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Taking shareholder protection seriously? : Corporate governance in the United States and Germany

  • The attitude expressed by Carl Fuerstenberg, a leading German banker of his time, succinctly embodies one of the principal issues facing the large enterprise – the divergence of interest between the management of the firm and outside equity shareholders. Why do, or should, investors put some of their savings in the hands of others, to expend as they see fit, with no commitment to repayment or a return? The answers are far from simple, and involve a complex interaction among a number of legal rules, economic institutions and market forces. Yet crafting a viable response is essential to the functioning of a modern economy based upon technology with scale economies whose attainment is dependent on the creation of large firms.

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Metadaten
Verfasserangaben:Theodor BaumsGND, Kenneth E. Scott
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-8613
URL:http://www.ilf-frankfurt.de/uploads/media/ILF_WP_016.pdf
Titel des übergeordneten Werkes (Deutsch):Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Institute for Law and Finance ; 16
Schriftenreihe (Bandnummer):Working paper / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Institut for Law and Finance (16)
Verlag:Inst. for Law and Finance
Verlagsort:Frankfurt am Main
Dokumentart:Arbeitspapier
Sprache:Englisch
Jahr der Fertigstellung:2003
Jahr der Erstveröffentlichung:2003
Veröffentlichende Institution:Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Datum der Freischaltung:29.04.2005
HeBIS-PPN:135264545
Institute:Rechtswissenschaft / Rechtswissenschaft
DDC-Klassifikation:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 34 Recht / 340 Recht
Lizenz (Deutsch):License LogoDeutsches Urheberrecht