
Journal of Religious Culture

Journal für Religionskultur

Ed. by / Hrsg. von Edmund Weber
in Association with / in Zusammenarbeit mit Matthias Benad
Institute for Irenics / Institut für Wissenschaftliche Irenik
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main

ISSN 1434-5935- © E.Weber – E-mail: irenik@em.uni-frankfurt.de – Website: www.uni-frankfurt.de/irenik/

No. 78 (2005)

Islamic Support on the Westernization Policy in the Ottoman Empire: Making Mahmud II a Reformer Caliph-Sultan by Islamic Virtue Tradition

By

Seyfettin Erşahin*

Abstract

In this article we dealt with the relations between the state and religion / Islam and its interpreters i.e., the ulama, their needs each other. As a case, with an original source, we focused on the time of the Mahmud II (1808-1839) The Ottoman reforms of the nineteenth century is reconciliation between Islam and Western civilization. In this process the ulama played key role by commenting Islam accordance with the need of the age or of the Ottoman Empire. The reformers, chiefly the Sultan and his close friends needed the support of the ulama to legitimate their reform programmes In this crucial stage the head of the ulama the Shaykhulislam, used his own religious knowledge and influence, derived from his office by writing a treatise to persuade the masses to accept the reforms. Applying the traditional virtue literature on the Ottoman dynasty he presented in this pamphlet one of the Western-minded Ottoman sultans as an ideal caliph-sultan. This attitude helped to transform the middle-aged Ottoman political structure and society into modern ages in Western line.

Key words: Islam, the ulama, Ottomans reforms, Mahmud II, Westernization, and modernization.

Introduction

Through the Islamic history, the ulama has been divided in response to the politics of the governments of the Muslim states. The official ulama (*ulama-i resmi*), has always been on the side of authority, stability and peace. Because of depending on the official salary of income to some extent economically, it has been said that they try to legitimize the policy of the authority to persuade the mass founding evidence from the Qur'an in which "*the killing - in this sense stability or authority- is preferable to the anarchy*". (Qur'an, II/217) The non-official ulama (*ulama-i gayr-i resmi*) who economically independent from the government and have not got any official post, have been criticising the policy of Muslim authorities outspokenly. Deriving their religious evidence to their political action from the Qur'an "*commanding right and forbidding wrong both of individual and governmental level*" (Qur'an, III/110)

Since the state and religion needed each other, the two spheres formed an uneasy partnership- with the politician holding up the upper hand- to preside over Islamic society. In essence this unwritten contract required the ruler to grant the ulama certain privileges, semi-autonomous control over judicial and educational institutions, a voice in or a vote over policies affecting the religious establishment, and a share of country's wealth - in return for ulama support of government. In secure regimes needed ulama cooperation for at least two reasons: Firstly of which was the ability of religious leaders to control *legitimacy* to political ruler. Secondly the ulama could serve as *intermediaries* between rulers and ruled, to calm restive elements and to win acceptance for unpopular measures.

As a rule the political and economic power of the ulama declined in countries where the administration succeeded in creating a centralized bureaucracy and secularized system of justice and education. Vulnerable or weak regimes invariably protected their flanks by consolidating the religious leaders in a variety of ways inter alie: by publicly deferring to their elevated social statues, by conferring with them on a regular - if largely ceremonial- basis, by participating in Muslim feast-days (Ramadan) and activities, by constructing and endowing mosques and religious schools, and especially by avoiding governmental violations of religious conventions. Even those administrations which had decided upon a policy of Westernization and secularization such Ottoman Empire tried to work out tactics to retain the ulama's support or at least to naturalise their potential opposition.

I. The Reforms of Mahmud II

The Ottoman Empire embarked quite early on the internal reforms programs inspired by European models since the Ottomans had long suffered heavy defeats in the battles against enemy. They understood that, militarily, they were behind contemporary Europe. First of all the army had to be reformed. Mahmud II (1808-1839) had to carry on the military reforms which were initiated by his predecessor. In 1826, with all ranks of ulama behind him, Mahmud II eliminated the Janissary corps and organized the new one, the Asâkir-i Mansure-i Muhammadiya.¹ But could not stopped there; he widened his reforms to encompass financial, administrative, educational, even social and cultural life.

To provide financial sources for his reform programme Mahmud, from 1813 onwards gradually put all the revenues of all the official and non-official "wakfs" under the care of the Awkâf-ı Humayun Nezareti in 1831.² By this policy Mahmud also made the `ulema and some leaders of the Sufi orders government employees. Mainly for economic purposes, the most important and larger iltizams were taken over and administered by a new military treasury, the Muqata'at Hazinesi. A similar treasury the Tershane Hazinesi was established to support the navy. Some economic burdens were imposed on shops and markets in the form of taxation such as the Holy War taxes (the Rusumat-i Jihadiyye).³

Mahmud II devoted increasing attention to education and opened training centres for the new army and the Hassa corps. In this process, despite the strong opposition Mahmud sent the first group of 150 students to various European centres such as England, France, Prussia and Austria in 1827.⁴ The educational reforms to a large extent aimed to create new educated elite on Western lines as an alternative to the madrasa-educated elite i.e. the `ulama.

As for the social reforms, Mahmud started by changing the appearance of the soldiers and later that of the civilians. In 1826, the Western tunics and trousers were formally accepted as the uniform of the Asâkir-i Mansure.⁵ After a period of hesitation among the `ulema and some other state dignitaries, in 1828, by the order of the Sultan, the `ulema sanctioned a new head-gear, the fez⁶ Gradually the Sultan extended the sphere of the clothing reform. In 1829 an edict of the Sultan imposed regulations concerning the clothing worn by different estates within the Empire. According to this edict, with the exception of the `ulema corps, which was

allowed to keep its traditional dress, fez, frockcoats (jubbe or harvani), trousers, and black leather boots became compulsory for all the state employees.⁷

Meanwhile the Ottoman palaces and the houses of the pashas (Pasha Konakları) started to be decorated and furnished with European-style furniture.⁸ Especially in the social life of the upper class state dignitaries the Western social manners and habits began to appear. This group started enjoying Western-style entertainment and recreation. In the foreign embassies in the Capital the Ottomans began dancing with ambassadors' wives.⁹ The Sultan introduced European protocol for receiving foreign diplomats.¹⁰ By the Sultan's initiative, traditional Islamic beards were trimmed, even sometimes shaved completely.¹¹ The European saddles became fashionable and symbols of reverence in the Capital.¹² Before Mahmud's edict, in the Empire Monday and Thursday used to be holidays. Now only Thursday was recognised as being a holiday by government offices.¹³

Mahmud II improved communications for his centralization policy and propaganda campaign. In 1831 the first official Turkish newspaper, the "Takvim-i Vekayi", was published in order to explain "the internal and external affairs of the Exalted State and changes".¹⁴ Finally we should mention that in 1832 hanging the Sultan's portrait became compulsory in government offices. Despite the fact that, according to the opinion of the majority of the `ulema, such a practice is forbidden in the sharia a portrait of Mahmud was sent to the office of the Shaykhulislam.¹⁵

II. The Opposition to the Reforms of Mahmud II

It is quite understandable that Mahmud II was in a difficult position. Going beyond a defensive military reform programme, by adopting European social and cultural practices, he faced strong opposition from different segments of the Ottoman society. First of all the reforms threatened, to a certain extent, social, political and economic interest and the status of different social strata. Moreover it brought about ideological arguments in society. Given any opportunity the resentful sections were ready to express their anger and concern regarding the reforms. For example, as the historian and statement M Nuri Pasha states: *"Because of the lack of a regular army the Russians won the war, (referring to 1829) and come to Edirne. In Istanbul the remaining Janissaries and their disgraced accomplices ascribed this defeat to the destruction of the Janissaries and the failure of the new army. Therefore they made anti-propaganda, even dared to some extent to demonstrate against the authorities in the streets of Istanbul"*¹⁶

At the beginning of the reform movement, as noted, almost all the ranks of the ulama supported the Sultan. However a new stage appeared in the relations between the Sultan and the `ulama even before the defeat by Russia in 1829. There were some rumours that some of the praying leaders (the imams) and the preachers (the wa'izs) in the army were going to be reduced. This policy caused displeasure among particularly the low-ranking `ulama.¹⁷ After the war with Russia self-criticism began in the Capital. On the one hand the Sultan and his reformist group thought that more reforms were needed to strengthen the army. On the other hand the resentful groups believed that the failure of the army was a result of imitating infidels.¹⁸ Moreover, as pointed out earlier, the economic consequences of the confiscation policy of the wakfs revenues pushed the low-ranking `ulama onto the side of the opposition. The historian Lutfi reports that in 1829 many mosque ministers criticized the reforms in their sermons and speeches in the holy month, Ramadan, so quite a number of `ulama were exiled for this reason.¹⁹ In 1829 and 1830 many of the dissatisfied `ulama supported and joined the rebels all around the Empire.²⁰

