Why do contracts differ between VC types? : market segmentation versus corporate governance varieties

We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings and aggregate liquidity. A merger changes the distribution of liquidity shocks and creates an internal money market, leading to financial cost eff
We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings and aggregate liquidity. A merger changes the distribution of liquidity shocks and creates an internal money market, leading to financial cost efficiencies and more precise estimates of liquidity needs. The merged banks may increase their reserve holdings through an internalization effect or decrease them because of a diversification effect. The merger also affects loan market competition, which in turn modifies the distribution of bank sizes and aggregate liquidity needs. Mergers among large banks tend to increase aggregate liquidity needs and thus the public provision of liquidity through monetary operations of the central bank. JEL Classification: G24, G32, G34
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Metadaten
Author:Julia Hirsch, Uwe Walz
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-27711
Parent Title (German):Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2006,12
Series (Serial Number):CFS working paper series (2006, 12)
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Year of Completion:2006
Year of first Publication:2006
Publishing Institution:Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Release Date:2006/06/12
Tag:Contract Design; Corporate Governance; Matching; Venture Capital
SWD-Keyword:Corporate Governance; Risikokapital; Vertrag
Issue:March 2006
Pagenumber:53
HeBIS PPN:195435834
Institutes:Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Wirtschaft
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Licence (German):License Logo Veröffentlichungsvertrag für Publikationen

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