REFLECTION, EVALUATION, INTEGRATION

Goodbye Bismarck?
The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany

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This essay examines the foreign policy discourse in contemporary Germany. In reviewing a growing body of publications by German academics and foreign policy analysts, it identifies five schools of thought based on different worldviews, assumptions about international politics, and policy recommendations. These schools of thought are then related to, first, actual preferences held by German policymakers and the public more generally and, second, to a small set of grand strategies that Germany could pursue in the future. It argues that the spectrum of likely choices is narrow, with the two most probable—the strategies of "Wider West" and "Carolingian Europe"—continuing the multilateral and integrationist orientation of the old Federal Republic. These findings are contrasted with diverging assessments in the non-German professional literature. Finally, the essay sketches avenues for future research by suggesting ways for broadening the study of country-specific grand strategies, developing and testing inclusive typologies of more abstract foreign policy strategies, and refining the analytical tools in examining foreign policy discourses in general.

It is in our interest to preserve peace whereas, without exception, our continental neighbors harbor desires, secret or officially known, which can only be realized through war. We must formulate our policy accordingly; that is to say, we have to prevent or contain war, we must avoid our hand being forced in the European game

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of cards, and we must not allow ourselves to be pushed by either impatience, favors at the expense of the country, vanity, or friendly provocation from a wait-and-see attitude to one of action too early. . . . We should strive to reduce the irritations which have been aroused by our becoming a real great power by making honest and peace-loving use of our influence in order to convince the world that a German hegemony in Europe is more helpful, impartial, and innocuous to the freedom of others than either a French, Russian, or British one (Bismarck, 1929 [1898]:543).

The radical changes brought about by the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union have significantly recast the foreign policy issues and challenges facing countries in Europe. Such is especially the case for Germany both because the two German states of the Cold War period, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), have been reunited and because unification has been accompanied by the removal of the restrictions placed on the sovereignty of these states by the victorious Four Powers after World War II.

In Germany, as in other countries, changed conditions have stimulated a lively debate over future policy directions within the foreign policy analysis community. The debate within Germany has special significance because of Germany’s role within Europe, within the Western Alliance, and within the global economy. As a result, the future of German foreign policy has become a subject for discussion and speculation among North American (for example, Hoffmann, 1990; Mearsheimer, 1990; Hopmann, 1994) as well as European (Saña, 1990; Verheyen and Soe, 1993; Garton Ash, 1994) scholars. Yet, there are sharp contrasts between the assumptions that non-Germans and Germans have made regarding feasible alternatives.

The ability of non-German speakers to access the German discourse on future foreign policy alternatives has been limited because this debate has been conducted largely in German. Consequently, it has received little attention outside Germany. Nevertheless, the importance of this discourse for understanding which foreign policy scenarios are more or less likely is suggested by Ole Wæver (1994). He argues that the foreign policy discourse of a country sets the parameters for foreign policy choices, at least in the near term. Competing discourses within a country provide insights into “those structures in the societies that play a major role in shaping foreign policy” (p. 254; emphasis in the original). For Wæver there are two major advantages to what he calls foreign policy “discourse analysis.” One is that:

It stays totally clear of any relationship to what people really think. It is not interested in inner motives, in interests or beliefs; it studies something public, that is how meaning is generated and structured in a national context. If it is true that this has both a certain inertia and a relatively strong structuring effect on foreign policy, one has found a location for studying a domestic factor which is at the same time important and accessible (p. 254).

Another advantage is that discourse analysis is “able to explain even grand designs . . . which is often problematic in a [foreign policy analysis] tradition which focuses on decisions seen as reactions to specific stimuli” (p. 255). To be sure, discourse “is by definition never settled” and for this reason discourse analysis cannot predict change in a country’s foreign policy. It can, however, “sense when a change is approaching and it can tell what are the most easily available options, and what are the almost completely excluded lines of action” (p. 255).

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2For an exception, see the collection of essays by German foreign policy experts edited by Arnulf Baring (1994) and Germany in Transition (1994).
This review essay examines the foreign policy discourse in contemporary Germany. First, it distinguishes and describes the worldviews, assumptions, and policy recommendations of five different schools of thought represented by scholars and analysts in Germany. Second, it examines how these schools of thought relate to actual preferences held by policymakers in the government and in the political parties, as well as by the public more generally. Third, it analyzes the positions of these schools as they relate to a small set of grand strategies that Germany could pursue in the future and argues that the spectrum of likely choices is narrow, with the two most probable ("Wider West" and "Carolingian Europe") continuing the multilateral and integrationist orientation of the old FRG. Such a development would be particularly at odds with expectations based on neorealism (Mearsheimer, 1990; Waltz, 1993, 1994). Finally, the essay sketches possible avenues for future research.

The Foreign Policy Discourse in Germany

In a recent article on the foreign policy of contemporary Germany, an astute British observer of German history and politics noted that the old Federal Republic has over the last 30 years pursued one of the most consistent foreign policies of any Western power. As a result, it has a well-formed foreign policy tradition. This tradition, a blend of Adenauerian Westpolitik and Brandtian Ostpolitik, has several distinctive features. Besides the renunciation of force and the pursuit of reconciliation with former foes, there is what one might call attritional multilateralism. German diplomacy has excelled at the patient, discreet pursuit of national goals through multilateral institutions and negotiations, whether in the European Community, NATO, or the Helsinki process (Garton Ash, 1994:71).

Especially in the eyes of non-German observers, another distinguishing feature of this foreign policy tradition is a reluctance on the part of all postwar German governments to define clearly what Germany's national interests are. Indeed, even German observers point out that the FRG "has never conducted a sovereign foreign policy, never a truly national, never even a largely autonomous foreign policy" (Rühl, 1992:741). Germans mostly see this "multilateralization of German foreign policy as a matter of principle" (Rühl, 1992:741), as an "enlightened" choice (Müller, 1992:163). In the eyes of non-Germans, however, this view represents only one side of the coin. The other side is that German foreign policy always tends to be "sowohl-als-auch-politik," that is, Germany is trying to "have it all ways" by seeking cover in multilateral or supranational environments, "using the diversity of its interests to avoid hard choices" (The Economist, 1993:23; also Garton Ash, 1994:71).

Given Germany's history and the delicate positioning of the "semi-sovereign" Federal Republic (Katzenstein, 1987) at the center of a divided Europe, it is not surprising that all the efforts of the old FRG were "devoted to avoiding international loneliness" (Bertram, 1994:91). As a result, "sowohl-als-auch-politik" was seen, at least until 1990, as both sensible and unavoidable (Nerlich, 1992b:788). Whether or not circumstances have changed so dramatically as to render this policy obsolete is a matter of debate. Some argue that it is obsolete because former dependencies have been reduced while external demands have increased and internal resources have shrunk (Garton Ash, 1994:73; Schwarz, 1994b:92–94). Others (Joffe, 1995:44) point out that the complications of Germany's "ultrapermmissive" geopolitical environment have increased rather than decreased. . . . , in spite of the fact that Germany "is probably among the safest places on the
Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany

planet after the end of the Cold War” (Risse-Kappen, 1995:19); as the now often quoted phrase goes, Germany today finds itself for the first time in the enviable position of being encircled by friends. Yet, Joffe (1994:38) argues that such “safety does not make for an easy grand strategy, nor for a clear thrust or determinate purpose,” especially since “as usual, Germany has to juggle more balls than most.”

Whatever the pros and cons, or the prospects, of continuing a policy aimed at keeping Germany’s options open, there is no doubt that the terms of reference in the foreign policy discourse within Germany are markedly different today than they were prior to 1990. Not only is there an increasing interest in (and a growing debate about) the usefulness of different concepts of “national interests” (Stürmer, 1994; Wolf, 1995b), but attention is also focused on what German interests and role in international affairs ought to be.

Two particular issues have figured prominently in the public debate during the past few years. The first, which has been on German policymakers’ agenda ever since the 1990–1991 Gulf War and which still catches headlines, is the question of whether and under what conditions Germany should contribute forces to multilateral peacekeeping or peace-enforcing operations (Bastian, 1993; S. Brunner, 1993; Schmillen, 1993a; Nerlich, 1994; Inacker, 1995; Stürmer, 1995). The second, more fundamental, issue is the debate over the basic Western orientation (“Westbindung”) of Germany. In contrast to the first issue, which involves public opinion more broadly, this latter issue is much more an elite-based discourse between, on the one hand, a small but outspoken group of mostly young and rightist intellectuals with some access to national-conservative media outlets5 and, on the other hand, a very diverse group of intellectuals, academics, and policymakers ranging from center-conservative to the left.

Although these debates capture two crucial and difficult issues confronting postunification German foreign policy, their highly politicized nature tends to obscure both the magnitude and the diversity of the problems and choices confronting Germany. Therefore, rather than focus on issues that dominate the headlines, this review essay analyzes five different schools of thought that dominate the serious but less-publicized debate over Germany’s future foreign policy. These schools can be classified as the pragmatic multilateralists, the europeanists, the euroskeptics, the internationalists, and the normalization-nationalists. These schools differ in their policy recommendations as well as in their underlying assumptions and worldviews.

Before proceeding, however, several qualifications are in order. First, this review essay concentrates on current discussions of German foreign policy, ignoring the debate that emerged in the immediate aftermath of unification. (For good overviews of this earlier period, see Müller, 1992; Anderson and Goodman, 1993; Gutjahr, 1994.) Second, the analysis of the different schools of thought excludes the statements of senior politicians and decision makers, although the political influence of the five schools is indicated. The review focuses, instead, on those who are widely considered to be the most original, influential, and articulate foreign policy analysts in the German media, universities, and think tanks. Of course, this is not to say that politicians and foreign policymakers are unimportant. Obviously quite the opposite is the case. However, there are good reasons to

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5 The two most prominent publications of this “new democratic right,” as they call themselves, are Zitelmann, Weißmann, and Grossheim (1993) and Schwilk and Schacht (1993); in fairness, it is important to add that not all contributors to these two volumes subscribe to the political agenda of the “new democratic right.” For a critique, see Herzinger and Stein (1995); see also the articles that appeared in the series “What’s Right” in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung between April and August 1994.
assume that analysts and experts outside the centers of power will be freer to speak their minds. Moreover, since they often show up in advisory functions, it is plausible to assume that much of their thinking will eventually be reflected in either government or opposition policy. Finally, every attempt has been made not to distort the views of individual authors by subsuming them under a particular school. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that ideal-type “schools” may not sufficiently differentiate the argumentation of authors within a given school.

Pragmatic Multilateralists

One rather distinct school of thought about German foreign policy can be labeled the “pragmatic multilateralists.” This school is largely made up of those foreign policy experts who represented the centrist foreign policy views of the old FRG. Many of these individuals—senior experts in German foreign policy think tanks as well as some academics—were (and are) quite influential in foreign policy decision-making circles. In the view of this group, the starting point for any serious analysis of German interests is the country’s embedment in and interconnectedness with the wider world.

If it is to serve German interests, Germany’s new foreign policy can only be conducted against the reality of the diverse regional and global interdependencies which connect the German society, economy, and polity with the external world and which create ties rendering partnership with others a precondition of successful German foreign policy (Kaiser and Maull, 1994:xviii).