Parallel to the low-ranking `ulama, the softas (the madrasa students) strongly opposed the reform programme. It seems, as Heyd states, that: *"Since the studies at the madrasa were*

strictly limited to the traditional subjects of Muslim learning, the softas objected violently to European reforms; in all probability they considered them a danger not only to their religious beliefs but also to their economic prospects."²¹

Another opposing group were the Sufi orders. The Sufi orders did not only suffer and object to the reforms from a religious point of view, but also from an economic one.²² Having suppressed the Janissaries, Mahmud, obtained a fatwa which accused the Bektashi Order, the spiritual ally of the former, of being heretics and so was able to abolish them.²³ Accusing of sympathising with the Bektashi, some `ulama and the elite were sent exile.²⁴ The Mujaddidiyya and the Khalidiyya branch of the Naqshibandiyya Order's emissaries, shaykhs and a number of its adherents were sent into exile being blamed for forcing the people to join their Order.²⁵

The Sufis publicly protested the reforms. For instance, in 1929 during a Friday prayer at which the Shaykhulislam Abdulwehhab Efendi and the other State dignitaries were present, a strange dervish cursed the Shaykhulislam accusing him of influencing the Sultan to adopt false rites.²⁶ Also a dervish, known as Shaykh Sachli, stopped Mahmud on his road and shouted at him: "Infidel Sultan, God will demand an accounting for your blasphemy, you are destroying Islam and drawing down upon us the curse of the Prophet."²⁷

III. Islamic Support of the High-ranking `Ulama to the Reforms

The fulfilment of such a Westernisation reform programme was not an easy task to achieve in a traditional Islamic society without the participation and support of the `ulama. Because first of all Mahmud II, as seen, faced with the crisis of legitimacy of his caliphate in the eyes of Muslim subjects.

Winning over the ulama and some segments of the society Mahmud II followed two ways. On the one hand he personally and deliberately following a religious policy, built up and restored a considerable number of mosques, "wakfs" and "tekkes", and very often attended Friday prayer, sometimes issued "fermans" calling people to observe their religious duties²⁸, made an Islamic primary education under imams' mandatory for all children; and gave to poor ulama positions as imams in his new army, doubling their salaries when they grow restive²⁹.

On the other hand Mahmud also seems to have decided to use the legitimate and intermediate power of the ulama. Thanks God, the attitude of `ulama towards the reforms were largely determined by the realities of their time rather than the ideals of Islam. In the course of time and that of political, economic and social developments they generally sanctioned all the proposed reforms, quoting some the legal maxims such as "necessity permits what is prohibited", the "lesser evil"³⁰ and "public interest necessitates one to act in this way"³¹

The ulama also gave constructive response for Mahmut's direct appeal to his subjects by appealing the traditional virtue literature (The Fadhail). For this purpose he ordered some prominent ulama to write some books and pamphlets "to enlighten" and even "to warn" the "ignorant mass". From the very beginning, the Ottoman / virtue (fadhail) literature had been emerged. In this literature the structure and basic characteristics of the Ottoman Dynasty was glorified and exposed. By centralisation on the caliph in these books it was made effort to apply to some religious traditional terms for legitimating of the Dynasty. The main objects of this literature are to glorify and to legitimate Ottoman Dynasty in the eyes / the judgement of the subjects; in other words religion i.e., Islam has been used as a political tool.³²

For propaganda processes Mahmud ordered the head of the ulama the Shaykhulislam to write a treatise in which the theory of obedience and virtue of the Ottoman dynasty would be explained in the terms of the virtue literature.³³ Responding to this order the Shaykhulislam Sayyid Yasincizade Abdulwahhab Efendi introduced his theory by collecting twenty-five hadith with some comments under the title of *Khulastu'l-Bayan fi 'itaati's-Sultan*.³⁴ The date of publishing of the treatise 1247/1831 is very important, because the Sultan's authority was

under threat of the opposition. It seems that on completion, the treatise distributed within the Capital as well as the main centres of the Empire.³⁵

It seems that Abdulwahhab's treatise made a considerable contribution to institute the theory of obedience to the caliph-sultan in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. The arguments of Abdulwahhab appeared again in the time of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909).³⁶

There is no doubt that, to a large extent, the theory of obedience was exploited by autocratic regimes through the Islamic history. In both cases i.e. the reigns of Mahmud II and Abdulhamid II, the Empire and the authority of the sultans were threatened by internal and external events. They, therefore, wanted to tighten their position and pull the Empire together. In Mahmud's centralization policy and Abdulhamid's pan-Islamic policy such theory was desperately needed to persuade the people to obey their caliph-sultan and to stand by them. The two sultans wanted to be recognized as caliphs by their subjects.

IV. Making a Westernized Reformer Caliph-Sultan

1. The Necessity of a Ruler

Abdulwahhab, for supporting the centralization policy, started to establish necessity of a ruler, and then moves to prove Mahmud's fitness for the position of ruler; finally he came to a conclusion that it is a religious obligation to obey such a Muslim ruler i.e. the Caliph-Sultan and his orders, referring to his reforms.

Abdulwahhab opens his argument concerning the necessity of a ruler with the medieval Islamic theory. According to this theory, human beings are social or political beings (*hayavan-i madani*) and must co-operate in order to meet each other's requirements. Al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111) took the same argument stating that "men had to live in a society; and were exposed to quarrels and conflict. They therefore, needed a principle of power (*sultan*) to guide them and to arbitrate in their disputes. Such a principle required a norm (*qanun*) to enable differences to be solved and decisions based on law to be imposed."³⁷

The Shaykhulislam accepts the same argument stating that "human beings are in need of solidarity and co-operation between each other, because every one has different abilities in issues of livelihood and continuation of life in many ways."³⁸ This statement reflects "the idea of different crafts", which was explained by al-Razi (d. 606/1209), such as agriculture for producing food, weaving for making clothing, building for creating houses and politics for arranging, in an orderly manner, human affairs.³⁹

Abdulwahhab carries on his argument as follows:

"Existence of this solidarity depends solely on civilization (tamaddun)⁴⁰ and human society. But the character of the human race is different; particularly, ordinary people lean towards evil (sharr) and depravity (fesad). This, therefore, causes depravity and disorder (fesad anu khalal) in the social order within a short time. This means the suspension of God's ordinances (ahkâm) concerning the 'umrân of the world⁴¹ and existence of mankind for a while. It is therefore necessary for some defined general principles ('usul kulliye) for this world and the hereafter to maintain the continuity of the human race and civilization of the world. For this reason God has sent the Messengers and revealed the Books to give order to the world and to the human race, and for the welfare of mankind. He has put down ordinances (ahkâm): instructions (awâmir) and restrictions (zawâjir) concerning the human affairs and fixed punishments (hudud) for the crimes of oppressors (zalims) and sinners (fasiqs) and clarified lawful (halal) and unlawful (haram) in accordance with the rules of wisdom (al-hikam) on behalf of all creatures and in conformity with the necessity of time and aptitude (isti'dad, in Turkish text mesalih).⁴²

It could be said at this stage that the Shaykhulislam was trying to set up a base for making a reformer or renewer caliph-sultan by emphasizing the conformity of the “ahkâm” to contemporary conditions and human welfare. As will be recalled it has often been repeated by Islamic jurists that “ahkâm will undeniably change in the course of time.”⁴³ This legal maxim appeared almost three decades later in the collection of civil codes of the Empire the *Majalla*.⁴⁴

Abdulwahhab continues his explanation: “Consequently Allah has authorized a just caliph of the Ottoman Dynasty (Al-i Osman) to implement the fixed punishments, the administrative issues (siyasa) and the obligation of “jihad” for the sake of Allah to raise His word until the last day.”⁴⁵

In medieval Islamic political thought although no doubt about the necessity of a ruler, there is a dispute as to whether reason or revealed law dictates the necessity. The jurists hold the idea that it is the shari` that dictates the necessity of a ruler whereas Muslim philosophers justify this idea via the use of reasoning. According to the former one the shari'a has to be implemented by one who is divinely authorized to enforce its ordinances. The Qur'an also indicates that: “Obey God and His Messenger and those in authority among you.” (IV/59) Obedience is, therefore, divinely imposed upon believers. And then it is clear that they are imams.⁴⁶ The jurists, therefore, insisted on the necessity of imamate by the Divine: the imamate is established to replace prophecy in the defence of faith and administration of the world.

