Open Access

Christian K. Muus

• It is the objective of this paper to determine the voting premium for French shares by comparing the values of voting and non-voting shares, and to analyze the value of the voting rights. The study uses data for 25 French companies which had both types of shares outstanding and traded on the stock exchange during the entire period from 1986 to 1996, or for some time during this interval. The average value of the voting premium is 51,35%. The paper analyzes the reasons for this surprisingly high value by testing different hypotheses based on dividend differences, the revival) of the voting right, capitalization, shareholder structure, and the share of non-voting capital in total equity capital. The regressions show that the shareholder structure strongly influences the value of the voting premium. A case study of the attempted takeover of Casino by Promodes shows that investors attach a much higher value to the voting right during relevant situations than at other tomes. Both companies involved had, at the time, two types of shares outstanding and listed. Furthermore the paper shows that non-voting shares have never played an important role in equity finance in France since the companies have different alternatives. In an international cumparison, France is found to have the second highest voting premium, exceeded only by that of Italy. A probable reason is the low quality of the national accounting standards and the low level of minority shareholder protection.
• Le but de ce cahier de recherche est l'evaluation du droit de vote en France par une comparaison des actiuns avec et sans droit de vote. L 'analyse est basee sur 25 societes ayant introduit ces deux types d'actions en bourse pendant une partie ou fa totalite des annees 1986-1996, Nous determinons pour cette echantillon l'existence d'une prime moyenne de 51,35% sur les actions sails droit de vote. A travers le test de differentes hypotheses (difference de dividende, reprise du droit de vote, capitalisation, actionnarial et pourcentage du capital sans droil de vote), nous essayons ensuite d'expliquer l'importallce de cette prime. Les regressiuns indiquent que la structure de I 'actionnariat influence jortement la prime. Le cas pratique de l'OPA Promodes sur Casino -ces deux societes ayant introduit deux classes d 'actions en bourse- montre investisseurs donnenl une valeur plus importante au droit de vote pendant des situations critiques. L 'histoire du financement des entreprises montre que les actions sans droit de vote n 'ont jamais joue un role important parce qu'il existe d'autres alternatives moins cheres. Au niveau international, la France presente la 2eme prime fa plus elevee apres l'Italie. L'explication du niveau de ces differents primes est a chercher dans les normes comptables et dans la protection des actionnaires minoritaires.