It is certainly not the emphasis on multilateralism that is peculiar to this group. Indeed, an overwhelming majority of German foreign policy experts from different schools of thought can subscribe to this statement. Rather, it is the combination of a basic commitment to multilateralism and a certain pragmatism that characterizes this school. Three characteristics of this school are especially noteworthy.

First, according to pragmatic multilateralists, there is no need for a wholesale reinvention of German foreign policy (Kaiser, 1994:11; Stürmer, 1994:53). As a matter of fact, there is much to learn from the successes of the first forty years of the Federal Republic. “Einbindungspolitik”—as the old FRG’s diplomatic strategy of multilateralism and integration is commonly known within Germany—has turned out to be “a more cost-efficient variant to a strategy based on narrowly defined national interests” (Haftendorn, 1994:140). It has also been (and still is) widely regarded as a morally responsible choice compared with past German behavior and the repeated destruction that it has brought on the peoples of Europe (Künhardt, 1994).

According to pragmatic multilateralists, the changes in Germany’s environment after 1990, if anything, have reinforced the incentives to stick with this multilateral orientation. “The combination of increasing tendencies for destabilization in world politics and transnational interconnectedness between regions has increased the demand for multilateral regulation” (Kaiser, 1994:7; see also Bühl, 1994:175–181; Haftendorn, 1994:148; Nerlich, 1994:158). Although pragmatic multilateralists recognize that Germany is today one of the three big players in the world economy (Kloten, 1994), they also hasten to add that it is, by far, the one that is most dependent on an open world economy, especially within the European Union, the North Atlantic area, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Walter, 1995:54–57). Politically and militarily, Germany is not perceived to be in a position to deal on its own with any of the major problems in its immediate environment. Even though the need to
“stabilize” central and eastern Europe is a major German foreign policy interest, the pragmatic multilateralists believe that it is neither wise nor materially possible for Germany, a nonnuclear middle power, to act unilaterally (Rühl, 1992:744-747; Schöllgen, 1993:128–132; R. Wolf, 1993:230–235; Kaiser, 1994:5–8; Stürmer, 1994:55–56). The same holds for a long list of additional problems of the new “era of globalism,” ranging from containing the spread of weapons of mass destruction to international terrorism and trade in narcotics (Kaiser, 1995).

A second characteristic view of pragmatic multilateralists is an acceptance of the notion that Germany’s “power” and, even more important, its international “responsibility” have increased (Schöllgen, 1993:152–153; Haftendorn, 1994:148–150; Kaiser, 1994:10). As the subsequent discussion of the thinking of “internationalists” will show, both concepts are highly contested. Pragmatic multilateralists base this view on two assumptions: first, that Germans have to come to terms with “the necessity of assuming a greater share of new international responsibilities,” and second, that this role has to be “commensurate with [Germany’s] political and economic weight as well as the expectations of its allies” (Meiers, 1995:97, 96). To be sure, the “expectations” of Germany’s allies are far from uniform. Moreover, Germany’s “political and economic weight” carries no specific, universally accepted imperatives as to how it should conduct its foreign and security policy. Still, the context within which such arguments are generally made leaves little doubt as to what the proponents of taking a greater share of international responsibility mean. Although it is seldom explicitly acknowledged (for an exception, see Kaiser, 1993a), these analysts subscribe to at least three of the ideas undergirding Realpolitik: (1) that order in the international system—in the sense of predictable, stable, and peaceful relations among major powers—is valuable; (2) that the threat and use of force is both necessary and legitimate as an ultima ratio to (re)establish order given the conflict-ridden nature of international politics and the repeated occurrence of war; and (3) that the major powers have both a special interest and a special obligation to see that order is kept (or reestablished).

For pragmatic multilateralists, it follows that contemporary Germany again has to be regarded as one of the major powers in the world and that it also has to participate in the task of providing for international order. Hence, if it is “normal” for a great power to be “responsible” for creating and keeping international order—even if only in a “co-leadership” role (Haftendorn, 1994:150)—and if this may, at times, necessitate the use of force, then it is also part of the “normalization” of German foreign policy to shed whatever restrictions exist to participating fully in these activities (see, for example, Schöllgen, 1993:137–143; Kaiser, 1994:9–10; Nerlich, 1994:157–163; Stürmer, 1994:44–51). Having said this, pragmatic multilateralists hasten to add four qualifications. First, force may be the ultima ratio, but “soft power” instruments are more important in managing the increasing international interdependence because “welfare” rather than “warfare” (Joffé, 1995:44) defines the new paradigm of international relations. (See also Kaiser, 1995:33–34.) Second, as a general rule, Germany cannot be successful unless it acts in conjunction with other Western powers—“for Germany, the ability to act (‘Handlungsfähigkeit’) is, first and foremost, synonymous with its ability to be a reliable Western ally (‘westliche Bündnisfähigkeit’)” (Stürmer, 1994:61). Third, it is in Germany’s interest to have its foreign policy activities legitimized by appropriate international institutions—preferably collective security institutions such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) but, if necessary, also by collective defense institutions made up of the Western democracies, that is, the European Union and NATO. Fourth, although Germany, like any other country, has the right to abstain from specific
multilateral actions, it “can only say no in a specific case, if it has said yes before in principle” (Kaiser, 1994:13). Here the challenge for Germany is “how to be both confident in itself and considerate of others” (Bertram, 1994:92).

Although pragmatic multilateralists advocate a strategy of multilateralism in principle, their third distinguishing characteristic is an emphasis on the need for German foreign policymakers to pay more attention to defining what German interests are. Simply “seeking cover behind its foreign partners,” as the old FRG is said to have done (Kaiser, 1994:8), will no longer suffice. Pragmatic multilateralists, however, differ among themselves about the nature of German interests. Some (Stürmer, 1994:59; Kaiser, 1995:35-36) argue that although it may, at first, appear contradictory “to pursue genuine German interests at the same time as one is demonstrating solidarity with the allies,” this contradiction is easily resolved by pointing out that, “as before, all of the essential German interests can only be realized if, and insofar as, they correspond to the essential interests of its allies.”

Other pragmatic multilateralists (Nerlich, 1992a:518–522) see more of a structural tension between Germany’s continuing interest in operating within multilateral contexts and the interests of some of its major Western allies, particularly those of France and Britain. The latter are viewed as primarily interested in those institutional functions of NATO and the European Union that help constrain Germany (for example, stationing allied forces on German soil, constituting multinational corps primarily of German forces, and having a European Monetary Union) without requiring themselves to reciprocate (for example, by pushing ahead with European political integration or by creating supranational military structures at the European level). Yet, if institutions such as the European Union and NATO continue to be regarded as instruments “to control the Germans,” they will not only fail to build the kinds of flexible structures needed to respond to the new security challenges within and around Europe, they may also provoke a backlash within Germany. Consequently, Nerlich (1992a:522) argues that:

>Mere continuity with the multilateral diplomacy of the [old] Federal Republic will increasingly lead to complications. Given that Germany will remain at the center of European security policy for the foreseeable future—due not so much to its history as to its geostrategic location in the middle of Europe and its superior role as an economic power . . . , it will have to structure the framework [of European security] in ways that are not just simply constraining for the purpose of perpetual reassurance.

Because future conflicts will require highly flexible mechanisms for conflict prevention and management, probably involving ad hoc multilateralism and “hybrid coalitions,” such restructuring is important, if not necessary.

Pragmatic multilateralists also disagree among themselves on what specific substantive interests Germany has. For instance, although most pragmatic multilateralists believe that Germany’s major interests lie within the bounds of the European continent, some argue that “German foreign policy towards Europe is not possible by concentrating on Europe” and that the German government ought to broaden its foreign policy (von Bredow, 1993:175; von Bredow and Jäger, 1993:69, 225; Kaiser, 1995:34–36). Moreover, although some see a permanent seat for Germany in the UN Security Council as an “inevitable consequence” of Germany’s increased international power (Kaiser, 1994:8, also 1993a), others argue that both Germany’s interests and those of the broader international community may be better served if this does not happen (Rühl, 1992:754; Wagner, 1993). Such differences on particular issues notwithstanding, all these authors subscribe to the core elements of pragmatic multilateralism: (1) that Germany
ought to stick with its multilateral orientation as a matter of principle; (2) that this policy will entail taking over more responsibilities for the maintenance of international order commensurate with Germany's increased status; (3) that there be an emphasis on the growing importance of "interdependence" (Kaiser, 1995:28-29) and a rejection of both the "geopoliticization" of international relations and European politics (von Bredow, 1993:175) and "geopolitical determinism" with regard to the formulation of German foreign policy (Stürmer 1994:60); and (4) that, even though the fluidity in international politics may require "a heavy dose of pragmatism" and flexibility in responding to new challenges (Kaiser, 1995b:77; also Rühl, 1992:752–753, 759), there must be no doubt that Germany's future lies "in the West, and there alone" (Stürmer, 1994:60; see also Kaiser, 1995:32–33).

There are two other schools of thought in German foreign policy that discourse share many assumptions and preferences with the pragmatic multilateralists: the "europeanists" and the "euroskeptics." In each school, a majority of analysts subscribe to the view that Germany, as a matter of principle, should pursue a multilateral diplomatic strategy. In this sense europeanists as well as euroskeptics represent variations of pragmatic multilateralism. However, both these schools differ from the latter in one important respect, which justifies describing them as separate schools of thought: both have strong views on Germany's policy toward European integration in general and the European Union in particular. The europeanists advocate that the future development of the European Union (its deepening and widening) should be the key concern in German foreign policy. The euroskeptics reject this as "europhoria" (Schauer, 1993) while calling upon German foreign policymakers to accept Germany as a "normal nation-state" in Europe and to stop aiming at a federal Europe. Whereas europeanists and euroskeptics tend to perceive an acceleration of European integration as either very beneficial or highly detrimental to German interests, pragmatic multilateralists refuse to advocate a strong position either way on this issue. Although, in general, pragmatic multilateralists accept that the stakes for Germany are high with regard to the future of the European Union, they view it as only one institution among many. This position should not be surprising given that many pragmatic multilateralists are security specialists by training, and highly "Americanized" ones at that.4

For europeanists, the European Union is much more than just another international institution to which Germany belongs. As a matter of fact, there are few European or international problems and tasks, if any, by which Germany can still be regarded in isolation from the European Union. "Modern leadership is realized neither by great power politics nor by going it alone; modern leadership shows itself in the initiative for community-building. So 'integration' becomes the key word for the new epoch in Germany and Europe" (Weidenfeld, 1995b:2). According to europeanists, there are two arguments why the acceleration of European integration should be at the center of German foreign policy concerns. It is important (1) for "internal" reasons—to prevent the reemergence of counterbalancing coalitions vis-à-vis Germany, and (2) for "external" reasons—to render the European Union a more competitive actor in international affairs more broadly. The first argument is, most fundamentally, based on the conviction that German foreign policymakers have a constitutional obligation to foster European integration. According to the preamble of the German constitution, Germany is

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4See Lindemann, 1995, the title of which translates as "America within ourselves." The list of authors in this edited volume on German-American relations reads like a "who's who" of the German foreign policy elite.
committed “to serve peace in the world as a member with equal rights in a united Europe.” More important politically, the argument is based on the assumption that recent developments in central and eastern Europe place a special burden on Germany as the economically most powerful and geopolitically most exposed state in the center of Europe. However, if Germany were to respond to these challenges by unilaterally expanding its influence (by engaging in what Link, 1993a:17, calls the “Germanization” of central Europe), such an action would provoke balancing behavior on the part of its western European allies (Link, 1992:605–606; Schmidt, 1995:6–7). Based on these normative and geopolitical concerns, a unilateralist foreign policy is considered not only unjustifiable constitutionally but also counterproductive politically. In contrast, the acceleration of European integration is viewed as the only sensible choice.

