Board committees, CEO compensation, and earnings management
- We analyze the effect of committee formation on how corporate boards perform two main functions: setting CEO pay and overseeing the financial reporting process. The use of performance-based pay schemes induces the CEO to manipulate earnings, which leads to an increased need for board oversight. If the whole board is responsible for both functions, it is inclined to provide the CEO with a compensation scheme that is relatively insensitive to performance in order to reduce the burden of subsequent monitoring. When the functions are separated through the formation of committees, the compensation committee is willing to choose a higher pay-performance sensitivity as the increased cost of oversight is borne by the audit committee. Our model generates predictions relating the board committee structure to the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation, the quality of board oversight, and the level of earnings management.
| Verfasserangaben: | Christian LauxORCiDGND, Volker LauxGND |
|---|---|
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-50576 |
| Titel des übergeordneten Werkes (Englisch): | Universität Frankfurt am Main. Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften: [Working paper series / Finance and accounting] Working paper series, Finance & Accounting ; No. 181 |
| Schriftenreihe (Bandnummer): | Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting (181) |
| Verlag: | Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss. |
| Verlagsort: | Frankfurt am Main |
| Dokumentart: | Arbeitspapier |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Jahr der Fertigstellung: | 2007 |
| Jahr der Erstveröffentlichung: | 2007 |
| Veröffentlichende Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
| Datum der Freischaltung: | 26.10.2007 |
| Freies Schlagwort / Tag: | board oversight; corporate governance; earnings management; executive compensation |
| GND-Schlagwort: | Topmanager; Generaldirektor; Vorstandsvorsitzender; Geschäftsführer |
| Ausgabe / Heft: | Version March 2007 |
| HeBIS-PPN: | 194393933 |
| Institute: | Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| DDC-Klassifikation: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
| Lizenz (Deutsch): |  Deutsches Urheberrecht |
