The economic impact of merger control legislation
- Based on a unique dataset of legislative changes in industrial countries, we identify events that strengthen the competition control of mergers and acquisitions, analyze their impact on banks and non-financial firms and explain the different reactions observed with specific regulatory characteristics of the banking sector. Covering nineteen countries for the period 1987 to 2004, we find that more competition-oriented merger control increases the stock prices of banks and decreases the stock prices of non-financial firms. Bank targets become more profitable and larger, while those of non-financial firms remain mostly unaffected. A major determinant of the positive bank returns is the degree of opaqueness that characterizes the institutional setup for supervisory bank merger reviews. The legal design of the supervisory control of bank mergers may therefore have important implications for real activity.
Author: | Elena CarlettiGND, Philipp Hartmann, Steven Onega |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-53217 |
Parent Title (German): | Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2008,04 |
Series (Serial Number): | CFS working paper series (2008, 04) |
Document Type: | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Year of Completion: | 2008 |
Year of first Publication: | 2008 |
Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
Release Date: | 2008/03/03 |
Tag: | Competition Policy; Financial Regulation; Legal Institutions; Mergers and Acquisitions |
GND Keyword: | Bank; Mergers and Acquisitions; Recht |
Issue: | 15 December 2007 |
Page Number: | 67 |
HeBIS-PPN: | 195433157 |
Institutes: | Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS) |
Dewey Decimal Classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
Licence (German): | Deutsches Urheberrecht |