The active participation of Germany in the development of federal structures in Europe is in its very own interest; indeed, European federalism can be regarded as the foreign policy “raison d’être” of Germany because in deepening European integration and in creating a European Union Germany can make best use of its power and increase its security without appearing threatening and without provoking counter-balancing coalitions. As a result, the foreign policy imperative is to do everything possible to foster the development of federal structures [in Europe] (Link, 1992:610).

Europeanists do not believe that accomplishing this goal will be an easy task. As a matter of fact, they doubt whether a federal Europe stands any chance of being realized in the foreseeable future. Still, they consider it an important long-term objective (Brenke, 1993:121; see also Hacker, 1995:288–289). Even seasoned elder statesmen, such as Helmut Schmidt (1995:11), view it as achievable eventually. In the short and medium term, europeanists think that the most practical ways to proceed are to acknowledge explicitly the notion of “variable speeds” in achieving objectives and to create a “hard core” of European Union member states that are willing and able to move ahead faster than the rest (Link, 1993a:18–20; Wessels, 1993:313–315; Janning, 1994; Weidenfeld, 1995a:12). In any of these scenarios, Franco-German cooperation is essential (Link, 1993a:18–20; Schmidt, 1995:8), while German-American relations, although important, rank second (Link, 1993b:51–55).

Europeanists also support an acceleration of European integration to improve Europe’s role in competing with other centers of power in North America and Asia. None of the key members of the European Union, including contemporary Germany, is viewed as able to compete effectively on its own with the United States, Japan, or China in any of the major issue areas (Schmidt, 1995:11). Moreover, both Germany and its western European allies are seen as lagging far behind the other centers of economic power in all of the key “information age” industries (Seitz, 1994:828–839). From this assessment, europeanists conclude that Germany’s position as a leading economic power can only be preserved (or regained) in concert with its most important European allies and with the help of an institutional apparatus such as the European Commission. Thus, because the (necessary) enlargement of the EU will take time and there is no time to waste, “it is paramount to create the hard core immediately: the Carolingian Europe of the six founding members” of the European Economic Community (Seitz, 1994:847). Proponents of this hard core strategy anticipate (and fear) the emergence of a “Japanese-American high-technology duopole” as a medium-term consequence of spreading mergers between United States and Japanese companies (Seitz, 1994:843–846).
Euroskeptics differ from europeanists mainly in their assessment of the future role of the nation-state and the possible function of the European Union. In general, they do not deny that the European Union and its predecessors have served (and continue to serve) important functions. They reject, however, the notion that it is desirable to aim at a federally structured Europe that transcends the nation-state.

The euroskeptics have three distinguishing characteristics. First, the end of the bipolar order in Europe is synonymous with the return of the “utterly normal anarchy” of the “world of states” (“Staatenwelt”) with all its consequences: the revival of nation-states, the reemergence of “great powers,” and the reconfiguration of diverse “concerts” among these powers (Schwarz, 1994b; von Alten, 1994). This dramatic upheaval in the international environment has not left Germany, at the center of the storm, unchanged. Heavily influenced by what they perceive as enlightened realist thinking, euroskeptics argue that Germans still refuse to accept the new realities and that they continue to “fear nothing more than not being bound or integrated” (Koch, 1994:813). In spite of all the historical legacies, for euroskeptics there is, in principle, no reason why Germany should not be able to meet the requirements of a “normal state.” In short, Germany has to “take its place” (“sich einordnen”) in the world. It should “not make itself greater or smaller than it actually is”; it should “accept the world of states, because there is no other”; and it should “move within [that world] in a rational manner as the respective situation (“Lageerkenntnis”) requires” (von Alten, 1994:345; see also Schwarz, 1994b:95–100).

As part of this “normality,” Germany should also accept that, with unification, it has left behind the two “rational states” (the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic) and again become a normal “nation-state” (Hacke, 1993:537; see also Schwarz, 1994b:58–68; Baring, 1995:16). The euroskeptics neither expect nor support a return to the roots of German national identity prior to 1945. National sentiments (“das Nationale”) in the sense of the nineteenth century’s national movements, Hans-Peter Schwarz (1994b) argues, have evaporated not only, but particularly, in Germany. To be sure, these sentiments “somehow persist—as communities of culture or history” (Schwarz, 1994b:87). But it is the state, not the nation, that remains tangible (Schwarz, 1994b:87; see also von Alten, 1994:70–77). Moreover, the main characteristic of the modern state is no longer the projection of power domestically and internationally; it is, instead, the democratic welfare state that stands out as its central feature. “The national egotism of the democratic welfare state—this is what is left of the old state, and it will continue to play a role in all of the mature western democracies” (Schwarz 1994b:87).

Yet, for euroskeptics, Germany is not only a normal nation-state, it is a “great power” (Hacke, 1993:521–522; von Alten, 1994:106–121, 329–330) and the “central power” of Europe (Schwarz, 1994b:70–79). According to euroskeptics, this great power status carries special rights and responsibilities—and it is the latter that are often perceived as “burdens” (von Alten, 1994:114–119). This perception is particularly acute because of the many dilemmas (or “multilemmas”) that Germany faces as a result of reunification (Schwarz, 1994a). Germany needs to go through a difficult “maturation” process before it resumes its “proper” place among the great powers. This process is seen to be difficult, first, because the Germans (for understandable historical reasons reaching back to the first German unification in the 1870s) still lack a “political class” that is able to lead and coordinate the political discourse” of the nation (von Alten, 1994:140–152, 331–
Moreover, this task is further complicated by the fact that Germany’s great power status has two contradictory components:

First, there is indeed a great distance [in terms of standard power indicators] between Germany and the powers next in rank, i.e., France, Britain, and Italy; second, Germany is located in an environment of equally efficient and productive neighbors that would not allow it to dominate economically, even if it wanted to. . . . [Moreover, all these states] are highly interdependent economically. The resulting consequence is as simple to recognize as it is fundamental: Germany is, of course, the most powerful, and, therefore, also potentially the most influential European country; at the same time, it can only prosper as long as it takes its place in this system of interdependence as a partner. Attempts at unilateral domination or the formation of a block of states with Germany at its center would provoke counter-coalitions and would destroy the system of interdependence (Schwarz, 1994b:78).

This assessment—that “the world of states” is returning, that a diverse set of “great powers” has replaced the predominance of the Soviet-American rivalry, and that a delicately positioned and ill-prepared Germany will have to take its place among these powers—leads to the second major characteristic of euroskeptics: an emphasis on traditional instruments of great power politics (such as alliances, diplomacy, great power concerts) in contrast to the formal institutionalization of international cooperation in supranational structures (von Alten, 1994:322–323). In the realist tradition, euroskeptics have long castigated as “politically dangerous” what they perceive to be a tendency on the part of German decision makers “to conduct foreign policy without any regard to traditional considerations of power politics” (Hacke, 1993:421). This criticism has become more pronounced as a result of the perceived magnitude of the challenges in central and eastern Europe and the alleged inaction on the part of the German government. Euroskeptics believe that it has paid too much attention to the (structurally different) interests of many of its western European partners (Baring, 1995:17–19). Again, this is not to say that euroskeptics think that Germany should opt for power maximization and unilateralism. It does, however, mean that “German foreign policy, including Germany’s European policy, will in the future for objective reasons become more selfish, more calculated and cost-conscious, less flexible and primarily fixed on a rather narrowly defined national interest” (Schwarz, 1994b:90–95). Moreover, given its central position, Germany’s “fate” is to “intelligently balance a complicated system of (interlocking) balances of power” made up mainly of the European Union, NATO, and a regional balance of power system stretching from “the European zone of stability to the earthquake zone in the Balkans and eastern Europe” (Schwarz, 1994b:121).

The third major view that euroskeptics hold follows logically from this analysis of German interests and the basic trends in international and European politics. In contrast to the advice of pragmatic multilateralists to act pragmatically and flexibly within international institutions in an international environment that is both highly interdependent and still very much in flux, euroskeptics argue that the shape of the new environment is sufficiently clear (at least as far Germany is concerned) to formulate clear-cut priorities in German foreign policy.

NATO stands unequivocally at the top of the euroskeptics’ list of priorities. In spite of the internal differences within the alliance that appeared during the Balkan crisis, NATO is still seen as the only functioning link between Europe and the United States. Washington’s continued military presence is deemed vital both for the balancing of intra-European relations and as reassurance against the prevailing risks in eastern Europe, especially in Russia (Schwarz, 1994c:781–783). Moreover, given that Germany cannot count on its major European allies, France and Britain, to the same extent that it can on the United States (a major historical
and structural fact that was brought back to the Germans during the Two-plus-Four negotiations on Germany unification), it should clearly side with the Americans if there should ever arise a conflict between Germany's European and Atlanticist interests (Feldmeyer, 1993:18-19). NATO also should remain Germany's first foreign policy priority for moral reasons. The alliance is the “legitimate heir and extension of the ‘Four Freedoms’ of President Roosevelt, the Atlantic Charter, and the United Nations, indeed of the anti-Hitler coalition of the core states of world civilization” (von Alten, 1994:344). Germany's “anchor” is in the West, in general, and “in the middle of the Atlantic,” in particular (Hacke, 1993:557) because being a member of the Atlantic community “may be the best thing that is worth preserving from the Cold War; what is more, it may even be the best thing that has ever happened to Germany” (von Alten, 1994:344).

For euroskeptics, Germany's second foreign policy priority should be the "irreversible political, economic, and cultural integration within the West ("‘Westbindung’") of Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Slovenians, possibly also of Croats, Bulgarians, Romanians, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians” (Schwarz, 1994c:785; see also Baring, 1995:17). Although this goal also ranks high for pragmatic multilateralists and europeans, there are several major differences between them and the euroskeptics. The latter put more emphasis on the structurally diverging interests of Germany on the one side and Britain and, particularly France, on the other (Schwarz, 1994b:87–92, 1994c:776–778; Baring, 1995:17–20). Moreover, they argue that the considerable risks associated with the transformation process in these central European states "make it imperative to stabilize the regions from Gdansk to Budapest and Bratislava at any cost, or at least at almost any cost" (Schwarz, 1994b:115; see also Baring, 1995:17–20). To be sure, euroskeptics do not advocate German unilateralism; their primary and ultimate objective is to integrate Germany's eastern neighbors into western institutions. Euroskeptics, however, in contrast to pragmatic multilateralists and europeans, advocate a more assertive approach vis-à-vis its western European partners in order to make them more responsive to Germany's own interests. Such an approach will require "greater toughness and vigilance in negotiations" (Schwarz, 1994b:93).

