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This dissertation consists of four self-contained chapters in the overlapping fields of industrial organization and organizational economics on the topics pricing, careers and supervision. Each chapter is the result of an independent research project. The dissertation analyzes empirical research topics by exploring novel observational data sets. It sheds light on open questions in the economic profession by extending fundamental models on pricing in the first two chapters and by challenging conventional explanations and methods on careers and supervision in the last two chapters.
- Chapter 1:
The first chapter is based on joint work with Steffen Eibelshäuser. It models price competition among brick-and-mortar retailers with business hours. Specifically, we propose a dynamic model of intraday price competition featuring spatial differentiation and firm size heterogeneity. The model makes detailed predictions concerning equilibrium-pricing patterns. When spatial differentiation is high and consumers cannot easily switch between retailers, equilibrium prices are stable at oligopoly levels. When differentiation is low, equilibrium prices fluctuate in cycles. The shapes of the cycles depend on the level of differentiation and on retailers’ reaction times. When reaction times decrease, the number of price cycles increases. In a second step, we apply the model to the German retail gasoline market. Gasoline retailers have been using digital price tags for decades and fast-paced price competition with more than ten price changes per day is no exception. Our model has successfully predicted the emergence of an additional intraday subcycle in April 2017. Moreover, we were able to confirm several detailed predictions concerning the shape of equilibrium price paths and individual firm behavior. Finally, we calibrate the model using a generalized method of moments. The model fits the data remarkably well, with coefficients of determination ranging from 60% to 80%. We use the fitted model to evaluate a number of policy counterfactuals. Restricting price increases results in higher prices and decreased welfare, leading us to conclude that regulation of dynamic markets is highly complex and can easily backfire.
- Chapter 2:
The second chapter analyzes the price-matching policies of two gasoline retailers. Customers of these retailers that are able to provide evidence of competitors posting lower prices have the ability to claim price matches. As shown in the first chapter, the Edgeworth Cycle model rationalizes price fluctuations in the German gasoline retail market. To determine policy interactions in cycling markets, this chapter extends the classical Edgeworth Cycle model by price-matching. The model predicts that price-matching retailers post higher prices and initiate price increases. The price-consulted firm anticipates this strategy, posts lower prices, and provokes the implementing firm to restore the price more frequently. Consulted stations also anticipate earlier price restoration reactions from implementing stations and, thus, provoke restorations earlier. This effect dominates in welfare calculations, such that price matching has positive welfare implications.
The second part of the chapter tests the hypotheses with price data on the German gasoline retail market. The estimation exploits a discontinuity in the policy-affected retailers. Therefore, the analysis disentangles the competitive effects of implementing and price-consulted market participants in comparison to retailers that are not affected. As predicted, the posted average and minimum prices of one implementing retailer and its consulted competitors increase. For the other price-matching retailer, I find reduced prices that contradict the model. The last part of the chapter relates the empirics to static models and shows that the dynamic component provides previously undiscovered insights.
- Chapter 3:
The third chapter is based on joint work with Emmanuelle Auriol and Guido Friebel. It represents the subtopic of careers in this dissertation. Specifically, the chapter provides the first comprehensive data collection analysis of women’s careers in all European research institutions in the field of economics. Using a web-scraping algorithm that constantly accesses position information on institutions’ websites, we collect a novel data set on researchers in Europe. These details entail information on researchers’ gender obtained by the first name and a face recognition. Similar to survey data on U.S. institutions, we identify a leaky pipeline, as women are less likely to become professors than men are. The situation is very heterogeneous across Europe. The gap is substantially larger in Western and Southern Europe than in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, we identify institutions with a higher research output and a better research-ranking having a systematically lower share of females in full professor positions as well as entry-level positions for Ph.D. graduates. Austria, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and Spain are the drivers for this correlation. All these results are in line with the “leaky pipeline” hypothesis, in which, over the different stages of a career, the attrition of women is higher than the one of men. We show that the cohort hypothesis arguing that the lag effect between the time of Ph.D. completion and the time of promotion to a full professorship is unable to explain the current low number of females.
