Overbidding in fixed rate tenders - an empirical assessment of alternative explanations
- This paper investigates various theories explaining banks´ overbidding in the fixed rate tenders of the European Central Bank (ECB). Using auction data from both the Bundesbank and the ECB, we show that none of the theories can on its own explain the observed overbidding. This implies that the proposed new rules by the ECB, aimed at neutralizing interest rate expectations, would not eliminate overbidding if the rationing rule in the fixed rate tenders remains unchanged. JEL - Klassifikation: D44 , E32
| Author: | Dieter Nautz, Jörg Oechssler |
|---|---|
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-36858 |
| Parent Title (German): | Bonn Graduate School of Economics: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; 2003,10 |
| Place of publication: | Bonn |
| Document Type: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Year of Completion: | 2003 |
| Year of first Publication: | 2003 |
| Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
| Release Date: | 2007/01/29 |
| Tag: | Auktionstheorie; Bank; EU-Staaten; Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion; Pensionsgeschäft; Zins; Zinstender Overbidding; monetary policy instruments of the European Central Bank; repo auctions |
| HeBIS-PPN: | 204010020 |
| Institutes: | Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
| Licence (German): |  Deutsches Urheberrecht |
