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REMARKS ON DEIXIS

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Notes

References
1. Introduction. The prevailing conception of deixis is oriented to the idea of 'concrete' physical and perceptual characteristics of the situation of speech.

Signs standardly adduced as typical deictics are I, you, here, now, this, that. I and you are defined as meaning "the person producing the utterance in question" and "the person spoken to", here and now as meaning "where the speaker is at utterance time" and "at the moment the utterance is made" (also, "at the place/time of the speech exchange"); similarly, the meanings of this and that are as a rule defined via proximity to speaker's physical location. The elements used in such definitions form the conceptual framework of most of the general characterisations of deixis in the literature. The following, much-echoed, definition is an example:

"By deixis is meant the location and identification of persons, objects, events, processes and activities being talked about, or referred to, in relation to the spatiotemporal context created and sustained by the act of utterance and the participation in it, typically, of a single speaker and at least one addressee." (Lyons 1977:637.)

The emphasis on concrete speech-situation "coordinates" is also reflected in the widely-held assumption of an essential dependence of deixis on face-to-face communication, on pointing, on "audio-visual monitoring", on interactants' physical locations. Related to this concretely-oriented view is the widespread equation of the concept of deixis with that of demonstrativity.

There is much in the literature, of course, that goes far beyond this framework. A great variety of elements, mostly with very abstract meanings, have been found to share deictic characteristics although they do not fit into the personnel-place-time-of-utterance schema. The adequacy of that schema is also called into question by many observations to the effect that the use of such standard deictics as here, now, this, that cannot really be accounted for on its basis, and by the far-reaching possibilities of orienting deictics to reference points in situations other than the situation of speech, to 'deictic centers' other than the speaker. A few examples:

Many types of signs beyond the classical person-, place-, and time-related ones have over the course of time been judged to be deictic, either by single authors or more generally. To list but a selection: articles, mood, voice, verbal aspect, sentence accent, word order variation, conjunctions, "discourse markers" (oh, well, anyway, besides, in conclusion), and even stylistic register. We have to do here with quite abstract meanings that cannot, for the most part, be
related to the classical triad of reference point types, or in unclear ways only (mood, e.g., is thought by most authors to be in a particularly narrow relation to the speaker; but its semantic orientation to the "person coordinate" cannot be of the same type as that of the first and second person pronouns). In fact, new "kinds" of deixis beyond person, place, time have been established: e.g. social, discourse, emotional deixis, as well as new types of reference point as abstract as socially-defined "normal states" and other general or ad-hoc norms.  

As to the definition of basic deictic meanings, the observation that here and now do not necessarily refer to place and time of utterance goes back at least as far as Bühler:  

"(Jetzt ebenso wie hier)...kann, je nach dem mitgedachten Nichtmehrjetzt eine kleinere oder auch beliebig große Ausdehnung annehmen. So wie ein gläubiger Christ hier sagt und das ganze Diesseits (die Erdoberfläche oder mehr noch) einschließt, mag einer, der in geologischen Zeiten denkt, in ein 'jetzt' die ganze Periode nach der letzten Eiszeit einschließen." (Bühler 1934/1982:132.)

"(Now just like here)...can take a smaller extension or one expanded at will, depending on the no-longer-now one is thinking of. Just as a pious Christian will say here and include all of this world (the surface of the earth or even more), someone thinking of time in geological dimensions may include in a 'now' all time since the last glacial period."

For analogous 'extensibility' of this and that, cf. Talmy:

"Notions that might at first be ascribed to such deictics, such as of distance or perhaps size, prove not to apply, on the evidence of sentence pairs like (2):

(2) a. This speck is smaller than that speck.
   b. This planet is smaller than that planet.

The scenes referred to by (2a) and (b) differ greatly, involving tiny objects millimeters apart or huge objects parsecs apart... the scenes' differences as to the magnitude of size or distance must arise from the lexical elements, they cannot be traced to the deictics..." (1968:168f.)

No more than absolute distance, relative distance is a sufficient criterion:

"... what 'proximal' and 'non-proximal' mean...depends on the context. It is apparently possible to say 'here comes my mother', when she is at a distance of 100 metres, but one can also say 'there is my mother', when she is at a distance of 10 metres. (Klein 1982:166.)

For Latin with its three-term system of demonstratives, criteria of relative distance were refuted almost fifty years ago, on the basis of detailed analyses of usage (Keller 1946, whose findings are incorporated in a reference grammar like Hofmann/Szantyr 1965).  

Uses like the following, where the reference is much too abstract..."
to be related to space or time in any literal sense, are well-known:

(1) (After a discussion of impasses in gluon theory:) In books it says that science is simple: you make up a theory and compare it to experiment; if the theory doesn't work, you throw it away and make a new theory. Here we have a definite theory and hundreds of experiments, but we can't compare them! (Feynman 1985:139).

(2) As we shall see, the concept of time has no meaning before the beginning of the universe. This was first pointed out by St. Augustine. (Hawking 1988:9.)

(3) (After a one-page exposition of how the number of extant Rembrandts believed to be authentic has been drastically reduced by the Amsterdam Rembrandt Research Project, and the arguments on which this is founded:) Who, then, executed all the pictures which the project has deleted? (The Times Saturday Review, 3/14/1992)

Here in (1) and this in (2) can hardly be treated as quasi-pointing to locations in the discourse (like above, below); the contents themselves must be considered. (Klein 1978:23f speaks of orientation in an actional deictic field, "Handlungsraum", in view of uses like (1). For diverse 'abstract' uses of then, see Schiffrin 1991.)

Analyses along the lines of the standard conception regularly acknowledge the existence of deviations from the assumed basic meanings.6 One traditional solution attributes them to speaker's "subjectivity", or to differences between "physical" and "psychological" space or time; in a similar vein, metaphorical extensions may be said to be at play, or a distinction between prototypical and non-prototypical meanings invoked.7 Quite apart from the question of the relative merits of these explanatory principles, which I do not wish to discuss here, the problem with all such accounts is that the definitions of the assumed basic meanings themselves are founded on axiom rather than analysis of situated use. The logical alternative, of course, is to set out for more abstract and comprehensive meaning definitions from the start. In fact, a number of recent, discourse-oriented, treatments of the demonstratives proceed this way; they view those elements as processing instructions rather than signs with inherently spatial denotation (Isard 1975, Hawkins 1978, Kirsner 1979, Linde 1979, Ehlich 1982.)8

Finally, flexibility in the choice of reference points. Linguistic analysis has long operated with reference points other than the situation of speech or the speaker. One classical domain is tense/aspect analysis. The traditional notion of relative tense, e.g., is based on non-speech-situational reference points; Reichenbach's influential analysis quite naturally operates with them. Tense/aspect forms that do not exhibit morphology marking them as 'relative'
nevertheless are not limited to speech-situational reference points: past-, perfect- and aoristlike meanings, e.g., quite commonly take orientation points in future situations:

(4) German: Ruf' mich an, wenn du auf dem Dekanat warst. (Phone me when you (lit.) were at the Dean's office). Cf. Latzel 1974:287f.

(5) German: Morgen um die Zeit habe ich schon abgegeben. (Tomorrow this time I (lit.) have turned in already <scil. the paper>). Cf. Latzel ibid., Comrie 1985:31.

(6) Braz. Port.: (At a wedding invitation, around 8.30h p.m.:) ...por volta das onze horas provavelmente já acabou. (Around 11h, it probably (lit.) finished/has finished already). Cf. Comrie ibid.

Clearly, then, such deictic elements are underdefined if only orientation to the 'moment of speech' is taken into account. The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for the reference points of motion verbs or directional affixes and for those of locationals like right and left.

For motion verbs, one remembers Fillmore's analyses of come, with options of reference point such as the following:

"WE WILL COME TO THE SHOP TONIGHT... is appropriate if WE is inclusive and you and I are at the shop now, or if WE is exclusive and either I am at the shop now, you are at the shop now, or you will be at the shop tonight."

"...WILL HE COME THERE TOMORROW NIGHT? supposes either that I will be there tomorrow night, or that you will be there tomorrow night."

(Fillmore 1966:220.)

That right/left orientation is not a matter of fixed reference points is evident. Speaker's orientation cannot be used as point of departure, e.g., if the hearer's is relevantly different (cf. Fillmore 1975:18).

The practice of defining deictic meanings uniformly via orientation to speaker/situation of speech must be reexamined, then. The prevailing idea of an essentially static relation between deictic meanings and corresponding "coordinates" of the speech situation is in conflict also with the many observations in the literature concerning the exploitation of shifts of perspective - of reference point, that is - for politeness and for the manipulation of narrative empathy.

Well-known as all such facts are, and much as they are listed in standard treatments, the idea that deixis proper resides in orientation to the concrete speech-situation setting remains basically untouched. Mostly, the phenomena mentioned are treated under special rubrics such as deictic projection, relativised deixis, Deixis am Phantasma, but they also tend to be kept away from the rest of deixis there. In fact, they are in general treated as marginal and somewhat
deviant; a frequent practice consists in dubbing orientation to reference points other than the canonised ones non-deictic use. But since the characteristic orientation of a deictic remains the same no matter where its reference point, in one sense this amounts to calling deixis non-deictic unless the reference points conform to set requirements. In the following quotation from Fillmore 1982, this impasse is articulated quite clearly. In commenting on the use of ago (as against more expected earlier) in a sentence like Several years ago, he had lived near the beach, the author says:

"...what is being presented is the inner experience of a central character, the 'he' of the passage. That is the kind of transfer I have in mind when I speak of a basically deictic word being used 'non-deictically'. The characterisation is potentially misleading, since it is precisely the deictic effect associated with the word which is responsible for the communicated 'point of view'. What justifies me in describing it as non-deictic is its not being anchored in the current speech event, the event in which the utterance is produced." (1982:38; emphasis mine.)

To sum up, a wealth of existing observations has remained unintegrated within the overall theory, which is dominated by concretistic conceptualisation.
2. "Here" and "now". Consider the following examples, both from "canonical", face-to-face utterance situations:

(7) Arun, an Indian living in Hamburg, is back from a trip to India. It is early November. A German friend, Helga, has proposed a walk on the banks of the Elbe. They are greeted by quite a breeze there. Helga turns to Arun with a smile and says:
   Kalt hier, nicht? (Chilly here, eh?)

(8) On the no. 26 bus, at the terminal station. It is 6 minutes past 10. The driver has been sitting near a passenger, chatting. He gets up and goes toward his own seat.
   Driver: So, dann woll'n wir mal langsam losjuckeln
   Passenger: 3 Minuten ham Se ja noch
   Driver: 6 is es, da fahrn wer
   Passenger: Ach so, ich dachte, 9
   (Driver: Alright, so let's get going
   Passenger: You have 3 minutes left...
   Driver: It's 06, that's when we leave
   Passenger: Oh, I thought <we leave> 09
   Driver: Naw, 06. We used to leave <lit.: before, we left> at 04, now we leave 06. So that no. 16 can connect with us at Theatre Square.)

It certainly does not make sense to assume that Helga, in (7), is referring to her physical location at the moment of utterance, in contradistinction to her interlocutor's. Under a more liberal definition, she might be said to be referring to their joint location at utterance time; but how are we to delimit that place? Since they are walking, does here refer to the exact place reached at utterance time (however that is delimited in turn)? In (8), although the precise time at which the dialogue takes place has some relevance to the concerns addressed, it is impossible to interpret the now as referring to that time.

What an interlocutor needs for adequate interpretation of the deictics goes far beyond knowledge of literal utterance time and place. Much inferential activity is needed.

