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    <link>http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/index/index/</link>
    <pubDate>Fri, 19 Apr 2013 07:42:21 +0200</pubDate>
    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 19 Apr 2013 07:42:21 +0200</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>How does contagion affect general equilibrium asset prices?</title>
      <link>http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/29381</link>
      <description>This paper analyzes the equilibrium pricing implications of contagion risk in a Lucas-tree economy with recursive preferences and jumps. We introduce a new economic channel allowing for the possibility that endowment shocks simultaneously trigger a regime shift to a bad economic state. We document that these contagious jumps have far-reaching asset pricing implications. The risk premium for such shocks is superadditive, i.e. it is 2.5\% larger than the sum of the risk premia for pure endowment shocks and regime switches. Moreover, contagion risk reduces the risk-free rate by around 0.5\%. We also derive semiclosed-form solutions for the wealth-consumption ratio and the price-dividend ratios in an economy with two Lucas trees and analyze cross-sectional effects of contagion risk qualitatively. We find that heterogeneity among the assets with respect to contagion risk can increase risk premia disproportionately. In particular, big assets with a large exposure to contagious shocks carry significantly higher risk premia.</description>
      <author>Nicole Branger; Holger Kraft; Christoph Meinerding</author>
      <category>workingpaper</category>
      <guid>http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/29381</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 19 Apr 2013 07:42:21 +0200</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Interbank network and bank bailouts : insurance mechanism for non-insured creditors?</title>
      <link>http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/29380</link>
      <description>This paper presents a theory that explains why it is beneficial for banks to engage in circular lending activities on the interbank market. Using a simple network structure, it shows that if there is a non-zero bailout probability, banks can significantly increase the expected repayment of uninsured creditors by entering into cyclical liabilities on the interbank market before investing in loan portfolios. Therefore, banks are better able to attract funds from uninsured creditors. Our results show that implicit government guarantees incentivize banks to have large interbank exposures, to be highly interconnected, and to invest in highly correlated, risky portfolios. This can serve as an explanation for the observed high interconnectedness between banks and their investment behavior in the run-up to the subprime mortgage crisis. </description>
      <author>Tim Eisert; Christian Eufinger</author>
      <category>workingpaper</category>
      <guid>http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/29380</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Apr 2013 08:58:50 +0200</pubDate>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The dynamics of spillover effects during the european sovereign debt turmoil</title>
      <link>http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/26658</link>
      <description>In this paper we develop empirical measures for the strength of spillover effects. Modifying and extending the framework by Diebold and Yilmaz (2011), we quantify spillovers between sovereign credit markets and banks in the euro area. Spillovers are estimated recursively from a vector autoregressive model of daily CDS spread changes, with exogenous common factors. We account for interdependencies between sovereign and bank CDS spreads and we derive generalised impulse response functions. Specifically, we assess the systemic effect of an unexpected shock to the creditworthiness of a particular sovereign or country-specific bank index to other sovereign or bank CDSs between October 2009 and July 2012. Channels of transmission from or to sovereigns and banks are aggregated as a Contagion index (CI). This index is disentangled into four components, the average potential spillover: i) amongst sovereigns, ii) amongst banks, iii) from sovereigns to banks, and iv) vice-versa. We highlight the impact of policy-related events along the different components of the contagion index. The systemic contribution of each sovereign or banking group is quantified as the net spillover weight in the total net-spillover measure. Finally, the captured time-varying interdependence between banks and sovereigns emphasises the evolution of their strong nexus.</description>
      <author>Adrian Alter; Andreas Beyer</author>
      <category>workingpaper</category>
      <guid>http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/26658</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 09 Nov 2012 12:22:28 +0100</pubDate>
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