section D defines five general strategies to be implemented in the arena of religion putting religious education as a main point on the agenda.

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[321] GBHN 1999: Chapter II, General Condition (http://www.dephut.go.id/INFORMASI/UNDANG2/tapmpr/gbhn_99-04.htm)

1. Consolidating the function, role and position of *agama* as moral, spiritual and ethical foundation in the operation of the state and seeking to warrant that all legal regulations do not oppose the morality of six state-funded religions. (*moral agama-agama*) (The term religion is plural in the Indonesian document – therefore in line with HR).
2. Increasing the quality of religious education by improving the religious education system to become more integrated into and integral to the national education system as a result by supporting it with adequate media and infrastructure
3. Increasing and consolidating inter-faith harmony (*kerukunan hidup antarumat beragama*) to produce an atmosphere of life which is harmonious as result; and supports mutual respect in the spirit of plurality by means of inter-faith dialogue and the operation of descriptive, non-dogmatic religious education at the level of tertiary education
4. Subsection 4 facilitates the religious community (*umat beragama*) to perform religious service, the hajj and the management of *zakat*
5. Enhancing the role and function of religious institutions to participate in overcoming the impact of change that is underway in all aspects of life with the purpose to strengthen national identity (*jati diri dan kepribadian bangsa*), and to substantiate harmonious life (*kerukunan hidup*) in society, nation and state (in societal, national and state-affairs).

It is interesting to note that the 1999 Guidelines officially demand the operation of an academic subject of descriptive, non-dogmatic religious education that is (comparing) religious studies at the level of tertiary institutions. The author therefore points to the need of future studies in this topic, as its description and analysis has been far beyond the scope of the present study.

The 1999 Guidelines were aborted during the Habibie presidency, but their line of thought has been continued in subsequent development plans thereby representing a strong continuity with the integralist stream of thought of the Suharto Regime. (cf. Hasan 2008)

Then, in 2000 the parliament and the president put Act 25 /2000 in effect that launched the five-year term national development program (PROPENAS, *Program Pembangunan Nasional*) in effect from 2000 until 2004. Again, in standard fashion, it is stated that "with the Mercy of One Supreme God", the Program is based on the 1945 Basic Law and continues the legacy of the 1999 guidelines of state policy that form its strategic substructure. The PROPENAS sets out five broad national objectives:

1. develop democratic politics and ensure national cohesion and social stability;
2. rule of law and achieve good governance;
3. accelerate economic recovery and strengthen the foundations for sustained growth;
4. develop the social sectors[322] and human welfare; and
5. strengthen regional autonomy, rural and urban development, and structural poverty programs.

Besides the issues of poverty and the inefficiency of the education system, literally verbatim as the 1999 guideline, the PROPENAS ascertains a gap between the formal conduct of religious life and actual conduct in everyday life. Social illnesses such as corruption, criminality, drug abuse, and a lifestyle and conduct deviating from and violating morality, ethics and appropriateness are widespread. Priority is ascribed to the development of social welfare, to increase the quality of religious life and endurance of culture. This priority is realized through achievement of progress in religious, educational, societal, and cultural fields. In its broad outline, the PROPENAS policy on the religious sector is identical to the tasks in the sector of religion as outlined by the 1999 Guidelines:

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[322] In the social sectors, the overriding national objective is to ensure all citizens access to basic services. Consistent with its commitment to decentralization, the national Government has outlined a development program giving major responsibility to local governments: they will determine specific development priorities based on regional needs and resources. (http://www.adb.org/Documents/COSSs/INO/ino202.asp79) October 2006

- utilize the function, role and position of religion as moral, spiritual and ethical base in societal and national life
- increase the quality of religious education
- strengthen and stabilize life harmony between religious communities (interreligious harmony; *kerukunan agama*)
- enhance the ease of performance of religious worship for religious communities
- strengthen the role and function of religious institutions in the participation of mastering the effects of chance ongoing in all aspects of life.

PROPENAS contains one chapter (VI) on *agama*-building and one chapter (VII) on education. In chapter VI it is stated that in the process of nation building and development, *agama* has an important and strategic position and role as spiritual, moral and ethical base. *Agama* inspires national life and state affairs; therefore *agama* as a value system shall be understood and realized by each individual, in families and in society. For that reason, *agama*-building merits more attention, not only in relation to the interpretation and performance of religion, but also in the operation of religious education and the religious life' service. In addition, the section C of the chapter sets out four objectives of the *agama*-building program:

1. enhance the service of religious life
2. strengthen the apprehension and implementation of religion, and inter-faith harmony
3. improve the quality of religious education
4. develop the improvement of social-religious and traditional religious education institutions

The third point of the program sets out the objective to improve the quality of religious education. Religious education at public schools shall aim to improve the quality of interpretation and performance of religious teachings in the student in order to consolidate the qualities of having faith in and following the commands of God and development of noble morals and upright character. (*keimanan dan ketakwaan serta pembinaan akhlak mulia dan budi pekerti luhur).* The decline of ethical and moral violations committed by pupils and students in the environment of both schools and society is the target to be reached. The pursued eleven main strategies to enhance the quality of the religion class are enlisted in the following:

1. perfect subject matters of religious education by giving them additional weight in real daily life
2. include moral building content integrated in the relevant subjects in the educational curriculum
3. carry out a teachers' restructuring, equalization of diplomas (D2; D3 for religion teachers)
4. provide support for religious worship means
5. hold seminars for religion teachers in order to deepen the subject matter and develop the concept of education
6. perfect didactics together with the evaluation system
7. develop management of education
8. organize competitions in religious capability, pupil camp outs, religious academic work competitions, and appreciation of religious art
9. support and develop the talent of leadership and the increase of knowledge and realization of religion
10. foster pupils organizations
11. develop express *pesantren* and similar types (*pasraman*, *Widyalaya*)

Those are the pursued main strategies to enhance the quality of the religion class on the tertiary level:

- raise the amount of Semester credits (more than 2 hours a week)
- increase the amount of religion class teachers
- enhance the amount of literature, both textbooks, and reading books
- improve the supporting facilities
- carry out an consolidation of curriculum and syllabus in religious education
- improve the quality of docents in undergraduate and postgraduate study programs
- improve the methodology of teaching

In section VII, on the development of education, PROPENAS raises the duration of compulsory basic education (*WAJAR, Wajib belajar*) to 9 years. A competence based curriculum (*Kurikulum Berbasis Kompetensi*, KBK) shall be drafted that communicates not only the regionally specific demands and potentials, but also the national conception (*wawasan nusantara*) which promotes a religious and a knowledge dimension in education, as faith in God, following the commands of God, noble morals and the mastering of basic knowledge (math, science and technology, language and literature, English) are subjects contained in the curriculum. In improving the quality of education, high school graduates shall be moulded, which are capable to compete on an international scale. (How those guidelines translate into the visions and missions of schools is illustrated here by the case study)

Despite still being under the PROPENAS, the Consultative Assembly launched a new national long-term development plan (*RPJPN, Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Nasional*) prepared for a 20 years' period (2005-2025) promulgated by Act 25 in 2004 under the Megawati presidency on October 5th, 2004. The RPJPN regulates that the government has to formulate national medium term development plans (*Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah, RPJM*) for a period of five years (2005-2009). The RPJPN has been launched in 2005 under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. It does not state development priorities in its elucidation part, but it formulates visions, missions and targets to be achieved in development, which provide the ministries and regions with a greater room to maneuver for adjusting their specific conditions and needs to the visions and targets formulated in the plan. It is my hypothesis, continuing the legacy of the 1999 Guidelines and the PROPENAS, the RPJPN defines religion as a noble national value and some of the broad objectives and strategies set out by 1999 Guidelines are maintained. The RPJP is divided into seven sections, of which the first section is concerned with the socio-cultural sector and the third section with science and technology. I give a brief synopsis of its contents in the following paragraphs.

In chapter II, 1 a (8) on the socio-cultural sector, the RPJP draws a rather pessimistic picture of the condition of *agama* in Indonesia. Among parts of society, their life would not yet reflect the comprehension and practice of the religious doctrines they adhere to (*penghayatan dan penerapan nilai-nilai ajaran agama yang dianutnya*) Therefore, in the section of *agama*, the plan attests a varying degree of awareness to practice the doctrine of *agama* as those parts of society would only demonstrate religious symbols but not the substantive values of *agama* doctrine. But there are parts of society, whose life approaches or even already reflects the *agama* doctrine.

The RPJP assesses although the performance of religious worship would flourish, while in the circle of religious leaders a strong consciousness would grow to build social harmony and peaceful intra- and interreligious relations based on mutual respect, this increasing awareness would not fully guarantee the quality of faith in and following the commands of One Supreme Lordship in the citizenry. Unmoral conduct, corruption, collusion and nepotism practices, abuse of drugs, pornography, porno-action, gambling, high divorce rates, and inharmonic family existences demonstrate the gap between religious doctrine, its understanding and its practice. The goal to build intra and interreligious harmony is not yet achieved. Moral commands of religion could not yet fully be realized and noble conduct is not yet internalized in every individual. Interestingly, the plan criticizes the weakness of the nation's capability to manage diversity, as demonstrated in the increasing orientation towards group, ethnic, and religion interests, which cause social conflicts and could trigger national disintegration. This problem increases in its seriousness due to the limited public space to be used by the multicultural society to channel their aspiration.

Human development is interpreted as holistic (*utuh*). (Chapter II, 2 a (5) The vision and mission of national development outlines eight broad missions. The first mission sets out to "Build a society which has ethics (*berakhlak mulia*) and morals, is cultivated and civilized as that base on the *Pancasila*. Education shall aim to mould humans who follow the commands of God, *(bertaqwa kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa),* obey the legal system, maintain intra- and interfaith harmony, interact between cultures (…) and are proud to be Indonesian in the context of stabilizing the spiritual, moral, and ethical base of national development."

The development of religions (*agama-agama*) shall stabilize the function and role of *agama* as moral and ethical base and aims at strengthening inter-faith harmony (*kerukunan agama*) by raising mutual trust and harmony between different fractions of society in a progressive Indonesia. Therefore *agama*-building aims to strengthen inter-faith harmony as it raises mutual trust between and equal rights of societal groups. This harmonic dimension is crucial to maintain the Indonesian unity as it creates awareness of the multicultural diversity and true nature of social pluralism in realizing an atmosphere of tolerance, considerateness, and harmony. The development of religion directs at stabilizing the function and role of religion as the moral base of national development and as the base of social meta-ethics in the organization of the state, aiming to practice a clean government/good governance. Development and the stabilization of national identity strive to create a firm, unique, modern, and superior national character and social system. This identity consists of a combination between noble national values – as religious, togetherness, and unity – and modern universal values such as work ethos and good governance.

The first phase of implementation of the RPJPN has been the national medium term development plan (*rencana pembangunan jangka menengah nasional, RPJMN*) 2004-2009 promulgated through Presidential Decree 7/2005 under the Yudhoyono presidency. This RPJM 2004-2009 forms the basis for ministries and government agencies in formulating their particular medium term development plans, called strategic medium term plans of Ministries and institutions (*Rencana Strategis Kementerian/Lembaga, Renstra-KL*). Likewise, the regional governments must take into account the RPJM 2004-2009 when formulating or adjusting their respective regional development plans (*Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah, Renstra-SKPD*) to reach national development targets. The RPJMN is to be further elaborated into the annual Government work plan (*Rencana Kerja Pemerintah RKP*) which will then become the base for compiling the Draft Government Budget (RAPBN). On the regional level the annual regional development plan, is called annual work plan of regional governments. (*Rencana Kerja Pemerintah Daerah; RKPD*).

Formulated by the Ministry of National education (henceforth MONE), the strategic plan of national education (2005-2009) states the goal of education is to produce as ideal type a holistic Indonesian citizen. By focusing on the progress in education, this educational aim shall be realized not only through the development of intellectual skills, but also through the improvement of character and morals, and societal and physical aspects of education. Therefore one of the main activities of the MONE is to develop an interdisciplinary education program by intensively working together with the other Ministries and governmental agencies/institutions involved in the multi- administration system as the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Finance, the National Development Board and the Parliament. As far as I know, that is intensively done.

MONE's strategic plan of national education (2005-2009) finds although education has been a goal of national development since 1969, its operation and organization is far from being optimal and the expected outcome of national education is not achieved. Referring to the three development missions set out in 2004 RPJM, the strategic plan of the MONE discovers that in order to realize the educational mission within the globalization era, the nation has to have high quality human resources, with skilled citizens capable to increase the quality of life and productivity, and able to compete in the international arena. National education has the vision of realizing an Indonesian society practicing peace and democracy; possesses expertise and competitiveness; and achieves advancement and prosperity in the Unitary Nation of the Indonesian Republic supported by citizens who are healthy, independent, faithful, and pious towards God; possess morals and noble character, love the country, observe the laws, and conserve the environment, master science and technology; and possess work ethos and discipline. To accomplish the vision, the Ministry of National Education (MONE) has 5 missions, of which the third mission is set out to improve quality of educational inputs and processes to optimize the building of moral character. (Alwasilah/Furqon 2010: 611)

Accordingly, the mission of the strategic plan is to operate an education system which is reorganized as to produce intelligent, holistic, and competitive Indonesians. In achieving the goals of quality education for all (EFA), Indonesian educational planners apply the four pillars of education promoted by the International Bureau of Education of the UNESCO in educational reform.

1) Learning to know focuses on combining broad general knowledge and basic education "'Learning to know' presupposes learning to learn', calling upon the power of concentration, memory and thought', so as to benefit from ongoing educational opportunities continuously arising (formally and non-formally) throughout life." (Zhou n.a.:n.a, emphasis in original)

(2) Learning to do emphasizespractical competences. "Learning to do thus implies *a shift from skill to competence*, or a mix of higher-order skills specific to each individual. 'The ascendancy of knowledge and information as factors of production systems is making the idea of occupational skills obsolete and is bringing personal competency to the fore'." (Zhou n.a.:n.a. emphasis in original)

(3) Learning to live together is relevant in the current context of diversity and globalization. "It implies an education taking two complementary paths: on one level, discovery of others and on another, experience of shared purposes throughout life." (Zhou n.a.:n.a.)

(4) Learning to be involves development of the human potential to its fullest. "'Learning to be' may therefore be interpreted in one way as learning to be *human*, through acquisition of knowledge, skills and values conducive to personality development in its intellectual, moral, cultural and physical dimensions." (Zhou n.a.:n.a. emphasis in original)

It is important to note that the four pillars of learning relate to all phases and areas of education. (Zhou n.a.:n.a.) In Indonesia, those four pillars are then contextualized in four fields of education (Belen 2007) In this context, Indonesian educational planners added the dimension of spiritual intelligence (UNHI 2007: xxv, Belen 2007; MONE's strategic plan of national education 2005-2009) to reorganizing curricular and educational content and structure.

Spiritual intelligence	Self-actualization using intuition and heart to develop and strengthen faith, following the commands of God, morals, character, and a noble personality[323]
Emotional and social intelligence	Self-actualization using emotion to increase sensibility and appreciation of aesthetic and beauty of art and culture. Related to this, the competence to express this emotion. Self-actualization by social interactions, which cultivate and foster reciprocal interactions, are democratic, emphatic, sympathetic, bright, and self confident, respect human rights and diversity (*kebhinekaan*) in society and state, and finally display a national conception (*berwawasan kebangsaan*) with an awareness of the rights and duties of citizens
Intellectual intelligence	Self-actualization using reasoning to attain competences and autonomy in science and technology. Actualization of a critical, creative, and imaginative Indonesian.
Kinesthetic intelligence	Self-actualization by doing sports

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[323] The development of scientific methods of objectively measuring human intelligence began in the 20th century. A proponent of the multiple intelligences approach, Tony Buzan makes a distinction between 10 types of intelligences: the creative and emotional intelligences (creative, personal, social, spiritual), bodily intelligences (physical, sensual, sexual), and the traditional intelligences (numerical, spatial, verbal). (Belen 2007: 3-4) Comparing Buzan (2002: The Power of Spiritual Intelligence: 10 ways to tap into your spiritual genius. S.I.: Perfect Bound) with Gardener (1985: Frames of mind. The theory of multiple intelligences. New York: Basic Books), Belen (2007: 2-5) finds that the intelligences (numerical and verbal) used to measure the intelligence quotient (IQ) contribute 5 percent to a person's success in life, whereas visual-spatial, kinesthetic, and musical intelligences contribute 15 percent. In consequence, a person's success in life is constitutes by the remaining 80 percent or the emotional intelligence quotient (EQ) consisting of interpersonal, intrapersonal and spiritual intelligence. UNHI (2007: xxv) demands a curriculum which not only develops the IQ of a student, but also the emotional intelligence quotient (EQ), and the spiritual intelligence quotient in an balanced matter.

6.2.2. The National Education System

The current national education system is characterized by two peculiarities, first the extensive private school sector and second the administrative multi-system. Those peculiarities evolved out of the colonial legacy. In the 1950s, Indonesia has operated a contextual education system (KPD 1950: 58-60), and with Act No. 20/2003 on the national education system she returns to this holistic, decentralized and contextual approach. The current education system is a result of legal reform, beginning with the amendment of the 1945 Basic Law. The amendment stipulates that education is not only the right of the Indonesian citizens but it is now part of human rights. (Alwasilah/Furqon 2010: 611) All Indonesians citizens are entitled to primary education and the government has to pay for it. The amendment also mandates at least 20% of the state budget at the national as well as regional levels to be allocated for education.

The amendment was then elaborated in Law 20/2003 on educational system. Consequential regulation in the area of education comprise (the list entails the regulation the author reviewed until May 2009, but is most likely incomplete):

1.) Act 14/2005 on teachers and lecturers
2.) Minister of Education decree 19 in 2006 on the national education standard
3.) Minister of Education decree 22 in 2006 on the curricular content standard for schooling (curricular framework and structure)
4.) Minister of Education decree 23 in 2006 on the graduation competence standards
5.) Minister of Education decree 24 in 2006 on the operational implementation of the decrees 22 and 23,
6.) Several Decrees of the Minister of Education on the operational education standard to be followed by elementary and high education units in 2007; Decree 12/2007 on supervision standards for schools/*madrasah*, Decree 13/2007 on the standard of school/*madrasah* principals, Decree 15/2007 on annual planning system of the Ministry of National of Education, Decree 16/2007 on teachers' academic qualification and competence standard; Decree 17/2007 on the in-formal education national exams; Decree 18/2007 on the certification of in-service teachers; Decree 19/2007 on the management standards for elementary and high schooling; Decree 20/2007 on the examination standard of education; Decree 24/2007 on the material and infrastructure standards, Decree 43/2007 on libraries,
7.) Government Regulation 47/2008 on compulsory school attendance

Act No. 20/2003 on the national education system

The strong emphasis on religion in the national education system has to be interpreted in relation with the third failure to implement the Jakarta Charter and with the problematic issue of the religion teacher at private schools. Albeit motivated by fully different ideas, Muslims and Hindus support the religious dimension of the education and both communities fear hidden conversion. As has been stated earlier, private Christian elite schools and universities are popular because they are known for their high quality, but Muslims and Hindus alike were in discontent with the regulation, that their children should attend Christian religious education as requirement for graduation. On the other side, as the Ministry of Religious Affairs allocates a large budget for the Islamic education sector, the Hindu minority has to struggle to have equal educational opportunities as given for the Islamic community in the education sector. (Sujana Interview 2007, Santika Interview 2007)

On July 8th 2003, the parliament enacted Law No. 20 Year 2003 on the National Education System. The current education system encompasses the entire archipelago, it is variably adjusted to the specific regional conditions and it may be therefore described as flexible, open, multidimensional, contextual and lifelong process. In familiar fashion, it is stated in the Law that with the mercy of God, the 1945 Basic Law mandates the government to organize and operate a national education system which strengthens faith in and following the commands of God (*keimanan dan ketakwaan kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*) and noble character (*akhlak mulia*) in order to educate national life as regulated in Laws. Chapter I on general conditions, article 1 (1) defines education as conscious and planned effort to realize an atmosphere of study and learning process in which the students actively develop their own potential to have spiritual and religious strength (*kekuatan spiritual keagamaan*), self-control, personality, intellect, noble character/moral (*akhlak mulia*), and skills useful to them, society, nation, and state. Article 1 (2) states that education is based on the *Pancasila* and the 1945 Basic Law, which are rooted in the values of *agama*, national culture and respond to the demands of epochal change.

Chapter II on the background, function and aim, article 2 states that the five principles and the 1945 Basic Law form the base of national education. Article 3 defines the educational aim according to the strategic visions and missions outlined in the RPJPN and RPJMN.

> The function of national education is to produce skills, to mould character and a prestigious national civilization in the framework of educating national life. Its aim is to develop the student's potential in order to enable his/her to grow into a human who has faith in God and follows God's command (*beriman dan bertakwa kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa*), has noble character/morals (*berakhlak mulia*), is healthy, learned, smart, creative, independent, and who is a democratic and responsible citizen.

Chapter III on operational principles Article 4 (1) states that education shall be carried out democratically, just, and non-discriminative by respecting human rights, religious and cultural values, and national plurality. The national education system is dynamic in its curricular outlook, because it can be flexibly adjusted to the regional conditions in order to communicate specific regional contents of knowledge. In line with the Education for All conception, education is understood as a lifelong learning process. (III: 4,3) In Chapter V the rights and obligations of the citizens, the communities, and the government are clarified. All societal groups and citizens have the equal right without discrimination to participate in education and to organize educational units. Citizens living in remote or backward areas and *adat*-communities have the right to receive and organize delivery of special education. (IV: 5) Compulsory school attendance is applicable from the age of seven to fifteen[324] (IV: 6, 1) and citizens are responsible for the operation of education. (IV: 6, 2) The communities may participate in planning, operation, supervision and evaluation of education and are obliged to provide resources for the operation of education. Therefore, the law demands the formation of an autonomous education council (*Dewan Pendidikan*) having as its members' prominent figures of society with an active interest in education. (XV: 56)

Talented children of economically poor parents are entitled to receive scholarships. (V: 12, 5) In 2005, the government introduced a number of programs, amongst them, the school operational aid (BOS, *bantuan operasional sekolah*) funded by cuts to oil subsidies and used for schoolbooks and scholarships for poor students to tackle the impact of poverty on education. There were several cases reported in the Bali Post in 2007, illustrating how principals, officials, or even private individuals attempted or succeeded in adventurous manner to misappropriate those BOS funds.

Following the decentralization of the education system, there are even more stakeholders in education then before, and the weaknesses of the education system are debated, criticized, and complained about in daily public discourse. The Indonesian central government, the regencies, society and the school committees[325] or the tertiary unit participate in planning, organization, and operation of the education system and define the curricular content according to the needs and conceptions of the respective education unit in question, the region in question, and the development plan in effect.

The elucidation of Act 20 Year 2003 on the national education system sets out the vision and mission statement and the strategy of the national education system. The vision is to operate an education system as strong and powerful social institution to qualify all Indonesian citizens to grow into qualitative humans skilled and perceptive to the demands of epochal change. According to that vision, five missions are outlined, of which mission three set out to improve the subject matter and quality of the education process in order to optimize the production of a moral personality. To realize that mission, thirteen strategies are to be accomplished, among others 1.) operation of religion class and moral education (*budi pekerti*), 2.) implementation of a competence based curriculum (KBK) based on a contextual-dialogical didactic; 5.) raising the quality of teachers through qualification and certification; 7.) guarantee funding of the education system; and 9.) realizing the compulsory basic education program.

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[324] The nine-year program of compulsory basic education (*WAJAR, Wajib belajar*) had been implemented in 1992, but has only been enforced by PROPENAS, Act 20 Year 2003 on the national education system and Government Regulation No 47 Year 2008 on compulsory school attendance in order to arrive at the objectives laid out in the Millennium Development Goals and the Education for All-program. The course of education every citizen is required to complete comprises nine years of compulsory basic education starting from the age of 7 up to 15 years. This compulsory basic education program seems to be at least partially realized across the Archipelago.
[325] Community-based education is then based on special traits in religion, society, culture, societal aspirations and potential, as a form of education from, by and for the society and is operated by society itself. Society takes part in the education units through the school committee that exists at every school. The school committee is an autonomous institution having as its members the pupils' parents/ trustees, the school community and prominent figures in society which have an active interest in education.(XV: 56)

Eventually Law 20/2003 introduced the national education standard as benchmark to be followed in every formal educational unit and as statutory standard of operation. Whether operated by the state or private foundations, all educational facilities must be operated by a standardized education legal body (*badan hukum pendidikan*). Prior to the Law 20/2003 on Education, which eventually equated the private and state run educational sectors by setting national standards, the extensive private school sector signified not only a specific issue concerning state authority, but as well the transfer of educational authority into institutions which are not controlled by the state. (Triguna Interview 2004, Sujana Interview 2011, Santika Interview 2011)

Private schools in Indonesia do not enjoy the same status as state institutions. State institutions are fully recognized by the MONE, while private institutions have schools or faculties with varying and mostly lesser levels of recognition. To control and assure quality, schools and faculties are subject to accreditation[326] by the National Accreditation Board at the MONE[327]. The National Accreditation Board appoints members to rate and accredit schools and universities. Two types of ratings are used in higher education facilities and schools. Education facilities which do not comply with the minimal standard are rated not accredited, whereas educational units which meet the minimal standard are categorized individually into three levels. Prior to 1998 these were equalized (*disamakan*), or recognized (*diakui*), or registered (*terdaftar*). Since 1998 the terms '*terakreditasi A*', '*terakreditasi B*', and '*terakreditasi C*' have been used respectively. At the lesser levels students must pass a state examination in addition to completing degree requirements at the school. In context with higher education, accreditation is carried out in a two-step-assessment of the minimal standard of quality and the assessment of the higher education facility[328].

For the first time in Indonesian history, a national education standard is set wit the Law on the Education System as minimum criteria in effect in the entire territory of the Unitary State of the Republic Indonesia. Since 2005 the curriculum of the private or state faith-based schools (*madrasah, widyalaya*) and faith-based universities under the MORA and the public schools and universities under the MONE is equal. Hence the change of the curriculum equalized the position of *madrasah* graduates with those of the public schools. This is particularly important, as for the first time in history the curricula for state faith-based schools and public schools is identical – and this equalization had met resistance from the Muslim fractions for centuries.

It seems that the provision of the religion class is an outcome of 60 years lasting conflict between secular and faith-based groups and their shifting alliances over the degree of secularism and pluralism in the country – therefore the current education system is the outcome of the debate between the Islamic approach on education (as represented in the MORA) and the secular approach on education (as represented in the MONE) and proponents of those approaches.

Article 12 (a) and Article 30

In the reform era, the issues of faith-based schooling, the religion class, and the religion teacher became tropical again during the debates on the draft of the bill of the national education system in 2003. Article 12 and 30 of Act 20/2003 on the national education system explicitly concern religious education. Included in Article 12 a is a provision ruling that students have to attain the compulsory religious class in the religion they adhere to, which is instructed by a teacher of the same religion. Chapter V on students, article 12 subsection 1a states:

> Every participant in education in every education unit has the right to receive religious education in the religion he or she adheres to instructed by a teacher who adheres to the same religion.
> <u>Elucidation</u>: The religion teacher who adheres to the same religion as the participant of education is facilitated by the government or the regional government according to the needs of the region, as enacted in article 41, 3.

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[326] Instruction of the Minister of Education and Culture, 0326/U/1994
[327] BAN PT Dirjen Dikti Depdiknas
[328] 5 criteria are assessed: Relevance, Link, Match, Quality and Efficiency. First, the institution executes an intern evaluation according to the standards set by the national accreditation board, and then the board examines the intern evaluation, and if necessary sends a specialist team for further investigation to the to-be-accredited institution. The temporal repeated accreditation assesses the curriculum, quality, number of education staff, students' welfare, materials and infrastructure, operation of the academic administration, finances and funding. The outcome of both assessments is then turned in to the Minister of Education. Interconnected to the outcome, certain measures will be taken or proposed, like increase or decrease financial support, closing of study programs etc. To open postgraduate study programs, state and private facilities are to be accredited A or B.

The efforts made by the Hindu Council (*Parisada Hindu Indonesia*) to enshrine public Hindu-based schooling in legislation were eventually successful, as Chapter VI, Article 30 on religious education, subsection 1-4, and especially subsection 4 on *pasraman* (Hindu Sunday Schools) show:

1.) Faith-based education is organized by the government and/or parts of the society which embrace that particular faith, according with legal regulations
2.) Faith-based education shall prepare the students to become members of society who understand and practices the values of their religious doctrine and/or to become a religious expert
3.) Faith-based education can be operated on every level of formal, non-formal and in-formal education
4.) Faith-based education has the form of education in *diniyah, pesantren, pasraman, pabhaja samanera* and other types of that kind.

Interestingly, section XVIII, article 65, subsection 2 states that education units that are under the authority of foreign governments are obliged to provide religious education and civics for Indonesian citizens at the level of compulsory basic education. This article warrants that Indonesian citizens attend the religion class according to their faith at international schools. A Muslim at an International Australian school may now demand to receive Islamic religious education, but it is not known to me, if that ever happened, and who has to provide the teacher, according to the law Article 41, 3 it is the Indonesian national or the respective regional government in order to raise the quality of education. Hence Act 20 in 2003 on the national education system embodies the normative right of every citizen to receive religious instruction in his or her embraced faith held by a qualified religion teacher who adheres to the same faith in articles 12 and 30. The facilitation of that teacher is the duty of the national or regional government, but given the complex geographic and demographic condition, it is the most likely still the task of the concerned religious community in question.

It is important to note in that context, the mark of the religion class is a compulsory item in the school report, Thus, a student's promotion to the next level of schooling depends on the mark received in religious education. Although religion is not part of the national exams, it is examined at the level of the educational unit either by the educational unit or the official faith-based agency - in the Hindu context, by the Hindu Council (*Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia*) - and included in the certificate. The examination of performance and acquired skills in the religion and morals subject area is done by observation, that is, the teacher rates whether a change in behavior and attitude may be assessed in the student's evolving affective capacity and personality. The grading of morality, defined as faith in God and following the commands of God, is done by the religion teacher after consultation with the class and other specialized teachers in evaluating how those qualities are put into practice. In addition, to give the overall mark in the religion class – excellent, capable and less capable – the class and other specialized teachers regularly inform the religion instructor about a student's conduct, and the overall mark in the religion and moral subject group is given by the teacher's conference considering the religion teachers' grading and the result of the school exams.

Articles 12 and 30 concerning religious education are an outcome of the 60 years lasting conflict between secular and faith-based groups and their shifting alliances over the degree of secularism and Islamization in the country. Unlike the Islamic course of education, where from the basic levels profound knowledge of Islam is taught, qualifying for the training as religion teacher, in the Hindu education system, there are virtually only a few faith-based schools providing basic education,(Arsada, 2006: 53) which are not even similar to the *madrasah* system, and there are literally only a few graduates qualified and specialized in Hindu studies. This precarious situation prompted Prof Triguna, President of the Hindu University, to compare the state of the Hindu education system with a toddler in 2007.

In 1994, the specialized faith study program at the senior high *madrasah* has been disbanded, as a consequence those graduates were less qualified and specialized in Islamic studies and this had become a serious challenge to the State Institute of Islamic Studies. (Mujiburrahman 2006: 227) And this is exactly the problem Indonesian Hindus face today and the reason why they struggle to establish private or even public Hindu faith-based schools (*widyalaya,* a term prominent since 2006 and introduced into legislation in 2008). Only in 2010, the *Dwijendra* Foundation changed the names of all levels of schooling to *widyalaya*. Answering the protests of Islamic education experts, the specialized faith study program was introduced again by law 19 in 2005 on the national education standard. Since the law on the national education system and the law on the national education standard list the *widyalaya* as public Hindu-based schools with a legal status equal to the *madrasah*, the regulation that faith-based communities may operate public general faith-based education units applies not only for Muslims, but also for Hindus.

This is of particular importance, since only faith-based schools offer a specialized faith-based study program at senior grades offering four additional subjects in faith-based matters. Whereas all students participate in a general program at grade X of the senior high level, four specialization programs are offered at grade XI and XII at public faith-based schools: (1) Natural science program, (2) Humanities and social sciences program, (3) language program, and (4) faith-based program. In addition to the allocated two class hours, the faith-based program at the *madrasah* provides four specialized subjects in religious education: Quran interpretation (*tafsir*), *hadith*, mystics (*tasawwuf*), and basics of jurisprudence (*usul fiqh*). Each of these four Islamic subjects is allocated three hours at each grade, which means that the total allocated class time for subjects in religion is fourteen hours a week. Analogously, public Hindu-based education may offer in its faith-based program four specialized subjects on Hindu *tatwa* (philosophy), *upacara* (ritual), ethics (*susila*), law, and governance. This specialization program shall produce profound Hindu graduates who may be employed as Hindu religion teachers, street workers, clerics, religion experts, bureaucrats or politicians, after they have developed a stable Hindu personality.

Organizational structure of the national education system

Multi-administration and state and private sector

The dual administration of the education system is a remnant from colonial times. In Indonesia, educational units have either the state or a private authority responsible for their operation. Traditionally, the private education sector is significant in Indonesia, as Islamic and Christian foundations play important roles as responsible non-state agencies in providing education to either the economic weak, people in isolated or remote areas, or high-qualified education. In addition to the complex and politically explosive dual education system, a legal and fiscal multi administration system persists. The logical outcome has been a messy confusion in educational policies, inefficiency, and a waste regarding personal, institutional, and financial means. (Müller 1974; Beeby 1979; Wandelt 1989)

Today, faith-based educational units are either state run and under the supervision of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (henceforth MORA), or if operated by a private faith-based foundation, they are under supervision of the Ministry of National Education (MONE). In short, the religion class in schooling and undergraduate studies and state faith-based schooling (*madrasah, widyalaya*) and universities are under the guidance of the respective Directorate General in the MORA, whereas general education in public schools is controlled by the MONE.

The MONE[329] decides on orientation, planning, and administration of educational policies and controls general and public education, state public schools and state public universities, and it subsidizes private faith-based schools. The Department of Internal and Home Affairs administrates elementary and vocational education. Several other Departments (Agriculture, Forestry, and Information) are involved in the operation of vocational schools or vocational subjects. The MORA has the authority over faith-based, to wit, Islamic, Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist instruction and over all public faith-based educational institutions. Consequently, the strong position of religion in education ascribes vast authority and power to the MORA.

Funding

In Indonesia, the funding picture of education is complicated, as the administrative multi-system of private and state education is maintained in the funding process. The budget for the MONE fails to reflect a major portion of public educational expenditures, since other Departments and especially the MORA are involved in paying operational costs and teachers' salaries. Despite the regulation that compulsory school attendance from elementary to junior high level shall be free of additional fees, the practice to charge tuition is continued. The fourth constitutional amendment mandates in section XII, article 31, subsection 4 the government to allocate at least 20 percent of the state budget (national and regional gross national product) on education. However, albeit varying in the regional districts, in 2006 the national allocation was around 9.1 percent of the state budget, or Rupiah 44.1 trillion, and 11.8 percent of the state budget, or Rupiah 54.06 trillion, in 2007[330].

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[329] The former Department of Culture and Education has been split into the National Education Department and the National Culture Department in 2005. In 2010 it was renamed to Ministry of Education.
[330] Maulia, Erwida. Increasing expenses put education out of reach, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta. Fri, 05/02/2008 (May 2008, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/05/02/increasing-expenses-put-education-out-reach.html)

Similarly, Alwasilah/Furqon (2010: 615) state that the budget for education was around US$ 4.63 billion in 2007. This figure, however, does not include the education budget allocated at the provincial levels for 33 provinces and 440 districts or cities. With this allocation, MONE is the Ministry that has the highest budget. In general, the budget is allocated for social assistance (63.47%), buying goods (16.01%), paying salaries (15.22%), and investment (5.29%). As the teachers' salaries, constituting about 12 -16 percent of the sum total to be allocated are included into the 20 percent, the national education system in an "unpleasant state"[331] because the pure percentage of budget allocation is minimal.

Educational streaming

As family, society, and state are listed as responsible bodies in the organization of the education system, general education is localized either in-school or out-of school in three areas: 1.) household (family); 2.) schooling; 3.) society (neither at home nor at school)[332]. This conception is derived out of the historical emergence of several responsible authorities in the arena of education and out of demographic conditions, and it is operationalized in the national education system as follows: The current national education system consists of formal education, non-formal education, and informal education. In this, it consists of two streams: in-school education (formal) and out-of school education (non-formal)[333] plus all additional measures related to education (informal)[334]. The levels of education at school consist of private or state basic education, secondary education and higher education, while types of education include general education, vocational education, and special education. Education at school is organized in intra- and extra-curricular activities. The streams, levels, and types of education can take the form of an educational unit organized by the central government, local government, and/or community. (Alwasilah/Furqon 2010: 613)

Education is provided at class or/and as distance learning. Distant learning comprises individual or collective correspondence courses (packet A-C using radio, Audio/TV and computer networks) on all educational levels. Higher education is structured analogously to the schooling system but instead of three pillars, formal, informal and non-formal education, it is structured into two pillars, to wit, intracurricular and extracurricular education. Yet, there is no non-formal path at the tertiary level, making it somewhat difficult to realize the teacher qualification program in remote or backward areas or for minorities. The following tables show the Structure of the Indonesian education system.

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[331] Professor Dantes, informal personal communication in April 2008

[332] In this point, the national education system corresponds with the Hindu concept of four instructors (*catur guru*). On the genealogy of this conception see Hinzeler 1993 and Bakker 1993. The Hindu education system reckons four types of educators: the parents (*guru rupaka*), the schools (*guru pengajian*), the government (*guru wisesa*) and One Supreme Lordship (*guru swadaya*).

[333] Non-formal education consists of education obtained outside schools. Nonformal education is designed for citizens who need education service that functions as replacement, complement, and/or supplement to formal education within the framework of providing lifelong education. (Alwasilah/Furqon 2010: 613) For example, to arrive at the objectives of Education for All (EFA, *Penddikan untuk semua*, PUS), the Department of Education provides students in remote and underdeveloped areas with an alternative model of schooling (Paket a, b,c). The three packets (Packet A (elementary level), B (junior high level), and C (senior high level) are of the same standard as formal education. These packets provide compulsory basic education to remote regions without access to schooling.

[334] Informal education consists of all educational measures carried out in family and society outside schools. Informal education can be in the form of self-learning, provided by families and communities. The outcomes of informal education shall be recognized as being equal to the outcomes of formal education and nonformal education after successfully passing an assessment according to national education standards. (Alwasilah/Furqon 2010: 613)

Figure 1 Education in Indonesia. GJSS: General Junior Secondary School; GSSS: General Senior Secondary School; JSS: Junior Secondary School; SSS: Senior Secondary School; MORA: Ministry of Religious Affairs; MONE: Ministry of National Education. Source: Ministry of National Education (2006: 15).

(Alwasilah/Furqon 2010: 612)

Source: I Made Santika

The educational streams are equal and switching schools between those streams is possible. For the first time in Indonesian educational history, citizens may switch between non-formal and formal and between public and private education units according to their educational needs and preferences. This is also true for special schools. The education system levels and paths are compatible and replaceable providing and guaranteeing the opportunity of a systematic life-long in-school or out-of school contextual and child-centered education according to the needs of the student. Hence, education is operated either by state or private authorities in a complementary and replaceable manner referring to the national educational standard.

National Standards on Education

Curriculum and Textbooks

Besides the administrative multi-system of private and state education, in the 1950s, a compromise was manifest in the curriculum: the schools under the Ministry of Religious Affairs taught secular subjects of the Ministry of Education and Culture, while general education included the religion class, which is organized by MORA. (Mujiburrahman 2006: 220-230) In 1968, the first national curriculum was organized. The second nation-wide curriculum was compiled in 1974, when the government changed the school curriculum, introduced a curriculum reform for the Islamic *madrasah* and began to implement *Pancasila* Moral Education, which had to be taught as a compulsory subject at all state or private schools. Law 2 in 1989 on education tried to adjust the varying secular and Islamic curricula into one unitary national curriculum and education system. The law laid the focus on value-based science and technology, the labor market, and productivity. Following the curricular reform in 1994, the *madrasah* curriculum has become only slightly different from that of the state schools.

In the context of the Hindu class, there was no nationwide curriculum compiled for the Hindu class during the Sukarno presidency. In Bali, specific schools offered the Hindu class, but the content depended on the skills and interpretation of the teacher, who was usually not a trained religion instructor, as a result the approach of the 1950s was unsystematic and unequal. (Gede Sura Interview 2007) In 1968, the first national curriculum for the Hindu religion class was compiled by I Gusti Made Ngurah (see *Parisada* policies on the Hindu class), Hindu General Secretary. Thus, a first nation-wide curriculum including a systematized approach on the Hindu class was applied in 1968, but it has never been implemented equally and evenly across Indonesia. According to I Gede Sura (Interview 2007), the very structure of this 1968 curriculum was never really reformed in the years to follow. Merely, it was adjusted in compliance with developments in home affairs and international policies, but not with an eye on improving the quality of the subject matter in curricular content and teaching and learning methods. In 1984, the third nation wide curriculum was implemented. With the 1984 curriculum, the first centralized approach on a Hindu religion curriculum was adopted. Content and syllabus were compiled by the Hindu Directorate General with little input from the Hindu Council (*Parisada)*, whereas a special team of officials from the Regional Office of Religion and the Regional Office of Education in Bali, delegates from the governor's office, and local religious experts in Denpasar compiled the text books.

The reform era and transition to democracy mandated a fundamental rethinking on education, motivated the paradigm shift in education from the transmission to the transformation paradigm, and led to the compilation of two new curricula. For the first time in Indonesian history, Law 20/2003 claimed the application of a national standard of education to warrant the quality of education in the entire territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. In consequence, the law equalized the position of private and public education by equating the curricula in setting national standards, which of course were then to be developed first (see chapter on national education standards). These national standards of education are used as benchmarks in the improvement of curricular quality and content (*standar isi*), examination/assessment (*standard kompetensi lulusan*), teachers and lecturers, resources and infrastructure, organization, and funding.

Law 20/2003, Chapter IX, Article 35 (3) mandated the establishment of an independent national center for education standards (BSNP, *Badan Standard Nasional Pendidikan*), which is tasked to control the quality of education and regularly reports to the government. After its inception in 2005, the center acts as partner of the MONE in the development, monitoring and controlling of the national education system's quality. Located in Jakarta, the BSNP is an independent and autonomous institution in charge of drafting and compiling the national curriculum standard (*standard isi*), evaluating the achievement of the graduates' competence through the national exams (*standard kompetensi lulusan*) and adjusting the curriculum according to the principles of diversification.

At all levels of education, the curriculum is based on the diversification principle relevant to the education units, local potential and students. In context with regional autonomy and decentralization, the principle of diversification is thought to provide the adjustment of the national education system with special characteristics given in the respective region, where the education unit is situated as regions, society and school committees participate in the organization and operation of the education system and develop the syllabus of the national curriculum and the curriculum of local contents. The curriculum is compiled referring to the national education standard in order to achieve the respective educational aims.

Applying a holistic approach to curricular renewal according to the guiding principle of learning throughout life, the curriculum reform followed the four pillars of education set forth by the International Bureau of Education of UNESCO in 2000[335]. The curriculum and syllabus is compiled at all educational levels and areas of education in the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, based on the following principles outlined in Chapter X on curriculum, Article 36 (3):

1. strengthening faith (*iman*) and following the commands of God (*takwa*)
2. improving noble character/morals (*akhlak mulia*)
3. increasing potential, intellect, and interest of students
4. respecting diversity of local potential and environment
5. considering local and national development demands
6. considering employment demands
7. considering development in science, technology, and arts
8. considering religion,
9. considering the dynamic of the global developments and
10. considering national unity and national values

The potential to be developed reflects a specific Indonesian approach on curricular renewal. Consequently, as the enhancement of faith (*iman*) and following the commands of God (*takwa*) is the first principle of state it translates top-down into the first objective of national development and the first goal of the national education system and curricular reform.

Chapter X on curriculum, Article 37 continues the previous policy of a *studium generale*. In basic education and secondary education this *studium generale* or the compulsory curriculum comprises:

1. religion class
2. civics
3. language (Indonesian, regional language, and English)
4. math
5. natural science
6. social science
7. art and culture
8. physical education and sports
9. skills/vocational education
10. local content

In higher education this compulsory curriculum comprises:

1. religion class
2. civics
3. language (Indonesian, regional language, and English)

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[335] 1) learning to know, which focuses on combining broad general knowledge and basic education; (2) learning to do, with emphasis on practical skills necessary for a profession or trade; (3) learning to be, the underpinning principle of which involves development of the human potential to its fullest; and (4) learning to live together, which is relevant in the current context of globalization. (April 2009, http://www.eric.ed.gov; http://www.unesco.org/delors/)

Elucidation of article 37 states that the religion class shall form students which have faith in God, follow the commands of God and have noblemorals/character[336].