- Chapter 4:
The fourth and last chapter "What does Mystery Shopping do?" is based on joint work with Sidney Block, Guido Friebel, Matthias Heinz, and Nick Zubanov. It addresses an auditing practice with a yearly U.S.-turnover of 19.5 billion USD in 2016 (European Society for Opinion and Market Research, 2017: Global Market Research 2017). The term mystery represents the key aspect of the tool. During an anonymous visit, so-called mystery shoppers perform certain predefined tasks such as purchasing a product, asking questions, registering complaints, or behaving in a certain way. Following their visit, the shoppers provide detailed reports about their experiences to the evaluated firms. The chapter investigates whether the practice is suitable to determine employees’ pay. Contrary to the general understanding that firms are able to observe service quality and, in turn, can proxy for business success with mystery shopping, we do not observe mystery-shopping evaluations to correlate positively with firm performance. A decomposition of the evaluation reports indicates that mystery-shopping scores are biased and the shopper’s identity explains up to 20% of the score’s variance. Thus, the shopper’s identity has the largest impact out of all observable characteristics. With the results that mystery-shopping scores are noisy and biased, we conclude that they are not suitable for performance pay in the context of our study. In addition, we show that if the number of observations is sufficiently large, aggregated scores relate to business success. The required number of shops per evaluation period must be, however, larger by a factor between 3 and 30 per evaluated subject. Hence, cost advantages of mystery shopping diminish such that the cost benefits to customer assessments could vanish completely. The current methodology, however, may still be useful for other employee-related purposes like monitoring, which is in line with the policies of the considered firms.
Im ersten Kapitel wird dabei die "klassische" Theorie des Fiskalföderalismus diskutiert, die von Problemen des politischen Prozesses weitgehend abstrahiert. Das zweite Kapitel bietet dann einen Überblick der Argumente, die Unzulänglichkeiten des politischen Prozesses als Begründung für Dezentralisierung bzw. Zentralisierung heranziehen. Obwohl die allgemeine Theorie des Fiskalföderalismus einige wichtige Anhaltspunkte für die Zentralisierungsentscheidung beinhaltet, ist es unabdingbar, in Abhängigkeit vom konkreten Politikfeld jeweils eine spezielle Bestandsaufnahme bezüglich der einhergehenden Kosten und Nutzen einer verstärkten Zentralisierung anzustellen. Die vorliegende Studie nimmt sich dabei aus der Fülle der möglichen Politikfelder einige wichtige Teilgebiete heraus. Kapitel 3 diskutiert die möglichen Vorteile einer verstärkten außen- und verteidigungspolitischen Zentralisierung in Europa. Vor dem Hintergrund, dass jedes Land in Europa einen Anreiz hat, sich bei der Durchsetzung gemeinsamer Interessen auf die Partnerländer innerhalb der NATO zu verlassen, lässt eine verstärkte Koordinierung der Europäer auf eine Verringerung des Freifahrerproblems hoffen. Allerdings steht zu befürchten, dass die resultierenden Mehranstrengungen der Europäer zu verminderten Anstrengungen der USA führen. Die Lasten der Verteidigungspolitik könnten sich daher verstärkt von den USA auf Europa verschieben. Je größer Europa durch zusätzliche Beitritte wird, desto eher lohnt es sich allerdings wie Kapitel 3 erläutert eine solche Verschiebung der Lasten in Kauf zu nehmen. Kapitel 4 erörtert die europäischen Finanzausgleichsbeziehungen. In einem ersten Schritt werden die existierenden Finanzbeziehungen innerhalb der EU skizziert. In einem zweiten Schritt werden die Grundlagen und Probleme einer erweiterten regionalen Umverteilung zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten diskutiert. Kapitel 5 argumentiert, dass es in dieser institutionellen Situation nicht verwunderlich ist, wenn die einzelnen Mitgliedsländer eine verstärkte Präferenz für rigide Arbeitsmärkte entwickeln. Weil es rigide Arbeitsmärkte für gebietsfremde Outsider schwerer machen dürften, Zugang zum regionalen Arbeitsmarkt zu erhalten, helfen Arbeitsmarktrigiditäten die Mobilität zu verringern. Umverteilungssysteme zu Gunsten von Geringverdienern, die ansonsten durch die Arbeitskräftemobilität erodieren würden, lassen sich so eher bewahren. Kapitel 6 beschäftigt sich mit der Koordinierung bei der Besteuerung von mobilem Kapital.