The central task is to find out what the speaker is getting at with the utterance, its intended relevance. Is Helga, in (7), drawing attention to the windiness of the place they have chosen for their outing, e.g., or is the remark intended as a starter for a conversation about Arun's recent change of worlds? The decision is interactionally consequential, of course; it will have to be based on, inter alia, a consideration of the topics expectable between the two, Helga's conversational style, intonational cues. Depending on the issue Arun decides she is addressing, he will have to examine
different shared-knowledge contexts in order to determine the reference of the "here": under the first interpretation, a possible implicit term of contrast might be less windy close-by places where one could walk more comfortably, and the "here" would be equivalent to, roughly, "on the river-bank"; under the second, the "here" would be in implicit contrast to the continent Arun has just returned from, and equivalent, roughly, to "in winterly Northern Europe". (Arun in fact chose the second interpretation, he said "Oh, I've come to like it", and the conversation turned to his trip, so probably he had hit upon Helga's intention. Had he answered instead: "we can go to a more protected place", he might well have produced a momentary disenchantment, having chosen an over-pedestrian interpretation.)

Likewise for the "now" in (8): to determine its reference, the hearer has to activate relevant shared-knowledge contexts. The utterance containing the "now" (actually, "now" itself, in this context) presupposes a change of bus schedules. On the basis of more general rules of conversation, the hearer can infer that the speaker is not referring, with his mention of an outdated schedule, to a state of affairs that obtained many years and many changes of schedule ago; the trivial difference would hardly warrant such historiography, at least in the given context. ¹ So the inferred reference of "now" is "since the last or some reasonably recent change of schedule". If the listener actually knows more about those changes (the last change of schedules had taken place some two months ago, but the particular change mentioned went back to the last but one, half a year before that), he may be able to determine the extension of the "now" in a more calendrically precise sense, if need be, or at least decide between the alternatives "since the last change" and "since some recent change"; otherwise, interpretation may well stop at the point reached without any omission of contextually relevant information. ²

A few more examples:

(9) A and B, who live in Göttingen, are on their way to a restaurant outside town - in fact, they have just left the town properly speaking. Over the radio, they hear a song by Purcell:
A: Das ist das Stafford-Ensemble.
B: Ach - die gerade hier gesungen haben!
(A: That's the Stafford ensemble. B: Oh, the people who just sang here!)

(10) A meets B, the daughter of a former neighbour who has moved to a suburb from a relatively central residential area of Göttingen. The encounter is at a bus stop in the old common neighbourhood. B explains she still goes to her old school (which is in town, but closer to the
old neighbourhood than to the new one:
A: ...und auch außerdem hab' ich hier noch viel: Basketball, Flöten... (and besides, I still have many other things here: basketball, flute-lessons...)

(11) At a large carnival party that takes place over the two floors of a student dormitory. A und B are in a medium-sized room on the upper floor:
A: Gott, was für'n Betrieb.
B: Was meinste, wieviele Leute hier wohl sind?
A: Weiß nicht, vielleicht fünf, sechs hundert?
(A: God, what a crowd
B: How many people do you think (lit.) are here?
A: Well - five or six hundred perhaps?)

(12) (A's son, a civil servant, has been transferred to the German embassy in an Eastern European country. He has been there for weeks and has just been telling his mother, on the phone, how he likes it. A gives a vivid picture of his first impressions...)
A: ...und jetzt haben sie 'n Botschafter, der ist so 50 Jahre alt, der wird jetzt abgelöst ... wir hatten da glaub' ich keinen Botschafter, der Ostblock hatte nur einen, also Ostdeutschland, und die werden jetzt alle abgezogen und ausgetauscht. Und jetzt käme 'ne Botschafterin, so ungefähr 60 Jahre, sagt er, da müssen wir uns erst drauf einstellen...
(A: ...now, they have an ambassador who is around fifty, and he's going to be exchanged... I don't think we (the interlocutors are from and in Western Germany) had an ambassador there, it's only the Eastern bloc that had one, I mean Eastern Germany, and those are all being called back and exchanged now. And <he says> a woman ambassador is coming, some 60 years old, he says, we have to get used to that thought...
(A little later, A mentions the son's girl-friend.)
B: ... und wo ist die jetzt... während er... die ist nicht mit, ne?
(B: ... and where is she now... while he... she has not gone with him, has she? A: Oh no. But she'll go to visit him.)

(13) Stefan, who lives in Hanover, some 100 km from Göttingen, has promised Daniel, who lives in Göttingen, a lift to Stuttgart. They have agreed that Stefan will start from Hannover around noon, on Sunday, and pick Daniel up in Göttingen in the early afternoon. On Sunday morning at 8.30, Stefan is on the phone. Daniel's mother answers.
S: Kann ich bitte Daniel sprechen?
A: Der schläfst noch, ich will ihn mal holen.
S: Nein, sagen Sie ihm, daß ich jetzt von Hannover losfahre. Ich rufe ihn dann an, wenn ich in Göttingen angekommen bin.
(S: May I speak to Daniel please?
A: He's still asleep; let me go and get him.
S: No, tell him I'm leaving from Hannover now. I'll phone him when I arrive in Göttingen.)
(After some repeating of details for A, who had not known of the scheme and wishes to make sure she transmits the right thing:)
S: Also ich fahr' in 'ner halben Stunde hier los, und ruf' dann an.
(S: So I'll start from here in half an hour, and I'll phone him.)

For (9), the relevant shared knowledge yields "at the Göttingen
Handel Festival (some ten days ago)" as the intended reference of the hier; for (10), roughly, "around the neighbourhood where we have just met". In a concretistic interpretation, we would have to say that the "here" in (9) refers to Göttingen (or even to the concert hall where the ensemble performed?), and thus, to where the interlocutors are not, at the time of speaking, while that in (10) refers to just part of that town, a section related to the locus of the utterance this time, but in a somewhat unclear way. Hardly an enlightening account. What actually determines the references is relevant relations in the shared-knowledge contexts addressed. (9) evokes a context to do with access, in a semiprovincial town, to performances of renowned musicians; potential terms of contrast are European capitals, diverse festivals of ancient music, England as the home country of this particular ensemble, etc.; "here" is "the place where we are" on this dimension of contrast. In the interpretation of (10), a shared-knowledge ingredient that permits the speaker to subsume both the school, which is not in the neighbourhood, and the other places mentioned, which are, under "here" is the fact that the school in question is easily reached by bus from this neighbourhood, so that many inhabitants send their children there, while it would not be the first choice for inhabitants of the new neighbourhood. The relevant terms of contrast, then, are each of the neighbourhoods plus the institutions in town typically frequented by its inhabitants or, more specifically, by its teenagers. Hier in (11) was obviously intended - and actually taken by the addressee - to refer to the social occasion (and thus, implicitly, to all the rooms in the building occupied by it), not to the particular room the interlocutors were in; although the latter would have been a possible interpretation under appropriate conditions of relevance, e.g. if the two had just come from a much less crowded room into the present one.

In (12), the first and third bold-face. Jetzt belong to the rendering of the son's situation and reflect his point of view (cf. the transition, in the sentence with Jetzt 3, from indirect reported speech - signalled by the subjunctive käme - to direct quotation); the second is part of an explanatory parenthesis and reflects the perspective of the immediate interlocutors, as does the fourth. 3 None of them is coreferential with any of the others in a metrically temporal sense. Der wirdJetzt , abgelöst introduces a situation of transition and expectation at the new working place, and the contribution of the "now" almost reduces to "there is relevant change..."
ahead". For now₂, the relevant shared-knowledge context is constituted by the ongoing political reorganisation following the reunification of Germany: "now that the GDR is no longer a country of its own". Metrically speaking, the period referred to here must be considered much more extended than that of now₁; but such comparison is awkward, because, functionally, very different planes are involved: a spotlight on a transitory situation, through participants' eyes, with 'forward tension', on the one hand, and an explanatory comment concerning a temporary order of things, on the other. In neither case is exact temporal delimitation at issue, which makes comparison under this angle appear beside the point. Now₃ might be said to cover the same time span as now₁, from an extraneous point of view. Yet, looking more closely, we see that the expressions are chosen from different angles in the two statements; the first "now" is delimited by the imminent change, the second almost the other way around, "now" being equivalent to something like "when the present ambassador goes" (note that this jetzt is stressed). Now₄, finally, refers to the whole period of the son's projected absence from Göttingen, as B actually makes explicit ("while he...", which says enough, in the context). The constant meaning of jetzt/"now" over all the uses is "since and/or up to the last/next relevant change"; what is relevant change is determined by the context addressed, as are the strictly temporal boundaries, to the extent that there is an ad-hoc interest in determining them with any precision. (13) is another example of the essential abstractness of the meaning of the deictic. There would be no point in accusing Stefan of a contradiction between "I am starting now" and "I am starting in half an hour", which would contradict each other, of course, if "now" meant "at the moment of utterance". The relevant 'context for comprehension' (with a term from Sperber/Wilson 1986) is constituted by Stefan and Daniel's earlier agreement, and the relevant term of contrast for the interpretation of the "now" is "around noon"; this plus the time of the call roughly delimit its reference to "in the early part of the morning" (the relevant change being defined by the portions we divide days into). Interestingly, when A woke Daniel and delivered the message (using jetzt/"now"), Daniel immediately reacted to its practical implication of having to get up, by doing so, but after some time asked: wann fährt er los? "when is he leaving?": he had interpreted the "now" in the sense sketched but was now figuring out his programme in more detail and wanted additional information; again, the question would not make sense if "now" meant "at utterance
time."

So far in our examples, "here" has been equivalent to "where we are (on the thematically relevant dimension of localisation)" rather than "where I am", i.e. than to "at speaker's location". Meaning definitions in the literature are based either on speaker's location or on that of the speech exchange, but there is no clear opinion as to which formulation is more adequate; the first one is, of course, presupposed by the frequent parlance of deictic "egocentricity".

The examples so far lend no support to "speaker's location", but they also exclude "at the place of the speech exchange" as an appropriate meaning definition. The function of here is to indicate the 'given' position on any dimension of localisation that may be relevant at the moment. The place where we are speaking, and, a fortiori, literal physical location is not too frequently relevant to what we are saying. But there are cases when they are, of course, and it is in those cases that here may refer, by the principle just stated, to what might be labelled the place where the utterance takes place, or even interactants' physical location.

(14) + (In a bar:) It's impossible to talk here, let's go somewhere quieter.
(15) + (Hikers on a warm summer day having a rest under a tree) How nice and shady here!

But note that although (14) is overtly about a place for speaking, the relevant dimension of contrast will be constituted by the bar where the interactants are as against other places to 'go to' on this occasion: other bars, a restaurant, the park (not just any quiet spot): socially and interactionally constituted places. Here is used to designate the place not in its capacity as locus of the speech exchange, but as the place "where we are" against this background. The here in (15), too, although it might be said to come close to referring to interactants' physical location, is really delimited, to the degree that such delimitation might become relevant, by the reach of the tree's shade. We are, actually, not necessarily located physically within the spaces we refer to as here:

(15a) + Here is a nice spot for us to rest, said while the hikers are approaching the tree, but are still some distance away from it.
(15b) (Father, mother and six-year old son. The parents have stopped at a shop-window richly decorated with folk-style women's wear.) Mama, was möchtest du hiervon haben? (Mommy, what would you like to have of this - <lit. hereof>?)
This is all the more true when the intended "where we are" is an obviously abstract space (I say "obviously" because ultimately any place or space we refer to linguistically is abstract since socially/interactionally defined on a relational basis), as in example (1), p. 3, or, for that matter, in I herewith declare the meeting opened. I don't treat this large category of use separately in this paper.

