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Even as online advertising continues to grow, a central question remains: Who to target? Yet, advertisers know little about how to select from the hundreds of audience segments for targeting (and combinations thereof) for a profitable online advertising campaign. Utilizing insights from a field experiment on Facebook (Study 1), we develop a model that helps advertisers solve the cold-start problem of selecting audience segments for targeting. Our model enables advertisers to calculate the break-even performance of an audience segment to make a targeted ad campaign at least as profitable as an untargeted one. Advertisers can use this novel model to decide whether to test specific audience segments in their campaigns (e.g., in randomized controlled trials). We apply our model to data from the Spotify ad platform to study the profitability of different audience segments (Study 2). Approximately half of those audience segments require the click-through rate to double compared to an untargeted campaign, which is unrealistically high for most ad campaigns. Our model also shows that narrow segments require a lift that is likely not attainable, specifically when the data quality of these segments is poor. We confirm this theoretical finding in an empirical study (Study 3): A decrease in data quality due to Apple’s introduction of the App Tracking Transparency (ATT) framework more negatively affects the click-through rate of narrow (versus broad) audience segments.
DESPITE AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT CUSTOMERS EXHIBIT HIGHER DISCOUNT RATES THAN FIRMS, IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW DIFFERENCES IN DISCOUNT RATES AFFECT OPTIMAL PRICES, PROFITS, AND WELFARE OF COMPLEMENTARY PRODUCTS (WHICH COULD BE GOODS OR SERVICES). WE SHOW FOR COMPLEMENTARY PROUCTS THAT HIGHER DISCOUNT RATES OF CUSTOMERS DO NOT INCREASE PROFIT OR CONSUMER SURPLUS. FIRMS, INCLUDING BANKS, WOULD BE ADVISED TO SEEK TO REDUCE EXCESSIVE DISCOUNT RATES AMONG CONSUMERS.
AS WE INCREASINGLY RELY ON SEARCH ENGINES AS AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF INFORMATION TO SUPPORT OUR DECISIONS, SEARCH ENGINES BECAME AN IMPORTANT VENUE FOR FIRMS TO ATTRACT ATTENTION AND SECURE THE LONGEVITY OF THEIR OPERATIONS. THIS ARTICLE DISCUSSES THE RESULTS OF OUR EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON HOW TO CAPTURE A FIRM’S VISIBILITY IN ORGANIC SEARCH AND HOW IT AFFECTS ITS SHORT- AND LONG-TERM FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE.
THE PRICE-TO-EARNINGS (P/E) RATIO IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT METRICS FOR VALUING FIRMS. UNFORTUNATELY, INTERPRETATIONS OF HIGH-GROWTH FIRMS’ P/E RATIOS CAN BE CHALLENGING, BECAUSE THEY FREQUENTLY EXHIBIT EITHER EXTREMELY HIGH OR NEGATIVE VALUES. WE SHOW THAT THE USE OF CUSTOMER METRICS ALLOWS FOR BETTER INTERPRETING THESE P/E RATIOS, THAT IMPROVEMENTS IN CUSTOMER METRICS HAVE NON-INTUITIVE AND SURPRISING EFFECTS ON THE P/E RATIO, AND THAT OUR NEW MODEL BETTER PREDICTS FUTURE P/E RATIOS THAN EXISTING MODELS.
This research examines the impact of online display advertising and paid search advertising relative to offline advertising on firm performance and firm value. Using proprietary data on annualized advertising expenditures for 1651 firms spanning seven years, we document that both display advertising and paid search advertising exhibit positive effects on firm performance (measured by sales) and firm value (measured by Tobin's q). Paid search advertising has a more positive effect on sales than offline advertising, consistent with paid search being closest to the actual purchase decision and having enhanced targeting abilities. Display advertising exhibits a relatively more positive effect on Tobin's q than offline advertising, consistent with its long-term effects. The findings suggest heterogeneous economic benefits across different types of advertising, with direct implications for managers in analyzing advertising effectiveness and external stakeholders in assessing firm performance.
UNDER LAISSEZ-FAIRE REGULATION, REGULATORS CHOOSE NOT TO INTERFERE BECAUSE THEY SEEK TO STIMULATE INNOVATION AND PROTECT ENTERPRISES FROM THE COSTS IMPOSED BY REGULATORY COMPLIANCE. YET, EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE REGARDING THE ABILITY OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE REGULATION TO ENSURE CONSUMER PROTECTION IS LACKING. THIS ARTICLE TESTS EMPIRICALLY WHETHER THE CURRENT LAISSEZ-FAIRE REGULATION OF PRICE ADVERTISING CLAIMS ON THE MOST POPULAR REWARD-BASED CROWDFUNDING PLATFORM, KICKSTARTER, IS SUFFICIENT TO PROTECT CONSUMERS.
Customer equity reporting
(2014)
WHARTON SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AT UNIVERSITY OF PHILADELPHIA HAS JUSTLAUNCHED AN 8-WEEK ONLINE PROGRAM “STRATEGIC VALUE OF CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS – ONLINE” TAUGHT BY MARKETING PROFESSOR AND AUTHOR PETER FADER. HE INVITED PROFESSOR SKIERA, DIRECTOR OF THE E-FINANCE LAB, TO PHILADELPHIA TO LEARN ABOUT HIS THOUGHTS ON “CUSTOMER EQUITY REPORTING”. THIS ARTICLE SUMMARIZES SOME OF PROFESSOR FADER’S QUESTIONS AND PROFESSOR SKIERA’S REPLIES.
ON THE INTERNET, SEARCH ENGINES INFLUENCE THE BEHAVIOR OF AN INCREASING PART OF CUSTOMERS. BANKS MAKE USE OF SEARCH ENGINES TO PROMOTE PRODUCTS BY USING KEYWORD AUCTIONS TO PURCHASE A PLACE OF THEIR ADVERTISEMENTS IN THE SPONSORED SEARCH LISTINGS. WE DESCRIBE HOW TO BID IN KEYWORD AUCTIONS AND HOW TO MEASURE THE SUCCESS OF SEARCHENGINE MARKETING.