Latest documents http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/index/index/ Tue, 02 Apr 2013 13:45:37 +0100 Tue, 02 Apr 2013 13:45:37 +0100 http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/28634 This paper investigates how an office-motivated incumbent can use transparency enhancement on public spending to signal his budgetary management ability and win re-election. We show that when the incumbent faces a popular challenger, transparency policy can be an effective signaling device. A more popular challenger can reduce the probability to enhance transparency, while voters can be better off due to a more informative signaling. It is also shown that a higher level of public interest in fiscal issues can increase the probability of enhancing transparency, while voters can be worse off by a less informative signaling. Laura Moretti; Toru Suzuki workingpaper http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/28634 Mon, 04 Feb 2013 13:45:37 +0100