We present an empirical study focusing on the estimation of a fundamental multi-factor model for a universe of European stocks. Following the approach of the BARRA model, we have adopted a cross-sectional methodology. The proportion of explained variance ranges from 7.3% to 66.3% in the weekly regressions with a mean of 32.9%. For the individual factors we give the percentage of the weeks when they yielded statistically significant influence on stock returns. The best explanatory power – apart from the dominant country factors – was found among the statistical constructs „success“ and „variability in markets“.
Das Ergebnis des Volksentscheids im Vereinigten Königreich ist ein Weckruf. Alle Entscheidungsträger der Europäischen Union und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten sind aufgerufen, grundlegende Reformen der Verfassung einer Europäischen Union, möglicherweise nur noch einer europäischen „Kontinentalunion“ unverzüglich in Angriff zu nehmen. Unverzüglich bedeutet, einen Reformprozess nicht erst dann zu beginnen, wenn die Verhandlungen über ein Austrittsabkommen beendet worden sind. Eine Rückentwicklung der Europäischen Union zu einer bloßen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft dürfte dabei keine Lösung sein. Es ist jetzt angezeigt, offen und – notfalls kontrovers – zu diskutieren, wie ein künftiger Bundesstaat auf europäischer Ebene aussehen könnte.
Despite a lot of re-structuring and many innovations in recent years, the securities transaction industry in the European Union is still a highly inefficient and inconsistently configured system for cross-border transactions. This paper analyzes the functions performed, the institutions involved and the parameters concerned that shape market and ownership structure in the industry. Of particular interest are microeconomic incentives of the main players that can be in contradiction to social welfare. We develop a framework and analyze three consistent systems for the securities transaction industry in the EU that offer superior efficiency than the current, inefficient arrangement. Some policy advice is given to select the 'best' system for the Single European Financial Market.
Efficient systems for the securities transaction industry : a framework for the European Union
(2003)
This paper provides a framework for the securities transaction industry in the EU to understand the functions performed, the institutions involved and the parameters concerned that shape market and ownership structure. Of particular interest are microeconomic incentives of the industry players that can be in contradiction to social welfare. We evaluate the three functions and the strategic parameters - the boundary decision, the communication standard employed and the governance implemented - along the lines of three efficiency concepts. By structuring the main factors that influence these concepts and by describing the underlying trade-offs among them, we provide insight into a highly complex industry. Applying our framework, the paper describes and analyzes three consistent systems for the securities transaction industry. We point out that one of the systems, denoted as 'contestable monopolies', demonstrates a superior overall efficiency while it might be the most sensitive in terms of configuration accuracy and thus difficult to achieve and sustain.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, it has been widely expected that the implementation of the European Single Market would lead to a rapid convergence of Europe’s financial systems. In the present paper we will show that at least in the period prior to the introduction of the common currency this expected convergence did not materialise. Our empirical studies on the significance of various institutions within the financial sectors, on the financing patterns of firms in various countries and on the predominant mechanisms of corporate governance, which are summarised and placed in a broader context in this paper, point to few, if any, signs of a convergence at a fundamental or structural level between the German, British and French financial systems. The German financial system continues to appear to be bank-dominated, while the British system still appears to be capital market-dominated. During the period covered by the research, i.e. 1980 – 1998, the French system underwent the most far-reaching changes, and today it is difficult to classify. In our opinion, these findings can be attributed to the effects of strong path dependencies, which are in turn an outgrowth of relationships of complementarity between the individual system components. Projecting what we have observed into the future, the results of our research indicate that one of two alternative paths of development is most likely to materialise: either the differences between the national financial systems will persist, or – possibly as a result of systemic crises – one financial system type will become the dominant model internationally. And if this second path emerges, the Anglo-American, capital market-dominated system could turn out to be the “winner”, because it is better able to withstand and weather crises, but not necessarily because it is more efficient.
