Public policy and venture capital financed innovation: a contract design approach : [Version May 2005]
- The effects of public policy programmes which aim at internalising spill-overs due to successful innovation are analysed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard double-sided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analysing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programmes, ex ante grants and some public-private partnerships depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.
Author: | Julia Hirsch |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-357217 |
URL: | http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/research/RICAFE/pdf/RICAFE-WP23-Hirsch.pdf |
Parent Title (English): | London School of Economics and Political Science: RICAFE working paper ; No. 23 |
Publisher: | London School of Economics and Political Science |
Place of publication: | London |
Document Type: | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Year of Completion: | 2005 |
Year of first Publication: | 2005 |
Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
Release Date: | 2014/12/01 |
Tag: | asymmetric information; contract design; moral hazard; public policy; venture capital |
GND Keyword: | Öffentliche Ordnung; Risikokapital; Moral Hazard; Asymmetrische Information |
Issue: | May 2005 |
Page Number: | 50 |
HeBIS-PPN: | 352816570 |
Institutes: | Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS) | |
Dewey Decimal Classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
Sammlungen: | Universitätspublikationen |
Licence (German): | Deutsches Urheberrecht |