The conception of the post-reform competence-based-curriculum (*Kurikulum Berdasarkan Kompetensi,* hereafter: KBK) and the brand new curriculum-at-the-level-of-education-units (*Kurikulum Tingkat Satuan Pendidikan,* hereafter: KTSP) adopted in 2006 substantiated the problem-based context learning and study-centered approach of the transmission paradigm and the learning throughout life model. The KBK was compiled in 2002, enacted in 2003 and applied until 2007. Still, professionals in the educational sector regarded the KBK as too centralistic, and what competence actually stands for was perceived as vague or even mysterious. In consequence, principals have refused to establish the KBK and a more decentralized and contextual approach was drafted. (Made Santika, Protocol 27.04.2007)

After the national standard was codified by Minister of Education Decree 19 in 2006 on the national education standard, the KBK (competence-based-curriculum, *Kurikulum Berdasarkan Kompetensi*) was standardized into the KTSP (curriculum-at-the-level-of-education-units, *Kurikulum Tingkat Satuan Pendidikan*), which was enacted with Minister of Education's decrees 22 on content, 23 on graduation, and 24 on organization in 2006. Following those decrees, it became clearer for what competences actually stand for, because the national standard of education regulated the curriculum, the syllabus, and the graduate's competence standard for compulsory schooling, junior and senior secondary high school and higher education in a generally intelligible way. In 2007, 30 percent of the schools used the KTSP and 70 percent will adapt it.(Made Santika, Protocol 27.04.2007)

Until 2009, all schools were required to adopt the KTSP and its textbooks. The legal documents define competence as to encompass standard competences (SK, *standar kompetensi*) and basic competences (KD, *kompetensi dasar*). These competences are the targets the participants to education are required to attain in order to fully develop their human potential as a complete person. The core competences outlined in the KTSP for both the public and the faith-based schools are identical now, this facilitates a national standard in examination/assessment, as in schooling 70 percent of the syllabi are uniform across the Archipelago, and only 30 percent of the students' performance which communicates the regionally specific knowledge is examined at the level of the educator, the educational unit, the offices of education and religion on behalf of the regional government. (Made Santika, Protocol 27.04.2007) The compiling process of the KBK and KTSP syllabus are quite similar, yet the core competences of the KTSP have been defined according to guidelines from the national center for education standards (BNSP, *Badan Nasional Standard Pendidikan*), which appointed members were drawn from experts in all subjects, originating from all ethnicities, and religions. The KTSP compilation process is virtually and literally complex. (Made Santika, Protocol 27.04.2007) The KTSP is to be further developed by all agents in the arena of education applying a subsequent pattern:

(1) student-centered and oriented at the potential, evolving capacity, needs, and interest of the participants in education,
(2) uniform and integrative,
(3) the progress of science, technology and art is integrated,
(4) relevant for the daily needs of the stakeholders,
(5) comprehensive and continuous,
(5) life-long learning, and
(6) balances national and regional interests.

Following this pattern, the curriculum and syllabus of the Hindu class is compiled by the following agents using the legal and administrative hierarchy of Indonesia: The Hindu Directorate General at the MORA consulted the Hindu Council (*Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia*) and other experts in the field of Hindu religion in order to collect the raw material and subject matter to be compiled as national standard. After consulting and re-consulting the Hindu Directorate General at the MORA, the standard of the Hindu class, and the core and basic competences to be acquired in schooling were compiled by the MONE applying the recommendations of the national center for education standards (BNSP, *Badan Nasional Standard Pendidikan*). (Made Santika, Protocol 27.04.2007; Made Sujana Interview 2007)

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[336] *Pendidikan agama dimaksudkan untuk membentuk peserta didik menjadi manusia yang beriman dan bertakwa kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa serta berakhlak mulia.*

Therefore, the MONE provided for the regulations, the national education standard (standards of competence and evaluation), in our context the national Hindu KTSP, after having consulted the Director of Hindu Education at the MORA. The budget for the Hindu class is provided by the Directorate General for Hindu Affairs at the MORA. Those competence and evaluation standards are uniform and implemented uniformly throughout Indonesia. Due to the principle of diversification then, the syllabi are further developed and adjusted according to the needs and potentials of the educational units, the regions and/ or the faith-based community in question in order to communicate regionally specific knowledge. (Made Santika, Protocol 27.04.2007; Made Sujana Interview 2007)

In accordance with the local genius of the region, 30 percent of the syllabus at basic and secondary education level is compiled by the respective school and its school committee, which is coordinated, supervised, and facilitated by the regional offices and agencies of education and/or religion at the provincial or district/municipality level. The district/municipality is responsible for basic education and the provincial level is responsible for secondary education. The provincial level is tasked with the contextualization of the textbooks, the provision of models, the accommodation of regulations, and the provision of grants and subsidies.

Consequently, the agency of education at the municipal or district level is tasked to build an education board (*dewan pendidikan*) – in 2007 there were deliberations on its establishment, but it was not yet formed in Bali's districts-, to form a syllabus compilation team, to develop the structure of the syllabus, to allocate grants and subsidies, and to equip schools with resources and textbooks. The schools then further elaborate on the syllabus, this is to say, the principals are in charge to warrant the organization of curricular development by installing a syllabus planning unit and to implement the then reformed and contextualized syllabus.

The special subject teachers, in our case the Hindu religion instructors, then develop the syllabus further and compile in the learning organization plan (RPP, *rencana pelaksanaan pembelajaran*) as contextual concretization of the national standard competences and basic competences outlined in the national curriculum. The RPP comprises the standard competence, basic competence, competence achievement indicators, learning aim, content, class methodology, learning activities, resources, and examination. For that reason, the specialized subject teachers meet regularly in the specialized subject teachers' conference (MGMP, *musyawarah guru mata pelajaran*) at the level of the province or regency/municipality and in the Teachers' working group (KKG, *kelompok kerja guru*) at the district level to discuss matters related to their profession and to develop the syllabus and the learning organization plan. (Ny Gusti Ayu Kartika Interview 2007; personal observation at such a conference)

The textbooks are another issue in the educational arena. The standard procedure of compiling textbooks is regulated in Minister of Education decree 11 in 2005 on textbooks. But as teachers still have to cope with their new autonomous role as educators, syllabus developers and researchers as mandated during the educational reform, the teacher-centered paradigm prevails in class and the textbooks remain the primary resource teachers rely on in structuring their lessons. (Ny Gusti Ayu Kartika Interview 2007; personal observation in class)

The development of the syllabus and the compilation of textbooks follow the same procedure. The BNSP issues a recommendation guideline, how textbooks shall be designed in questions of lay out, content, and illustration. Then the Hindu Director of Education at the MORA appoints a textbook compilation team, which works out the syllabus of the KTSP in a draft of the teachers' raw material manual (*buku pedoman guru*), giving models of texts, practices, exercises, and revisions. The draft of the textbook is then handed in to the BNSP, and after a reworking, the draft returns to the Hindu Director of Education at the MORA. Here the final draft is compiled and turned in to the MONE. In consequence, the MONE approves of the draft and then the Hindu Directorate at the MORA prints the textbooks or gives a publisher the permission to print the textbooks. (Sujana Interview 2007, Santika Interview 2007, Kartika Interview 2007)

In this, the Hindu Director of Education at the MORA drafts and implements the standard type of textbook, which after printing is distributed complimentarily to the regional and local offices of religion throughout Indonesia. Afterwards the specialized subject teachers' conference (MGMP, *musyawarah guru mata pelajaran*) commissions a team to develop further on the raw material, as content and methods of the Hindu class vary in the regions due to the diversity and plurality within Indonesian Hinduism itself.

The office of religion at the provinces then accommodates the contextualized teachers' manual. However, there are several private publishers that publish the final textbooks. Since 2002, every year new textbooks were printed, and one might speculate, the textbook printing press profits more from educational reform than the families, which have to buy new textbooks every year. In the next step, textbooks to be used in schooling are chosen from the all textbooks available during a joint conference of all Hindu religion teachers and are approved by the school committee in question. (Sujana Interview 2007, Santika Interview 2007, Kartika Interview 2007)

In the final analysis, the reform of the Hindu curriculum paradigm shifted the orientation from teacher-centered content learning (*bahasan*) towards student-centered, problem-based context learning and competence (*kompetensi*), therefore it situated the pupil in the center of the learning and teaching process. The contents of the curriculum however, have not been reformed, merely adjusted to the new educational paradigm. The KTSP is not fully determined by the nation-state as only core competences are outlined in the national curriculum, therefore it is contextual and decentralized, since the school-communities, as well as the tertiary educational institutes develop the syllabus. In addition, the schools compile and evaluate the local content curriculum. This diversification is considered necessary to preserve the local genius, or specific local features in the regions, which otherwise would be homogenized or vanish. (Sujana Interview 2007, Santika Interview 2007, Kartika Interview 2007)

Critical captions of the Bali Post read, 'Our schools are turned into professional professors!', or 'Teachers, the new researchers! Why not?' These captions reflect the critical discourse on the fact that it is now left to the schools and teachers themselves, with the support of the civil society at large, to push for a better educational system that will equip Indonesian students with the basic skills to meet the challenges of the future world. Therefore one might get the impression that the operation of the Hindu class would be the task and responsibility of Hindu religion instructors only. Yet, as it is the principal educational duty of parents and the society to educate the youth in the religious tradition and values, a tight cooperation between school and parents seems necessary. But the importance of a profound education in Hindu religion is less valued in the lower social classes of Balinese society, which have not yet built a proper awareness of the importance of a proper understanding of religion. (Arsada 2006: 5, 55) In this sense the educated Hindu elites gave themselves the mandate to play the formative role in the constitution of the Hindu education system.

National standardof education

As state funded *agama* are understood as first concern and prime national value, strategic element in and aim of the national development process, the advancement of faith in God and following the commands of God is the first objective of the new contextual and student-centered education system. In order to realize this objective, the national curriculum comprises a compulsory religion class for students of all state funded religions at all levels of education (with the exception of postgraduate studies), held by a teacher of the same religion, who has to be provided by the central or regional government.

Minister of Education Decree 19 Year 2005 implemented the national standard of education, curriculum and syllabus as benchmark in the development of the national education system in order to monitor the quality in the application of the KTSP (curriculum-at-the-level-of-education-units, *Kurikulum Tingkat Satuan Pendidikan*). The scope of the national education standard in schooling encompasses levels of competence in:

- content standard: (SI; *Standar Isi*) encompasses the competences of graduates, resources, and the national curriculum and syllabus that students have to master at a certain level of education in order to achieve the graduates' competence standard
- standard of process denotes the operational standards at educational units in order to achieve the graduates' competence standard
- graduates' competence standard: (SKL, *Standar kompentensi lulusan*) lays out the basic framework of capacity students need to acquire comprising attitude, knowledge and skills
- educators and educational staff standard teacher's competency
- resources and infrastructure standards: competence of teaching material, textbooks and facilities
- financing standard: Budget
- examination standard: examination of the *students' performance* through the educator, the education unit or the government (in case of non-formal HRE the *Parisada*)

The content standard (SI; *Standar Isi*) stipulated in the Minister of Education Decree 22 in 2006 encompasses the basic framework and structure of the curriculum, the study load, the KTSP, and the academic calendar. The compulsory nation-wide unitary curriculum comprises five learning areas:

1. religion and morals subject area
2. civics and personality subject area
3. science and technology subject area
4. aesthetics subject area
5. physic, sports and health subject area

All these subject groups are offered in an integrative and interdisciplinary manner in order to foster a holistic understanding. Holistic is defined as integrative and interdisciplinary learning process between the subject areas that aims to attain the legally prescribed competences. The religion and morals subject group aims to transform the student to such an extent that he/she becomes human, has a noble disposition (*ahklak mulia)* and faith in God (*beriman*). Noble disposition (*ahklak mulia*) is understood to comprise ethics, character and morals as realization of the subject matter of the religion class.

In consequence, the aim of the religion and morals subjects group in schooling is to build the spiritual potential of the student, and the group encompasses learning activities in the field of recognizing, understanding, and nurturing religious values, and the implementation of these values in individual or collective social life. By raising the spiritual potential, it is targeted to ameliorate the diverse potentials intrinsic to human beings, whose actualization reflects their dignity and worth (*harkat/martabat*) as God creatures. Note the inherent organicist logic of argumentation. Interestingly, it is mandated that the subject matter and content of the religion and morals subjects group is integrated in an interdisciplinary manner into the science and technology subject group. In consequence, the development of technology in Indonesia shall be based on religious ethics. The *Dwijendra* foundation provides an outstanding example how these national guidelines are locally implemented.

Accordingly, the curriculum for basic education and secondary education comprises ten compulsory subjects:

1. religion class
2. civics
3. language (Indonesian, regional language, and English)
4. math
5. natural science
6. social science
7. art and culture
8. physical education and sports
9. skills/vocational education
10. local content

In higher education the compulsory curriculum comprises:

1. religion class
2. civics
3. language (Indonesian, regional language, and English)

The graduates' competence standard is set for each stream, level and type of the education system: at the level of basic education, the graduates' competence standard aims to impart or lay down competences, whereas at the level of secondary education the aim is to raise/build intellect, knowledge, personality, morals, and skills to be able to lead an independent life and to continue education at the next levels. In consequence, the graduates' competence standard at the higher education level aims to prepare the students to become a moral member of society, who has knowledge, skills, autonomy, and the attitude to find, develop, and apply science, technology, and art, which are of use for humanity.

Regarding Hindu religious education, the KTSP standard allocates three class hours for religious instruction from grade IV to VI at the level of basic education. From grade I to III the methodology is integrative and interdisciplinary, while from grade IV to VI a subject-based approach is used. At the level of secondary schooling, two class hours are allocated for the religion class from grade VII to XII. At grade X of the senior high level, all students participate in a general program. At grade XI and XII then, four specialization programs are offered: (1) Natural science program, (2) Humanities and social sciences program, (3) language program and (4) faith-based program, especially at the *madrasah*, but this special study program shall be opened at the public Hindu-based schools *(widyalaya)*.

Teachers

As agents of instruction, educators (teachers, lecturers and others involved in teaching) at all levels and types of education (pre-school, basic education, secondary education and higher education) are required to have four competences available which have been outlined in the national standard of education:

1. pedagogical competence,
2. personality competence,
3. professional competence
4. social competence

The Minister of Education Decrees 15 in 2005 on teachers and lecturers and Decree 16 in 2007 on teachers' academic qualification and competence standard regulate the academic qualifications and competencies educators need to have or acquire. Competencies are defined as behaviors and skills that educators must have, or must acquire, to perform effectively at work. Those competencies are categorized as educators' core competencies, which are then further diversified into teachers' competencies according to the level and type of education under question.

As a nation state based on *Pancasila*, following competences are interesting to note. In the area of personality competence, the core competence an educator has to posses is the ability to act in line with and communicate the norms of religion, law, society, and national culture. This competence is then diversified into specific teachers' competencies. The primary competence is defined as respecting all students without discrimination with respect to their embraced conviction (*keyakinan*), ethnic group, *adat-istiadat* (customs and usages), region of origin, and gender. Interestingly, in this document the term conviction/creed (*keyakinan*) is mentioned, which does not actually discriminate between *agama* and *kepercayaan*, but is itself implied that the document refers to *agama* as only *agama* can provide a conviction or creed, however, the teacher may not discriminate belief systems (*kepercayaan)*. This perspective on the non-discriminatory attitude of teachers has been already mentioned in the first law on education.

The second specific competence educators shall acquire in the area of personality competence refers to conduct which mirrors the norms and values of the embraced *agama*, law and social norms of a specific society, and of the plural Indonesian national culture. Further, educators' conduct shall follow the commands of God (*takwa*) and morals (*akhlak*). It is very interesting to note, that faith in a specific image of God (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*) is not mentioned here, because religious practice is considered to be a tradition-specific set of actions, whereas piety/following the commands of God (*takwa*) and morals (*akhlak*) are interpreted as universal.

Furthermore, in the area of social competence, an educator is expected to act in an inclusive, objective, and non-discriminatory way, based on grounds of sex, religion race, physical condition, family background, and social economic-status. Likewise, educators are required to be capable of communicating effectively, empathetically, and courteously with the students, other educational staff, the parents, and the society at large.

Higher education

In 1851, a school for the training of native medical assistants was established in Java, and after 1880, there were three chiefs' schools for the education of the local elite in Java. The embryo of Indonesian tertiary education using Dutch as language of instruction were the Training Schools for Native Officials (OSVIA) and the 1902 opened School for the Education of Native Doctors (STOVIA). In 1920, the first tertiary institution was a technical college and established at Bandung. In 1924, a law facility was established at Batavia (Jakarta), the embryo of the Law Institute of the contemporary Indonesian University. In 1927, a medical academy was opened in Batavia. In 1940, the forerunner of the Institute of Literature and Philosophy of the Indonesian University (UI) was established. 1941 the Agriculture Institute was established in Bogor. (Frederick/Worden 1993; Sudijarto/Thomas 1980: 57; Bunge 1982: 22)

Considering the state of tertiary education in 1945 (see chapter XY), in 1995[337], and in 2006, the expansion of the tertiary system is remarkable in terms of quantity nonetheless quality remains a point of concern. In 2006, there were 2,838 (526 Islamic) higher education institutes, of which 83 (50 Islamic) were state run and 2,756 (476 Islamic) were private institutions. There were 225,687 docents employed, of which 2,754 held professorships. Of the 2, 7 million registered students, the share of women was 48 percent, a remarkable fact for a majority Muslim country. Of the total number of students, around 43 percent were registered at law, economics or management faculties, around 18 percent were enrolled at engineering disciplines including architecture and planning, only 10 percent were registered at natural sciences faculties including math and informatics, and finally 13 percent had registered with social science or humanities faculties. This data does not reflect enrollment at Islamic institutions of higher education. There were about 5,000 PhD students distributed across Indonesia in 2006[338].

Minister of Education decree No. 30/1990 on higher education has been substituted by Decree 60/1999, which has not yet been replaced by new legislation and is thus still in effect, but consequential legislation amended specific regulations. In autumn 2006, I found a bill on a draft of a new tertiary education system at the Department of Education's website, but the link was dead in spring 2007, and Mr Santika at MORA said the bill is still in the process of drafting. There was no new bill available in 2009. Higher education is classified according to institutional types and functional activities by Law 20/2003: universities, institutes[339], colleges or schools of applied sciences[340], academies[341], polytechnic institutes or colleges of advanced technology[342]. Tertiary institutions have the right to carry out academic programs, professional trainings and vocations. This work will only focus on Universities and Institutes as defined in Law 60/1999 and Law 20/2003, because the case study was conducted at a University and an Institute and therefore other facilities were excluded.

Tertiary institutions administrate autonomously their respective institutes as centers that put the triple mission of Indonesian higher education (*tri dharma perguruan tinggi*) into practice: providing teaching, research, and public service. Teaching[343] encompasses the wide variety of higher educational courses available in Indonesia. Research[344] should show outcomes that are of use in the economic and social progress of the country. Public service[345] refers to the provision of assignments to community that result from teaching and research activities.

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[337] In 1995 there were 51 state higher education instituions and 26 Polytechnic facilities spread over the entire archipelago. The number of private facilities reached 1,220 in the same year (251 Universities, 47 Institutes, 256 colleges, 396 academies, and 8 Polytechnic facilities). The total number of students amounted 436,133 and the number of docents 46,735 at state facilities. On the private sector, 1,450,171 students were enrolled and taught by 110,912 docents. (Departemen Pendidikan 1996: 7)

[338] In: http://evaluasi.or.id/; http://www.daad.de/berichte/Jakarta.pdf (February 2009)

[339] Considering the administrational aspect, there is no difference between universities and institutes, but Universities comprise four faculties at least and institutes comprise two faculties, with each faculty offering a variety of departments and study programs.

[340] Colleges or Schools of applied sciences comprise one faculty in one discipline only with a variety of specialized programs

[341] Academies offer a specific discipline only

[342] Polytechnic institutes or colleges of advanced technology operate a study professional program in a number of specialized disciplines

[343] The target or duty of education (*pendidikan*) appears as the preparation of the participant as citizen having academic and/or professional skills at his or her disposal and capable of applying, developing and/or producing science and technology; expanding and disseminate science, technology and striving for its application in order to increase societal life and enrich national culture.

[344] The aim or duty of Research (*penelitian*) is expressed in the efforts to deliver empirics, theories, concepts, methodology, models and information pointed to enrich science and technology.

[345] The objective of public service (*pengabdian kepada masyarakat*) constitutes the effort to put science and technology, which is realized by higher education in institutionalized manner or directly, in use for society that societal welfare may be increased. The objective of community-service is directed to the general public in the form of the distribution if information, consultation, guidance and training according to the academic field.

Higher education is defined as to comprise academic and professional education. Academic education gives priority to quality improvement and the advancement of science, whereas professional education aims to produce a skilled and competitive work force. Academic education comprises study programs ranging from undergraduate studies as associate degrees or diploma (*D I-IV*) to bachelor study programs (stratum one, *Sarjana 1,* S1) and to postgraduates studies as master studies (stratum two, *Sarjana 2,* S2) and the Doctorate (stratum 3, *Sarjana 3*, S3). However, in line with quality improvement, Law 20/2003 abolished the operation of the Diploma I-III. The table shows the Indonesian Study Programs.

Study Program	Credit point	Endurance (semester)
Diploma I (DI)	40-50	2-4
Diploma II (D2)	80-90	4-6
Diploma III (D3)	110-120	6-10
Diploma IV (D4)	144-160	8-14
Stratum 1 (Sarjana 1) equivalent to a bachelor degree	144-160	8-14
Stratum 2 (Sarjana 2) equivalent to a master degree	36-50	4-10
Stratum 3 (Sarjana 3) equivalent to a bachelor degree	40-50	4-10

The educational reform introduced the organization of tertiary education in semesters, and the division between a national core curriculum and a regional institutional curriculum by Minister of Education Act 232/U/2000. Semester is defined as the smallest time unit expressing the length of educational program in an educational level each comprising 16 to 18 learning weeks. The amount of students' attendance is recorded with a system called semester credit system (*SKS, Sistem Kredit Semester*). The credit points system is an educational coordination system in which the student study load, the lecturer workload, and the organization of the institutional education program (SAP) are defined in credit points. In the Bachelor program the content of the core curriculum comprises between 60 and 80 percent of the number of required SKS, and in the Master program it is between 40 and 60 percent of the number of required SKS. The content of the institutional curriculum is the remaining percentage that is under the responsibility of the Higher education facility. The compilation of the core curriculum is the duty of the Hindu Directorate General and the development of the institutional curriculum is achieved by responding to the specific regional situation as local needs, labor market and environmental condition as well as the socio-religious potential.

The structure of state universities is uniform; the presidium is structured into three units, academic affairs, administration, and student affairs. Private universities are more varied in structure, as decisions on structure are the prerogative of the organizations or foundations that run them. The university president is responsible to the operating educational legal body, which is either state run, or private run but state coordinated. The operation of state universities is controlled directly by Jakarta, with university presidents being responsible to the Department of Education only via the Directorate General of Higher Education. In comparison, the operation of Hindu state universities is controlled by the Hindu General Director, who is in turn responsible to the Minister of Religion and the Minister of Education. The Ministers are appointed by and responsible to the President, who is, since 2005 elected directly by the Indonesian citizenry. Subsidies can be applied for by the MONE, in case of faith-based institutions also by the MORA. In general, higher education is financed by four sources:

1. Budget, subsidies and grants allocated from the central or regional government
2. Foreign financed loans and grants
3. Research and enterprises of the University
4. Funds or donations allocated by stakeholders (community)

The presidium of the private University is responsible to the executive board of the foundation that runs the respective educational unit and to the private higher education cooperatives (*Kopertis*, *Koperasi Perguruan Tinggi Swasta*) (as it is the case with UNHI and YD). The government requires that all private universities are administered under the umbrella of regional private higher education cooperatives (*Kopertis*, *Koperasi Perguruan Tinggi Swasta*). There are currently twelve such *Kopertis* in Indonesia, of which *Kopertis* VIII comprises the province Bali, West Nusa Tenggara (Lombok, Sumbawa) and East Nusa Tenggara (this area consists of more than 500 islands, the main islands are Flores, Sumba, and West Timor).

In consequence, all private tertiary institutions are run by a private contractor that is an operating organization/foundation. Also, all private universities are under supervision of the MONE via its regional private higher education cooperatives (*Kopertis*, *Koperasi Perguruan Tinggi Swasta*). Each *Kopertis* is run by an implementation secretariat headed by a coordinator, who is an established administrator from a state university run by MONE's regional office. Whereas the coordinator is directly responsible to the Minister of Education, the secretariat is under the aegis of the Director General of Higher Education. The aim of this system is to ensure that private universities maintain the national standard of education set by the central government[346].

In Bali three state-run universities/institutes (UNUD, ISI, IHDN) are located and around 40 private run universities/institutes are under the guidance of *Kopertis* VIII, as amongst others: *Dwijendra* University, UNHI, School for Applied Pedagogy and Educational Science in Amlapura and School for Applied Pedagogy and Educational Science in Singaraja[347].

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[346] (March 2009,*www.papuaweb.org/goi/rangka/freeman/lr-03-3.pdf)*
[347] (March 2009, http://www.pocesoft.com/perguruan%20tinggi/direktori%20pts/kopertis%20wilayah%208.html)

6.3. The Hindu Class and Hindu Competences

6.3.1. National Standard and Basic Competences of the Hindu class

It would be best to impart ethics not by religious knowledge to be memorized but by observing older people who serve as role models. In the past, our parents conveyed merely a general orientation to us: as Hindus, we are advised to act in a good way towards fellow people, we shall not take what is not our due, and we shall never to hurt the feelings of fellow people. This broad outlook orientation was supplemented with the principle of *karma phala.* If we do wrong, we will suffer the same wrong in the future. Or in the context of the doctrine of *tat twam asi,* it is implied that if we hurt somebody else, we simply hurt ourselves. In other words, religious ethics would be taught at best by providing a practical model to be followed.

(Prof Ida Bagus Yudha Triguna, Questionnaire)

The competence-based curriculum (KBK) formulated the aim of the Hindu class at school so as to consolidate and increase *sradha* (*iman*, faith) and *bhakti* (*ketakwaan*, following the commands of God) in *Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa/Brahman* (Hindu-Balinese, One Supreme Lordship[348]) by nourishing Hindu doctrine in the students. As a result of this effort, the student shall develop into a dharmic Hindu who is able to realize the noble destination of *Moksartham Jagadhita* (release from the cycle of rebirth, physical wellbeing and bliss*).*

The function of the Hindu class, as codified in the KBK, is to

- implant the values of Hindu teachings as manual or device to attain release from the cycle of rebirth, welfare and bliss (*Moksartham Jagadhita*)
- increase *sradha* (*iman*, faith) and *bhakti* (*ketakwaan*, devotion/following the commands of God) in *Ida SangHyang WidhiWasa*
- teach religious doctrine in general, explain the system and function of religion
- build a qualified mental and physical attitude in the students that enables them to continue schooling at the next level
- prepare maturity and a sense of resistance in the student in the process of adapting to the global social and physical environment
- adjust students' misunderstandings and weaknesses in having faith, understanding, and practicing religious teachings in daily life.
- shield the students from negative influences which are the result of encounters with the external world.

The KBK and the KTSP for the Hindu religion class comprise eleven learning areas.The first three learning areas comprise the pillars of Indonesian Hindu Dharma as they have been outlined in the Upadeca.

1. creed(*Tatwa* (philosophy/metaphysics) and five creeds (*Panca Sradha*)
2. ethics (*Susila*)
3. ritual (*Yadnya*), and in addition
4. sacred scriptures (*kitab suci*)
5. sages and seers (*orang suci*),
6. sanctuaries and holy places (*tempat suci*)
7. religious holidays (*hari suci*)
8. governance and leadership (*kepemimpinan)*
9. nature[349] (*alam semester*)
10. culture (*budaya*) and
11. history of Hindu Dharma

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[348] As Hindu Dharma Indonesia should not be understood as a coherent belief system, but more as a collection of several Hindu inspired traditions, the ethnic groups adhering to Hindu Dharma Indonesia have varying names for their One Supreme Lordship. Indian Hindus in Medan revere Kali, whereas the Sikh community in Banten and Jakarta

[349] The *taman siswa* concept of learning in nature from nature is part of the Hindu class learning areas.

Minister of Education Decree 23 in 2006 regulated the graduates' competence standards in all learning areas; in this, the graduates' competence standards for the Hindu class are also regulated in the Decree 23 Year 2006. At the level of basic education, six standard competences to be achieved are outlined in the religion and moral subject group. At the level of junior secondary education, seven competencies to be acquired are outlined, and at the level of senior high school, eight competences to be achieved are codified, which are to be continuously developed from one level of schooling to the next.

The six competences to be acquired in the religion class of all state funded *agama* at the level of basic education encompass:

1. practicing the teachings of the embraced faith according to the evolving capacity of the child/adolescent.
2. showing an honest and fair attitude
3. recognizing plurality of religions, culture, races, ethnic groups, and social-economic classes in the social environment (life-world)
4. communicating correctly and in courteous manner, which reflects dignity and value as God's creatures.
5. demonstrating a clean, hygienic, healthy, and safe lifestyle and to use leisure time according the requirements of religion
6. showing love and care for fellow human beings and the environment as beings created by God.

In consequence, following the legally prescribed competences to be acquired, the Hindu class shall nurture in following standard competences at the level of basic education:

1. having faith in the omnipotence of *IdaSang Hyang Widhi Wasa* (One Supreme Lordship) as sublime creator, the three forms of God (*Tri Murti)* as creation (*Brahma*), maintenance (*Vishnu*) and dissolution (*Shiva*)*,* the three manifestations of God in nature[350] *(Tri Purusa)* and the four energies or powers of Shiva (*Cadusakti)*[351]
2. comprehending Hindu doctrine of *Panca Sradha* (the five creeds) and *Tri Sarira* (three bodies)
3. understanding Hindu ethics (*susila*) which comprises following areas: *Tri Kaya Parisudha* (proper thought, speech, and action), *Tri Mala* (threeignominies: negative emotions and thoughts, arrogance, and harmful behavior), *Catur Paramita* (four noble attitudes: softness, compassion, happiness, respect), *Tri Parartha* (three ends/objects that cause bliss, love, ownership, *bhakti* (devotion of the Divine)), *Panca Bratha* (five acts of self-control: not killing, not indulging in pre-marital sex, not lying, not arguing or buying-selling, arrogance, not taking others' possession without their consent), *Panca Nyama Brata, Catur Guru* (the four teachers)*, Dasa Yama*, dan *Dasa Nyama Brata* in daily life
4. showing the ability to proper Hindu worship attitudes (*Tri Sandhya)*, and materials needed for worship
5. appling the five types of ritual (*Panca Yadnya*) as daily obligation (*nitya karma*) and occasional or puncturay obligation (*naimitika karma*)
6. understanding that the Vedas are the sacred scripture and revelation of *Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa* (One Supreme Lordship)
7. understanding about Hindu sainthood and the tasks and duties of saints
8. comprehending the religious feasts, and the basics of the Hindu calendar (*wariga*) in order to appoint the proper days at which those feast are to be held
9. understanding good leadership, which shall serve as role model in the respective region
10. comprehending the macro cosmos (*bhuwana agung*) and micro cosmos (*bhuana alit*)
11. knowing religious dances, devotional chants and prayer (*yadnya*) and the history of Hinduism prior to and after Independence

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[350] These three manifestations may refer either to the Tridewi (dewi Uma, Dewi Sri, and Dewi Saraswati) or to the three emanations of One Supreme Lordship as manifested in Siwa or Iswara, Sadasiwa and Paramasiwa.
[351] The second emanation of One Supreme Lordship, Sadashiva sits on a *padmasana* (lotus throne, also symbolized in the Balinese shrine). This *padmasana* is said to be his four *sakti* (energy/power): *wibhusakti* (energy to be everywhere), *prabhusakti* (the power to control), *jnanasakti* (the power to know), and *kriyasakti* (the power to create or do).

The seven general competences to be acquired in the religion class of all state funded *agama* at the junior secondary school level encompass:

1. regularly practicing the teachings of the embraced faith according to the evolving capacity of the adolescent
2. applying the values of honesty and fairness
3. understanding the plurality of religions, culture, races, ethnic groups, and social-economic classes (life-world)
4. communicating and interacting effectively and in a courteous manner thereby reflecting the dignity and value of humans as God's creatures
5. applying a hygienic, healthy, and safe lifestyle, using leisure time according to the requirements of religion
6. using the environment responsibly as the nature which has been created by God
7. respect differences of opinion in the practice of religious teachings

The standard competences to be nurtured in Hindu religious instruction at the junior high level are then:

1. having faith in the omnipotence of *Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa* (One Supreme Lordship) as *Asta Aiswarya*, *Awatara*, *Dewa*, and *Bhattara*
2. understanding the doctrine of *sad ripu*, *sad atatayi*, *sapta timira* as negative aspects of each individual personality which have to be overcome
3. understanding the background and meaning of rituals (*yadnya*)
4. comprehending the Vedas as sacred Hindu scriptures and the sages (*resi*) as their receiver
5. understanding the condition of Hindu sainthood
6. comprehending the religious feasts and their meaning
7. understanding Hindu leadership and governance doctrines
8. comprehending the relations between macro cosmos (*bhuwana agung*) and micro cosmos (*bhuana alit*)
9. knowing the *Dharma Gita*, the history of the advent of Hinduism to Indonesia, and the Hindu kingdoms in the Archipelago

The eight general competences to be acquired in the religion class of all state funded *agama* at the senior high school level encompass:

1. behaving proportional to the rules of the embraced faith in accordance with the evolving capacity of the adolescent
2. respecting the plurality of religions, nations, races, ethnic groups, social-economic classes, and culture in a global dimension
3. taking part in upholding social rules
4. understanding individual and collective rights and obligations in society
5. respecting differences of opinion and being empathic towards other people
6. communicating and interacting effectively and in a courteous manner using various media including information technology, which is based on the dignity and value as God's creatures
7. taking care of purity, hygiene, the body's immune system and health following the requirements of religion
8. using the environment responsibly as the nature which has been created by God

The standard competences to be nurtured in Hindu religious instruction at the senior high level encompass:

1. understanding *atman* (individual soul) as the fountainhead of life, karma (actions that cause cycle of cause and effect and in this rebirth) and purnabhawa (reincarnation law), and the doctrine of *mokhsa* (spiritual release) as superior goal
2. understanding the virtues of *Triguna* (In Indonesian samkhya philosophy, there are three major qualities that serve as the fundamental operating principles of nature(prakriti)) *Dasa Mala* (ten sins), the *tat twam asi* doctrine, *Catur varna*(classification of Hindu society into four groups), *Catur Asrama* (four stages of life), and *Catur Purusharta* (four aims of human existence)
3. comprehending the worship systematic, performance of offerings, rituals (*yadnya*) and marriage (*wiwaha*) according to Hindu law
4. understanding the central themes contained in the Vedas (*sruti* and *smriti*) as source of Hindu law
5. comprehending the structure, reality, and conservation of Hindu sanctuaries' purity
6. understanding the calculation of Hindu holy days
7. comprehending Hindu leadership and governance doctrines according to *niti sastra*
8. understanding the process of creation and disintegration of nature
9. comprehending the values of the *Dharma Gita* culture, sacral Hindu arts and the history of Hinduism in India, and other countries

The Minster of Education Decree 19 in 2007 on the operational standard of basic and secondary schooling places a school under the obligation to phrase an ethical code or a school ethos for its community, which then shall be nurtured in the students. In consequence, in order to raise their respective communities' ethical awareness, schools need to formulate a clear program, which is applied by the principals. It is regulated in the Decree that the first norm of the school ethos shall be to practice the *agama* the student embraces.

6.3.2. The Hindu class

After having outlined the standard competences to be acquired according to Indonesian educational policies, here I summarize the perspectives on the Hindu class held amongst the participants in my study. Since religion permeates every dimension of life, religion or the religion class cannot be separated from other social areas or from the educational sector and it is carried out by families, communities, and schools. Religious education is seen as an enterprise beginning at birth and ending in the funeral pile, in consequence, religious learning takes place throughout the entire life cycle. For the reason that the Hindu class moulds identity aspects as a type of social learning, all participants in my study agreed that Hindu educationshould begin with pre-school age and the religion class should be taught until university. The practical effect is to increase religious knowledge and competence with the hope that the students will be acquainted with the basic principles of Hindu religion and can put those principles to practice in daily life.

At preschool age and in the lower grades, religious education should be entertaining, serve as role-model for proper conduct, tell folk stories, legends and tales, and teach how to chant religious songs (*Dharmagita*) that include religious values. (Suryani Protocol 2006, Sura Interview 2006, Triguna Protocol 2007) The focus is laid on oral religious-folk narratives and religious songs, in which holy men serve as role models for heroism, self-sacrifice and justice (**Mahabharata, Ramayana**, Balinese legends and tales), and their values are then absorbed in the personality of the pupil who puts to practice these values in daily life, without being aware of it.

The concept of four educators (*catur guru)* introduces the parents (*guru rupaka*), the school (*guru pengajian*), the government (*guru wisesa*), and One Supreme Lordship (*guru swadaya*) as primary sources of learning. (Bakker 1993: 135-136; Hinzeler 1993) The path of education in religion can be formal (religion class in school), non-formal (*pasraman*), and informal (family, community). Hindu education should be attained not only in-school but it should also be organized in non-formal express-Sunday schools (*pasraman kilat*) and informally, that is community based, intraditional neighborhood units (*banjars*) and in temples (*pura*). This reflects the Hindu concept of contextual learning and individual spiritual progress throughout life. Hindu education may be carried out in dyads, small groups, classes, large groups, online education, print and broadcasting media. One participant to the questionnaire writes, children which attend the Hindu class in school are more ethical and have a much more clear set boundaries in social interactions, in other words their morals are way higher than children that do not attend the Hindu religion class.

The main function of religion in the Hindu class is seen by the participants to my study in following aspects:

- The religion class shall produce a *suputra* (good child) who knows how to practice Hindu Dharma, can put to practice Hindu values, and is able to lead the community
- The religion class provides knowledge about the Hindu style and way of life
- The religion class may be used as a torch to illuminate the obscure paths
- Compared with nonreligious people, *agama* is more convincing as motivational force to perform beneficial deeds, and as a resistive force to cope with ailments
- The religion class in the ideal case transfers emotional tranquility and liberates people from distrust and protracted fear

The religion class supports parents and the religious community to put to practice the Hindu value theory in regularly performing religious service A fundamental introduction to Hindu Dharma Indonesia is given in the religion class, with the aim to strengthen the students' Hindu identity and Hindu knowledge. The students shall comprehend the sacred scriptures and traditions in accordance with their evolving cognitive, emotional, affective and spiritual capacities. In consequence, the aim of the religion class is to introduce the basic principles of Hinduism as laid down in the *Upadeca* and with this the students can gradually identify with the overarching values promoted by Hindu Dharma Indonesia while simultaneously adhering to and practicing their local cults. In school, the religion class applies teaching methods that fit with the evolving learning capabilities and the development of the child. The national standard of education and the statutory basic competences are the direction and base to develop further the subject content, the learning activities and the competence attainment indicators. In consequence, it is seen as a major achievement that assessment of the competencies acquired in the Hindu class is now unitary for all Hindu ethnicities in the Indonesian archipelago.

Logically, the Hindu class shall mould attitudes based on Hindu Dharma values and spirituality. In addition, the concept of *suputra* (good child or noble descendant) is the central aim of all streams of Hindu education whether within the core family, the community, or at school. In other words, the function of the Hindu class is to guide the students in becoming descendants of noble morals/character, proper conduct, and striking aptitude, who illuminate their families and communities (*suputra sadhu gunawan mamadangi kula wandhu wandhawa*). In this context, it is of importance to recognize the main objective of marriage in Hindu and in Balinese society in order to understand the importance of the suputra conception. There is an important limitation to the concept though, as it is a concept which is common in the cultural Hindu Javanese-Balinese context, but I do not know how far it is valid for other Hindu ethnics. But, as far as I know, ancestor veneration is of central importance in all Indonesian Hindu Dharma communities. As the participants in my study have all been Balinese, the concept of *suputra* has been uniformly referred to, but this concept might be formulated with great variation in other Hindu Dharma ethnicities – however, these variations are absorbed in the local content curriculum.

The main objective of marriage in Hindu Balinese society is to produce moral descendants who understand their individual and collective Hindu Dharma obligations in order to secure the continuation of the family lineage. Oversimplified, as in all social groups who practice ancestor worship and veneration, the descendants have the obligation to help the departed crossing over from our material world otherworld (*neraka-preta*) to the divine sphere (*surga, pitr*). Only a *suputra* may save his (or her) ancestors from sticking in hell, and only a *suputra* may become an august leader in his community. The reverse is the *kuputra*, who, as a single rotten fruit in a basket full with fruits, blights the entire basket. (Donder 2004)

Today, many Hindu experts attest that the community in general, and the parents in particular, have a limited capacity and insufficient ability to properly nurture Hindu Dharma values and competencies in the children. (Suryani Protocaol 2006, Triguna Protocol 2007, observation at workshops) The reasons for this are modernization and inclusion into nation state policieswhich press the aim to understand religion on the Hindu communities which have been traditionally orthoprax instead of orthodox. The politization of religion in Indonesia, however, triggered the orthodoxation or scriptualization (Howell 2003) of Hindu Dharma Indonesia to such an extent that the newly conceptualized religion is compiled in curricula and taught in schools. (Geertz 1973; Howell 1978, 2003; Sura Interview 2006) Many parents understand the rituals they have to perform, but they are unabale to explain the deeper meaning of those rituals. (Personal experience as a researcher doing more than ten years research in Bali) usually they say *mulo keto* (as it has always been), but the nation state presses the need on the religious community and the students alike to legitimize and understand the traditions and doctrines followed.

In this light, the fundamental introduction to Hindu Dharma Indonesia provided by the religion class shall strengthen and adjust the education in Hindu Dharma Indonesia and praxis given in families and community. The function of the religion class is to assist parents in nurturing religion into their offspring, since not all parents are able to explain religion to their children sufficiently. The net effect is that the religion class gradually plants religious competences in the next generations. (Sura Interview 2006) Another value of the religion class is seen in its function as controlling and motivational device for life, a manual for life is provided, which has practical consequences for daily life. The religion class assists the young generation in understanding the content and teachings of religion in a structured and integrated way, thereby pupils learn to critically interpret, explain and transform the values of religion, since they do not obtain holistic guidance in their family and community. (Suryani interview 2006, Sura Interview 2007) The participants in my study outlined three practical effects of the religion class in public schooling:

- The Hindu class in schools is easy to monitor and to supervise by state authorities, because the curriculum sets the national standard of competence to be achieved. Otherwise it would be difficult to control whether the content of teachings outside of schools, especially in the community, is adequate or not adequate.
- A broad difference exists between the conduct of religious and not religious pupils. The attitude, morals, and logical reasoning of pupils well informed of their religion is more comforting.

In sum, as juvenile delinquency is not only criticized by Hindu clerics (Interview Ida Pedanda Telabah 2006, Interview Ida Pedanda Bajing 2006) and Hindu educators (Interview I Gede Sura 2006, Donder 2004) but by all Indonesian education planners (see all development plans), the Hindu class shall not only provide Hindu knowledge, but also a model or manual for proper behavior. In consequence, the Hindu class shall nurture in Hindu creed from early childhood aiming to standardize the students' conduct. During class and in the curricula, instances of good character, morals, and personality are adduced which aim to strengthen students' moral, ethical, and spiritual qualities. In consequence, Hindu education aims to nurture in Hindu competencies, as information on Hindu Dharma, knowledge about Hindu Dharma, Hindu behavior, and practical skills which are used by the participants to classify and control their experiences in daily life. Thereby, Hindu education shall provide the students with a "manual for behavior" (Triguna protocol 2007) helping them to put their Hindu competencies to practice. In brief, Hindu religious education is necessary to balance secular education in adding spiritual knowledge and competence on the rational content of curricula, therefore it serves to support the gradual germination and growth of student's spiritual intelligence, which enables them to cope with their life.

6.3.3. Hindu teachers

According to Minister of Education Decree 16 in 2007, the special competence a Hindu religion teacher must possess is the ability to interpret and analyze the curriculum, resources, structures, concepts, and patterns of scientific thought which have relevance for the Hindu class. With regard to Hindu educators, the participants to my study assessed five main points of concern:

1. low quality of teachers
2. economic welfare of teachers
3. status discrimination of Hindu teachers
4. the problems of appointment outside Bali
5. dearth of Hindu teachers in Bali and Indonesia (see Hindu Directorate General)

In its effort to raise the teachers' quality and economic welfare in 2005, the Indonesian government launched a stunning teachers' certification program in order to certify the 2, 7 million state and private school teachers in service until 2015. The national education standard has set the standard for those mandatory teachers' qualifications, which in turn shall better their economic welfare. The teacher certification program is part of a national educator certification system that aims to improve teachers' and lecturers' professionalism and welfare, and it is one of the most important regulations in the arena of education.

The certification program is promulgated by Law 14 in 2005 on teachers and lecturers, which requires teachers and lecturers to possess professional certificates. At the level of basic education and secondary education, the minimal qualification for pre-school nurses and teachers is graduation from undergraduate studies, in other words, to hold a four-year associate degree (*Diploma-IV*) or a Bachelor degree (*Sarjana1*) from an accredited higher education institution. The required qualification for lecturers at higher education institutions has been raised, it is now mandatory for lecturers to hold a postgraduate degree as a Master Degree or a PhD. Educators employed at Diploma-programs are required to be awarded a four-year associate degree (*Diploma-IV*) or a Bachelor degree (*Sarjana 1*) at minimum. Educators employed at the Bachelor program (*Sarjana 1*) are required to be granted a magister-degree (*Sarjana 2*) at minimum, whereas a doctorate (*Sarjana 3*) is the obligatory requirement for educators employed at the master- and doctorate- programs.

