Strategic trading and trade reporting by corporate insiders

Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes–Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, for example, by executing several trades and reporting them jointly afte
Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes–Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, for example, by executing several trades and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting requirements were frequently violated and that the strategic timing of trades and reports was common. Event study abnormal re-turns are larger after reports of strategic insider trades than after reports of otherwise similar nonstrategic trades. Our results also imply that delayed reporting is detrimental to market efficiency and lend strong support to the more stringent trade reporting requirements established by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. JEL Classification: G14, G30, G32 Keywords: Insider Trading , Directors' Dealings , Corporate Governance , Market Efficiency
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Metadaten
Author:André Betzer, Jasmin Gider, Daniel Metzger, Erik Theissen
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-91473
Series (Serial Number):CFS working paper series (2011, 04)
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Date of Publication (online):2011/02/14
Year of first Publication:2011
Publishing Institution:Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Release Date:2011/02/14
Tag:Corporate Governance ; Directors' Dealings ; Insider Trading ; Market Efficiency
HeBIS PPN:233053107
Institutes:Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Wirtschaft
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Licence (German):License Logo Veröffentlichungsvertrag für Publikationen

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