Partnerships based on Joint Ownership
- In a unifying framework generalizing established theories we characterize under which conditions Joint Ownership of assets creates the best cooperation incentives in a partnership. We endogenise renegotiation costs and assume that they weakly increase with additional assets. A salient sufficient condition for optimal cooperation incentives among patient partners is if Joint Ownership is a Strict Coasian Institution for which transaction costs impede an efficient asset reallocation after a breakdown. In contrast to Halonen (2002) the logic behind our results is that Joint Ownership maximizes the value of the relationship and the costs of renegotiating ownership after a broken relationship.
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| Author: | Matthias BlonskiORCiDGND, Daniel HerboldGND |
|---|---|
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-828593 |
| DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.007 |
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 |
| Parent Title (English): | Games and economic behavior |
| Publisher: | Elsevier |
| Place of publication: | Amsterdam |
| Document Type: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Date of Publication (online): | 2024/01/25 |
| Date of first Publication: | 2024/01/19 |
| Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
| Release Date: | 2024/03/01 |
| Tag: | Coase Theorem; Joint Ownership; Property rights; Relational contracts; Renegotiation |
| Volume: | 144 |
| Page Number: | 20 |
| First Page: | 183 |
| Last Page: | 202 |
| Institutes: | Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
| Sammlungen: | Universitätspublikationen |
| Licence (German): |  Creative Commons - Namensnennung-Nicht kommerziell - Keine Bearbeitung 4.0 |
