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"Die Digital Humanities sind kein Hochgeschwindigkeitszug, sondern ein gemächlich, aber stetig vorantreibendes Unternehmen, dem bisher noch die Anerkennung seiner Leistungen fehlt. Mit dem Engagement in digitalen Projekten ist weiter kein Blumentopf zu gewinnen": So konnte man am 13. Dezember 2011 im Feuilleton der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung lesen (Thiel 2011). Das stellte sich schnell als Fehleinschätzung heraus. Kaum acht Monate später war an derselben Stelle von einer "empirischen Wende für die Geisteswissenschaften" die Rede, vom "Ende hermeneutischer Einzelforschung" (Thiel 2012). In den seither vergangenen vier Jahren zeigte die Konjunkturkurve der Digital Humanities steil nach oben; das Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung erklärte es zur forschungspolitischen Notwendigkeit, die "Digitalisierung der Geisteswissenschaften zu einer Erfolgsgeschichte" zu machen. Die Konjunktur zeigt bereits erste Anzeichen einer nahenden Überhitzung, etwa in der Befürchtung, Digital Humanities in ihrer derzeitigen Ausprägung könnten "antragstechnisch bereits verbraucht" sein; erforderlich seien neue, noch ambitioniertere Schwerpunkte, etwa durch ein noch weiter ausgreifendes, Disziplinen überwölbendes Zusammenführen multimedialer Quellen (Texte, Bilder, Musik) in einer einheitlichen Datenstruktur. Der starke politische Rückenwind hat inzwischen eine teilweise polemisch geführte Debatte über die politische und ökonomische Agenda der Digital Humanities hervorgebracht (Fiormonte 2012; jüngst: Allington/Brouillette / Golumbia 2016 und Spahr / So / Piper 2016). ...
Does the Polish development concern us — the European citizens and the European institutions we have set up? There is a functional and a normative argument to state that it does. The normative argument is that the European Union organizes a community of states that profess allegiance to a set of fundamental values—among others, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. The functional reason is that the European legal space presupposes mutual trust. European law operates on the presumption that all institutions are law-abiding. Otherwise, the legal edifice crumbles.
The application of the EU Commission’s Rule of Law Framework in the current Polish case is a step in the right direction. It seems a good instance to develop the Framework as an EU mechanism to protect European constitutional values in a European legal space which is rife with constitutional crises, but short of instruments to address them. Its pertinence appears even more clearly in comparison to the Council’s (in)activity under its own rule-of-law mechanism, hastily put forward after the Commission’s Framework. The activation of the Framework has shown its potential to mobilize European public opinion and orient public discourses to the current condition of EU values
Rechtswissenschaftliche Abhandlungen und Veranstaltungen zu internationalen Gerichten stehen häufig unter dem Titel „Internationale Streitbeilegung“. Es wäre aber viel besser, so die Leitthese dieses Beitrags, solche Texte und Veranstaltungen als „internationale Gerichtsbarkeit“ zu betiteln. Dies ist keineswegs ein bloßer Streit um Worte, da hinter diesen Alternativen unterschiedliche rechtswissenschaftliche Auffassungen stehen. Im Folgenden sei gezeigt, dass anders als die Be-zeichnung „Internationale Streitbeilegung“ suggeriert, nicht nur eine, sondern vier Funktionen die Rechtsprechung heutiger internationaler Gerichte kennzeichnen. Es handelt sich dabei um: Streitbeilegung im Einzelfall, Stabilisierung normativer Erwartungen, Rechtschöpfung sowie Kontrolle und Legitimation öffentlicher Gewalt. Die Ana-lyse dieser Funktionen zeigt, dass die Bezeichnung „Internationale Streitbeilegung“ überkommen ist. Entsprechend sollte die Bezeichnung des Fachs geändert und es als Teil des Fachs internationale Institutionen verortet werden.
If a report on state and perspectives of the history of social law is to be written, two problems involving demarcation have to be dealt with in advance. 1. What is social law? 2. What kind of literature has to be considered as a part of the history of social law? In both cases the boundaries can definitely be drawn in a subjective manner and can be oriented towards the interests and competences of the author insofar as the criteria are plausible. ...
Social law is an important cornerstone of the normative constitution of the modern state, if not one the most important. The stability of market-based societies in the current era primarily resulted from both the existence of legally guaranteed provisions against the risks of life and the legal mechanisms that make the social inequalities bearable – or, at the very least, that ensure a minimum standard of living and prevent those affected from being completely excluded from social participation. Social law is, however, not just a stabilizing element for democratically constituted market societies in a normal situation. Over the course of the 20th century, it was also used to great effect by dictatorial and authoritarian regimes as a means of securing power, and it was employed more often in times of war and crisis in order to keep peace within the state, to attenuate or pacify fragile social situations, not to mention to generate social consensus. Throughout all the ups and downs of recent history, social law has remained a key element involved in the shaping of society. ...
