Latest documents http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/index/index/ Thu, 18 Apr 2013 08:49:05 +0200 Thu, 18 Apr 2013 08:49:05 +0200 http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/29379 This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on managerial compensation. We argue that excessive risk taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate governance failures within banks. The idea of the proposed regulation is to utilize the compensation scheme to drive a wedge between the interests of top management and shareholders to counteract shareholder risk-shifting incentives. The decisive advantage of this approach compared to existing regulation is that the regulator does not need to be able to properly measure the bank investment risk, which has been shown to be a difficult task during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Christian Eufinger; Andrej Gill workingpaper http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/29379 Thu, 18 Apr 2013 08:49:05 +0200 http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/22870 It is the objective of this paper to determine the voting premium for French shares by comparing the values of voting and non-voting shares, and to analyze the value of the voting rights. The study uses data for 25 French companies which had both types of shares outstanding and traded on the stock exchange during the entire period from 1986 to 1996, or for some time during this interval. The average value of the voting premium is 51,35%. The paper analyzes the reasons for this surprisingly high value by testing different hypotheses based on dividend differences, the revival) of the voting right, capitalization, shareholder structure, and the share of non-voting capital in total equity capital. The regressions show that the shareholder structure strongly influences the value of the voting premium. A case study of the attempted takeover of Casino by Promodes shows that investors attach a much higher value to the voting right during relevant situations than at other tomes. Both companies involved had, at the time, two types of shares outstanding and listed. Furthermore the paper shows that non-voting shares have never played an important role in equity finance in France since the companies have different alternatives. In an international cumparison, France is found to have the second highest voting premium, exceeded only by that of Italy. A probable reason is the low quality of the national accounting standards and the low level of minority shareholder protection. Christian K. Muus workingpaper http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/22870 Thu, 06 Oct 2011 00:00:00 +0200