In the light of this explanation without any doubt Abdulwahhab accepts the argument of the jurists stating that “God has delegated caliphs to implement the ordinances, administrative affairs and the obligation of jihad.”⁴⁷ On the same matter he quoted a saying of the Prophet: “Religion and (temporal) power (sultan) are twins, therefore, religion is the foundation and the sultan is guardian; without the foundation the sultan is torn down and without the sultan the religion will be destroyed.”⁴⁸

2. The Making Mahmud II an Ideal Ottoman Caliph-Sultan

a. The Titles of Mahmud II

Having established the basis for the necessity of a ruler, Abdulwahhab moves to the next step to establish the Caliph-Sultan as acceptable to the shari'a and to call the masses to obey him. In his address to Mahmud II Abdulwahhab combines the traditional Turkic-Persian titles with Islamic ones, on the same lines as the Ottoman dynastic theory, which was developed and completed by the mid-sixteenth century.⁴⁹ He adheres to a rather formal and traditional style of presentation, listing the Sultan's titles as follows:⁵⁰ 1. “sultanu'l-ghuzât va'l-mujahidin” (the sultan of fighters on behalf of Islam), 2. “khalifetu'l-haliqa fi'd-devrân” (the caliph for the creatures of all times), 3. “emiru'l-mu'minin” (the head of believers), 4. “imamu'l-muslimin” (the leader of Muslims), 5. “munawwiru eriketi'l-khilafa” (the illuminator of the Caliphate throne), 6. “muzayyinu seriri's-saltana” (the embellisher of the throne of the power), 7. “afkhâmu'l-khawâqin” (the most illustrious of khaqans), 8. “zill Allahi fi'l-ard” (the shadow of God on the earth), 9. “sahipkiran” (the lord of a fortunate conjunction), 10. “mujaddidu'l-erkâni'l-dawla” (renewer of the state's pillars), 11. “sâhibu'l-shawkah” (the lord of the might), 12. “hâfizu'l-bilâd” (the guardian of the lands), 13. “nâsiru'l-ibâd” (the helper / ally of the creatures), 14. “azamu salâtini'l-ard” (the biggest sultan of the world), 15. “ghawsu'l-Islam wa'l-muslimin” (the helper of Islam and Muslims), 16. “suratu'l-amn wa'l-aman” (the aspect of security and protection), 17. “mahdi-i akhir zaman” (the saviour of the last time).

It is useful to focus on some of them.

Ghâzi: As the Shaykhulislam states the Sultan is the Sultan of the “guzzat” (p. of ghazi) who wages “jihad” or “ghaza” for the sake of Islam. From the early years, the Ottoman Sultans considered themselves leaders of a religious war (ghaza) against infidels.⁵¹ The foun-

dation of the Ottoman state on the border with Byzantium emerged this idea gave a particular force and immediacy. As known The Holy Law, in fact, makes jihad against non-Muslims an obligation on the Islamic community. In waging war on Christians, the Ottoman sultans fulfilled the command of God, the duty of ghaza, and this idea gave legitimacy to their rule and a *raison d'être* to the state itself.⁵² It could be considered that by emphasizing the ghaza idea Shaykhulislam tries to give the Muslim subjects, who suffered from defeats in the battlefields before enemy, self-confidence that Mahmud is the sultan of the ghuzat who wages war against the infidels victoriously.

Khalifa: In the treatise Mahmud is titled “Khalifetu’l-haliqa fi’d-devran” (the caliph for the creatures of all times), “emiru’l-mu’minin” (the head of believers), “imamu’l-muslimin” (the leader of Muslims) and “munawwiru eriketi’l-khilafa” (the illuminator of the Caliphate throne). It is obvious in the *Khulasa* that Mahmud II is the caliph of all Muslims and sat on the throne of “al-khilafat al-kubra”,⁵³ a phrase which is generally only used in connection with the first four caliphs of the Prophet by some strict jurists. The emphasis on the caliphate of the Sultan is the main theme of the treatise. In this crucial time Ibnu’l-Annabi also emphasized the right caliphate of Mahmud II more or less by the same arguments.⁵⁴

When the Ottomans reached their hay-days by the sixteenth century, as head of a Muslim state, the sultans required spiritual and divine approval and developed the theory of the Ottoman Caliphate.⁵⁵ The Grand Wazir Lütfi Pasha who was the key person in this process, composed a treatise in 1541 called *Khalasu’l-Ümme fi Marifeti’l-Eimme* firmly defined and established the caliphate of the Ottoman Sultans, denying the classical theory of the Quraysh origin, with some religious arguments.⁵⁶

After the war with Russia (1768-74) the treaty of Kuchuk Kaynarja named the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph asserting the religious authority of the caliph over the Tatars in the Crimea. From this time onwards the practice of sultans of adopting the title “caliph” became very frequent in order to exert religious influence upon their Muslim subjects and to be used as a political weapon against rebels within the Empire. As the case of Mehmed Ali of Egypt indicates, the Muslim rebels seem to have had some religious and political arguments to justify their actions against the caliph-sultan. Mehmed Ali's son Ibrahim Pasha, after invading Syria in 1831, decided to march into Anatolia. But before doing that he got a fatwa from the mufti of Aleppo to depose the caliph. By spreading such a fatwa inside Anatolia and Istanbul he hoped to effect the deposition of the Caliph by a popular revolt.⁵⁷ One of the reasons to emphasis on Mahmud's rightful claim to the Caliphate was a response to this development.

With connection to the title caliph, Abdulwahhab addresses Mahmud II as “zill Allah zillullahi fi’l-ard” (the shadow of God on the earth), a phrase which appears in the sayings of the Prophet.⁵⁸ This title had been used by Muslim rulers from the beginning of Islam borrowing from the Sasanid political tradition to claim that the ruler is supported and sanctioned by God in all his actions. In the Ottoman virtue literature zill Allah attributed the Sultans.⁵⁹ It is quite understandable why Mahmud was addressed by this title. As will be remembered the people in the Capital started insulting Mahmud, accusing him of being an “infidel sultan” (Gavur sultan). This title gave the message that he was still within Islam and the Shadow of God. Whatever comes from him also comes from God. All these reforms are, therefore, in accordance with the will of God.

Mahdi: Mahmud was called with the title “Mahdi”, reflecting the popular eschatological belief that a Muslim saviour will appear at the end of time.⁶⁰ In the Ottoman history Mahmud was not the first sultan who bore this title, before him, for example, Selim I was described as Saviour of the later times, “Mahdi-i Akhir zaman”.⁶¹ It is most probably the idea of Mahdi was introduced in the Ottoman virtue literature by Abdurrahman el-Bistami el-Hurufi (d. 1454) in his pamphlet *Miftahu’l-Cifri’l-Cami*.⁶² It is known that the Ottoman state had been suffering from a series of defeats since the 1760s and there was an expectation of the

“Mahdi” who would save the Empire. The idea was even common among the bureaucrats and military officers.⁶³ The public, therefore, was ready to accept such a saviour. At this stage, by attempting to modernize his army in order to restore Muslims’ pride against infidels, Mahmud was a good candidate for being presented as an expected “Mahdi on the horizons of the Empire.

Mujaddid: One of the titles of Maumud in treatise is the “Mujaddidu’l-erkani’l-dawla” (renewer of the state’s pillars). With regard to the idea of “mujaddid”, “renewer” a saying of the Prophet in Abu Dawud's collection indicates that “At the beginning of each century God Most High will send to the Muslim community someone who will renew its faith and sovereignty.” (Sünen-Melahim 1) In the Ottoman history it was claimed that the some Ottoman sultans are renewer of its century. Lütfi Pasha referred this hadith to glorify the Ottoman Dynasty. He assumed that the most recent “renewers of the faith”, the Ottoman Sultans: At the beginning of the eighth Islamic century Osman Bey had restored Islam after the conquests of the pagan Mongols; at the beginning of the ninth, Mehmed I (1413-1421) had revived the faith after the destructions of Timur; and at the beginning of the tenth, Selim I (1512-1520) had defeated the Safavid infidel, Shah Isma’il, and upheld the shari’ah.⁶⁴ According to M. Es’ad, apart from those mentioned above, Sultan Mahmud is the “mujaddid” of the laws of Islam by virtue of renewing matters relating to religion, the Imperial council (Divan), the Scribe (Kalemiya) and the army (Sayfiya) at the beginning of the thirteenth century Hijri.⁶⁵ There is no doubt that Mahmud was the renewer of the laws of Islam (mujaddid-al-kawanin al-Islam) and of the pillar of the state (al-arkan al-dawlah).⁶⁶ Here again the title aimed to respond to the public resentment against the reforms; that is to say, Mahmud cleared the way for a new path for the Ottoman State by renewing the old Ottoman system.