The teacher certification program - and the salaries and grants in turn - are restricted to those teachers who already hold four-year associate degrees (D4), Bachelor, Master or Phd degrees. Educators considered fulfilling the competence standards by their principals and supervisors are entitled to certificates, professional salaries and grants. Since the principal and the supervisor conduct the assessment, this process is not free from personal interests, relation and social networks. Qualified junior teachers are promoted to take part in the teacher certification program that lasts two semesters; senior teachers are required to take part in teacher certification through portfolio assessment. Educators who are not considered to fulfill the competence standard are given time to complete their portfolios by their principals, and/or the opportunity to attend training courses and to take a competence exam. Since most of the teachers have lower educational backgrounds, they have to attain the teacher qualification program, which then requires them to pursue undergraduate studies.

In this context, educators in the religion and morals subject group are explicitly mentioned; they are required to hold the same minimum qualification and certification as all other educators. Though, the Minister of Religion may give additional criteria, which leaves loopholes for practices ranging outside the standards that could threaten the national quality standard of education. With regard to Hindu instructors, the Hindu Directorate General is authorized to issue the final certificate and it provided 600 scholarships for Hindu teachers in 2007 and 1,000 scholarships for Hindu teachers in 2007 to complete undergraduate or postgraduate studies.

In this context, it is interesting to note that the *Dwijendra* University offers a Hindu-based special didactic program for teachers (*Akta Mengajar IV*), and UNHI and IHDN were appointed by the Minister of Education as in-service teacher certification institutions. In addition to the direct certification programs, the Hindu Directorate General started a long-distance certification program, which is not explicitly covered by Law 20 in 2003 on Education. But considering the demography and geographic distribution of the Hindu ethnic groups in Indonesia, the scope of the long-distance program shall answer the special needs of the Hindu community. Therefore UNHI and IHDN offer special didactic programs for the training of Hindu teachers in order to assess the quality and certify the in-service Hindu teachers and lecturers at all levels in all Indonesian provinces. Consequently, all Hindu teachers in Indonesia are certified by either UNHI or IHDN in their statutory function as in-service religion educator certification centers. Either the educators attain the direct education programs at the respective institutions or they attain the far-distance learning courses and open lecturers (*kuliah terbuka*) which are offered by both institutions at special learning centers to those regions, where teachers cannot attain the regular weekend courses in town.

With relevance to the status discrimination and economic welfare of Hindu teachers, the current study assesses a complex picture. As a result of the administrational multi-system, the civil employment status of teachers in general and Hindu teachers in particular is complicated in Indonesia. There are six different categories depending on an educators' appointment and on who pays the salary. The Hindu teachers paid and appointed by the MONE to be employed at public or private schools belong to the first category. Generally, the civil servant number (NIP, *nomor induk pegawai*) of those teachers starts with 13[352]. Those teachers enjoy the securest position, they are assigned a fixed number of courses, they receive a fixed salary, they are entitled to regular raises of salary and subsidies, they can become class teachers and finally their civil rank can rise in hierarchy as they may be promoted as principal or as supervisor of other teachers in the certification programs. The second category of Hindu teachers is paid and appointed by the MORA to be employed at state or private schools. The civil servant number (NIP, *nomor induk pegawai*) of those MORA appointed teachers starts with 15. They enjoy a less favorable position, as they cannot become class teachers, they cannot be promoted as principals, they cannot act as supervisors to other teachers, their salaries are paid by honorarium, and they do not receive subsidies. The third category of teachers refers to those teachers who are permanently appointed and paid by the respective private school foundation. The next two types are non-permanent teachers contracted and paid by either the central or the regional government. The last type is the non-permanently employed teacher, appointed and paid by the public or private school. (Kartika Interview 2007, interviews during workshops)

In addition to quality and welfare problems, Indonesia's geography of widely distributed, mountainous islands causes staffing problems. Apt young teachers who have attended teacher-education institutions in cities are often unwilling to take teaching jobs in remote areas, particularly if the customs and language of the area differ from their own. (Sudijarto/ Thomas 1980: 50) This is particularly true for Hindu teachers and lecturers. Ethnic differences among Indonesian Hindus cause problems for the training and placement of religion teachers in Indonesia. (Own fieldwork 2009-2010 in Bali and Palangkaraya) Teachers from Bali might be uncomfortable or unwelcomed, if assigned to a school outside Bali. Or the Hindu community they are assigned to may not accept the teacher. In addition, in most cases the social environment changes to be majority Muslim and this may impose serious conflicts within the teacher and with his or her environment.

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[352] In Indoensia, every civil servant must have an identifying number.

6.3.4. Hindu higher education and tertiary Curriculum

The number of Hindu institutions of higher education is insignificant in comparison with the Islamic education sector, there are eleven institutions at all of which four institutions are public facilities under the supervision of the MORA

1. State Hindu Dharma Institute (*Institut Hindu Dharma Negeri*) in Denpasar
2. Pedagogical Faculty, Manado State University in North Sulawesi, which operates a Hindu pedagogy undergraduate study program
3. State Hindu Dharma School for Applied Science (*Sekolah Tinggi Agama Hindu Negeri*) Gede Puja in Mataram, Lombok
4. State Hindu Dharma Schools for Applied Science *Tampung Penyang* in Palangka Raya, Central Kalimantan

Whereas the remaining private Hindu institutions are operated jointly by regional private higher education cooperatives (*Kopertis*, *Koperasi Perguruan Tinggi Swasta*) and are under supervision by the MONE and the Hindu Directorate

1. Universitas Hindu Indoensia (UNHI),
2. Universitas *Dwijendra*,
3. Hindu Dharma School for Applied Science in Klaten, Central Java,
4. *Agama* Hindu School for Applied Science *Dharma Nusantara* in Jakarta
5. *Agama* Hindu School for Applied Science in Lampung, Lampung
6. School for Applied Pedagogy and Educational Science in Amlapura, Bali
7. School for Applied Pedagogy and Educational Science in Singaraja, Bali.

In 2008, I was not able to collect comparative data for all Hindu higher education institutions, since the data set was still being compiled by the Hindu Directorate.

The tertiary curriculum is structured into intracurricular and extracurricular activities. Intracurricular activities are structured, programmed, and compulsory:

1. Lectures
2. Group meetings (seminar, group discussion, review discussion, students' engagement is furthered)
3. Supervision of the final work (mini-thesis, thesis, and dissertation), practical or lab work
4. Individual tasks (review, report, observation, test etc.; the students utilizes his or her scientific skills and the docents serves as advisor)
5. Autonomous or autodidact learning

In contrast, extracurricular activities are unstructured, not programmed, and compulsory. These activities can be followed in or outside the campus. To extracurricular activities belong:

(1) Advancement of reasoning/intellectual capacity and science (targets scientific quality, scientific attitude, and broadens scientific insight, introduces academic norms, values, ethics and tradition. In short, it comprises all activities aimed at imparting good scientific practice). These activities include:
(a) academic forum/academic meeting of the students,
(b) competition of students' academic works
(c) training in students' managerial capabilities
(d) organizational activities between campuses
(2) Advancement of students' interests: students' sports, students' art, students' scouts, students' regiment, students' campus magazine, nature conservation, Indonesian Red Cross voluntary corps;
(3) Production of students' welfare (strengthening faith (*beriman*) and following the commands of God (*bertakwa*), subsidizing economically weak but intellectual outstanding students):
(a) students' spirituality
(b) scholarships
(c) students' cooperation (selling food, material, photo copies etc.)
(d) students' boardinghouse
(e) guidance and counseling

The curriculum is divided into the national obligatory core curriculum (*kurrikulum inti*) and the institutional curriculum (*kurrikulum institutional*). The core curriculum is standardized for the whole Archipelago, since it follows the national education standard set by the MONE. It contains the educational aim, the content of academic teaching, and the minimal competencies each student needs to acquire in order to graduate in his or her study program. Guided by the national standard of competencies, link-and-match considerations, and development objectives, tertiary education is operated by each tertiary facility applying the core curriculum according to the aims of the study program outlined in the course syllabus (SAP, *satuan acuan pembelajaran*). The core curriculum of undergraduate studies comprises a *studium generale* in

1. religious education
2. civics,
3. language (Indonesian and English)

The institutional curriculum on the other hand, is compiled entirely by the course lecturers at the respective institute and communicates regionally specific knowledge and skills. Therefore on the tertiary sector "the asymmetric relation pertaining to quality between state and private institutions moves now away from a competitive pattern, in which the private institutes were considered below state institutes, to a pattern of cooperation and partnership as all use the national education standard as reference standard"[353]. Applying UNESCO's four pillars of education, the tertiary curriculum has been grouped into five learning areas or components by the Minister of Education Act 23/U/2000.

1. Personality development subject group (MPK, *mata kuliah pengembangan kepribadian*)
2. Knowledge and skills subject group (MKK, *mata kuliah keilmuan dan ketrampilan*)
3. Professional work subject group (MKB, *mata kuliah berkarya*)
4. Work attitude subject group (MPB, *mata kuliah prilaku berkarya*)
5. Social coexistence subject group (MBB, *mata kuliah berkehidupan bermasyarkat*)

The personality development subject group (MPK, *mata kuliah pengembangan kepribadian*) aims to develop the Indonesian human who has faith in One Supreme Lordship (*beriman*), follows the commands of God (*takwa*), has high morals (*akhlak mulia*), a steady personality, is independent and responsible for society and nation. The contents and courses comprised under the second and the third learning area shall transfer basic knowledge and skills, as analytical and synthetic skills, mastering of modern technologies, management, and communication skills. In detail, the second area of the knowledge and skills subject group (MKK, *mata kuliah keilmuan dan ketrampilan*) enables the student to learn how to learn and to master the basic special knowledge and skills of the study program. The contents and courses comprised in the third learning arena, the professional work subject group (MKB, *mata kuliah berkarya*), aim to produce professional and skilled graduates who have developed occupational/vocational and technical skills and can apply them in practice. Based on the learned special knowledge and skills of the study program, the professional work subject group shall enable the student to learn to do. The forth arena then targets the attitude-building in work and transfer basic skills in leadership, teamwork and cross-cultural work. In consequence, the fourth learning area, the work attitude subject group (MPB, *mata kuliah prilaku berkarya*) provides contents and courses which shall build attitudes and work habits of the graduates corresponding to the achieved knowledge and skills in the study program. Finally, the fifth learning area offers courses that nurture competencies that are related to the labor market, as work ethos, understanding globalization processes and flexibility in applying for work. The social coexistence subject group, (MBB, *mata kuliah berkehidupan bermasyarkat*), enables the student to learn to live together, as the patterns of living together in the specific working environment according to the study program are trained. In the postgraduate programs curriculum courses again are grouped into leaning arenas.

In the context of Hindu education, the Hindu Directorate General is responsible for the facilitation and supervision of the religion class in public and private schooling, in private or public undergraduate studies[354] and in faith-based education. Again, the Hindu Directorate General is responsible for the core curricula of the Hindu-based tertiary institutions, whereas the institutional curriculum is compiled by the institution in question.

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[353] Prof Dr Baharuddin AB, Coordinator of Kopertis Region VIII, October 10, 2007 at the graduation ceremony of UNHI at the Grand Inna Beach Hotel, Sanur.
[354] The *studium generale* comprises courses in religion, civics, and language, therefore the Hindu higher education core curriculum of undergraduate and diploma study programs at public and private tertiary institutions is the responsibility of the Hindu Directorate General.

From 2006 to 2007, the Hindu Directorate General appointed in-service lecturers and docents from all eleven Hindu tertiary institutions to attain four organized three-day conferences in which the syllabi for the tertiary Hindu institutions were less or more enthusiastically compiled (personal observation at three of those conferences). In my analysis, especially for Hindus, this national standard of the religion class and the tertiary curricula for Hindu institutions is revolutionary. But it appears that some of the educators involved are less impressed by the historical weight of their activity; rather they regard it as necessary duty. However, I did observe that non-Balinese Hindu were keen to develop a national standard of education in order to facilitate a syllabus which also comprises the specific particularities of their traditions.

Minister of Education Act 44 in 2006 on the pattern of compiling the Hindu tertiary education curriculum governed that the curriculum is divided into an institutional and a core curriculum of which the latter is compiled based on the graduates' minimal competence standard by the Hindu Director General. Considering that the graduates of all Hindu tertiary institutes shall have an equal minimal graduate's standard, the Hindu Director General's regulation DJ.V/137/SK/2007 dated 31st August 2007 endorsed such a standard core curriculum structure for all (currently eleven private and public) Hindu tertiary institutes under the Directorate's Guidance. The core curriculum is nationally in effect for all undergraduate studies, and the respective institutions had to adjust and reform their curriculum according to the national core curriculum. The curriculum structured the Hindu tertiary education system into three faculties according to their specialization: *Dharma Acharya* (education), *Dharma Duta* (social and cultural) and *Brahma Widya* (theology). To illustrate an example, the national Hindu core *Dharma Acharya* curriculum for the bachelor study program in Hindu pedagogies is represented in table 22:

Nr	Learning arena (subject areas)		Main competence (Core Curriculum)	SKS
1	**MPK**	1	Civics	3
	(personality development subject group)	2	*Pancasila* instruction	3
		3	Basic principles of *Agama* Hindu	3
			Total	**9**
2	**MKK**	1	Classroom management	3
	(knowledge and skills subject group)	2	Educational psychology	4
		3	Education management	2
		4	Teaching strategies (didactics)	4
		5	Educational assessment (examination)	3
		6	Media and Resources	2
		7	Educational statistics	2
		8	Comparing religious studies	2
		9	Education administration and supervision	2
		10	Research methods	2
		11	Curriculum development program	4
			Total	**30**
3	**MKB**	1	Vedas	3
	(professional work subject group)	2	*Darsana* (Hindu-Philosophy)	2
		3	*Acara Agama Hindu* (Ritual)	3
		4	*Bahasa Kawi* (Old Javanase)	2
		5	Sanskrit	2
		6	Hindu governance and leadership	3
		7	Yoga	2
		8	*Tata susila* (value system and ethics)	4
		9	*Ithiasa* (Hindu epic poetry)	2
		10	Hindu sociology	2
		11	*Purana* (religious texts)	2
			Total	**27**
4	**MPB (work attitude subject group)**	1	Teaching practice (one semester)	4
		2	Guidance and counseling	2
		3	Thesis	6
		4	*Dharma Gita* (Chanting and religious songs)	2
			Total	20
5	**MBB (Social coexistence subject group)**	1	Principles of social and cultural science	3
		2	Principles of natural science	3
		3	Work practice (*Praktek kerja lapangan*)	2
		4	Public service (KKN)	2
			Total	**10**
			TOTAL	**90**

6.4. Dwijendra Foundation - Centre

May *Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa* and the ancestors who have attained *Amoring Acintya*[355] always provide the
path and strength to realize the vision and mission of the founders of *Yayasan Dwijendra*
Ida Bagus Gede Wiyana[356]

6.4.1. History

From the 1920s up to the 1950s, Balinese originating from distinct educational and social backgrounds were
engaged in manifold socio-religious reform organizations. (cf Bakker 1993: 39-44) "Their emphasis on
education is striking. They obviously had the idea that in traditional Balinese society there was too little
information about religion." (Bakker 1993: 44) In 1952, some of those reformers decided to establish a
foundation that actively participated in societies' education. According to Government Regulation No 21/1950,
the islands of Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores, West-Timor and Sumba were included into the province *Sunda
Kecil* (Lesser Sunda Islands). The capital was Singaraja in North Bali[357]. Thus, in 1952 the Balinese kingdoms
were still in power (*swapraja*), as the young republic struggled to maintain full legal and political dominance
over the archipelago. In consequence, the reformers, who planned to establish a foundation engaged in Hindu
religion education efforts, appealed to the kings of Bali and Lombok for financial support and a labor force.
During a joint assembly with the founders, the Kings' Council as guardian of Balinese religion, practices, and
rituals assented on supporting the founders' efforts to increase formal education in religion and thus the
religious literacy of their society and agreed upon the establishment of the school. In order to honor the
"founder" of *Agama* Tirtha and progenitor of the *Brahmana-wangsa,* Dang Hyang *Dwijendra*, the foundation
was named *Dwijendra*. The naming shall recollect his spirit of defending, unifying and revitalizing Hinduism in
Bali after Empu Kuturan (Wiyana Interview 2010). "Dang Hyang *Dwijendra* is not only important for the
Brahmanwangsa but for all Balinese. He is enshrined in numerous temples and may be compared to a prophet
(nabi)." (Wiyana Interview 2010)

First they allocated the land on which the school building should be erected. Until today, the land is
government property. (Wiyana Interview 2007) Second, every day the labor force of another Banjar was
provided. But also the parents and the founders helped in the construction process. Third, the regent of
Kesiman and the king of Karangasem donated "contributions"[358] (Yayasan 2003: 30) and timber, while the kings
of Klungkung and Bangli aided with Bamboo. Keys and nails were donated by local shop houses. Thus, the
school was built by the Balinese community. (Wiyana Interview 2010) As the foundation's building has been
erected "with bare hands on the ethics of Hindu lore within an unceasing climate of support in society"
(Yayasan 2003: 31), I suspect that as the document and my interviews exemplify, the founders imagined the
foundation to belong to the "whole of Balinese society" (Wiyana Interview 2010), not only to an exclusive
group, because society supported the construction of the buildings with human labor force, materials, and
land. As even the kings made contributions, I suspect that since its establishment, the foundation is considered
to incorporate a spiritual quality in disseminating Hindu teachings. Rightly, it had the image of a "*sekolah
pemangku*", a lay priest school until recent years. (Wiyana Interview 2010) Informal discussions with the
Balinese community tend to confirm the image as a foundation which is held in high esteem.

The "Hindu nuanced" (Wiyana Interview 2010) *Dwijendra* Foundation and the public Saraswati School were
built adjacently and at the same time. The *Dwijendra* Foundation is considered to be the "embryo" of all Hindu
institutions in Indonesia. All other Hindu institutions used the *Dwijendra* building for their meetings,
assemblies, and for educational activities. As the process of modernization, to wit, institutionalization and
systematization of Hindu Dharma Indonesia had its seeds with its establishment, the *Dwijendra* foundation
should be regarded as the embryo of all Balinese and thus Indonesian Hindu institutions, as the Hindu Council,
Indonesian Hindu University and the State Hindu Dharma Institute. (Wiyana Interview 2010) In addition, many
of the contemporary educated elites that work at the MORA, the local Office of Religious Affairs, UNHI or IHDN,
who are forming the future course of the Hindu class and the Hindu education system, went to school at
Dwijendra. (Wiyana Interview 2010)

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[355] *Amoring Acintya* means moksa, or release from the cycle of rebirth
[356] Chairman of Dwijendra Foundation, Opening address January 2009, (http://sma.dwijendra.com/)
[357] With Law 64/1958 the Lesser Sunda Islands Province was split into three provinces: Bali, West Nusa Tenggara Barat, and East Nusa
Tenggara. According to the Minister of Home Affairs Instruction 52/2/36-136 Year 1960, the municipality of Bali moved from Singaraja to
Denpasar in the South.
[358] The text uses *seseh* here. *Seseh* is a material or monetary contribution to the service of a priest. The foundation was thus understood to
have a priest's spiritual quality as it disseminates Hindu teachings.

Founded on January 28, 1953, the foundation was legally established on July 7^{th,} 1953 in Denpasar. The following founders signed the foundation charter (Yayasan 2003: 29-31, 54, 80):

- Ida Bagus Wayan Gede (Head of the Peoples' school in Denpasar; Brahmin from Sanur, the current chairman Ida Bagus Gede Wiyana is his grandson. He also was a member of the legation which met Sukarno in 1958 to claim the recognition of *Agama* Hindu and later member of the national parliament under Sukarno)
- Putu Serangan (Clerk at the governor's office)
- Ida Bagus Alit (Ida Pedanda Putra Telaga) (Judiciary clerk in Denpasar)
- I Wayan Reta, (Peoples' school teacher in Penatih, Denpasar)
- Anak Agung Gede Agung
- Gede Merta Inggas
- I Wayan Korea
- I Gusti Alit Deli
- Tan Siong
- Tjokorda Rai Pajangan
- Nengah Tjilik
- I Gusti Oka Puger
- Ida Bagus Tapa
- I Gusti Made Tamba
- I Gusti Bagus Sugriwa (Gusti Bagus Sugriwa is credited with giving the several religious practices in Bali the common name *Agama* Hindu Bali instead of *Agama* Hindu Dharma, as the modern educated elite proposed)
- Pak Blongo
- A frequent visitor and likeminded actor was Pandit Shastri. (Pandit Shastri introduced prayer and was a missionary from Arya Damaj in India (Sura Interview 2006)

From 1953-1982, the foundation was managed by the Chairman Ida Bagus Wayan Gede (the grandfather of the incumbent Chairman). Putu Serangan officiated as vice chairman. The office of the first secretary was held by I Wayan Reta. Ida Bagus Alit acted as second secretary. The treasurers were Anak Agung Gede Agung and I Gede Merta Inggas. The corporate charter, article 4, sets out the objectives:

1.) to establish a kindergarten, elementary school, high schools, a vocational school, and a university;
2.) organize long time and short time courses and seminars;
3.) offer speeches and lectures, which are not conflicting with the law, using several media
4.) publish books, brochures, and other printed media
5.) be prepared to cooperate with similar oriented institutions (Yayasan 2005: 5)

The objective of the *Dwijendra* Foundation was increasing and continuing Hindu heritage and knowledge. Given the fact that social change resulted in the need to understand religion, which had prior to the Dutch conquest and intrusion in internal affairs not been conceptualized as a separated category, explanations on Hindu religious, cultural, and literary issues to the broad Hindu community should be provided. Or in other words, a modernized and rationalized knowledge and understanding of *agama*, culture, and literature should be increased in the *Agama* Hindu Bali congregation and/or people interested in it.

On July 17, 1953 the private *Dwijendra* Foundation opened a secondary high school. Since the construction of the buildings was still under work, the first lessons were held at the neighboring Saraswati School, the first public school in Bali. The first teachers at *Dwijendra* were the musician and son of I Gusti Bagus Sugriwa, I Gusti Nyoman Suwastha, who acted as Principal, Pandit Shastri, who also taught at the Saraswati school, Luh Rinang, I Nyoman Regug, and I Nyoman Rota. As there was no curriculum, the curricular content of the *Agama* Hindu Bali class depended on the Hindu teacher (Sura Interview 2006) For example, the first activity conducted at the *Dwijendra* Foundation was a Hindu religion course held by Narendra Dev Pandit Shastri, Arya Samaj missionary from India (Bakker 1993: 57; Sura Interview 2006). For the first time in history, Pandit Shastri introduced and taught a uniform style of prayer at *Dwijendra*, the contemporary *Tri Sandhya* (Sura Interview 2006, Wiyana Interview 2010) Pandit Shastri introduced facing East while praying, and he taught Old Javanese, Balinese and Sanskrit at *Dwijendra*. (Sura Interview 2006)In sum, the basic idea for the establishment of the foundation was that the first efforts taken there aimed to deepen Hindu knowledge and competencies using the streams of formal and non-formal education (Yayasan 2005: 2), as those reformers regarded the Western model of secular education as an important investment in the future of Balinese society. Until today, the foundation aims to improve the educational and cultural opportunities of the Balinese Hindu congregation. In consequence, the *Dwijendra* Foundation as an institution was born out of the Balinese reformers' conceptual and political struggle, which aimed to protect and continue their religious practices.

In consequence, the *Dwijendra* Foundation (henceforth YD, *Yayasan Dwijendra*) played a significant role in the recognition process of Indonesian Hindu Dharma and the implementation of the Hindu class and Hindu education system, because YD was the epicenter of the reformers' rationalization and systematization efforts the 1950s and early 1960s.

Several organizations and individuals concerned with the recognition of *Agama* Hindu Bali assembled regularly there to discuss the course of action to be taken. Thereby they did not only provide ideas, but they also realized and facilitated their ideas. It is therefore worth noticing, that YD is the "mother" or "embryo" of all Hindu nuanced educational institutions. Unsurprisingly, YD was one of the Hindu Councils' founding organizations. During the first five years after the Council's inception, the great annual assemblies were held at YD secondary high school and the foundation is still connected closely with the Council. Further, the idea was born at YD to establish higher educational institutes as *Koperasi Kekarawitan* Bali (SMK 1 *Kekarawitan*, Batu Bulan, Vocational School for Arts), *Agama* Hindu Bali Teacher Training College, (*Pendidikan Guru Atas Agama Hindu Bali,* PGAAHB, now IHDN), and the Institute Hindu Dharma (IHD, now UNHI). The first lessons and courses of those institutions were held in the *Dwijendra* building.

In 1959, the *Agama* Hindu Bali Teacher Training College (*Pendidikan Guru Atas Agama Hindu Bali*, PGAAHB) at the level of a senior high school was launched. The school was the first higher educational unit which provided vocational training for Hindu teachers to be employed at secondary and higher education in Indonesia. The basic structure of the curriculum was compiled by I Gusti Bagus Sugriwa, who acted as first teacher. It was Sugriwa, who insisted on the naming of the religious practices as *Agama* Hindu Bali, thereby opposing the better educated elite, who proposed *Agama* Hindu Dharma. I Gede Sura was one of his first students. Graduates from the *Dwijendra* secondary high school, or even public schools were trained at the PGAAHB. Those graduates were the first appointed Hindu teachers. Similarly, after its establishment in 1963, the first educational activities of the Institute Hindu Dharma (IHD, now UNHI) were held at the YD building before the institute moved to its new campus in Tembau, Denpasar.

The Minister of Education acknowledged the right of the private *Dwijendra* secondary high school to receive governmental funding and subsidies in 1964. In 1965, showing its great popularity in society, the junior high school has been split into two schools (SMP 1 and SMP 2). The foundation was even able to open a junior high school branch in Gianyar on September 1, 1965. In 1968, the *Dwijendra* elementary school was established, which has been split into two schools in 1977. In the same year, 1968, complying with their objective to produce skilled teachers, YD opened a Teacher Training College *(Sekolah Pendidikan Guru, SPG)*. In 1972, the kindergarten was established. In 1978/1979[359], the senior high school (SMA *Dwijendra*) was opened. The Director General of Elementary and Secondary Education Instruction 007/C/Kep/1985, dated January 17th, 1985 transferred an equal status as state schools (*status disamakan*) on the SMA; a predicate only a few private schools held in Bali at that time.

As can be deduced from my data, between 1965 and 1985, the foundation boomed as it was able to open Hindu faith-based schools at all levels of schooling and Teacher Training institutes across Bali and even outside Bali[360]. This boom is, as I suspect, related to national policies, as it is situated between Suharto' take over and his Islamic turn in 1989. In 1982, YD not only opened four new high schools throughout Bali, but it also opened the Technical College of Balinese Traditional Architecture, the precursor of the contemporary University *Dwijendra*. In 1984 the *Dwijendra* University was formed with five faculties.

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[359] The Dwijendra Senior High School was established by the Bali Province' Educational Office Decision 496/UM1.4/77 dated December, 6th 1977 and began to operate in 1978/1979.

[360] Further institutions in Bali under the guidance of Dwijendra Foundation-Centre are: SMP Gianyar (established in 1965); SMP Buala in Kuta (established in 1975) , SMA Kapal in Badung (established in 1982); SMP Negara in Jembrana (established in 1984-1985); SMP Singaraja (established in 1976-1977), SMP Kalianget (established in 1982), SMP Musi (established in 1985), SMP Tajun (established in 1981-1982), SMA Banjar in Buleleng (established in 1985-1986), and SMP Dwijendra in Petiga, Tabanan (established in 1979-1980).
Outside Bali the YD acts as patron of:
Dharma Wiyata foundation, which runs the Hindu teachers' training college *Dharma Wiyata* (PGAH *Dharma Wiyata*) in Blitar, East Java (established in 1978);
Parentas Kaharingan foundation operates the PGAH *Parentas Kaharingan* in Palangkaraya, East Kalimantan (established in 1981-1982) and the *Yayasan Dwijendra* in Mataram, and Lombok. Additional HinduTeacher Training Colleges were established in Negara, Tabanan (PGAH *Darsana*), in Amlapura (PGAH *Saraswati Bajra*), Gianyar, and Bangli (*Widhya Shanti*). (Yayasan, 2005: 6-9; Arsada, 2006: 53)

During the second period from 1982-1993, the executive board was composed of I Wayan Reta, the former secretary, who had been appointed Chairman, and Putu Serangan continued to officiate as vice chairman. I Made Anom held the office of the first secretary and Nengah Tjilik was appointed as treasurer. In the third period from 1993-2004, the board was restructured. I Gede Sura was appointed chairman, and Tjokorda Raka Dharana held the position of the vice chairman. I Ketut Renda acted as general and development secretary, I Nyoman Gunadi served as educational secretary, and Luh Rinang officated as treasurer. The current fourth period executive board was legally established in 2004. It is structured into three boards: The boards of advisors, the supervision board, and the executive board. The position of secretary of the supervision board is held by Ida Ayu Ratna Wesnawati, the chairman's wife and dean of the Faculty of Communication Studies[361]. The Chairman position in the executive board is held by Ida Bagus Wayan Wiyana, grandson of the founder, the vice chairman is Made Sumitra Chandra Jaya, the secretary is I Made Rinting and the treasurer is Luh Rinang.

6.4.2. Profile

After being accepted to study at *Dwijendra*, the students are required to accomplish an orientation period at the school, which is closed with a study-initiation ritual (*pawintentan*) called *Upanayana*. After graduating, the pupil participates in a study-closing ritual (*pawintenan*) called *Samawartana*. Analogous to the guru-kula system, students, who are accepted, are bound to spiritually prepare and purify themselves in a ritual. The aim of those rituals implies that a human should be mentally, spiritually and physically prepared to study, because it is the religious duty of a Hindu to submit oneself and to venerate a guru. In order to achieve the national and institutional educational aims, YD has implemented the KBK in 2004, and the KTSP in 2007. In 2007, YD provides education at following levels:

1. Kindergarten (TK)
2. Elementary School (SD) (accredited A in 2007)
3. Junior High School (SMP) (accredited A in 2006)
4. Senior High School (SMU) (accredited A in 2006)
5. University (UNDWI, Universitas *Dwijendra*):
    1. law faculty (accredited A in 2006);
    2. agriculture faculty, social economy agriculture and agro business study program (accredited B in 2006);
    3. communication studies, public relation study program (accredited B in 2006);
    4. the pedagogy and educational sciences, with the departments of civics and *Pancasila* studies (accredited B in 2006),
    5. national and local language and art education (accredited C in 2006),
       and additional programs: pedagogy and social sciences (Akte Mengajar IV), and coaching and counseling, technical faculty, architecture program (accredited C in 2006)

According to the foundation's self-perception (Yayasan 2003: 31), the faith-based school ethos fulfills the function of the social development, if it

(1) makes the effort to impart courage, autonomy and initiative, sensibility towards the rights and needs of fellow human beings, ability to cooperate for public needs;
(2) attempts to impart a strong motivation into the students to study and understand society's social reality;
(3) attempts to stimulate students to put their religious convictions to practice;
(4) tries to integrate and synchronize non-religious subjects.

Besides general subjects taught at all public schools, the special educational content of the Hindu nuanced education at the *Dwijendra* educational units is in consequence *Agama* Hindu. Following an interdisciplinary approach, *Agama* Hindu is included in all subjects. Without such an interdisciplinary and integrative approach of religious and non-religious contents, it is feared that the Hindu class and Hindu nuanced education, especially in public schools, becomes a mere ornamentation of the curriculum. The enclosure of religious instruction in the curriculum serves mere political means as it satisfies the wishes of "a particular faith group"[362] (Yayasan 2003), but it does not aim to create a generation, which is more eligible than the previous one, to manage societal development and changes in a meaningful way. (Yayasan 2003)

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[361] The brother in law of IB Gede Wiyana studied space technology in the Netherlands.
[362] I suspect reference has been made to the Islamic majority with this phrase.

In consequence, the special feature of education at YD is the Hindu nuance, as expressed in religious, cultural, and literary aspects of *Agama* Hindu Bali included into the curriculum according to regional, national, and international educational policies and the spirit of the age. This Hindu faith-based education shall nurture in *sraddha* (conviction, *berimam*) and *bhakti* (devotion, *taqwa*) in the students. In providing Hindu faith based and Bali culture based education, the foundation combines Hindu Balinese religion, culture, and literature with education in technologies and foreign languages aiming to mould graduates able to participate in global competition. As two factors, namely increasing community's religious literacy and perpetuating the values of the Balinese ancestors, motivated the establishment of the foundation, the contemporary vision of *Dwijendra* is to create balance between intellectual, emotional, and spiritual intelligence in its students in the teaching and learning process. The ideal educational outcome is a graduate, who has high morals, puts to practice values of Balinese culture contained in literature, has required globalized ideas, thoughts, and knowledge, and is able to participate in current development and progress.

To improve the function and role of the school as cultural centre, in extracurricular teachings students are encouraged to develop skills and morals (*budi pekerti*), which are based on the concept of *Solah-Bhawa-Tata* Cara in Bali. According to the incumbent Chairman Wiyana (Interview 2010), the acculturation of Indian, Javanese, and Balinese religions and cultures in Bali led to the basic framework of *Agama* Hindu Bali, expressed in the Vedas, in Mantras (sacred group of words or verses that encourage spiritual transformation), and in *tembang* (sacred songs as *kakawin* and *kidung*). This basic framework requires a Hindu to perform the five rituals (Panca Yadnya) and to follow the five basic creeds (Panca Sraddha). Students at YD are educated profoundly in the basic framework of *Agama* Hindu Bali, which transforms them spiritually. This transformation is then expressed in their spiritual conduct (*solah*). Their spiritual conduct in turn demonstrates their religious attitude or mental preparedness (*Bhawa*), which in turn implies that they know how to behave according to proper Balinese etiquette, social order, and norms (*tata cara*). To demonstrate this fact, the moral education subject (*budhi pekerti*) – a concept introduced by the *Taman Siswa* Movement of KH Dewantara[363] - is allocated two hours a week in the curriculum since the establishment of YD. Contrary to national educational policies, in which *budhi pekerti* has been an optional or a compulsory subject, it has continuously been taught at YD since its establishment in 1953, and always been a basic feature of YD's educational mission.

In this context, YD adopted the secular Western model, but continuously upheld the spirit of the Hindu tradition. Since the establishment and the engagement of YD in the educational sector began, YD tries to synergize the religious and the secular approach. By accomplishing this integration, synchronization, or synergy of religious and secular education, education at YD aims to produce graduates, who have developed a deep seated Hindu conviction, high morals, courage, initiative and scientific, cognitive knowledge and skills, and master the latest technologies with all their strength and weaknesses. (Yayasan 2003: 48) Since religion and culture, especially literature, are part of *Dwijendra*'s corporate identity, Hindu religious content is included in the subject of history, moral education (*budi pekerti*), and in sports. The weight laid on Hindu religion and value based education is maintained in an inclusive and contextual approach throughout all subjects as well as extracurricular activities since the foundation's establishment.

Students and teachers perform twice daily the prayer of *Tri Sandhya* at 7.15 and at 12.30. The intention of the prayer activity is to enable all students to flawlessly lead the *Tri Sandhya* in public. In addition, compulsory extracurricular activities teach students the basic religious-cultural skills as for instance, manufacturing ritual paraphernalia, local martial arts (*Pencak Silat*), literature, drama, handicraft, dances, chanting (*Weda, Mantra, Tembang*), writing *lontar,* ritual knowledge, regular charitable work, island wide pilgrimages, and environmental care around YD's compound.

Those extracurricular activities are provided to improve YD's function and role as Hindu nuanced cultural centre and to enhance Hindu personality development and specialized Hindu nuanced skills in the students. The students help to organize a major ritual (*Bhattara Turun Kabeh*) at the main temple in Besakih, they decorate temples, and help to set out the ritual offerings, sacrifices, temporary buildings and paraphernalia. They participate in the holy water preparation ritual in the annual New Year's animal sacrifice (*Tawur Agung*) at the *puputan* square in Denpasar, and they are active at the main temple in Denpasar (*Pura Jagatnatha*). And they carry the flag of the guardians of the nine directions (*Dewata Nawa Sangha*) during the opening ceremony

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[363] Inspired by Rabindranath Tagore's model of education, which originated in the ashram education model and considered nature and life-world as integrally belonging to education, KH Dewantara had tried to establish his concept of the Taman Siswa school system in the 1950s.

of the annual Art Festival in Denpasar. All this activities shall habituate a Hindu Bali identity, and the ability to perform the acquired skills in society, and thereby becoming respected members and leaders of society.

In sum, YD offers various extracurricular activities, and most of the students are apt in all those skills, which are practiced at regular intra-school, inter-school and regional contests. As YD wins many contests, the efficacy of YD's approach to integrate knowledge and skills in students is proven by their performance. Consequently, YD has been successful in linking the religious or spiritual approach on education with a secular approach – in consequence YD still plays an active part in social development and change. Consequently, YD has not only a long history in fostering religion and education in Bali, but also holds a unique and honorable position in educational circles and wider society. (Wiyana Interview 2010: Yayasan *Dwijendra* 2003: 48) Education at *Dwijendra* is Hindu nuanced or faith-based, but the teaching and learning process is directed likewise to produce human capital able to compete in the global market.

Since 2004, discipline is the top item on the daily agenda by Chairman Wiyana. Every morning at 7.15 sharp, the lessons start with a *Tri Sandhya*, chanted over the school loudspeakers by the chairman IB Gede Wiyana. If he is unavailable, someone is appointed to replace him. At 12.30 the *Tri Sandhya* is chanted again. Teachers and students who are late, have to wait in front of locked school gates, unable to enter the school yard, as the security has strict orders to lock the gates twenty seconds prior to joint prayer and only to unlock the gates after the prayer has ended. The intention is to embarrass latecomers in public. This strategy proves to be really effective, as my son and I were late only three times. Once we met the deeply blushing principal in front of the gate. Likewise, if the chairman summons all staff to the regular meetings, they hasten to be on time, otherwise the doors are locked. As in all schools in Bali, private or public, at religious holidays at full moon, new moon, and Saraswati, the Hindu students wear Balinese ritual dress in school, bringing offerings, incense and young palm leafs to school, needed for collective prayer at the YD temple (*Pura Mahawidya Yayasan Dwijendra Pusat Denpasar*). At every level of schooling, a few mostly female students are tasked to make offerings every morning. Regular health and body hygiene checks are conducted by teachers. Pak Kumis (Master Mustachio) was highly respected, as he regularly picked students from the yard to check on the condition of their nails and hairdo. If the nails were too long, or dirty, the students have find and borrow a cutter to clean and cut their nails, otherwise they were not permitted to attend class. Hairstyleis military short for boys; girls shall wear pigtails or braids.

Interestingly, there are a few Christian, Muslim, and Buddhist students, who attend Hindu religion class, as YD offers no other religious instruction than Hindu instruction. This is in some conflict with the law, as they are required by Act 20/2003 to provide a religion class for all religions. Since parents enrolling their children at *Dwijendra* are aware of the Hindu school ethos, I was told by the Chairman and staff, they accept in advance that their children are educated in Hindu religion. Interestingly, as a school built by society, YD does not apply an elitist approach, but it follows a Hindu based social justice approach, as the monthly schooling fees and the single building contribution fee are the lowest in Denpasar and are used to maintain the building. School uniforms that are cheaper than the average are sold as well.

In 2007, the Chairman Ida Bagus Gede Wiyana, who is also the chair of the Inter-faith Harmony Forum (FKUB) in the Province Bali, successfully applied to the Department of Religion for a renaming of all levels of the school to use the Hindu faith based name for the schools. The renaming completed in 2009. The kindergarten is now called *Pratama Widyalaya*[364]*Dwijendra*, the junior high school *Madya WidyalayaDwijendra*, the senior high school *Utama WidyalayaDwijendra*, and the university has changed to *Maha WidyalayaDwijendra*. This is particularly important, because now YD has two responsible bodies, the MONE and the MORA[365]. In consequence, the routine budget of YD increased considerably because it may apply for funding and teachers from both Ministries. This option is thus in line with the mission and vision of YD as a centre for the protection and advancement of Hindu religion and Balinese culture.

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[364] *Widya* (Sanskrit: knowledge), *Widyalaya* means an institute or school to transfer knowledge
[365] Bali Post, January, 29th 2009, on http://www.parisada.org/, accessed on 12.03.2009

6.4.3. Location and Facilities

The school building and the institutions managed by the YD-Centre are located at Kamboja Street in the centre of Denpasar. Following the rehabilitation of the pavement surface, the Kamboja Street was made a one way street and is named the Education Boulevard. YD is situated at a very strategic location, as the huge market and public transport terminal Kereneng is located just at the opposite side, and public transport is easily facilitated at this location. In the close nearby neighborhood there are several schools and a University. The YD centre area has between 7,000 and 8,000 square meters.

As is common in Indonesia, school hours are either morning or afternoon – thereby the building can be used in shifts by all students. The Aula was built in 1978, and has an area of 20,648 square meters. In 2007, the main building had three floors and three wings centered on a basketball court, one three-floor building, and two one-floor buildings. The kindergarten and the elementary school have their own buildings and schoolyards. In 2008 and 2009 the elementary school building and its schoolyard were extended and renovated. The statue in front of the entrance shows Ganesha and Dewi Saraswati. Entering the front building from the Kamboja Education Boulevard, we find the office of the chairman ("Please take off your shoes!").

The chairman's secretariat is located at the right hand side, and the foundation's administrative unit at the left hand side. The administrative unit of the foundation and its university are located in the front building on an area of 63,612 square meters. The university however, borrows offices and rooms of the high school buildings, which are located in the right and left wing. The primary school and one of the three floor buildings and restrooms have been enlarged and renovated in 2008 and 2009; the entire complex is in a brand new condition, and the laboratories, libraries, and the technical equipment are modern. YD has an air-conditioned computer terminal for students, and next door to the storage room, where 47 original palm-leaf manuscripts are stored, the students run their own managed radio-station. The *Dwijendra* community Radio was officially inaugurated by the Bali Region Broadcasting Commission on November 5th, 2008. The program is broadcasted at the frequency of 107.7 FM. The Chairman explained proudly: "Here at *Dwijendra*, the values of our ancestors, our history, and latest technologies coexist".

