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Analyzing interest rate risk: stochastic volatility in the term structure of government bond yields
(2009)
We propose a Nelson-Siegel type interest rate term structure model where the underlying yield factors follow autoregressive processes with stochastic volatility. The factor volatilities parsimoniously capture risk inherent to the term structure and are associated with the time-varying uncertainty of the yield curve’s level, slope and curvature. Estimating the model based on U.S. government bond yields applying Markov chain Monte Carlo techniques we find that the factor volatilities follow highly persistent processes. We show that slope and curvature risk have explanatory power for bond excess returns and illustrate that the yield and volatility factors are closely related to industrial capacity utilization, inflation, monetary policy and employment growth. JEL Classification: C5, E4, G1
Anschleichen an Übernahmeziele mittels Cash Settled Equity Derivaten : ein Regelungsvorschlag
(2009)
Noch ist das Risikobegrenzungsgesetz, das unter anderem neue Meldepflichten in das Wertpapierhandelsgesetz (WpHG) einführt, nicht vollständig in Kraft getreten. Gleichwohl wird bereits angesichts aktueller Entwicklungen auf dem internationalen und deutschen Übernahmemarkt in Artikeln der Fachpresse und im kapitalmarktrechtlichen Schrifttum die erneute Überarbeitung des wertpapierhandels- und wertpapierübernahmerechtlichen Meldesystems gefordert. Diese Forderung ist berechtigt. Denn im Risikobegrenzungsgesetz, dem zeitlich letzten Versuch des Gesetzgebers, die Transparenz des Wertpapierhandels zu erhöhen, konnte die Chance nicht genutzt werden, das wertpapierhandelsrechtliche Meldesystem an eine neuere Praxis auf den Finanzmärkten anzupassen.
This paper argues that banks must be sufficiently levered to have first-best incentives to make new risky loans. This result, which is at odds with the notion that leverage invariably leads to excessive risk taking, derives from two key premises that focus squarely on the role of banks as informed lenders. First, banks finance projects that they do not own, which implies that they cannot extract all the profits. Second, banks conduct a credit risk analysis before making new loans. Our model may help understand why banks take on additional unsecured debt, such as unsecured deposits and subordinated loans, over and above their existing deposit base. It may also help understand why banks and finance companies have similar leverage ratios, even though the latter are not deposit takers and hence not subject to the same regulatory capital requirements as banks.
Corporate borrowers care about the overall riskiness of a bank’s operations as their continued access to credit may rely on the bank’s ability to roll over loans or to expand existing credit facilities. As we show, a key implication of this observation is that increasing competition among banks should have an asymmetric impact on banks’ incentives to take on risk: Banks that are already riskier will take on yet more risk, while their safer rivals will become even more prudent. Our results offer new guidance for bank supervision in an increasingly competitive environment and may help to explain existing, ambiguous findings on the relationship between competition and risk-taking in banking. Furthermore, our results stress the beneficial role that competition can have for financial stability as it turns a bank’s "prudence" into an important competitive advantage.
This paper analyzes the risk properties of typical asset-backed securities (ABS), like CDOs or MBS, relying on a model with both macroeconomic and idiosyncratic components. The examined properties include expected loss, loss given default, and macro factor dependencies. Using a two-dimensional loss decomposition as a new metric, the risk properties of individual ABS tranches can directly be compared to those of corporate bonds, within and across rating classes. By applying Monte Carlo Simulation, we find that the risk properties of ABS differ significantly and systematically from those of straight bonds with the same rating. In particular, loss given default, the sensitivities to macroeconomic risk, and model risk differ greatly between instruments. Our findings have implications for understanding the credit crisis and for policy making. On an economic level, our analysis suggests a new explanation for the observed rating inflation in structured finance markets during the pre-crisis period 2004-2007. On a policy level, our findings call for a termination of the 'one-size-fits-all' approach to the rating methodology for fixed income instruments, requiring an own rating methodology for structured finance instruments. JEL Classification: G21, G28
This paper analyzes the risk properties of typical asset-backed securities (ABS), like CDOs or MBS, relying on a model with both macroeconomic and idiosyncratic components. The examined properties include expected loss, loss given default, and macro factor dependencies. Using a two-dimensional loss decomposition as a new metric, the risk properties of individual ABS tranches can directly be compared to those of corporate bonds, within and across rating classes. By applying Monte Carlo Simulation, we find that the risk properties of ABS differ significantly and systematically from those of straight bonds with the same rating. In particular, loss given default, the sensitivities to macroeconomic risk, and model risk differ greatly between instruments. Our findings have implications for understanding the credit crisis and for policy making. On an economic level, our analysis suggests a new explanation for the observed rating inflation in structured finance markets during the pre-crisis period 2004-2007. On a policy level, our findings call for a termination of the 'one-size-fits-all' approach to the rating methodology for fixed income instruments, requiring an own rating methodology for structured finance instruments. JEL Classification: G21, G28 Keywords: credit risk, risk transfer, systematic risk
We study a model of “information-based entrenchment” in which the CEO has private information that the board needs to make an efficient replacement decision. Eliciting the CEO’s private information is costly, as it implies that the board must pay the CEO both higher severance pay and higher on-the-job pay. While higher CEO pay is associated with higher turnover in our model, there is too little turnover in equilibrium. Our model makes novel empirical predictions relating CEO turnover, severance pay, and on-the-job pay to firm-level attributes such as size, corporate governance, and the quality of the firm’s accounting system.
This paper describes a method to treat contextual equivalence in polymorphically typed lambda-calculi, and also how to transfer equivalences from the untyped versions of lambda-calculi to their typed variant, where our specific calculus has letrec, recursive types and is nondeterministic. An addition of a type label to every subexpression is all that is needed, together with some natural constraints for the consistency of the type labels and well-scopedness of expressions. One result is that an elementary but typed notion of program transformation is obtained and that untyped contextual equivalences also hold in the typed calculus as long as the expressions are well-typed. In order to have a nice interaction between reduction and typing, some reduction rules have to be accompanied with a type modification by generalizing or instantiating types.
This note shows that in non-deterministic extended lambda calculi with letrec, the tool of applicative (bi)simulation is in general not usable for contextual equivalence, by giving a counterexample adapted from data flow analysis. It also shown that there is a flaw in a lemma and a theorem concerning finite simulation in a conference paper by the first two authors.