In conversation, questions such as "what do you mean 'here'?" sometimes occur (they shouldn't, if the usual meaning definition were correct); one can use such a question for silent tests on examples, and it will become clear that a contextually adequate answer, i.e. a paraphrase as might be formulated by the speaker, would hardly ever refer to the current speech activity and seldom to physical location in a strict sense. I stress this because our descriptive expressions in this domain invite equivocation and hypostatisation. "Speaker's/interactants' location", e.g., seems a natural enough scientific nominalisation to use instead of "where speaker is", "where interactants are". From there, the step is short, in a physically-oriented frame of mind, to overlooking that any such "where speaker is" is thematically defined and to interpreting "speaker's location" in the sense, more or less, of "place occupied by speaker's body".5 (Cf. also section 4).

It is also worth noting that as far as 'localising' in a strict sense is concerned, the here in (14), just like that in (7), p.6, might have been omitted; in either case, there is not much possible doubt as to what place the statement is being made about. The point of using here, in either case, is not so much to indicate the location the predication applies to as to evoke places that contrast with "where we are", on the relevant dimension (noisiness, coldness). Spatial expressions are all too often construed as if their main if not sole use were in answering "where?" questions.6

But now, how about this "where we are" rather than "where I am"? In the examples so far, the speaker was clearly not talking about his location to the exclusion of the addressee's. Things are different in cases like:

(16) + Come over here, I want to show you something.

(17) + (You wish to indicate to someone the precise location where a small piece of furniture is to go, so you step over to that place and say:) Here is where I want it.

What happens here is that the concerns addressed 'thematically
dissociate' speaker's location from hearer's. Physically speaking, those locations never coincide anyway, but most of the time this is thematically irrelevant. When it is relevant, it is speaker's location that counts as the 'given' one, on the relevant dimension of localisation. (Again, the locations indicated are at issue not in the capacity of being place of utterance, but of being where speaker is; in (17), a small paper-ball thrown to the place in question might have done the same service as the displacement.)

Much the same goes for situations such as letter-writing or long-distance calls, except that the difference in factual location is probably somewhat more prone to become thematic. Long-distance communication does not automatically dissociate speaker's and addressee's locations as far as the use of deictics is concerned; again, it is a matter of thematic context. A and B may be speaking, in a long-distance conversation, say, between Munich and London, about the destruction of traditional agricultural structures in Africa for the sake of export trade, one of them remarking

(18) ...nur damit es hier im Dezember Erdbeeren gibt (...just in order for there to be strawberries in December here),

where "here" refers to a climatic zone including both speaker's and addressee's places. It is only when the concern addressed separates speaker's and hearer's locations thematically that here will have to be heard as "where I am". Thus A, in Munich, may write to B, who lives in Nuremberg but is thinking of moving to Munich:

(19) ...Der Wohnungsmarkt ist allerdings katastrophal hier (the market for flats is catastrophic here, though).

One might be tempted to conclude that since in case of conflict it is speaker's location that wins out, this is the basic criterion after all; where there is no conflict, the interpretation "where we are" would arise by simple inclusion of addressee's location. But this is geometrically-oriented thinking severed from questions of communicational relevance. In the bulk of cases, i.e. those where we would paraphrase via "where we are", speaker's position on the relevant dimension cannot be relevantly distinguished from addressee's. The functional motivation for treating speaker's position as 'given' (i.e. "here") when it is thematically separated from addressee's seems clear. Some reference point is needed, or else deictic formulation would be impossible. A convention different from that of having speaker refer to his own position as "here" is hardly conceivable.
Could he, non-"egocentrically", reserve here for addressee's location and formulate his own from the addressee's point of view? Besides the lack of naturalness of such a convention (it would run counter to the way deictic 'given'ness vs. projection work in the system as a whole), there would be no deictic available for the reference to speaker's location (there, unlike here, requires 'establishing', see below). Furthermore, addressee's location may not be involved at all (as in +they offered me a job in Frankfurt, but I prefer staying here, said by a speaker in Munich to an addressee in Hamburg). (Where it is, as, say, in (16), both locations are necessarily thematic and relevant, so there is not much "egocentricity" left even here.)

If here means "at the 'given' location on the relevant dimension of localisation" as applied to places ("spatial" deixis is more about 'places' or 'spaces' defined via social and interactional relevances than about "space"), now may be said to mean the same as applied to time or, better again, 'times'. Just as 'places' are defined by social and/or ad-hoc relevances, not 'physically' (and that is true even for definitions in 'physical' terms), 'times' are delimited on the basis of relevant events, relevant change; the characterisation of the meaning of now just given is therefore equivalent to that given earlier: "since and up to the last/next relevant change" (where since effects the same anchoring as 'given' here). Depending on ad-hoc relevances, we use many different dimensions of localisation for referring to what looks like one and the same physical location; and different, thematically-defined "time-lines", each with its specific delimitations, determine the extension of any "present" or "now".

The question of speaker's vs. both interactants' "now" on the whole receives answers parallel to those for "here", but there are some clear differences. One is that for face-to-face interaction, it practically never makes sense to distinguish between speaker's and addressee's, or coding and receiving, time. It is only the traditional genres of written communication that separate them, factually and, under appropriate conditions, thematically.

For the extreme referential adaptability of here and now, the metaphor of extensibility has frequently been used; it suggests itself especially by contrast to the received idea of what those deictics designate. It is misleading, however, insofar as it invites visualisations like that of a series of "heres" expanding concentrically around one location, and of an analogous expansion around the "present point" on the "time line". "Here" just like "now"
may localise things or events in quite incommensurable dimensions, as the examples have shown. This adaptability should not be astonishing if it were sufficiently appreciated that here and now are "pro" elements; "pro" not so much in the sense of anaphoric or syntagmatic as in that of paradigmatic substitutability. No one expects to find more than a minimum of designative content, rather schematic in nature, in a pro-element, the actual denotata having to be inferred from context and varying widely. (Cf. also section 4.)

To a greater or lesser degree, the possibilities of reference will usually be narrowed down by the verbal environment, but, as a rule, no more than that, and inferential work will still be required. Speakers may add explicative material: cf. "while he..." in example (12), and the following two examples:

(20) Now that conflict has largely died down in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Burma, tourists are slowly returning to what is one of the last undeveloped parts of the world. (The Times Saturday Review, 14/3/92)

(21) (From a broadcast interview) Es ist ja einfach nicht so, daß nur die russischen AKWs riskant sind und mit denen hier in Deutschland überhaupt nichts passieren kann. (It's just simply not the case that it is only the Russian nuclear plants that are dangerous while nothing can happen with those here in Germany.)

One point implicit in the preceding analyses deserves special mention: in situated use, as we have seen, the pragmatic terms of contrast for here and now are not there and then, as analyses neglecting discourse conditions would make it appear. Most discussions of the semantic domains of here and there, e.g., seem to be based on a visualisation of some spatial extension starting from speaker's - or speakers' - physical location, somehow divided up into two zones delimiting each other, the "here" zone and the "there" zone (with some modifications for languages with three-or-more-term distinctions); illustrative examples often establish a "here"/"there" contrast. But the difference between here, now and there, then is not one of remoteness within a single spatial or temporal plane; what is involved is different types of instruction for contextualisation, there/then referring to places/times just 'established' in the situation, verbally or otherwise, e.g. by pointing.

It may seem amazing that descriptions of languages worldwide more or less confirm the time-and-place-of-utterance type of analysis for "here" and "now". At least part of the answer certainly lies in the practice of approaching deixis without consideration of discourse
contexts (inter alia, doubtless, because the "speech situation coordinates" are felt to be the relevant context themselves). The analyst will probe for the words by which to denote utterance place and utterance time, and in a typical eliciting situation, that is what "here" and "now" words will refer to by default. (But see now Hanks 1990 for a realistic approach.)

A word concerning the notion of thematic context(s): The crucial role of the shared-knowledge contexts (or "frames", "scenes", "background" etc.) activated in communication is being emphasized more and more (cf. Sperber/Wilson's 1986 - "context for comprehension", Fillmore's 1977, 1985 - "scenes" or "frames"; Talmy's 1988- "cognitive representation"). Every utterance - in fact, every single meaningful element of an utterance - has its indispensable unspoken complement in the shared context it addresses. In part, those contexts will be stereotypical and shared by a larger community (social norms; the "scenes" associated with lexical elements, etc.), in part they will be specific to those interacting on the given occasion, in part to that occasion itself (e.g., knowledge concerning the course of the interaction so far). Access to the relevant shared-knowledge contexts is via inference of the concern (or 'issue') addressed by an utterance (or meaningful element thereof), a point also emphasized in Keenan/Schieffelin 1976 (cf. their "question of immediate concern") and Murray 1983. One of the hearer's fundamental tasks, then, consists in inferring the concern(s) addressed by an utterance, with the associated shared 'world segment(s)'. 10
3. The 1st and 2nd person pronouns. One might grant all the preceding yet say: there can be no doubt, however, that "I" and "you" refer to concrete data of the speech situation at the very moment of utterance, the distribution of speech roles there and then. What parallel could there be here to the dependence on further shared-knowledge contexts for the determination of reference, or to the "extensibility" observed above à propos "here" and "now"?

But the relation between 1st and 2nd person sg. pronouns and observable speech-role distribution is much less straightforward even at the purely referential level than one is inclined to think. The actual speaker may be quoting the words of another and using his I, me, your etc. unchanged (without even so much of a warning as he/she said...); inference is in order, again.1 Besides, in some languages at least, "I" is very frequent in a generalising use, cf. (22) and (23), as is, of course, "you"; this adds to the need for inference (cf. the oscillation, in (22), between the 'generalized' use - here in boldface - and actual self-reference in I shall be arguing).2

(22) (About Silent Speech Acts) Our subject matter here is those expressions...which appear in cognitive space... Whilst expressions in actual space may be witnessed by anyone who happens to be around, I am the only witness to what I put into my own cognitive space. With respect to <silent speech acts>, I shall be arguing, I play both quasi-speaker and quasi-hearer. (Murray 1987:383)

(23) D'une manière générale, quand j'emploie le présent d'un verbe aux trois personnes (selon la nomenclature traditionnelle), il semble que la différence de personne n'amène aucun changement de sens dans la forme verbale conjuguée. (Benveniste 1958:263)

Conversely, speaker and addressee reference is not always accomplished through specialised forms. English you does not tell me if I alone or I plus any number of others, who need not even be present, are being addressed; analogous problems arise in formal address, in the numerous languages that use for this purpose pronouns that otherwise have 2nd person plural or 3rd person singular or plural' reference. Mitigating we may be used where actually the addressee is being referred to (not only in addressing children); in German, many people are in the habit of using generic man ("one") when they are actually referring to themselves; an author may use we to refer to himself, along with I and with we's that refer to the scientific community, and so on.3

Caricaturing a little, the frequent statement that, to know who I and you refer to, we must know "who is uttering the sentence", and who is being spoken to, might lead to the idea that a person that knew
only the words for "I" and "you" in some language could tell how many times over a given exchange a speaker had referred to himself and how many times to his addressee. This is far from what actually happens. On the other hand, what interferes with such simple correspondences is well-defined patterns of usage, so that if we state and 'subtract' those, it is indeed possible to correlate 1st person and self-reference on the one hand and 2nd person and addressee-reference on the other.

With the plural pronouns of 1st and 2nd person, however (it has often been stated that they are not really in a "plural" relation to their singular analogs), we are back to the kind of situation encountered with here and now: the 1st and 2nd person element can be characterised as above, but the "plural" element - far from pluralising "speaker" or "addressee" - actually adds something like "and a relevant other/and relevant others", or, more adequately, constitutes a contextually relevant group of persons that includes speaker or hearer or both; what that group is (and also, for languages that do not overtly distinguish "inclusive" from "exclusive" 1st person pl. reference, whether the addressee belongs to it), must, again, be inferred on the basis of the thematic context.