6.4.4. Funding

In 2007, YD is financed by the single building fee, by school fees, by central, regional, and local governmental aide and by private donations. After its renaming into *widyalaya* in 2009, YD is entitled to apply for funds and subsidies of MONE and MORA – an advantageous position. The single building contribution fee is used to maintain the building. In 2005 and 2006 the Japanese and the Dutch government subsidized the elementary schools with grants and materials (musical instruments, art). The data reproduced were obtained from the Chairman in 2007, either as photocopy, or copied manually into my field note-book. As between 2007 and 2011 (and for the period of fieldwork), the exchange rate of 12,000 Indonesian Rupiah was 1 €, thus I took this exchange rate as basis for all following tables. The table shows the annual budget of the elementary school in 2006/2007:

Break down of received fees (in Rupiah)			Break down of expenditures (in Rupiah)		
	Source	Amount		Expenditure	Amount
	Balance at start of the year	-			-
1.	Parents/society	-	1.	Operation of teaching and learning process	**10.228.000**
	A) building fee	10.010.000	2.	Materials of teaching and learning process	**5.005.000**
	B) School Committee fees	-	3.	Salaries/ welfare aid	**70.805.000**
	C) other income/ fees	-	4.	Maintenance of Materials	**5.005.000**
2.	Sub district/municipality	-	5.	Extracurricular activities	**10.000.000**
	A) Teacher salaries/ welfare aid	70.805.100	6.	Other expenditures	**26.120.000**
	B) Education Operations Subsidies (DOP)	-	7.	Professional guidance	-
	C) DOB	-	8.	Transferred to the Foundation	**156.480.000**
	D)Grants	120.000			
3.	Province government	-			
4.	Central Government	-			
	A) School operations aide (BOS)	46.228.000			
	B) Grants	-			
5.	Others	-		Balance at the end of the year	**0**
	Total of revenue	**283.549.000 (23-24.000 €)**		**Total of expenditures**	**283.543.000 (23-24.000 €)**

The following table shows the annual budget of the Junior High School in 2006/2007:

Break down of received fees (in Rupiah)			Break down of expenditures (in Rupiah)		
	Source	**Amount**		**Expenditure**	Amount
1	Balance at start of the year	623.000	**1.**	Teacher Salaries/welfare aid	
2	Regional government Sub-district/municipality	-		a. Teacher salaries	**145.000.000**
	a) Teacher salaries/ welfare aid	-		b. State Teacher salaries (private)	**12.900.000**
	b) Staff salaries/ welfare aid	-		c. Teacher paid by honorarium	**190.905.000**
	c) Free lance teachers/ welfare aid	-		d. Free lance teacher	**261.000.000**
3.	Regular school operations subsidies (BOS)	-		e. Welfare Aid	**45.000.000**
4.	School operations subsidies: Books	-	**2.**	Staff Salaries/welfare aid	
5.	Quality management operational aide (BOMM)	-		a. Staff salaries	**119.262.000**
6.	Special aide for students (BKM)	-		b. Staff paid by honorarium salaries	
7.	Education operation subsidies (BOP)	-		c. welfare aide	**29.628.000**
8.	Educational Foundation (private)	-	**3.**	Learning and teaching process	**24.000.000**
	a. Staff salaries	120.268.000	**4.**	Maintenance of infrastructure and materials	
	b. Operational/ Maintenance	5.435.000		a. building	**175.458.000**
	c. Administration	-		b. tools	**41.000.000**
9.	Non-educational private institutions	-		c. furniture	**3.000.000**
10.	Parents/society	-	**5.**	Rehabilitation	
	a) building fee	118.930.000	**6.**	Provision of infrastructure and materials	
	b) School Committee fees	749.309.000		a. Books	**5.000.000**
	c) extracurricular	60.000.000		b. others	**8.000.000**
	d) others	31.309.000	**7.**	Extracurricular activities	**3.400.000**
11.	Production units	-	**8.**	Capacity and service	**2.000.000**
12.	Other sources	-	**9.**	Management/Administration	**20.000.000**
.		-	**10.**	Other expenditures	
		-	**11.**	Balance at the end of the year	316.000
	Total of revenue	**1.085.869.000 (90.500 €)**		**Total of expenditures**	**1.085.869.000 (90.500€)**

The table shows the annual budget of the Senior High School in 2006/2007:

Break down of received fees (in Rupiah)			Break down of expenditures (in Rupiah)		
	Source	Amount		Expenditure	Amount
1	Balance at start of the year	89.468.000	1	Teacher Salaries/welfare aid	
2	Regional government Sub-district/municipality			a. Teacher salaries	**335.655.600**
	a) Teacher salaries/ welfare aid	52.723.200		b. State Teacher salaries (private)	
	b) Staff salaries/ welfare aid			c. Teacher paid by honorarium	**418.200.000**
	c) Free lance teachers/ welfare aid			d. Free lance teacher	
3.	Regular school operations subsidies (BOS)			e. Welfare Aid	**468.516.200**
4.	School operations subsidies: Books		2	Staff Salaries/welfare aid	
5.	Quality management operational aide (BOMM)	50.000.000		a. Staff salaries	**100.426.800**
6.	Special aide for students (BKM)	17.690.000		b. Staff paid by honorarium salaries	**4.587.600**
7.	Education operation subsidies (BOP)			c. welfare aide	**223.890.000**
8.	Educational Foundation (private)		3	Learning and teaching process	**25.000.000**
	a. Staff salaries	120.268.000	4	Maintenance of infrastructure and materials	
	b. Operational/ Maintenance	5.435.000		a. building	**245.150.000**
	c. Administration			b. tools	**39.660.000**
9.	Non-educational private institutions			c. furniture	**47.350.000**
10.	Parents/society		5	Rehabilitation	**545.000.000**
	a) building fee	186.400.000	6	Provision of infrastructure and materials	
	b) School Committee fees	118.500.000		a. Books	**13.920.000**
	c) extracurricular			b. others	**29.927.000**
	d) others (school fee, exam fees)	2.383.200.000	7.	Extracurricular activities	**12.275.000**
11.	Production units		8.	Capacity and service	**67.250.000**
12.	Other sources		9.	Management/Administration	**23.000.000**
			10.	Other expenditures	**33.125.000**
			11.	Balance at the end of the year	480.661.000
	Total of revenues	**3.113.594.200 (260.000 €)**		**Total of expenditures**	**3.113.594.200 (260.000 €)**

The Senior High School received following subsidies from 2005 to 2007:

Nr	Year	Type of Subsidies	Source of subsidies	Amount	Additional aide	Utilization
1	2005	Internal School Quality Subsidy (Bantuan Internal Sekolah, BIS)	Central government	75.000.000	22.228.000	Computer
2	2006	Furniture	Regional government	25.000.000	17.972.000	Tables
3	2006	BIS	Central government	100.000.000	50.000.000	Computer
4	2006	BIS	Regional government	265.000.000	200.000.000	New class rooms
5	2007	Rehabilitation	Central government	50.000.000	-	Office renovation
6	2007	Quality management operational aide (BOMM)	Central government	50.000.000	41.910.000	Excellent class
7	2007	Block grant	Central government	150.000.000	207.547.724	Building, tools. furniture

6.4.5. Organizational structure

Educators, staff, and students

The numbers of staff and educators employed by YD Centre (Yayasan 2003: 60; Yayasan, 2005: 19), and the numbers of graduates and students in 2003 and in 2005 (Yayasan, 2003: 63-64; Yayasan, 2005: 17) are demonstrated in the following tables. As can be deduced from the high attendance rate, both, the Junior High School (*Sekolah Menengah Pertama,* SMP) and the Senior High School (*Sekolah Menengah Atas,* SMP) are very popular. The Elementary School is a little less prominent. Visiting the Junior High School would impart a really good value base in the students, I was told by former students, but at the Senior High School the faith-based approach would not suit all characters. The table shows the number of staff and educators at *Dwijendra* in 2003.

Staff in 2003	Number of individuals
Employed permanently by the Foundation	29
Civil servants	-
Employee paid by honorarium	9
Teachers	
Employed permanently by the Foundation	21
Civil servants	41
Paid by honorarium	58
Docents	-
Employed permanently by the Foundation	4
Civil servants	37
Employee paid by honorarium	60
Students	-
Kindergarten	73
Elementary School	135
Junior High School	467
Senior High School	679
University	500

The table shows the number of students and graduates in 2003 and 2005.

Nr.	School	Number of Graduated students In 2003	class	Number of students in 2002/3	Number in 2004/5 (male/female)
1.	Kindergarten	1.255	A	13	18 (9-9)
			B	23	19 (8-11)
			C	25	22 (7-15)
				Total: 61	Total 59
2	Elementary School	1.644	1	38	32 (20-12)
			2	28	36 (15-21)
			3	32	26 (11-15)
			4	28	31 (16-15)
			5	35	25 (15-9)
			6	37	32 (22-10)
				Total: 198	Total 182
3	Junior High school	17.350	I	252	247 (149-125)
			II	244	243 (124-119)
			III	237	231 (134-97)
				Total: 733	Total 721
4	Senior High school	6.940	I	294	367
			II	307	279
			III	285	299
				Total:886	Total: 945

Kindergarten

The kindergarten is a one level building, has one classroom, three playrooms, equipped with toys and books, one playground, one teacher's lounge, and one restroom on an area of 40,897 square meters. Note, as a *guru* (teacher) is an honorable and respected position in Indonesia, kindergarten care-takers are called teachers in Indonesia. There are 6 teachers, one headmaster and one assistant. The extracurricular activities comprise a traditional music band, Balinese dance, and traditional painting or drawing. Languages taught are Indonesian, Balinese, and English. The children participate in local competitions in traditional painting, Balinese clothing, traditional music, and they take part in cultural performances.

Elementary School (SD Dwijendra)

Next to the kindergarten, the one level elementary school building is located. It is the oldest of the buildings, as it was one of the first buildings erected in 1953, and it was only recently renovated in 2007-2008 (after renovation it has two levels and air-conditioning). In 2007 and 2008, the elementary school has six classrooms, one library, one teacher's lounge, and one principal's office. There are 6 class teachers, 4 specialist teachers (religion, physical education, and English), one principal, and one secretary. The elementary school has one governmental paid Hindu religion instructor appointed by the Department of Education, Ibu Sarwi. From grade one to six at elementary level, three class hours are allocated to Hindu religious instruction, and one hour to character building or moral education (*budhi pekerti)*.

In order to guarantee educators' quality, teachers are encouraged to partake in continued education at courses, trainings, and seminars. The elementary school places weight on the teaching of the Balinese language and script, and the graduate of the elementary level shall be able to read and write Balinese fluently. The students shall also learn to respect and to continue Balinese language and literature in their daily life. In order to meet the educational aim to link secular knowledge with Hindu Bali based religious traditions, the extracurricular activities are chanting (*mekidung, macepat, mewirama*), *tabuh* (gamelan), and *mejejahitan* (offerings). There were no students dropping out or repeating class in 2007/2008. All students were promoted to the junior high school after passing the national exams. The following table shows the religious affiliation of the students at the elementary school in 2006.

Islam	Protestant	Catholic	Buddhist	Confucian	Hindu	Total
12	1	6	2	-	160	181

Junior High School (SMP Dwijendra)

Passing the chairman's office in the main building, turning to the right, the Junior High School is located in the right wing and in one additional one floor building. The Junior High School was renovated in 1998 and 2007 and has an area of 99,220 square meters. It has 14 classrooms, one principal's office, one teacher's lounge, one administration office, one library, one IT lab, one natural science lab, one basic technology lab, and one storeroom. The library is used by the Junior High School and the Senior High School, the Junior High School has 16,868 books, whereas the Senior High School has 8,044 books. The University has 1,812 books. All students except one were promoted to the next level after passing the national exams. I have no dropout data available. The following table shows how many students registered, how many were actually accepted and how many graduated at the junior high school from 2001 to 2008[366].

Year	enrolled			accepted			graduated
	male	female	total	male	female	number	number
2001/2002	149	126	**275**	137	112	**249**	(no data available)
2002/2003	166	107	**273**	142	98	**240**	(no data available)
2003/2004	164	133	**297**	124	125	**249**	227
2004/2005	159	142	**301**	149	125	**274**	241
2005/2006	202	147	**347**	181	130	**311**	228
2006/2007	250	200	**450**	210	164	**374**	232
2007/2008	259	241	**500**	194	188	**382**	(no data available)

The Junior High School's graduates shall be intelligent, excellent, moral, honest, and capable of solving future challenges. The Philosophy of the Junior Secondary High School states that each student would own an excellent potential, in consequence during the learning process, the effort is made to provide qualified educators and impart best Hindu based values. The Vision of the Junior Secondary High School is to produce a qualified, skilled, and moral (*budi pekerti*) student, who has faith in God and follows the commands of God (*beriman dan bertaqwa*) in order to be able to lead a a fine life. The school's mission is to provide teaching and ethical guidance in the process of developing intellectual capabilities, skills, emotional stability, a healthy body to mould moral and honest citizens capable to face future challenges.

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[366] (January 2009, http://www.smp-dwijendra.com/)

The approach of the Junior High School is a combination of Hindu based value education, ritual skills, and modern technologies. Since 2007 the school applies the national KTSP. In addition, intra-curricular and extracurricular contents taught in the framework of the local content curriculum (*curriculum muatan local*) are education and subjects in basic technology, language (Balinese, Japanese, English, Mandarin, German), sports (*Pencak Silat,* Yoga, chess, basket ball, soccer) and traditional art and culture, advanced skills in manufacturing offerings (*Majejahitan*), Balinese dance, *Lontar* (palm-leaf manuscripts) writing, traditional carving and painting skills, chanting, and ceremonial dances, shadow play (*Wayang),* and traditional music (*tabuh/gamelan*). The subsequent table shows the status of teacher qualification at Junior High School.

Function	Certificate															
	Senior high school		Diploma 1		Diploma 2		Diploma 3		BA		Master/MA		Doctorate (m/f)		Total	
	m	f	m	f	m	f	m	f	m	f	m	f	m	f	m	f
Principal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-
Permanently employed	-	-	-	2	-	-	3	-	9	21	1	-	-	-	13	21
Non-permanently employed	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	5	4	1	-	-	-	8	6
Total Teacher	1	-	1	3	-	-	3	1	14	25	3	-	-	-	22	29

The Junior High School employs 4 Hindu religion instructors, of which one is a permanent governmental paid teacher, appointed by the Department of Education, two are permanently employed by the foundation, and one non-permanent employed teacher is paid by honorarium.The Junior High School claims furthermore a shortage of two Hindu instructors in 2007/2008. The Hindu class is allocated three hours, and *budi pekerti* one hour a week from grade seven to nine. The following Table shows the religious affiliation of the students at *Dwijendra* Junior High School in 2006.

Grade	Islam	Protestant	Catholic	Buddhist	Confucian	Hindu	Total
I	9	3	4	-	-	366	**382**
II	8	2	1	-	-	353	**363**
III	12	1	1	-	-	293	**307**
Total	29	5	6	-	-	1.012	**1.052**

Senior High School (SMA Dwijendra)

Turning to the left, the Senior High School is located in the right wing and in one additional building covering an area of 992, 20 square meters. It has 22 classrooms, one principal's office, one teacher's lounge, one administration office, two student lounges, one air-conditioned computer terminal (37 pc), one language lab, one natural science lab, one technical operations unit (UPT), and one room for the student organization (OSIS).

The Senior High School's Vision sets the agenda for playing an active role in protecting and continuing or simply strengthening (*mengajegkan*) Balinese *adat* and culture. Based on education in *Agama* Hindu literature and scientific technological progress, qualified Hindu human capital shall be prepared having the skills necessary to compete in the era of globalization. The targets to be reached are:

a) to be superior in faith and following the commands of God/devotion [*sraddha* and *bhakti*, *keimanan,* and *ketaqwaaan* (imtaq)]
b) to be superior in discipline
c) to increase the outcome of the national exams
d) increase the quality of registration tests
e) be superior in creativity, sports and art
f) to excel in scientific writing

The mission of the Senior High School is to

a) organize a teaching process, which directs the students to an understanding of faith and following the commands of God/devotion
b) orient students to become a *sujana* human being that has morals, individuality and a noble character
c) direct students to become clever, intelligent, skilled, independent, and responsible human beings
d) direct students to master technology and informatics
e) produce a human being that has a firm character, life skills, and ability to compete in the globalized era

The aim of education at *Dwijendra* Senior High School is to produce students, who

- have religious literacy that is to understand not only the given religious and moral teachings, but are also able to apply these teachings in practice either in family, school, or in society
- have moral skills, and being accepted by their social environment
- have cognitive skills, that may be used to solve future societal issues
- are able to use existing technologies (that are not technology illiterate) in order to participate in modern civilization
- are willing to work hard, are tough, able to take proper decisions in varying situations and to have the courage to take responsibility for responsible decisions

Being based on Hindu Bali religion and culture, the Senior High School *Dwijendra* compiles the KTSP curriculum and structures its teaching by adding the local content of moral education (*budhi pekerti)*, manufacturing ritual paraphernalia, preparing offerings, and other types of Balinese cultural art. The extracurricular content offers yoga, preparing offerings *(mejejahitan),* chanting (*kidung*), traditional painting and carving, traditional dance, music (*gamelan*), and vocals, scientific pupil contests and competitions, Japanese, *pencak silat*, athletics, badminton, soccer, volley, basket ball, table tennis, scouts (*pramuka*), Balinese scripture, literature, Olympiads in math, physics, chemistry, biology, accounting, English, and computer skills.

In 2007, 556 students registered at Senior High School. Actually it was planned to accept 320 students, but due to the increased demand, the administration decided to accept 408 applicants. In 2007, only one pupil had to repeat grade II, whereas the dropout rate was considerably low, nine boys dropped out at grade I, and four boys at grade II and only one girl at grade III. Out of 346 participants of the national exams, 344 passed the exam successfully.

The Senior High School employs five Hindu religion instructors, of which Ibu Kartika is a permanent government paid teacher, appointed by the Department of Education, and the remaining four are non-permanently employed and appointed by MORA**.** Senior High School claims a shortage of two Hindu instructors in 2007/2008. Three hours of Hindu religious instruction and one hour of moral education (*budhi pekerti)* are given from grade ten to twelve. The Senior High School teachers I have interviewed, agreed with the paradigm shift in education and value the KBK and the KTSP as very positive, since not only theory is transmitted, but practice is also taught. Thereby the possibility to forget the subject matter is reduced, as the students not only are required to memorize and comprehend theory, but they are educated to truly master the subject matter in ways relevant to their lives, which enable them to apply the acquired skills in practice. In attaining school, the students acquire the national competence standards while experiencing, exploring, and working out the curriculum. Ibu Kartika said by using the KTSP methodology, the Hindu class transforms the pupil spiritually. In this process, they acquire morals and respect towards the *catur guru* (parents, teachers, society and God; cf. Bakker 1993: 135-6). Thus,the KBK and the KTSP revised and revitalized the subject matter of the Hindu class. The following table shows the religious affiliation of the students at *Dwijendra* Senior High School in 2006.

Grade	Islam	Protestant	Catholic	Buddhist	Confucian	Hindu	Total
I	7	1	-	-	-	400	**408**
II	3	1	-	-	-	375	**379**
III	9	1	-	-	-	392	**402**
Total	19	3	-	-	-	1.167	1.189

The following table demonstrates the teacher qualification at the *Dwijendra* Senior High School in 2006.

Function	Certificate															
	Senior high school		Diploma 1		Diploma 2		Diploma 3		BA		Master/MA		Doctorate (m/f)		Total	
	m	f	m	f	m	f	m	f	m	f	m	f	m	f	m	f
Principal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-
Permanently employed	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	9	10	-	-	-	-	12	11
Non-permanently employed	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	21	10	5	-	-	-	34	12
Total Teacher	9	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	30	20	6	-	-	-	47	23
Administration Staff	5	3	1	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	6

The Technical Operations Unit (UPT) offers out-of-school-education, and has three major areas of activity: curriculum, laboratories, and extra-curricular content. The UPT evaluates the local curricular contents, equips the libraries with textbooks, and the laboratories (physics, chemistry, biology, basic technologies, clinic) with materials and media. The extra-curricular activities of the UPT are (1) to offer computers and IT courses from kindergarten to senior high level, (2) courses in English, Japanese, and Balinese, (3) courses in Art and Culture (*Gamelan*, Dance and Music), (4) spiritual bathing rituals, (5) *pasraman*/ Hindu Sunday school for children, (6) Workshops for teachers at all grades, (7) health service (clinic) for students at all grades and the neighborhood, (7) publishing and printing books, modules, tests, and letters.

6.5. Universitas Hindu Indonesia: Survival of the fittest!

The symbol of the Indonesian Hindu University (*Universitas Hindu Indonesia*, henceforth UNHI) shows a sacred lotus flower*(Nelumbo nucifera)*. The roots of the lotus are planted in the soil or river bottom, while the leaves float on top of the water surface or are held above it. The flowers rise several centimeters above the leaves. The lotus symbolizes how the knowledge, technology, art and *agama* teachings that students obtain at UNHI emanate into the dimensions of earth, water and air. In consequence, the symbol is given the name *Dharma Widya Prawerti* (Learning process to achieve Dharma). The University's motto is *Amertham Tu Widya* (Knowledge is the source of life). Since 2006, the catch-cry of UNHI is 'survival o the fittest', the slogan is written below the lotus-symbol of UNHI on all cars used by the University, and if one leaves the campus area, there is a board stating: "Thank You, survival of the fittest!"

Established in 1963, the Hindu Dharma Institute (*Institut Hindu Dharma*, henceforth IHD) – the institutional forerunner of UNHI - targeted the preparation and training of Hindu experts and Hindu reformers. In 1993, the Institute has been restructured into the Indonesian Hindu University (*Universitas Hindu Indonesia*). President Sukarno himself opened the University. The graduates should play an important role in protecting and continuing Hindu Dharma Indonesia, as they were given the mandate to systemize and represent Hindu Dharma Indonesia in society and politics. At IHD (UNHI), a specific Bali-centric and conservative expert group, the "*Brahmana Gang*"[367] is represented, as the institution is closely affiliated to the Hindu Council and the Directorate General of the Guidance of the Hindu Congregation.

As stated earlier, the *Brahmana* Gang refers to the circle of new-*jero* and super-*jero* (brahmins and educated, religiously literate intellectuals), who either centre around or constitute the inner circle of the Hindu Council, the Directorate General of the Guidance of the Hindu Congregation, and UNHI, as their "cadre training unit". However, despite their religious literacy and expertise, they belong to the new *jero* or super *jero*, as they are seen to lack traditional authority in religious issues by some individuals and at certain villages.

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[367] Following a comment of Dr I Gusti Nyoman Aryana in November 2007, I apply this term gratefully as *invivo* code.

UNHI's graduates are appointed as officials to the regional government offices or to national government offices; they are appointed to MORA, and the Ministry of Culture. Following the National Education Act 20/2003 and the extensive educators' certification program, many Hindu teachers complete their bachelor and master studies at UNHI. The academic and professional activities of UNHI have an impact on Balinese as well as Hindu discourse and identity. The ethos is modern-reformist yet Balinese conservative traditional. Incumbent President Triguna focuses on improvement of Hindu human resources paying great attention to the spiritual, emotional, and cognitive potential of individuals and the needs of the labor market.

6.5.1. History

After the Hindu Council's establishment in 1959, the Hindu Council adopted the first national Hindu document called*Campuhan Ubud* Charter in November 1961. In its second article, the document urged the formation of an *Asrama Pangadyayan* (Hindu-based higher education institute). This institute should be the place, where Hindus could study Dharma and a future Hindu cadre could be educated. This cadre then should be slipped into strategic positions in the national and regional government, the clerical center in the national army, and the private sector. In consequence, the call for Hindu-based higher education enunciated in the *Campuan Ubud* Charter represents the historical point of origin of the Hindu Dharma Institute (*Maha Widya Bhawana,* High knowledge of the World) and of Hindu-based higher education in general.

On October 3 1963, the *Institute Hindu Dharma,* the first Hindu institute of higher education on Indonesian soil, was established with two faculties: The faculty of religion and culture, and the faculty of teacher training and biology pedagogy. The biology pedagogy department has been established to preserve and develop traditional medical knowledge (*usada*) and to increase the popularity of *usada* in society. It was, however, only established on paper, because the Hindu Council did not own land to build the institute. Therefore, the first lectures were held at the *Dwijendra* building. Then the Institute was located in the Panjer district. In the 1970s, it was given land and moved to its current location in the Penatih district in East Denpasar.

The Institute's formation document No 77 in 1964 enlists two founders: I Gusti Bagus Oka (governor of Bali from 1958 to 1959) and Ida Bagus Mantra (governor of Bali from 1978 to 1988). Dr Ida Bagus Rai, medical doctor, author, and religion expert, who had studied in Java and the Netherlands, was appointed as first president (*Dharma Adyaksa*) from 1963 to 1968. In 1964, the Directorate General of Higher Education authorized the IHD to carry out final exams equivalent to national exams. Dr Ida Bagus Oka, pulmonary expert, was appointed second president from 1968 to 1976. From 1976 to 1979, the former director of the provincial office for Hindu and Buddhist Affairs of the province Bali in Denpasar, dean of the faculty of Religion and Culture, I Gusti Agung Gede Putra was appointed interim president. From 1985 to 1994 he officiated as Director General in Jakarta.

In 1979, I Gusti Agung Gede Putra has been replaced according to the proposal of the Hindu Council. Commander of the Military Region XVI/Udayana in Denpasar, Lieutenant Colonel Prof Ida Bagus Suanda Wesnawa, acted as fourth president from 1979 to 1993. Under his term, the students had to line up once a week and were mustered on the campus' clay court. When I studied from 1998 to 1999 at UNHI, asenior student showed me his scarred knees. He explained, prior to 1993 less disciplined students had to crawl with bare legs around the court for hours. Yet, after 1998, this military ethos was softened and the courtyard is overgrown with grass and a huge green meadow today, used by students for campus activities, or to sit and chat while accessing Facebook and neighboring children play volley or soccer.

IHD's graduates were employed in the central or local government service, and many of them were employed by the Army Center for Clerics (*Pusat Rohaniwan TNI*). Those Hindu clerics employed at the Army Center were appointed all over Indonesia. In consequence, they were in regular contact with *Parisada*'s regional branches and they certainly played a role in the joining in of ethnic religions into the fold of Indonesian Hindu Dharma. Since there were only a few students, it is safe to assess, however, that the interest to study at IHD was very low throughout the 1970s. The IHD, as *Dwijendra*, had the image of institutions providing education suitable for priests only. In the 1970s and 1980s, the economic standard of the Indonesian population increased and students were interested in modern, progressive study programs, giving them the chance to participate in the service sector. Education in Hindu religion and culture had a backward image. Due to the minimal budgets of the Hindu-based institutions, the quality of education and teachers' was very low.

The few students honestly willing to study Hindu religion, culture or traditional medicine (*usada*) strengthened the perception of IHD in society as a Hindu center, which either provided Hindu information personnel (*penyuluh*) or served as a place, where society could inquire into matters of religion – a function the traditional priesthood never provided. Despite having only a few students and docents, IHD gained considerable popularity in society. It became a respected institute of higher Hindu learning. Despite its marginal position, the esprit of the IHD remained intact. In the 1980s, societal interest to study at IHD increased, and the organizational structure of the IHD changed according to the contemporaneous demands of society. IHD has been restructured into four faculties: 1.) Hindu religion faculty, 2.) Hindu pedagogy faculty and biology department, 3.) Hindu law faculty, and 3.) Hindu literature and philosophy faculty. After its restructuring, the IHD increased its popularity as arbiter of Hindu-based higher education. As my study shows, all Hindu-based institutions now enjoy a favorable position in society and continuously expand their services.

One objective of IHD's establishment was finding solutions and replying to the drastic and rapid changes and challenges faced by the Balinese society. Those solutions should be found by emphasizing the consolidation of Hindu doctrine and knowledge. After almost 30 years of operation, the IHD still constituted the singular Hindu institute of higher education in Indonesia. As result of its minimal budget and poor human resources, IHD graduates were not able to compete with graduates of other tertiary institutions, and they became increasingly unemployed. This resulted in turn in a dramatic decline of enrollment, because IHD did not reply to the rapid and drastic social changes and did not produce graduates able to compete in the labor market during the 1980s and 1990s.

In the context of teacher quality improvement stipulated by Education Law 2/1989, the Teacher Training Colleges and the Hindu Teacher Training Colleges were closed. As the majority of those graduates continued education at IHD, only a few students enrolled at IHD from 1990 to 1993. Not only was the existence of the Hindu class in danger, as there were virtually no institutions to produce qualified Hindu teachers. But the only operational institute of higher Hindu education battled for its existence, as the management of a tertiary institute with only a few enrolled students is highly uneconomical. In consequence, the decrease of students in Hindu religion subjects was feared to cause the closure of the institute in 1993.

In the early 1990s, an idea to restructure the Institute and to expand its educational services into the "secular" sector arose in the Hindu Council, the *Widhya Kerthi* foundation (funded by the Hindu Council, the foundation operates the IHD), and the administration of IHD. The 1983 Broad Guidelines of State Policy and the 1988 Five Year Development Plans required all groups in society - including the Hindu community - to participate in the creation of a holistic Indonesian. Using the developmental target of a holistic citizen as room to maneuver, the Hindu Council and the IHD had submitted an application to the Department of Education to nationalize the institute. But this proposal was not approved.

On the initiative of Prof Dr Ida Bagus Mantra and Prof Dr I Gusti Putu Adnyana (former president of UNUD), members of the executive board of the *Widya Kerthi* education foundation that operated IHD, aimed to increase its status from an institute into a university. According to Indonesian education laws, the minimum formation requirement for a university is the operation of four faculties. In consequence, the IHD was restructured and opened an economics faculty, a civil engineering faculty, a natural science faculty and a Hindu studies faculty. This restructuring targeted to attract students interested in non-Hindu studies, and thereby to broaden the educational scope of the institute.

Minister of Education and Culture Decree No 75/D/O/1993 dated May 19 1993, officially established the Indonesian Hindu University. Prof Dr I Gusti Nala, medical doctor and traditional medicine expert, was appointed first president from 1993 to 2001. The appointed presidents in succession were Prof Dr I Gusti Ngurah Gorda (2001-2003), followed by two interim presidents, and Prof Dr Ida Bagus Gunadha (2004-2006), who was assigned as head of postgraduate studies in 2007. The years between 2001 and 2006 reflect a serious leadership crisis and crisis of orientation at UNHI, which is related to the restructuring of the PHDI. In 2004, UNHI created a new corporate image for itself, thereby trying to overcome the old image that all graduates of UNHI become priests. It represents itself now as up to date ('*gaul*') and/or cool ('*keren*'), and it increasingly broadens its international and national cooperation with universities from outside Bali and abroad, the Indian government, Indian spiritual organizations, and NGOs. Following Prof Dr Ida Bagus Triguna appointment as acting president on January 10 2006, academic and campus life at UNHI underwent a rapid and amazing revival, revitalization and boom.

6.5.2. Widya Kerthi Foundation

Since its establishment, the Hindu Council regards education as key area to achieve individual and communal spiritual and social competences and knowledge. Education is interpreted as vehicle to overcome the marginal position of the Balinese society following its incorporation in the nation-state. In consequence, the establishment of a Hindu tertiary institute has been demanded in the *Campuhan Ubud* Charter in 1961. As all private higher education institutions, IHD (1963-1993) and UNHI (1993-present) are operated by a foundation.

On December 22 1982, the central Hindu Council set up the *Widya Kerthi* Foundation (*Yayasan Pendidikan Widya Kerthi*) to operate IHD. Signatories were Prof I Gusti Ngurah Sindhiya, Prof Dr Ida Bagus Suanda Wesnawa, and I Gusti Putu Raka. Since the central Hindu Council acted as founding entity of the Foundation, the right to appoint or to discharge the founding body, the management board and the supervision agency lies with the Hindu Council. Inconsequence, IHD/UNHI is under the direct patronage of the Hindu Council via its foundation. The vision and mission statement of the foundation are

1. organizing and assisting educational institutions tasked with the education of citizens, especially the Hindu community, with the objective to increase elementary to tertiary education,
2. assisting the efforts of the central Hindu Council to organize education and guidance for the Hindu community by use of education.

The *Widya Kerthi* Foundation has been restructured based on Law 16/2001 on foundations. The management board of the 2003-2007 period consists of 13 members (Chair: I Made Sutama) and three supervisors (I Nengah Dana). In 2003, the annual great assembly (*pesamuhan agung*) of the Hindu Council appointed the management board. In 2004, its executive board was established. The first appointed chairman was I Mangku Pastika, who was appointed in succession: Balinese police chief, Head of the National Drug Institute, and is currently elected governor of Bali since 2008. Pastika is assisted by four functionaries. This restructuring reformed and improved considerably the work of the foundation and the cooperation with the presidium of UNHI, especially since Prof Yudha Triguna was appointed president. Since 2006, educational management and the provision of facilities was continuously improved, due to the concerted action of Pastika and Triguna, who both have vast political and social networks with donors from inside and outside Indonesia. On October 10 2007, Pastika appointed the executive board and the boardof supervisiors on behalf of the Hindu Council for the period 2007-2012. I Nengah Dana, former military officer and currently secretary of the Hindu Council was appointed as chairman of the board of supervisiors, and Prof Dr Wayan Wita former president of UNUD, was appointed chairman.

Funding

As the foundation is responsible for finances, I did not obtain exact data on UNHIs funding. The sources of funding are, however, student's registration fees, tuition and examination fees, subsidies from the Balinese provincial government, subsidies from the Bali Region Development Bank, subsidies from the municipality of Denpasar, subsidies from the Department of Education, and the Department of Religion (teacher certification and qualification) and its regional offices, own revenues and private donors, whose donations are non-binding. These revenues are entirely spent on teaching activities, research, and the community service assignment program. In 2006, UNHI received a 4 billion Indonesian Rupiah scholarship grant from the MONE to release 633 students from education progress fees (DPP, *dana pengembangan pendidikan*) and 625 scholarships for educators attaining the Bachelor program at the Hindu education department from the Hindu Directorate General. Since 2005, the education and training unit for guiding and culture in Bali (*P4BB, Pusat Pendidikan dan Pelatihan Pramuwisata dan Budaya Bali*) is established. The offered courses have to be paid. If the program finds interest in society, it would be a good source for financing UNHI, but society's response is low.The *pasraman* building is hired by the Hindu Council and the local governments, and therefore the *pasraman* is a way to finance UNHI, still it is not used optimally.

6.5.3. Profile

In its vision statement outlined in the strategic plan, UNHI sets itself the task of becoming a university of excellence and a Hindu center on the regional and international level for the interpretation, development, and application of Hindu values. Its first mission statement outlines the target to operate competence based Hindu higher education, which is oriented at the *Tri Dharma* (education, research, and public service) of higher education. The ethos is based on Hindu values, which aim to increase the outcome of education, research and public service.

The second mission statement implements the target of playing an active role in developing and improving the capacity of Hindu human capital that is well-versed in information and technology sciences, with the aim to increase human capital competences and professionalism in support of the improvement of academic and non-academic service quality. The third mission outlines the strategic steps to be taken to introduce a Hindu center, which improves Hindu religion and culture by education, research and public service.

The academic community of UNHI is hoped to realize the vision and mission statements in order to integrate UNHI as a highly regarded general but Hindu-based tertiary institute in Indonesia, ASEAN and the world. Thereby the leading competitive position of UNHI in the era of global competition shall be increased using ritual (*yadnya*), devotion (*bhakti*), and reliability (*satya wacana*) as parameters. In addition, the image of UNHI shall be developed continuously and without knowing despair as a brand of pride among other tertiary institutes. In the academic year 2007-2008, 941 regular and qualification program students registered with UNHI.

6.5.4. Location and facilities: 'Mewah'

The campus of UNHI is located at the Sanggalangit Street, in the district of Tembau, Penatih in Northeast Denpasar. According to Prof Triguna's favorite joke, the campus of UNHI is luxurious (*mewah*). In this context, it might be recalled that Indonesians are "acronym-mad". The adjective *mewah* is an acronym of two words, and the punch line sounds like the campus is <u>mepet sawah</u> or cornered by rice-fields, as indeed vast rice-fields extend next to the campus. The joke directs at the revival potential of UNHI, since prior to 2002 the campus could be described virtually as rural.

Its area comprises 35,000 square meters, with a built-up area of 12,000 square meters. All buildings are designed according to Balinese architecture. In the north, the municipal office for building permits is located, next to it, we find the auditorium, and on the right-hand side a new three-floor building comprising the technology faculty, the renovated and well organized library, and the computer pool. The national telecom company has installed a hot spot at UNHI, yet, regrettably access was only free for one month after installation. In 2010 and 2011, four free hot spots are installed. In the east, the new aesthetic three-floor master program building is located, which was constructed during 2006 and declared open by the governor in February 2007. The fifteen air-conditioned rooms are equipped with beamers for presentations, and the well-managed master study program library is placed here on the first floor. Each room is named after a character of the Hindu epic Mahabharata. In the northeast corner, the bungalow of Mr Gede, the heart-warming custodian is located and by its side, a wide variety of plants grow in the botanic garden primarily to be used for scientific purposes.

Besides the master program building the tennis court is located. Especially the president loves to play tennis, therefore on Friday morning, campus life is vivid. Every Friday at 7a.m. sharp, the educational and administrative staff has to do sports, as do all Indonesians employed in the civil service. In the southeast and the south of the compound is the Mensa, all bachelor study programs and their class rooms, a small branch of the Indonesian Red Cross practicing orthodox and local medicine, the prestigious Language Education Training Center (LETC), the computer lab, the *upakara*-lab and the training center for priests (*pasraman sulinggih*), the student corporation run copy shop and the P4BB building (*Pusat Pendidikan dan Pelatihan Pramuwisata dan Budaya Bali,* education and training unit for guiding and culture in Bali) are located. In all there are around 30 classrooms most of them are now air conditioned.

When I studied at UNHI in 1999, there was no air conditioning; most of the time there was even no lecturer present. I still remember the raining seasons: as all students use a motor bike as transport, we were of course all wet entering class. But Balinese are used to this and we all sat simply dripping in class. Two fellow students, one from Singaraja and the other from Kintamani were housed in the Boarding House of UNHI. Since there was no running water, they showered and washed at the two campus bathrooms. The boarding house is now renovated and is located close the campus. Since 2005, the first Hindu-based kindergarten was established at campus UNHI. Today a huge parking area is also promoted by the UNHI as facility.

In the southwest there is another cantine. Located in the centre of the compound, we find the *Mahawidya Mandira* temple, a *balai* (open meeting hall), the grass court and the newly built four-floor building, where the administrative departments of the S1 study programs and the presidium are situated. This building is still under construction. In 2010, it became fully operational. The renovation and expansion of the campus were financed by the Balinese provincial government, the Hindu Directorate General and private stakeholders.

The campus site's expansionconsumed 3, 3 billion Indonesian rupiah (approx. € 290,000 by the rate at January 1, 2006).The expenses for the postgraduate's studies building were provided by the Hindu Directorate General, the provincial government and private stakeholders. 2, 75 billion Indonesian rupiah (approx. € 240,000 by the rate at January 1, 2006) for the presidium buildingwere provided by the provincial government and private stakeholders[368].

6.5.5. Organizational structure and academic cycle

UNHI provides undergraduate and postgraduate studies. In all, three study programs (*PRODI, program study*) were operated in 2009: the Bachelor study program, the master study program, and the doctoral study program. Bachelor studiesare operated at the economic facultywith the departments of management and accounting that provide a Hindu-based approach on economics; the civil engineering faculty; the natural science faculty withits department of biology and traditional medicine (*usada*) which was restructured by Prof Nala into an *ayur veda* faculty. The objective of the natural sciences faculty is to conduct research and to scientifically cultivate local plants and animals that are used in *usada* (traditional medicine) or *upakara* (ritual offerings and sacrifices). With the broadening of the concept into *ayur veda*, the medical component has gained weight.

As the study is concerned with Hindu instruction, these study programs were not investigated in the present study. The Hindu studies faculty (status accredited A) is structured into three departments: Hindu philosophy, Hindu law, and Hindu pedagogy. The postgraduatestudies at the Hindu Studies faculty offer a master degree in religious and cultural studies and in Hindu pedagogy and evaluation of Hindu pedagogy. The brand new doctoral program offers a structured doctorate either in religious and cultural studies or in Hindu pedagogy. In addition to academic and professional programs, UNHI operates training programs: The *pasraman*are used for orientation and training courses in ritual and religion offered for priests and masters of ceremony (*tukang banten*), or for teachers and civil servants.

6.5.6. Tri Dharma Perguruan Tinggi

UNHI has autonomy in the organization of the learning and teaching process which comprises the admission of students, lecture activities, examination, issue of diplomas and certificates. As common in Indonesia, lecture hours are either held in the morning or in the afternoon from Monday to Saturday. The morning classes start at 8 am and end at 13.00 pm. The regular classes start at 17.00 pm and end at 21.30 pm. The postgraduate studies lectures are held from 16.00 to 20.30 on Thursday and Friday and on Saturday from 9.00 am to 17.00 pm.

The curriculum forms the base of the organization of all study programs. It consists of a core curriculum (60%) and an institutional curriculum (40%). The core curriculum is compiled by the MONE or in our context by the Hindu Director General at MORA. The Bachelor study program (*Sarjana 1, stratum 1*) has a total credit load of 144 SKS allocated in eight semesters, but the study program may be accomplished earlier. In case a student was not able to collect 152 credit points after seven years, he or she has to quit studies.The post-graduate Masters program (S2) has a total credit load of 48 SKS allocated in three semesters and the doctoral program has a total credit load of 64 SKS allocated in six to eight semester. Since 2008, UNHI operates a doctoral study program.

Research at UNHI follows a double-strategy; it shall benefit humanity, reply to demand of societal progress, and increase the quality of education and theory in its environment. Research projects were conducted in the fields of religion and culture (Hindu and Islam), biology, forestry, gender issues, Hindu and Islamic banking, and smaller projects were conducted at UNHI to investigate students' happiness and management issues. In sum, UNHI has conducted several research projects and won national and local tenders.

Concerning the publishing sector, UNHI has published and edited several books and two quarterly journals, the *Majalah Widya Werta* (BA program) and the *Jurnal Dharmasmrithi* (MA program). Academic life at UNHI is vivid and energetic, regularly (bi-weekly) seminars, book reviews and lectures on regional, national and international level are held in the Aula. Academic activity is known as the students' learning cycle which commences from the admission process until they accomplishes studies. The term public service denotes the direct and practical application of methods, skills, and theory acquired in academic activities in small out-of campus projects at the end of the study program that aim to reach society with projects unrelated to formal education.

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[368] Prof Triguna, UNHI's 44 Anniversary speech on October 3rd, 2007; UNHI 2007: Laporan tahunan Rektor, xvi

Service to the community may be carried out in the following modes: educational activities in society (sermons, offerings), community service assignment (voluntary work, assist priests, assist in temples, and assist in ceremonies), regional progress projects (forestry, *usada*, access to water), action research and social research methodology (*KKN, kuliah kerja nyata*). The social research methodology is an intra-curricular activity in the form of an assignment to community-service, education and research which is carried out in an interdisciplinary approach. The social research methodology is a compulsory part of academic activity.

The total credit load of a social research methodology unit has 3 SKS and the social research methodology may be conducted only after having gathered 125 SKS. The social research methodology projects were conducted in Bali and East Java. Community service assignment activities undertaken are distribution of books, voluntary work, religious exegesis (*dharmawacana*), planting trees, greening, fish seeding, blood donation, and a weekly radio broadcasting program and a monthly Bali TV presence. In the operation of the social research methodology program, UNHI cooperates with several governmental and private international and national institutions, the Delhi University, the Goethe University in Frankfurt, UNUD, IHDN, the Constitutional Court in Jakarta, the Denpasar district police, the military base in Denpasar, local branches of the Departments of Education and Religion, banks, hospitals, Bali TV, and the provincial and regional governments.

6.5.7. Academic staff and students

There were 120 professional permanent and non-permanent academic educators lecturing at UNHI: two of them hold a BA degree, 109 a Masters degree and nine hold a professorship in 2007. (UNHI, 2007: xvi) Out of the 89 permanent lecturers, eleven hold a professorship, thirteen lecturers hold a doctorate, 45 educators - of which seven were following a doctoral study program in 2007 - held a Masters degree, and only seven lecturers held a Bachelor degree, of which six attend a Masters study program.

It is planned that all educators shall hold a doctorate in the near future. However, due to the immobility tendency of Balinese, most hold cultural studies doctoral degrees from the national Udayana University in Bali, and this uniformity in academic scope made Prof Triguna literally force Hindu educators to register in non-cultural doctoral study programs outside Bali in order to amplify the academic and professional profile of Hindu institutions. Then, guest lecturers are invited from national universities across the Archipelago, as the UI (Jakarta), UGM (Yogyakarta), UIN Yogyakarta, UNPAD (Badnung), UNUD (Denpasar), UNDIKSA (Denpasar), ISI (Denpasar), IHDN (Denpasar), and Undiknas (Singaraja).

The table shows the development of students at all faculties' from 2000 to 2008.

Year	Department/ under and postgraduate	new	old	total	graduated	Drop out
2000	Hindu study (including pedagogy/Akta VI)	11	57	69	9	
	Economics	8	40	8	9	
	Natural science	2	14	16	-	
	Engineering	-	6	6	4	
	Master	-	-	-	-	
	Total	**21**	**117**	**138**	**22**	
2001	Hindu study	17	59	76	4	
	Economics	4	39	73	8	
	Natural science	11	16	27	-	
	Engineering	-	2	2	-	
	Master	-	-	-	-	
	Total	**62**	**116**	**178**	**12**	
2002	Hindu study	12	72	84	12	
	Economics	17	74	91	-	
	Natural science	105	27	132	1	
	Engineering	-	2	2	2	
	Master	78	-	78	-	
	Total	**212**	**175**	**387**	**15**	
2003	Hindu study	19	72	91	31	
LAW 20/2003	Economics	24	86	110	33	5
	Natural science	19	123	142	11	10
	Engineering	-	-	-	-	-
	Master	53	78	131	-	-
	Total	**115**	**359**	**474**	**75**	**15**
2004	Hindu study	31	60	91	28	
	Economics	59	77	136	12	
	Natural science	40	89	129	4	42
	Engineering	-	-	-	-	
	Master	97	131	228	57	
	Total	**275**	**357**	**632**	**101**	**42**
2005	Hindu study	479	59	538	11	22
Teacher	Economics	35	124	159	24	7
certification	Natural science	9	80	89	25	9
program	Engineering	-	-	-	-	-
	Master	105	53	68	68	18
	Total	**625**	**416**	**128**	**128**	**56**
2006	Hindu study	717	523	1240	24	34
scholarships	Economics	166	128	294	16	13
	Natural science	19	55	74	16	9
	Engineering	-	-	-	-	-
	Master	118	185	303	64	18
	Total	**1020**	**891**	**1911**	**120**	**74**
2007	Hindu study	311	1182	1493	404	
	Economics	131	265	396	53	
	Natural science	16	55	71	24	
	Engineering	18	-	8	-	
	Master	169	216	385	34	
	Total	**645**	**1718**	**2363**	**515**	
2008	Hindu study		1089		305	
	Economics		343		14	
	Natural science		47		1	
	Engineering		16		-	2
	Master		331		36	
	Total		**1826**		**356**	**2**

6.5.8. Profile of the Hindu StudiesFaculty (FIA, Fakultas Ilmu *Agama*)

The Hindu StudiesFaculty operates academic and professional education. Academic education (Sarjana 1) is offered in Hindu philosophy, Hindu pedagogy, and Hindu Law. The Hindu Studies Faculty was accredited with status A by the national accreditation board for tertiary education in the years 2000 and 2007. Professional teacher training provided was the special didactic and qualification program *Akta MengajarIV*. The Hindu studies faculty operates activities on three fields as any Indonesian faculty:

1. Academic sphere: (a) type of education, (b) curriculum, (c) operational system, (d) study load and study length, (e) study load allocation, (f) teaching and learning process, (g) examination, (h) Social research methodology and thesis, (i) graduation exercise and graduation.
2. Administrational and financial sphere: (a) organization and staffing, (b) enrollment/registration, (c) students swap, (d) material and infrastructure, (e) funding, (f) student regulation and other administrative matters.
3. Student organization affairs: (a) students affairs and (b) organizational affairs

In line with the Tri Dharma of Higher Education, the Hindu Studies Faculty pursues and achieves prestige in the academic sphere, in research and in public service based on Hindu doctrines, which will be furthered and applied in everyday life. Thereby a Hindu center shall be set up that is able to function as a center for education, instruction, research, and development of Hindu religion and culture. This centershall produce qualified graduates, who respect *sraddha* and *bhakti* which isbased on dharma.

