Does exchange of information between tax authorities influence multinationals' use of tax havens?

  • Since the mid-1990s, countries offering tax systems that facilitate international tax avoidance and evasion have been facing growing political pressure to comply with the internationally agreed standards of exchange of tax information. Using data of German investments in tax havens, we find evidence that the conclusion of a bilateral tax information exchange agreement (TIEA) is associated with fewer operations in tax havens and the number of German affiliates has on average decreased by 46% compared to a control group. This suggests that firms invest in tax havens not only for their low tax rates but also for the secrecy they offer.

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Metadaten
Author:Julia Braun, Alfons J. WeichenriederORCiDGND
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-371220
URL:http://ssrn.com/abstract=2573596
Parent Title (English):SAFE working paper series ; No. 89
Series (Serial Number):SAFE working paper (89)
Publisher:SAFE
Place of publication:Frankfurt am Main
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Date of Publication (online):2015/03/05
Date of first Publication:2015/03/05
Publishing Institution:Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2015/03/10
Tag:international taxation; location decisions; tax havens; tax information exchange agreements
Issue:23 February 2015
Page Number:43
HeBIS-PPN:357671473
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / House of Finance (HoF)
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Licence (German):License LogoDeutsches Urheberrecht