For 1st person plural, the 'relevant group' may comprise, besides the speaker, any number of persons up to the rest of mankind, and a 2nd person plural pronoun has almost the same variability of inclusion. So here indeed we do have a parallel to the 'extensibility' (not a good term, as we noted p.14) observed with here and now (logically enough, it is lacking with the designations of single individuals, I and you). Hanks (who more aptly speaks of scope, not extensibility) also observes this parallel; moreover, the following quotation furnishes a correspondence, for this domain, to what was stated above (p.14) concerning the multitude of socially constituted 'spaces' and event-dependent 'time-lines' available for defining a given "here" or "now":

"The variation in the scope of the 'we' is an unavoidable consequence of any individual's belonging to many distinct aggregates at a single time. From the viewpoint of deixis, it is the same variability in scope that we see in different uses of 'here' and 'there'. (Hanks 1990:172)

(24) (From a phone-in broadcast discussion about seasonal rhythms in modern times) Wir sind gar nicht mehr so abhängig von den Jahreszeiten vom Wechsel der Jahreszeiten mit unserer Ernährung, nicht? Alles immer. (We are no longer so dependent on the seasons on the change of seasons for our food, are we? Everything all the time.)
(25) (A little later) So, wir haben jetzt die erste Hörerin am Telefon. (O.k., we now have the first listener on the line.)

(26) I believe that for each three-step demonstrative system that we examine we need to ask what choice the language has made with its middle term... (Fillmore 1982:50)

(27) (Making an appointment for the evening. The speaker is married, the addressee single) Wir wollten vielleicht in diesen mexikanischen Film gehen. Wenn du kommst, könnten wir doch zusammengen... (We were thinking of maybe going to that Mexican film. If you come <to see us>, we might <go> together...)

Parallel to what we have seen for here and now, the inclusion of the group need not always be delimitable with numerical precision; it is often sufficient that the thematically relevant group as such be recognised. The distinction between 'inclusive' and 'exclusive' interpretation of we in languages that do not have separate forms is dependent on the thematic context, just like that between "where we are" and "where I am" as appropriate interpretations of here (and the verbal environment may help, cf. the "together" in (27)).

Let us return to the singular pronouns and leave aside questions of reference assignment, to discuss how their meanings should be defined. For the moment, I shall mainly concentrate on first person. According to the prevailing opinion, something like "the speaker of the present utterance" is an adequate rendering of the meaning of I. But parallel to what we have seen for here and now, a first person pronoun (I or, for that matter, me, my...) is not used in order to refer to the speaker in that capacity, as the momentary incumbent of speaker's role; what it is used to refer to is the individual known to the interlocutor that he is. To interpret an utterance with a 1st person sg. element, it is not enough, and is at one stage beside the point, to fill in "the speaker of this sentence" in the 'blank'. Such utterances are interpreted by recourse to the presupposed relevant knowledge concerning the individual in question (and any information they may convey about him/her is intended to have repercussions on that very knowledge).

(28) + I just got an invitation from the Millers.

(29) + All of a sudden there's this big fat Mercedes trying to overtake me...

(30) + Let's meet at my place.

(31) + Five years ago, I was living in Mexico.
(32) + (A person invited to a party calling the host:) It's a great pity really, but I have such a bad 'flu I just can't come.

(28) will, in situated use, be adequately interpreted only if the listener activates his/her presupposed knowledge of what the relationship between speaker and the Millers is. Perhaps they were on bad terms up to now; invitations to the Millers' may be something craved or something abhorred by the speaker; what is his/her reaction going to be; etc. etc. For (29), knowledge of the type of car the speaker drives may be essential to grasping the point of the upcoming narrative episode: a race between two fast cars, for example, if he drives a Porsche, or the insolence of drivers of big cars, if his is a Rabbit. (30) will hardly make a good appointment if all the addressee is supposed to rely on is his knowledge of the speaker's "participant role" at the moment; and in what sense could the I of (31) be said to relate to the speaker's role as speaker? Is the addressee of (32) to tell other guests "the man who told me he has such a bad 'flu he can't come has such a bad 'flu he can't come"? Of course, he would use the person's name, or some description likewise based on shared knowledge of the individual.

When the pronoun is stressed, it is often particularly clear how it aims at the speaker in his known identity, not qua speaker:

(33) Rel: Shut up please!
Stanley: ...'ey, you tellin' me?
Rel: Yes. Your mother's a duck. (Labov 1972:304) Stanley is, of course, not drawing attention to himself as utterer of the utterance. What the stressed me is intended to bring to the fore is obviously those aspects of his identity that should keep Rel from daring to address a command to him (the fact that he is a leader in the peer group, the exploits or other personal attributes that have made him such, etc.). Rel's artful dodge - a 'ritual insult' equivalent here to "I am joking" (Labov 1972:305,351f) - shows this is the way he actually understood the question.

What parts of the shared knowledge about the speaker are to be activated for the interpretation in any given case is, of course, dependent on the context.

It seems clear, then, that a statement like "I means the addressee (and you, the addressee) of the message to which it belongs" (Jakobson 1957/1971:132) can only be read as a description of how the reference of those pronouns is determined, the verb mean being used in a loose sense. Placing the quotation marks differently, "I means 'the addressee of the message to which I belongs'", as a meaning
definition, cannot, as we have seen, be adequate, if a meaning definition is to capture an element’s systematic contribution to the interpretation of utterances. A realistic definition will at least have to state that the pronoun serves to indicate the ‘known individual’ that is the addressee of the statement. (And perhaps even that is formulated too much from an extraneous perspective. I am "I" whether talking or listening. Why not simply say that the meanings of the first and second person pronouns are built on the convention that everybody refers to himself as "I" and addresses others as "you"?) We come back to the question of definition in the next section.

It has been said, rightly, that the speaker/hearer dichotomy is an oversimplification (Hymes 1972, Goffman 1979, cf. Levinson 1988). The person talking may in fact be rendering the words of someone else, so we should distinguish between the "phonator" or "animator" and the "principal" or "source"; the person ostensibly spoken to may not coincide with the intended recipient, being perhaps merely a messenger, etc. Such distinctions are important to the analysis of many types of speech event. The interpretation of the 1st and 2nd person pronouns, however, is uniformly 'source' (in the sense of 'accountable speaker') and 'intended recipient', respectively. When I talk to a 'messenger', e.g., I may use you in regard to him as well as to the third party ("I want you to tell him: you are to come by Friday"); but since the utterances where I use you to address the 'messenger' will be for him, at that point he is the intended recipient, just as the third party is in utterances that are for him. When we hear someone reading a paper for someone else at a congress say "throughout this paper I am assuming...", we will interpret the I as referring to the "principal", i.e., the author of the paper, the "source" of the utterance in question; but when he says "I am afraid I have mislaid a page", we will interpret such an I as referring to the "source" of that utterance, in this case the "phonator", at speech event level. Jakobson's formulation (cf. above) is in this sense quite precise.- I have for this reason not felt uneasy about using the traditional terms "speaker", "addressee" and the like; they are, for our purposes, never to be understood in the sense of "mere phonator", "mere messenger" and the like.5

A final note: For many kinds of speech event, saying that "I" involves the speaker's known individuality may appear too strong a formulation. When the priest says "I baptise thee...", it is not really him as an individual that the pronoun involves. Yet far more than his speaking the words in question plays a part; he is known or
at least assumed to speak them rightfully, i.e. to really hold the function of priest. Knowledge of the speaker 'as a person' is often restricted to such functional or schematic elements; a term like 'figure' might be more appropriate in such cases than 'individual'. Be that as it may, interpretation of the pronoun depends on what the hearer knows or infers about the speaker beyond the fact of his being speaker ('speaker' is being used for spoken as well as written communication, of course). A reader of one of King Aśoka’s Rock Edicts in some outer province of India, in the 3rd century BC, probably did not know the speaker as an individual, in the everyday sense; but he had to know 'who he was', to be able to make sense of the inscription - even if this knowledge was inferred from the inscription itself. Even in reading an anonymous lyrical poem, we endow the 'speaker' (the literary construct, not the author) with a number of conventional or inferred attributes as a background against which to interpret what he says. I have come to doubt that there are in fact any kinds of speech act or speech event where we might safely say that what counts for the interpretation of an I is nothing but the role of speaker. One is led to think of ritual genres, but even there a 'speaker' will have some transcendent legitimation from which the speaking role derives and which is presupposed for the interpretation of any occurring self-references. Performative formulas - I baptize you, I swear, I promise - are not cases in point either: the I of I baptize you has to be an authorized representative of the institution; "commissives" engage the speaker not qua speaker but qua 'social figure' or 'known individual', and the contribution of the 1st sg. pronoun in them lies in identifying the accountable individual: it is Peter Smith, not Donald Butler - if Peter Smith swore or promised - who will be held responsible should the testimony prove false or the promise be broken.
4. Defining the meanings of the deictics so far. We have seen that I refers to the 'source' (or 'accountable formulator') of the utterance in which it figures. On the other hand, as the examples have shown, its actual contribution to the intended messages is not concerned in any way with the individual's engagement in the utterance event. If the definition of a meaning is to capture the conceptual elements it may contribute to the content of an utterance, then, clearly, gearing the definition to the individual's role as source of the message is out of place, and a concept like that of a (perhaps schematically) 'known individual' indispensable; on the other hand, that individual's identification is based on this very role, and we would be leaving out precisely what makes the meaning a deictic one if we did not account for this relation.

What we must do is keep the two levels - that of the conceptual contribution and that of referent identification - apart. We can then more adequately describe the characteristic semiotic design of the pro-elements we have seen so far.

Let us, following Weinreich (1963/1966), distinguish deictics (which figure among his "formators", signs that "consist of a sign-vehicle and an implicit instruction for an operation", 1966:145) from "designators" such as lexical elements (which "consist of a sign-vehicle and a designatum", ibid.). More precisely, we must distinguish deictic from designative components of signs, since deictics also have at least some designative meaning, and many designative signs (come, bring, contemporary... , and see section 6) have a deictic component. 1

With deictics, particularly the pro-elements we are now treating, the relation between the signifiant and the conceptual elements the sign contributes to the message is different from that obtaining with 'designators'. A signifiant like the ubiquitous table, or better, cup (to evoke the rich conceptual analysis of that word in Wierzbicka 1985) is associated in the language with a set of 'stereotypical' attributes on which the listener draws in reconstructing the intended message (a process I imagine takes place along the lines shown by Fillmore's analyses, especially 1977). What is associated with the signifiant I is a search instruction in speech-situational terms: the hearer is first to find the intended referent and then to draw upon that referent's individual shared-knowledge attributes to reconstruct the intended message ("first" and "then" reflect a logical, not a temporal order). You, here, now etc. operate the same way.
Lexemes and pro-elements alike are used to evoke elements of the thematic world segments rather than of the speech exchange scenario. But with the pro-elements, we reach those elements via a detour, the association is largely ad-hoc, and it is mainly the search instruction that is firmly associated with the sign.

The search instruction tells the hearer to fill the 'blank' by reference to situationally identified individuals, places, times: the source of the present utterance, its intended recipient, the 'given' position on the thematically relevant dimension of places or times. (All the meanings in question are inherently definite.) It, too, implies an amount of constant designative meaning: "individual" in the case of "I" and "you"; "at place..." and "at time...", with "here" and "now".

There should be nothing very unexpected about such a characterisation of pro-elements. But - parallel to what we said above (p.13) for here and now - the pronominal character of I and you is in general not fully considered and those elements said to stand for the speech event participants as such; from mere clues for the determination of reference, "speaker" and like concepts are promoted to designata.

