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SAFE Update February 2024
(2024)
In times of crisis, insurance companies may invest into riskier assets to benefit from expected price recoveries. Using daily stock market data for 34 European insurers, I investigate how a stock market contraction, as experienced during the Covid-19 pandemic, affects insurers’ decision on the allocation of their corporate bond portfolio. I find that insurers shift their portfolio holdings pro-cyclically towards lower credit risk assets in the first month of the market contraction. As the crisis progresses, I find evidence for counter-cyclical investment behavior by insurers, which can neither be explained by credit rating downgrades of held bonds nor by hedging with CDS derivatives. The observed counter-cyclical investment behavior of insurers could be beneficial for the financial system in attenuating price declines, but excessive risk-taking by insurance companies over longer periods can also reinforce stress in the system.
This paper empirically analyses whether post-global financial crisis regulatory reforms have created appropriate incentives to voluntarily centrally clear over-the-counter (OTC) derivative contracts. We use confidential European trade repository data on single-name sovereign credit default swap (CDS) transactions and show that both seller and buyer manage counterparty exposures and capital costs, strategically choosing to clear when the counterparty is riskier. The clearing incentives seem particularly responsive to seller credit risk, which is in line with the notion that counterparty credit risk (CCR) is asymmetric in CDS contracts. The riskiness of the underlying reference entity also impacts the decision to clear as it affects both CCR capital charges for OTC contracts and central counterparty clearing house (CCP) margins for cleared contracts. Lastly, we find evidence that when a transaction helps netting positions with the CCP and hence lower margins, the likelihood of clearing is higher.
In its first ten years (2014-2023), the banking union was successful in its prudential agenda but failed spectacularly in its underlying objective: establishing a single banking market in the euro area. This goal is now more important than ever, and easier to attain than at any time in the last decade. To make progress, cross-border banks should receive a specific treatment within general banking union legislation. Suggestions are made on how to make such regulatory carve-out effective and legally sound.
We study the many implications of the Eurosystem collateral framework for corporate bonds. Using data on the evolving collateral eligibility list, we identify the first inclusion dates of bonds and issuers and use these events to find that the increased supply and demand for pledgeable collateral following eligibility (a) increases activity in the corporate securities lending market, (b) lowers eligible bond yields, and (c) affects bond liquidity. Thus, corporate bond lending relaxes the constraint of limited collateral supply and thereby improves market functioning.
The Federal Reserve has been publishing federal funds rate prescriptions from Taylor rules in its Monetary Policy Report since 2017. The signals from the rules aligned with Fed action on many occasions, but in some cases the Fed opted for a different route. This paper reviews the implications of the rules during the coronavirus pandemic and the subsequent inflation surge and derives projections for the future.
In 2020, the Fed took the negative prescribed rates, which were far below the effective lower bound on the nominal interest rate, as support for extensive and long-lasting quantitative easing. Yet, the calculations overstate the extent of the constraint, because they neglect the supply side effects of the pandemic.
The paper proposes a simple model-based adjustment to the resource gap used by the rules for 2020. In 2021, the rules clearly signaled the need for tightening because of the rise of inflation, yet the Fed waited until spring 2022 to raise the federal funds rate. With the decline of inflation over the course of 2023, the rules’ prescriptions have also come down. They fall below the actual federal funds rate target range in 2024. Several caveats concerning the projections of the interest rate prescriptions are discussed.
Central banks sowing the seeds for a green financial sector? NGFS membership and market reactions
(2024)
In December 2017, during the One Planet Summit in Paris, a group of eight central banks and supervisory authorities launched the “Network for Greening the Financial Sector” (NGFS) to address challenges and risks posed by climate change to the global financial system. Until 06/2023 an additional 69 central banks from all around the world have joined the network. We find that the propensity to join the network can be described as a function in the country’s economic development (e.g., GDP per capita), national institutions (e.g., central bank independence), and performance of the central bank on its mandates (e.g., price stability and output gap). Using an event study design to examine consequences of network expansions in capital markets, we document that a difference portfolio that is long in clean energy stocks and short in fossil fuel stocks benefits from an enlargement of the NGFS. Overall, our results suggest that an increasing number of central banks and supervisory authorities are concerned about climate change and willing to go beyond their traditional objectives, and that the capital market believes they will do so.
In this study, we unpack the ESG ratings of four prominent agencies in Europe and find that (i) each single E, S, G pillar explains the overall ESG score differently,(ii) there is a low co-movement between the three E, S, G pillars and (iii) there are specific ESG Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) that are driving these ratings more than others. We argue that such discrepancies might mislead firms about their actual ESG status, potentially leading to cherry-picking areas for improvement, thus raising questions about the accuracy and effectiveness of ESG evaluations in both explaining sustainability and driving capital toward sustainable companies.