The titles of Mahmud II represent the heroic and honorific epithets traditionally ascribed to the Ottoman dynasty, even though the political and military situation of the Empire made it impossible for him to fulfil the promise of these titles. However this tendency has been continuous in the Middle East, even though it has declined very sharply for the last two centuries. Small and local successes, even military coups, made the Middle Eastern rulers heroes and saviours of the ummah and encouraged them to bear such titles. It was particularly common during the wars of independence directed at Western colonialism for almost all the rulers in the Middle East to be called by Islamic-nationalist titles, such as “qaid-i `azam” (the exalted leader), “za`im al-ummah” (the leader of ummah), in spite of their humiliating circumstances.

Despite some traditional Turkic titles in the treatise one would not claim that Abdulwahhab was appealing to the nationalist sentiments of the Turkish population of the Empire. Because at the beginning of the nineteenth century, although nationalist movements started among the non-Muslim millets in the Balkans, nationalism had still not gained any ground among the Muslims in the Empire. Islam was the only means of keeping the Muslim subjects together. Therefore it would not be wise to play on such sentiments in order to invite Muslims to obey their universal caliph-sultan.

b. The Personal Qualifications of Mahmud II

As far as the qualifications of the caliph are concerned, the well-known sunni political theory of al-Mawardi (d.450/1058) states that the Caliph must be just ('adil) in his dealings among his subjects; have religious knowledge ('ilm) to exercise the independent reasoning (ijtihad); be brave and courageous (najdah and shaja'ah) to protect the Islamic territories and wage 'jihad' on non-believers; be able to hear, see and talk perfectly and must not have any physical disabilities; be broad-minded regarding the administration of the state; and finally be a member of the Quraysh tribe of Arabs.⁶⁷

In the Ottoman political experience, the fundamental qualification for the Sultans was the individual's worthiness to fill the position. The Ottomans believed that simple succession

proved that the Sultan was worthy of the crown; however, the Sultan may grow old, feeble, or corrupt and thus lose his worthiness to serve as Sultan. Following this orthodox Sunni line Abdulwahhab presented Mahmud II as an almost perfect ruler i.e. the caliph-sultan to the subject.⁶⁸

1. In physical and spiritual aspects Mahmud is perfect. He is unequalled / unique (adimu'l-misal), and his creation is in the excellent form of the human race with all perfections (fitrat'u'l-'aliya wa kamalatu'l-insaniyya).

2. Mahmud has a perfect intelligent. He is bewildering minds (muhayyiru'l-ukul) and the level of his intelligent in science and spiritual knowledge is unique (mertebe-i akli ilm u irfanda sabık-ı fazail-i ula). His miraculous orders and decrees are accordance with canonical text i.e. Qur'an and reason (emir wa irade-i kerametleri muvafık-i menkul wa makul)

3. Mahmud has good intention. His good intention is the enlivening the religion and executing the Prophetic tradition (niyet-i hayriyeleri ihya-ı din wa icra-yı sünnet) and his most important thoughts and cares is the security and order of the poor and subjects (ehem-i efkarı wa endisheleri amn u asayish-i fukara wa raiyya)

4. Mahmud's wishes is justice and equity, and organising the army of the jihad, improving of the lands, and comfort of creatures (muradları adl u dad wa tanzim-i cünd-i cihad ile imar-i bilad ve eriha-i ibad) and his just politics is improving and prosperity of the Umma (siyaset-i adliyesi müsltezim-i salah ve falah-i umma). The quality of 'adl became almost inseparable from Mahmud II, and he was accorded the title "'adlı".⁶⁹ A number of the institutions were entitled by "'adlı" (referring to Mahmud II) such as the Divan-ı Ahkâm-ı Adliyya (the Council of Juridical Enactments) and the Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adliyya (the School of Education). In Islamic tradition, "justice" has been regarded as one of the most important qualifications and aims of a Muslim ruler as in the Ottoman one. It is claimed that Mahmud personally protected his people from the excesses of government, such as predatory taxation and the corruption of local officials. For the Ottomans, the ruler could only guarantee this justice if he had absolute power. For if he was not an absolute ruler that meant that he would be dependent on others and so subject to corruption. Absolute authority, then, was at the service of building a just government and laws rather than elevating the ruler above the law as Europeans have interpreted the Sultanate. In order to ensure adalet, the Ottomans set up a number of practices and institutions in the central government surrounding the Sultan. In the Ottoman Empire it was accepted theoretically that the fundament of the state / power is justice (Mülkün temeli adalettir).⁷⁰

It seems that the emphasis on the justice here was intended to persuade the public. As pointed out, Mahmud confiscated "wakfs" and "timars" and the lands of the "ayans" and "derebeys" and moreover changed the status of the classes within the Ottoman society. This policy might have caused the feeling that these people were treated unjustly, and that Mahmud II, therefore, was an unjust ruler.

5. Mahmud has religious and spiritual knowledge ('ilm wa 'irfan). Mahmud's 'ilm enables him to exercise independent reasoning (ijtihad). In the contemporary literature he was praised as "mujtahid".⁷¹ "Irfan" in the Sufi tradition indicates semi-divine knowledge, so it is superior to "ilm". According to this tradition "'irfan" cannot be formally studied but was taught by God or a spiritual teacher (murshid). If someone attains "'irfan" he becomes "arif" (agnostic).⁷² Mahmud II was frequently presented as a spiritual Sufi leader with miracles (karamah).⁷³ The aim of this literature seems to have been to persuade the disciples of the Sufi Orders of the acceptability of Mahmud's reforms.

6. Mahmud has the wisdom of Plato (hikmat-i Eflatun). Mahmud II is a man who knows the wisdom of Plato⁷⁴ The Platonic political legacy expressed in Plato's Republic and Laws, and Aristotle's Niccomachean Ethics was introduced into the Islamic environment by Muslim philosophers such as al-Farabi (d. 958), Ibn Sina (Avicenna) (d. 1037) and Ibn Rushd

(Averros) (d. 1198), who modified and then adopted it.⁷⁵

As head of a state based on Islam, Mahmud II initiated a reform movement on the Western lines. Therefore it is quite understandable why the concept “the wisdom of Plato” was added to his qualifications. It seems that he wanted to be seen as a ruler who knew the wisdom of Plato, one of the important formative elements of Western civilization which, to some extent, he wanted to adopt. Although Abdulwahhab adds two more elements i.e. `irfan and hikmah al-Eflatun to the jurists' theory he is still within the bounds of Islamic political thought.

Now the Shaykhulislam presented Mahmud II as the ruler fit for his own time.

c. The Duties of the Caliph-Sultan

Within the realm of administration the main duties of the caliph were stated especially by theologians. In al-Balqillani's (d.404/1013) statement the duties of the “imam” are to defend the ummah against its enemies; to enforce the fixed punishments (hudud) of the shari'a; to restrain oppression and redress grievances; to divide the revenues (fay' and zakah) among Muslims, and to make the pilgrimage safe.⁷⁶ Al-Mawardi develops this statement adding the following ones: to undertake jihad; to fix stipends (ataya); to seek out trusted persons; and appoint advisers; to oversee affairs personally and carefully; and finally to protect the ummah from disorder and sinfulness.⁷⁷

In the Ottoman political literature almost all these main duties were applied to the caliph-sultan. For example, the Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Pasha (d.1129/1717) writes in his *Nasa'ih al-Wuzera* that: *"He (imam) should make affluent the condition of the governed (terfih-i ahwal al-ra'aya); carry out the injunctions of the illustrious holy law (ijra-i ahkam-i sharif gharra); protect the boundaries of the territory of the Muslims (sadd thughur-i inha wa ijra): and delegate some of his functions to a wise vizier such as to protect the poor and to take care of the state affairs."*⁷⁸

Abdulwahhab follows the same line giving a long list of the duties of the caliph, which he generally mentions as the aims of the sultan, as follows:

1. to enforce the fixed punishments (*iqama al-hudud*),
2. to revive religion and perform the sunnah (*ihya al-din wa ijra al-sunnah*),
3. to provide comfort for the poor and the subjects (*rahat al-fuqara wa al-'ibad*),
4. to serve religion and the state (*hidmat al-din wa al-dawlah*),
5. to provide security for the re'aya (*amn al-ra'aya*),
6. to reorganize the army of jihad (*tanzim jund al-jihad*),
7. to provide goodness for the millah and salvation for the ummah,
8. to undertake the administration of the state (*tadbir al-mulkiyya*),
9. to enforce siyasa (*iqama al-siyasa*)⁷⁹