The semantic definition, then, will have to characterise the semiotic design of the elements, the way the conceptual contribution to the intended message is obtained via the shared knowledge about the individual referent found via the search instruction in the sign, rather than via the shared stereotypical knowledge associated with a typical designative sign.

This semiotic design, incidentally, is in part like that of proper names, person as well as place. The search instruction here is, grosso modo, relative to the individuals and places liable to be referred to among the given interactants and in the given thematic context (there is thus a clear deictic element to person and place names); upon retrieval of the referent, the relevant knowledge associated with it can be brought to bear on the interpretation of the message. I am here indebted to Schegloff 1972, from where I quote the following concerning the "recognizability" of person and place names:

"It appears to be the case that persons (in this society, at least) in using names and in asking for them, claim their recognizability... To speak of the "recognizability of the name" is insufficiently precise here. What is central is more than hearing once again a sequence of morphemes that have been heard before. What we mean by "recognizability" is that the hearer can perform operations on the name -- categorize it, find as a member of which class it is being used, bring knowledge to bear on it, detect which of its attributes are relevant in context, etc. It is the ability to do such operations on a name that allows such responses as:
* A: who did you go with?
   B: Mary.
   A: Oh, it was a family affair.

... Whereas in English, personal names may indicate sex, ethnicity, and sometimes social class, they are otherwise mute. Recognition involves, then, the ability to bring knowledge to bear on them, to categorize, see the relevant significance, to see "in what capacity" the name is used. In this respect, too, place names are like personal names.

   A: And he said that some teacher, who's coming uhm from I believe he might have said Brooklyn, some place in the east.

... Here the particular place that had been mentioned is not clearly remembered, but the outcome of some operation (some analysis of the place that was mentioned) is." (Schegloff 1972.)
5. The "spatio-temporal zero-point". The meanings of here and now and the reference points of 'spatial' and temporal deictics with a fuller designative component are usually equated, under the idea that it is utterance place and time that are at stake in all cases (cf. the frequent use of the locution "the here-and-now" to designate the deictic center - as in the quotation from Lyons below p. 29). Now, it is clear that if, e.g., here may designate, à la limite, the whole terrestrial world, the "here-and-now" reference point of, let's say, downstairs cannot possibly be as extended.

For the pro-adverbials, the kind and extension of the ad-hoc referents depends entirely on the thematic context. With the more designative spatial and temporal deictics, perviousness to the thematic context is restricted by the designative component, to varying degrees corresponding to the degree of semantic vagueness of that component (vagueness or, more positively, context adaptability). Let us look at a few sample expressions: downstairs, next door, abroad, over(by the window); half a minute ago, last night, recently, 500 years ago, in the past. Half a minute ago determines the 'location' of the event in question much more precisely than last night; recently may refer to days or weeks or years ago, depending on the context; 500 years ago may refer to a given year, as in (34), or to a more extended epoch, as in (35):

(34) +Just 500 years ago Columbus discovered America.
(35) +This country was much more wooded 500 years ago.

Downstairs and next door circumscribe the intended location more narrowly than abroad (still, you may have more trouble finding my handbag than the kitchen of my house if I say of either it is downstairs, and next door may be in the same house or at the neighbours'). And so on.

With the character of the designative component, the kind and extension of the spatial and temporal reference points varies; and the more pervious this component in a sign to the influence of the thematic context, the more pervious the reference point. Over by the window determines the reference point relatively more precisely ("in the same room, but some distance away from the window") than next door ("to the room where we are", "to the house where we are") or abroad (the interactants may be in New York, yet speak of friends in San Francisco going abroad); a minute ago determines the reference point more precisely, in a literally chronometric sense, than five hundred
years ago, which, depending on the reference context, may be relative to "this year" (just 500 years ago Columbus discovered America, said anywhere between Jan. 1st and Dec. 31st of 1992), to "our century", "modern times", etc.: generally, to the time since the relevant changes intervened (cf. ex.35). Even more latitude is left by an expression like in the past (or, for that matter, by tense morphology), as regards localisation as well as reference point.

Parallel to what we have seen for here and now, what spatial and temporal deictics are systematically relative to is not the literal place and time where and when the utterance is made, but the 'given' position within the dimension of localisation activated by the designative component of the sign and/or the thematic context. At this level of abstraction, and in a relational, not a concretely referential sense, we may indeed equate "here" and "now" with the zero-points presupposed by the 'designative' spatial and temporal deictics. Functionally, we observe a complementarity: here, e.g., designates the 'given' position as against implied "not-here" ones; a non-"pro" spatial deictic designates a "not-here" position as against an implied 'given' one.

A possible objection to the characterisation of the 'zero-points' that I give here (just as to that of "here" and "now") is that, after all, to remain in the spatial dimension, the kinds of place that are here considered reference points include the place where the speaker is, so that it all comes back to that, in the end. In fact, many authors have defined "here"/"now" or the corresponding zero-points as places/times that do not so much coincide with as "include" speaker's position/time of utterance.

But this is geometry. In communication, the implied reference points play a role beyond that of furnishing the points 'from where' to compute the ad-hoc values of the designative deictics; the relation between these values and the reference points themselves may be relevant to the intended message. If I say, in Munich,

(36) + I wish I could live abroad,

I may get, and may have been wishing to provoke, an answer like: "don't you like Germany?"; it is the country where we are/where I am that counts as the reference point of abroad. Ex. (37)

(37) + Who are the owners of the yellow house next door?

brings into play two houses, or perhaps household units, not the house next door plus, e.g., the place in front of the fireplace where the
interlocutors are sitting. In (38), the relevant contrast is between a
destination within or close to Göttingen and a long-distance one; the
zero-point relative to which the destination is "far away" is
Göttingen, not the particular spot on the way to my home where we are
when the driver is talking to me:

(38) (A taxi-driver:) Das beste ist immer, wenn ein Fahrgast an einen entfernten Ort will. 'Ne entspannte Autobahnfahrt... (What I
like best is when a passenger wants to go to a far-away place. A
relaxed ride on the Autobahn...)

(39) and (40) clearly depend in their pragmatic value on the
presupposed reference point:

(39) Equally novel is the idea of flying to Paris with Bahrain-based
Gulf Air, or to Frankfurt on TWA or Philippine Airlines.
("Europe's secret airlines", The Times Saturday Review,
23/6/1990)

(40) ... a return to Frankfurt can cost about ~ 70, compared with...
(ibid.)

For someone in Dubai who wants to go to Paris, or a person in Albany
N.Y. or in Manila planning to go to Germany, there will be nothing so
novel about the ideas presented, and whether ~ 70 is an interesting
rate for a return flight to Frankfurt depends on the point of
departure. In the examples, the relevant zero-point is obviously
London, but not some particular "utterance place" or "speaker's
location" there; the delimitation is determined by the "not here"
designated by the deictic expression (and other elements of the
thematic 'air travel' context: your ticket will not take you from and
back to any place within London).

When a textile firm puts a little label "Imported" into a shirt
(with addressee-oriented 'projection' of the reference point), that
information is relative to the country where the shirt is put on sale,
not to the place in that country where I read the label. The
information is meant to be valid in every place within this country,
and would, if some of the shirts were sold in the country of origin,
be non-valid there; anywhere in this latter country I could, if I had
an interest in doing so, file a complaint.

Note that the determination of the reference points (and of the
reference of here and now) via the relevant dimension of contrast as
activated by the thematic context and the designative component yields
quite precise (though complex and basically abstract) entities, while,
e.g. "place including speaker's location" does not help a hearer much
in a given case if he knows that that place can be of indefinite
extension but does not know what the extension meant right now is.
Besides, the characterisation distorts relevance relations in the many
cases where the speaker's physical location is of no import to the
locating expression being used. (Also, as we saw above, p. 11, with
examples (15a) and (15b), speaker or interactants need not be located
physically within the space referred to as here on a given occasion.)

We begin to see the lack of realism of the current conception of
the function of deixis as expressed in statements like the following:

"...the basic function of deixis is to relate the entities and
situations to which reference is made in language to the
spatio-temporal zero-point (the here-and-now) of the context of
utterance." (Lyons 1982:121)

or, with regard to spatial deixis in particular,

"Spatial deixis is that aspect of deixis which involves referring
to the locations in space of the communication act participants; it
is that part of spatial semantics which takes the bodies of the
communication act participants as significant reference objects for
spatial specification." (Fillmore 1982:37)

The vast domain of locational deixis, with its abstract relations, and
relate defined essentially on a social and interactional basis, is
conceptualised on the pattern of an interesting but systematically
quite restricted subdomain, that of quasi-geometric locating
expressions such as in front of, right, left, under used in reference
to objects in the immediate perceptual field; and the equally complex
field of time deixis reduced to the indication of temporal relations
to the moment of speech, the need for which in situated speech, again,
arises under quite limited circumstances: with small-scale measures
such as seconds, minutes (where not too many), quarters or halves of
hours (but here already, things get more approximative).
6. Deictic "egocentricity" and "subjectivity". Deixis is generally said to be organised in an "egocentric" way. Immediately following the characterisation of the basic function of deixis by Lyons that I just quoted, we read:

"... this zero-point is egocentric, as everyone who ever talks about deixis would agree." (Lyons 1982:121.)

The second clause is overstated, and there have been voices expressly questioning the adequacy of the concept (Opalka 1982, Pasierbsky 1982, and see now Hanks 1990); but the tenet remains near-general.

Deixis has also long been associated with "subjectivity", and the notion of an "irreducible subjectivity" introduced by it into language has regained currency of late.¹

"Egocentricity" as well as "subjectivity" invite associations that are in conflict with the idea of language as a socially shared system. What is meant by them, in our context?

Although the distinction is not general, the notions of egocentricity and subjectivity are current, by and large, in regard to specific types of phenomena each, at least in the more recent literature (cf. Lyons 1982, esp. 121f): "egocentricity" is meant to capture the putative relativity of all deictic signs, in particular spatial and temporal ones, to the speaker as reference point; "subjectivity" is used predominantly a) for 'shifts of perspective', b) for what seems to underlie grammatical mood and all kinds of evaluative and expressive signs.

As to "egocentricity", I hope the examples have shown that the assumption has no factual basis. In those cases where it is actually speaker's 'location' to the exclusion of addressee's that serves as reference point, there is a functional motivation for it. I have tried to show this for the use of here; more arguments could be given by looking at other deictics and, importantly, by analysing the contexts in more detail and showing how they may make either 'projection' or speaker-relative formulation the more natural choice.

The notion of deictic egocentricity should certainly be abandoned. As things are, it exerts a very strong influence on the imagination of researchers and frequently biases their thinking. Thus, in one of the rare attempts at characterising what "egocentricity" is (mostly, the concept is presented as self-evident), we read:

"...the unmarked anchorage points, constituting the deictic centre, are typically assumed to be as follows: (i) the central person is the speaker, (ii) the central time is the time at which the speaker produces the utterance, (iii) the central place is the speaker's
location at utterance time or $C<oding>T<ime>$, (iv) the discourse centre is the point which the speaker is currently at in the production of his utterance, and (v) the social centre is the speaker's social status and rank, to which the status or rank of addressees or referents is relative." (Levinson 1983:63f)

But - leaving aside (ii) and (iii), which we have discussed -, ad (i), no justification is given for considering the speaker "the central person" (in person deixis); as to (iv), the current "discourse centre" is certainly a point both interactants "are at", if in complementary roles; calling it "the point which the addressee is currently at in the reception of the utterance" would seem no more arbitrary than the formulation proposed; for (v), likewise, considering the "status and rank of addressees' or referents" as central, and that of the speaker relative to it, seems no less warranted than the other way around.