As the name of the school suggests, the third (and defining) foreign policy priority on the euroskeptics' agenda revolves around their rejection of a federal Europe. They are not in principle against a further deepening of European integration in specific areas where all members may profit (such as environmental policy or immigration). Their clear preference, however, is a widening of the European Union "with all its consequences" (Schwarz, 1994c:786). They reject measures to accelerate the trend toward centralization and overregulation by the European Union bureaucracy in Brussels. This discussion focuses especially on those areas of policy that the member states value highly nationally—such as national autonomy in foreign and security matters in the French and British cases, or the independence of the Deutsche Mark in the German case. Euroskeptics advocate a more stringent German attitude toward the financing of the European Union budget, particularly as far as subsidies for southern European regions are concerned (Schwarz, 1994b:91–95, 1994c:785–786; Baring, 1995:21, n. 7).
to some extent by realist thinking, especially with regard to the possible consequences of the geopolitical changes in Europe. To be sure, this is not to say that the analysts of these three schools are realists. As a matter of fact, with the possible exception of the euro-skeptics, the majority would probably reject such a label outright, identifying more easily with the label “institutionalists.” However, realist thinking does inform the analysis of all three schools, if only (as in the case of pragmatic multilateralists and europeans) in suggesting the warning signs and points of reference that facilitate devising “institutionalist” solutions to “realist” problems.

A fourth school of thought, the “internationalists,” differs fundamentally from the previously discussed schools with regard to realist thinking. For them, such thinking is wholly inadequate for addressing any major global problem (either analytically or prescriptively). In contrast to the debate about “national” interests among some of the representatives of the first three schools, internationalists emphasize that Germany’s interests are not really national in the traditional sense but “interconnected” (“verflochte Interessen” according to Senghas, 1995; see also Wolf, 1995a). Some internationalists even argue that Germany should be “aiming at a national policy in the international interest” rather than being “guided by the principle of international politics in the national interest” and that “in this regard the values of peace-maintenance, safeguarding of nature, human rights, and the elimination of poverty have priority” (Volmer and Fues, 1993:71).

These quotes already indicate that the internationalists approach the challenges facing German foreign policy in a different manner than any of the three schools of thought discussed earlier. The central point of departure for internationalists is their judgment that today’s foreign policy has to be conducted against the background of an ever more complex and interdependent world. Indeed, this world has changed so much during the past four decades that there simply is no “foreign” policy anymore; there is only “internationalizing policy” (“internationalisierende Politik”—Czempiel, 1993:151) or “policy within one world” (“Weltinnenpolitik”), because whatever decision makers do has consequences that are as much domestic as they are international or global (Brock, forthcoming). Internationalists have some clarity about the nature of the agenda for this “one world” and the hierarchy of issues. Ecological threats to sustainable global development, which are in large part a result of modern industrialization, are the highest priority (Breyer, 1993). However, the preconditions for action are not well specified. There can be no doubt that the world hangs together, but how it does so—that is, the worldwide consequences of discrete policy choices—is far from clear because today’s world society is at risk from “civilizationally produced threats which can neither be controlled spatially nor temporally or socially” (Beck, 1995:13; see also Zürn, 1995).

Internationalists agree almost unanimously that a “world-state” is neither likely nor desirable (Lutz, 1993a) and that the “world of states” is gone for good (Czempiel, 1994a; Habermas, 1991:105–110). “To be sure, nation-states will play a role in the era of globalism. . . . But they will only be sovereign with regard to their competence for chaos; with regard to their competence for solutions, they will depend on transnational and supranational structures in the future” (Fischer, 1994:252). Yet, it also seems clear that the challenges to “governance without government” are immense and that the supply of governance in the form of supranational institutions, international regimes, and multilateral policy coordination may not correspond to the increasing demand (Kohler-Koch, 1991a; Müller, 1991).

Such is the environment in which Germany will have to conduct its “foreign” policy. For internationalists, it will have to do so mindful of the fact that it is “no
Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany

more or no less an inter- and transnationally cooperating democracy and market economy which is integrated in Europe and obliged to act ‘collegially’ rather than ‘directorially’” (Rittberger, 1992:215). Thus, internationalists, in concert with representatives from the other three schools, emphasize that Germany is highly dependent on being on good terms with its neighbors and the world more broadly. However, in contrast to the other schools, internationalists are more pronounced in rejecting realist concepts of “power” or of a “great power,” because these are based on a misconceived notion of power as control over resources (Rittberger, 1992:208–215). A more adequate definition of power sees it as the luxury of being able “to afford not to learn” (Senghaas, 1993:489). Thus defined, Germany is no better off now than before 1990. In a sense it is even worse off because its environment is more complex and, therefore, more demanding. The concepts of “trading state” or “civilian power” are seen as better descriptions of Germany’s status (Maull, 1990, 1992; Rode, 1991; Wolf, 1991a, 1991b, 1995a, 1995b; Rittberger, 1992; Senghaas, 1994). Neither, however, is meant to idealize Germany’s role in international affairs given that internationalists recognize both the advantages (for example, the downgrading of the military as an instrument of foreign policy) and the shortcomings (for example, profit orientation at the expense of the ecological system and the developing countries) of the international roles of states associated with these concepts.

In the internationalists’ worldview, Germany has an obligation to take over its share of “responsibility” in international affairs. It should do so for the purely selfish interests of an important trading state—a key interest of which is to initiate collective action to solve problems that cannot be solved unilaterally—and for ethical reasons. Moreover, it may have to do so in a “leadership role” (“Vorreiterrolle”) (Maull, 1993:69; Wolf, 1995a:62–63). Internationalists define “leadership” and “responsibility” in a very different way than the previously discussed schools. They advocate leadership and responsibility, not in terms of being a global policeman or firefighter in a “territorial world” dominated by great powers (Rosecrance, 1986, 1993), but rather as a promoter of preventive conflict management (Maull, 1992; Wolf, 1995a). As a matter of principle, Germany should stick with the strategy of “cooperative internationalism” that was so successful for the old Federal Republic. According to this strategy, the pursuit of political objectives is not understood as the “powerful or even violent realization of one’s own fixed interests, but as a communication process that is fluid and focuses on a complementarity of interests” (Kohler-Koch, 1991b:616).

Although internationalists take multilateralism and integration seriously, many criticize the fact that the substance of multilateral action is defined primarily by Germany’s major Western allies, who seem ready to use the ‘power’ of contemporary Germany, including its military potential, for specific international purposes, while denying it a greater say in formulating what those purposes should be” (Rittberger, 1992:208–209; see also Kreile, 1993). Therefore, rather than uncritically accepting the roles attributed to Germany by analysts and allies, whose thinking is still heavily dominated by the world of nation-states, Germany should self-consciously choose a strategy of self-restraint and “refuse to project power or apply the [traditional] instruments of power, be they military, economic, or ideological” (Statz, 1993b:184; also Fuchs, 1993). Instead, it should define its role in line with the demands of an agenda for sustainable global development. If adopting this strategy leads to charges that Germany is, once again, pursuing a “special path” (“Sonderweg”), Germans should be prepared to live with the consequences, because selecting this role would be proof that they have learned from history (Wolf, 1995a:63).
All this is not to say that the use of force is excluded under any circumstances. There will, of course, still be situations in which using force may be unavoidable. However, even in these cases "the crucial question will be, whether we succeed in developing effective and legitimate forms of multilateral sanctions ("Zwangsmaßnahmen") or whether the recourse to force follows traditional nation-state thinking" (Maull, 1993:71). In essence, then, "responsible" German foreign policy has to be a "policy for peace" ("Friedenspolitik") that has the following objectives:

the promotion and protection of the [domestic] rule of law ("Rechtsstaatlichkeit") and, more generally, of human rights; the creation of networks of cooperation, that reduce the security dilemma and institutionalize expectations ("Erwartungsverläßlichkeit") resulting in motives for action becoming more transparent and predictable; economic compensation ("Ausgleich") without which there is no legitimacy in highly politicized societies; and, finally, empathy, the emotional glue that facilitates a constructive culture of conflict ("Konfliktkultur") within and between societies and access to constructive forms of conflict management. Taken together, such orientations will result in a civilizing ("Zivilisierung") of politics (Senghaas, 1993:491).

How do these general principles translate into concrete policy recommendations for Germany? Although internationalists differ from the other schools of thought in their specific policy recommendations, there is consensus that Germany must follow a strategy of self-restraint "combined with a policy of active commitment within international contexts to international law because this is the only way to realize mutual control of Realpolitik ambitions" (Statz, 1993b:184; see also Fischer, 1994:222). In all international contexts, the overall objective must be a "change of paradigm," that is, abandoning power politics in all its forms in favor of a persistent pursuit of the "demilitarization of politics" (Statz, 1993b:186).

Obviously, the focus of attention in realizing such a strategy has to be Germany's current set of memberships in international institutions: "Western" institutions such as the European Union and NATO, but, especially, international institutions with more "universal" memberships like the OSCE and the United Nations. Whereas prior to 1990, many internationalists identified the "West" predominantly with the military structures (and militarized policies) of NATO and Germany's major Western allies, a majority have now come to emphasize the importance of "Western" institutions in general. The latter facilitate Germany's internal development as a civic democracy and its integration within multilateral and supranational structures (Habermas, 1990:98-99; Krell, 1992:273-274; Knapp, 1993:91; Fischer, 1994:187-210; Naumann, 1994). Two foreign policy objectives build from these views: the first concerns the continuation and acceleration of European integration; the second involves the need to form a collective security system that transcends NATO.

The European Union is viewed as the only existing institution with the potential to tame national ambitions within supranational structures (Knapp, 1993:91; Fischer, 1994:222-225). Once making this point, however, internationalists emphasize that:

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5For different views on the conditions under which force may still be necessary, see Lutz, 1993b:90-94, 125-128; Maull, 1992:273-274, 278; Schmilen, 1993a:36-44, 1993b; Statz, 1993a:97-98, 1993b:189; Thomas and Weiner, 1993:159-164; Czempiel, 1994b:39, 1994c:802-803; and Fischer, 1995. It is also possible to identify a "pacifist" subgroup among internationalists which distinguishes itself from the former by rejecting the use of force under almost any circumstances, based on the conviction that military means are wholly inadequate to solve any conflict. Rather than considering the use of force even in cases such as the genocides in Rwanda or the Balkans, these pacifists would argue that it is more important to address the sources of these atrocities and to use nonviolent countermeasures such as sanctions. For a sample of pacifist views, see Krippendorff, 1992; Bastian, 1993:94-96; Narr and Vaack, 1993; Wette, 1993; Koppe, 1994; and Buro, 1995.
It would be naïve to believe that international commitments as such have a “civilizing” effect on the Federal Republic [since] the European Community is the starting point and instrument of autonomous centers of power. An uncritically positive reference to international commitment . . . ignores both the national powers that make use of these structures of integration, and the integration into structures that reinforce a militarization of conflicts (Statz, 1993b:190).

Against this backdrop, internationalists demand that Germany emphasize the “civil forms of international commitments” and seek to play the role of a “benevolent hegemon” in the sense of supporting the strengthening of civil, joint (“solidarisch”), and ecologically sustainable structures” (Statz, 1993b:192, 193). Thus, deepening of the European Union must include EU-wide regulations that allow individual member states to set minimum standards in ecological and social matters at the national level (Bütikofer, 1993:185–187; Statz, 1993b:192). As for central and eastern Europe, internationalists advocate an EU strategy that supports the creation of civil and democratic domestic structures (Albrecht, 1993:64–65; Fischer, 1994:225–226; Senghaas, 1995:32, 36). Moreover, most internationalists advocate the early acceptance of the membership applications of Germany’s eastern European neighbors, especially Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Germany is perceived as having a special responsibility vis-à-vis these countries, and these countries are seen as the best guarantors against any “tendencies towards a germanization of the EU” growing out of their historical experience with a German hegemon (Albrecht, 1993:67; Fischer, 1994:225).

