Academic faculty governance and recruitment decisions

We analyze the implications of the governance structure in academic faculties for their recruitment decisions when competing for new researchers. The value to individual members through social interaction within the faculty depends on the average status of their fellow members. In recruitment decisions, incumbent members trade off the effect of entry on average faculty status against alternative uses of the recruitment budget if no entry takes place. We show that the best candidates join the best faculties but that they receive lower wages than some lesser ranking candidates. We also study the allocation of surplus created by the entry of a new faculty member and show that faculties with symmetric status distributions maximize their joint surplus under majority voting.

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Metadaten
Author:Jens Prüfer, Uwe Walz
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-259512
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9885-9
ISSN:0048-5829
ISSN:1573-7101
Parent Title (English):Public choice
Publisher:Springer Netherlands
Place of publication:Dordrecht
Document Type:Article
Language:English
Date of Publication (online):14.10.2011
Date of first Publication:14.10.2011
Publishing Institution:Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Tag:Academic faculties; Labor market competition; Status organizations; University governance
Pagenumber:23
First Page:1
Last Page:23
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Wirtschaft
JEL-Classification:D02 Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
L22 Firm Organization and Market Structure
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Note:
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Licence (German):License LogoCreative Commons - Namensnennung-Nicht kommerziell 3.0

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