The essay, originally written in German as an introduction to a volume of collected papers, shows the influence of the Historical School of Law on legal, historical and social sciences in Germany throughout the 19th and even 20th centuries – a time span running contrary to the dominate view that sees the end of the School in the middle of the 19th century. In my view the School constitutes not only a method for developing norms of private law out of the historical materials of Roman and German-Germanic laws, but is based on a wider conception of culture, law and history that is also connected to the political positions of that time. In Savigny’s founding pamphlet, "The vocation of our time ...", two major theoretical topics for this long-lasting influence can be found: The Romantic one, which views law as a part of culture and parallel to language and custom, based on the "spirit of the people", and, on the other side, the rationality of the European tradition of Roman law, which was developed and administered by jurists. These two basic points, in part standing in contradiction to one another, form a fertile tension that provides an impulse to the intellectual discussions and new movements in jurisprudence and history analysed in the text. Realism, founded in the connection of both sciences to political and social life, builds a kind of "basso continuo" and acts as a counterbalance to the former two. And it is in this context that the works of Jacob Grimm, Puchta and Beseler, Heinrich Brunner, Georg von Below and others are analysed, in particular the works of Otto von Gierke and Max Weber. Finally, evidence is furnished that a new image of the medieval period, and its impact on law, as a centre of Western identity was outlined in the 20th century by authors like Ernst Kantorowicz, Fritz Kern, Otto Brunner and, last but not least, by Harold J. Berman (walking in the footsteps of Eugen Rosenstock- Huessy), all of whom were situated in different ways within the tradition of the broader, cultural-based Romantic view.
Scholarship and practice
(2016)
How can I as an international lawyer, conscious that international law is deeply implicated in today’s global injustices and that the course of history will not be changed by any grand legal design, practice law responsibly? Taking as a point of departure my own desire not to seek comfort in the formulation of a critique of law, but to aspire to a responsible practice, I consult two quite different bodies of work: first, critical theory of law and second, recent scholarship on international law that argues a practice guided by ethics may enhance the legitimacy of international law. I turn then to my own practice of international economic law focusing on my occasional role as legal expert on the so-called megaregionals the EU aims to conclude with Canada and the United States. I propose that the debate on international economic law lacks an investigation into the role of law in shaping political economy; that this lack can be explained by the compartmentalization of expertise which leads to justification gaps with respect to projects such as the megaregionals. One way how lawyers can assume responsibility is to work on closing these gaps even if it means leaving the ‘inside’ of the legal discipline. Finally, I suggest that a responsible legal practice of social change might follow Roberto Unger’s call for institutional imagination. Maybe I can satisfy my wish for a transformative practice by joining forces with friends in experimenting with institutions, hoping to build an alternative political economy.
This text is an only slightly modified version of the Herbert Krüger Memorial Lecture that I held upon invitation of the Arbeitskreis Überseeische Verfassungsvergleichung on 4 July 2014 at Bucerius Law School in Hamburg. My point of departure is the observation that even though the economic exploitation of natural resources triggers a multitude of distribution conflicts, international and transnational law treat these conflicts inadequately. While the New International Economic Order had as one of its objectives distributional justice between resource exporting poor states (former colonies) and resource importing high income states (mostly former imperial powers) its demands were never fully realized. Instead a transnational economic law emerged which can be interpreted as itself establishing a distribution order -- albeit a distribution order that is not oriented towards distributional justice, but rather posits the market as the best distribution device. This distribution order has depoliticized and deterritorialized distribution conflicts between resource exporting and resource importing states and has secured – through the promotion of privatizations, protection of foreign investments and dismantling of trade barriers – access to resources for the resource importing states. At the same time it has freed importing states from responsibility for the harms that accrue from resource exploitation to the resource exporting states and their populations. I call in this text for a repoliticization of distribution conflicts at the international as well as the (trans)national level, a repoliticization that may be achieved not only through the reform of political, but also economic institutions.
Schneller als erwartet fängt Donald Trump an, seine Versprechungen, mit denen er sich die Stimmen der radikalen Rechten im Wahlkampf erkauft hat, einzulösen. Und er scheint die Möglichkeit der Befriedung der Ultra-Rechten gefunden zu haben: die Nominierung eines neuen Richters am Obersten Gerichtshof der Vereinigten Staaten, dem Supreme Court.