Taking shareholder protection seriously? : Corporate governance in the United States and Germany
The attitude expressed by Carl Fuerstenberg, a leading German banker of his time, succinctly embodies one of the principal issues facing the large enterprise – the divergence of interest between the management of the firm and outside equity shareholders. Why do, or should, investors put some of their savings in the hands of others, to expend as they see fit, with no commitment to repayment or a return? The answers are far from simple, and involve a complex interaction among a number of legal rules, economic institutions and market forces. Yet crafting a viable response is essential to the functioning of a modern economy based upon technology with scale economies whose attainment is dependent on the creation of large firms.
| Author: | Theodor Baums, Kenneth E. Scott |
|---|---|
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-8613 |
| Series (Serial Number) | Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Institute for Law and Finance (016) |
| Document Type: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Date of Publication (online): | 29.04.2005 |
| Year of first Publication: | 2003 |
| Publishing Institution: | Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main |
| Source: | Institute for Law and Finance - Working paper series No. 16 |
| HeBIS PPN: | 135264545 |
| Institutes: | Rechtswissenschaft |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 340 Recht |
| Sammlungen: | Universitätspublikationen |
| Licence (German): |  Veröffentlichungsvertrag für Publikationen ohne Print on Demand |
