The design of vertical R&D collaborations
Suppliers play a major role in innovation processes. We analyze ownership allocations and the choice of R&D technology in vertical R&D cooperations. Given incomplete contracts on the R&D outcome, there is a tradeoff between R&D specifically designed towards a manufacturer (increasing investment productivity) and a general technology (hold-up reduction). We find that the market solution yields the specific technology in too few cases. More intense product market competition shifts optimal ownership towards the supplier. The use of exit clauses increases the gains from the collaboration. JEL Classification: L22, L24, O31, O32
| Author: | Patrick Herbst, Uwe Walz |
|---|---|
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-63776 |
| Series (Serial Number) | CFS working paper series (2009, 06) |
| Document Type: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Date of Publication (online): | 16.04.2009 |
| Year of first Publication: | 2009 |
| Publishing Institution: | Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main |
| Tag: | Managing Innovations ; R&D Collaboration ; Rent-Seeking; Vertical R&D |
| HeBIS PPN: | 211776009 |
| Institutes: | Center for Financial Studies (CFS) |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 330 Wirtschaft |
| Sammlungen: | Universitätspublikationen |
| Licence (German): |  Veröffentlichungsvertrag für Publikationen ohne Print on Demand |