The common uncritical acceptance of the idea of deictic "egocentricity" may lead to statements that verge on the fantastic:

"Egocentric use of the space concept places ego at the center of the universe. From this point of origin ego can lay out a three-dimensional coordinate system..." (Miller/Johnson-Laird 1976:395)

"The first spatial relatum we learn to use is ego. The primitive meaning of "here" is "where I am", "from" is probably first understood as "from me", "to" as "to me", and so on." (ibid. 394, emphasis mine.)

Of course, the concept invites psychologicist associations. Against those, it is well to underline, with Tanz 1980, that mastery of the deictic system is actually founded on non-"egocentric" understanding of perspective.

"To use the deictic terms correctly, children must incorporate perspective as a component of meaning. They are addressed by name and as you, but must learn that while the name is a label for them, the you is not. The people who speak to children refer to themselves as mommy or daddy etc., etc., or as I. Children can address them as mommy or daddy, but not as I. To use the deictic terms correctly, with themselves at center, children must have grasped how other people use them, all with themselves at center. (Tanz 1980:7.)

Not half-blind "ego"-centeredness, but centeredness in the sense of an intrinsic orientation of meanings to corresponding speech-situational reference points is what characterises deixis.

Now there is a vast category of meanings that are indeed systematically relative to the given speaker, meanings that have often been characterised as being "subjective" in essence, and many of which have
been thought to be deictic on the grounds of their speaker-relativity. Mood including affirmation belongs here, gradations of affirmativity (probably, perhaps...), expressions of aesthetic, 'social', and practical evaluation (beautiful, unkind, adequate, unfortunately,...), the expression of attitude via intonation and choice of vocabulary, much of so-called social deixis, etc. In any instance of use, any of the signs or features in question counts as a commitment on the speaker's side - a commitment to a certain 'truth value', a commitment to an evaluation, a commitment as regards the relation between the interactants, etc. The meanings in question are interpreted on the background of the shared knowledge about the speaker - his reliability, informedness, competence, usual level of expressivity etc., and are booked to his account rather than taken directly as representations of properties of the thematic world segment.

It seems clear that the signs and features in question should be assigned a deictic component, depending and in turn reflecting as they do, in their interpretation, on the shared knowledge about the known individual who uses them, just like I.

The "subjectivity" they express is, of course, entirely intersubjective, - "conventional subjectivity", one might say. It is based on a system of social demands and responsibilities. A speaker is socially required to make reliable statements, and to qualify his assertions, if necessary, so as to indicate the degree of reliability; this includes the requirement of competent evaluation (can I confidently take the route to some mountain viewpoint speaker has recommended to me as "not steep"?). A speaker is also socially required to do what is sometimes misleadingly called "express himself": express attitudes toward the interlocutor and toward the things spoken about (expression of a 'neutral' attitude is an expression of attitude in itself, with a conventional value resulting from the system of available options). Failure to do so if habitual with a speaker counts as a kind of sociopathy; on a specific occasion (unless it is motivated by specific requirements due to the type of speech event, or is imputable to extraordinary circumstances), it will be heard as 'implicating', with Grice, some special message.

We have to do here with the domain of language functions that have been set off against the representational function under various designations: the plane of expression, with Bühler (and perhaps also that of his "Appell"); the interpersonal function, with Halliday. To me, Halliday's tripartite schema of functions (the ideational or
content function, the interpersonal or social role function, and the textual or discourse function) seems the most adequate (for what it covers; certainly aesthetic functions must also find their place, and perhaps still others); his 'interpersonal' function in particular is "the...function whereby the speaker enters into the communication process in its social and personal aspects", the function that expresses "speaker's involvement" (Halliday 1970:325f). Functions of this domain are systematically reflected in the grammar, in lexical choice, etc., after Halliday (1970:326f).

It seems that the functional plane adumbrated here, the domain of 'interpersonal'/ 'expressive' functions, in fact extends all the way to more complex schemata of language use - metaphor, irony, "performing" in narration and other genres. Of course, more than just the 'interpersonal' or expressive function is needed to characterise those procedures; but their use is integrated in a system of social conventions and implies a specific commitment on the part of the speaker. To that extent, a speaker-deictic component is involved (in literary analysis, in fact, we may draw information about the figure of the narrator, e.g., from the metaphors the author has him use). Choice of lexical register for politeness has been included under deixis in Anderson/Keenan 1985:261, and it is a short step from here to including the speaker-relative component of schemata such as those underlying ('creative') metaphor, irony, or, for that matter, much of deictic projection. We should add that there is, beyond the requirements on speakers already mentioned, a very strong one to 'speak well'; not in the sense of schoolmasterly correctness (although to some, this is important, too), but in that of vivid, evocatory, succinct, allusive, witty ... (or at times: blunt, ...) formulation. The aesthetic functions in language are related, inter alia, to this requirement.

Instead of "subjectivity", then, what we see is a socially regulated domain of communicationally vital, but non-representational, functions. "Subjectivity" is a term commonly opposed to the socially constituted; it is misleading especially because it corroborates widespread unreflected assumptions about language. The phenomena it has been used to capture are better described on the basis of a differentiated theory of the basic language functions.
7. Deixis and the definition of the speech situation. (Concerning the inventory of deictics.) In all we have seen so far, it has become clear that it cannot be the function of deixis to relate utterance contents to concrete of the utterance setting. But this does not invalidate the old founding intuition of the deictics' relativity to the circumstances of each of their uses, to the individual speech situations; it is only the concretistic interpretation that distorts the facts. After all, factors like those we have seen at work, the interlocutors' identities and the concerns and shared contexts addressed, are vital ingredients of any speech situation. It is just that we must give the notion of speech situation its proper sense.

It is amazing how the theory of deixis, presumably a pragmatic domain par excellence, is operating under a concretistic conception of the speech situation that has remained virtually waterproof to the interactionally-oriented research of the past decades. If nothing else, everyday use of the word situation should warn us against reducing the concept to an assembly of externals such as time, place, and speech role incumbency ("just imagine the situation I was in!"; "that'll make the situation even worse!"...). Such reduction misses the very essence of the notion, the action and dramatic tension, participants' interests and expectations. Admittedly, the notion is not an easy one to define; as an approximation, we may perhaps say that what the notion aims at is a configuration of factors that matter, under some concern or interest, at a given juncture. I have found no outright definition in the literature, but Goffman 1974 paraphrases "situational":

"My perspective <in the book, AF> is situational, meaning here a concern for what one individual can be alive to at a particular moment, this often involving a few other particular individuals and not necessarily restricted to the mutually monitored arena of a face-to-face gathering." (Goffman 1974:8)

and continues:

"I assume that when individuals attend to any current situation, they face the question: 'What is it that's going on here?' Whether asked explicitly, as in times of confusion and doubt, or tacitly, during occasions of usual certitude, the question is put and the answer to it is presumed by the way the individuals then proceed to get on with the affairs at hand." (ibid.)

A situation is a complex social construct and is not definable on the basis of inspection with the naked eye. Even a house afire does not by itself make what would be referred to as "the situation" in every given case; the concept presupposes an interested party, or 'evaluator', and a configuration of background assumptions,
expected, often obligations, etc. 1

A speech situation will at any moment be defined by factors at two principal levels. First of all, it is what we might call a moment in life, where people with defined identities, with a shared world and shared interests, are, at a certain point in their interactional history and in the history of their worlds, engaged in business consequential to them and to those worlds. In addition, a speech situation is a situation 'of speech', with the frames, norms and expectations proper to this medium of action. Deictic theory has unduly isolated the 'situation of speech' aspect, and in a superficial manner at that. (I am using speech in a broad sense, of course: any kind of verbal action, including, mutatis mutandis, those in print and on stone.)

Utterances are moves in interactional episodes, or 'dramata' (however trivial or impersonal the embedding speech event may appear at times). 2 Interaction has many dimensions and is structured at many layers, so that situations may be delimited at different levels: we often refer to "the" speech situation throughout some interaction when we are interested in the factors that remain constant, but since every utterance attends to the interactional state that obtains when it is made and changes that state, we must also say that every utterance creates a new situation; and there are levels of structure in between, of course.

In characterising what participants must be 'alive to' at any moment, i.e. what makes up a speech situation, we must take into account the individuals engaged in it in their full individualities (to the extent that attributes of those individualities are intersubjectively presupposed or manifested, of course, and only in those aspects that are relevant to the given interaction); the social and affective relations between them; their known long-range and ad-hoc intentions; the shared 'world segments' the given interaction concerns, in all those aspects that are shared and may be relevant to the present concern; the stage reached in the present interaction, the projected course of the interaction as well as what has gone before, including relevant aspects of previous interactions; norms and expectations associated with the thematic contents; interactional norms or 'maxims', and more (thus the social definition of the place where the interaction takes place may be a relevant speech-situational factor: being in a church, e.g., will have repercussions on the loudness with which two tourists exchange their remarks; but such
aspects are not relevant to our discussion).

Networks of factors like the ones just hinted at form the background to the production and interpretation of any utterance and its diverse elements; in fact, they are what the speakers address in their utterances, what makes them formulate the utterances they formulate. (In the literature, situational factors are often treated as a kind of 'noise'.) I tentatively group the factors under three categories:

1. factors to do with the shared-knowledge 'world segment' the utterance addresses;

2. factors concerning the course of the given interaction (at the 'thematic' as well as the personal/social level);

3. factors to do with the personal and social relations.

The grouping not inaptly parallels the distinction of basic language functions discussed in the last section - "not inaptly" because it stands to reason that the functions served by linguistic expressions should be geared to the factors that make up the situations in or rather on behalf of which they are used.

The individual configurations of factors vary infinitely, of course, but they are made up of factors of recurrent types.

If we take a deictic to be a sign whose meaning is defined relative to a recurrent type of speech-situational factor - a characterisation that should not meet with too much objection -, and start from a realistic conception of what the types of factors are that make up speech situations, we can easily include in the definition the many kinds of meaning that have at one time or other been characterised as deictic but have been difficult to integrate under the prevailing conception (cf. sections 1 and 6).

In the following list, the systematisation is imperfect, but I hope it will suffice to illustrate the point I am making. I distinguish the designative component, or 'value', of each sign or pattern from the type of speech-situational factor this value is relative to or presupposes, its reference point. Numbers (1), (2), (3) behind the type of reference point are meant to indicate the gross category of situational factor it belongs to. The functional characterisations are approximative and possible polysemies neglected. Note that a number of meanings are relative to more than one kind of factor.

- THE DEFINITE ARTICLE: The 'uniqueness' value conferred by it upon the referent of the noun is relative to an appropriate thematic 'world segment' ("intended pragmatic uniqueness set", with Hawkins 1984) (1). Thus, with an example of Hawkins', the noun president is associated
(inter alia) with a country someone is president of; the president will be heard as referring to the president of the country we are just speaking of, or to the president of the country we are in.

- DISCOURSE CONNECTORS AND PARTICLES:
  
  - Incidentally. Value: "not exactly dovetailed", relative to: the present concern (2).
  
  - à propos. Value: "Mention warranted by related thematic content", relative to: some name, concept, fact... just spoken of (1), (2).

  - German ja (wir haben's ja; ich war ja mal in Mexico "we're not poor, after all"; "I've been to Mexico, after all"). Value: Validating argument, relative to: proposal or assertion just made (2) ("let's go first class"; "Mexicans are friendly/unfriendly/..."")

- CONJUNCTIONS:
  
  - but (they were poor, but merry) . Value: refutation of possible inference based on stereotypical associations (1) to the content of the antecedent phrase (1), (2).

- VERBAL ASPECT: Perfect-like and past-like tenses differ in instructing the hearer to (value:) compute the relevance of the predicated fact relative to a present concern (2) either immediately or via the relevance to an evoked situation (1).

