The design of vertical R&D collaborations

Suppliers play a major role in innovation processes. We analyze ownership allocations and the choice of R&D technology in vertical R&D cooperations. Given incomplete contracts on the R&D outcome, there is a tradeoff betw
Suppliers play a major role in innovation processes. We analyze ownership allocations and the choice of R&D technology in vertical R&D cooperations. Given incomplete contracts on the R&D outcome, there is a tradeoff between R&D specifically designed towards a manufacturer (increasing investment productivity) and a general technology (hold-up reduction). We find that the market solution yields the specific technology in too few cases. More intense product market competition shifts optimal ownership towards the supplier. The use of exit clauses increases the gains from the collaboration. JEL Classification: L22, L24, O31, O32
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Metadaten
Author:Patrick Herbst, Uwe Walz
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-63776
Series (Serial Number):CFS working paper series (2009, 06)
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Date of Publication (online):2009/04/16
Year of first Publication:2009
Publishing Institution:Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Release Date:2009/04/16
Tag:Managing Innovations ; R&D Collaboration ; Rent-Seeking; Vertical R&D
HeBIS PPN:211776009
Institutes:Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Dewey Decimal Classification:330 Wirtschaft
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Licence (German):License Logo Veröffentlichungsvertrag für Publikationen

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