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- Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE) (87) (remove)
- Ein staatliches Hospital für kranke Banken (2010)
- Wir halten das bisher in Deutschland und anderen Ländern praktizierte Krisenmanagement für ordnungspolitisch inakzeptabel. Die aktuelle Notlage 2007 und 2008, verbunden mit einem enormen Überraschungsmoment, ließ möglicherweise keine andere Wahl, als die betroffenen Banken unbürokratisch zu retten - aber nun ist es Zeit, grundlegende Lehren aus den Rettungsaktionen zu ziehen.
- Risiko muss wieder kosten (2011)
- Die staatlichen Rettungsmaßnahmen für Banken haben den Bondmarkt korrumpiert. Die Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeit für Bankanleihen muss wieder realistischer bewertet werden.
- The bail-in puzzle (2011)
- Under the current conditions of a global financial crisis, notably in Europe’s banking industry, the governance role of bond markets is defunct. In fact, investors have understood that bank debt will almost always be rescued with taxpayers’ money. The widespread practice of government-led bank bailouts has thus severely corrupted the bond market, leading to the underestimation of risk and, as a consequence, the destruction of market discipline. Any feasible solution to the bank-debt-is-too-cheap problem will have to re-install true default risk for bank bond holders.
- "Politiker wollen die Wahrheit nicht hören" (2011)
- Sie sind keine graue Macht: Ratingagenturen. Im Interview mit CICERO ONLINE erklärt Finanzmarktökonom Jan-Pieter Krahnen, woher die harsche Kritik an ihnen kommt und warum diese nicht nur unbegründet, sondern auch unseriös ist.
- Kluge Finanzarchitektur zur Begrenzung des systemischen Risikos (2011)
- Die große Herausforderung, um das systemische Risiko im Finanzsektor zu vermindern, besteht darin, kluge Finanzarchitektur zu etablieren, die gewährtleistet, dass ein verbindlicher Anteil von Bankanleihen außerhalb des Finanzsektors gehalten wird. Die Anleihegläubiger von außerhalb des Bankensektors müssen sich dadurch auszeichnen, dass sie kein Refinanzierungsrisiko haben, wenn sie eine plötzliche Verlussituation erleben.
- Rettung durch Regulierung? Eckpunkte des Liikanen-Berichts (2013)
- Ausgehend von einer Erläuterung der Kriseninterpretation (crisis narrative), wie sie in dem Bericht der Liikanen-Kommission zugrunde liegt, werden die nach Ansicht des Verfassers zentralen Vorschläge des Kommissionsberichts ausgewählt, vorgestellt und in den größeren Rahmen einer erneuerten Ordnungspolitik für die Finanzmärkte Europas eingeordnet. Die mit den Vorschlägen eng zusammenhängenden Reformelemente der Bankenunion werden in diesem Text bewusst ausgeklammert. Die beiden zentralen Strukturvorschläge des Liikanen-Berichts betreffen die Abspaltung der Handelsgeschäfte von dem Universalbankengeschäft für große, internationale Banken (der Trennbankenvorschlag), sowie die verpflichtende Emission nachrangigen, glaubwürdig haftenden Fremdkapitals (der strenge Bail-in Vorschlag). Glaubwürdigkeit der Haftungszusage wird durch strenge Halterestriktionen erreicht. Vorhersehbare Folgerungen einer Einführung dieser Strukturregeln für die Finanzindustrie und -märkte werden in einem abschließenden Teil angesprochen.
- Rescue by regulation? Key points of the Liikanen report (2013)
- This paper summarizes the key proposals of the report by the Liikanen Commission. It starts with an explanation of a crisis narrative underlying the Report and its proposals. The proposals aim for a revitalization of market discipline in financial markets. The two main structural proposals of the Liikanen Report are: first, for large banks, the separation of the trading business from other parts of the banking business (the "Separation Proposal"), and the mandatory issuing of subordinated bank debt thought to be liable (the strict "Bail-in Proposal"). The credibility of this commitment to private liability is achieved by strict holding restrictions. The anticipated consequences of the introduction of these structural regulations for the financial industry and markets are addressed in a concluding part.
- Designing the funding side of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM): a proposal for a layered scheme with limited joint liability (2013)
- This note proposes a new set-up for the fund backing the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The proposed fund is a Multi-Tier Resolution Fund (MTRF), restricting the joint and several supranational liability to a limited range of losses, bounded by national liability at the upper and the lower end. The layers are, in ascending order: a national fund (first losses), a European fund (second losses), the national budget (third losses), the ESM (fourth losses, as a backup for sovereigns). The system works like a reinsurance scheme, providing clear limits to European-level joint liability, and therefore confining moral hazard. At the same time, it allows for some degree of risk sharing, which is important for financial stability if shocks to the financial system are exogenous (e.g., of a supranational macroeconomic nature). The text has four parts. Section A describes the operation of the Multi-Tier Resolution Fund, assuming the fund capital to be fully paid-in (“Steady State“). Section B deals with the build-up phase of the fund capital (“Build up“). Section C discusses how the proposal deals with the apparent incentive conflicts. The final Section D summarizes open questions which need further thought (“Open Questions“).
- A big bang for banking in Europe (2013)
- This policy letter provides an overview of the strengths, weaknesses, risks and opportunities of the upcoming comprehensive risk assessment, a euro area-wide evaluation of bank balance sheets and business models. If carried out properly, the 2014 comprehensive assessment will lead the euro area into a new era of banking supervision. Policy makers in euro area countries are now under severe pressure to define a credible backstop framework for banks. This framework, as the author argues, needs to be a broad, quasi-European system of mutually reinforcing backstops.
- Measuring ambiguity aversion: a systematic experimental approach : [Version 20 June 2014] (2014)
- This paper provides a systematic analysis of individual attitudes towards ambiguity, based on laboratory experiments. The design of the analysis allows to capture individual behavior across various levels of ambiguity, ranging from low to high. Attitudes towards risk and attitudes towards ambiguity are disentangled, providing pure measures of ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity aversion is captured in several ways, i.e. as a discount factor net of a risk premium, and as an estimated parameter in a generalized utility function. We find that ambiguity aversion varies across individuals, and with the level of ambiguity, being most prominent for intermediate levels. Around one third of subjects show no aversion, one third show maximum aversion, and one third show intermediate levels of ambiguity aversion, while there is almost no ambiguity seeking. While most theoretical work on ambiguity builds on maxmin expected utility, our results provide evidence that MEU does not adequately capture individual attitudes towards ambiguity for the majority of individuals. Instead, our results support models that allow for intermediate levels of ambiguity aversion. Moreover, we find risk aversion to be statistically unrelated to ambiguity aversion on average. Taken together, the results support the view that ambiguity is an important and distinct argument in decision making under uncertainty.