The outlined task of the Hindu Studies Faculty is to analyze critically the Balinese social system and social order to provide solutions in order to counteract the looming dehumanization process from growing into a chronic condition in Bali. The deepening of *sradha* (faith, *iman*) is carried out to revitalize belief or faith in society. In consequence, the aim of Hindu faith is seen as a basic property in the progress of humanity. As the core convictions of Hindu Dharma Indonesia are the *panca sradha*, the structure and commitment standard of the Hindu Study Faculty root in *sradha*. *Sradha* are understood as universal and transcendent Hindu values, which are contextualized in the way of life of specific human beings or groups.

In contemporary times, *agama* has to be interpreted critically and contextually, that is to say religion has to be directed to elaborate on and concretize those universal and transcendent values into an understanding which is practicable and contextual. Therefore thematic interpretations of religious scriptures are undertaken by the faculty in a contextual approach that reflects pragmatic needs of life. It is assumed that universal truth is contained in scriptures and local wisdom of specific life worlds.

The contextualization has the result that religious teachings are truly applicable in life and encourage the growth of humanitarian values. In essence, this means that a conception of education, especially Hindu-based education has to be constructed while paying attention to the equilibrium of religion, humanities, and science. The 2006 academic guide gives an account of the ideals of the faculty:

- The Hindu Studies Faculty shall become a vehicle for efforts in the retrieval, exposition, and interpretation of Hindu scriptures, whose are still hidden mysteriously by traditional authorities and conflicts between social groups in Bali.
- The Hindu Studies Faculty shall transfer moral values into a more pragmatic life; thereby a peaceful and prosperous life shall be created for society and humanity.
- The Hindu Studies Faculty shall become an information center for Hindu religious and cultural teachings with the result that it can take part in creating the splendor, excellence, and peculiarity of Balinese culture as one item of national culture.
- The Hindu Studies Faculty is hoped to become the source of inspiration for the construction of a structure of Hindu-based social life while humanity progresses into a peaceful, prosperous, fair and democratic world.
- The Hindu Studies Faculty shall become a Hindu visionary and missionary in order to protect the perpetuity of the ideal model of life in line with *catur purusa artha*.

Hindu educators training at UNHI

According to its vision statement, Hindu pedagogy and educators' training program operated at the Hindu Studiesfaculty has the objective to become 1.) popular as a training institution for professional and moral Hindu religion educators which provides one of the best Hindu pedagogy trainings and 2.) a center for the interpretation, guidance, and quality improvement of Hindu religion in the Indonesian republic. The stated missions to realize the vision statement are to:

1. carry out education, research and public service in order to produce professional and moral Hindu educators
2. operate education based on a rational, transparent, innovative procedure
3. operate an efficient and outcome-oriented education process capable of producing skilled graduates in a short time
4. carry out guidance and development for the quality of the operation of Hindu education
5. establish cooperation and partnerships with various institutions active in the guidance and development of the quality of Hindu education.

The target of the Hindu pedagogy and educators training program is to produce 'super' Hindu educators with the following virtues:

1. Faith (*sradha, iman*) and devotion (bhakti, takwa)
2. have a high *Pancasila*istic awareness as citizen and community member in the nation
3. master patterns of thinking, theory, generalizations, process, concepts, and important facts as a base to advance knowledge
4. have a pedagogic mindset, attitude, and skills for developing the process and managing of education at school
5. have personal habits, values, and tendencies supportive to the educator's profession
6. are capable of professionally communicating in society and with colleagues
7. educate competent Hindu educators able to further develop their own competences in line with their professional field and latest technologies and capable of solving issues of pedagogy in their responsibility

The designed profile of graduates of the Hindu pedagogy and educator's training specifies four components: The basic profile, the professional educator profile, the researcher profile and the expert profile. The basic profile of an educator covers four competences: Educators shall orient themselves to Hindu values which are rooted in faith (*iman, sraddha*) and devotion (*takwa, bhakti*), shall put to practice moral values, realize the values of *Pancasila*, act as responsible citizens in line with national norms, and respect the academic ethic code as educated members of the academic community. This basic profile is nurtured in the personality development lectures group (MPK, *mata kuliah pengembangan kepribadian*). The professional Hindu educator profile covers five competences: the graduates develop a deep knowledge in the study field of Hinduism. In order to develop the potential of the students, the teachers learn to understand and develop their students' intellectual, social, emotional, and physical characteristics and background.

Teachers shall have vast knowledge in their discipline and the skill to chose and manage Hindu knowledge in such a way that it can become the subject matter in curriculum and students' life worlds. Teachers shall provide instruction that educates. Education involves the skills to plan and carry out instruction, to assess and grade the instructional process and outcome, and the skill to continue the assessment result to continuously improve instruction. This involves the willingness of the teacher to continuously further his or her professional skills with the result that instruction organized advances of the students' potential. This basic profile is nourished in the professionalism and skills lectures group (MKK, *Mata kuliah Keilmuan dan Ketrampilan*) and in working lecturers (MKB, *Mata Kuliah Berkarya*).

The researcher or expert profile covers four competences: the graduates shall be capable of employing their scientific knowledge as benchmarks to provide solutions to problems by doing research; to utilize their research and academic activities as basis for scientific development, to understand the scientific reality in the epistemological perspective, and their pragmatic function in daily life. This basic profile is achieved in the working attitude lectures group (MPB, *mata kuliah Prilaku Berkarya*) and in the social coexistence lecturers (MKB, *mata kuliah Berkehidupan Bermasyarakat*).

Last, but not least, the experts' profile covers three competences: able to master and apply their Hindu expert knowledge in professional work performance, capable of utilizing their accumulated knowledge as bedrock to continuously develop their Hindu expertise. At any rate, the expert has to demonstrate a professional ethos in professional work performance.

Undergraduate studies: academic and professional

The Hindu StudiesFaculty offers three study programs: Hindu philosophy, Hindu pedagogy, and Hindu Law. The Hindu pedagogy program is structured as follows. One credit point (SKS) comprises 50 minutes of face to face lecture, one to two hours structured academic activities and one to two hours independent academic activities. The bachelor program comprises 95 core curriculum credit points and 58 institutional curriculum credit points. After having gathered 120 credit points, the student may turn in his or her thesis proposal. After collecting 152 credit points, and having submitted thesis, which has been accepted, the student is allowed to take the bachelor certificate. Subsequent table shows the Hindu education curriculum at the Hindu pedagogy faculty in 2006.

Nr	Lecture	SKS	Nr	Lecture	SKS
	Core Curriculum			**Institutional curriculum**	**2**
	Pancasila Education	2	1	Natural science basic	**2**
1	Civics	2	2	*Wariga* (Astrology)	**2**
3	Religious education	3	3	Lay priest or high priest skills	**2**
4	Philosophy basics	2	4	Sacral Art (*Rerahinan*)	**2**
5	Cultural Philosophy	2	5	Traditional Balinese Architecture	**2**
6	Anthropology of Religion	2	6	*Usada*	
7	*Niti Sastra*	2	7	Balinese	
8	Sociology of Religion	2	8	Pedagogy basics	
9	Psychology of Religion	2	9	Development of students	
10	Research Methodology	3	10	Teaching and Learning	
11	English	2	11	Educational media	
12	Philosophy of Religion	2	12	Examination of learning progress	
13	West- Philosophy	2	13	Didactics	
14	Philosophy of Humans	2	14	Development of subject matter	
15	Philosophy of Ethics	2	15	Basic teaching skills	
16	Hindu Philosophy I (*Sradha*)	2	16	Teaching and Learning strategies	
17	Hindu Philosophy II (Upanisad)	3			
18	Hindu Philosophy III (Darsana)	4			
19	Hindu Philosophy IV (*Shiva Siddhanta*)	4		**Practical Lectures**	
20	Weda I	2	1	Yoga	
21	Weda II	4	2	Dharmagita	
22	Hindu religion history	2	3	Offering and sacrifice practice	
23	Hindu ethics I	2	4	Hindu information practice	
24	Hindu ethics II	4	5	Community assignment / Social research methodology (KKN/KKL)	
25	Hindu literature I	2	6	Teaching practice	
26	Hindu literature II	3	7	English	
27	Ritual (*Dewa/ Manusia Yadnya*)	2	8	Computer skills	
28	Ritual (*Buta, Rsi, Pitra Yadnya*)	4			
29	History of South Asian Religion and Culture	2		**Selection Lectures**	
30	History of Indonesian Religion and Culture	3	1	Basic Statistics	
31	Comparative religious studies	2	2	Education supervision	
32	Mini-thesis	6	3	Education management	
33	Old Javanese	4			
34	Sanskrit	4			
35	Philosophy of Science	2			
36	Indonesian	2			
	TOTAL	**95**		**TOTAL**	54

In 2002, as a measure to counter the critical lack of Hindu teachers, the Hindu Studies Faculty opened a special didactic education program (*Akte Mengajar IV*) for bachelor graduates of all disciplines to attain an advanced training required for teaching qualification. National Education Law 20/2003 had stipulated the certification procedures and qualification trainings for educators. Since 2005, the didactic education program is operated and executes the qualification of Hindu instructors in Bali. In two years, 980 students registered with the program. The following table gives a comparison of the subject groups' statutory distribution of teacher education in the bachelor program and the Akta IV.

No	Program	Study load	
		S1	AKTA IV
1	General Subject	10	-
2	General Specialist Subjects	54	-
3	Specialist Subjects	74	40
4	Social research methodology (KKN)	2	-
5	Thesis	6	-
	TOTAL	146 credit points	40 credit points

As the Director General for Guidance of the Hindu-Community is at the same time president of UNHI, the program has the right to organize the qualification of all Indonesian Hindu instructors given by the Hindu Directorate General Decree No. DJ.V/142/SK/2007. In academic means the, didactic education program has demonstrated its competence since the Decree of the Minister of National Education No. 057/O/2007 dated July 13, 2007 appointed UNHI as cooperation partner of IHDN to manage the assessment of the Hindu class educators' certification procedure in all Indonesian provinces. UNHI is further given the permit to carry out long-distance certification programs, which is really outstanding, as there is no non-formal long-distance education path provided by National Education Act 20/2003.

As this fact was identified as major obstacle in the qualification process of Hindu teachers, and the Minister of Religion and the Director General may pass additional legislation, Prof Yudha Triguna followed the example of the Catholic long-distance modules and reintroduced the former concept of the Open University (Kute, *kuliah terbuka*). The issue and quality of long distance programs was debated vividly by teachers and bureaucrats alike, as I conducted the field work. The special didactic program has 40 credit points. After collecting 40 credit points, the student may take the certificate. The length of study is three or six semesters, if the students do not have a collected 40 credit points after two years, they must quit studying and drop out. The following tables show the curriculum of Akta Mengajar IV.

Semester I		
no	Subject	SKS
1	Introduction: Education	3
2	Teaching and Learning resources and media	2
3	Teaching and Learning strategy (didactics)	4
4	Development of students	3
5	Learning and Teaching	4
6	Basic instruction skills	3
	TOTAL	20
Semester II		
no	Subject	SKS
1	Assessment of students performance (examination)	3
2	Educational Research	2
3	Revision teaching	4
4	Curriculum Development	3
5	Education planning	4
6	Teaching practice	3
	TOTAL	20

Postgraduate studies programs

The ambitious vision of the postgraduate studies program is to establish UNHI as a university of excellence. This shall in turn improve the progress of UNHI, society, and the state as the graduates will be able to compete on a national and international scale. The target of the program is to produce graduates, who master and understand theories in the field of religion and culture, can apply those theories in debates on issues concerning religion and culture and can develop new concepts in the field of religion and culture by conducting their own independent, professional, multidisciplinary, and integrative research. As the bachelor program of the Hindu Studies faculty has beenaccredited A in 2000, postgraduate studies were established by the Director General of Tertiary Education, Department of Education Decree 319/D/T/ in 2002 for those, who are committed to deepen religious and cultural knowledge on October 28 2002[369]. Since 2002 thepostgraduate program operates a religious and cultural studies Masters program.

In 2007, the Masters program has been rated B (Decree No. 019/BAN-PT/AK-V/S2/IX/2007). Since 2004, the postgraduate study program of Hindu pedagogy is operated. The Masters study program was designed to implement the basic pattern of development in the Region Bali (*Pola Dasar Pembangunan Daerah Bali*), which is based on the Hindu Bali culture inspired by Hindu religion. In consequence, the Masters program has the aim to produce academic teachers, docents, researchers, analysts in the field of Hindu religion and Hindu culture which acquire (1) sharp and reliable scientific and scholarly analytical skills to investigate religious and cultural issues concentrated on religious and cultural studies, pedagogy of religion, *Usada* research, and Hindu politics and governance; (2) skills in analysis and contextual interpretation of religion and culture; and (3) broad understanding of dynamic process in the arena of education and religion.

The output of the program shall meet the requirements of expert staff mastering the interpretation of Hindu religious and cultural symbols and phenomena. Those graduates shall be qualified to work at all sections of the regional, provincial, and national government. In October 2008, Minister of Religion Decree No 139/2008 restructured the Masters program into three study programs: religious and cultural studies, Hindu pedagogy, and evaluation of Hindu pedagogy. In 2008, as director of the postgraduate program acted Prof Dr Ida Bagus Gunadha, as vice director of academics Prof Dr I Putu Gelgel, as vice director of administration A. A. Ngurah Gde Sadiartha, as head of the Masters study program I Wayan Budi Utama and as head of the doctoral study program A. A. Anom Kumbara. Standard competences to be required are motivation, attitude, skills, capacity, and interpretation. The matriculation fee amounted to 1,5 million Indonesian rupiah in 2008/2009, and the education operation contribution amounted to 15 million Indonesian rupiah. Registration fees, examination, and graduation fees are not included. The curricular structure of the Hindu pedagogy and Hindu pedagogy evaluation magister program is shown in following table:

Hindu pedagogy			Hindu pedagogy assessment	
Group	Lectures	SKS	Lectures	**SKS**
MKK	Philosophy of science	2	Philosophy of science	**2**
	Research methodology	2	Research methodology	**2**
	Hindu philosophy	2	Hindu philosophy	**2**
MPB	Theory of education	4	Education assessment theory	**4**
	Theory of religion	3	Pedagogy and didactics theory	**3**
	Shiva Buddha Tatwa	2	Theory of religin	**3**
	History of Hindu evolution	2	Shiva Buddha Tatwa	**2**
	Social theory	2	History of Hindu evolution	**2**
			Social theory	**2**
MKB	Learning psychology	3	Statistics	**4**
	Hindu ethics	3	Education Psychometrics	**3**
	Hindu management and leadership	2	Hindu management and leadership	**3**
	Basics of Hindu education	2		
	Quantitative and qualitative research methodology	3		
Thesis	Research proposal	0	Research proposal	**0**
	Thesis	8	Thesis	**8**
	TOTAL	**40**	**Total**	**40**

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[369] The permit of the master program has been renewed in the Directorate General of higher education decree No. 2327/D/T/2005 on October 7th, 2005.

In 2007, the doctoral program was established comprising three programs: religious and cultural studies and Hindu pedagogy. The developed standard competences are the same as for the Masters study program. The registration fee is at 350 thousand Rupiah and the education operation contribution amounted to 75 million Indonesian rupiah. The curricular structure of the Hindu pedagogy doctoral program is shown in the following table:

Group	Lectures	Credit points
MKK	Philosophy of science	3
	Research methodology	3
	Philosophy of education	3
MPB	Theory of education	3
	Theory of religion	3
	Quantitative research methodology	3
MKB	Research: Religious psychology	2
- choice	Research: Hindu management and leadership	2
	New trend in the field of education	2
	Research: education need assessment	2
Additional lectures	Social theory	2
Pre-requisite	History of Hindu evolution	2
	Shiva Buddha Tatwa	2
	Critical issues in education	2
Dissertation	Comprehension	4
	Seminar research proposal	4
	Reviewing academic work	
	Closed disputation	16
	Open disputation	4
	TOTAL	64

6.6. State Hindu Dharma Institute Denpasar

Whereas UNHI has been established and operated by the Hindu Council, the State Hindu Dharma Institute (*Institute Hindu Dharma Negeri*, IHDN) is closely connected to the Directorate General of the Guidance of the Hindu Congregation and even its structure reflects the administrative divisions of the Directorate. Since the State Hindu Dharma Institute is a state run institute, the president is responsible to the Minster of Religion. Interestingly, the State Hindu Dharma Institute is not based on a Hindu motto (since the sole base policy of the Sukarno regime has been abolished, organizations, parties and institutions may be based on Hindu or *Pancasila* values, as UNHI or *Dwijendra*) but on the *Pancasila*.This has not been changed during Indonesian democracy.

6.6.1. History

The early history of the IHDN and the history of the *Dwijendra* foundation are closely linked. Established under the patronage of the *Dwijendra* foundation in 1959, the embryo of all State Hindu Teacher Training Institutions and the State Hindu Dharma Institute was the *Agama* Hindu Bali Teacher Training College (*Pendidikan Guru Atas Agama Hindu Bali*, PGAAHB) at the level of a senior high school.

It was the first school in Indonesia to train Hindu religion instructors for higher schooling. I Gusti Bagus Sugriwa, who had proposed the term *Agama* Hindu Bali in 1958, compiled the basic structure of the curriculum and acted concurrently as instructor at the college. The students of the first-generation came from the *Dwijendra* junior high school or elementary schools and were trained at the PGAAHB. In 1968, the government nationalized the PGAAHB and renamed it as the State Hindu Teacher Training College (PGAHN, *Pendidikan Guru Agama Hindu Negeri*), and authorized the college to perform national exams and to issue state certificates. The students were trained in Hindu religion for three years; the curricular contents also comprised psychological, didactical, methodical, and pedagogical aspects. The school then moved to its current location in Ratna Street in East Denpasar.

In Indonesia and Bali, the demand for qualified guidance of Hindu cadres became more pressing during the 1990s, as the Suharto government increasingly included Islam into their political agenda. In the period between 1990 and 1999 the equal status of Hinduism sometimes became threatened.Education Law No 2/1989 provision required all in-service teachers at elementary schools to hold a Diploma II qualification and all in-service teachers at higher schooling to hold a Diploma III qualification. As result in 1990, the State Hindu Teacher Training College (PGAHN) was closed, whereas all State Islamic Teacher Training Colleges (PGAI), including the one in Negara, Bali were restructured into State *MadrasahAliyah* at the level of undergraduate studies. Although the restructuring of the State Hindu Teacher Training College (PGAHN) into a State Hindu Academy at the level of undergraduate studies would have been possible, this has not been done. Only Islamic institutions were upgraded but not the Hindu based education institutions. (Arsada 2006: 53) This development should be seen in connection with Suharto's Islamic turn in 1989, and the strengthened role of political Islam in national policies and the MORA and MONE.

The Hindu Directorate redeployed the PGAHN staff and the educators in the regional office of the MORA in Denpasar. However, "by courtesy of the Director General, Ketut Pasek, the governor of Bali Prof Dr Ida Bagus Oka, regional and national executives and the prayers of the entire Hindu community", (IHDN 2007/2008: 2) the state opened the State *Agama* Hindu Educator Training Academy (APGAHN; *Akademi Pendidikan Guru Agama Hindu Negeri*) in 1993. Its faculty of Hindu pedagogy provided Diploma II and Diploma III study programs, as required by Educational Act 2/1989. I Gede Sura was appointed rector and the facilities and materials of the disbanded State Hindu Teacher Training College (PGAHN, *Pendidikan Guru Agama Hindu Negeri*) in Denpasar were used to provide the resources and materials needed, as funding was problematic. Furthermore, Gede Sura was busy redeploying the former staff and educators from the State Hindu Teacher Training College in Denpasar and Singaraja, which were employed at the regional office.

On December 9 1994, I Nyoman Warjana was appointed president. During his term, organization and teaching became clearer and more structured. He recruited permanently employed docents in order to improve the functioning of the *Tri Dharma Perguruan Tinggi*. I Gusti Made Ngurah was appointed third president in June 1996. He tried to improve the quality of the teaching and learning process by political lobbying. He proposed to raise the status of State *Agama* Hindu Educator Training Academy (APGAHN) into a School of Applied Science. In addition, the teaching process at the State *Agama* Hindu Educator Training Academy has been improved concerning staff, educators, resources and materials. In consequence, the State *Agama* Hindu Educator Training Academy is not the immediate successor, but the heir of the embryo of the *Agama* Hindu Bali Teacher Training College (*Pendidikan Guru Atas Agama Hindu Bali*, PGAAHB) under the patronage of the *Dwijendra* foundation.

Then during the era of reform, "by courtesy of the former governor of Bali and Minister of Family Planning and Population, Prof Dr Ida Bagus Oka, the Hindu Director General I Wayan Gunawan, the governor of Bali I Dewa Beratha, regional and national executives and Hindu non-governmental organizations, and the prayers of the entire Hindu community" (IHDN 2007/2008: 3), the status of theState *Agama* Hindu Educator Training Academy (APGAHN) was raised by Presidential Degree 20/1999. It was renamed into State *Agama* Hindu School For Applied Sciences (STAHN, *Sekolah Tinggi Agama Hindu Negeri*). The reform government had endorsed the decree, which was signed by president Habibie and the Minister of Religion A. Malik Fajar on April 10th, 1999.

According to the decree, the STAHN has been authorized to organize undergraduate study programs (DII, DIII, DIV, S1) at four faculties: 1.) Hindu pedagogy faculty, 2.) Hindu information faculty, 3.) Hindu law faculty, and 4.) Hindu philosophy faculty. The school was set up officially by Minister of Religion Prof Malik Fajar, while Wayan Suarjaya was appointed the first rector, though six month after he was appointed Hindu Director General and moved to Jakarta. Suarjaya's policies concentrated on motivating the educators to continue their qualification in postgraduate studies in Bali, outside Bali, and in India. Thereby the continuous improvement of Hindu training centers' quality should be guaranteed. Note, the State *Agama* Hindu School For Applied Sciences (STAHN, *Sekolah Tinggi Agama Hindu Negeri*) was the singular state Hindu institute of higher education in Indonesia at that time. With regard to the quality of education, he urged that the operation of the *Tri Dharma* were to be bettered by extracurricular courses in *upakara* (ritual materials), *dharma gita* (chanting), *tabuh* (gamelan), *tari* (dance), foreign languages and Yoga. Suarjaya made the IHDN popular in Bali and introduced it to the regional government and other tertiary institutions in order to obtain feedback how to better the condition of the school.

The second president in succession was Dr. I Made Titib who was appointed on June 26th, 2000. Prof Titib, who has studied in India, has been the only appointed professor of the institute in 2008 and was reappointed as president in 2009. He continued his predecessor's polices in urging the academic staff to continue their studies, and the cooperation with other tertiary institutions as the Udayana University, the Gadjah Mada University, and the Institute for Pedagogy and Education in Singaraja. Prof Titib also pioneered the cooperation with the government of the regency Bangli, and the twin campus of the STAHN was erected on an area of 75 thousand square meters at Kubu, Bangli.

The first Hindu-based postgraduate study program concentrated on Hindu theology (*Brahma Widya*) has been established by the Hindu and Buddha Director Instruction No. H/20/tahun/2001 dated May 1 2001. Following Prof Titib's appointment as Director of the subdivision of Hindu Affairs at the MORA in 2002, I Gede Rudia Adiputra, who previously served as official at the Department of Religion in Jakarta, was appointed president on March 8 2002. Adiputra continued the strategic policies of his predecessors and during his term STAHN has been accredited as B in August 2003. After the rapid renovation efforts in 2002, the new and renovated buildings were inaugurated in August 2003 and a big animal sacrifice wasperformed as a sign that the renovation process had been completed.

As State *Agama* Hindu School For Applied Sciences (STAHN, *Sekolah Tinggi Agama Hindu Negeri*) was accredited as B in 2002, the school was officially given the permit to provide Masters postgraduate study programs in *Agama* Hindu or *Agama* Hindu Pedagogy by Minister of Religion Instruction No. 494 in 2003. The continuous efforts to improve quality of the STAHN were successful.

Presidential Regulation 1/ 2004, dated November 8, raised the status of the STAHN into an institute. It was renamed into State Hindu Dharma Institute (IHDN, *Institute Hindu Dharma Negeri*). The president of the institute is appointed by and responsible to the Minster of Religion. In consequence, the director has full autonomy to manage the institute under the guidance of the Hindu Directorate General and according to legislation in effect. In consequence, the IHDN is funded by the Department of Religion. On March 23 2005, the Minister of Religion M Maftuh Basyumi officially opened the Institute. Consequential legislation was Minster of Religion Regulation No 6 in 2005 on the organizational and administrational structure of the IHDN and Minster of Religion Regulation 4/ 2005 on IHDN's statutes. On recommendation of the senate and personal support, I Gede Rudia Adiputra was reappointed as president on July 7th, 2005. IHDN operates 3 faculties: *Dharma Acarya* faculty (pedagogy), *Dharma Duta* faculty (social and cultural studies), and *Brahma Widya* faculty (philosophy). The president of IHDN endorsed the study guide for 2007/2008 on June 18th 2007. In 2009, I Made Titib has been reappointed President.

6.6.2. Profile

In its vision statement outlined in the 2005 statutes, the IHDN shall be empowered in such a way that it produces Hindu human resources who are versed firmly in *Agama* Hindu values. Its first mission statement outlines the task to realize IHDN as an institute of excellence which takes responsibility in the consolidation process of *agama*Hindu, the development of science, technology, art and culture based on the philosophy of *Tri Hita Karana*. Note the congruent vision statement of the IHDN and the province of Bali. Another endeavor aims to develop IHDN into an institute of higher education, which is competitive, adaptive, and responsive towards the changing spirit of the ages. The institute's last mission aims to manifest IHDN as a reliable institute of higher education in the development process of qualified, professional, independent, democratic, responsible, and firm human resources, which apply Hindu values in society and nation. The outline's objective sets out to prepare the students to become valuable members of society, have academic, professional or vocational skills, can work out, create and apply technologies, *sraddha* and *bhakti*. In short, the objective of IHDN is to consolidate and apply Hindu teachings and values in society and the nation in order to raise society's standard of life and to enrich the national culture

6.6.3. Location and facilities

The IHDN campus is located in the Ratna Street in Denpasar. The regional office of the *Parisada* is located just a few meters up the street. On the campus area, there is a four floor presidium, were the deaneries, the presidium and the administration are located. Cars are allowed to park in front of the presidium and motor bikes have to park in the dense packed parking area behind the presidium. Behind the presidium, two four-floor buildings are located, and one Mensa. Since 2005, the twin campus in Bangli (Kubu district) was upgraded, and parts of the administration in Denpasar were out housed to Bangli in 2007 and 2008. Facilities at the campus in Denpasar are the presidium, the auditorium, the ritual lab, resources for extracurricular activities, the language lab and the boardinghouse. The campuses in Bangli and Singaraja have their own boardinghouses and resources for extracurricular activities. In 2010, two additional campuse swere opened by the Directorate General for the Guidance of the Hindu congregation. These two new campuses are located in the parallel Kenyeri street

6.6.4. Organizational structure and academic cycle

The IHDN provides academic and professional education at three faculties in bachelor undergraduate studies and postgraduate studies, as the DIII, DIII and DIV study programs have been closed in 2007. The *Dharma Acharya* faculty is concentrated on pedagogy, education and teacher training. The *Dharma Acharya* faculty provides two academic and one professional study programs: the Hindu pedagogy department provides an academic bachelor study program in Hindu pedagogy, the Language and Art Department offers the academic bachelor study program in Balinese regional language, and the professional *Akta* VI program provides educators' qualification courses.

The *Dharma Duta* faculty provides Hindu information management on the social and cultural sector, and professional and academic education at two departments. The bachelor study program in *agama* information and the DII study program for professional tour guides are offered by the *agama* information department, whereas the department of Hindu law provides the bachelor Hindu law study program. In 2007, Prof Titib acted as the dean of the *Brahma Widya* faculty, which specializes in Hindu theology and Hindu religion. The faculty is structured into two departments, of which the department of Eastern philosophy provides a bachelor study program in Hindu philosophy. The department of Hindu theology offers the singular Hindu theology bachelor study program in Indonesia.

The president of the postgraduate study program is Dr I Ketut Widnya, who obtained his PhD in India and is a highly professional academic with a controversial position in Bali, since he is allegedly too fond of Indian Hindu influences. In 2009, he was appointed as President of STAHN Gede Pudja in Mataram, Lombok. The program offers two Masters study programs, in Hindu theology and in Hindu pedagogy. The capacity building of the students in extracurricular activities is organized by the students' activity unit, and comprises activities preparing the student to become a Hindu scholar and professional employee. The activities aim to deepen the practice and knowledge of *agama* Hindu, to sharpen analytical skills, and to enrich the Hindu perceptions of the students by applying the Council's and the Directorate's *sad dharma* methodology of teaching: *dharma tula* (discussion), *dharma wacana* (lecture, speech), *dharma yatra* (pilgrimage), *dharma gita* (*kidung*, chanting), *dharma sadhana* (spiritual practice, yoga), *dharma santhi* (religious reception).Further activities include competitions in academic writing and innovative and productive works, sports, student organization, a student corporation, student regiment, dancing and gamelan (*tabuh*).

The guidance of students in extracurricular activities is directed at the creation of a national progress manager elite (*kader pelaksana pembangunan nasional*) in the arena of *agama* Hindu and to create a people struggle elite (*kader perjuangan bangsa*), graduates of brave Indonesian personality. Compulsory extracurricular activities at the bachelor programs comprise *dharmagita* (chanting)*, upakara* (ritual materials)*, dharma wacana* (lecture speech) and *yoga asana* (meditation, yoga).

6.6.5. Academic staff and students

I could not obtain dataon the current state of educators' status and number. But, I obtained data on student enrollment at the *Dharma Acharya* faculty in the second semester in 2006/2007. The following table shows the number of students enrolled at the *Dharma Acarya* faculty in 2006/2007.

Study program/ semester	II			IV			VI			VIII			X			XII			XIV			Total
	M	F	T.	M	F	T.	M	F	T.	M	F	T.	M	F	T.	L	P	T.	M	F	T.	
Hindu pedagogy																						
S1	172	226	398	91	87	178	206	182	388	100	126	226	12	15	27	15	5	20	9	3	12	**1.249**
DII	-	-	-	41	70	111	-	-														**111**
DIII	-	-	-	16	35	51	14	29	43													**94**
Total	**172**	**226**	**398**	**148**	**192**	**340**	**220**	**211**	**431**	**100**	**126**	**226**	**12**	**15**	**27**	**15**	**5**	**20**	**9**	**3**	**12**	**1.454**
Language and art																						
S1	47	74	121	14	15	29	18	24	42	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	0	**192**
DII	-	-	-	19	27	46	-	-	-	-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-		**46**
DIII	-	-	-	7	7	14	-	-	-	-	-		-	-		-	-		-	-		**14**
	47	74	121	40	49	89	18	24	42													
	219	**300**	**519**	**188**	**241**	**429**	**238**	**235**	**473**	**100**	**126**	**226**	**12**	**15**	**27**	**15**	**5**	**20**	**9**	**3**	**13**	**1.706**

Since the IHDN is authorized to organize long-distance bachelor programs for in-service, it maintains small learning centers (*pondok belajar*) throughout Bali in Pupuan, Banjar, Busung Biu, Kintamani, Gianyar, Negara,and Tabanan. The students attend class four hours a week and the remaining credit points are collected by autonomous academic work, which is assigned by the docents coming from Denpasar or Singaraja.

The following table shows the number of Hindu pedagogy students according to study programs.

HRE	SMT Genap 2007/2008							TOTAL
	II	**IV**	**VI**	**VIII**	**X**	**XII**	**XIV**	
S1	398	178	388	226	27	20	12	1.249
DII		111						111
DIII	-2	51	43					94
	SMT Ganjil 2008							**1.454**
	I	**III**	**V**	**VII**	**IX**	**XI**	**XIII**	**XV**	
S1	208	396	**677**	454	137	24	15	8	1.919
DIII	-	-	-	-	44				44
									1. 953

The table demonstrates the students' enrollment in Hindu pedagogy following the abolition of the Diploma II and III study programs. Students of the diploma II and diploma III program either graduated or registered with the bachelor program or dropped out. The drastic rise in student numbers is caused by the in-service teachers registered at the respective level of their graduation, in other words teachers holding a diploma II continue their studies in the third semester. The following table shows the number of students enrolled at the theological faculty (*Brahma Widya*) from 2002 to 2008 for comparison

Year	Total student enrollment	Capacity	Accepted students	New students	Amount of graduates
02/03	50	20	14	10	-
03/04	60	20	15	13	7
04/05	65	20	15	11	6
05/06	75	40	25	22	14
06/07	60	40	20	16	6
07/08	125	80	70	62	11

The master program is operated in cooperation with the STAHN Gede Puja in Mataram, the administration of the study program is located at the campus in Denpasar, where the examination of the students' performance is carried out also. The following table shows the students registered with the Hindu pedagogy Masters program.

Generation	Year	Amount of enrollments	Accepted students	male	female
I	2004/2005	36	34	31	3
II	2005/2006	74	57	38	19
III	2006/2007	99	67	48	19

6.6.6. Profile of the Dharma Acharya faculty

The *Dharma Acharya* faculty is specialized in the Hindu educators' sector and provides two academic and one professional study program. The Language and Art Department offers the academic bachelor study program in Balinese regional language, the Hindu pedagogy department providesa bachelor study program for Hindu teachers, and teacher qualification courses are offered in the professional Akta VI program. The dean of the faculty is Made Girinatha. The objective of the bachelor program is to prepare professional Hindu educators for elementary and higher schooling. The function of the faculty is to organize academic activities in the fields of education, research and public service. Its duties are to develop *agama* Hindu by carrying out instruction, research, and other academic duties, to prepare educators in programmed and structured lecturers, theory, practice, and field experience, and to report on administration and the teaching and learning process.

According to the Act on Higher Education, the curricular structure consists of 5 learning areas, the distribution of the learning areas in the application of the curriculum is shown in following table:

	Learning area / curricular component	Legislation	Application at IHDN
1	MPK (personality development subject group)	8-10%	10,81
2	MKK (knowledge and skills subject group)	12-20%	18,91
3	MKB (professional work subject group)	40%	43,24
4	MPB (work attitude subject group)	20%	21,62
5	MBB (Social coexistence subject group)	0-10%	05,40

The following table shows theUndergraduate Hindu pedagogy curriculum at *Dharma Acarya* faculty.

	Learning area (subjects group)	Main competence (core curriculum)	Credit points	Supporting competences (institutional curriculum)	CP	
1.	MPK (personality development subject group)	Civics	2	Principles in social science	2	
		Indonesian	2	Principles in natural science	2	
		English	2			
		TOTAL	**6**		**4**	**10**
2	MKK (knowledge and skills subject group)	Educators profession	2	Teaching methods for religion	2	
		Educational Psychology	2	Sociology of education	2	
		Education administration and supervision	2	History of Hindu culture	2	
		Education management	2	Teaching strategy (didactics) I	2	
		Teaching strategy (didactics) I	2			
		Educational assessment (examination)	2			
		Curriculum development program	2			
		Media and Resources	2			
		Educational statistics	2			
		Classroom management	2			
		TOTAL	**20**		**8**	**28**
3	MKB (professional work subject group)	Introduction to Vedas	2	Essence of Vedas	2	
		Upanisad I	2	Upanishad II	2	
		Darsana I	2	Darsana II	2	
		Acara *Agama* Hindu (Ritual) I	2	Acara *Agama* Hindu (Ritual) II	2	
		Saiwa Siddhanta I	2	Saiwa Siddhanta III	2	
		Saiwa Siddhanta II	2	Old Javanese (Kawi) III	2	
		Old Javanese (Kawi) I	2	Sanskrit III	2	
		Old Javanese (Kawi) II	2	Regional language II	2	
		Sanskrit I	2	Priesthood	2	
		Sanskrit II	2	Nitisastra II	2	
		Regional language	2	Yoga II	2	
		Wariga I	2	Ithiasa (epic poetry) II	2	
		Nithisastra I	2	Tantra	2	
		Yoga I	2	Hindu Law	2	
		Ethics (Tata Susila) I	2	Darsana III	2	
		Tata Susila II	2	Pujastawa	2	
		Ithiasa (epic poetry) I	2			
		Hindu sociology	2			
		Purana	2			
4	MPB (work attitude subject group)	**TOTAL**	**38**		**34**	**72**
		Comparing studies of religion	2	Dharmawacana	2	
		Dharmagita I	2	Psychology of Religion	2	
		Guidance and Counseling	2	Sacral Art	2	
		Research methodology I	2	Hindu evolution history	2	
		Research methodology II	2	Academic works evaluation techniques	2	
		Cultural Anthropology	2	PPL/PKM	2	
		Design instructional and micro teaching	2	Journalism	2	
		TOTAL	**20**		**18**	**72**
5	MBB (Social coexistence subject group)	Thesis	6	Tour guiding	2	
		Practice (Praktek kerja lapangan)	0	Computer application	2	
		Public service (KKN)	4	Seminar proposal	0	
		TOTAL	**4**		**66**	
		TOTAL	**88**		**66**	**154**

If a student studies six to eight hours at day and 2 hours at night during six consecutive days, as the IHDN study guide calculates, then the study time of a student to comprise 48 to 60 hours in a week. Since one credit point comprises three hours of academic work, one credit point comprises 50 minutes teacher centered learning (lecture), 60 minutes structured academic activities assigned by the teacher (homework, presentation, review, summary, paper) and 60 minutes independent academic activities to deepen course matter, the student should collect 18-22 credit points each semester.

The bachelor program comprises 88 core curriculum credit points and 66 institutional curriculum credit points. After having gathered 140-150 credit points the student may turn in his or her thesis proposal. Then the student is allocated six months to finish the thesis and if the thesis is approved, the student is allowed to take the certificate during the graduation ceremony. Students who do not collect 144 credit points in fourteen semesters are advised to change the study program or to drop out.

The *Dharma Acharya* faculty operates the special didactic education program (*Akte Mengajar IV*) for bachelor graduates (S1) of all disciplines to attain training to obtain the teaching qualification. The program has shown its competence since the Decree of the Minister of National Education No. 057/O/2007 conferred the right to organize the qualification of all Indonesian Hindu instructors on IHDN. Also in 2007, UNHI was appointed as IHDN's cooperation partner in the certification assessment procedure of instructors in the subject of Hindu religion in all Indonesian provinces. After collecting 36 credit points, the student will be awarded the certificate. The length of study is three or six semesters. If the students have not collected 40 credit points after seven years, they have to quit studies.The following table shows the*Akta Mengajar IV* curriculum

Semester I		
No	Subject	SKS
1	Introduction: Education	2
2	Learning and Teaching Strategies (Didactics) Teaching and Learning media	2
3	The educator profession	2
4	Classroom management	2
5	Psychology of education	2
6	Curriculum development program	2
7	Hindu religion basics	4
	TOTAL	16
Semester II		
1	Guidance and counseling	2
2	Assessment of students performance (examination)	2
3	Teaching and Learning resources and media	2
4	Classroom management	2
5	Educational research	2
6	Applied theory of education (Design instructional and micro teaching)	2
7	Real teaching practice	6
	TOTAL	20

I could not obtain the curriculum for the current Masters study program in Hindu pedagogy as it has been under compilation during my field work at the IHDN.

PART E

7. Conclusion: Parts of the Ensemble

In the pre-colonial Indian subcontinent and in the Archipelago individual and collective identities were plural, fluid, flexible, segmented and contextual. There was no unitary, across-the-board identity which transcended the frameworks of kinship and clan, region, village, and faith community. Those pre-colonial communities had fluid boundaries for the reason that collective identities were not defined territorially, but relationally through ritual, personal relationships, and social networks. Distinctions and interactions between collective identities were determined by ritual and context, expressing a continuous contention about the rule of precedence in the social hierarchy. These plural and 'fuzzy sets' of membership and identity pertained to the historical period in which the world was not yet charted, mapped, and enumerated. Probably related to extensive maritime trading networks in the region, a cognizance of other societies resided at the core of each society's self-definition.

The change from a traditional to a pluralistic society demands amongst others a change of attitude and perception of neighboring communities. In traditional societies rather a collection of communities living side by side as groups existed instead of a 'society'[370]. Each of these communities based on one of the primordial bonds like blood (ethnicity or race), religion, functional or social stratum. (Schumann 2001: 23) Their prosperity, especially those of their leaders who symbolized the unity of a system, was safeguarded by their functioning together in a complementary fashion. In Southeast Asian policies, there are loose parts constituting one ensemble, usually one part of the ensemble is located in the center and by making use of personal relations, social networks, and short lived fluctuating shifting alliances, the respective periphery is integrated by processes of affiliation or association. (Tambiah 1985; Dellios 2003; Parker 2004; Munoz 2006) Those structures are highly dynamic and constant tensions are constitutive parts of the system. Once a center is defined, then the center's perspective is taken and all other parts are located at the periphery of the center.

In general, socio-religious plurality as well as interaction and negotiation of varying vested interests and shifting alliances denote the key feature of Indonesia's society. In consequence, the present study demonstrated that first an exclusive understanding of religion actually contradicts the traditional archipelagic way of life, the constitution, and legal framework of Indonesia, and second the plurality of religious and other world views represented in Indonesia results in endless negotiation processes represented in shifting alliances steered by vested interests with high fluctuation.

7.1. Indonesia: Southeast Asian Model for organizing religious plurality?

The Indonesian state seems to have a considerable capacity for improvisation or as the World Bank put it, "muddling through". Faced with multiple crises in almost every field, Indonesia often seems to be moving in the direction of collapse but it never happens. Somehow at the last moment a way is always found to avert the looming disaster, not through basic reforms but by improvisation. Immediate problems are fixed when they become really threatening to the system but the solution is usually temporary. (Harold Crouch 2003: 33)

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[370] Schumann refers here to a differentiation introduced by Tönnies between community (*Gemeinschaft*) and society (*Gesellschaft*). Community embodies natural will (*Wesenswille*) and is maintained by face-to-face interhuman relationships and a sense of solidarity governed by traditional rules. Society, however, is a more complex entity reflecting rational will (*Kürwille*) and characterized by indirect and impersonal relationships motivated by rational self-interest. Students of religions generally apply Tönnies's notion of the community type to both archaic and contemporary tribal communities, in which the religious and natural will coalesce. They also acknowledge that a more stratified society usually develops from a community, even though smaller religious or ethnic communities may continue to exist within the framework of a larger society. Buddhism, Christianity and Islam considered their fellowship to be "religious communities" or "faith communities" that united different segments with a society or even crossed ethnic, linguistic, cultural and national lines. These larger communities gave birth to a variety of religious societies that often became *de facto* a religious community, even if they retained the nomenclature of "society" as in the case of the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits). The category of religious community must include (Kitagawa, 1987: 302):

1. Tribal communities, both natural and religious, archaic or contemporary
2. Sacred national communities
3. Founded religious communities such as the Buddhist, the Christian, and the Islamic
4. Various religious societies-turned-communities, as for instance orders of monks and nuns

7.1.1. Indonesia: A possible Model for Arab spring countries?

> "(A)s a developing country, Indonesia is making a painful transition to democracy facing a myriad of problems.
> If handled properly, Indonesia can become a model for other Islamic countries by demonstrating that
> democracy and Islam are not incompatible" (Amitav Acharya 2007: 87)

Researchers on Southeast Asia and Indonesia have long pointed at the discursive uses of *Pancasila* as a platform for dialogue and model of pluralism. During the reform area, there was a fair amount of discussion in the media and the public sphere in general, about whether to retain the five principles, given their history as tools of control and manipulation. It became evident during the reform-era that the five principles and pluralism was not merely rhetoric to Indonesians, but something which the majority felt was integral to the national culture and something that they wished to retain, even when given the freedom to discard it, and to re-actualize it in national discourse. (Yudhoyono 2006 in Raillon 2011; Habibie 2011; Zoelva Interview 2011)This indicates that there is some level of commitment and political will within Indonesian society towards pluralism. (International IDEA 2000: 209)

This pluralism remains not uncontested though. For example, the Indonesian Ulama' Council (MUI, *Majelis Ulama Indonesia*) issued 11 *fatwa* (religious decrees) in July 2005. These decrees arouse controversies and heated debates. Three of these fatwa were highly controversial and banned secularism, pluralism, and religious liberalism[371]. A controversial issue is primarily about the definition that MUI uses to define pluralism. Practicing contextual Muslims argued, MUI could not ban Muslims from thinking, because pluralism, liberalism, and secularism are not ideologies but ways of thinking and they hold that these fatwa are against freedom of expression and human rights in general[372]'. (Nahrowi 2005) On top of that MUI banned Ahamadiyah's doctrine and forbid collective inter-faith prayer[373]. (Nahrowi 2005)

Oversimplified media and scholarship portray two very distinct features of religious life in Indonesia, in this they are portraying the ambiguity of the *Pancasila* – one feature shows the more legalistic and normative aspects of the *Pancasila*, the focus of interest is the potential for conflict solution mechanisms, a peaceful coexistence of religions contained within the principles and the numerous cases of actual peaceful existence. The other feature shows discriminative legislation, lenient police in the enforcement of equal rights, and localized and specific group-targeted violence against religious minorities and members of certain "sects" and terrorism. International media, Human Rights organizations, and scholarship regularly report on religious violence in Indonesia. Recent events show an Indonesian reality where religious pluralism is in peril, which reveals that "diversity is such a threat to one group that it feels it must be met with violence" (Gunawan 2010). In this context, the Indonesian Institute for Peace and Democracy, SETARA (2009: 18-19), draws a rather negative picture of the state of religious freedom in Indonesia.

