Financial disclosure and market transparency with costly information processing
- We study a model where some investors ("hedgers") are bad at information processing, while others ("speculators") have superior information-processing ability and trade purely to exploit it. The disclosure of financial information induces a trade externality: if speculators refrain from trading, hedgers do the same, depressing the asset price. Market transparency reinforces this mechanism, by making speculators' trades more visible to hedgers. As a consequence, issuers will oppose both the disclosure of fundamentals and trading transparency. Issuers may either under- or over-provide information compared to the socially efficient level if speculators have more bargaining power than hedgers, while they never under-provide it otherwise. When hedgers have low financial literacy, forbidding their access to the market may be socially efficient.
Verfasserangaben: | Marco Di Maggio, Marco Pagano |
---|---|
URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-353087 |
URL: | http://ssrn.com/abstract=2517287 |
Titel des übergeordneten Werkes (Englisch): | Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 485 |
Schriftenreihe (Bandnummer): | CFS working paper series (485) |
Verlag: | Center for Financial Studies |
Verlagsort: | Frankfurt, M. |
Dokumentart: | Arbeitspapier |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Jahr der Fertigstellung: | 2014 |
Jahr der Erstveröffentlichung: | 2014 |
Veröffentlichende Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
Datum der Freischaltung: | 03.11.2014 |
Freies Schlagwort / Tag: | OTC markets; disclosure; financial literacy; limited attention; transparency |
Ausgabe / Heft: | August 18, 2014 |
Seitenzahl: | 58 |
HeBIS-PPN: | 351017305 |
Institute: | Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS) | |
DDC-Klassifikation: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
Sammlungen: | Universitätspublikationen |
Lizenz (Deutsch): | ![]() |