The United Nations, OSCE, and, to a lesser extent, NATO are for internationalists the relevant institutions to deal with the problem of safeguarding peace in Europe and the world. Whereas many internationalists had favored Germany’s withdrawal from NATO before unification, this call has now been toned down because of fears that it might lead to a renationalization of German foreign policy. Some prominent internationalists even explicitly welcome the German army’s integration within the “transnational command structures” of NATO, “as long as a German army exists” (Fischer, 1994:222). For internationalists, the overall objective of Germany’s policy vis-à-vis NATO is to contribute to its steady “demilitarization” (including the renunciation of, and opposition to, any plans for “expansion”). Eventually, Germany must aim at transcending NATO with a true collective security system. Such a goal will necessitate strengthening the United Nations at the global level (Rittberger, 1992:226; Czempiel, 1994c; Senghaas, 1995:36–37) and the OSCE at the European level. The latter is viewed as especially important for Germany because it is the only truly all-European institution with a rudimentary set of instruments for conflict prevention and mediation already in place (Schlotter, 1992:296–297, 1995:269–272; Senghaas, 1993:481–485; Czempiel, 1994b:42–43; Fischer, 1994:225–228). In the long term, this objective may also involve the abolition of alliances and their replacement by a collective security organization such as the “European Security Community,” modeled to some extent on the United Nations but endowed with a more important “General Assembly,” referred to as the “European Security Council” (Lutz, 1993b:91–153).

Normalisation-Nationalists

One of the most visible schools of thought in the public debate about Germany’s role in the new international environment includes a group of young German historians who call themselves the “new democratic right” (Weißmann, 1994; Zitelmann, 1995) or “normalization-nationalists.” In contrast to the previously discussed schools of thought that, in one way or another, focus on what
Germany’s role should be in the post–Cold War international environment and advocate specific foreign policy responses, this group has concentrated primarily on domestic issues such as a revised “image of (German) history” (“Geschichtsbild”), internal security, immigration, and the presumed “discourse dominance” of “the left” in German political culture.

At the core of the agenda of normalization-nationalists is a call for Germans to abandon their “self-hatred” (Röhl, 1995) and to replace it with a “love for their own land” (Seebacher-Brandt, 1995) which is thought common among other nations with as long a history as Germany’s. Contemporary Germany should, once again, become a “self-confident nation,” grounded in a “familiarity with itself” and appreciative of its “experience and the identity of family and nation” (Schwil and Schacht, 1995:11). As one of the heroes of the new democratic right, the writer Botho Strauß (1995:24) put it in a startling essay for the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel:

Being right, not as a result of cheap conviction or general intentions but out of the total personality, this is to experience the superiority of a remembrance; a remembrance which moves man, not so much the citizen, and leaves him isolated and shaken in the midst of the modern, enlightened circumstances within which he conducts his ordinary life. This permeated state (“Durchdrungenheit”) does not call for a disgusting and ridiculous masquerade of dog-like imitation, nor does it call for a slide into the second-hand-shop of the history of mischief. It requires a different act of rebellion: one against the total domination of the present which weeds out and deprives the individual of any presence of unenlightened past, of historical coming-into-being, of mythical time [emphasis in the original].

Strauß’s essay, which was originally published in February 1993, was reprinted as the lead article in one of the key works by the new democratic right, the volume Die selbstbewusste Nation. Its editors hailed the essay as “the most emphatic, profound, and momentous attempt” to pursue the “spiritual conversion” necessary to move Germany toward becoming a more self-confident nation (Schwil and Schacht, 1995:12). Whatever the ultimate aims of the new democratic right, this volume and another one edited by Zitelmann and his colleagues (1993) have provoked repeated charges that the normalization-nationalists are playing down (“verharmlosen”) the Nazi period to free the way for a revival of the dubious political culture of “the people in the center” of the continent (Bergfleth, 1995:116) distinct from the West. Normalization-nationalists, however, have vigorously rejected any association with or sympathies for neo-Nazism: “The crimes of the nazis are so immense that they cannot be compensated for by moral shame or other civic sentiments. They put the German into shock and left him there trembling” (Strauß, 1995:35; see also Schwil, 1995:465–468; Schwil and Schacht, 1995:16). Still, normalization-nationalists also reject the “ritual repetition of the word ‘unique’ in the context of discussions of nazi crimes” (Maurer, 1995:73) and emphasize that German history must not be reduced to the Nazi period. Instead, they see a need for a “reconnection with the past” and a remembrance of its richness, both religiously and politically (Schwil and Schacht, 1995:16; Strauß, 1995:25).

The call for a revival of Germans’ “love for their own land” is accompanied by a heavy dose of skepticism, if not outright opposition, to the kind of “West-

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6The term “normalization-nationalists” (“Normalisierungsnationalisten”) was coined by Peter Glotz, the editor of the center-left periodical Frankfurter Hefte. Representatives of the “new right” have accepted the term as a proper description of the main characteristics of their movement (Weißmann, 1995:324).
ern” values that are now widely seen as forming the core of German political culture. Normalization-nationalists argue that the German “Western orientation and integration with the West (“Westorientierung und Westbindung”) are not well grounded and debated as rational decisions but are metaphysically transfigured by leftist liberals and conservative intellectuals” (Zitelmann, Weißmann, and Grossheim, 1993:10; see also Weißmann, 1993). “Westbindung” is viewed as having “outlived itself as an ideological blinder (“Ver­satzstück”) which has nurtured a false conscience in Germany” (Weißmann, 1994). One of the reasons why the normalization-nationalists see a need to “demystify” Western culture lies in the roots of “Westernization” after the defeat of Nazi Germany. The reeducation campaign of the Western allies after 1945 is thought to have been aimed mainly at erasing a German sense of identity. “If one [that is, the allies of the anti-Hitler coalition] wanted to ban the German threat once and for all, the Germans would have to cooperate in achieving that themselves; they would have to lose their historical identity, and, thus, their sense of belonging together and their self-respect. What was called for was not the ability to feel sorrow (“Fähigkeit zu trauern”) but the inability to love (“Unfähigkeit zu lieben”): oneself, one’s language, one’s culture, one’s customs, and one’s history” (Röhl, 1995:94). For normalization-nationalists there is little doubt that the allies succeeded since “Westernization” has become part of a permanent “education program” (Straub, 1993) and since German intellectuals have thoroughly “internalized the Morgenthau-plan, the division [of Germany], and the allied education of the populace (“alliierte Volkserziehung”) as national masochism” (Röhl, 1995:97, emphasis in original). What has been lost along the way is “that complex of melancholic, contemplative introversion and detachment from the world, which is difficult to combine with the belief in progress and rationality of the West,” a certain “pre-civilizational basic mood” which was typical of German culture in the past (Krause, 1995:136–137, 140).

How does this core objective of normalization-nationalists, that is, a revival of a distinct sense of German identity, translate into foreign policy recommendations? In comparison to the other four schools of thought, the foreign policy program of the new democratic right is the least developed. There is, however, one distinct element that does inform current thinking and that may, in the future, form the basis for a more detailed foreign policy agenda: the rediscovery of geopolitics, including its German roots, in the writings of Karl Haushofer, the most prominent German representative of geopolitics in the 1920s and 1930s (Hahn, 1995:331–333; see also Brill, 1993, 1994; Weiser, 1994; Winkler, 1995). (For a critique of the geopolitical argument see Kandziora, 1994; Sprengel, 1994, 1995.) This “renaissance of geopolitics” is very much welcomed because it is thought to “provide important insights into the interests of states.” The German debate about geopolitics, however, ignores “the classical laws of political action” according to which “all political ideas . . . are geopolitical ideas” (Weißmann, 1995:319).

It is not clear to what extent German foreign policy will need to be altered if “the laws of geopolitics” are taken seriously by German decision makers. Normalization-nationalists agree that Germany’s geopolitical position condemns it to form alliances. Its dependence on the interests of its neighbors and on those powers that have a transregional radius of operation (“überregionaler Wirkungsradius”) is higher than in the case of many other states. First and foremost, therefore, geopolitical analysis will have to take into account the goals of other actors. This fact is especially true with regard to the United States because of the importance that Washington places on “the Mackinderian question of the control of the Eurasian rim” and because Germany’s influence
within Europe is due to some extent to its good relations with the United States (Hahn, 1995:336-337; see also Thies, 1993:527; Inacker, 1995:369). Thus, there seems to be agreement among normalization-nationalists about the importance of good relations with the United States and the continued integration of the German army within NATO structures. Yet, the integration of almost all German army units into multinational units and their assignment to NATO command structures is criticized as giving rise to “military multiculturalism which threatens the core of the self-confidence of the armed forces ('Streitkräfte-Bewusstsein')” (Inacker, 1995:371-372).

Opinions differ, however, as to Germany’s policy vis-à-vis the future of European integration. Some normalization-nationalists are explicitly opposed to the downgrading of the European Union to a free trade area, arguing that it has always been “a classical task of geopolitics to integrate different zones with diverging interests” (Hahn, 1995:339). A majority, though, clearly side with the euroskeptics, arguing that the deepening of the European Union must give way to its widening because Germany’s security depends primarily on stability on its eastern borders (Thies, 1993:531). Therefore, Germany should (1) draw the appropriate lessons from the return of the nation-state and geopolitics (Zitelmann, Weißmann, and Grossheim, 1993:13); (2) work toward the stabilization of its immediate eastern neighborhood (preferably in concert with its western European partners) while granting Russia its own sphere of influence in the territory of the former Soviet Union (Hahn, 1995:343); and (3) reject “the utopia of a total Western integration ('Totalwestintegration') of Germany into a federal European state” (Zitelmann, Weißmann, and Grossheim, 1993:15; see also Watzal, 1993; M. Brunner, 1995; Nolte, 1995:160), especially in the form of a “French-led continental block with an anti-American accent” (Hahn, 1995:339).

**Relative Status of the Schools of Thought**

*Policy Influence.* The five schools of thought discussed above represent distinct sets of opinions in the current German debate over the country’s future foreign policy. Obviously, not all of these views are equally important or influential. Broadly speaking, the views of the pragmatic multilateralists and the Europeanists are the most widely shared by the mainstream foreign policy establishment: the German foreign policy bureaucracy, the parties of the governing coalition (that is, the Christian Democratic Union or CDU, the Christian Social Union or CSU, and the Free Democratic Party or FDP), and an important segment of the Social Democratic Party (SPD). (See Schössler, Albert, and Kostelnik, 1993:21-57, 141-144; Biedenkopf, 1994:193-226, 1995; Rühe, 1994, 1995; Scharping, 1994:193-226; Schäuble, 1994:184-221; Kinkel, 1995a, 1995b.) Similarly, the views of the internationalists are shared by many members of the opposition parties, including some Social Democrats (SPD) (especially the so-called left wing), the Greens, and the almost exclusively East German-based Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), which is the successor of the communist party that ruled the former German Democratic Republic.

