The design of vertical R&D collaborations
- Suppliers play a major role in innovation processes. We analyze ownership allocations and the choice of R&D technology in vertical R&D cooperations. Given incomplete contracts on the R&D outcome, there is a tradeoff between R&D specifically designed towards a manufacturer (increasing investment productivity) and a general technology (hold-up reduction). We find that the market solution yields the specific technology in too few cases. More intense product market competition shifts optimal ownership towards the supplier. The use of exit clauses increases the gains from the collaboration. JEL Classification: L22, L24, O31, O32
| Verfasserangaben: | Patrick Herbst, Uwe WalzORCiDGND |
|---|---|
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-63776 |
| Titel des übergeordneten Werkes (Deutsch): | Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2009,06 |
| Schriftenreihe (Bandnummer): | CFS working paper series (2009, 06) |
| Dokumentart: | Arbeitspapier |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Jahr der Fertigstellung: | 2009 |
| Jahr der Erstveröffentlichung: | 2009 |
| Veröffentlichende Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
| Datum der Freischaltung: | 16.04.2009 |
| Freies Schlagwort / Tag: | Managing Innovations; R&D Collaboration; Rent-Seeking; Vertical R&D |
| HeBIS-PPN: | 211776009 |
| Institute: | Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS) |
| DDC-Klassifikation: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
| Lizenz (Deutsch): |  Deutsches Urheberrecht |
