Open Access

Xiaoxi Zhang

• The venture capital industry holds relevance for entrepreneurs looking for money to finance an innovative project, investors seeking to make money by investing in entrepreneurial firms and governments trying to promote innovation and entrepreneurship. Venture capital investment could facilitate innovation and thus a better economy. Venture capital has enabled the U.S. to support its entrepreneurial talent by turning ideas into world-famous products and services, building companies from mere business plans to mature and powerful organizations. Three of the five largest U.S. public companies by market capitalization – Apple, Google and Microsoft – received most of their early external funding from venture capital. Having its ups and downs, venture capital investment in the U.S. expanded from virtually zero in the mid-1970s to $8 billion in 1995 and $49.3 billion in 2014. Venture backed companies have been a prime driver of economic growth in the U.S.Across the pacific, venture capital investment in China has grown out of the transition from a centrally planned economy to a free market economy over the past three decades, becoming an important pillar supporting China’s innovation system. In 2015, a total of 2,824 venture capital investment deals provided an aggregate investment of $36.9 billion. Venture capital has long been a hot topic in China’s capital market, particularly since the government decided to boost “mass entrepreneurship and innovation” in 2014. In the U.S., most venture capital firms are organized as limited partnerships, with the venture capitalists being general partners and the investors limited partners. Studies have shown that investors choose to invest through venture funds as an intermediary rather than placing their investments directly with the entrepreneurs; because of the high risk nature of the entrepreneur’s business, it is hard for them to get bank loans or direct equity investments. Conflicts may also arise, however, between the venture capitalists acting as agents and the investors as principals.5 This agency problem maybe particularly severe, since venture capital provides money for businesses with high potential and high risk, although the limited partnership has certain merits and is still most commonly chosen as the business form for venture capital funds.6 At the same time, the fact that general partners have total control of the partnership business necessitates that the agency problem is addressed by legal rules, contracts and other mechanisms. Meanwhile, despite the rapid growth of venture capital investments in China, little attention has been paid to the organizational form of venture capital funds. In contrast to the U.S., most Chinese venture funds have been structured as corporations. One may argue that it was due to legislative reasons: that the limited partnership was not recognized by Chinese law when venture capital first appeared in China. However, after adopted a chapter was adopted in the Partnership Enterprise Law (PEL) governing limited partnerships in 2007, most of the venture funds abided by their choice, while those opting for the limited partnership have encountered difficulties: the limited partners are having trouble trusting the general partners with their money and are therefore interfering with the operation of the partnership business, which may lead to dissolution of the partnership. This thesis applies transaction cost theory to explain the benefits and costs of choosing the limited partnership as a business form in the special context of venture capital investments, showing that the potential agency conflict between the general partners and the limited partners have been mitigated by legal and other mechanismsin the United States, and that the U.S. investors could therefore exploit the merit of the limited partnership form in venture capital financing. In China, investors have different answers to the agency problem. Similarly to the situation in the U.S., Chinese partners also employ contract terms to deal with agency problems, and the legislators enact laws that aim at regulating the limited partnership form; some legislation was even transplanted from the U.S., such as that part of the PEL which governs limited partnerships. It seems, then, that similar mechanisms that deal with agency problems also exist in China. However, given the unique history of the development of China’s innovation system and venture capital market, the effectiveness of these constraints is questionable. Chinese venture capital investors have therefore characteristically behaved differently to U.S. investors. Rather than relying on these questionable mechanisms, Chinese investors as well as the Chinese government have developed different approaches to addressing these agency problems.