In contrast, the euroskeptics and, especially, the normalization-nationalists so far have more limited (if growing) support within the rather small national-conservative circles of the CDU, the CSU, and the FDP. However, one of the main messages of the euroskeptics—not to sacrifice the stability of the Deutsche Mark at the altar of a federal European Union—has begun to resonate even among the leading Social Democrats. This may, however, primarily reflect the SPD’s perceived need for “a national issue” in the 1998 federal election campaign if the
party is to have any chance against Helmut Kohl, the “chancellor of German and European unity,” should he stand for reelection once again.

*Public Opinion.* Even though pragmatic multilateralists, europeanists, and internationalists are the dominant schools among the foreign policy experts of the political parties, the euroskeptics can count on increasing (if somewhat diffuse) support among the broader public. Some of the key positions of euroskeptics are shared by a noticeable portion of the German population. This especially includes beliefs about what should undergird a European currency and that Germany should put more emphasis on its own interests within the European Union than it usually has in the past (Asmus, 1995). Generally, however, attitudes among the German population remain favorable toward European integration. Indeed, Germans perceive little threat to German identity as a result of further integration; they remain aware of the many benefits of the European Union, rejecting a hegemonic role for Germany within the EU; and they support the further development of its institutions, including the transfer of German sovereignty to the Union, in such core areas as foreign and security policies. (For relevant public opinion data and interpretations, see Infratest Burke, 1992:3–4, 36, 58–67; Eurobarometer, 1994:34–35; Noelle-Neumann, 1994, 1995:8–9; Platzer and Ruhland, 1994; Deubner, 1995:33–39; and Rattinger and Krämer, 1995, especially Tables 7–15.)

Specifically, when asked the general question about whether they think contemporary Germany has a right to play the leading role in Europe, 43 percent of Germans in both the East and West object, while 31 percent are in favor and 26 percent are undecided (Rattinger and Krämer, 1995: Table 17). If anything, Germans feel that their country ought to play a leading role in economic policy (81 percent in favor, with France mentioned by 6 percent), in monetary policy (77 percent in favor, with France ranking second with 4 percent), and in foreign policy (71 percent in favor, followed by France with 58 percent and Britain with 37 percent) but not in security and defense policy (29 percent in favor, with France ranking first with 37 percent) (Infratest Burke, 1992:47–49).

The hesitation to play a leadership role becomes even clearer when the public is queried about Germany’s future military role. To be sure, there are some indications of support for a certain “normalization” in attitudes toward military matters. Almost 70 percent of Germans consider it “normal” for a sovereign country to have its own army (including an astonishing 68 percent of the electorate of the Greens), and some 50 percent favor having a “strong military” even in the absence of a military threat to Germany (Holst, 1995: Tables 1, 2). Having said this, however, three examples from recent public opinion surveys show that the German population continues to hold serious reservations about the role of the military in general and the use of force in particular. First, 64 percent of the Germans believe that defense expenditures are too high (30 percent about right; 5 percent too low) (Holst, 1995: Table 8). Second, 57 percent consider 370,000 troops (the figure agreed upon in negotiating the Two-plus-Four treaty) as “about right,” while 36 percent think it is too high, and 7 percent believe it is too low (Holst, 1995: Table 9). Finally, there is a clear preference for “internationalist” goals. Fully 92 percent of the Germans polled support the use of the military in international disaster relief or for safeguarding the environment, but support drops markedly when Germans are asked about using the military for peacekeeping purposes (76 percent), for fighting an aggressor in the context of the United Nations (59 percent), or together with the allies in order to defend German interests (54 percent) (Holst, 1995: Tables 12, 13).
In sum, while public opinion data indicate that far-reaching (and potentially costly) European integration projects such as the European Monetary Union may face more difficulties within Germany than in the past, the same data also underline a continuing preference for multilateralism, including the readiness among Germans to transfer power to supranational levels of government in such crucial areas as foreign and security policy.

**German Foreign Policy Alternatives**

What should one conclude from this analysis about the future course of German foreign policy? If foreign policy discourse does, indeed, foreshadow the major trends in a country's policy toward the outside world—that is, tell us "when a change is approaching,... what are the most feasible options, and what lines of action are precluded" (Waever, 1994:255)—then the analysis of the five schools of thought can offer some insights into the directions German foreign policy might take in the future.

**Four Competing Options**

Basically, there are four potential future directions for German foreign policy that are either suggested in the literature or debated in one form or another in public discourse. They can be summarized under the following headings: "World Power," "Wider West," "Carolingian Europe," and "Mitteleuropa." These concepts may be said to represent the core competing grand strategies, "grand strategy" being broadly defined as a country's overall "plan for making itself secure" (Walt, 1989:6; see also Posen, 1984:13).

**World Power.** According to this option, contemporary Germany will choose to become a genuine "world power" by going nuclear (Mearsheimer, 1990:35–39; Waltz, 1993:62–67, 1994:198–199) and/or by seizing "with both hands the United States' offer to be 'partners in leadership'... enhancing its military power... [and becoming] the captain of a great European trading bloc" (Garton Ash, 1994:78; see also Waltz, 1993:71–72). Germany would, thus, break with its current orientation of being both a low key military power and a player in world politics that acts almost exclusively within and through multilateral institutions. Instead, it would assume a role in international politics similar to the ones ascribed to traditional great powers by realists.

Among the five schools of thought discussed above, there is not a single voice that advocates the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Germany. Even if this situation were to change in the course of a dramatic reversal in eastern Europe, it is

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7"Gesamteuropa." that is, the determined effort to build all-European structures that would increasingly supersede the dominance of "Western" institutions (and, most important, include Russia as a full member with equal rights) may be considered a fifth option. However, even though there are many proponents for such an option among internationalists, it is widely considered to be unrealistic because neither Germany's Eastern neighbors nor its Western allies have an interest in replacing NATO with a collective security system.

8As with grand strategies in general, the four options discussed here do not cover the whole spectrum of Germany's foreign policy. More specifically, they are organized around territorial concepts that may obscure the fact that some schools of thought (such as the internationalists) advocate an overall foreign policy strategy that is organized around international and global policy issues rather than territoriality. Still, as the previous analysis has shown, even internationalists assume that the existing patterns of world politics force states to operate within largely territorially defined confines. Consequently, even the key foreign policies advocated by internationalists can be subsumed under these headings.
very difficult to imagine a German government actively pursuing this option. Not only would it face legal hurdles (such as the stipulation against the acquisition of nuclear weapons reiterated in the Two-plus-Four treaty on German unification) and the opposition of its major allies in the West, but it would also have to confront deep antinuclear sentiments among the German population, which are as pronounced now as they were before unification (Infratest Burke, 1992:177–186).

The same holds for the two "milder" versions of "world power": (1) the "partnership in leadership" with the United States, and (2) the "Moscow first," or so-called classical eastern option of German foreign policy (Garton Ash, 1994:77–78; see also Waltz, 1993:75). According to the partnership in leadership scenario, Germany would strengthen its military capabilities and become the "captain" of the European Union in dealing with the other great powers. Although it is true that some voices (among pragmatic multilateralists in particular) favor a more visible role for Germany in international affairs and support the government's efforts to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, there is agreement across the five schools of thought that Germany simply does not have the resources and should not have the ambition to aim either at a hegemonic leadership role within the European Union or a global leadership role in the traditional sense of a great power (Rode, 1991:235–242; Kreile, 1993:52–62; Schwarz, 1994b:75–78). Although some experts among the euroskeptics and normalization-nationalists argue that Germany should give priority to its relations with the United States over its relations with its western European neighbors (France and the United Kingdom in particular), none advocate that it should do so in order to play a global great power role. Instead, good relations with the United States are viewed as necessary to provide reassurance both to Germany with regard to Russia and to Germany's neighbors with regard to Germany.

The "Moscow first" policy option finds even less support than the "America first." Not a single school of thought advocates this policy. However, there are important differences among the schools as to how far Germany (and the West) should go in taking Russia's interests into account. Internationalists, for instance, oppose the expansion of Western military structures to eastern Europe (at least as long as Russia objects or is visibly excluded), while euroskeptics put the inclusion of Germany's eastern neighbors in NATO and the European Union at the top of their agenda, even at the risk of Moscow's opposition. All the schools are united, however, in rejecting any kind of "special relationship" between Russia and Germany "over the heads of the peoples between" (Garton Ash, 1994:77).

**Wider West.** A second grand strategy entails working toward the gradual, possibly parallel, and necessarily selective Eastern enlargement of the two key Western institutions, the European Union and NATO, as a medium-term objective. Germany would remain fully embedded within these institutions, thereby continuing an established pattern that an overwhelming majority of experts believes has proven successful for Germany in the past. In addition, the reach of these institutions would be expanded, thereby gaining some protection from the potential trouble spots on Germany's eastern borders.

This option is clearly preferred by most schools and, not surprisingly, by government policymakers as well. To be sure, there are differences of opinion among the schools on how the strategy should be spelled out in detail. Among internationalists, for instance, this option would have to go hand in hand with a radical transformation of NATO from a military alliance to a system of collective security, which would have to include Russia eventually. Their position amounts to a radicalization of Western values in the liberal tradition. For normalization-national-
ists, on the other hand, a Wider West would be acceptable only if it allowed for a certain "de-Westernization" of German identity and foreign policy more in line with the traditional precepts of realism. These important differences notwithstanding, there is agreement even among these two extremes in German foreign policy discourse that the key challenge for Germany is to come to better terms with its eastern neighbors while staying on good terms with its neighbors to the west.

**Carolingian Europe.** According to this grand strategy, the organizing concept for German foreign policy should be continued concentration on creating an ever "deeper" political and economic union with all its willing neighbors in the European Union. As things currently stand, this "hard core" of the European Union would probably consist of Germany, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and, possibly, Belgium and Austria, thereby encompassing almost all of the old Carolingian Empire (Garton Ash, 1994:74–75; Seitz, 1994:847). (For Germany's "European" options, see Deubner, 1995:147–197.) This grand strategy would not aim at excluding other European Union members, but it would set more ambitious goals for integration than are possible if all fifteen current members must reach consensus. Moreover, in adopting such a strategy, the core states would push for treaty provisions (or treaty interpretations) that would allow them to proceed with integration even if the others were either not ready or not willing to go along.

This option is favored by europeanists, some pragmatic multilateralists, and some influential voices within the current ruling coalition. Although the pursuit of a Carolingian Europe does not necessarily exclude the possibility of realizing the aims of a Wider West at the same time, even some of those favoring this option think that deepening European integration along these lines will not only be difficult to achieve but may be counterproductive. Such "deepening" could, for example, have negative repercussions for the European Union integration project as a whole (Wessels, 1993:314–315). Euroskeptics, normalization-nationalists, and even some internationalists have serious (if diverging) reservations about various aspects of a Carolingian Europe. On the other hand, there are very influential voices in the German foreign policymaking community who favor such a scheme, including the present chancellor, Helmut Kohl, who considers the creation of an ever deeper European Union his "life's work." However, given that the most important partner for realizing this option, France, is viewed as harboring doubts about its prospects, observers increasingly question whether it will ever materialize.