Here, three concepts need explanation: “dawlah”, “tadbir” and “siyasa”. The concept “dawlah”, basically means to turn, to alternate. In the course of centuries the concept had additional meanings of “dominion”, “state” and “realm”, a ruler's kingdom such as “Dawlat-i Osmaniyya” referring to the house of Osman.⁸⁰ Throughout the nineteenth century it seems that all these meanings were used. However, at the end of the nineteenth century, the meaning of “dawlah” was fixed as “state”. In this process the *Sened-i Ittifaq* of 1808 has been regarded as one of the important steps in separating “state” from ruler by some contemporary historians such as N. Berkes.⁸¹ It was considered that the *Sened* did not mention the sultan in term of being a party but only “dawlah”.⁸²

It seems that in the treatise on the one hand the dependence of the state on the sultan was indicated in the phrase “the axis of your personality means religion and state” (*kutb-u zat-i shawkatlari medar-i din u dawlah*).⁸³ On the other hand the separation of state and sultan

was described in such a way as “the body of state founds a new soul with the new military and administrative kanuns” (jism al-dawlah wajada ruhan jadidan bi tajdid al-gawanin al’askariyya ve bi ihya al-usul al-mulkiyya)⁸⁴

The term “tadbir” means organization, management, regulation and administration in Islamic political thought. In this sense al-Baqillani states that “tadbiru’l-jaysh” (the organization of the army) is among the duties of the imam.⁸⁵ Al-Mawardi also declares that the caliph must know the “tadbir”,⁸⁶ that is to say, the issue of administration.

As for the concept “siyasa” it refers in the political literature to the management of human affairs. In Islamic law, “ta’zir” (discretionary chastisement) was described as “al-siyasatu’l-shariyya”.⁸⁷ In the Ottoman context, according to U. Heyd “siyasa”, “in its widest sense it seems to denote “punishment” in general, which may include strokes and punishment. As a technical term, however, it generally means either execution or severe corporal punishment or both.” He also states that “it refers to a punishment inflicted in accordance with the shari’a as well as one decreed by the “kanun”. Also penalties not in conformity with the shari’a and inflicted by secular authorities are often said to be carried out siyaseten, i.e. “as an administrative punishment.”⁸⁸ In this sense Abdulwahhab uses a phrase “by committing the crime of disobedience some people deserve the wrath of God and the punishment of the Padishah” (siyasat-i padishahiyya)⁸⁹ for the groups which oppose the reforms.

3. The Theory of Obedience to the Caliph-Sultan

It is clear that throughout Islamic history only a few caliphs fulfilled the conditions demanded by the political theorists. What would be the way out for them under these circumstances? Al-Ghazali's response demonstrates the `ulama’s attitude:

*"There are those who hold that the imamate is dead, lacking as it does the required qualifications. But no substitute can be found for it. What then? Are we to give up obeying the law? Shall we dismiss the kadis, declare all authority to be valueless, cease marrying and pronounce the acts of those in high places to be invalid at all points, leaving the populace to live in sinfulness? Or shall we continue as we are, recognizing that the imamate really exists and that all acts of the administration are valid, given the circumstances of the case and the necessities of the actual moment?"*⁹⁰

In general the majority of the jurists preferred any kind of stable authority to civil strife (fitna) in order to preserve the unity of the ummah. They demanded obedience to the ruler from all subjects, whether or not he fulfilled the required conditions. To legitimize their arguments they quoted generally the following verses from the Qur'an: 'Rebellion (fitna) is greater (more dangerous) than murder (qatl) '(II/217) and 'Allah forbids all shameful deeds, injustice and rebellion (baghy)' (XVI/90).⁹¹

A quite considerable number of traditions enshrining the duty of obedience to a Muslim ruler were put into circulation. Abdulwahhab collected and interpreted twenty-five of these sorts of tradition which were used for the same purpose by previous jurists. Some of them, for example, appeared in “Kitab al-Kharaj” attributed to Abu Yusuf (d. 179/798). The most well-circulated among them is that “Fear God and obey Him and even if a flat-nosed, shrunken-headed Abyssinian slave is invested with power over you, hearken to him and obey him”⁹² Another very common one is this: “He who obeys God obeys me and he who obeys the imam obeys me; he who rebels against me rebels against God, and he who rebels against the imam rebels against me”⁹³ Another typical example is that “If the imam is just, then reward is due to him and gratitude from you, if he is tyrannical then the burden of sin is his and it is yours to be patient”⁹⁴

From the translations of some of these hadiths into Turkish, interpreted by Abdulwahhab in the treatise, it seems that there is some appeal to the Islamic sentiment of the peo-

ple rather than Turkish-Persian one. For instance he translated “sultan” as “padishah-i Islam” or “imamu’l-muslimin” and “zill Allah” as the “shadow of God”.⁹⁵ It seems that this inclination in the translation and the interpretation was designed to respond to the religious criticism and concern about the institution of the caliphate and its decrees.

Having introduced these hadiths the Shaykhulislam went a step further to getting sanctions from the Qur'an in order to legitimize the obedience to the present caliph-sultan. He quoted a well-known verse of the Qur'an, as mentioned above “Obey God, obey the Messenger and obey those in authority among you” (IV/59) adding that “according to the `ulama of religion “ulu’l-amr” means the caliph of Islam.”⁹⁶

For the same purpose he provides some sayings from the Sufi traditions saying that 'Ibn Arabi (d. 638/1240) states that if the sultan is “kamil” (perfect in personality and character) he is the pole of the world (kutb); if he is “gayr-i salih” (non-perfect) he is the saint (bedel sg. of abdal)”. Abdulwahhab declares without any hesitation that “Thank God our Sultan is the greatest Sultan (al-Sultan al-`Azam); he is the pole of the time (kutb al-zaman)”⁹⁷

The Shaykhulislam continues to glorify the Ottoman dynasty by quoting the sayings of the Prophet and the Sufis. He includes the following hadith, which appears in the collections of al-Bukhari and Abu Dawud, in his argument “here will be a group of people among my ummah who are in the right path”. He comments that “a group of people” means, according to the researchers, “the house of Osman”.⁹⁸ Another hadith which appears in Ibn Hanbel's Musnad is that “Verily Constantinople will be conquered, the commander of this conquest is the best commander and the army is the best army”. There is no doubt that Constantinople was conquered by the house of Osman. These two hadiths show, says Abdulwahhab, the virtue and continuity of the Ottoman State.⁹⁹

He includes some Sufi comments on the following verse of the Qur'an “And verily we have written in the Scripture (the Psalms of David), after the Reminder, My righteous slaves will inherit the earth” (XXI/105). Here, Abdulgani al-Nablusi made a comment saying “that it is a sign from the Qur'an about the sultans of the Ottoman dynasty; the words “‘ibad al-salihin” refer to the house of Osman.” The shaykh Salah al-Din Safadi and Imam Yahya b. `Aqb, most probably another two Sufis, comment that “the Ottoman Sultans are the most righteous sultans and the most virtuous after the Companions of the Prophet.”¹⁰⁰

After interpreting the verses, the hadiths and the comments of Sufis concerning the obedience to the sultan and their glory, the Shaykhulislam came to the conclusion that “all these hadiths demonstrate the obedience imposed upon every believer to the imam of Muslims; even if the sultan is tyrannical (jabir) or sinful (jair)”¹⁰¹

“It has been proved from hadiths, the Qur'an and the Sufi writings”, says Abdulwahhab, “that the shari`an arranged divine ordinances to affairs of religion and of the world. To obey its performer, therefore, is an obligation upon Muslims. According to reason and the canonical texts it is also obligatory to *keep on praying about the life of the Sultan and his dawlah*”¹⁰² Moreover having reminded his people that *the ancestors of the Sultan conquered the lands and countries and enlightened them with the light of monotheisms and the faith of Islam*. The Shaykhulislam states that “this also gives the sultan a right to demand obedience from his subjects.”¹⁰³

It is clear that Mahmud II was presented as a traditional Muslim caliph-sultan in terms of titles, duties and qualifications. The reason could be: either the `ulama still saw him as a traditional Muslim leader; or Mahmud wanted to be presented in this way; or, public opinion was not ready to see or accept any leader except for the caliph-sultan. It seems that the last statement has some grounds in the Capital. As recalled, some groups demonstrated their disapproval at any kind of change in social, military and political life as well as in the appearance of the sultan. Furthermore, logically, only a Muslim caliph-sultan could demand obedience from his Muslim subjects.

