A new governance architecture for european financial markets? Towards a european supervision of CCPs

Does the new European outlook on financial markets, as voiced by the EU Commission since the beginning of the Capital Market Unions imply a movement of the EU towards an alignment of market integration and direct supervi
Does the new European outlook on financial markets, as voiced by the EU Commission since the beginning of the Capital Market Unions imply a movement of the EU towards an alignment of market integration and direct supervision of common rules? This paper sets out to answer this question for the case of common supervision for Central Counterparties (CCPs) in the European Union. Those entities gained crucial importance post-crisis due to new regulation which requires the mandatory clearing of standardized derivative contracts, transforming clearing houses into central nodes for cross-border financial transactions. While the EU-wide regulatory framework EMIR, enacted in 2012, stipulates common regulatory requirements, the framework still relies on home-country supervision of those rules, arguably leading to regulatory as well as supervisory arbitrage. Therefore, the regulatory reform to stabilize the OTC derivatives market replicated at its center a governance flaw, which had been identified as one of the major causes for the gravity of the financial crisis in the EU: the coupling of intense competition based on private risk management systems with a national supervision of European rules. This paper traces the history of this problem awareness and inquires which factors account for the fact that only in 2017 serious negotiations at the EU level ensued that envisioned a common supervision of CCPs to fix the flawed system of governance. Analyzing this shift in the European governance architecture, we argue that Brexit has opened a window of opportunity for a centralization of supervision for CCPs. Brexit aligns the urgency of the problem with material interests of crucial political stakeholder, in particular of Germany and France, providing the possibility for a grand European bargain.
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Metadaten
Author:Jan Friedrich, Matthias Thiemann
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-472301
URL:https://safe-frankfurt.de/de/policy-center/publikationen/detailsview/publicationname/a-new-governance-architecture-for-european-financial-markets-towards-a-european-supervision-of-ccps.html
Parent Title (English):SAFE white paper ; No. 53
Series (Serial Number):SAFE white paper series (53)
Publisher:SAFE
Place of publication:Frankfurt am Main
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Year of Completion:2018
Year of first Publication:2018
Publishing Institution:Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2018/08/15
Tag:Brexit; Capital Markets Union; Central Counterparties; EMIR; European Supervisory Architecture; regulatory arbitrage; supervisory arbitrage
Pagenumber:24
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaften
House of Finance (HoF)
Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Wirtschaft
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Licence (German):License Logo Veröffentlichungsvertrag für Publikationen

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