**Mitteleuropa.** According to this grand strategy, Germany would try to extend its influence eastward unilaterally, that is, mostly without, and possibly even against, its Western allies (Brechtefeld, 1995:91–97). This option is based on the assumption that German interests increasingly conflict with the interests of its major Western partners, particularly France and Britain. As a result, Germany should try to create separate institutions with the states in central Europe.

In comparison to Wider West and Carolingian Europe, the Mitteleuropa option is considered quite unrealistic and highly undesirable by most observers. Even though all five schools think that a congenial environment on Germany's eastern border should rank among the top priorities of German foreign policy (if for very different reasons), and while some euroskeptics and normalization-nationalists may in the future increasingly sympathize with the Mitteleuropa option (either as a result of disillusionment with the lack of responsiveness of the Western allies or, more unlikely, as a result of rising anti-Western sentiments), it is hard to see how
Germany could “project stability” (to put it in benign terms) to the region in its immediate eastern neighborhood without securing the political and material support of its Western allies. Moreover, even if Germany had the ambition and the means to do so, and, in addition, the doors to the European Union and NATO had been closed to these eastern European states, it is unlikely that the countries concerned would want to join institutions dominated by Germany. Finally, almost all observers agree that following this option would mark a major departure from Germany’s traditional Western orientation (including a dramatic unlearning of historical lessons) and would almost certainly lead to a deterioration in Germany’s relations with the West. Adopting this option would immediately raise the specter of what has happened historically when Germany has attempted to play a special role between East and West.

In Sum. Table 1 indicates how the five schools of thought in German foreign policy discourse relate to these four grand strategies. Although it is more likely that Germany will opt for Mitteleuropa than for World Power, the most probable options are either a Carolingian Europe or a Wider West. To be sure, whether or not German foreign policy will follow one of these two paths (or some combination of the two) depends as much on the intentions of German decision makers (and Germany’s capabilities in the broadest sense) as on the complementarity of German objectives with the goals of other important players.

Germany as Ulysses, Not Gulliver

Shortly before the Berlin Wall came down in November 1989, the German correspondent for the Economist called on Germany’s partners to “unite to bind the German Gulliver” (Carr, 1989:13). Subsequent events have shown that this metaphor was inappropriate in several regards. Not only were Germany’s neighbors far from defining themselves as Europe’s Lilliputians, but the image of Germany as a stranded giant, tied down by a frightened people of dwarfish stature on a strange island, was a far cry from European realities. Germany may have been the Gulliver of Europe when the Nazis terrorized the continent and the world; it certainly is no longer today.

Instead, the journey that began in late 1989 is more like Ulysses’ encounter with the sirens. Knowing full well that the reunification of the two Germanys would take the country on a long and potentially dangerous trip by exposing it to the seemingly bewitching sounds of increased power and freedom of action, the German government (with the full support of the opposition parties and an overwhelming majority of foreign policy experts) set out to tighten the strings that had already tied the German Ulysses to “the European mast” (Keohane and Hoffmann, 1993:389). Disregarding all the important differences between then and now, even Bismarck may be said to have pursued a “Ulysses” foreign policy by tying down the rising power at the center of Europe in an intricate web of alliances. Of course, as the post-Bismarckian phase showed, the problem with the strategy of building a system of alliances was that the loosely knit ties were too easy for Bismarck’s successors to break as their ambitions for world power increased.

In the minds of many German foreign policymakers and experts today, the basic problem for which Bismarck designed his system of alliances still has to be tackled: how can the leadership make sure that the power at the center of the continent is as much at ease (or “satisfied”) with itself and its neighborhood as its neighbors are? The crucial difference between Bismarck’s solution and the two options favored by an overwhelming majority of German foreign policy experts today is that Bismarck was content with the flexibility and ad hoc nature of an
<table>
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<tr>
<th>&quot;School of Thought&quot;</th>
<th>World Power</th>
<th>Wider West</th>
<th>Carolingian Europe</th>
<th>Mitteleuropa</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pragmatic Multilateralists</strong></td>
<td>accept increased global responsibilities but deny possibility of traditional world power role; emphasize flexible multilateralism; reject nuclear status</td>
<td>best option but may necessitate flexible adjustments in Western institutions; must not undermine Western orientation of Germany; expand NATO and EU pragmatically, taking Russian concerns seriously</td>
<td>EU is important institution, but Western Europe can be stable without a federal Europe; deepening EU may raise problems</td>
<td>not a serious option because well beyond German means; would damage Germany's crucial relationship with the West; not acceptable to Eastern Europeans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europeanists</strong></td>
<td>focus primarily on Europe; reject unilateral global role for Germany; promote EU as global actor to realize German interests; reject nuclear status</td>
<td>best option if it provides for deepening of EU as well; perceive deepening and widening may not be feasible at the same time; second-best option if Carolingian Europe fails</td>
<td>best option based on skepticism about parallel deepening and widening of EU; best guarantee for providing safe anchor (and international platform) for Germany</td>
<td>worst option because would deal a fatal blow to EU; &quot;germanization&quot; of Eastern Europe would provoke balancing behavior of other European powers (Russia, France, UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Euroskeptics</strong></td>
<td>concentrate on problems in Germany’s neighborhood, especially in the East; accept international responsibilities commensurate with Germany’s limited power</td>
<td>best option if it addresses main problems in the East (security, welfare); perceive German and Western European interests may conflict, necessitating significant adjustments in Western institutions</td>
<td>current level of integration is sufficient; strong EU would undermine Germany’s ability to address problems in East, due to structural differences with France; could undermine NATO as key Western institution</td>
<td>not a preferred option but may become necessary if situation in East deteriorates and Western partners fail to address German concerns about providing effective stabilization in the East</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Internationalists</strong></td>
<td>accept global responsibilities defined in terms of a global agenda for common survival; reject any &quot;militarization&quot; of foreign policy</td>
<td>best option if accompanied by continuing demilitarization of Europe (transcend NATO, strengthen OSCE); must not leave out Russia; keep global agenda in mind</td>
<td>EU is important as reassurance against renationalization, but Carolingian Europe could lead to militarization if based on French perspective</td>
<td>worst option; &quot;germanization&quot; of Eastern Europe would likely be accompanied by renationalization and militarization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Normalization-Nationalists</strong></td>
<td>concentrate on immediate task of rebuilding the &quot;nation&quot;; reject global ambition; do not openly advocate nuclear status</td>
<td>acceptable if it allows for rebuilding a sense of German identity (&quot;Mittellage&quot;); must not perpetuate &quot;Westernization&quot;; nation is more important than international institutions</td>
<td>worst option because it would lead to &quot;Totalwestintegration&quot;; could finally destroy whatever is left of German identity</td>
<td>probably not feasible, but may be only option if situation in East deteriorates and Western partners fail to address German concerns about providing effective stabilization in East</td>
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**TABLE 1** Positions of the "Schools of Thought" in German Foreign Policy Discourse on the Potential "Grand Strategies"
alliance system based on the balance of power, whereas many German experts and policymakers today advocate either the creation of new international institutions or the "deepening" and "widening" of existing multilateral and supranational ones. They do so not only with the full knowledge that such designs will deprive Germany of some of its freedom of maneuver but precisely because this effect is actively sought. In a nutshell, then, experts and policymakers pursue "institutionalist" foreign policies even beyond the "mast" of the European Union in order to check whatever "realist" instincts may still be alive. In this sense they are indeed saying goodbye to Bismarck—or as Hans-Dietrich Genscher (1995:1016), Germany's long-time foreign minister, put it in his recently published memoirs:

Germany's power has certainly increased since unification because the country has shed the limitations on its sovereignty and room for maneuver that accompanied the division of Germany. Still, the increased responsibility for our foreign policy is not so much the result of German unification as it is the consequence of the changes in Europe and the world; the understanding of German foreign policy as policy based on responsibility ("Verantwortungspolitik") rather than policy based on power ("Machtpolitik") has remained unaffected by unification. It is only through the continued adherence to these basic principles that a European Germany can secure the kind of influence in the future that it had acquired in the years up to 1989.

To be sure, Germany's journey has just started, and some observers may have discovered scattered evidence that certain segments of the German political elite are increasingly tempted to listen to the sirens of power. However, contrary to realist expectations, more than five years after unification there are few signs (if any) in the German government's foreign policy or the foreign policy discourse of the country's elite that Germany will break with its traditional diplomatic strategy of multilateralism (see also Hellmann, 1995; Sauder, 1995).

Comparing German and Non-German Perspectives

How do these projections of future German foreign policy compare with the predictions made in the non-German professional literature? As described above, there are two characteristics that are shared by almost all schools in German foreign policy discourse irrespective of other differences. First, from internationalists to euroskeptics, German experts agree that the concept of the trading state (Rosecrance, 1986) provides the best description of Germany's current role in international affairs (Rode, 1991:242–245; Wolf, 1991:252, 1995a, 1995b; Rittberger, 1992:223–228; Hacke, 1993:567–571; Pfetsch, 1993:213; Schwarz, 1994b:142–153; Senghaas, 1994). (For a German critique see Statz, 1992.) Yet, this concept seldom appears in non-German assessments of Germany's new international role. Instead, most non-German views are shaped to a significant extent by realist concepts. Such thinking represents a minority perspective in the German discourse. For instance, pragmatic multilateralists and internationalists consider territoriality or geopolitics as less important than economic interdependence and Westernization (for example, Kaiser, 1995; Wolf, 1995a). Yet, many non-German observers have argued that geopolitical factors will exert more influence on Germany now than in the past and that German foreign policy behavior will increasingly look like that of other great powers. Thus, around the time of unification, Stanley Hoffmann (1990:604) predicted that in the future Bonn would opt for "just enough integration to meet the interests of German farmers, of German industry, and of the services sector; just enough diplomatic coordination to keep receiving a European stamp of approval; but also enough freedom for diplomatic maneu-
vers to prevent unwanted restrictions as far as foreign policy and defense are concerned." In subsequent years, other analysts have argued along similar lines (Bergner, 1993; Smyser, 1993:27–37; Tønærvold, 1993; Gordon, 1994, 1995:101–108).

Although many of these non-German analysts grant that Germany’s “postmodern conception of sovereignty” (Anderson and Goodman, 1993:62) will continue to influence its identity and foreign policy in significant ways (Pond, 1992; Duffield, 1994; Le Gloannec, 1994; Livingston, 1994; Sperling, 1994; Young, 1994), they are generally more skeptical about the adequacy of the German self-image (Tønærvold, 1991; Verheyen and Soe, 1993). Not all would go as far as Gary Geipel (1993:19), who noted that “to take the German elite at its word is to drown in the latest conventional wisdom.” Yet, non-German area specialists would agree with Geipel’s assessment that the German “either-or-mode of analysis with respect to Germany’s future,” projecting Germany as either “a latent hegemon or a model of international civility,” is misplaced. Rather than aiming for a realization of former Foreign Minister Genscher’s “seraphic vision of a Germany diligently exercising its new found responsibilities in pursuit of universal brotherhood” (Marsh, 1995:167), many of these experts see Germany’s continuing preference for multilateralism as a calculated and rational response, based on the assessment that the country can advance its interests more effectively through such institutions than it ever could on its own (Hamilton, 1991:129).