> The State, either at legislative, executive or judicative level, was still not able to create a constructive breakthrough for the fulfillment of constitutional rights of its citizens to have religion/belief freely. Instead, in 2008, there were systemic efforts to create uniformity through legislations and policies by using a monolithic view based on religion and morality. The political movement of creating uniformity is not only monopolized by particular political powers, Islamic mass organizations that so far often have acted intolerantly, but has been obsessed by the State executors and integrated in the State body. (…) Collective fraud was created by the State executors who have authority to legislate; all of those were done to continuously build up and accumulate political support and to be in power. The logic of politics of the majority versus the minority, moral versus immoral, good versus bad have dominated the practices of the Government of Indonesia. The Constitution which should be a consensus and an instrument to regulate relations among citizens and relations between citizens and the State has been removed and replaced with the logic of politics to create uniformity.

> In 2008, freedom of religion/belief once again failed to have intact recognition from the Constitution due to biases in interpreting the Constitution, which are still carried on by the political elites of the State.

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[371] MUI considered these things as bad because they only employ rational ways of thinking freely, not religious-based thinking. MUI defined secularism as a concept that considers religion only to be concerned with the relationship between religion and God, while the relationship among humans is not a religious concern. Additionally, MUI defined pluralism as the concept that every religion is the same, and characteristically relativistic so that no one can claim the truth of the religion. (Nahrowi 2005)

[372] Nahrowi 2005: 10 (The Jakarta Post.com, August 1, 2005: MUI's fatwa encourage the use of violence)

[373] MUI considered that such prayer is halal (allowed) only if the leader of the prayer is Muslim. Yet, if another religious leader leads a prayer, it is prohibited for Muslims to participate.

Instead, at the same time, the State produced policies which legitimize uniformity by using the dishonor of and defamation of religion as an excuse. In such situations, the violations of freedom of religion/belief increased. This opinion emphasizes the hypothesis that reformation merely provided political liberties, but has seized civil liberties.

In essence, the Institute comes to the conclusion that contemporary politics are dominated by the moralistic discourse of elites, and that despite the fact that political liberty is guaranteed, civil liberties continue to be severely limited. In this, civil liberties are at stake in Indonesia. A recent study by the Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life on Global Restrictions on Religion is concerned with governmental restrictions on religions and social hostilities between faith communities. I found it fruitful to sketch those trends, in order to locate the specific Indonesian situation in a broader statistical context.

Among the world's 25 most populous countries, Iran, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, and India stand out as having the most restrictions, when governmental restrictions and social hostilities are taken into account. The report finds that 64 nations (one-third of the total sum) have either high or very high governmental restrictions on religion in the period studied (mid-2006 through mid-2008). Since nearly 20 of the more populous nations among the Asian and Pacific region figure very high (Iran, China, Burma) or high scores (Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey, Afghanistan, Vietnam, and India) on governmental restrictions on religion, more than half of the world's 6.8 billion people live under high restrictions on religion. (Pew December 2009: 14) The list of countries with the most restrictive governments differs from the list of those with the highest levels of social hostilities. Only one country, Saudi Arabia, appears on both lists. India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Israel score in the high range on government restrictions and very high in social hostilities.

In 178 countries (90%), religious groups must register with the government for various purposes, and in 117 (59%) the registration requirements resulted in major problems for (19%) or outright discrimination (40%) against certain religious groups in almost three-in-five countries (59%)[374]. Indonesia's legislation requires all religious groups to register with the government. Adherents to non-sanctioned religions face problems in civil registration and the free choice of profession. In 2008, the dissemination of religious material through the 'deviant' Islamic *Ahmadiyyah*h currently has been banned, effectively criminalizing the religious practice of the group and causing increasing violent conflict since then. In 1966, the government de-registered Confucianism, which has been re-established as a state-funded religion 2001. In 137 countries (69%) the governments harassed or attempted to intimidate certain religious groups, and in 91 countries (46%) there were reported cases of the use of physical force against religious individuals or groups by governments or government employees. For instance, the religious police of Darul Aceh Darussalam or other communal security forces enforces the wearing of Islamic attire, restaurants are require to close in the daytime during the holy month of Ramadan in specific regions; national authorities do not intervene. (Pew December 2009: 10; SETARA 2009)

In 75 countries (38%), national or local governments limit efforts by religious groups or individuals to convert others. Nearly half of all countries either restrict the activities of foreign missionaries (41%) or prohibit them altogether (6%). In Indonesia, Presidential Decision No. 1/1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and Desecration of *Agama* limits most proselytizing, and Article 156 of the Criminal Code makes heresy and blasphemy punishable by up to five years in prison. (Pew December 2009: 10; SETARA) Religion-related terrorism caused casualties in 17 countries; thus nearly 9% of the states are affected by religious-related terrorism worldwide (Pew December 2009: 4). The problem of religious-related terrorism in Indonesia is not discussed here.

Governmental founding of religions remains a hotly debated issue. The Pew study (and the author) considers government support for religious groups a restriction only if it involves preferential treatment of some group(s) and discrimination against others. (Pew: December 2009, GRI Question No. 20.3, p. 61) A vast majority of governments (86%) provide funding or other resources to religious groups. But in 151 countries (76%), governments provide this assistance in ways that are either clearly imbalanced or that favor only one religious group (Pew December 2009: 8). Indonesia funds and protects six religious communities and the Ministry of Religious Affairs regulates the interpretation of religion.

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[374] In this context, it is important to note that a number of countries in Western Europe have governmental restrictions on religions: Germany, France and Austria, which have laws aimed at protecting citizens from what the government considers dangerous cults or sects. (Pew: December 2009)

Like government restrictions, social hostilities range widely. Some degree of public tensions between religious groups was reported in the vast majority (87%) of countries. (Pew December 2009: 4)In 126 countries (64%), these hostilities involved physical violence. Countries that figure very high scores in social hostilities are Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Somalia, Israel, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia.

Crimes, malicious acts or violence motivated by religious bias were reported in nearly three-in-four countries (72%). With unclear state regulations and hesitant or lenient national police, much public animosity is aimed at the minority *Ahmadiyyah* community in Indonesia but also against Christians and small religious movements. In 49 countries (25%), private individuals or groups used force or the threat of force to compel adherence to religious norms. In more than half of all countries, however, it is religious groups themselves that make attempts to stop other religious groups from growing. Indeed, in 22 countries (11%), there were acts of sectarian or communal violence between religious groups (Pew December 2009: 19). Following the peak of religion-related violence (1998-2001) in the reformation era in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Maluku, Sulawesi and Java (http://www.crisisgroup.org/), Indonesia faced a series of religion-related terrorist attacks (1998-2005). After a four years period in which Indonesia experienced a break in terrorist activities, two International Hotels were bombed in Jakarta in July 2009. (http://www.crisisgroup.org/)

How far then can the Indonesian *Pancasila* and organization of plurality provide a model for the organization of religious plurality and religious freedom and contribute to the global debate on pluralism or religious freedom? What are the limits of the *Pancasila* and such a model's function? The present study proposes that the inter-religious, non-confessional aspects of *Pancasila* might be regarded as a possible *modus vivendi* or model of religious pluralism for countries with religious plurality; however, the principles are not universally transferable as they are specifically Indonesian. (Sukarno 1961 in Purdy 1994: 91; Zoelva Interview 2011)

Let us now consider first President Sukarno's (1945 – 1966) conception of the principles as he is one of the founding fathers of the Indonesian nation. Asian African solidarity was the central concern of Sukarno since 1955, when Indonesia initiated and hosted the first Asian-African Conference in Bandung. (Purdy 1984: 87) As Sukarno moved to establish Indonesia as a leader of the emergent Asian-African nations[375], that quest for leadership steadily shifted its ideological banner from non-alignment to an increasingly exclusive emphasis on Asian-African solidarity from 1957 to 1965. (Brunnel 1966; Schindehütte 2006) Manifesting his idea to implement *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* at a global scale, Sukarno invited 29 states to the conference[376] –in order "to build the world anew". On August 17th 1960, Sukarno made the ultimate claim for the *Pancasila*, that is, as a universal phenomenon that could be recommended to all nations: "*Pancasila* is universal (and has a) basis that can be used by all nations (…) that can guarantee the welfare, peace, and brotherhood of the world". (Purdy 1994: 90)

Choosing then the dramatic occasion of the General Assembly of the United Nations on September, 30th 1960, Sukarno reiterated his belief in the universality of *Pancasila* in a major address titled "to build the world anew" to the heads of the states, in which he also expressed his concept of a new world order. (Brunnel 1966; Purdy 1994: 90; Indonesian and German translation of the original in Schindehütte 2006) The address also incorporated the draft resolution of Ghana, India, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, and Indonesia calling for the reduction in cold war tensions between the US and the Russian blocs. Recalling the global conflict of ideologies in 1960, Sukarno argued that the way out of this confrontation is the "universal application of *Pancasila*". (Purdy 1984: 90) Somewhat claiming the recognition of non-Western values, Sukarno thus proposed the inclusion of *Pancasila* into the UN Charter – as the organization would merely be a representative of the Western systems of states. (Brunnel 1966; Schindehütte 2006)

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[375] In April 1955 the founding members of the Non Aligned Movement held a Conference of Asian and African states in Bandung hosted by President Sukarno. The founding fathers of the NAM, apart from Nehru of India, Sukarno of Indonesia, and Tito of Yugoslavia, were Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Their actions were known as 'The Initiative of Five'. The attending nations declared their desire not to become involved in the Cold War and adopted a 'declaration on promotion of world peace and cooperation', which included Nehru's five principles: (1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) Mutual non-aggression, (3) Mutual non-interference in domestic affairs, (4) Equality and mutual benefit, (5) Peaceful co-existence. Six years after the Bandung Conference, an initiative of Yugoslav president Tito led to the first official Non-Aligned Movement Summit, which was held in September 1961 in Belgrade. On Non-Aligned Movement see: www.sukarnoyears.com/311nonaligned; htm; www.en.wikipedia.org (May 2008)

[376] The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is an international organization of states considering themselves not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc. As of 2007, it has 118 members. www.en.wikipedia.org (May 2008)

I firmly believe that the adoption of these five principles and the writing of them into the Charter (of the United Nations) would greatly strengthen the U.N. I believe it would bring the U.N. into line with recent development of the world. I believe it would make it possible for the U.N. to face the future refreshed and confident. Finally, I believe that the adoption of *Pancasila* as a foundation of the Charter would make the Charter more wholeheartedly acceptable to all Members, both the old and the new. (Purdy 1994: 90-91)

The resolution was not acceded, but it demonstrates the fervent awareness of the then president to take responsibility toward global security in a *"fair play"* fashion. (Brunnel 1966; Purdy 1984: 89-91; Schindehütte 2006: 72-75; 187) A year later, in 1961, Sukarno stated in front of the Council for World Affairs in Los Angeles: "If you don't understand *Pancasila*, then you cannot begin to understand Indonesia." However, in the same speech, he spoke of *Pancasila* as although universally applicable, yet unique to the Indonesian experience. (Purdy 1994: 91)

Recently, Tibi (1995), Stepan (2001), Franke (2006), and US President Obama (2009) positively discussed the function of *Pancasila*as a model, whereas former president Habibie (2011), the former head of the state intelligence agency, Hendropriyono (2007)[377], and Balinese anthropologist Prof Bawa Atmaja (2005) call for the re-actualization and revitalization of the five principles in social and political reality. Tibi[378] asks whether the Southeast Asian country Indonesia offers a model for religiously and ethnic-culturally different communities to live together in peace and mutual respect for the Islamic civilization or civilizations in general. And he is of the opinion that the *Pancasila* can serve as a model for Islamic countries regarding religious pluralism and religious freedom in a Muslim majority country (Tibi 1995). Franke (2006: 62) points to the significance of a study of the Indonesian model of religious pluralism for the history of religions, thus also in religious studies, such an analysis could also provide a momentum in the perception and organization of religious plurality in European contexts. In international forums, Indonesia is often portrayed as a role model for countries with a plural population with respect to its capacity to reconcile democracy, pluralism and Islam and celebrate tolerance and diversity.For instance, US president Obama stated in November 2009[379]:

Indonesia is not only regionally important, but as a member of the G20, as one of the world's largest democracies, as one of the world's largest Islamic nations, it has enormous influence and really is, I think, a potential model for the kind of development strategies, democracy strategies, as well as interfaith strategies that are going to be so important moving forward.

Certainly such positive evaluations remain not unopposed. Like SETARA, the Asian Human Rights Commission disagrees with President Obama, "While his statement is no doubt true in some respects, the essence of Obama's remark is at odds with the current situation in Indonesia"[380]. Similarly, the United Nations[381] is disturbed about continuous religious violence and expresses discomfort about religious discrimination and intolerance in the country and speaks of "continuing concern at the distinctions made in legal documents between the six recognized religions of Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism, and the adverse impact on the freedom of thought, conscience and religion of people belonging to minorities, ethnic groups and indigenous peoples in Indonesia".

The following paragraphs present an overview of the debates on a possible model character of the five principles. If understood as system of five basic values intrinsic to the Indonesian cultural area, and therefore to the Indonesian nation-state, Wandelt (1989: 9-11) has argued, then these five principles indicate a specific trait of the archipelagic socio-cultural area. Since every political group could interpret the five principles according to their particular *Weltanschauung*, intentions, and vested interest, *Pancasila*'s functionality was theoretically unlimited.

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[377] Antara News 07/25/2009, in: (www.antaranews.com/berita/1248509382/revitalisasi-pancasila-cegah-terorisme)
[378] Written three years before the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime and the monetary crisis, some claims and considerations are outdated as the article is uncritical of the Suharto regime, but the here cited considerations remain reflective of actuality.
[379] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary 2009: Remarks by President Obama and President Yudhoyono of Indonesia after Bilateral Meeting, 15.11.2009, in www.whitehouse.gov/ (10.05.2010)
[380] Asian Human Rights Commission 2010: Indonesia: Freedom of religion not protected, in: www.ethicsinaction.asia/ (10.05.2010)
[381] Asian Human Rights Commission 2010: Indonesia: Freedom of religion not protected, in: www.ethicsinaction.asia/ (10.05.2010)

"As the national collective is superior to the concept of Lordship, although the quintuplicate manifested monotheistic Lordship is allocated in the state, it bears no political relevance for governance"[382]. (Wandelt 1989: 193) In consequence, Wandelt interprets the *Pancasila* state as a secular state. This has certainly been the understanding of the Suharto regime, but as in Indonesian democracy, religion plays a significant public role, the present study only partially supports this proposition, because first a religious dimension is always at present in national discourse, in policy making processes and influences civic and political alliances, second, religion is used by the state in the public to balance relations between faith communities, and third, religion is understood as a noble national value promoting development.

Schumann notes the five principles were promoted as a model and platform for societal dialogue during the first years after the proclamation of Independence.

> Later on it was used – or misused - as a justification for the enforcement of partial and ideological interests, which actually had nothing to do with *Pancasila*. (…) The *Pancasila*, was (…), originally not meant to be a doctrine, a philosophy, or an ideology. It was a *Weltanschauung*, expressing some basic convictions in general terms, but leaving its concrete expressions open to later circumstantial interpretation and, if necessary, adaptations. Its Silas mentioned (…) principles in a general way, but did not define their meanings (Schumann, 1990: 30-1

If we look behind the scenes, it becomes clear that, contrary to Schumann's argument, the state itself indeed does interfere as has been shown 1.) in the distinction between the term *agama* and *kepercayaan*, 2.) state funding of six *agama* only, 3.) the state denies the right to negative religious freedom, and 4.) the state limits the right to freedom of belief and thought.

The most basic political functions of the five principles, as Canonica-Walangitang (2003: 26-29) has argued, has been to legitimize authority. The generalized nature of its principles allowed both Sukarno and Suharto, despite their very different policy orientations, and one must add also the contemporary government, to base their authority on it. Hence, under the Sukarno government, *Pancasila* was defined as a national minimal consensus which functioned to keep the plural republic united. The five principles were designed to keep the military, Islam and Islamic groups and communist forces in balance. Suharto used *Pancasila* even more as the political formula to legitimize his authority. In 1966 the five principles were implemented as basic principles of the state and supreme base of jurisdiction. Invented as a formula to unite the nation, *Pancasila* was invested with almost sacred status by the ideologues of the New Order, during which religion became a crucial factor of Indonesian everyday politics. There was no other official interpreter than the New Order government. Suharto himself was the leading *Pancasila*-ideologue and became increasingly obsessed with *Pancasila*, taking it and its integralist or organicist interpretation as the only acceptable state ideology and basis of the state. (Canonica-Walangitang 2003: 26-29)

The five principles were thus used as effective instruments to control the social and political organizations, to legitimize the ruling groups, and to delegitimize political challengers. Consequently, *Pancasila* was interpreted as an Indonesian cultural concept as expressed in the values of harmony, family, and religious tolerance that naturally emerged as a constitutional base. The New Order regime used Soepomo's integralist ideals of family-ism, cooperation, harmony, unity, and paternalism to interpret *Pancasila* as opposed to the three ideological alternatives: Islam, Communism, and Liberalism. Referring to this interpretation Canonica-Walangitang speaks of an ideological offensive designed to guide the political discourse. The strategy of '*Pancasila*ization' was an instrument for de-politicization. *Pancasila* took on mystical and Javanist connotations, and the idea of *Pancasila* Democracy (*Demokrasi Pancasila)* gave the New Order an alternative to Western democracies. (Canonica-Walangitang 2003: 26-29)

Vickers and Parker identify Indonesia as "a paradigm, if not a paragon, of state attempts to regulate society through the manipulation of systems of values". (Vickers/Parker 1999: 383) Antlöv (Antlöv 2005: 13) argues the five principles would merely be a modern political construct. The assumed or 'imagined' (Antlöv 2005: 13) indigenous pre-colonialist archipelagic culture would confer some kind of authenticity to the five principles, "while simultaneously turning it into a powerful ideological instrument that brought legitimacy to political restriction and centralization". (Antlöv 2005: 13)

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[382] *Das Kollektiv der Nation ist gegenüber der Gottesgestalt souverän, zwar findet die fünffach sich offenbarende monotheistische Gottheit einen Platz im Staate, eine politische Relevanz für die Staatsführung besitzt sie nicht. Der Nationalstaat Indonesien versteht sich als sekulär.* (Wandelt 1989: 193, author's translation)

This argument certainly holds true for the Suharto regime, because the New Order established a dominant discourse which drew on the manipulation of the 1965/1966 events and the resulting collective trauma: key features were anti-Communism, the concept of *dwi-fungsi* (the Armed Forces dual, military and socio-political function), discourse of national security, public order, developmentalism, and national unity.(Stockmann 2004: 28)

Discussing the place of Islam under the *Pancasila*, Abalahin demonstrates Islam was the religion that was active in a great part of the nationalist struggle and informs *Pancasila* itself, even as *Pancasila* evades and determines the limits of Islamic claims. In the ways it has structured the negotiation of religious identity, he has remarked, the *Pancasila* state makes an overall concession to Islamists in its language, but leaves loopholes for other constituencies. Consequently, the *Pancasila* state is structured more along the lines of traditional, historical Islamic states than along the lines of an Islamic state projected by radical Islamists. This argument was similiarly made by TIBI (1995).

> Far from detaching itself from organized religion as a secular state would, the Indonesian state attaches organized religion to itself without subordinating itself to any single manifestation of it. Indeed, it can be argued that through the four directorates general under the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the state subordinates the religions. However, (…) in practice, the principle of "Belief in one God" imposes an Islamic framework on the State. (Abalahin 2005: 121)

Abalahin shows that the "*Pancasila* state displays unequal pluralism of such polities as the Ottoman and Mughal empires" (Abalahin 2005: 141). Howell (2003) speaks of "delimited pluralism", I decided to use authoritarian pluralism. Abalahin draws the conclusion that "the *Pancasila* state accords *theoretical* equality to all the religions it recognizes. Thus, depending on one's political position, Indonesia can be regarded as a semi-, quasi-, or pseudo-Islamic republic". (Abalahin 2005: 121-122) This thesis is only partially supported here, as there is neither reference to the Koranic formula nor Islam in the Constitution, rather Indonesia defines herself as a religious state (Smith-Kipp 1987) grounded-in-the Belief-in-One-Supreme-Lordship, a unique approach to structure the relation between state and religion. It is noteworthy, that all national laws start with the formula: With Mercy of One Supreme God, the Government of Indonesia (*Dengan Rahmat Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, Pemerintah Republik Indonesia…*) and so on.

In conclusion, scholars hold varying views on *Pancasila*'s historical authenticity (Dharmaputera 1989; Wandelt 1989; Antlöv 2003; Abalahin 2005) and view *Pancasila* more or less enthusiastically as a model and platform for societal dialogue, but whether its principles are seen to be rooted in archipelagic history as inherent cultural features or are interpreted to be social constructs to manipulate and exploit the citizenry is in ardent dispute. Some view *Pancasila* as a collectively acceptable consensus of minimal values; others interpret *Pancasila* as a nationalist recompense to Islamic aspirations, as a compromise between two contesting camps, as guiding principle or as an instrument to legitimize authority.

With the exception of most of the 32-years of the Suharto regime, religions go public as they occupy the public sphere to articulate their demands and ideas. This process began during the period of national awakening, while it continues through all processes of nation-building, development, cultural engineering, and lately, transition to democracy and democratization. Today, faith-based parties and nationalist parties compete in elections. It is an everyday experience for Indonesians, that the various interest groups in Indonesian society bargain their political value. In "Law, Religion and Pluralism", John Bowen (2005: 5, emphasis in original) notes,

> Indonesian society is (...) criss-crossed by competing claims about how people ought to live and about what Indonesian society ought to become. These claims draw on highly local ideas, on national values, *and* on universal rights and laws. To make matters still more complicated, ideas from what is at stake change from one level of society to another.

In consequence, social and cultural diversity induced the chronic culture of negotiation in Indonesia's public sphere about the suitable nature of the Indonesian nation, constitutional framework, and its national ethics as represented in *Pancasila* or in Islam (Hilmy 2011, Hasan 2008, Hosen 2005). "Despite a consensus on the wording of *Pancasila*, there is no common understanding of how it should be interpreted." (Raillon 2011: 110)

> In every era, *Pancasila* must pass the dialectics of civilization that test its strength as the basic philosophy of the Indonesian nation whose development does not stop at a certain terminal within history. (Habibie 2011)

In this, the five principles reveal a certain ambiguity. (cf. Raillon 2011: 110) Within the context of religious pluralism, the first principle allows for plurality, but it is open to manipulation by the state, religious elites, and other interest groups. Whereas the wording of the five principles remains constant, how to implement and manifest their actual content is continuously renegotiated, reshaped, and reinterpreted during the eras of revolution(1945-1950), parliamentary democracy (1950-1959), Guided Democracy (1959-1965), New Order (1965-1998), reform (1998-2001) and the contemporary multi-party democracy (2001 onwards). Albeit President Sukarno (1945-1966) and President Suharto (1966-1998) have differently interpreted the religious pluralism of the *Pancasila*, the state apparatus continuously maintains a legal plural perspective on multireligiosity as national standard (Triguna Interview 2007; Zoelva Interview 2011).

Today, the five principles have somewhat lost their public acceptance. "It seems as if national collective memory has forgotten about *Pancasila*. The principles are less frequently mentioned, referred to, and debated in the context of state, nation and society". (Habibie 2011) This collective amnesia of the national "*Grundnorm*" has been triggered by its mystification, sacralization, and systematic use as indoctrinatory ideology by the authoritarian Suharto regime (1966-1998). "Despite the observed social amnesia, the five principles will be there as long as Indonesia exists as a nation." (Habibie 2011) Despite their unpopularity, and because of their ambiguity, the five principles seem to constitute the adhesiveness that keeps Indonesia together –those concepts appear apparently to continue traditional ideas and concepts and thereby form a synthesis of models and concepts of organizing human coexistence. (Franke 2006; Habibie 2011)

The constitutional amendments (Stockmann 2004, King Blair 2005, Hosen 2005) showed that *Pancasila* continues to function as "Grundnorm" embedded in the Basic Law and as guardian of the "nusantara conception" (*wawasan nusantara*)[383] and a common point of reference to the Indonesian people. In 2006, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono indicated that the *Pancasila* is final and stated: 'In fact, the debate is over, the founding fathers of the Republic have already found the right solution.' (in Raillon 2011: 101) Likewise, in a commemoration speech on the Birth of the *Pancasila* in 2006, the president said: "We should end the debate on alternatives to the *Pancasila* as our ideology." (Witular 2006[384]) In this, four pillars of the modern Indonesian state that have to be reinvented are the five principles (*Pancasila*), 1945 Basic Law, the state motto (*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*) and national unity. (Habibie 2011) In sum, in a perpetual process the meanings of the *Pancasila* are reconstituted and reinterpreted through consequential legislation which all must be in accordance with the five principles. Raillon (2011: 110) states *Pancasila* is a "mandatory locus for ideological and religious competition.

> But it has a power of its own, since the various actors of Indonesia's political and religious scene cannot help but refer to it, sometimes to the verge of irrationality, as though the *Pancasila* was an *azimat*, an 'amulet' whose possession would give its holder an irrefutable privilege and advantage over everyone else. Rather than a properly religious struggle, the battle for the control of *Pancasila* and ultimately the state, is a political struggle. The ultimate goal is God, not power. (Raillon 2011: 110)

On the whole, it is safe to say that the instrumentality of the five principles derives out of their cryptic character. Whether created to achieve consensus or to serve as compromise between contesting political and faith groups, Indonesia is built-on-the-belief-in-One-Supreme-Lordship as *Staatsfundamentalnorm* or *Grundnorm* – and this is to be implemented in politics, law, and state funding of religion. Indeed, the religious national *Weltanschauung* is clearly expressed in its civil religion: the nation is embedded in the-belief-in-One-Supreme-Lordship. The first principle inspires thus the following four principles which emerge as immediate consequence of the first and thereby introduce constitutional state theism as represented in monotheism or integral monism. The second principle embodies equality of all human beings and the condemnation of discrimination on a normatively level. The five principles form the integrative ethos of a religious and civilized nation which follows the command of a sixfold manifested One Supreme Lordship. By taking morals, religious values, and public order into account, the freedom of religion is however limited to guarantee national security and stability.

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[383] The "nusantara conception" of the Indonesian state prescribes multi-religiosity and national territorial unity. Both are achieved through the four pillars of Indonesia. In this, four pillars of the modern Indonesian state that have to be reinvented are the five principles (Pancasila), 1945 Basic Law, the state motto (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) and national unity (NKRI).
[384] Witular, RA 2006/02/06 SBY urges end to debate on Pancasila's merits. The Jakarta Post, Jakarta. In: www.thejakartapost.com/ (September 2010)

The present study assumes that despite many civil liberties, may it be individual or collective rights, are compromised in political and social practice in Muslim majority Indonesia, the five principles may be seen as to serve as a model for religious pluralism and religious freedom especially for Muslim majority countries. Tibi (1995) and Weber (2002) criticize the Arab core countries of Islamic civilization for not offering a cultural-ethnical and religious foundation for inner peace. In promoting an exclusive version of Islam, Weber (2002) sees them as acting un-Islamically. In this context, the Muslim Indonesian intellectual N. Madjid (1994: 69) writes, "it is therefore ironic that when tolerance and pluralism are among the values most needed in globalized human interactions, the tolerance and pluralism of classical Islam has almost disappeared." Thus one might promote Indonesia as to provide such a model for domestic peace. Tibi (1995) even wonders if "(…) it is Southeast Asia that will become the center of Islamic civilization while moving into the 21st century because of its model capabilities". "The Mediterranean Islam can learn a lot from the Southeast Asian Islam. Can the periphery become thereby the center?" (Tibi 1995)

16 years of political history following Tibi's prophetical question showwhereas most countries with Muslim majority or Muslim plurality live under undemocratic political and unfree social conditions (Freedom House 2009; PEW 2009), the two exceptions to the overall trend of non-democratic or illiberal politics in the Muslim world are Indonesia and Mali. (Freedom House 2009; Pepinsky/Liddle/Mujani 2009: 20). Both are predominantly Muslim democracies, and both have relatively high levels of political freedom. But in Mali, laïcité is enshrined in the constitution, which explicitly forbids political parties from appealing to religious principles. (Pepinsky/Liddle/Mujani, 2009: 21)

In this context, Casanova predicts the rise of another sort of democracy among Muslim societies based on the parallel experiences of Confucian and Catholic societies (….) that proved to be democratic later on. (Hilmy 2010: 255) In August 2011, Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, Greg Moriarty noted that the Arab Spring developments have raised interest in whether Indonesia's emergence as the third-largest democracy can show how to reform movements elsewhere in the Muslim world[385]. He asks whether Indonesia can provide a model for Arab uprisings

In Indonesia, Belief in One Supreme Lordship is established in the five principles of the state, religious freedom is enshrined in the Basic Law and parties advancing a religious agenda compete with secular parties in national elections. The terrorist attacks in 2009 prompted the statement by Prof. Komaruddin Hidayat, then president of the leading Islamic university "Indonesia is not a battlefield but a Muslim country. The hard-liners' militancy and energy are better spent if used for building civilization"[386].

> *Pancasila* (…) is not a democracy of European pattern but it would be the best an Islamic state could ever achieve. And only because of this reason Indonesia is a country that could serve as a model for Islamic civilization. It would be eurocentric to put the European yardstick to the Indonesian model. (Tibi 1995)

From a Quranic perspective (3:64), the established Muslim intellectual Madjid holds, *Pancasila* denotes "a common term between religious factions that God commands to seek and find" (Madjid 1994 63) in order to coexist peacefully in monotheism[387].

> Say: "O People of the Book! Come to common terms as between us and you: That we worship none but God; that we associate no partners with him; that we erect not, from among ourselves, Lords and patrons other than God." If then they turn back, say ye: "Bear witness that we (at least) are Muslims (bowing to God's Will)". (http://www.jannah.org/qurantrans/quran3.html; 3.08.2011)

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[385]   Alford,   Peter.   August   27,   2011:   Indonesia   model   for   Arab   uprisings.   The   Australian.   In: (www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/indonesia-a-model-for-arab-uprisings/story-e6frg6so-1226123161330), August 2011
[386] AsiaViews 2009: 14 (September-October)
[387] The degree of pluralism, that is amongst others, the acceptance of non-monotheistic beliefs, is an important controversy amongst Islamic scholars since the classical period. In Islamic history, one finds instances of intolerance and tolerance to other religions. Madjid notes critically, the problem of Islam vis-à-vis pluralism would be the problem of how Muslims adapt themselves to the modern age. This process is related to "how they see and assess the history of Islam, and how they see and assess problems of change and the necessity of bringing universal and normative Islam into a dialogue with temporal and spatial realities". (Madjid 1994 67) For an international discussion, see the open letter "Common Word", launched on October 13th 2007 signed by 138 leading Muslim scholars and intellectuals to the leaders of the Christian Churches and denominations all over the world, including H.H. Pope Benedict XVI. In essence, it proposes that Islam and Christianity share at their core, the twin "golden" commandments of the paramount importance of loving God and loving the neighbor. Based on this joint common ground, it is an interfaith theological document which calls for peace and harmony between Christians and Muslims worldwide. (http://www.rissc.jo/index.php/english-publications.html)

In Madjids opinion, the five principles are five terms which the different cultures and religions in Indonesia agreed to be common amongst them. This view on the organization of plurality is also supported by Constitutional Judge Prof Dr Hamdan Zoelva, who agrees with the view that the *Pancasila* are the point of common reference (*kalimatunsawa*) to the Indonesian people. Sukarno, the first president (1945-1966), "commonly credited as the inventor of *Pancasila*"(Madjid 1994: 57), proposed the five principles as the "*modus vivendi*" (Madjid 1994: 57) between secular nationalism advocated by the nationalists and the idea of an Islamic state demanded by the Islamic oriented politicians.

The principles have been further Islamized in various ways during the course of the national history. During the 1945 Committee of 62 the idea of national monotheism as the first principle is the Islamization of Sukarno's original concept of a more universal or generalized belief in God that also may include other types than monotheistic faiths (national monism). Whereas he proposed "Belief in God" as the fifth principle, the Islamic groups wanted it to be implemented as the first and synergizing one. Due to objections from the Islamic side, the third principle "nationalism" was amended to "Unity of Indonesia", whereas the forth principle "Democracy led by wisdom through deliberation and representation" may be seen as a common term between secular-national and Islamic ideas of statehood or nation, which made it acceptable to Muslims and religious minorities alike and may explain *Pancasila*'s survival.

The founder of the Indonesian national news agency *Antara* and foreign minister Adam Malik compared the *Pancasila* with the Madinah Charter[388] , which he regarded as "a formula for a state based of the idea of social and religious pluralism" (Madjid 1994: 66). Today, the modernist Islamic party PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) opts for an introduction of the Madinah Charter. (Hosen 2005; Hilmy 2010) It is interesting to note, as Tibi (1995) points out, that original Islam knew neither Confucianism nor Buddhism nor Hinduism, and the Indonesian model would thereby enrich Islam by recognizing these world religions but by putting them on equal standing with Islam.The decisive point would be that the first monotheistic principle came from the Islamic periphery and not from the Islamic center, where the definition of Christians and Jews as "dhimmi/protected ones" i.e. second-class believers is still dominant.

I suspect that the notion of religious freedom in Islam is evident in the toleration of people of the book outlined in the prophet's Madinah Charter, the practice of religious toleration and legal pluralism in the Ottoman Empire, the management of religion in the medieval Indian Mughul Empire, and in contemporary Indonesian religious policies. It is interesting to note in this context, that cultural and religious diversity had been an intrinsic feature of Austronesian cultures and diversity and plurality have therefore a longstanding trajectory in Indonesia. Whereas Indian law courts have faced difficulties regarding the nature of religion, (Sen 2007; Scheifinger 2009: 4) in Indonesia the Ministry of Religions operates with a monothetical definition of religion (*agama*) and legislation approves of six state funded *agamas*. Despite the Muslim majority, Indonesia follows a definition of religion along Islamic principles; Hindusim, Buddhism, and Confucianism are funded and protected by the state. This remarkable legislation shares some features with the classic Ottoman Empire[389]. An important distinction to the Ottoman conception of religious freedom is that Indonesia's constitution is not based on Islam but on One Supreme Lordship as the first principle of the state and the office of the president has no official religious functions; in fact the office bearer does not have be a Muslim – in theory. The administration of religion is delegated to the Ministry of Religion, similarly to the Department of Religious Affairs in modern Turkey[390].

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[388] Madinah Charter, 622 AD. For a full text of the document see Hilmy 2010: Appendix 1, pp. 265-269

[389] In1453, Mehmet II granted religious freedom to all non-Muslim communities. "They were allowed to choose their religious leaders who were approved by an Imperial decree. In addition, being free to practice their religion under the guidance of their religious leaders, minorities were governed, in matters of their personal status, by their own religious laws. Thus, matters such as marriage, divorce, child custody and support, alimony and inheritance were under the jurisdiction of the community's religious authority. Article 11 of the Ottoman Constitution also confirmed religious freedom by stating: the State shall protect the free exercise of all religions recognized in the Ottoman Empire, and the integral enjoyment, in accordance with previous practice of all religious privileges granted to various communities, provided such religions are not contrary to public morals nor conducive to the disturbance of public order." (Law Library 2000: 130)

[390] The Department of Religious Affairs gives advice to the public on the fundamentals of Islam and Islamic worship, and is also responsible for mosques and the appointment of imams. In addition, a Ministry of Religious Affairs was established under the Ministry of Education and is charged with supervising religious cultural and ethics education. (Law Library 2000: 138)

Both Abalahin (2005: 121) and Schumann (2000:31) use the expression to "invite religious communities to define their faith", meant here is the compliance with the Ministry of Religious Affairs' Islamic model. For example, Schumann reads, "(l)ikewise, the Christian and other religious communities were invited to give the first principle a meaning corresponding to their own understanding. This may be a weakness, but it also may be strength. This is because it invites every religious community to realize that there are other communities who keep to the same principle, even if they explain it through different conceptions" (Schumann 2000:31)

7.1.2. Indonesian pluralism: state theism and spirited statehood

In order to explain - on what score the Indonesian state concerns itself with defining what is and what is not a religion - as opposed to either simply approving of some religions or refusing to take up taxonomy altogether (Abalahin: 2005) -, I paid great attention to significant details of negotiation processes amongst the political and religious camps. In this context I demonstrated that the Indonesian approach on managing plurality of religions may be typified as delimited pluralism (Howell 2003) or authoritarian rights-based pluralism. In my view, Islam, but also local religions, Hindu-Buddhist legacy, contemporaneous Hindu and Buddhist organizations, Christian churches and the encounter with Western thought have contributed to the emergence of the Indonesian approach to coexistence of religions and the conception of One Supreme Lordship.

'*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*' represents the culmination of a long Indonesian history that includes not only Islamic but also Hindu and Buddhist traditions. '*Ketuhanan*' is understood by minority religious congregations as a principle of religious pluralism. Therefore it should not be understand in terms of the Islamic concept of God (*tawhid*) but rather as a general and neutral concept of Lordship that gives room to all funded faith-based communities to interpret the first principle in terms of their respective traditions and more important, it also grants them the right to do so. In this, the first principle functions as a civil religion. However, the shift from the term One Supreme Lordship (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa)* to God Almighty (*Tuhan Yang Maha Esa)* in all legal and developmental documents indicates an increasing exclusive understanding of the principle, as public Islam attempts to impart an understanding of the Islamic concept of God (*tawhid*) on the religious minorities via the backdoor of religious policies. Yet, Hindu strategic planners are not too concerned with this trend, since the Hindu conception of One Supreme Lordship allows for transcendent, immanent, personal, and impersonal images of God. In consequence, I assess that the first principle promotes state theism (integralist monism or national monotheism).

Having been recognized as people of the book (*ahl-al kitab*), Hindu communities were integrated into the *Pancasila* state as people of the *dhimma*. This case is exceptional as it deviates from classical Islam. As people of the *dhimma* they are protected by the state. Although Hindus in the *Pancasila* state are theoretically granted equal rights, it could be argued, that this is only partial restoration of the *dhimma*, because practice differs from theory. In practice, these rights are compromised by national and regional governmental backdoor lobbying and policies. Notwithstanding, Indonesia represents a singular case of a Muslim majority country which grants the Asian religions of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism equal rights and funding. As the Islamic differentiation between Islam, people of the book, and non-Muslims is maintained in Indonesian legislation, it could be said that Indonesia's basic law only recognizes Islam, but tolerates certain other religions. (cf. Abalahin 2005)

In structuring the negotiation of religious identity in a specific Indonesian-style, the state rhetoric makes an overall concession to the political and public on one side, but it leaves loopholes for other constituencies at the other side. In this, the *Pancasila* state grants theoreticalequality to all the religions it recognizes,but the plurality of religion is organized in an authoritarian pluralism as those rights are frequently compromised by individual actors, groups, and local government employees under a 'conspiracy of silence' by police and military. Accordingly, the *Pancasila* state might rather be compared to traditional Islamic Empires (*Ottoman, Mughul*), in which the state (*dawlah al islamiyah*) was not identical with the Muslim community (*ummah*) and other congregations and faith communities were accommodated as people of the *dhimma*. This attitude is closer to the spirit of the Charter of Medina than are several Islamic states in Middle East, which suppress religious plurality.

On the whole, the Indonesian nation state is based not on a naturalistic, but a religious interpretation of statehood and citizenship, therefore I employ the term spirited statehood. State theism (integral monism or monotheism) as represented in the first principle inspires the remaining four principles and the entire hierarchy of legislation. Although religion is subordinated to the state, legislation is increasingly given an Islamic framework.

Despite this assessed Islamic framework, Indonesia leaves loopholes for other religious traditions and I described how the Balinese Hindus made use of this open space for room to maneuver. Thereby they set a precedent to be followed by other ethno-religious communities in Indonesia.

The present study maintains that despite all theoretical equality an Islamic model is imposed on religious systems by the MORA, may it be Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, or traditional belief systems, which does not allow for an own bottom-up interpretation and model, but merely for a top-down interpretation along the lines of the Department's model. Hence, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, traditionally staffed with Muslims of more orthodox learning, has been at liberty to dictate with little opposition what they claim as the proper model of religion. In the Islamist conception, religion must be made public, since there is no reason to hide it from the public sphere. When religion is hidden away from the public, there is no heavenly guidance for all the members of society. (Hilmy 2010: 215) This is to say that Muslim culture shapes institutional practices of Hindus. In the final analysis, however, it has to be pointed out that the consolidation of Indonesian Hindu Dharma has not only been influenced by the Islamic framework as standard setting parameter, but also by the early Hindu reformers who were organized in the Hindu Council and worked at the Hindu Bali section within the Ministry, who established cadre training units to produce Hindu religion engineers.

7.2. Bali Shantishanishanti (Bali is at peace)

This section critically analyzes the contemporary social situation of Bali that may not really be said to be at peace. Being concerned about the possibilities in which the ethnic and religious identity of "a million intelligent people living a simple and logical life" as Covarrubias (1965: 403) has put it in 1935, nowadays a three-and-half a million people, exposed to Indonesian immigrants which bring cultural values alien to Bali with them to the island, as well as foreign influences from tourists and expatriates, "can be preserved from distortion, losing their entire cultural-socio-religious background and rooting, proselytizing, and mere stamping-ground for traders" is worth a closer look.

In historical times both, continuously feuding regencies as well as volcanic eruptions, slavery, diseases, plagues, and fatigue constituted an incalculable social and natural environment, in and to which Balinese commoners had to render services. They rendered feudal services to the kings, the centers of power, whose task was to spiritually and materially ensure the safety of the kingly subjects. Using surrogates for human flesh to barter for their freedom, Balinese ethnic religion propitiates and placates chthonic elements and renders homage to ancestral spirits (*bhattara*) and gods (*dewa dewi*). The imagined or constructed identity of Bali as paradise was introduced by the Theosophical Society, Javanese nationalists, and the Dutch (and other Western influences) as early as the 1900s. (cf. Schulte-Nordholt 1986) In this period the image of Bali as a living museum of ancient Javanese court culture etiquette was created.

The modern image of Bali as paradise contradicts its old image of being ruled by savage and violent regents, who sell their subjects as slaves to Batavia in order to fund their habbits of celebrating flippant and risqué parties and indulging in gay practices and opium consumption. In addition, the image of Bali as Paradise belies the cruelty of the *puputan* between 1906 and 1946 and the massacres from 1965. Finally, the 2006 branding of Bali is at peace (Bali *shantishantishanti*) disguises the nature of contemporary social problems, conflicts and tension and silences about the collective memory of the 1965 massacres. The introduction of the Hindu class in 1966 and after the reform area must be seen in relation to extra insular developments in the nation state and the international community from which the Balinese Hindu reformers somehow profited.

The colonial power itself had been humiliated by its cruelty. In order to make the public forget the causalities they had caused between 1846 and 1908, they set out a program (*Baliseering*) to protect the allegedly entheal culture. Prevention of Christian and Islamic proselytizing in Bali targeted to perpetuate the feudal system sympathetic to Dutch interests on one side. On the other side, the prohibition of Malay as the language of instruction aimed to limit pro-national and anti-colonial activities among the Balinese, which similarly could have affected colonial interests. It was of utmost necessity to preserve the ethnic religion, viewed as the crucial and most important element of the social order constructed as as limb of the organism that was finally dubbed Hindu as result of an encounter and intercourse between Dutch colonizers and the Balinese clerical class and feudal regents. Balinese royalty and priesthood welcomed that attitude because their status quo and privileges, which the feudal system guaranteed, were preserved as allegedly authentic and an eternal reality of Balinese society.

In my opinion, the agents were motivated by a large part to act in order to preserve their hedonistic lifestyle as contemporary practices among Balinese upper classes impressively demonstrate. In this context, Dutch colonialists created a romantic picture in portraying Bali as a heavenly garden, a paradise, and serving as a recreational spot to comfort colonial civil servants and the European upper class and Jet Set, which in turn collaborated to indulge in the above mentioned practices of partying.

Although Balinese natural resources (rice) never were exploited as in the Moluccas, Java, and Sumatra, Balinese social and human capital was and is exploited since colonial times. The history of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, when many Balinese were deeply involved in party politics and debates over issues like modernity, feudalism, land distribution, gender and international capitalism, were swept away with the broom of tradition (Santikarma 2005: 318) which were to be found in concepts as *Tri Hita Karana*. In consequence, not natural resources, but religion, culture, and art emerged as a means of covetous gain located at the heart of distinct colonial, national, and local group interests and desires. This image of Bali as a harmonious paradise had been upheld by the Sukarno-government, but especially after the 1965 mass murders this image was pro-actively encouraged and promoted by Balinese circles and the Suharto-government to develop Bali as touristic destination and as a money printing press for the Bali region, the central government, and foreign investors with little interest or consideration of local interests of the lower classes.

