Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (25)
Language
- English (25)
Has Fulltext
- yes (25)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (25)
Keywords
- Monetary Policy (25) (remove)
Institute
- Center for Financial Studies (CFS) (25) (remove)
In the euro area, monetary policy is conducted by a single central bank for 20 member countries. However, countries are heterogeneous in their economic development, including their inflation rates. This paper combines a New Keynesian model and a neural network to assess whether the European Central Bank (ECB) conducted monetary policy between 2002 and 2022 according to the weighted average of the inflation rates within the European Monetary Union (EMU) or reacted more strongly to the inflation rate developments of certain EMU countries.
The New Keynesian model first generates data which is used to train and evaluate several machine learning algorithms. They authors find that a neural network performs best out-of-sample. They use this algorithm to generally classify historical EMU data, and to determine the exact weight on the inflation rate of EMU members in each quarter of the past two decades. Their findings suggest disproportional emphasis of the ECB on the inflation rates of EMU members that exhibited high inflation rate volatility for the vast majority of the time frame considered (80%), with a median inflation weight of 67% on these countries. They show that these results stem from a tendency of the ECB to react more strongly to countries whose inflation rates exhibit greater deviations from their long-term trend.
This paper analyzes the relationship between monetary policy and financial stability in the Banking Union. There is no uniform global model regarding the relationship between monetary policy-making on the one hand, and prudential supervision on the other. Before the crisis, EU Member States followed different approaches, some of them uniting monetary and supervisory functions in one institution, others assigning them to different, neatly separated institutions. The financial crisis has underlined that monetary policy and prudential supervision deeply affect each other, especially in case of systemic events. Even in normal times, monetary and supervisory decisions might conflict with each other. After the crisis, some jurisdictions have moved towards a more holistic approach under which monetary policy takes supervisory considerations into account, while supervisory decisions pay due regard to monetary policy.
The Banking Union puts prudential supervision in the hands of the European Central Bank (ECB), the institution responsible for monetary policy. Nevertheless, at its establishment there was the political understanding that the ECB should follow a policy of meticulous separation in the discharge of its different functions. This raises the question whether the ECB may pursue a holistic approach to monetary policy and supervisory decision-making, respectively. On the basis of a purposive reading of the monetary policy mandate and the SSM Regulation, the paper answers this question in the affirmative. Effective monetary policy (or supervision) requires financial stability (or smooth monetary policy transmission). Moreover, without a holistic approach, the SSM Regulation is more likely to provoke the adoption of mutually defeating decisions by the Governing Board. The reputation of the ECB would suffer considerably under such a situation – in a field where reputation is of paramount importance for effective policy.
As any meticulous separation between monetary and supervisory functions turns out to be infeasible, the paper explores the reasons. Parting from Katharina Pistor’s legal theory of finance, which puts the emphasis on exogenous factors to explain the (non)enforcement of legal rules, the paper suggests a legal instability theorem which focuses on endogenous reasons, such as law’s indeterminacy, contextuality, and responsiveness to democratic deliberation. This raises the question whether the holistic approach would be democratically legitimate under the current framework of the ESCB. The idea of technocratic legitimacy that exempts the ECB from representative structures is effectively called into question by the legal instability theorem. This does not imply that the independence of the ECB should be given up, as there are no viable alternatives to protect monetary policy against the time inconsistency problem. Rather, any solution might benefit from recognizing the ECB in its mixed technocratic and political shape as a centerpiece of European integration and improving.
The unintended consequences of the debt ... will increased government expenditure hurt the economy?
(2011)
In 2008, governments in many countries embarked on large fiscal expenditure programmes, with the intention to support the economy and prevent a more serious recession. In this study, the overall impact of a substantial increase in fiscal expenditure is considered by providing a novel analysis of the most relevant recent experience in similar circumstances, namely that of Japan in the 1990s. Then a weak economy with risk-averse banks seemed to require some of the largest peacetime fiscal stimulation programmes on record, albeit with disappointing results. The explanations provided by the literature and their unsatisfactory empirical record are reviewed. An alternative explanation, derived from early Keynesian models on the ineffectiveness of fiscal policy is presented in the form of a modified Fisher-equation, which incorporates the recent findings in the credit view literature. The model postulates complete quantity crowding out. It is subjected to empirical tests, which were supportive. Thus evidence is found that fiscal policy, if not supported by suitable monetary policy, is likely to crowd out private sector demand, even in an environment of falling or near-zero interest rates. As a policy conclusion it is pointed out that by changing the funding strategy, complete crowding out can be avoided and a positive net effect produced. The proposed framework creates common ground between proponents of Keynesian views (as held, among others, by Blinder and Solow), monetarist views (as held in particular by Milton Friedman) and those of leading contemporary macroeconomists (such as Mankiw).
The lessons from QE and other 'unconventional' monetary policies - evidence from the Bank of England
(2011)
This paper investigates the effectiveness of the ‘quantitative easing’ policy, as implemented by the Bank of England in March 2009. Similar policies had been previously implemented in Japan, the U.S. and the Eurozone. The effectiveness is measured by the impact of Bank of England policies (including, but not limited to QE) on nominal GDP growth – the declared goal of the policy, according to the Bank of England. Unlike the majority of the literature on the topic, the general-to-specific econometric modeling methodology (a.k.a. the ‘Hendry’ or ‘LSE’ methodology) is employed for this purpose. The empirical analysis indicates that QE as defined and announced in March 2009 had no apparent effect on the UK economy. Meanwhile, it is found that a policy of ‘quantitative easing’ defined in the original sense of the term (Werner, 1994) is supported by empirical evidence: a stable relationship between a lending aggregate (disaggregated M4 lending, i.e. bank credit for GDP transactions) and nominal GDP is found. The findings imply that BoE policy should more directly target the growth of bank credit for GDP-transactions.