A second striking difference between German and non-German views of Germany’s new international role concerns the extent of its power. Even those German analysts who sympathize with traditional realist concepts of power (such as the euroskeptics) do not believe that Germany’s increase in power since reunification puts it in the same league as the United States or enables it to play a hegemonic role in Europe. What is more, a clear majority of German experts—especially among pragmatic multilateralists, europeanists, and internationalists—are wary of (if not outrightly opposed to) traditional notions of power (Rode, 1991; Rittberger, 1992; Kreile, 1993; Seitz, 1994; Kaiser, 1995). In contrast, an overwhelming number of non-German analysts still believe that such notions of power are relevant (Vernet, 1993:107; Wallace, 1995). This is not to say that these observers are painting a picture of a remilitarizing great power at the center of Europe. With a few eccentric exceptions (e.g., Sana, 1990), they are not. In contrast to German analysts, though, they are emphasizing “that deutschmarks might go much further than panzers in extending German power” (Markovits and Reich, 1999:272; see also Link, 1995c:190–191).

The point of contrasting German and non-German perspectives is not to judge which one is closer to the truth. It is simply to point out that such differences exist, and that these differences, if they reflect perceptions held within the respective governments, could have an impact on the policies of both the German government and other states.

Future Research

Three suggestions for future research follow from the previous discussion. First, the analysis of the five schools has shown that each one reflects a specific combination of beliefs and assumptions about the viability and impact of cer-

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9In discussing the nature of ideas in foreign policy, Goldstein and Keohane (1993:8–11) distinguish between three types of beliefs: (1) "worldviews" which are conceptions of possibility, (2) "principled beliefs" consisting of normative ideas for specifying right and wrong, and (3) "causal beliefs" which indicate beliefs about cause-effect relationships derived from the shared consensus among recognized elites.
tained grand strategies for Germany from which concrete policy recommendations emanate. The causal beliefs underlying the policy recommendations can and ought to be subjected to more systematic analysis. In the German case, for instance, little systematic research has been carried out on any of the four grand strategies (or related variants from the old Federal Republic of Germany) or the underlying causal arguments. As a result, support for Wider West and Carolingian Europe is based as much on assumptions about their plausibility as on the rejection of Mitteleuropa. Paying more attention to the underlying causal arguments would help make foreign policy debate more systematic and rigorous.

The study of grand strategy as it has been systematized in the United States may be a useful point of reference in this regard. As Stephen Walt (1991:219) has argued, research since the early 1980s has revealed a “growing tendency” among scholars of U.S. grand strategy “to base their recommendations on testable empirical and theoretical hypotheses.” (See also Lynn-Jones, 1991/92:56–57.) The same cannot be said about research in Germany and, perhaps, in Europe more broadly. Due to its different historical roots, international relations scholarship in Germany in the past has shunned the systematic study of grand strategy, a tendency that was probably reinforced by a broader public perception that such study belonged in the domain of historians.

These shortcomings in German and European international relations scholarship are not meant to imply, however, that U.S. scholarship on grand strategy should serve as an unquestioned model. As a matter of fact, based on our previous analysis of German foreign policy discourse, the U.S. literature has some important shortcomings. Most important, it has characteristically used a rather narrow, military conceptualization of security. As Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein (1993:4) observe, the traditional notion of security as “the adaptation of domestic and international resources to achieve security for a state . . . in both peace and war” has been replaced in recent decades by a more restrictive understanding that relates the term mainly, or even exclusively, to military threats and/or military means to meet those threats. (For examples of this narrow definition see Mearsheimer, 1988:17; Art, 1991:6–7). Paul Kennedy’s (1991:168) concurrent judgment that the “essentially political nature” of the concept has been lost is particularly obvious in the case of contemporary Germany, in which the military play a secondary role in grand strategy at best. Moreover, as more recent constructivist critiques of traditional security studies suggest, grand strategies are not only the result of political conditions in the domestic and international environments but of broader cultural determinants as well. (For overviews and further references, see Kupchan, 1994; Wendt, 1995; Berger, forthcoming; Katzenstein, forthcoming.) Rather than taking the formulation of interests as unproblematic, constructivists argue, it is crucial to examine the historical, ideational, and cultural sources of actors’ identities in order to understand the behavior of states. All these efforts represent important steps in broadening the research agenda and refining our conceptual and theoretical tools for the study of country-specific grand strategies. (See also Rosenau, 1987.)

This broadening of the research agenda must not leave out a rethinking of the theoretical foundations underlying the study of grand strategy, which is a second area for future research. Obviously, one of the reasons for the narrowed scope of grand strategy is the dominance of realism in international relations theory. As the above analysis of the five German schools of thought shows, however, there is little support for the two options that are suggested by this traditional theoretical literature. Germany will neither aim at a world power
role, nor is it likely to pursue the kind of autonomy maximization strategies in its regional context (the Mitteleuropa strategy) suggested by neorealist theory. Instead, if we assume that the foreign policy discourse analyzed here does, indeed, foreshadow the general outlines of future German foreign policy, we are likely to see Germany continue to adhere to the multilateral and integrationist orientation of the old Federal Republic.

One consequence of this finding is that we need to broaden the theoretical horizon in the analysis of foreign policy strategies beyond the narrow range considered currently among U.S. security experts. Based on the logic of anarchy and self-help, realists see balancing and bandwagoning as the main possibilities for states. (For recent syntheses of the literature, see Walt, 1987; Jervis and Snyder, 1991; Schweller, 1994.) This rather narrow focus has only been slightly broadened recently by Joseph Grieco (1992:24) in an analysis of the sources of European Union monetary cooperation in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Starting with the observation that the “renaissance of the EC” creates “serious problems for realist theory,” he suggests that a distinct “realist-informed ‘binding thesis’” could account for most of the aspects of EU monetary cooperation that were difficult to explain in traditional realist terms. However, even this realist “binding thesis” was thought “unable to explain why the German government has accepted EC institutionalization in the monetary area when its partners want it as a way of constraining German influence.” To account for German acceptance, Grieco suggested that “one might develop further the persuasive general argument already put forward by the domestic structuralists, namely, that a large part of the explanation for Germany’s receptivity to European institutionalized collaboration and binding must be located in that country’s internal political and economic institutions” (p. 40).

Whether German behavior is merely an exception to the rule (as Grieco seems to suggest) or whether it represents a distinct behavioral pattern that may also be found in other cases is an empirical question. The German case, however, is a prominent reminder that the spectrum of possible state strategies is broader than that suggested by recent studies based on realist concepts. In an article from the early 1970s, even Kenneth Waltz (1971) argued that “integration” (defined by him as the close association of states in a cooperative spirit) ought to be considered as one of four “typical modes of behavior” open to states. States pursuing such a strategy would “try to promote closer integration through the establishment of durable institutions and reliable patterns of behavior” (p. 465). Conflict under integration, according to Waltz, means that bargaining replaces war-making and that “international politics begins to look like domestic politics” (p. 467).

During the last two decades integration and cooperation have certainly ranked high on the research agenda of international relations scholars. Given the tacit general division of labor between realists (military security) and liberals (political economy), though, little research has been carried out on integration as an overall state strategy (rather than as a systemic process) since the pioneering work of Karl Deutsch and his colleagues was published (Deutsch, et al., 1957). It is high time to redress these shortcomings. One way to start is to pick up on earlier suggestions and develop an inclusive typology of foreign policy (or grand) strategies (Vasquez, 1986:214–218; Hellmann, 1995:121–127; Link, forthcoming). Such a typology

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10 Given that Germany’s security environment has radically improved and that its relative power has increased as a result of the end of the Cold War and unification, neorealists such as Waltz (1993:62–70) expect that Germany will increasingly opt for autonomy maximization, especially if no external threat forces it to join with its Western European neighbors. Autonomy maximization is emphasized by all neorealists as a fundamental motivation shaping state behavior (Snyder, 1990:116–117; Grieco, 1992:315).
would build on the theoretical and empirical research carried out by realists. But
given the weaknesses identified above, it would also pay special attention to
strategies that have been neglected due to realist biases. In a second stage, the
typology could serve as the basis for systematic, possibly comparative, theoretical
and empirical studies, again with a special emphasis on strategies that have thus
far been neglected. Research along these lines would not only help in closing
existing theoretical gaps but could potentially contribute to “bridging the gap”
between foreign policy practitioners and academics (George, 1993, 1994).

A third area for future research revolves around discourse analysis, which may
become an important tool for helping researchers identify the possible ranges of
both country-specific and general foreign policy strategies. In this regard, we
noted at the outset that a very diverse group of international relations scholars
agree (at least implicitly) that foreign policy discourse does matter. Besides con­
structivists, realists pay tribute to them. To be sure, there is a fundamental differ­
ence between these two in that the former emphasize how ideational sources
shape discourse, whereas the latter argue that discourse merely reflects material
factors (such as particular balances of power) (Mearsheimer, 1994/95:42). Still,
also as they analyze the concrete foreign policies of states, both pay attention
to discourse as a relevant indicator of the directions in which a country might be
heading (see, for example, Waltz, 1998). Given this appreciation of the impor­
tance of discourse, the question becomes whether and how the existing methodo­
logical instruments used in discourse analysis can be further refined.

One point of reference and possible inspiration for such refinement is the litera­
ture on cognitive approaches to foreign policy decision making. Research on opera­
tional codes (George, 1969, 1979), for instance, has established a nexus between
fundamental belief systems and individual behavior. Figure 1 shows the parallels
between the causal mechanisms underlyig the “operational code” approach and
discourse analysis. The latter may benefit by incorporating some of the former. For
instance, discourse analysis could adapt, refine, and extend the sets of questions
developed in the operational code to assess philosophical and instrumental beliefs
(George, 1969). Empirical research has shown that these questions, indeed, address
the most basic policy-relevant beliefs held by individuals. (For good recent surveys of
the literature, see Tetlock and McGuire, 1986; Rosati, 1995.) Given its focus on
intrasocietal collections of discourses (rather than focusing on individuals and discrete
foreign policy action as in the case of the operational code approach), discourse
analysis does, however, face a challenge in adapting these methodological tools.
First, it has to establish a theoretical link between the beliefs of individuals and
collectivities. Second, it needs to develop a more operational concept of identity to

**OPERATIONAL CODE APPROACH:**

philosophical beliefs + instrumental beliefs →
operational code → individual behavior → foreign policy

**DISCOURSE ANALYSIS:**

beliefs (worldviews; principled beliefs; causal beliefs) +
conception of “identity” →
discourse → foreign policy

**FIG. 1** The Casual Structures of the Operational Code Approach and Discourse Analysis
complement the tools already available to analyze beliefs.

If discourse analysis were to develop along these lines, it could yield a systematic and multileveled picture of the cognitive and ideational sources underlying both specific policy recommendations and the preferences for particular grand strategies. Such a discourse analysis could have rich implications for international relations. By analyzing the ways in which arguments are developed in a foreign policy debate, for instance, it would enable researchers to locate the sources of specific policy recommendations (for example, in particular worldviews or more immediate factors such as expediency), thereby allowing them to assess the relative robustness of various policy recommendations. Moreover, in contrast to the study of grand strategy, which is primarily informed by the theoretical debates in the international relations literature, discourse analysis would be closer to the “practical theories” actually held by influential voices in the ongoing foreign policy debates. Finally, by examining these “practical theories” systematically, we could provide the broader public with a basis for critiquing available foreign policy options.

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