Open Access

Agustín Elías Casagrande

• In the last few decades the concept of self-regulation accompanied the process of dismantling the welfare state. In this context, in central countries—Europe and North America—the importance given to private regulations versus public action increased, thus requiring new mechanisms of legitimacy. To this end, appeals to the principles of economy and technical efficiency to legitimate private regulations have been made by several researchers. However, these principles acquired a negative view in Argentina because they were used to use to legitimate processes that led to various crises, especially taking into consideration the neo-liberal experience of the 1990s. Against this historical background, this paper seeks to show a particular case of legitimizing the self-regulation of non-state organizations (social clubs) by using classic topoi, which had been historically used to legitimize state action. In order to do so, this text focuses on the analysis of “Luna de Avellaneda” Act of 2007, by which the government of Buenos Aires sought to legitimize the self-regulation of clubs appealing to the classical values of democracy, participation, and solidarity. For this, the historical experience of the Argentinean political community will be observed from the perspective of the history of these clubs, thus recovering the social function they played in the diverse political and economic crises.