The Shaykhulislam Sayyid Yasincizade Abdulwahhab Efendi used some accusations against the opposition groups calling them the common people (awam-i nas), because of ignorance and of forgetfulness and probably of weakness of faith. Firstly they don't know the affairs of the world (umur-ı dünya) and the rights of the caliph (hukuk-ı halife), that is to say his legislative power and the demand of obedience from his subjects. Secondly they are not unaware the public interest of the country (mesalih-i dawla). Fourthly, therefore, they are causing civil strife, disorder and rebellion (fitna, fasad and bagha)¹⁰⁴

The Ottomans inherited a rich mixture of political traditions from vastly disparate ethnic groups: Turks, Persians, Mongols, Mesopotamian and, of course, Islam. The Ottoman state, like the Turkish, Mongol, and Mesopotamian states rested on a principle of absolute authority in the monarch.

Conclusion

It could be said religion i.e., Islam and the state supported each other in the Ottoman Empire. The Shaykhulislam made a reformer caliph-sultan in Western line with Islamic and traditional values, since Mahmud II extremely was in need of such a support. Beyond any doubt, the reformers of the time of Mahmud, to a large extent, faced a traditional medieval Muslim society and empire. The problem was to transfer this medieval empire into modern times. In this respect the `ulama were the vital element in executing such a policy. The best way for the Sultan and his reform-minded men was, first of all in one way or another to persuade the `ulama and acquire their approval about any reform. As a next step the `ulama would convince Muslim society.

Let us ask the following question: Was there any alternative ideology or system to the `ulamas' interpretation of the sacred texts, say, in the sixteenth century Ottoman Empire? It is very unlikely. First of all, at that time it was almost impossible to suggest an alternative to Islam which could be imitated and followed by the sultan and the state dignitaries. Islam was superior to all the systems of the world in the eyes of the Ottomans. It was highly unlikely that any elite group in Istanbul would be willing to follow Europe. But, although it had started before, at the end of the eighteenth century the picture clearly changed. By experience the Ottomans were well aware of the fact that Europe was in every aspect superior to the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore there was an elite group with whom the Head of the Empire wanted to secure the Empire by strengthening itself militarily and in other areas by adopting European practices. They believed that the only way to prevent the Empire from declining was to follow the European examples.

Under these circumstances the Shaykhulislam as a head of the `ulama was in a difficult position. It seems that he had to make a historical decision concerning the survival of the Ottoman Empire, whether to survive in modern times by participating in the process of Europeanization or whether to turn back to the past and defend its legacy. The Shaykhulislam at this point chose the first option, and tried to catch up and to control the political, social and intellectual developments, which had become inevitable. He and the top official ulama did this as far as possible within the scope of Islam, by participating in the policy-making and justifying decisions in Islamic maxims.

If we consider that the aim of the reform policy was to adopt the economic, military and administrative practices of Europe into an Islamic society it became easy to understand the mind of `ulama towards the reform movement. One could say that in this process of adoption the `ulamas' main concern, as the representatives of Islamic civilization, was to soften the impact of this new civilization and to present it as complying with the needs of modern times. From the Tanzimat period onwards this became a task for the `ulama. In this respect the Ottoman `ulama of the nineteenth century were no longer offensive but defensive.

Furthermore the `ulama might have realized that the internal weakening of their corps make it impossible for them to resist such a policy. Additionally it could be speculate that the

high ranking `ulama of this time with short-sighted did not realize the Westernization reforms eventually destroy the Islamic nature of the Ottoman State and society.

It could be said that as in the Ottoman Westernization processes, Islam is still strong enough and can play a constructive role in modern Turkey's efforts to join EU, as mean of legitimating of reform programs in the eyes of Turkish public.

* The Ankara University e-mail: ersahin@divinity.ankara.edu.tr

O6500 Besevler Ankara Turkey

¹ See for a well-documented study on the attitude of the `ulama in Mahmud II's military reforms, Heyd, U, "The Ottoman Ulama and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II", **Studies in Islamic History and Civilization**, Scripta Hierosolymitana, IX, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1964, pp. 63-96; A. Levy, "The Ottoman Ulama and the Military Reform of Sultan Mahmud II", in Gabriel Bear (ed), **Asian and African Studies VII: The Ulama in Modern History**, (Israil Oriental Society) Jerusalem, 1971, pp. 13-39.

² J R Barnes, **An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire**, Leiden, 1987, 72-73, 76; Bernard Lewis, **The Emergence of Modern Turkey**, Oxford Uni Press, Oxford, 1961, 92.

³ S J Shaw and E K Shaw, **History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey II Reform Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1987, 28.

⁴ The Naval Engineering School (Muhendishane-i Bahr-i Humayun) and the Army Engineering School (Muhendishane-i Berr-i Humayun) which were opened by Selim III were enlarged to include military technical education in 1827. In the same year an Army Medical School (Tıbhane-i Amire) was opened. O M Ergin, **Türkiye Maarif Tarihi, İstanbul**, Eren Pub. 1940, II, 127-128, 256-280; Lewis, 83; E Z Karal, **Osmanlı Tarihi**, Türk Tarih Kurumu pub. Ankara, 1961, V, 162.

⁵ See for the ferman concerning the regulations of the new uniforms of the Mansure on different class Lutfi, **Tarih**, İstanbul, 1290 A H., I, 191-193. The new uniforms were introduced to lighten the clothes of the soldiers in war and peace (Asâkir-i Mansure elbisesinin takhifî ... sefer ve hadarde) ibid, 255; Lewis, *Modern Turkey*, 99.

⁶ Lutfi, *Tarih*, 255, Lewis, 100.

⁷ For the text of the decree see Lutfi, *Tarih*, II, 269, Lewis, 101.

⁸ Lewis, *Modern Turkey*, 101.

⁹ A Cunningham, "Startford Canning and the Tanzimat" in **Beginning of Modernization in the Middle East in the 19th Century**, eds. W R Polk and R L Chambers. The University of Chicago Press, 1968, 253.

¹⁰ Lewis, *Modern Turkey*, 106.

¹¹ I Engelhart, **Türkiye ve Tanzimat: Devlet-i Osmaniye'nin Tarih-i Islahatı**, trs. from French by A Resadi, İstanbul, 1328, p. 19; N. Berkes, **The Development of Secularism in Turkey**, Montreal, 1964, 122.

¹² Engelhart indicates that even the Grand Vizier who avoided using the European saddle fell from favour of Mahmud, p. 19.

¹³ Lutfi, *Tarih*, III, 100; However, Lutfi reports that "once there was no holiday in the Porte (Bab-i Ali), the government offices had to be open every day. But the civil-servants of the Imperial Treasury had their holiday, Thursday. Therefore Thursday was decided as a holiday for all government departments." II, 55; B Lewis (p. 101) states that it was adopted from France.

¹⁴ "masalih-i dakhiliya ve kharijiya-i Devlet-i `Aliyye ve tebdilat". Lutfi (III, 109) cited the first editorial of the *Takvim-i Vekayi*.

¹⁵ Lutfi (V, 50-51) provides us with an account of hanging the first portrait of the Sultan in the Selimiye Kışlası. With a big state ceremony the portrait was hung on the wall after praying of 'ulema and mashayikh.

¹⁶ Quoted from **Netayic'ul Vukuat**, simplified by N. Cagatay, Türk Tarih Kurumu pub. Ankara, 1987, III-IV, 297.

¹⁷ Levy, *Ottoman Ulama and the Military Reform*, 27.

¹⁸ Heyd, *Ottoman Ulama and Westernization*, 70-71.

¹⁹ Lutfi, *Tarih*, II, 144.

²⁰ For instance Bosnian mudarris in the Eyub mosque in his Ramadan sermons publicly accused the Sultan and his reformists of being unbelievers (kafir) and he was exiled. The Mufti of Tosya and some 'ulama supported the local rebels, see Lutfi, *Tarih*, II, 169; III, 146; III, 146, Heyd, *Ottoman Ulama and Westernization* 71.

²¹ Quoted from Heyd, 73.

²² When the Evkaf Nezareti was established it controlled tightly the revenue of the wakfs of the Orders. In times of need the Nezaret used its control to suppress the Orders. Furthermore, the Nezaret started to give salaries to the heads of the Orders, so they became state employees, and civil-servants. This practice reduced the dignity and influence of the shaykhs among the masses. I Gunduz, **Osmanlılarda Devlet-Tekke Münasebetleri**, Ankara, Seha publication, 1983, 15. He provides some information about the complaints of Sufi shaykhs about the Sultan's policy towards them.

²³ See for the arguments of the `ulama against this order, M Es'ad, Uss-i Zafer, Istanbul, 1243/1827, pp. 207-221S. Farughi, "The Tekke of Haci Bektas: Social Position and Economic Activities", **International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies**, 7, 1976, 201-2.

²⁴ S Mardin, **The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought**, Princeton, 1962, 230.

²⁵ See for the activities of this Order B. Abu Manneh, "The Naqshibandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early 19th century", **Die Welt des Islam**, 22, 1982, pp. 21-25.