- SENTENCE ACCENT:
  
  - Non-contrastive accent on the subject (My purse is gone!) tells the hearer to evaluate the predication as that of an event, introduced into the present thematic context (1) and argumentation (2) "as a whole" rather than for separate relevance consideration of subject and predicate.

  - 'Iterative' accent as in When did they come? has the value of acknowledging, for the (at least propositional) content of subject + predicate (e.g., "they came") of the present utterance (2) that it has been at issue before.

- "STYLE DISJUNCTS" (with a term from Greenbaum 1969):
  
  - Frankly (frankly, he's not too intelligent; frankly, I don't know). The value, approximately, is: "(I know delicate matters must often be expressed in a roundabout way, and what I am going to say is delicate, but, in this case, I think it's preferable) to call things by their name"; it is relative to the given speaker's person, goes to his account (3), and presupposes the norm of verbal conduct formulated
in the parenthesis (3).

- "SENTENCE MODE" (Question, affirmation, imperative):
  - Affirmation. Value: "I can vouch for the truth of the fact in question". Relative to such traits of speaker's personality (3) as informedness, competence, sanity of judgment.... Counts as the given speaker's (3) commitment in relation to the requirement for speakers to make their assertions reliable (3).

- MOOD
  - Inferential, e.g. the inferential use of future tense ("where's Peter?" - "oh, he'll be watching TV"). Value: I have no positive information that x is the case, but from what information I have, plus my experience etc., I can infer that it is. Counts as the given speaker's (3) commitment, etc. as above.
  - EPISTEMIC QUALIFIERS (certainly, probably etc.) can be described along the same lines.
  - 'DEONTIC' MODAL VERBS such as must, should express values that are relative to the given speaker's (3) evaluation of appropriate courses of action in the thematic domain (1); they count as commitments in regard to the social requirement upon speakers to take a stand in moral issues under appropriate conditions (3).
  - EVALUATIVE ADJECTIVES AND ADVERBS (beautiful, good; stupidly, sadly, fortunately): the values expressed are relative to the given speaker's evaluation and count as his commitments (3); they may be relative to socially shared norms associated with the thematic world segment (1) (standards of beauty for paintings, women...; of intelligence for actions...), and to ad-hoc concerns (3) (as when I am trying to extract a nail from a wall and you pass me a pair of scissors, which I give back to you saying "they're no good" - scil. for the purpose in question, not in themselves).

- INTONATION:
  - An 'endearing' tone of voice, e.g., counts as speaker's commitment (3) in relation to requirements of expressing affections (3) appropriate to the given dyad's (3) relationship.

Quite a number of the meanings listed above are 'metalocutionary' (Gibbon 1982) in the sense of expressing not features of the thematic world, but indications about how to interpret the material they are in construction with. I have left this out of the discussion in order not to confound deictic relationality, i.e. relativity to factors in the
situation, with intra-sentential relationality. In a sense, of course, the intra-sentential context is 'in the situation', too, but the two kinds of relationality should certainly be kept apart so as not to blur the specificity of the traditional notion of deictic relations. At some higher level of abstraction, commonalities (as well as specific differences) will probably appear. In any case, not only for the 'metalocutionary', but for all deictics and in fact for all types of sign, the kind of intrasentential relations they contract should be part of a full functional description. (Where a deictic is relative to the content of a preceding or following utterance, however, I speak of a deictic relation, as is more or less traditional in the domain of 'discourse deixis'; cf. the characterisation of the German particle je above.)
Let us go back to the question, mentioned in the introductory section, of non-'canonical' reference points: places and times other than the 'given' ones, a person other than speaker as source of evaluations and expressive traits, a situation other than the current one as 'relevance target' of a predication...

Two cases must be distinguished:

1) There are deictic signs that occur only with 'transferred' reference points, such as there, then, <seven days> earlier (as against <seven days> ago), certain tense/aspect markers (e.g., the English Past), etc. I call this phenomenon (explicit) secondary orientation; more detailed treatment (and the exact delimitation against 'deictic projection' at the functional level) must be deferred.

2) A given deictic sign or feature may be oriented, in discourse, either to a 'primary', or speech-situational, reference point such as those discussed up to now, or to a 'transferred' reference point (a reference point in some 'established' or evoked situation). What is usually called 'deictic projection' belongs in this rubric, and more. I adopt the term 'projection' to cover all orientation to 'transferred' reference points of this second type.

Between them, phenomena of the two types make orientation to 'transferred' reference points ubiquitous.

Type 2, deictic projection in the sense sketched, ranges from uses with very marked effects, such as those usually discussed under terms like point-of-view technique, to grammaticalised patterns such as those illustrated on p.4 for tense/aspect use, patterns that are the most usual way of expressing the relations in question in the languages concerned and whose projectional character emerges mainly on a comparative basis. (Another grammaticalised projection is at the base of generalising you as in you never know; projection is we may say contextually lexicalised in cases like I'm coming in answer to a summons, where the addressee's point of view is taken rather than the speaker's.)

Let us recall the example quoted from Fillmore 1982 on p.5, and his discussion of it:

(50) Several years ago, he had lived near the beach.

"...what is being presented is the inner experience of a central character, the 'he' of the passage. ... It is precisely the deictic effect associated with the word which is responsible for the communicated 'point of view'. What justifies me in describing <this use> as non-deictic is its not being anchored in the current speech event..." (Fillmore 1982:38).
If the effect observed is due to the deictic character of ago, and if, taking the situation of the central character as reference point, ago functions in relation to it exactly as it would in relation to the speech situation if this latter were taken as reference point, then what we have is a difference in deictic orientation, not a difference between deictic and non-deictic use. We may cover the difference with a terminological distinction such as primary vs. transferred orientation ("primary" vs. "secondary" might seem more logical, but for the moment I reserve the label secondary orientation for cases with explicit marking such as mentioned above under point 1). Contrary to current mainstream thinking, quite a few authors have indeed insisted that the difference between 'primary' (or immediately speech-situational) and 'transferred' orientation is a mere difference of use, and that deixis must be defined in a fashion independent of such differences. To quote but two voices, a less recent and a very recent one:

"Die 'Deixis am Phantasma' besagt, daß der betroffenen Zeigfunktion ein fiktives und nicht das der Realität des Sprechereignisses entsprechende Zeigfeld zu Grunde liegt. Sie unterscheidet sich somit von der 'eigentlichen' Deixis ausschließlich auf der Ebene der als parole verstandenen Sprache." <Note:> "Nur die Existenz als solche des Zeigfelds ist ein die als langue verstandene Sprache betreffendes Phänomen, nicht jedoch die jeweilige Fixierung seines Koordinaten-Nullpunktes." ("'Deixis am Phantasma' means that the deictic function in question is based on a fictive deictic field rather than on the one that corresponds to the reality of the speech event. Consequently, it differs from deixis 'proper' exclusively at the level of language in the sense of parole." <Note:> "It is only the existence as such of the deictic field that concerns language in the sense of langue, not the ad-hoc fixation of the zero-point for its coordinates." (Heger 1963:19)

"<The> capacity to project transposed, fictional, or narrated indexical frames is basic to communication; it is a design feature of shifters." (Hanks 1990:180)

There are two possible interpretations of such a tenet: Under one, a deictic is simply neutral with respect to primary vs. transferred orientation, and it does not make any difference whether primary or transferred points of reference are chosen; under the other, 'primary' reference points are primary in some functional sense as well, and transferred ones functionally derived. We seem to need the second interpretation - which is closer to the prevailing conception - in order to account for the marked effects so often associated with projection ('point-of-view' etc.), but the first one (where, as in the statement by Heger, choice of transferred reference points is just a special case of the definitional 'shifting' of deictics) seems more
appropriate when we deal with projection in grammar, or with such items as local, contemporary, current, already, which occur just as freely with transferred reference points as with 'primary' ones.

There is less contradiction between the two interpretations than appears, if we differentiate contexts of use, and take into account phenomena of language-specific automatisation (among which certain types of grammaticalisation).

Orientation to 'primary' reference points is certainly to be regarded as basic in a systematic sense. Without arguing this here (some justification also emerges from the very way the 'stylistic' effects of projection are to be characterised), let us note the indirect evidence deriving from the existence in all languages (it seems) of 'secondary-orientation' deictics (p. 40), deictics specialised for orientation to situations other than that of speech, but with one component, the one usually indicated via such terms as distal, relativising them to the situation of speech as well.

Orientation to transferred reference points is a specific procedure with effects of its own, comparable in many ways to metaphor. In metaphor, the use of a sign is extended to a content in a 'universe of discourse' not normally associated with it; in 'deictic projection', the definitional 'here-and-now' situational schema of interpretation is extended to a situation that is not actually our present one.

The best semantic theory at present to my knowledge for a differentiated analysis of such phenomena is the "frame semantics" as developed by Fillmore. In two rich papers (1977, 1985), Fillmore shows - in particular, but not only, for lexical semantics - how meanings are based on and activate "backgrounds of knowledge and practices" (1985:224), "coherent schematizations of experience" (1985:223), "presupposed structure(s) of relationships against which words...are understood"(1985:224), their "interpretive frames" (passim).

The "presupposed structure of relationships against which" deictics are understood is, of course, situational. I have tried to suggest, in the last section, what this implies - including a dramatic element and a filtering through the view of an 'evaluator'. Being tailor-made to fit and complement the situationally-shared, the deictic meanings necessarily carry with them the presupposition of a shared situation 'here and now', a situational schema. In the standard type of use, 'primary' orientation, this schema is so to speak absorbed by the appropriate factors of the current situation. But very often, the meaning of a deictic cannot be relativised to the current situation
and must be related to some other contextually eligible one, for instance a currently evoked narrative one (+ "...at that moment I knew it had to be now,..."). Over and above the purely designative element in the meaning of now, which will, when applied to that situation, yield a temporal interpretation, there is the 'here-and-now' situational schema lingering, which invites the listener to invoke elements of the narrated situation to interpretively saturate its constitutive elements - the dramatic tension, the view through an 'evaluator's' eyes, etc. The projectional effect of the now clearly contrasts with the effect of the preceding at that moment. At that moment is formulated from the point of view of the interactional situation, with the 'distancing' that (a 'secondary-orientation' element, cf. above): we 'look upon' the narrated situation; to contextualise the 'now', we must for a moment step into that situation as it would present itself to a participant.

As stressed before, such procedures are by no means limited to fictional literature. An example from spontaneous discourse:

(41) (During a dinner conversation, A. is telling how he once, on his way through Northern Italy to catch the ferry to Sardinia, could not resist the temptation to visit some museum:)
Morgen abend ging erst das Schiff, es war nicht mehr sehr weit, ich dachte, das schaffst du ganz gemütlich...
(The boat was not sailing until tomorrow night, there wasn't much of a distance left, I thought you're going to make it comfortably...)

Different contexts will give different degrees of 'resonance' to the lingering components of the situational schema in projection; hence different effects of the procedure. (This in turn is analogous to what we observe with metaphor, cf. Birus/Fuchs 1988:165) In the classical example of literary 'point-of-view' technique, 3rd person narrative, narrator and protagonist are different persons, and to interpretively saturate the 'evaluator's view' element of the situational schema, the listener will invoke elements to do with the protagonist's personality and situation to a strong degree. If what is being said is very private or 'subjective'/expressive, this will add to the effect ("transparent minds", with the title of Cohn 1978). In 'blank-check' projection, on the other hand, a very frequent though little described pattern of use (ex.s 42 to 44), where a deictic is used within a generalising statement, there is no contextually available specific situation to relativise the deictic to, and the result is evokation of a situational schema per se.
(42) ...if one hears a "ticktock" of a clock, the "tick" is not remembered in the way in which a "ticktock" 10 minutes ago is remembered. (Encycl. Brit. 1977, vol. 18:420, "Time")

(43) (In a conversation among physicists. Is meteorology a branch of physics? A: Yes, of course. B:)
Nur mit dem Vorhersagen ist's so'ne Sache. Und die Leute wollen halt wissen, wie morgen 's Wetter ist. (It's just prediction that is a problem. And people want to know what the weather's going to be like tomorrow.)