"Bali's retreat from the national arena into a postmodern nostalgia for a museum-worthy past was encouraged not only by Balinese and their foreign guests", Santikarma (2005: 318) analyzes sharply, "but by middle class Jakarta culture enthusiasts who need Bali to provide them with a kind of "fantasy island" offering respite from the stress and turmoil that have spread through other regions of Indonesia". But alarmingly, not only tourists, and the Jakarta executives, but also foreign researchers somehow chose to ignore the situation in Bali, which they regard as a resort island too, perfectly tailored to suit their recreational needs after hardnosed field trips to Papua, Aceh, Central Sulawesi, and Java. Most of the Indonesinists laugh out loudly, if I tell them about conflicts in Bali. I have the impression that they chose to believe that in Bali, their recreational spot, there is peace – despite poverty, social inequality and conflict lingering everywhere – at the beach, behind the luxury hotels, and in the vicinity of their acclimated superior rooms. Other areas in Indonesia, yes, they have conflicts, poverty, inequality, but in Bali, well, even researchers need to spend a good time! In the context of the mass killings in 1965 and 1966, Geoffrey Robinson has remarked that

> (T)he strength of support for the militant and combative PKI and BTI, the prolonged and bitter fighting among Balinese during the National revolution (1945-1949), and the evidence of caste conflict even before the war, all suggest that such ideals of harmony were not shared by all Balinese. Rather, the historical evidence suggests that there has been ample room for – and possibly even a robust tradition of – disagreement and conflict within Balinese society. What has been portrayed as "traditional" belief in harmony shared by all "Balinese" appears instead to represent a social ideal espoused by a particular segment of the population – and by their supporters at home and abroad – in the name of collectivity. (Robinson 1996: 121, emphasis in original)

In the small domain of cultural and religious capital, tight rivalry and competition are on the daily agenda interconnected to accumulating status and prestige, exertion of political influence, accessing economic advantages, and the power to shape public discourse. These conflicts arose amidst a small fraction of Balinese society, the old and new elites. In consequence, at a closer look in contemporary Bali manifold conflicts exist; rarely leading to an outbreak of mass violence, but small scale violence is always part of the daily agenda. Greed, envy, hatred, and jealousy can be noticed in nuclear and extended families and kinsfolk, often culminating in betrayal, deception, fraud, even murder, and most likely black magic.

As the pace of modernization is rapid in Bali, another factor refers to the democratization and secularization of Balinese religion and culture and the erosion of ancient social systems. To put aside pressing contemporary economical issues such as poverty, joblessness, and low economy, it is reiterated repeatedly that the current climate of materialistic thinking leads to the overall sell out of property and land. This sell-out endangers in turn Balinese religion and culture, since villages, *banjars* or the sanctity of temples are traditionally not defined by boundaries, but by rituals conducted by several customary communities bound to overlapping pluralistic local units. "The phenomena of confusion of meaning and change of practices are empirical facts in Bali." (Informal communication Prof. Phalgunadi 2005)

According to Prof Phalgunadi there is a big confusion about Balinese Hindu concepts which are too easily mixed and thereby confused. This statement especially refers to the difference between Hindu Bali and the *sampradaya* (Hindu currents that practice Indian Vedanta Hinduism). The Vedanta concept of *ahimsa* (non-violence) seems to contradict the continuity of the megalithic practice of the blood sacrifice or animal sacrifice, central to the Balinese ritual.

Many religious groups called *sampradayah* (currents) make their appearance in contemporary Bali. (cf. Howell 2003, 2004) This may indicate that people are feeling increasingly dissatisfied with the institutionalized religious practices and state-organized religion. The mainstream religion promoted by the *Parisada* during the New Order regime pandered too much to the government and religious expression was controlled and limited by the government. The mainstream Hindu religious practice has been accused of being overly preoccupied with rituals and offerings – with religious praxis – and with increasingly ostentatious and expensive displays of wealth and status concurrently neglecting the content – doctrines and philosophy, the discipline of fasting, meditation, and charity – of religion. The Vedanta conception of *ahimsa* (not killing) and vegetarianism is not known in traditional Bali, but has been recently imported from India. As the blood sacrifice of animals is the cornerstone of Balinese ritual, the Vedanta conception endangers the indigenous ritual concept. Oversimplified, in sacrifice animals are used as surrogate for human meat in the ritualistic efforts Balinese make to neutralize malevolent energies (*bhuta kala*) in order to turn them into benevolent ones. This shows that the negotiation of Hindu identity is a continuing dynamic process. In consequence, Balinese face not only immense areas of social problems related to rapid social and economic change, but as adherents to a living religion they also face a dilemma: expressing their faith in a living, dynamic and meaningful way by at the same time keeping the balance between religious fundamentalism and secularization or individualization of religious traditions.

After the first Bali assault in October 2002, the extent to which the international and national media coverage debated the question whether or not the tiny island of Bali had ever been a peaceful paradise, whose innocence might now be destroyed and lost forever. According to my judgment, this question is wholesale and indiscriminative and has to be deconstructed. In Bali nothing was or is mere harmony and peace. Multi-dimensional conflicts smolder beneath the calm surface for over a millennium, of which the bunch of sweeping past tourists is not aware, taken in by the delusional service smile of the Balinese tourism industry. A short glance into some editions of the Bali Post or Nusa Bali, the local newspapers, discloses immediately that the rates of environmental pollution, criminality, suicides, drug abuse, prostitution, and violence increase steadily in Bali. This development belies the promoted concepts of *Tri Hita Karana*, which is merely a theorem of tolerance and harmony constructed after the 1965 massacres to avoid victim families' revenge on their murders. As the death list provided the *tameng* (people that took the alleged Communists and killed them) with the names of alleged Communists, actually the families of the victims know that person X or person Y from the neighboring village came to kill their relative. But as Bali is a small island and dependent on its interlocking social networks, those events have never been disclosed, communicated, or brought to closure. Occasionally, at Balinese New Year's Eve (Nyepi) those old grievances surface and mass violence erupts suddenly. (Interview Windia 2010) This even more belies the brand new slogan of Bali *shantisantisahnti* (Bali peace-peace-peace) which is in my eyes designed to attract foreign tourists, investment, and dollars to the island - from which only a small local, central, and foreign elite profits.

In the aftermath of two bombings in Kuta, the tourists continue to come in ever increasing numbers to spend a "Bali-holiday", although some exponents of Balinese culture "do hope the tourists will not come again". (Interview Prof. Suryani, protocol on 26.07.2006) In the conservative view, only then the Balinese can realize that their contemporary materialistic world view differs sharply from all values prescribed in their religion. There is a continuous debate in dailies and in public discourse about what steps are to be taken in order to face the radical and rapid change of Balinese everyday life. Today, conflicts between religious currents, clans (*wangsa*), intra-clan conflicts (*soroh*), disputes over land ownership occur frequently. Furthermore there are conflicts between traditional villages (*desa pakraman*) concerning their boundaries and resources, between traditional villages and international hotel chains at their territory that are not always dissolved by consensus achieving assemblies but are sometimes solved violently. In rare cases, if Balinese citizens are unsatisfied with practices of their local government or the police, precincts, offices, or private compounds are burned down or violently attacked. Clans continue to struggle about the right to perform ceremonies up to certain levels.

In addition, sometimes when elections are held either at district, provincial or national level, certainly violence breaks out; even ninjas sometimes make their appearance. Beheaded dead bodies are sometimes found at Kuta beach. A salient feature of contemporary society is alcohol and drug abuse, prostitution, gigoloism, and adultery. Nobility, the upper classes, expats and tourists (in short, all who can afford it) engage regularly in flippant and risqué parties, a phenomenon which is termed Discotheque-ism (*Dugem, Dunia gemerlap*, night-life) and Café-ism in local discourse. The police hunt down illegal alcohol, drug abuse, prostitution, gambling, cock fights, and adultery with minor success. Although almost everyone takes part unofficially, partying is officially viewed as amoral, illicit and out of place. Partying is a feature of resilience, because all concerted actions of the executive and the exponents of a sober culture to break down on those practices are unsuccessful.

Thus in my judgment, the ethical slogans developed by Hindu cultural engineers indicate a strong effort to provide an alternative to such practices. The process of engineering the image of Bali as a peaceful and tranquil paradise outlined above culminates in three phenomena: first, if we recall that the history of Bali is a history of shifting alliances, violent reinforcement of the status quo and asymmetric hierarchies, the brand new branding of the Bali province *Shanti-shanti-shanti* (peace) is quite ironical, if we consider the power asymmetries in Baliand it is a mere utopian vision tailored to attract investment, steer export, and tourism. Second, if we consider the share of Bali's revenues in the Indonesian budget, it has to be assessed that the own source revenue of Bali in 2003 had been the highest in Indonesia, even higher than the capital Jakarta, with the districts Badung and Denpasar ranking first and second. (Worldbank Report No. 26191-IND 2003: 26, 119-126) Thus the function of Bali as money printing press for regional and national stakeholders is prominent, with little concern for the Balinese social, cultural, and natural environment, especially the economic low class. Another point to note in this context is the passing of the controversial and in Bali highly unpopular so-called anti-pornography bill that imposes jail terms for kissing in public or baring 'sensual' body parts, and imposes a threat and a major limitation to the freedom of cultural and religious expression. However, with an eye on foreign exchange revenues, bikinis are not yet forbidden at Balinese Beaches.

> Tourists are allowed to wear bikinis in tourism resorts like Bali and Parang Tritis beach. The porn bill will treat recreational and leisure areas differently,' states lawmaker Husein Abdul Azis of the Democratic Party. Bali is the country's top tourist destination. Indonesia aims to attract 7 million tourists in 2008 and collect some US$6.7 billion in foreign exchange revenue. (Dian Kuswandini: Porn bill committee OK's bikinis at resorts. Jakarta: The Jakarta Post , Fri, 10/17/2008)

Third, the controversial conservatism expressed in the top-down spiritual revitalizing movement named *AJEG!* Bali sponsored by the independent Bali Post Group which emerged in 2002 has to be adduced. (Schulte-Nordholt 2007: 55) *Ajeg* means immortal, strong, or upright in the Balinese language and it shall provide the way to attain physical and spiritual welfare. *Ajeg* Bali became the key word in a quest for a new master plan that respected the delicate balance between Gods, men and the environment (*Tri Hita Karana*). (Schulte-Nordholt 2007: 2) *Ajeg* has become the catchword to indicate the need for a socio-cultural self-defense. Concerning the utility of the *Ajeg* Bali movement, though, the educated elite is divided into two camps, one supportive and the other rejecting. In this context, Prof Bawa Atmaja critically remarks, one might ask whether Bali is a corporate identity, a product, a utopia or a factual island with real inhabitants located in the framework of the globalizing *Pancasila*-state. While there is much pride in Balineseness and a growing sense of the incursions of other ethnic groups, especially the Javanese into Bali, the sense of nationalism and belonging to the Indonesian nation-state is remarkable amidst the Balinese, while at the same time in ethnic questions the Balinese become increasingly Bali-centric ethno-nationalists, whereas in intra Hindu plurality questions they hold currently highly pluralistic opinions. Whether the revenues of the Visa paid at the airport are allocated to the central or the regional government is in ardent dispute, as is the fact that the international hotel chains pay too little money to the *banjars*. Again Covarrubias proves true, "unfortunate as this is, the power of our civilization to penetrate can no longer be ignored. It would be *futile* to recommend measures to prevent the relentless march of Westernization. Advocate to preserve the original culture in the midst of modern civilization would mean to turn Bali into a living museum, a measure which is certainly impossible". In this context, Schulte-Nordhold (2007) has assessed: "The dilemma, in short, was how to make Bali into an open fortress."

7.3. Hindu Dharma Indonesia: Bulwark and Canopy

This section focuses on the consolidation process and the contemporary state of Hindu Dharma Indonesia.

7.3.1. One for All and All for One: In search for state funding, civil and political rights

The core values at the nucleus of Balinese culture and religion are Indo-Melanesian, Hindu and Buddhist – significantly influenced by Buddhist and Shivaist Tantrism. (Fic 2003) Culture, religion, and art are closely related, and form an inseparable cluster - each element inspiring the other. (Ida Pedanda Bajing, Interview 2006)

The Balinese do not consider themselves to be the singular Hindu community in Indonesia. They are aware that Hinduism as a "way of life" belongs to all human kind, to India and Indonesia alike. Hinduism is not exclusively Balinese, but it belongs to numerous Indonesian ethnic groups – only every ethnic group has their own ritual, etiquette, ethics, ancestors and local Gods, which are manifestations of One Supreme Lordship. This functional interpretation (Triguna, protocol 2007) enabled the Balinese reformers to sustain the megalithic practices of ancestor veneration and to integrate their ancestors as manifestations of One Supreme Lordship into the national monotheism. Likewise, the functional interpretation made it possible to integrate all the different pantheons of local and ethnic gods and goddesses as manifestations or "rays" of One Supreme Lordship (*Upadeca* 1967: 17; Triguna protocol 2007)– thereby complying with the provisions of the MORA.

In consequence, during the years of politization of religion, several ethno-religious groups in Sulawesi and Kalimantan joined Indonesian Hindu Dharma. In 1964, the Hindu Council joined for pragmatic political reasons the Joint Secretariat of the Functional Groups (*Sekber Golkar*), because "the situation forced us to do so" (Interview Sudharta 2008). With this political move, the Hindu Council aspired to "save the Hindu congregation outside Bali - the friends at the other islands" (Interview Sudharta 2008). There are the following Hindu communities in Indonesia: Balinese, Javanese (*Wongso Kulon* and *Wongso Weton*), *Tenggerese, Kaharingan*, *Toraja, Mamasa, Aluktodolo*, *Batak Karo*, and Hindus in Lombok, Madura, Lampung, Ambon *(Engki)*, Medan (Indians), and the Sikh community (joined in 2005). As Hindus, they could not be accused of being Communists, or of not having a religion, but those ethno-religious groups were regarded as legitimate members of the recognized universal *Agama* Hindu, and therefore protected by the state and given the same political and civil rights as to receive birth certificates, identity cards, and jobs in the government.

After 1965, during the late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, Hindu Dharma Indonesia emerged gradually as unitary religion in the arena of Indonesian politics and religion. It is my hypothesis, that it serves as a political and conceptual bulwark or canopy for local ethno-religious traditions and practices gathering under its administrative umbrella for the following reasons:

- to avoid persecution under the Suharto regime, or by Islamists
- to receive state funding
- to receive state protection
- to be safe from Christian proselytizing and and Islamic dakwah
- to enjoy the same civil and political rights as the Muslim majority and Christians.

Hindu Dharma Indonesia is accordingly a "political and conceptual" (Picard 2004) meta-framework for ethnic and individual beliefs and practices classified as Hindu. Despite the regional and local variations in orthopraxis, ethics and theology, one unitary system of creed is maintained throughout Indonesia.

This unitary version is designed to a large extent by Balinese Hindu reformers from the 1950s onwards, who are represented in the Hindu Council and the Hindu Directorate General. Of course, the overrepresentation of Balinese reformers in both institutions results in conflicts and tensions within the elites of those ethno-religious groups, as I could observe at the Annual Meeting of the Hindu Council in 2007 and the Workshop on Internal Pluralism organized by the Hindu Directorate in 2007. One point of controversy, for example, is that the Hindu Directorate General builds temples following the Balinese model throughout Indonesia, which does not conform to the local architecture outside of Bali. Tensions also arise in reference to the appointment of officials, and teachers, and the distribution of funding. (Fieldwork in Kalimantan 2011)

Hindu class textbooks are another point of ardent dispute, because they teach a Balinese-Indian version of Hinduism with little concern to the local variants of other ethnic Hindus. However, these points of contention and controversy are internally debated and the internal pluralism is respected – this is in my view of utmost necessity, as the Hindu minority as an "ant" needs to demonstrate internal unity and uniformity of creed towards the "elephant" of the Muslim majority, if it wants to survive. Since 2006, the Hindu congregation increasingly acknowledges their internal plurality and the overrepresentation of Balinese in both institutions decreases, as members of the other Hindu ethnicities are increasingly pushed to complete higher education in order to be appointed to positions in the central and regional government. In addition, the KTSP textbooks acknowledge increasingly local content in the Hindu class.

In consequence, it is my hypothesis, that Hindu Dharma Indonesia is best described as a designed religion. It is a canopy under which local groups united by ethno-religious practices gather to achieve the same political and civil rights as the majority religion, or rather, the people of the book, as Islam and Christianity were recognized as *agama* from MORA's inception in 1946 onwards. Until today, the interpretation of Hindu Dharma Indonesia continues using Islam and Christianity as a system of reference or standard-setting tool, especially educational models of both religions. (Triguna, Protocol of Interview, 2007). In consequence, Hindu Dharma Indonesia provides a pluralisticframework for all archipelagic Hindu religions. This pluralistic and functional interpretation is sponsored and promoted increasingly by the Hindu Directorate General for the Guidance of the Indonesian Hindu community. The graph illustrates my conception of Indonesian Hinduism as One for All and All for One:

Because Indonesian Hindus are distributed over the entire archipelago, there are several interpretations of Hindu Dharma Indonesia, but despite those differences in understanding and performance, which originate in the various ethnic traditions, Hindu experts maintain that the basic concept of One Supreme Lordship is identical. Oversimplified, Hindu Dharma Indonesia exists primarily in the heads of the elites and their discourses, and in the Hindu class textbooks, but in practice, there is *Agama* Hindu Bali which differs from village to village, there is *Agama Tengger*, *Agama Kaharingan*, *Agama Aluk To Dolo*, *Agama Sikh* and so on. The Hindu fondness for pluralism is seen as being rooted in variations of religious practice throughout the Archipelago, and these variations may be interpreted using a religious, historical, geographic, or individual approach. Interestingly, this understanding is in perfect harmony with the megalithic traditions of legal (cf. Hooker 978; Munoz 2006) and religious plurality and pluralism in the Archipelago, where the awareness of "internalized or internal pluralism", "a consciousness of other societies at the core of each society's self-definition". (Bowen 2003: 12) seems to constitute the main socio-cultural trajectory.

From the religious viewpoint, in the past, manifold "ways of life" or dharma (the Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, and Christian dharma) and numerous differing Hindu cults coexisted in the Archipelago, moreover various local traditions were practiced in Bali, therefore the historical inter-religious and intra-religious plurality is considered to be an expression of the pluriform and polyphone manifestation of One Supreme Lordship (Balinese: *Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa*). As possible roots for this polyphony or this understanding of plurality, one may adduce 1.) the Hindu philosophical systems (*darsana*), which approach the empiric one reality with different methods; and 2.) the tantric *Samkya*-Logic, in which the variety of creation emerged from two basic principles, which originated in one principle. During meditation, the practitioners are required to repeat the steps of creation, but he proceeds from variety to oneness (*Upadeca* 1967: 17; Triguna protocol 2007, Suka Yasa Interview 2007) In consequence, one conception is applied at different local sets of traditions and practices (local genius, *desa, kala, patra*) and therefore various understandings and practices emerge. The individualistic and spiritual viewpoint assumes one principal understanding, yet for the fact that humans vary in their spiritual intelligence, their level of understanding and realization varies profoundly.

All groups united in the Indonesian Hindu congregation share the same concept of One Supreme Lordship, and its basic creeds (*Panca Shradda*), but rituals, and traditions in each denomination vary. Basically, there is only one official understanding of One Supreme Lordship. The geographic condition of Indonesia, however, is used to explain the intra-Hindu plurality expressed in the veneration of different local Gods, variations in ritual and ethics. Those variations arose because the Hindu denominations have different ancestors, or religious teachers (*guru*), who spread their teaching in one region, but not in another, or simply due to immigration. For example, ancestor veneration is a central element of all indigenous Hindu denomination and has its origin in megalithic times, whereas for the Indian Hindus and the Sikh community, it is of minor importance. The Indian Goddess *Sri Lakshmi* is not indigenous to Bali, and was not known in the 1930s – the Balinese equivalent would be *Rambut Sedana*. The process of cross fertilization between Indian and Balinese Hindu traditions after 1950, however, gave birth to *Sri Sedana*.

In conclusion, in the retrospective view, differences are explained by individual spiritual capability to understand and realize faith, and the will to upgrade and deepen continuously religious and spiritual knowledge, which depends on the stage of reincarnation. In essence, every Hindu denomination follows their own traditions, while at the same time it maintains the basic five creeds (*panca Sradha*) of Hindu Dharma Indonesia.

7.3.2. How to identify an Indonesian Hindu?

> The government issues an identity card in which my religious affiliation is included; in addition I may be identified as Hindu because I believe in *Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa*, enshrined and venerated in my domestic Merajan (ancestor shrine) both as ancestor and as *Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa*. (Triguna, questionnaire)

Indonesian Hindus may be identified according to the participants in my study by the following characteristics:

1. legal evidence issued by state authorities as identity documents[391] (birth certificate, identity card, marriage license, death certificate)
2. Hindu salute (Om Swastyastu & Om SantihSantihSantih)
3. Swastika (卐) as central symbol
4. communal and public Hindu practice, ethics, and conduct (born into Hindu family, Hindus are informed by their familial, affinal, cultural and social environment - in turn the environment testifies their Hindu-ness, because *Agama* Hindu is expressed in a specific style of worship, conduct, and ethic which mirrors the values of the Hindu way of life of Vedic ethics, dharmic lifestyle, and karmic actions)
5. Prayer: Veda, Mantra *(Tri Sandhya, Panca Sembah)* chant (*tembang, kidung, kakawin, Dharmagita*)
6. Devotional acts accompanying Hindu prayer: Flower-offering, burning incense, purification with holy water, animal sacrifice
7. Offerings/animal sacrifice[392]: *Upacara* (*Panca Yadnya* Rituals) and *Upakara* (Paraphernalia, Offerings (*Sajen, Banten*), animal sacrifice (*Caru, Tawur*)
8. Gesture: *Mudra* (a symbolic gesture made with the hand or fingers. Each *Mudra* has a specific meaning, playing a central role in Hindu and Buddhist iconography), *Asana* (body position)
9. The types and classes of professional high priests (*sulinggih*), lay priests (*pemangku*) and their clothing and paraphernalia. (The "apex" of a Hindu life is to be called by the community to serve as a lay priest or professional high priest – even if the individual does not consent as this is a tough job. In Bali, one becomes a professional high priest by belonging to the Brahmin class and being appointed by the family, or to the Pande, Pasek, or Dukuh clan, or belonging to the *Waisnawa* group. There are four ways to be appointed as lay priest)
10. Production and centrality of sacred water (*tirtha*) in all rituals, especially in the cremation rituals (*tirtha pangentas*, used in the cremation rituals, which transport the deceased soul from the family shrine to the family temple in Besakih and transform the deceased soul into an ancestor, is an ardent point of concern between the old and the new elites)
11. Ritual clothing: *Kebaya, Selandang*, *Sarong, Udang* etc.
12. Places of worship: *Pelangkiran* (Shrine in House)*, Sanggah* (Family Shrine)*, Merajan* (Family Shrine)*, Pura* (Balinese Temple)*, Kuil* (Indian Temple)*, Bale (*Bali Village Temple, Kaharingan Temple)*, Candi* (Javanese Temple) etc.
13. Religious holidays: *Galungan, Kuningan, Nyepi, Saraswati, Shiwa Latri* etc.

It is important to note, that meditation or fasting as signs of being a Hindu were not mentioned by the participants in my study, indicating their assumption that both devotional acts belong to all religious communities.

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[391] As Indonesia maintained the controversial legislation to include religious affiliation ion identity cards, the question is in this context, whether an equal, just and non-discriminatory administrative practice is warranted for Indonesian Hindus in their encounter with national and regional bureaucracy outside Bali.

[392] Currently, there is a fervent quarrel, whether or not the ritual (*upacara, panca yadnya*) should be retained in its present style. It seems to be uncontroversial that the culture and objective of *yadnya* shall be retained. However, in general there are three opinions on the style of ritual: 1.) to exactly retain the style of *upacara* with costly and exorbitant *upakara* (offerings) and animal sacrifice (Bali-traditional): 2.) to adjust the ritual to the current socio-economic situation by slimming the system of *upakara* (offerings) to be more modest, less expensive and convoluted, but to retain the animal sacrifices (Bali-modern): 3.) not only to slim the system of *upakara* but to abolish animal sacrifices (Indian influenced).

7.4. Religious policies and religious education

The present study sought to describe the emergence, conception, and organization of the Hindu class in context of Indonesian educational and religious policies. Those policies comply with national and international policies. The study found that the first aim of Indonesian strategic and educational policies is to create an Indonesian citizen who has faith in God (Islam: *imam* or Hindu: *sradha*), follows the commands of God (Islam: *taqwa* or Hindu: *bhakti*), and has morals (Islam: *akhlak* or Hindu: *budi pekerti*). The dimension of spiritual intelligence in education is a particular Indonesian dimension of education, which Indonesian educational planners add to the UNESCO standards of student-centered learning throughout life.

Unique to the Indonesian case is, as the findings show, the organization of religious education as strictly confessional on one side, but at the same time pluralistic, because the citizens have the right to attend religious class from elementary to tertiary level in the religion they adhere to instructed by a teacher of the same belief. The term religion is defined by MORA and legislation approves of six state-funded religions. In addition, the religious mark is a compulsory item in the school report, and whether a pupil/student stays back or is promoted to the next level depends amongst others on how the religion teacher grades the student.

In facilitating six compulsory confessional religion classes, Indonesia aims to internalize the respective religious representations into the citizenry and to strengthen religious identity, competence, practice and the ability to communicate and understand the *agama* they adhere to. At the same time, however, an exclusive understanding of religion is nurtured which makes the students aware of considerable religious differences that might generate discrimination in schoolyards and the individual personality.

7.4.1. Human Rights and Freedom of Religion

In the aftermath of the Second World War, concepts of individual liberty and human rights have been declared universally valid. Opposed to that universalism is cultural relativism as expressed in the frequently criticized Asian Values. The cultural relativist and orientalist argument claims universal human rights would be a Christian concept that may not be extended into non-Christian legacies and cultural areas. One reason cited is "fears that the U.S. is an imperial 'Christian' power'". (Marshall, 1998: 18; emphasis in original) The relativist viewpoint holds that political theories and institutions developed in Southeast Asian countries are based on quite different assumptions about the categories and groups that make up nations as is the case in Europe or North America. (Bowen, 2005: 153; Parker, 2004: 8, 9) In consequence, Indonesia would have a particular, culturally based notion of politics that makes the country unfit for democracy and human rights.

The present study follows Antlöv (2005: 13) in qualifying such relativistic points of view, since a number of contradictory understandings of politics coexist side by side, of which no single understanding can be given primacy. The study assesses competing perspectives in Eastern and Western thought, but as difference structures identity and alterity, the Eastern way of reasoning and living could only emerge as a construction out of the contact with a supposed Western way of reasoning. In continuous reciprocal cross-fertilization processes, both perspectives influence each other and ideas are mediated into local contexts (glocalization).

Similarly, Sen's study on the genealogy of European and Asian values does not sustain the thesis of a grand dichotomy between East and West. However, by keeping in mind the concept of 'multiple modernities' (Houben 2005; Hefner 1994) and the fact that the Asian countries China, India, and Indonesia host the largest populations in the world, regional concepts of diversity und pluralism originating in Asian sets of values should be taken into serious consideration not only by Western countries, but by Arabic states that propagate universal notions and exclusive worldviews. Furthermore, it should be seriously examined how far Hindu concepts and local concepts of pluralism and their embedded styles of conflict management - as for instance conducted by Balinese Hindus after the attacks in 2002 and 2005 - can contribute to improve peaceful relations between peoples and nation-states.

The study observed a discrepancy between empirical and formal dimensions of civil life in Indonesia. Even though Indonesia formally acknowledges her 'kaleidoscopic diversity' and declares her commitment to achieve 'unity in diversity' and respect of human rights for all on an equal basis, in practice the rights of religious minorities and indigenous peoples have been compromised by state interpretations adopted in the name of national interest, modernization, economic and social development[393]. As demonstrated above, the state is constitutionally defined as a religious state, and religion plays a vital role in the public area as august national value. State-theism as represented in monotheism or integral monism inspires the remaining four principles and the entire hierarchy of legislation.

The MORA promotes the official definition of the category *agama* through its administrative channels. The Indonesianstate therefore officially establishes belief in One Supreme Lordship in currently six manifestations of *agama* as foundation for religious harmony to protect Unity in Diversity. In other words, the promotion of monotheism is a religiously neutral and tolerant statement that equates Islam with the other religious systems, if they meet the catalogue of criteria. Therefore in the last analysis the state conveys limited freedom of religion in organizing authoritarian pluralism and most of the citizenry enjoys a high, albeit varying degree, of religious freedom.

The right to embrace a religion is guaranteed as one of the basic rights in Indonesia. The freedom to adhere to a religion is substantiated in human nature as it is part of creation. Consequently, it is seen as an intrinsic part of human nature to adhere to a religion. Since the national asset of socio-cultural diversity is created by One Supreme Lordship, all religions are understood as being intrinsically equal, because the entire creation is equal. In consequence, the right to religion can neither be bestowed by the state nor by a certain group as it a divine obligation. Thus, religious liberty is defined foremost as a group right and an obligation to adhere to one of the sponsored religions. This line of thought implies that the naturalistic view of atheism or agnosticism is ignorant to human nature. In this, it is not allowed for and constrained as blasphemy or even betrayal of society, humanity, and nation. Therefore atheism, communism (during the New Order), and polytheism contradict the first principle, which explicitly prescribes state theism as represented in monotheism or integral monism.

Consequently, atheism and polytheism are not sanctioned in the Basic Law. In practical terms this requires all persons to identify themselves with one of the six faiths acknowledged by the Department of Religion (authoritarian freedom-of-choice-policy). As a result, the 1945 basic law contradicts international human rights instruments, which explicitly allow for approaching atheism or any kind of belief system. The double-edged legislation results in a *scorpion-effect* since it supports on the one hand religious pluralism as apparent in its exhaustive interfaith harmony legislation, but on the other hand, religious currents as *Ahmadiyyahh*, the Baha'i or local religions are under constant threat of being banned and the awareness of religious communities is increasingly exclusive.

On the one hand, Indonesia votes for a fascinating and globally unique treatment of religious plurality, yet on the other hand, the adverse impact of such a distinction results in a puzzling and disconcerting management of the rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion of persons belonging to particular religious or ethnic groups and indigenous people. It is noteworthy thus that the Committee on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (CERD) even applauds Indonesia in August 2007,

> Indonesia is committed to the principle of religious freedom and tolerance and has been actively advocating and promoting dialogue as the most effective means of enabling different communities to understand and respect one another. Where there is genuine dialogue, communities can live together in harmony and work together to address the challenges confronting them. Indonesia has been actively promoting various bilateral and multilateral interfaith dialogues in order to promote religious harmony, tolerance, respect and solidarity among different faiths and cultures at the regional, international and global levels CERD-Report[394]

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[393] United Nations. 2007 (August). Consideration of Reports submitted by state parties under article 9 of the Convention. Concluding observations of the CERD. Indonesia. CERD/C/IND/CO/3 : 3 (http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/CERD.C.IDN.CO.3.pdf)
[394] (http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/CERD.C.IDN.CO.3.pdf)

The discrimination between religion (*agama*) and belief (*kepercayaan*) has been upheld in the amended Basic Law. The freedom to embrace a religion – definition is up to the Ministry of Religious Affairs – is guaranteed in private and in public and to manifest this right in practice and teaching is likewise permitted. Religious freedom on an individual and communal basis is therefore guaranteed for adherents of funded religions. Thus Indonesians have to identify their religion, probably even forced to have a religion, but free to choose between the offered ones (authoritarian freedom-of-choice policy), adhere to it and perform their religious worship and receive religious teaching according to the adhered to religion. This is noteworthy for a Muslim majority state – because not only the people of the book but also Hindus, Buddhists, and Confucians are considered as a religion (*agama*). (Tibi 1995; Howell 1987)

Since the authoritarian freedom-of-choice between funded religions policy prohibits atheism, the right to freedom of thought and conscience is thereby severely limited. An authoritarian pluralism is guaranteed, however, between Islam and other religions of the book (toleration), and between Islam and religions that meet the requirements of the category *agama* (monotheism-pressure results in toleration), and between such sanctioned *agama* and belief systems (*kepercayaan*). Despite differing ideological interpretations of religious pluralism by Indonesia's political regimes and contemporary processes of Depancasilasasi, the state apparatus continuously maintains theoretical religious pluralism promoted in state policies, even if opposed by and under pressure of Islamic fundamentalist thought. Yet, besides the legal framework, there is to a certain extent commitment and awareness towards religious pluralism in society and religious communities mostly do live together peacefully.

However, alarmingly, the number of people who support a radical Islamic group is increasing; implying that pluralists have to toil to find a strategy to deal with religious exclusivists and to disseminate a helpful understanding of the term religious pluralism. (Nahrowi 2005: 11) It may be said that Indonesia is marching towards democracy even though, like all democracies, it has idiosyncrasies and imperfections. Democracy has been welcomed by the majority of Indonesian Muslims, although a small minority (…) has rejected it. (Hilmy 2010: 255)

7.4.2. Policies on religion

Following the decades after the proclamation of independence, but especially following the era of reform, Indonesia has run through complex transformation and painful transition processes in the social, environmental, economic and socio-cultural field. Three cultures of religious practices, the Archipelagic, the Hindu-Buddhist, and the Islamic in encounter with Western thought constitute the spine of the *Pancasila* state. Occupying an enormously important place in politics, economics, education and arts, religion permeates every section of life in Indonesia. (Kelabora 1976: 230) In general, all state affairs are managed according to religion defined as first national value. But one has to recall, religious values are not defined by a single *agama*, but each funded congregation developed their *agama* values in conformity with their tradition specific set of values expressed in creed, doctrine, and identity. Those particular sets of values shall be respected equally by each state funded *agama*. Consequently, a spiritual dimension is highly valued in Indonesia as state theism and spirited statehood demonstrate. Development and religion are interpreted as complementary units, the former accelerates progress and the latter bestows inward and outward bliss and the right attitude needed for developmental processes.

Starting with the first Broad Guideline of State Policy, religion constitutes an integral part of the mental-spiritual advancement of the Indonesian citizen aimed to bestow physical and psychical progress and welfare. A spiritual dimension in education, and the student's transformation into an individual, who has faith, morals, and follows the commands of God is the first developmental and educational objective in Indonesia. In consequence religious education is considered to be an integral part of progress and functions to serve societal welfare. Peculiar tasks of the MORA are to organize and facilitate the religion class and faith-based education systems at all educational levels, the compilation of the curricular content of the religion class and faith-based education system, and the administration of state faith-based educational units.

In 1946, MORA has been founded with sections for Islam and Christianity as a nationalist recompense to political Islam to comfort modernist Islamic aspirations and to integrate them into the young republic. One of its assigned tasks was to put to practice and implement the first principle and article 29 of the 1945 Basic Law in society.

In the 1950s, MORA, predominantly staffed with modernist Muslims, introduced its monothethic definition of religion, which is significantly influenced by the principle of Islamic monotheism (*tawhid)*. AsHindu, Hindu-Buddhist, and Buddhist religious practices never were fully codified in a sacred text body as the abrahamitic religions, those religions initially faced serious problems being recognized, receiving state funding, and state protection. In consequence, in the 1950s, the Balinese community was classified as not having a religion, because it had 1.) no *nabi* (founder and/or prophet), 2.) its name was disputed amongst the Balinese, and 3.) it was not internationally recognized. Afraid of Christian missionary work and Islamic *dakwah*, Balinese actively engaged in political and conceptual efforts to rationalize and systematize their religion following Islamic and Christian parameters.

Synthesizing archipelagic traditions (ancestor veneration, veneration of earth and mountains), Hindu-Buddhist, with Indian Hindu traditions, Balinese reformers rationalized and systematized their *agama* in a catechism (*Upadeca*) and institutionalized their congregation in the Hindu Council and the MORA in the 1950s. This process has been termed internal conversion by Geertz (1973). In consequence, contemporary Hindu Dharma Indonesia as expressed in the basic meta-framework expressed in the five creeds (*Panca Sradha*), philosophy (*tatwa*), ethics (*Susila*), and ritual (*Upacara*) was reinvented along archipelagic trajectories, the Hindu-Buddhist legacy and MORA's definition using Islam and Christianity as reference setting tools. (Triguna Protocol 2007) In 1958, a Hindu section was opened at MORA. In 1963, it was upgraded to a Directorate. Today, MORA has sections in which all state funded religions are represented; however, a manifest overrepresentation of Islamic sections is evident.

From 1952 to 1963, Hindu reformers represented in the Balinese educated elite and clerical elite engaged in numerous efforts to rationalize, systematize and unify the island wide divergent and variant religious orthopraxy in order to develop a digestible religion to the Muslim-controlled Ministry. Following the proposal of I Gusti Bagus Sugriwa, they favored the naming *Agama* Hindu Bali over Hindu Dharma or *Agama* Tirtha. By acknowledging their religion to be Hindu, it enjoyed international recognition, as India just had become an autonomous nation state that increasingly gained international influence and had good bilateral relations with Indonesia. By following the Indian model broadly, the reformers systematized their sacred scriptures. Alongside with the Old Javanese scriptures, the Vedas, and Smriti texts, which were in the 1930s still largely unknown, were recognized as a systematic body of sacred scriptures. Those scriptures, ancient stone inscriptions originating in the Hindu-Buddhist legacy, and the local histories of lineages provided them with the founders and prophets of their religion. As adherents to "Bali'ism" also lived scattered throughout the archipelago, and some ethnic groups in Sulawesi claimed to be Hindu in the late 1950s, the religion also was not limited to a single ethnic group.

It is my hypothesis that the fear of "Bali-ism" and of the rejoining of the Javanese *kebatinan* groups into the fold of Hinduism, Geertz (1973: 188) already has refered to, is the reason that the Hindu community is undercounted, and has problems receiving fair and equal funding from the MORA. This might also be the reason why the funding of Hindu education is considerably low, because with a small budget it is very difficult to guarantee the quality of Hindu education and educators. As the budget of the MORA is considerable, the rejoining of millions of Muslims into Hinduism would considerably alter the distribution of MORA's budget and power relations in Indonesia.

Education is conceived of as the principal agent of change in Indonesia. In relation to colonial policies and the very late educational opportunities for the vast population, educated elites of all political and religious groups subscribed to a central meaning to education. The red threat of the ideological struggle between Islamic and all other ethnic or interest groups led to two basic difficulties in education: 1.) the administrative multi-system; and 2.) the extensive private school sector. We can see that the ideological conflict about the shape of the nation state and its culture is manifest in the education system. Indonesian nationalists and the Islamic groups always placed a great weight on the importance of education. In consequence, they added spiritual intelligence as an important dimension to the national education system. As a uniform national culture, identity, or a coherent system of values never had existed, schooling represented a vehicle to achieve a civil religion or a national culture. In this context the constitutional link between culture and schooling acquires its meaning. Consequently, I assess that the most formative indicator of the nation state's efforts to construct a civil religion or a national culture is the education system. Indeed, the contemporary education system is characterized by its spiritual dimension and multi-administration. All Indonesians have the constitutional right to attend school, the religion class became compulsory in 1966, and school attendance was made compulsory in 1989.

The right to equal access to education and to sacred scriptures has to be understood as extraordinary democratic improvement in Indonesia, and especially in Bali. First, traditional feudal and paternalistic communities treated their members unequally, and second in the course of 150 years of colonization, all Indonesians were treated as second class humans and inferior to their colonizers. Equal education facilitated thus a radically different way of thinking: Individual lives became open-ended and individuals could achieve an altered social condition and status. The rapid nationwide implementation of a sufficient national education system for boys and girls alike must be evaluated as a major success of the emancipation from colonial exploitation and Indonesian developmental policies. Modern education, though remaining at a most elementary level throughout the nation, is then the primary device for nurturing national culture and values.

The outbreak of inter-ethnic and inter-faith conflicts and violence after 1998 awakened the awareness for a paradigm-shift in socio-religious diversity management. After the demise of the Suharto regime, Indonesia was able to consolidate a fragile democracy having two successful democratic elections. In 2001, the centralistic administration has been decentralized and regional autonomy has been implemented. The 1999 Guidelines (GBHN) and the 2000 medium-term development strategy (PROPENAS) mandated the drafting of a bill on a new national education system and the compilation of a contextual, competence based curriculum. The consistent practice of *Pancasila* is the main objective set out in the 1999 guidelines.

Tolerance and brotherhood of all *agama* shall be created in order to avoid conflicts, disintegration of the nation, and separatism. In consequence, faith (*imam*), following the commands of God (*takwa*). Morals (*akhlak*) and interactions between faith-based communities are continuously interpreted as the vehicle for maintaining national unity and integration. The stabilization of the function, role, and position of the sponsored *agama* in the nation state serves as moral, spiritual, and ethical base. All regulations shall conform to the values of the state funded *agama*.

In consequence, the first aim of national development is to encourage the qualities of faith, following the commands of God, and morals to facilitate unity, civilization, progress, and welfare. In that particular context, the first target of the state is to upgrade the quality of the religion class and faith based education systems by reforming the religion class and the faith-based education sector. The development of the religion class and faith based education systems shall strengthen the function and role of *agama* as they provide the moral base of national development and social ethics. Interestingly, interreligious harmony shall be practiced not only in elitist interreligious dialogues, but also by facilitating understanding that diversity is located at the very root of Indonesian society. As has been shown, this line of argumentation is maintained throughout all consequential strategic development plans in a top-down approach.

In 2002, the contextual competence based curriculum (KBK) was compiled. In 2003, the parliament passed Act 20/2003 of the National Education System, which changed the education paradigm from the transmission model to the transformation model. As stated earlier, the Indonesian education system is seen as a unifying force in the formation of the young Indonesian citizen. The new education system aims to develop the students' potential to mould moral humans who have faith in God, follow the commands of God, have morals, are healthy, educated, smart, creative, autonomous, democratic, and responsible. In contemporary Indonesia, a mixture between a centralized and contextual or community-based approach is applied. Family, society, and government are the main responsible bodies of education. Education is decentralized and all components of society have the right and task to actively engage in the operation of the education system. The Indonesian approach makes use of local cultural elements in the curriculum as a familiar area to pupils, teachers and the subject itself. In that approach local culture is not a mere setting or framework for education, but also the content of education.

The Islamic fraction argued that in the development plans since 1973, one of education's aims was to develop faith, following the commands of God, and morals. Thus, they successfully transported the 1966 compulsory religion class policy into Indonesian democracy. However, not only the Islamic faction, but also Indonesian Hindus supported the inclusion of the provision that every citizen shall attend the religion class in their *agama* instructed by a teacher of the same *agama*. This provision is in effect for all Indonesian citizens, even at schools run by foreign governments, in which either the Indonesian national or the regional governments shall facilitate the teacher.

This provision is seemingly very seldom put to practice. Likewise, for Hindus not living in Bali, this provision was rarely implemented during the duration of my fieldwork. In consequence, the regional Hindu Council try to facilitate a teacher or the religion class may be taken online or by distance learning, as the religion mark is a compulsory item in the school report. In my analysis, Hindus do profit from the compulsory classes, because as a minority they have the statutory right to Hindu education throughout the Archipelago, whether local or district governments approve of this or not.

Again, the long-term strategic plan in effect (RPJP) defines religion in catchy but vague terms as a noble national value. It is repeated that the development of religions aims at stabilizing the function and role of religions as a moral and ethical base of the nation and strengthens interreligious harmony (*kerukunan agama*). To maintain the unity of Indonesia, interreligious harmony is considered as the crucial element to achieve awareness of Indonesia's multicultural nature. Thus, the RPJP continues previous policies on the sector of religion:

In the final analysis, *agama* is considered as a national value and strategic element and end of national progress. The first objective of the new contextual and student-centered education system is strengthening of faith, following the commands of God, and morals. This post-reform legislation of the religion class continues therefore the 1966 religious policies. To achieve this end, the compulsory national curriculum comprises the religion class in all state funded *agama*, instructed by a teacher, who adheres to the same *agama* as the student. This teacher has to be provided by the national or regional government. Religious education at public schools aims at strengthening religious competence by nourishing knowledge of religious teachings and proper religious practice in the participants.

The target to be achieved is the decline of ethical and moral violations conducted by pupils and students both in the environment of schools and in society. The pluralistic awareness extends into the education sphere, since with Act 20/2003 of the national education system and the 2004 and 2006 curricula, including the curricula of religious education, a paradigm of peaceful coexistence and human rights is gradually implemented to sensitize the youth toward diversity and difference. Religious minorities, such as Hindus, Buddhists, and Confucians argue that religious education should be based on a multicultural perspective as enshrined in the five principles and the state slogan. Therefore they participate in a religious inclusivism project carried out by the MONE. However, the Muslim community is less engaged in the program and its pluralist inclusive approaches to organize the religion curricula and textbooks. (Belen Interview 2007)

7.4.3. Religion class

The issue of the religion class having been dormant since the 1870s, resurfaced in the early young republic and quickly became a great political, ideological, cultural, religious, and educational controversy. (Kelambora 1976: 236) From 1945 to 1966, participation in the religion class depended on the decision of the parents. In 1966, the religion class became compulsory. After the fall of Suharto, the religion class and faith-based education systems became the centre of controversy during the deliberation of the new law on the national education system in 2003.

Under the amended Basic Law and the Human Rights Charter, state support for faith-based education is guaranteed as a right to non-Muslim communities in predominantly Muslim inhabited Indonesia. This is a group right and one comes to possess it not through citizenship but through membership within a specified *agama*. The right has an additional collective dimension in that the interest it protects –funding and protection of long-established *agama* – can only be enjoyed in the context of group activity. In consequence, this right limits no freedom of others.

In contrast to modern Islamic states which suppress religious plurality, (Weber 2002) Act 20 in 2003 of the national education system gives students the right to attend the religious class in the state sponsored faith they embrace instructed by a teacher of the same faith. The confessional religion class begins at primary school and ends with graduation from a tertiary education institute. This is of particular importance since the religion mark determines promotion. In postgraduate studies, however, the religion class is not compulsory.

