Performance measurement and information production
- When performance measures are used for evaluation purposes, agents have some incentives to learn how their actions affect these measures. We show that the use of imperfect performance measures can cause an agent to devote too many resources (too much effort) to acquiring information. Doing so can be costly to the principal because the agent can use information to game the performance measure to the detriment of the principal. We analyze the impact of endogenous information acquisition on the optimal incentive strength and the quality of the performance measure used.
Author: | Christian LauxORCiDGND, Volker LauxGND |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-7874 |
Parent Title (English): | Universität Frankfurt am Main. Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften: [Working paper series / Finance and accounting] Working paper series, Finance & Accounting ; No. 133 |
Series (Serial Number): | Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting (133) |
Publisher: | Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss. |
Place of publication: | Frankfurt am Main |
Document Type: | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Year of Completion: | 2004 |
Year of first Publication: | 2004 |
Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
Release Date: | 2005/04/25 |
Tag: | Anreizvertrag; Betriebliche Kennzahl; Informationsverhalten; Theorie Agency Theory |
GND Keyword: | Leistungsbewertung; Leistungsmessung |
Page Number: | 30 |
Source: | Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting ; 133 |
HeBIS-PPN: | 188880445 |
Institutes: | Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
Dewey Decimal Classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
Licence (German): | Deutsches Urheberrecht |