(44) (About Rorschach tests) To interpret such a blot as, say, a bat or a butterfly means some act of perceptual classification - in the filing system of my mind I pigeonhole it with butterflies I have seen or dreamt of. (Gombrich 1972:183.)

Beside different types of interaction with the context ("resonance", etc.), a or the main parameter accounting for the wide range of variation in the effects of projection is that of 'creativity' vs. 'usuality' or automatisation. Again, the situation is paralleled in metaphor. Just as we have a 'creativity range' from the completely spontaneous via the semi-usual, the usual, etc., down to the so-called dead metaphor (the stool's leg), there is a range from the we may say creative, spontaneous projection through projection more or less usual in the language in certain contexts and with given lexical items (I'm coming in answer to a summons, contemporary etc. with 'transferred' orientation) to grammaticalised projection as in the tense/aspect examples on p.4 (cf. p. 40).
1. Introduction

* The present paper contains part of what is to appear as a monograph, probably toward the end of next year. I thank Hansjakob Seiler for the opportunity to publish this first instalment in his akup series, and Dick Geiger for reading most of the manuscript and correcting mistakes in my English. Comments and criticism are highly welcome at this stage.

Due to a sudden serious incident, I have to leave section 8 a torso, and omit the projected Conclusion. For the same reason, some of the bibliographical indications are not quite complete.

1 "Spatiotemporal context", in this quotation, is indeed defined via speaker's location and moment of utterance:
"...the spatiotemporal zero-point (the here-and-now) is determined by the place of the speaker at the moment of utterance..." (ibid. 638).


4 Actually, it is found already in Brugmann 1904 (10f; cf. also ibid. p. 15).


6 Not always does the acknowledgement go so far as in the following statement: "A careful examination of extended uses of demonstrative categories even in English could easily be of monograph length". (Fillmore 1982:53)

7 E.g., Anderson/Keenan 1985:278, Schiffrin 1991:219; an approach in terms of prototypicality is Fillmore 1982. - For Brugmann (1904:15), the difference was one of phylogenetically primitive vs. historically attested use, and the (assumed) diachronic primitivity was held to warrant treating the patterns in question as the logically basic ones; a similar epistemic relation between (more implicit) phylogenetic speculation and perceptive observation of actual usage seems to be what explains the discrepancy, in Bühler, between the concretistic core of his theory and subtle analysis of all sorts of usage not reconcilable with it. (Assumptions concerning primitive stages play some role in prototypicality approaches as well; in regard to deixis, cf. Fillmore 1982:49, à propos the 'medial' distance category.)

8 In the descriptive tradition, demonstratives have in fact largely been treated together with the articles, or with personal pronouns (the latter also in Isard 1975, Linde 1979, Ehlich 1982), rather than as a subtype of spatial deictics (Lyons 1977:646ff tries
to reconcile the two approaches). - Ehlich's "deictic" must be read as "demonstrative" - one instance of the frequent equation of the two notions (another among many is Hanks 1990, cf. note 13).

9 See, in this sense, e.g., Brecht 1974, Latzel 1974, Comrie 1985 (e.g., the discussion in 1.5.), Heger 1963. - For the German and Portuguese examples, cf. also Fuchs 1988a and 1988b.

10 Fillmore 1975:2f explicitly criticises meaning definitions of the simplifying type "movement toward speaker" for come. For options in orienting the German prefixes her-, hin- (corresponding, roughly, to the directional components in come vs. go/arrive), Latzel 1970.

11 Politeness phenomena: especially Brown & Levinson 1985:123-127, 209-211. The management of narrative empathy via choice of perspective has been analysed above all for literary fiction, and the bibliography is too rich to give a selection here; the phenomenon is not limited to literary fiction, however (cf. section 8).

12 Fillmore considers this kind of usage unacceptable in ordinary discourse (1982:38, cf. also ibid. 41 "the transfer from deictic to non-deictic with its literary effect"), which it is not. - What the distinction between deictic and so-called non-deictic uses is meant to capture is real enough differences, but they are differences between types of deictic orientation; cf. section 8.

13 Against the concretistic slant of the prevailing conception, see now also Hanks 1990, a book very similar to the present treatment in its orientation to situated use and to the social/interactional grounding of deixis. The book has come to my attention just recently, but I incorporate references to it wherever feasible now; a more thorough discussion will follow. See also Weinrich 1971:32f., Fuchs 1980: 459f.

2. "Here" and "now" .

1 Cf. the conversation-analytic notion of tellability; see, e.g., Coulthard 1977:75ff.

2 Just as the boundaries of the reference of a given now, those of a given here, a given we are not necessarily delimited in a metrically precise sense, the required degree of precision resulting from context (cf. also recently, soon, etc. etc.).

3 I have not commented on the very first jetzt in the extract, which seems to have yet another type of interpretation. - Jetzt and Jetzt should, actually, probably be described as instances of 'deictic projection' (cf. section 8), as I realised when rereading the analysis; I do not think this interferes with the point being made.


5 Cf., e.g., the following definition: "A Locating Expression, then, is an expression by which a Figure is said to be at a Place identified with reference to a Ground. In the particular case of
Notes to pp. 12 - 16

deictic Locating expressions, the Ground is the Speaker's (or in some cases the Hearer's) body." (Fillmore 1982:43.) A little further on the same page, we read, à propos the Informing function of Locating Expressions (cf. next note):

"The Informing function can be achieved deictically...by means of a reference to the Speaker's current location, as seen in sentence (24), interpreted as sentence (25), or...

(24) She lives here.
(25) She lives in the place where I am now."

But can the place where she lives really be the one presently occupied by speaker's body? Fundamental aspects of the definition of 'places' are being glossed over here.

6 For a differentiation of possible functions, see Fillmore 1982:43ff.

7 For the social/interactional definition of 'places', see Schegloff's classic 1972 paper; with regard to deixis, Hanks 1990. Relevant change as the basis of time delimitation: Fuchs 1991:103ff,106. - "'Given'" in "'given' location" ought to be explicated, but for the moment I cannot do that; I use it as the best term I have been able to find.

8 For paradigmatic substitutability as a criterion of "pro" status, see Bosch 1983. Here is treated as a pro-element also in Brugmann 1904, Schegloff 1972, Hanks 1990.

9 I cannot substantiate this here, but, as an approximation, cf. Hawkins' characterisation of the demonstratives, which functionally parallel there and then; see in particular point (b):

Very briefly, the speaker can be said to be 'doing' the following things, or performing the following acts of reference when uttering a demonstrative (we ignore the actual distinction between this/these and that/those in this context): He (a) introduces a referent (or referents) to the hearer; and (b) instructs the hearer to match this linguistic referent with some identifiable object, where identifiability means either (i) visible in the situation or (ii) known on the basis of previous mention in the discourse. (Hawkins 1978:152)

For then, such an analysis should not be astonishing; this deictic is quite nearly limited to anaphoric use (verbal establishment), cf. Fillmore 1971:10 ("then really has only an anaphoric function"). (Schiffrin 1991:220ff has some examples of establishment via interactional focus and pointing).

10 To conclude, a concise and poetic statement of the dependence of deictic interpretation on the thematic context, and the need for inference, by a linguistic layperson, an Indian lady I occasionally converse with on the bus. I had mentioned the difficulties in defining the meanings of even such simple words as here, and that a common definition for here is "speaker's location at utterance time" when in fact here may cover, say, the whole of Europe, in contradistinction to some other continent. Her comment was: "It depends on what you want to talk about. One has to listen with the inner ear".
3. The first and second person pronouns.

1 Cf. the beautiful passage regarding the "subtile Verkehrstechnik des Standpunktswechsels" - the subtle interactional technique of perspective change - in Bühler 1934(1982):374.

2 Benveniste uses nous (with singular agreement in adjectives!) for self-reference, in the article quoted, so that no ambiguity arises. But this of course is not general practice any more; besides, the generalised use of I is very frequent in spoken discourse, cf. section 8.

3 Misunderstandings occur, and there are special formulae to forestall them; in German, one often hears "sie mit großem s" or "sie mit kleinem s" ("sie with an upper-case s" or "sie with a lower-case s"): polite address is accomplished via 3rd person plural sie, which in print is written with an upper-case initial letter when used in address. In English, I have repeatedly heard "I don't mean you personally" in cases where a statement meant as a generalisation might have been misunderstood as a description of addressee's way of acting.

4 For 1st person plural, see also the instructive examples and discussion in Hanks 1990:171ff. (The "third person Included" variant mentioned 174f is probably not grammaticalised to the same degree as the others; it seems parallel to what we find, e.g., in Russian: my s Ivanom ezdili v Moskvu "I went to Moscow with Ivan" <lit. "we went with Ivan">, which will be used to introduce the referents, but substituted for by simple my "we" in the sequel.)

5 We may add here that, contrary to common formulations, so-called social deixis is not relative to "participant roles".

4. Defining the meanings of the deictics so far.

1 The relation between deictic and 'designative' features should be viewed in a more comprehensive way than is done here for expository reasons. Important here is Seiler's conception of the functional complementarity and varying dominance of 'indicativity' and 'predicativity', as expounded in Seiler 1986 and many other places.

5. The "spatio-temporal zero-point".

1 In the discussion after a talk where I once said this, a participant remarked that 500 years ago may also be relative to the day when it is uttered (500 years ago, Raphael was born, said on April 6, 1983). This convinced me at first, but I now think we must be careful: it is possible to use an utterance like above and thereby imply that today is some personality's birthday, but only if the situation somehow suggests a 'birthday context' - if I utter the sentence after a glance at the newspaper, e.g., my interlocutor may infer that I just gleaned this very specific information there. The temporal expression by itself, however, will suggest a reference point
no smaller than the current calendar year; if there is no element in
the context to suggest a concern with birthdays, all I can claim to
have informed my interlocutor of is that it's the 500th anniversary
this year. (When I asked a friend, a few days ago, i.e. in April 1992,
if he could help me remember a famous person who was born 500 years
ago, the reply was: "You mean exactly 500 years? 1492? Or
approximately...?")

6. Deictic "egocentricity" and "subjectivity".


7. Deixis and the definition of the speech situation.

1 Even where what is represented is a relatively static state of
affairs - a linguistic rule, a given equilibrium of geological forces,
etc. - it may be referred to as "the situation" when evaluated by an
interested party under the point of view of its relevance to some
concern, some open question or decision, cure of action, step of
argumentation.

2 I hold that elements of interactional tension are always
traceable, in subtle cues, even in utterances that form part of
abstract treatises and the like. - I should like to take the
opportunity here to correct a mistake in the printed version of Fuchs
1991, where, in the same vein, I had written:
"In an important but easily overlooked sense, the relevance of any
predication is 'episodal', since any predication is an event, a
change-of-situation, in an interactional episode and is evaluated
for its relevance to the situation at that point." (Fuchs 1991:102)
Unfortunately, one of the editors substituted her views to mine at this
point, without consulting me, and changed the statement to "...may be
'episodal'...", "...may be an event...", "...may be evaluated...". This
distorts the overall systematics and leads to a number of
contradictions within the paper.

8. Deictic projection.

1 What follows is just an introduction to and outline of section 8
as projected; cf. the first note to section 1.

2 Cf. also the expressions described in Allen/Hill 1979.

3 The phenomena discussed in Hill 1982, in my view, also belong in
this context; cf. the author's reflections ibid. 36f.
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