TY  - UNPD
A1  - Lee, Samuel
A1  - Moisa, Nina
A1  - Weiß, Marco
T1  - Conditions for open source as a signalling device
T2  - Universität Frankfurt am Main. Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften: [Working paper series / Finance and accounting] Working paper series, Finance & Accounting ; No. 102
N2  - Open source projects produce goods or standards that do not allow for the appropriation of private returns by those who contribute to their production. In this paper we analyze why programmers will nevertheless invest their time and effort to code open source software. We argue that the particular way in which open source projects are managed and especially how contributions are attributed to individual agents, allows the best programmers to create a signal that more mediocre programmers cannot achieve. Through setting themselves apart they can turn this signal into monetary rewards that correspond to their superior capabilities. With this incentive they will forgo the immediate rewards they could earn in software companies producing proprietary software by restricting the access to the source code of their product. Whenever institutional arrangements are in place that enable the acquisition of such a signal and the subsequent substitution into monetary rewards, the contribution to open source projects and the resulting public good is a feasible outcome that can be explained by standard economic theory.
T3  - Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting - 102 r 
KW  - open source software
KW  - signalling
KW  - career concerns
KW  - economics of organization
KW  - Open Source
Y1  - 2004
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/3672
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-17948
IS  - This version: August, 25th. 2004
PB  - Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss.
CY  - Frankfurt am Main
ER  -