Insuring non-verifiable losses
- Insurance contracts are often complex and difficult to verify outside the insurance relation. We show that standard one-period insurance policies with an upper limit and a deductible are the optimal incentive-compatible contracts in a competitive market with repeated interaction. Optimal group insurance policies involve a joint upper limit but individual deductibles and insurance brokers can play a role implementing such contracts for the group of clients. Our model provides new insights and predictions about the determinants of insurance.
| Verfasserangaben: | Neil A. Doherty, Christian LauxORCiDGND, Alexander Muermann |
|---|---|
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-241157 |
| Titel des übergeordneten Werkes (Deutsch): | Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2011,31 |
| Schriftenreihe (Bandnummer): | CFS working paper series (2011, 31) |
| Verlag: | Goethe-Univ., House of Finance, Center for Financial Studies |
| Verlagsort: | Frankfurt am Main |
| Dokumentart: | Arbeitspapier |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Jahr der Fertigstellung: | 2011 |
| Jahr der Erstveröffentlichung: | 2011 |
| Veröffentlichende Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
| Datum der Freischaltung: | 07.02.2012 |
| Freies Schlagwort / Tag: | Deductible Insurance; Implicit Insurance Contracts; Insurance Brokers; Upper Limit |
| Ausgabe / Heft: | Version November 2011 |
| Seitenzahl: | 39 |
| HeBIS-PPN: | 312315651 |
| Institute: | Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS) |
| Lizenz (Deutsch): |  Deutsches Urheberrecht |