There is much discussion today about a possible digital euro (PDE). Is this attention exaggerated? Are “central bank digital currencies” (CBDCs) “a solution in search of a problem”, as some have argued? This article summarizes the main facts about the PDE and concludes that, if the decision on adoption had to be taken today, the arguments against would outweigh those in favor. However, there may be future circumstances in which having a CBDC ready for use can indeed be useful. Therefore, preparing is a good thing, even if the odds of its usefulness in normal conditions are slim.
We develop an estimated model of the U.S. economy in which agents form expectations by continually updating their beliefs regarding the behavior of the economy and monetary policy. We explore the effects of policymakers' misperceptions of the natural rate of unemployment during the late 1960s and 1970s on the formation of expectations and macroeconomic outcomes. We find that the combination of monetary policy directed at tight stabilization of unemployment near its perceived natural rate and large real-time errors in estimates of the natural rate uprooted heretofore quiescent in inflation expectations and destabilized the economy. Had monetary policy reacted less aggressively to perceived unemployment gaps, in inflation expectations would have remained anchored and the stag inflation of the 1970s would have been avoided. Indeed, we find that less activist policies would have been more effective at stabilizing both in inflation and unemployment. We argue that policymakers, learning from the experience of the 1970s, eschewed activist policies in favor of policies that concentrated on the achievement of price stability, contributing to the subsequent improvements in macroeconomic performance of the U.S. economy.
This paper uses factor-augmented vector autoregressions (FAVAR) estimated using a large data set to disentangle fluctuations in disaggregated consumer and producer prices which are due to macroeconomic factors from those due to sectorial conditions. This allows us to provide consistent estimates of the effects of US monetary policy on disaggregated prices. While sectorial prices respond quickly to sector-specific shocks, we find that for a large number of price series, there is a significant delay in the response of prices to monetary policy shocks. In addition, price responses display little evidence of a “price puzzle,” contrary to existing studies based on traditional VARs. The observed dispersion in the reaction of producer prices is relatively well explained by the degree of market power, as predicted by models with monopolistic competition. JEL Classification: E32, E52
This paper reviews the rationale for quantitative easing when central bank policy rates reach near zero levels in light of recent announcements regarding direct asset purchases by the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. Empirical evidence from the previous period of quantitative easing in Japan between 2001 and 2006 is presented. During this earlier period the Bank of Japan was able to expand the monetary base very quickly and significantly. Quantitative easing translated into a greater and more lasting expansion of M1 relative to nominal GDP. Deflation subsided by 2005. As soon as inflation appeared to stabilize near a rate of zero, the Bank of Japan rapidly reduced the monetary base as a share of nominal income as it had announced in 2001. The Bank was able to exit from extensive quantitative easing within less than a year. Some implications for the current situation in Europe and the United States are discussed.
Opting out of the great inflation: German monetary policy after the break down of Bretton Woods
(2009)
During the turbulent 1970s and 1980s the Bundesbank established an outstanding reputation in the world of central banking. Germany achieved a high degree of domestic stability and provided safe haven for investors in times of turmoil in the international financial system. Eventually the Bundesbank provided the role model for the European Central Bank. Hence, we examine an episode of lasting importance in European monetary history. The purpose of this paper is to highlight how the Bundesbank monetary policy strategy contributed to this success. We analyze the strategy as it was conceived, communicated and refined by the Bundesbank itself. We propose a theoretical framework (following Söderström, 2005) where monetary targeting is interpreted, first and foremost, as a commitment device. In our setting, a monetary target helps anchoring inflation and inflation expectations. We derive an interest rate rule and show empirically that it approximates the way the Bundesbank conducted monetary policy over the period 1975-1998. We compare the Bundesbank´s monetary policy rule with those of the FED and of the Bank of England. We find that the Bundesbank´s policy reaction function was characterized by strong persistence of policy rates as well as a strong response to deviations of inflation from target and to the activity growth gap. In contrast, the response to the level of the output gap was not significant. In our empirical analysis we use real-time data, as available to policy-makers at the time. JEL Classification: E31, E32, E41, E52, E58
This paper undertakes a quantitative investigation of the effects of anticipated inflation on the distribution of household wealth and welfare. Consumer Finance Data on household financial wealth suggests that about a third of the US population holds all its financial assets in transaction accounts. The remaining two-third of the US population holds most of their financial assets outside transaction accounts. To account for this evidence, I introduce a portfolio choice in a standard incomplete markets model with heterogeneous agents. I calibrate the model economy to SCF 2010 US data and use this environment to study the distributive effects of changes in anticipated inflation. An increase in anticipated inflation leads households to reshuffle their portfolio towards real assets. This crowding-in of supply for real assets lowers equilibrium interest rates and thereby redistributes wealth from creditors to borrowers. Because borrowers have a higher marginal utility, this redistribution improves aggregate welfare. First, this paper shows that inflation acts not only a regressive consumption tax as in Erosa and Ventura (2002), but also as a progressive tax. Second, this paper shows that the welfare cost of inflation are even lower than the estimates computed by Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2009). Finally, this paper offers insights into why deflationary environments should be avoided.