Online shopping and platform design with ex ante registration requirements
- We study platform design in online markets in which buying involves a (non-monetary) cost for consumers caused by privacy and security concerns. Firms decide whether to require registration at their website before consumers learn relevant product information. We derive conditions under which a monopoly seller benefits from ex ante registration requirements and demonstrate that the profitability of registration requirements is increased when taking into account the prospect of future purchases or an informational value of consumer registration to the rm. Moreover, we consider the effectiveness of discounts (store credit) as a means to influence the consumers-registration decision. Finally, we con rm the profitability of ex ante registration requirements in the presence of price competition.
| Author: | Florian Morath, Johannes Münster |
|---|---|
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-428690 |
| URL: | http://www.digital.uni-koeln.de/sites/digital/user_upload/paper/MorathMuenster.pdf |
| Document Type: | Report |
| Language: | English |
| Year of Completion: | 2016 |
| Year of first Publication: | 2016 |
| Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
| Release Date: | 2017/02/28 |
| Tag: | Digital Transformation; E-commerce; Information; Monopoly; Platform design; Price competition; Privacy concerns; Registration cost; Security concerns |
| Issue: | July 12, 2016 |
| Page Number: | 59 |
| HeBIS-PPN: | 401591379 |
| Institutes: | Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
| Sammlungen: | Universitätspublikationen |
| Licence (German): |  Deutsches Urheberrecht |