²⁶ "Pekmezci delisi nam mejub Cuma günü Süleymaniye camiinde Shaykhulislam Efendi'ye "Seni sakalından sürümeli, padishahı ayine-i batıla alıstırdın" diye bagırdı." Lutfi, Tarikh, II, 94; Heyd, Ottoman Ulama and Westernization, 73.

²⁷ Quoted from R Davison, **Reform in the Ottoman Empire**, Princeton, 1963, 31. The same dervish in Lutfi's Tarih appears as a wa'iz in Istanbul. Because of his criticism on new regulations (nizamati-jadiyda) he was exiled, II, p. 144.

²⁸ For instance a ferman calls people "Shariat-i Islamiyyenin esasi ve din-i mubin-i Ahmediyyenin `imad, bina, me`ash ve me`adi olan bes vakit namazin cevami`i sharifte cemaatle eda ve daire eshab-i iman tarikiyle kanaklarda cemaatle namaza mudavemet eylemeleri" see Lutfi, II, 66. See for Mahmud's internal religious policy Heyd, 90-94; Abu Manneh, Naqshibandiyya-Mujaddidiyya, 29-33

²⁹ This practice not only provided jobs for imams and wa`izs but also pleased softas who in that time numbered several thousand in Istanbul. Most of them were poor and had to wait a long time to get a job. M C Zilfi, "The Ilmiye Registers and the Ottoman Medrese System prior to the Tanzimat" in **Contributions an L'Histoire Economique et Sociale de l'Empire Ottoman, (Collection Turcica III)**, Paris 1983, 323, she estimates the number of the softas more than 5000-6000; Heyd's estimation is about 5000. However Reed gives their number over 50.000. Reed, H A, "Ottoman Reform and the Janissaries: The Eskinci Layihasi of 1826", in **Social and Economic History of Turkey, 1071-1920**, eds. O. Okyar and H. Inalcik, Ankara, 1980, 197.

³⁰ "al-darurat tubih al-mahzurat) and "chose the lesser of two evils" (ahwan-i sharrayn). These legal maxims are from A. Cawdat's Tarih as quoted by Heyd, Ottoman Ulama and Westernization, 89.

³¹ "İcab-ı maslahat böyle iktiza eder." I. Sungu "Mahmud II 'nin İzzet Molla ve Asakir-i Mansure Hakkında bir Hattı", **Tarih Vesikaları**, I, 1941, 168.

³² Some the important books of the virtue literature on the Ottoman dynasty are follows: Aşıkpaşazade, **Tevarih-i Al-i Osman**; Neşri, **Cihannuma**; Lutfi Paşa, **Khalasu'l-Ümme fi Marifeti'l-Eimme ((Süleymaniya Library, Yeni Cami, 1182)**; Andulgani Nablusi (d. 1143/1731), **Talaatu'l-Behiyya fi Muluki'd-Dawlati'l-Osmaniyya** (one of the most referred work of the Ottoman virtue literature); Abdurrahman al-Bistami, **Miftahu'l-Cifri'l-Cami** (Trs. into Turkish Shaykh Burhaneddin, manuscript, Sulaymaniya Library, Hafid Efendi 179). Additionally Abdulwahhab refers the following ones: Muhyiddin Ibnu'l Arabi, (d. 638/1240), **Al-Shajaratul-Nu'âmaniyya**; Shaykh Salahuddin es-Safedi, **Sharhu Shajaratul-n-Numaniyya**; İmam Yahya b. 'Aqab, **Sharhu'l-Daira**, Shaykh Mustafa as-Sadiqi, **al-Muazzinu bi't Tarab fi'l- farqı bayna'l-Ajam wa'l-Arab**. Mer'i b. Yusuf (d. 1033/1624) **Qaladidu'l-'İkvan fi Fadhaili Al-i Osman** (Mer'i as a prominent Hanbali jurist of the 17th century Egypt tried to legitimate the Ottoman dynasty in the eyes of the Arab subjects of the Empire (Trs. into Turkish by Shaban b. Shifai.)

³³ In this process Mahmud's close ally Mehmed Es'ad Efendi wrote **Uss-i Zafer** (Istanbul, 1248/1828) for general reading in contemporary language "lisan-i asr" i.e., simple Turkish. Also Ibnu'l-Annabi (Muhammad b. Hüseyin el-Hanefi of Algaria, wrote a treatise to legitimate Mahmud's military reforms, **es-Sa'yu'l-Mahmud fi Nizami'l-Cunud** (Süleymaniya Libray Esad Efendi 1885) It was translated by M. Es'ad Efendi under the title **al-Kawakibu'l-Mas'ud fi Kawkabati'l-Cunud**, (Süleymaniye Library, Es'ad Efendi 2363).

³⁴ Istanbul 1247 / 1831. The treatise was written in Arabic and Turkish, the Arabic part 1-15, the Turkish part 16-31. The both part is almost the same.

³⁵ In this respect the treatise was expounded by prominent scholar, the mufti of Baghdad Alusi (Ebu's-Sena Mahmud Shihabuddin b. Abdullah) (d. 1270/1853) to address the Arab public opinion, under the title **Al-Bayanu al-Sharhi'l-Burhan fi 'Itaati's-Sultan**. He wrote this book by the offer Ali Rıza Pasha and presented him. Munir Hasan, Alusi'nin Shia'ya Karşı Reddiyesi, master thesis, Ankara 2002, p. 40.

³⁶ Some of them are follows: 1. Ahmed Midhad Efendi, **Tavzih-i Kelam ve Tasrih-i Meram**, (Istanbul 1296 / 1880). 2. Es-Seyyid Muhammad Ebu'l-Huda Efendi of Hama-Syria, **Da'i'r-Reshad li Sebili'l-İttihad ve'l-Inkiyad**, translated into Turkish by Kudsi Efendizade Abdulkadir of Aleppo, (Istanbul after 1880) The same author also wrote another pamphlet, **en-Nafahatu'n-Nabawiyya fi Hidmati'l-Khilafeti'l-Hamidiyyati'l-Osmaniyya** (manuscript). 3. Mehmed Fevzi Efendi, the Mufti of Edirne, **en-Nasayihu'l-Fawziyya fi'l-Ed'iya ve'l-Madayihu'l-Seniyya**, (Istanbul after 1885). Mahmud b. Hamza Efendi of Damascus, **al-Burhan 'ala Bakai Mulki Beni Osman ila 'Akhiri'z-Zaman** (Istanbul 1304 / 1886), translated into Turkish and exposed by Bereketzade İsmail Hakkı Efendi, **Baka-yı Saltanat-ı Osmaniyya**, (Istanbul 1332 / 1913). 4. Ahmad Hafzi Efendi, ex-Mufti of Yaman, **Hilafet ve Cihada Dair Kirk Hadis**, (Istanbul 1307 / 1890). 5. Yusuf b. İsmail en-Nabhani, the head of Bayrut Law Court, **el-Ahadisu'l-Arbain fi Vucubi Ta'ati Emiri'l-Mü'minin**, (Bayrut, 1312 / 1893). 6.

Nazif Sururi, *Khilafat-i Mu'azzama-i Islamiyya* (Istanbul, 1315/1899) He compiled almost the same hadiths used by Abdulwahhab and reinterpreted to suit the political conditions of the time. He says that “the meanings of these hadiths were written by one of the very great `ulama, the late Abdulwahhab Efendi and published by him for the interest of Islam.” 7. Zaki, *'Alam-i Islamiyyat* (Istanbul 1316/1900). 8. Es-Sayyid Muhammad Arif, a famous alim of Damascus, *el-Hakku'l-Mubin fi Ahadisi 'Arbain fi Man Kharaja 'an Taati Amiri'l-Mu'minin wa Shakka 'Asa'l-Muslimin*, (Damascus, 1318 / 1900). See for more information, Hilafet Risaleleri (Treatises on the Caliphate), ed. Ismail Kara, I-II-III, (Istanbul 2002-2003).

³⁷ Quoted from A K S Lambton, **State and Government in Medieval Islam**, Oxford Uni. Press, 1985, 108; see also al-Ghazali, **al-Iqtisad fi al-tiqad**, Egypt, no date, 197-99; see for Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's argument *ibid*, pp. 132-33; Ibn Khaldun's one, *ibid*, 156; for al- Farabi's argument, E I J Rosenthal, **Political Thought in Medieval Islam**, Cambridge. Uni. Press, 1958, 126.

³⁸ Khulasa, 3.

³⁹ Lambton, *State and Government*, 132.

⁴⁰ This word appears in Tursun Bey's **Tarih-i Ebu'l Feth** “temeddun örfümüzce ana shehir, köy oba denir”, ed. M. Tulum, Fetih pub. Istanbul, 1977, 12

⁴¹ In Ibn Khaldun's theory “umran” means human civilization and social organization Lambton, *State and Government*, 156.