The graph shows my model of factors which influence the religion class and the Hindu religion class in Indonesia.

Ethno-religio-cultural Diversity in Indonesia
Approximately 17.000 islands; 101 ethnic groups, more than 300 languages
Diversity of religious traditions and practices
Majority Muslim Country

UNITARY NATION STATE: Reference point *Majapahit and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*
INDONESIAN CULTURE, IDENTITY and LANGUAGE (civil religion and public religion)
(Local genius: Which cultural elements have to be maintained, developed, left behind; which foreign influences have to be adopted or extracted)

Nationalism

Organicists

ISLAM (various fractions from liberal/national/ Salafi/ Jihadi)
Religious MINORITIES

Traditionalists/Javanism

Socialism/Marxism

Pluralists

State Theism: religious, but not confessional base of the nation state
Objective of all policies: citizen who has faith, follows the commands of God and has morals
(religious perspective on life)

Development Plans / Education /Security/ Value /Ministry of Religious Affairs

1945 Basic Law (§29, 30)
Pancasila
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika
Legislation

PUBLIC RELIGION
Islam, Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian
----- Civil religion (Belief in One Supreme Lordship)

pan- Islamic discourse, pan-Christian dialogue pan-Hindu discourse, pan-Buddhist discourse

ASEAN
International legal Instruments (UDHR)
World Bank
Trade& Economy

Western liberalism/ globalization

Unitary Education system as crucial vehicle of development and progress
Spiritual dimension of education
First aim of education system: citizen who has faith, follows the commands of God, and has morals

Pan-islamism *tawhid*

Indian Hindu secularism and pan-Hinduism

Intra Hindu, Inter Hindu, Interfaith discourse

Bali

Hindu Council

Six state funded religions
Authoritarian pluralism of religion
Six confessional religion classes
Hindu class and Hindu based education system

During the Sukarno presidency, religious affiliation was - despite being hotly debated - handled quite laxly and participation in the religion class has been optional. In the 1950s, the educational aim was the moral democratic human. Suharto is reported to have thought of the religious class as a threat to national unity. (Belen Interview 2007) In his view, the religion class could lead to national disintegration as it makes differences aware, and thereby creates an exclusive and not a plural understanding of religion. (Belen Interview 2007) However, related to the role of Islam in anti-colonial activities and in education, and the interest of modernist Muslims in political, educational, legal, and religious issues, the religion class was made part of the general education system in public schools in 1950.

The first Act on Education introduced an optional religion class, since the parents decided whether their child attends the class and it did not affect promotion. As a result of the polarization between nationalism, Islam, and communism in the early 1960s, the religion class was made a compulsory subject in 1966. After 1966, religious affiliation became a crucial factor of citizenship. Since then, the confessional religion class and faith based education systems are organized in an exclusive model from primary to tertiary level. The state uses the religion class to limit the freedom of religion, as only state funded religions may organize a religion class, faith based education systems, and teaching in public. Continuing Act 2/1989, Act 20/2003 on the national education system enshrined the religion one of the basic subjects in public schools, and therefore it determines promotion.

Following Independence, the modernist Muslims have worked incessantly to reverse the policy of the non-compulsory religion class in public schooling, but the political situation in the 1950s and early 1960s preserved the status quo of the non-compulsory religion class. With their efforts, the Islamic group created eventually an open public space for Hindus to realize their educational aims in the context of the national education system in the 1960s and Indonesian democracy. Whereas the private sector of Christian education and Islamic education has been well established since colonial times, Hindus inexhaustibly struggled for recognition of their religion in the 1950s, to have a Hindu religion class introduced into public schools, and to establish a Hindu education system in the 1960s and 1970s.

In 1968 the first unified curriculum of the Hindu religion class was implemented in Bali, and not uniformly throughout Indonesia. The compulsory status of the confessional religion class was continued in 1989, but a nationwide implementation of confessional classes for the minority religions has not been achieved. (Sura Interview 2007) Hindu students outside Bali were instructed in *pasraman* or Sunday schools, but the *pasraman* were neither systematized nor authorized for grading students. In consequence, the religious education of Hindu children outside Bali represented the main concern of Hindu strategic planners and the Hindu community in the arena of education. Only since 2003 the *pasraman* are supervised by the Hindu Directorate and grading is carried out by the Hindu Council to guarantee equal educational opportunities for all Indonesian Hindus.

The compulsory religion class policy in relation to private schools has been continuously debated in Indonesia. The efforts of Islamic groups to implement a provision at public and private schools alike, which ruled that the religion teacher had to adhere to the same religion as the student never succeeded during the New Order. It was only implemented in public schools and this was also not done evenly and equally for all faith communities. In consequence, the confessional religion class and the religion teacher in private schools constituted the main ideological problem in education between 1989 and 2003.

Thus, the controversy of the religion class and the religion teacher at private faith-based schools was a contested issue common to the Islamic and Hindu discourse on the religion class. According to the participants to my study, the reason might be seen in the Christian religion class at private Christian schools and higher education units. The Christian minority in Indonesia is said to have a better economic standard than the other congregations. Related to this, Christian private schools have higher quality standards than state or Islamic educational units. Muslim, Buddhist, and Hindu students alike are registered with Christian educational units and were 'forced' to attain Christian instruction. (Sujana Interview 2007; Santika Interview 2007) There was no provision that private faith-based schools shall provide religion classes other than the faith the school is based on. Therefore, Hindus and Muslims had to attend the Christian religion classes until 2003. After attending school and learning the Christian prayers and credo, the students were feared by the Hindu community to identify with Christian religion and then convert to it. (Sujana Interview 2007; Santika Interview 2007)

After the fall of Suharto, the issue of the religion class at private faith-based schools became the centre of controversy during the debate on the new education act of 2003. Despite strong opposition from the Christians, (Mujiburrahman 2006: 250) the Islamic groups supported by the Hindu Council successfully included in the Act a provision stating that students are entitled to the religion class in their own religion and instructed by a teacher of the same religion. Thus, the fear of the Islamic community of a hidden Christian agenda in schooling and the feared secularization of the nation, opened up a political space and public room to maneuver for the Hindu congregation represented in the Hindu Directorate and the Hindu Council to expand and develop the Hindu educational sector. (Sujana Interview 2007; Santika Interview 2007) Despite the increasing exclusivism of *agama*, the Hindu community profits from current legislation, as, for the first time in national history they have the statutory right to develop an educational system that is organized equally to the vast Islamic educational system of *madrasah*.

The Islamic groups supported by Indonesian Hindus successfully included two provision (article 12 and article 30) in the law stating that students have the right to attend the compulsory religion class in the embraced religion which is instructed by a teacher of the same religion. The facilitation of that teacher is the duty of the national or regional government or the concerned religious congregation itself. The *agama* congregations successfully defended the compulsory religion class policy of the New Order into Indonesian democracy by arguing that in the development plans one of the aims of education is to develop human qualities, including the religious qualities of having faith in God (*iman, sradha*) and following the commands of God (*takwa, bhakti*).

This is to say that the Hindu followed the trace previously laid by Islamic interests and were thereby able to exploit the provisions in the law for their own benefit. Consequently, Hindus do profit from the compulsory classes, because as a minority they have the right to attend Hindu religion class throughout the Archipelago. In addition, Act 20/2003 gives Hindus the opportunity to establish the statutory Hindu class at all levels and a Hindu education system. The compulsory religion class is therefore strongly supported by Hindu intellectuals.

Following the era of reform, the Hindu Dharma education sector witnesses an increasing equality with the Islamic education sector. Hindu faculties are opened throughout the country and one virtually might speak of a second-time Hindu Dharma Indonesia education boom – following its inception and first blossoming in the 1960s. This boom is the result of the new orientation of the *Parisada* Hindu Dharma on the social and educational sector, and to the strong leadership qualities and lobbying ability of Prof Yudha Triguna, Director General of the Hindu Directorate. Prof Triguna however compares the state of the Hindu education system and the Hindu class with a toddler.

In this context, I observed a concern among Hindus living outside Bali and Balinese experts about lagging behind the large private Islamic and Christian religious education sector. In Bali, where Hindus as a majority are not too much concerned about Hindu classes, leaving alone the professionals, the article on religious education is put to practice. However, despite the legal equality of Hinduism to Islam and the provisions of Act 20/2003 on National Education, this implementation seems to be problematic in financial and organizational terms in areas where Hindu are minorities. Hindus not living in Bali are really concerned even alarmed about the religious education of their children.

The present study found that the unique Indonesian approach to organize religious education is an outcome of the political situation in Indonesia. The debate on the decree of secularization of the country and the conflict between nationalism and Islam in the arena of education triggered the controversy on the place of the religion class in public schooling and higher education. Each of these ideological poles has its vested interests to protect at all cost. Kelambora (1976) shows how the status of the religion class in the school curriculum directly corresponds to the position of Islamic groups in this conflict. It also tends to elevate the status of this subject from an obscure one to the most important subject in the school curriculum.

Every funded *agama* congregation has the right to attend the religion class without discrimination, although the right not to attend RE is omitted at all. In fostering this authoritarian religious pluralism, Indonesia remains loyal to its constitution and statemotto, but in practice the equality is often infringed and compromised by the state apparatus and civil actors.

As Act 20/2003 stipulates the compulsory confessional religion class as basic subject, the students' performance in the religion class determines their promotion. In this, the government's intervention into the *agama* sector is enormous. Normatively, the freedom-of-choice policy allows for a delimited pluralism or authoritarian pluralism of religion. In this regard, Indonesia organizes the religion class in schooling and higher education in a modern and - albeit limited – authoritarian pluralistic manner - a unique approach for an Islamic majority state.

Despite its pluralistic and contextual nature, the religion class is organized strictly confessional and inter-faith elements are simply non-existant. Contrasting the exhaustive inter-faith legislation, the pillarization (Riis 1999) of religion in every sector of life may be seen as to implant an exclusive understanding of *agama* into society. From the elementary level, children are taught to look at each other as distinct by attending different religion classes. However, as the religion class is allocated two hours a week only, one might not overestimate this point.

Rather, the well documented hesitation or unwillingness of Islamic institutions and actors - may it be private or governmental - to actively engage in pluralism indicates and substantiates the lack of inclusive understandings and religious exclusivism in Indonesia. Only at the level of higher education, comparative study of religion is offered. In the final analysis, exclusive understandings are nurtured at the regional level, and discriminatory practices slow down and hinder the even and equal treatment of faith-based communities the national pluralistic framework provides for.

The integration of the Hindu class into the modern school system and the Hindu education system may be considered 1.) as one of the greatest democratic renewals of religion in Indonesia (Steenbrink 2001: 20) and, 2.) as a singular case of religious pluralism in Muslim majority nation-state.

7.4.4. Hindu class and Hindu education system: Specifics and challenges

The rationalization and systematization process from traditional orthoprax religions of Bali to Hindu Dharma Indonesia is singular in the world. By choosing from among their religious traditions certain elements that they considered essential and universal, the Balinese reformulated elements of their own traditional heritage and Hindu-Buddhist legacy into a "new" religion: first as an ethnic religion (1052-1964) and then as a universal Hindu religion (1964-present). They also introduced acculturated elements from Indian Hinduism since the 1940s. The "process of "internal conversion"" (Geertz 1973: 182) may be classified as singular and "unique" (Bakker 1993: 323), because it took a course that the Weberian model of rationalization did not predict (Geertz 1973: 182; Howell 1978: 266-271). It brought forth new religious institutions (Hindu Directorate at MORA, *Parisada*). Summarizing Geertz 1973, Howell 1978, Bakker 1993, and my findings, the current study identifies four elements of the "internal conversion", which in turn resulted in the emergence of the Hindu class and the Hindu-based education system in Indonesian democracy:

1. intensification of religious concern/ religious reason(ing)
2. Belief and Practices related to One Supreme Lordship (first principle of the nation-state)[395]
3. religious literacy/systematization of doctrine (democratization of access to sacred scriptures; *panca sradha*)
4. social organizational institutionalization of religion (Congregational organization in *Parisada* and Hindu Directorate and Agents of religious construction

The intensification of religious concern and reasoning during the colonial period led to foreign ascriptions (Dutch, Indian) and self-identification of the Balinese practices as Hindu.

In 1958, the Balinese reformers and traditional elite consented to the name *Agama* Hindu Bali. The first principle, the 1945 Basic Law and Policies of the MORA resulted in an increasing religious literacy and the democratization of access to sacred scriptures by segments of the society previously not allowed to access scriptures. In addition, it caused the formulation of the five core creeds of Hindu Dharma Indonesia in 1963. "Both the act of formulating such a creed and the creed itself are unique in the Hindu world". (Bakker 1993: 323)

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[395] I expanded Howell's concept of practices relating to a transcendental God, as God may be in discrepancy to Islamic orthodoxy conceptualized as immanent.

The institutionalization of Hinduism in the nation state resulted in the establishment of the Hindu Council. Never before in the history of religion in Bali, an institution modeled after a modern organization existed, which could unify the cults, priests, and practices of Bali. Moreover, thirty years after its establishment, the ethnic based organization broadened its scope and became national and universal in its outlook as the bulwark or canopy for several ethnic groups adhering to traditional religions based on ancestor veneration.

Traditional Balinese religion had no religious teaching for all children. Teaching was given according to the social classes children were born into. Whereas the majority of the commoners and peasants were left without any education before the Dutch conquest, the access to historical and ritual knowledge was restricted to the upper classes *(triwangsa)*, the *jero* (insiders). The *jero* were authorized after an initiation ritual (*upanayana*) to study sacred scriptures. The initiation is considered a second birth. After this rite, the student is considered a "twice born" belonging to the *dwijati* segment of society. In consequence, viewed from the social and political perspective, knowledge was not freely disclosed prior to the 1920s; it was valuable and a source of power. The tight control or release of historical and ritual knowledge and information conferred upon the palace or priest compounds considerable advantage, by not sharing information freely both could to an extent direct ritual and kinship networks and were vested with a source of power. (Parker 2003: 31) At formal educational units as the *Dwijendra* Foundation, the Indonesian Hindu University, or the State Hindu Dharma Institute the tradition of *upanayana* is continued. Students are required to participate in initiation rites prior to taking up studies. Likewise, at the end of the studies, a closing ritual is held (*mejaya-jaya*).

Following the Dutch conquest, sacred scriptures were no longer restricted to the *triwangsa*, but are now printed in textbooks and are therefore made available to all Balinese and Hindus. The integration of the Hindu class into the public school system may be considered one of the greatest democratic achievements of religion in Indonesia. The shift from a traditionally exclusive understanding of accumulating knowledge (*ajawera*) towards the modern universal concept of public schooling for all Balinese demonstrates the secularization of expert religious knowledge and religious exegesis and a move towards an understanding of education as a universal right, which is not restricted to birth-right privileges. Today, many scriptures have been translated into Indonesian or even English and are published as books. Their contents and the designed *panca sradha* were systematically developed into contents of textbooks, curricula and syllabi and are taught from kindergarten to higher education. The shift from a traditionally exclusive understanding of accumulating knowledge towards the modern universal concept of schooling for all Balinese demonstrates the secularization and democratization of tradition towards an understanding of education as a universal right, which is not restricted to birth-right privileges. Religious scriptures were after the 1920s no longer restricted to the *triwangsa*.

The methods (*Sad Dharma*) to nurture in the Hindu competencies used in formal and non-formal education are:

7. *Dharma Wacana* (method of speech/lecture)
8. *Dharma Tula* (discussion method: panel, sarasehan, symposium, seminar)
9. *Dharma Santi* (reading Vedas communal approach method, networks and clubs, silaturahmi/maintaining family ties; *anjangsana*/ philanthropic visits to orphanages)
10. *Dharma Gita* (Vedas reading method in *pesantian* mode, from club to national level)
11. *Dharma Yatra* (pilgrimage method in order to attain enlightenment)
12. *Dharma kanti* (method of cooperation with social organizations and state institutions)

These methods are very effective in the nurturing religion and religious competencies and are applied for all Hindu communities (Sujana Interview 2007) These methods are used to achieve the twofold solution to the problem of Hindu Dharma: *Moksartham Jagathiaya ca iti Dharmah*, dharma is the path to achieve bliss and release.

I like to recall that Hindus profit from the compulsory classes, because as a minority they have the right to operate and attend the religion class in their faith throughout the Archipelago. The Hindu class and the Hindu education system is mainly organized by the Balinese new *jero* elites, but these elites constitute not a coherent, but a highly fractioned group, therefore the contemporaneous Hindu education system and the Hindu religion class face challenges located either within the Hindu community or outside the Hindu community. Factors inside the Hindu community which slow down the progress of HRE are the low educated human capital, inadequate finances, no congruent view on content and didactics, competition for status and funds between institutes and docents, and finally leadership.

Prior to 2003, education was dominated by a centralistic organization. As a natural consequence, the transition the new educational act demands is difficult to realize, because the educational institutions and their stakeholders were not used to create an educational culture which corresponds and materializes the vision and mission of the 2003 education system. (Tanu 2007: 2) The phenomena caused by this deficit are (1) the decline of piety and moral of pupils, (2) the decline of quality and (3) the decline of standards. (Tanu 2007: 2) In consequence, theweaknesses of the national education system are to be found in management and organization (decentralized responsibilities), the budget, the social situation (economy), and the geography of Indonesia. It has been assessed that besides an insufficient infrastructure (textbooks, buildings, libraries, technology), the quality of the national education system is very low, and since the Hindu class and the Hindu education system are a subsystem of the national education system, its quality is low as well for several reasons.

Considering <u>access and allocation</u>, the access for Hindu students in Bali to the Hindu class in schooling and higher education and the Hindu education system is warranted. However, Hindu communities living outside Bali face obstacles and sometimes even severe discrimination by the regional governments or schools, when they attempt to organize the Hindu religion class, therefore equal access to the Hindu religion class is currently not guaranteed in Indonesia. As already mentioned, whereas Hindus as a majority in Bali are not concerned about the religion class and Hindu education, in areas, where Hindus are a minority, it is highly problematic to put these provisions into practice. Therefore Hindus not living in Bali are alarmed about religious education of their children. In theory, Hindu parents could file a lawsuit to seek their constitutional, educational, and human right to operate a Hindu religion class at public and private faith-based schools, but according to the officials in Jakarta, this has never happened for security reasons. Therefore formal education is complemented with non-formal *pasraman* education, to assure a nationwide grading of Hindu students to guarantee equal opportunities in schooling, since Hindus have the lowest educational background and standard throughout the population.

Act 20/2003 provides the Hindu minority with the possibility of organizing the Hindu class and a Hindu class and education system at all levels. The allocated class time of formal HRE is only two or three hours each week. This class time is generally regarded as insufficient, in order to satisfactorily impart religious competence in pupils. Reasons are that as a result of the rapid social change, increasingly fewer people work in the agrarian sector, hence administration, education and services (handicraft and tourism) are important industries nowadays. As a result, increasingly more married mothers leave the villages and are employed in urban areas and their children are looked after in day care, pre-school, and kindergarten. Thus the familial function to transmit religious values and competences is gradually defunct. In addition parents in general are regarded as being less qualified to nurture Hindu values and competences by Hindu strategic planners. Traditionally Hindu education and moral education was conducted in the core family or clan, but because of social change and modernisation many mothers are working and the core families move from villages to cities (Urbanisation) because the workforce at the villages is limited and in the south mostly home industries and service sectors in relation to tourism booms, so there are no members of the clan to take care of toddlers and children. The Hindu women organization has the noble task of organizing PAUD that is education for toddlers and children from the level of playgroups to kindergarten. Now that is transmitting Hindu beliefs and morals. (Suryani, Interview 2006)

For the first time in history, a national education standard of the Hindu class and Hindu faith based education was stipulated in 2005. This has to be assessed as a major success in the implementation of the Hindu religion class, and for the first time in Hindu history a unitary Hindu examination standard of Hindu competences and performance was set.

There is not yet a continuous Hindu education system established which provides a profound education from kindergarten to higher education. This is to say the number of private Hindu-based educational units is insignificant compared with other private faith based institutions, whereas a public Hindu-based education system (*widyalaya*) is virtually not existent that is equal to the Muslim (*madrasah*) or Christian education systems, which provide a special faith-based study program at the senior high school. In this context, the outstanding and pioneering position of the *Dwijendra* foundation in the area of Hindu based education is noteworthy. Similar to the Islamic education system that is equalized with the state education system, the establishment of an integrated course of a public Hindu based education system (*widyalaya*) is deemed necessary to form graduates qualified in Hindu religion that either continue education at Hindu faith-based or general universities, either to be appointed as Hindu teachers or to have an integrated and secure Hindu identity and to represent Hindu values in their respective profession. Contemporaneously there are only four state Hindu based tertiary institutions and seven private Hindu based tertiary institutions. Public facilities are the State Hindu Dharma Institute (IHDN) in Denpasar (established 2005), the undergraduate Hindu Pedagogy Study program at the Manado University in Sulawesi (established 2006), the State Hindu Dharma Schools for Applied Science (STAHN) *Gede Puja* in Mataram, Lombok (established 2003) and the Tampung Penyang in Palangka Raya, Central Kalimantan (established 2003). Private institutions are UNHI, Universitas *Dwijendra*, the Hindu Dharma Schools for Applied Science in Klaten, Java, the *Agama* Hindu Schools for Applied Science Dharma Nusantara in Jakarta and Lampung, and the Schools for Applied Pedagogy and Education in Amlapura and Singaraja, Bali.

Looking at the sum total of schools and tertiary institutions in Indonesia, the Hindu-based institutions hold only a minuscule and insignificant share of that sum total. Hindu tertiary institutions face two major challenges, first the quality of education at those institutions is considered to be lower than the state universities, and therefore only students enroll who are not accepted at state universities and consequently the students' capital is not optimal. Second, there are link and match problems, since the capacities of the labor market to absorb graduates of the Hindu based institutions is limited, graduates of Hindu based study programs who hold a degree in Hindu Dharma (*sarjana agama*) may be employed at the Hindu Directorate, the regional Hindu offices, at Hindu tertiary institutions, at the Clerical Center of the Army, or as Hindu religion teachers. But they will have difficulties to find work in the civil sector, or as teachers at other tertiary institutions, since not even the State Udayana University in Bali employs a *sarjana agama.*

The rapid development of the Indonesian education system has to be assessed as a great achievement, yet it produced unqualified teachers that cost the quality of education.Due to the fast expansion of the education system, the high demand for Hindu teachers had to be filled with scanty and provisionally trained teachers, but it has to be seen as a major success of Hindu educational planners that a Hindu teacher training has been operated at all. Additionally, the quality of Hindu instructors is low, because many teachers graduated from colleges or universities, where they only attended one or at most two courses in each Hindu subject. Most Hindu teachers graduated from schools, where they did not obtain a profound basic education in Hindu religion and their knowledge remains superficial.

Related to the paradigm change in education, another point of concern for Hindu planners is that many teachers still apply the teacher centered approach in class, and are less skilled in understanding and employing the new child centered contextual paradigm. The negative effect is that religious competence is inadequately nourished in children, since teachers themselves frequently have insufficient competences in religion and didactics. Moreover teacher's salaries are low, forcing teachers and lecturers to have two or even more jobs, causing decreasing labor-discipline and willingness to work, health problems, and inefficient instruction. Therefore all national and Hindu policies on education target the increase in quality of teachers and graduatesin postgraduate programs. Next, after having graduated from the qualification program, the situation of the teachers shall be improved by grants for nourishment, transport, and special grants as stipulated in 2005. In this regard the Hindu Directorate provides scholarships for teachers, and the Department of Education appointed UNHI, IHDN and the *Dwijendra* University as in-service teacher qualification centers, which even have the permit to operate far distance training programs that are not provided by law 20 in 2003. As I have shown in a previous chapter, there is a demand for about 30,000 Hindu instructors all over Indonesia. Even in the Hindu heartland of Bali, there are not enough Hindu instructors at all levels. This is to say that the distribution of Hindu instructors is uneven and unequal. Reasons are discriminative practices, poorly educated Hindu teachers or not enough graduated Hindu teachers.

Another problem with regard to the religion teacher is appointment and who pays the salary. State Hindu teachers who are paid and appointed by the MONE to public or private schools enjoy the securest position, they are assigned a fixed number of courses, they have a fixed salary, they receive regular raises of salary and subsidies, they can become class teachers, and finally, their civil rank can rise in hierarchy, as they may be promoted as principal or as supervisor. The second type is the Hindu religion teacher paid and appointed by the Department of Religion which enjoy a less favorable position, as they cannot become class teachers or be promoted as principals or become supervisors, their salaries are paid by honorarium, and they do not receive subsidies, thus the Hindu Directorate incessantly negotiates with the MONE about teachers' assignments and appointments.

A major obstacle to the operation of a Hindu education system and the Hindu class is the minuscule budget allocated to the Hindu Directorate by the planning unit in the Secretariat General at the Department of Religion. In consequence, state run Hindu educational units are seriously in deficit. This sheds a critical light on the generally neutral and pluralistic position and policies of the MORA. I found that Hindu educational planners may be as motivated and spirited as possible, yet, if the Head of the MORA planning unit does not approve of the Hindu Directorate's budget plan list, the Directorate is not allocated the necessary budget to realize its targets.

Consequently, prior to Prof Triguna's appointment, the budget might be influenced by the political and religious orientation of the Head of the planning unit, that is to say whether the head of the planning unit is a nationalist or a 'greenish' (Sujana Interview 2007: Santika Interview 2007) – an orthodox – Muslim, the allocated budget is minuscule or sufficient though still below the optimal amount. There appears to be a drawn out argument on the Hindu budget allocation, as according to the proportional argument the Hindu Directorate should receive around six percent of the entire budget allocated to the Department, but in practice they receive less than one percent of the actual six percent. This reduction is legitimized with the argument that the Hindu community would not have many Hindu institutions, and only three tertiary institutes, and therefore it would be sufficient to have a small budget. In consequence, an adequate carrying out of the Directorates functions is severely restrained. The net effect is that the three state Hindu institutions have a limited budget to operate educational activities. For that line of argument, Prof Triguna made a census of all Hindus in Indonesia, and the real number is now 10, 5 million Hindus. As demonstrated by the steadily increasing budget, Prof Triguna argued successfully that for such a number of Hindus, a sufficient budget has to be allocated. He is even the first Director General to have a staff car and a staff residence. MORA's backdoor policies oppose the national educational targets, since the statutory program for pre-school Hindu education, for the *widyalaya* and for Hindu inter-faith harmony policies were not subsidized by the Department in 2007 and 2008.

As I have shown, observers of the Hindu class and education system assess that children obtain not only limited religious education in school but also increasingly insufficient parental education in religion. As a result, formal, informal and non-formal education in Hindu Dharma wins currency as a long-term strategy to engage with Hindu Dharma Indonesia. The crucial change in the modern world is that increasing numbers of lay people are pressed to understand religion, since not only the religious meaning systems that structured their lives are blurred by the impact of modernization and globalization, but also the social systems that structured their lives are increasingly destabilized. A net effect of the rapid process of urbanization in Bali is the endangered religious and value education of the youngest generation, as young core families live in cities dependent from child care institutions; therefore the larger family cannot socialize the traditional values. For this reason Hindu educational planners attest that the religion class has an important position in nourishing Hindu religion and values, even if the allocated class time is limited. The function of the religion class is to assist parents in nurturing religion in their offspring, since not all parents are able to explain religion to their children sufficiently. Thus Hindu experts in religion and education criticize that society has an unsatisfactory knowledge and competence in Hindu Dharma as a whole. Therefore, the national and regional government and the Hindu elites are given the mandate to organize a system of Hindu education for children and society at all levels of education. The net effect would be that the religion class gradually plants religious competences in the next generations and as a side product, in the parents.

Concerning the operation of the Hindu education system by Hindus themselves, I found that shortages, incompetence, vested interests, and internal conflicts as well as disagreement between its exponents are the main factors leading to an insufficient functioning of the Hindu education system outside and to some extent in Bali. In general, the universal Hindu identity is set as protection against proselytizing and discriminative practices, whereas Balinese ethnicity is used as protection against "Muslim Java". The educated new *jero* elite promotes and utilizes religious concepts as tools of power and behind the promotion of those peaceful and harmonic concepts are real vested interests related to economics and political authority.

The present work likes to point to the monopoly on textual exegesis held by the *Parisada Hindu Dharma* and the Hindu Directorate which vests enormous power and authority into the hands of these institutions by shaping religious practice and education - in case of the Hindu Directorate administrating the scarce funds. It is safe to say that the *Parisada* is an institution for religion-building, controlling, and promoting religious uniformity between Indonesian Hindus of different ethnicity. Related to domestic political factors, the *Parisada*'s engagement increased only recently in the educational sector, and its education committee was inefficient in this regard in 2007. However, the trend is towards a positive improvement of its role in the educational sector.

The problem at hand is that there is virtually only a small fraction of Hindu experts, who master both pedagogy and Hindu Dharma. Either the experts master Hindu theology, ethics and ritual with little command of pedagogy, or they are fully trained pedagogues and researchers, but not qualified to interpret Hindu Dharma. Furthermore caused by differences in orientation either towards India or the Archipelagic past, these experts usually do not agree on a common viewpoint in exegesis and methods. In brief, they either follow the secular Western model in education, or they support the Indian ashram model, but I could observe no efforts made to design an own model of Hindu Dharma Indonesia education. In consequence, the inefficiency of the Hindu class and the education system administration is caused by a lack of concerted action amongst the actors in the educational arena, either the *Parisada*, or the Hindu Directorate or the respective Hindu education units.

To adduce an example, the tycoons of Hindu education, Prof Triguna and the chair of the *Dwijendra* foundation Wiyana, whose grandfathers already were appointed to the positions their grandsons contemporaneously hold, maintain a friendly, but competitive and tense relationship. Both belong to the Brahmin class, promote discipline, the application of modern technology, and a transparent and sober work ethos. But yet Wiyana's conservative orientation is feudal-balicentric, and whether material or spiritual, he strictly objects to Indian influences in Bali fearing an Indianization of his beloved Balinese culture, whereas Prof Yudha Triguna is modern oriented, cooperates with Balinese and Indian organizations and individuals alike, and has secularized the last stronghold of the Brahmins in September 2007 by declaring that anybody may be appointed as a high priest. Thereby he stripped off the feudal Brahmin privilege of providing the professional high priests legitimated to perform the most important rituals.

It appears that every institution and every teacher training institute has its own ideas and conceptions. There is little cooperation and integration between the institutions as I conducted my fieldwork. In consequence, the resulting confusion slows down the process of Hindu education planning, realizing the planned education targets, and thereby achieving progress. Out of this reasoning Prof Triguna has adopted a national core curriculum aiming to unify the competences Hindu religion educators must learn during their studies. After the splitting of the Hindu and the Buddha section at MORA in 2006, Hindu Dharma Indonesia, the Hindu class and the Hindu education system are managed centralized by small, educated elites.

However, success of the Hindu class and the Hindu education system depends not only on the goodwill of the planning unit at the Secretariat General at MORA, but as I found, likewise on the charisma or *taksu* of the leadership's quality, personal relations, social networks and the skills and professionalism of the staff. Therefore the proper operation of the Hindu class and Hindu education system depends on the education, quality, and lobbying capabilities of the leadership of the *Parisada*, the Hindu Directorate and the respective tertiary institutions. But these institutions compete and vie for the authority of interpreting Hindu Dharma Indonesia, for students, and funds, and in addition their leadership promotes varying perspectives, which are followed loyally by their staff which identifies with the institutions and the leadership; in 2008 there existed no coherent approach and conception of the Hindu class and the Hindu education system.

In the final analysis, the state of the formal Hindu education system is that of a toddler compared to the adult Islamic or Christian education systems, which have an integrated course of education from elementary to higher education. Consequently the Hindu community is still very backward in respect to a faith-based integrated course of education from elementary to higher education in general. In order to produce a sufficient output of Hindu humans to raise the quality of Hindu human capital in general, a private or state education system has to be established across Indonesia to provide the Hindu community, especially the youth, with the opportunity of learning throughout life to comprehend and realize Hindu teachings.

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9. CURRICULUM VITAE

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16.08.1975, Jugenheim, Germany

Single parent of I Gede Merlin A. Landmann
(12.12.1998; Denpasar, Indonesia)

<u>**Education**</u>

Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany – October 2005 to November 2010
PhD in <u>IPP Religion in Dialogue, Religious Studies</u>, Department of Protestant Theology
(Expected publication: Augustus 2012)
Dissertation topic: "*Hindu Class and Hindu Education System in Bali: Emergence, Organization, and Conception in the Context of Indonesian Educational and Religious policies*" (in English)
Supervisors: Edmund Weber, IB G. Yudha Triguna (Bali, Indonesia)
Reviewers: Edmund Weber, Baerbel Beinhauer-Koehler, Freek L. Bakker
Disputation Committee: Stefan Alkier (chair), Edmund Weber, Freek L. Bakker, Heiko Schulz, Markus Wriedt
Submitted: May 2009, Disputation November 2010, Publication Permit April 2012,
Grade: rite ("passed")
Complimentary exam (*Ergänzungsprüfung*) in Religious Studies – May 2008
Grade: sehr gut ("very good")

State Examination Authority for Translators and Interpreters, State Education Authority for the District of Darmstadt-Dieburg, and Darmstadt Municipality (*Staatliches Prüfungsamt für Übersetzer und Dolmetscher, Staatliches Schulamt für den Landkreis Darmstadt-Dieburg und Stadt Darmstadt*)
 November 2004 to May 2005
Grade: *befriedigend* (satisfying)
Certified translator of Indonesian Language

Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany - October 1996 to November 2004
Magistra Artium in South East Asian Science, Psychoanalysis and Religious Studies
Thesis topic: "The spiritual Hindu cleansing ritual ‚*Pemarisudha Karipubaya':*
A Way of traditionally coping with the tragedy of Kuta (in German)"
Grade: sehr gut ("very good")
Commitee: Bernd Nothofer, Tilmann Habermas, Edmund Weber

Hindu University of Indonesia, Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia – August 1998 –August 1999
Study of Hindu-Theology and Balinese Culture

Eleven March University, Surakarta, Central Java, Indonesia – February – Augustus 1998
Study of Indonesian Language (Dharmasiswa fellow)

Professional education and experience

Research and Development, Bali Mode: Visa and Business Consultant, Sanur and Jakarta, Indonesia, June 2012 – present

Coordinator of Training Program on Indonesian Hinduism, Master and Doctoral Studies Program, Hindu University of Indonesia, Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia, November 2011 – present

Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Research Fellow, RD: Governance and Societal Peace, Project: "Genesis, Structure and Functioning of systems of violent social control: An inter- and intra-regional comparison between various regions in Indonesia and the Philippines", Project Director: Lothar Brock, Project Coordinator: Peter Kreuzer, August 2009 – July 2011, funded by DFG (Deutsche Forschungs- Gemeinschaft)

Sworn translator at Darmstadt district court, Germany (*allgemein ermächtigte Übersetzerin der Indonesischen Sprache am Landgericht Darmstadt*), February 2006 – November 2012

Employment History

Tutor for IPP "Religion in Dialogue" PhD. Candidates, Faculty of Protestant Theology, Goethe University Frankfurt a. M., Edmund Weber, 2005 -2006

Research Assistant, Technical University of Darmstadt, Architecture, Faculty of Planning and Building in non European Areas, Compilation of Online Database, Costa Mathey, 2005 -2006

Research Assistant (*Wissenschaftliche Hilfskraft*), Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Research Department III: Democratic Peace; South East Asian Section, Lothar Brock, Peter Kreuzer, 2005

Undergraduate research assistant (*Studentische Hilfskraft*), Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Research Department III: Democratic Peace; South East Asian Section, Lothar Brock, Peter Kreuzer, 2003-2004

Undergraduate research assistant (*Studentische Hilfskraft*), Clinic for Psychosomatic Medicine and Psycho-Therapy, Goethe University Hospital Frankfurt a.M., (Goethe Universitaetsklinikum), Jochen Jordan, Frankfurt a.M., 2000 - 2003

Student job at Deutsche Bau und Boden Bank, during national vacations 1993 - 1997

Awards, Honors and Fellowships

Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Frankfurt Graduate School for Social Sciences and Humanities Graduate, awarded fellowship for completing doctoral studies – May 2008 to March 2009

Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, awarded Graduate Fellowship "Frankfurt - Doctoral Grant" – May 2006 – May 2008

University of Leiden, IIAS, Erasmus/Socrates Intensive Program "Social and Cultural Change in Southeast Asia, focusing on Indonesia", May, 21 2006 to Jun, 3 2006

Hindu University of Indonesia, German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) awarded research grant for completing Master thesis, December 2003 – April 2004

Dharmasiswa Fellowship, Language Faculty, Eleven March University, Surakarta, Central Java, Indonesia (Department of Education and Culture, Indonesia) – February 1998 – August 1998

Training and **Courses (complimentary education)**

Interview training for specialists and executives (*Interviewtraining für Fach- und Führungskräfte mit*), Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt a.M, *Monika Weiß,* October 29, 2010,

Disputation (*Disputation*), Workshop Frankfurt Graduate School, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Dr. Dunia M. Mohr, January 27, 2010

MAXQDA (*MAXQDA*), Workshop Frankfurt Graduate School, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Dr. phil. Thorsten Dresing, December 8, 2009

Qualitative Interviews (Qualitative interviews), Workshop Frankfurt Graduate School, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Prof. Dr. Cornelia Helfferich, October 8 -9, 2009

Leadership skills for doctoral students (*Führungskompetenz für Promovierende*), Workshop Frankfurt Graduate School, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, March 05-06, 2009

Writing Academic Articles in English, Workshop Frankfurt Graduate School, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Dr. Miriam Wallraven, 18.02. 2009 and12.03.2009

Final PhD -phase: Writing Workshop on Scientific processing (Redesign, reformulation ...) and completion of doctoral *thesis (Endphase Promotion: Schreibwerkstatt Wissenschaftliche Bearbeitung (Rekonzeption, Reformulierung …) und Fertigstellung der Promotion*), Workshop Frankfurt Graduate School, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, January 10-11, 2009

Generic Skills Training: From doctorate to executive positions; how to valorize your doctoral education, Workshop Frankfurt Graduate School, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Paule Biaudet, December17-18, 2008

Qualitative methodology as a "method of choice" (*Qualitative Methode als „Methode der Wahl"*) Workshop Frankfurt Graduate School, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Prof. Dr. Ingrid Miethe, November 20-21, 2008

Marie Curie Fellowships in the Seventh Framework Program for research and technological development (FP7), Workshop Frankfurt Graduate School, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, November 30-31, 2008

Research Experience

Fieldwork PRIF research project on "Genesis, Structure and Functioning of systems of violent social control: An inter- and intra-regional comparison between various regions in Indonesia and the Philippines",

Application and admission of research permit, PRIF research project on "Genesis, Structure and Functioning of systems of violent social control: An inter- and intra-regional comparison between various regions in Indonesia and the Philippines", February 2011 and July – Augustus 2011 (including three presentation at the Indonesian Ministry of Research and Technology)

Preparatory fieldwork PRIF research project on "Genesis, Structure and Functioning of systems of violent social control: An inter- and intra-regional comparison between various regions in Indonesia and the Philippines", Denpasar, Jakarta, Serang, May 2009 – August 2009

PhD. Field Research (Third step), Validation of Field work at the research sites in Denpasar and Jakarta, cultural and academic activities at the research sites, March – April 2008

PhD. Field Research (Second step) at three research sites in Denpasar, Bali (Hindu State Institute, Dwijendra Foundation, Hindu University of Indonesia) and in Jakarta (Ministry of Religious Affairs, Directorate General for the Guidance of the Hindu Community), cultural and academic activities at the research sites with Prof. Weber, conducting of 20 interviews, participating in 6 workshops organized by the Ministry of Religious Affairs,

Directorate General for the Guidance of the Hindu Community, participation in the Hindu Council of Indonesia's annual assembly, February 2007 to January 2008

Applying for the research permit to conduct field work at The Indonesian Institute for Sciences (LIPI) in Jakarta, November 2006

PhD. Field Research (First step) at three research sites in Denpasar, Bali (Hindu State Institute, Dwijendra Foundation, Hindu University of Indonesia) and in Jakarta (Ministry of Religious Affairs, Directorate General for the Guidance of the Hindu Congregation), conducting of four biographic interviews, Jul-Aug, 2006

Preliminary field work for PhD. Project, "limitation to the research field", Hindu University of Indonesia, Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia, June-September 2005

Preparation for translator examination, Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia, December 2004 – April 2005

MA thesis research on punctual Balinese ritual "Pemarisudha Karipu Baya", Hindu University of Indonesia, Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia, academic activities with Edmund Weber, December 2003 – April 2004

Study trip to Bali, Indonesia with Edmund Weber, academic activities at Hindu University of Indonesia, Memorandum of Understanding between Goethe University Frankfurt and Hindu University of Indonesia, **February-April 2003**

Study trip to Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, Penang) Singapore, Thailand (South-North), February-April **2002**

Study trip to Central Java and Bali, Indonesia, February-April **2000**

Travelling Indonesia (Lombok, Bali, Java, Sumatra), Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, Penang) Singapore, Thailand (South-North), October 1995 – July 1996

Publication:

Fathurrohman, Ferry and Landmann, Alexandra, Human and Socio-environmental Studies, Kanazawa University, Japan, 24/2 (Sep 2012) "Ancestral Tradition, Social Control, and Sentencing in South Banten: '1001 Rules of the *Wiwitan Polity"*

„Every man has a religion", in: Federlin et al. Was Ist Religion? Beiträge Zur Religionsforschung: Edmund Weber zum 70. Geburtstag. 2011. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. pp 71-97

Asien, Juli 2007 104, Book review: *Johannes Herrmann*: Unter dem Schatten von *Garudas Schwingen*. Chancen und Probleme nationaler Integration in Indonesien, p 186

Paideuma, 52, 2006: Book review: Hinduism in Indonesia, 2004, Martin Ramstedt

Conference Presentations / Papers

Presentation on "Hindu Dharma Education in Indonesia" at the 22nd Conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia (IAHA), Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Indonesia/Directorate of Historical Geography/AIPI/HOMSEA; Surakarta, Central Java, July 02-05, 2012

Presentation on "*Restorative Justice A la Baduy*", 8th Conference of the Indonesian Association of Oral Traditions, Association of Oral Traditions and Tandjung Pinang Municipality, Tanjung Pinang, Bintan, Riau, Indonesia, 23-26.05.2012

Presentation on Traditional Law of the *Baduy Wiwitan* Polity, Southeast Asia Update 3, Van Vollenhoven Insitute, Leiden, 24. Juni 2011

Paper on "Adat Law in Indonesia", Open Seminar on "Legal Plurality as a Grace" (*Kemajemukan Hukum Sebagai Rahmat*) organized by Ferry Fathurokman, Firman Venayaksa and Alexandra Landmann at House of the Worlds (*Rumah Dunia*), Serang, 04. Februar 2011

Presentation on "Hindu Dharma Indonesia: A tailored religion" at the 21st Conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia (IAHA), Asian Research Institute; National University of Singapore; Singapore, June 22-25, 2010

Presentation on „*Qual der Wahl: Religionsfreiheit in Indonesien*" (*Tough choice : religious freedom in Indonesia*), Department of Cultural, Faculty of Southeast Asian Studies, 26.01.2010, Goethe University Frankfurt a. M.

Presentation on „*Die Bomben-Rede Praesident Yudhoyonos*" (The „bom adress" of President Yudhoyono) in 2009, held at the public discussion on "Superwahljahr 2009" (super election year 2009) at the Conference of the PhD. Candidates Network on Indonesia (*Tagung des Doktorandennetzwerkes Indonesien*), Faculty of Ethnology, Excellence Cluster "Normative Orders" Goethe University Frankfurt a. M., October 23, 2009

Paper on „*Der hinduistischen Religionsunterricht in Indonesien*: *Entstehung, Konzeption und Organisation im Kontext der Bildungs- und Religionspolitik*" (Hindu religious education: emergence, conception and organization in the context of Indoensian educational and religious policies), German Association for Asian Studies, DGA junior researcher' group on Asian Studies (*Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Asienkunde - DGA Nachwuchsgruppe Asienforschung*), , Schloss Buchenau, December 8-10, 2006

Competencies & Interests

Linguistic proficiency

Language	Converse	Write	Read	Experience
German	1	1	1	Mothertongue
English	2	2	2	3 years
Indonesian	1	1	1	Since 1995, certificate
Malaysian	3	2	2	5 Month
Dutch	3	3	3	qualification
Latin	-	1	2	qualification

Computer Literacy: MS Office, MAXQDA, Adobe Photoshop, SPSS

Social sciences and humanities:

- *Religious Studies* (sociology and ethnology of religion, ritual theories)
- History and Structure of the Archipelagic Religious Field, Indonesian Hinduism
- *Cultural Studies*: functionalism, structuralism, system theory
- *Legal Anthropology*: Malayo-Poynesian legal systems, legal pluralism in Indonesia, "Adat Law" (Bali, Dayak, Baduy)
- History and contemporaneous mechanism of Adat Law (Bali, Dayak, Baduy), Indonesian Constitution
- *Area Studies:*
- *Indonesia*: language, prehistory to contemporary politics, Indonesian Islam and Politics, Indonesian Constitution, Indonesian Religious and Educational Policies
- *Bali*: social and religious change in Bali, contemporary Balinese culture and religion, Balinese ritual theory, adat Bali, Balinese Samkya Philosophy
- *Baduy*: culture, religion, and law