Aus dem weiten Spektrum ökonomisch relevanter Fragen, die die europäische Integration und das Gesellschaftsrecht verbinden, soll hier diejenige herausgegriffen werden, ob sich die nationalen Corporate-Governance-Systeme in den großen europäischen Volkswirtschaften Deutschlands, Frankreichs und Großbritanniens unter dem Einfluß der europäischen Integration bereits aneinander angeglichen haben und ob es demnächst zu einer solchen Angleichung kommen wird. Unser Thema deckt nur einen Teil des Gesellschaftsrechts ab und geht zugleich hinsichtlich der angesprochenen rechtlichen Materie über das Gesellschaftsrecht hinaus, denn die Corporate Governance fügt sich nicht einfach in herkömmliche juristische Klassifikationen ein. Unser Vorhaben unterscheidet sich aber vor allem dadurch von einer juristischen Behandlung des Themas, daß primär ökonomische Mechanismen und Zusammenhänge angesprochen werden. Ökonomen betrachten die Corporate Governance im weiteren Kontext des Finanzsystems, denn das Corporate-Governance-System ist ein Teil des Finanzsystems eines Landes. Die Fragen, wie unterschiedlich die nationalen Systeme der Corporate Governance waren, ehe zu Beginn der 80er Jahre der Prozeß der Angleichung in Europa einsetzte, wie unterschiedlich sie heute noch sind, wie sehr sie sich somit bereits angeglichen haben und wie ein möglicher Angleichungsprozeß weitergehen könnte, sind deshalb ein Teil der weiteren Frage nach der Angleichung der Finanzsysteme in Europa. In diesem Beitrag konzentrieren wir uns aber nur auf Entwicklungen der 90er Jahre.
Although the world of banking and finance is becoming more integrated every day, in most aspects the world of financial regulation continues to be narrowly defined by national boundaries. The main players here are still national governments and governmental agencies. And until recently, they tended to follow a policy of shielding their activities from scrutiny by their peers and members of the academic community rather than inviting critical assessments and an exchange of ideas. The turbulence in international financial markets in the 1980s, and its impact on U.S. banks, gave rise to the notion that academics working in the field of banking and financial regulation might be in a position to make a contribution to the improvement of regulation in the United States, and thus ultimately to the stability of the entire financial sector. This provided the impetus for the creation of the “U.S. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee”. In the meantime, similar shadow committees have been founded in Europe and Japan. The specific problems associated with financial regulation in Europe, as well as the specific features which distinguish the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee from its counterparts in the U.S. and Japan, derive from the fact that while Europe has already made substantial progress towards economic and political integration, it is still primarily a collection of distinct nation-states with differing institutional set-ups and political and economic traditions. Therefore, any attempt to work towards a European approach to financial regulation must include an effort to promote the development of a European culture of co-operation in this area, and this is precisely what the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) seeks to do. In this paper, Harald Benink, chairman of the ESFRC, and Reinhard H. Schmidt, one of the two German members, discuss the origin, the objectives and the functioning of the committee and the thrust of its recommendations.
Major differences between national financial systems might make a common monetary policy difficult. As within Europe, Germany and the United Kingdom differ most with respect to their financial systems, the present paper addresses its topic under the assumption that the United Kingdom is already a part of EMU. Employing a comprehensive concept of a financial system, the author shows that there are indeed profound differences between the national financial systems of Germany and the United Kingdom. But he argues that these differences are not likely to create great problems for a common monetary policy. In the context of the present paper, one important difference between the two financial systems refers to the structure of the respective financial sector and, as a consequence, to the strength with which a given monetary policy impulse set by the central bank is passed on to the financial sector. The other important difference refers to the typical relationship between the banks and the business sector in each country which determines to what extent the financial sectors and especially the banks pass on pressure exerted on them by a monetary policy authority to their clients in their national business sector. In Germany, the central bank has a stronger influence on the financial sector than in England, while, for systemic reasons, German banks tend to soften monetary policy pressures on their customers more than British banks do. As far as the transmission of a restrictive monetary policy of the ECB to the real economy is concerned, these two differences tend to offset each other. This is good news for the advocates of a monetary union as it eases the task of the ECB when it comes to determining the strength of its monetary policy measures.