⁴² Khulasa, 17.

⁴³ On this discussion see Ibn Abidin, **Resail**, Bairut, no date, II, 125; S. Mahmasani, **Falsafa al-Tashri' fi al-Islam**, Beirut, 1371/1956, 50.

⁴⁴ “Ezmanın tegayyuru ile ahkâmın tegayyuru inkar olunamaz”

⁴⁵ Khulasa, 4.

⁴⁶ The Mu'tazile also follow the line of the Muslim philosophers, see for this argument, R. Levy, **The Social Structure of Islam**, Cambridge University Press, 1957, 284; Rosenthal, 28,39.

⁴⁷ Khulasa, 4.

⁴⁸ Khulasa, 9; cf. al-Ghazali's exposition *al-Iqtisad*, 197-99; for Mustafa Ali's argument C. H. Fleischer, **Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Ali**, Princeton University Press, 1986, 302

⁴⁹ See for a critical exposition of this theory C. Imber, “The Ottoman Dynastic Myth”, **Turcica**, XIX, 1987, pp. 7-27.

⁵⁰ Khulasa, 5, 21.

⁵¹ Mer'i b. Yusuf also praises the Ottoman Sultan with their efforts on ghaza and jihad. See *vr. 20b*.

⁵² It is interesting that the ghazi title was used by the founder of the secular Turkish Republic, Ghazi Mustafa Kamal Atatürk. For the development of the idea of ghaza in the Empire and the criticism on the classical theory of Paul Wittek on this idea, C Imber “Paul Wittek's ‘De la Defaite d'Ankara a'la Prise de Constantinople”, **Osmanlı Araştırmaları** (Journal of Ottoman Studies), V, 1968, pp. 65-86.

⁵³ Khulasa, 2-3.

⁵⁴ See, Sa'yu'l-Mahmud fi Nizami'l-Cunud.

⁵⁵ The Ottoman Sultans used the title khalifa even before Selim I. Inalcık, “Padishah”, **İslam Ansiklopedisi**, IX, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı pub. pp. 491-495

⁵⁶ Süleymaniya Library, Yeni Cami, 1182. This treatise was translated by H.A.R. Gibb, “Lutfi Pahsa on the Otoman Caliphate”, **ORIENTS**, XV, 1962, pp. 287-295.

⁵⁷ A L Marsot, **Egypt in the reign of Muhammad Ali**, Cambridge University Press, 1984, 224-26.

⁵⁸ al-Muttaqi, **Kanz al-'Ummal**, Aleppo, 1391/1971, VI, 3-90; Khulasa, 9-10.

⁵⁹ See Badri Dishad, **Muradname**, ed. Adem Ceyhan, Kültür Bakanlığı pub. Istanbul 1997, 1-209-210; Enveri, **Düsturname**, (Osmanlı Tarihi Kısmı), haz. Necdet Öztürk, Akademi Pub. İstanbul, 2003, 46; Tursun Bey, 197; Oruc Bey, **Tevarih-i Al-i Osman**, ed. N. Atsız, İstanbul, 1972, 17.

⁶⁰ D B Macdonald, *al-Mahdi*, **Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam**, Leiden, 1961.

⁶¹ Lutfi Pasha, **Tevarih-i Al-i Osman**, Istanbul, 1343, 13.

⁶² **Miftahu'l-Cifri'l-Cami**, Süleymaniya Library, Hafid Efendi, 179, *vr. 164a*.

⁶³ Sungu, Mahmud II, 170; Heyd, Ottoman Ulama and Westernization, 76.

⁶⁴ Lutfi Pasha, *Tawarikh*, 11.

⁶⁵ M.Es'ad has a long discussion to prove that Mahmud II was the Mahdi of his time, 174-77.

⁶⁶ Khulasa, 5.

⁶⁷ al-Mawardi, **al-Ahkam al-Sultaniya**, Egypt, 1973, 6.

⁶⁸ Mer'i b. Yusuf praises the Ottoman sultans almost with the same qualifications. *vr. 62a*.

⁶⁹ See for a discussion on the title *adli of Mahmud*, N Berkes, 94-95. In Ottoman history Bayazid II and Mehmed III were also known as “adli”. A D Alderson, **The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty**, Oxford, 1956, 112.

⁷⁰ In the Ottoman political tradition the circle of justice (daire-i adalet) is the main pillar of sovereignty and power. See Kınalızade Ali Efandi, **Dawlat wa Aile Ahlakı**, ed. Ahmet Kahraman, Tercüman pub, 283. This maxim appears in **Kutadgu Bilig** of Yusuf Has Hajib (in the time of Karahanid Turkish dynasty) ed. Rashid R. Arat, Türk Dil Kurumu, pub, Ankara, 1998, verses 2056-2059. The Ottoman chronicles use the phrase about the Ottoman rulers “reayaya adalat dağıttı” (he distributed justice to the subject) or “raayaya adl ü dad itti” (he ruled the subject with justice) Aşıkpaşazade, 135, Neşri, I, 119, 313, 314. The Sultans still emphasised on the justice towards the end of the Empire. For example in the time of Mahmud’s successor Abdülmajid (1839-1861) there was a maxim on an Ottoman medal in French “Justice Egale Pour Tous” (Equal justice to all) Selim Deringil, **İktidarın Sembolü wa İdeoloji**, trs. G. Çağalı, İstanbul, 2002, 37.

⁷¹ Es'ad, 177.

⁷² M Z Pakalın, **Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü**, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı pub. İstanbul, 1953, II, 80; A Golpınarlı, **Tasavvuftan Dilimize Gecen Deyimler ve Atasözleri**, İstanbul, 1977, 25.

⁷³ Khulasa, 5.

⁷⁴ Khulasa, 6.

⁷⁵ See for this legacy Rosenthal, 113-121.

⁷⁶ Baqillani, **al-Tamhid**, Cairo, 1947, 185-6.

⁷⁷ Mawardi, **Ahkam**, 15-16.

⁷⁸ **Ottoman Statecraft: the book of Counsels for Viziers and Governors, Nasa'h ul-Vuzera wa al-Umara of Sari Mehmed Pasha the Defterdar**, trs. and ed by W L Wright, Westpost, 1971, 64.

⁷⁹ Khulasa, 6. Most of these virtues and aims were attributed to the Ottoman Sultans by Mer'i b. Yusuf, see vr 10b.

⁸⁰ F Rosenthal, *Dawla*, **Encyclopaedia of Islam**², see for changes in the meaning of Dawlah in the nineteenth century Middle East A. Ayolun, **Language and Change in the Arab Middle East**, Oxford University Press, 1987, 82.

⁸¹ See for his argument The Development, 90-94.

⁸² Inalcik, **Traditional Society**, 52.

⁸³ Khulasa, 20.

⁸⁴ Khulasa, 6-7.

⁸⁵ al-Bakillani, **Tamhid**, 181-3.

⁸⁶ al-Mawardi, **Ahkam**, 6.

⁸⁷ A I Doi, **Shari'ah: the Islamic Law**, Indianapolis, 1982, 96-112. See for the Ottoman usage of “tazir” Joseph Schacht, **An Introduction to Islamic Law**, Oxford 1986, 96.

⁸⁸ **Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law**, ed. V. L. Menage, Oxford, 1973, 259-60. See, A Mumcu, **Siyaseten Katl**, (Ankara, 1963) for the usage of the term, also M Z Pakalın, II, 240.

⁸⁹ Khulasa, 22.

⁹⁰ The quotations are from **al-Iqtisad**, 107, as translated by R. Levy, 291.

⁹¹ On this discussion of the jurists see H Siegman, “The State and Individual in Sunni Islam”, **Muslim World**, 54, 1964, pp. 14-26.

⁹² Abu Yusuf, **Kitab al-Kharaj**, Cairo, 1352/1933, 9; al-Bukhari, **al-Sahih**, tr. M. Muhsin Khan, Beirut, no date, IX, 192; Khulasa, 10.

⁹³ Abu Yusuf, **Kharaj**, 9; Khulasa, 10-11.

⁹⁴ Abu Yusuf, **Kharaj**, 10; Khulasa, 9.

⁹⁵ Khulasa, 22-23.

⁹⁶ Khulasa, 12.

⁹⁷ Khulasa, 12.

⁹⁸ Khulasa, 13.

⁹⁹ Khulasa, 13.

¹⁰⁰ Khulasa, 13.

¹⁰¹ Khulasa, 13.

¹⁰² Khulasa, 13.

¹⁰³ Khulasa, 7-8.

¹⁰⁴ Khulasa, 7, 14, 19, 30.