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We determine optimal monetary policy under commitment in a forwardlooking New Keynesian model when nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero. The lower bound represents an occasionally binding constraint that causes the model and optimal policy to be nonlinear. A calibration to the U.S. economy suggests that policy should reduce nominal interest rates more aggressively than suggested by a model without lower bound. Rational agents anticipate the possibility of reaching the lower bound in the future and this amplifies the effects of adverse shocks well before the bound is reached. While the empirical magnitude of U.S. mark-up shocks seems too small to entail zero nominal interest rates, shocks affecting the natural real interest rate plausibly lead to a binding lower bound. Under optimal policy, however, this occurs quite infrequently and does not imply positive average inflation rates in equilibrium. Interestingly, the presence of binding real rate shocks alters the policy response to (non-binding) mark-up shocks.
The effects of public policy programmes which aim at internalising spill-overs due to successful innovation are analysed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard double-sided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analysing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programmes, ex ante grants and some public-private partnerships depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.
This paper shows that a capital budgeting process in which the division manager is required to engage in personally costly influence activities prior to a project approval has beneficial incentive effects: It provides the manager with incentives to acquire costly information about project prospects and helps to elicit the revelation of the acquired information. As a consequence, imposing influence costs on the manager can lead to improved capital allocations. The optimal level of influence costs, chosen by the firm, trades off ex ante incentives for information acquisition against efficient use of the acquired information ex post.
In this paper, I examine the potential of mobile alerting services empowering investors to react quickly to critical market events. Therefore, an analysis of short-term (intraday) price effects is performed. I find abnormal returns to company announcements which are completed within a timeframe of minutes. To make use of these findings, these price effects are predicted using pre-defined external metrics and different estimation methodologies. Compared to previous research, the results provide support that artificial neural networks and multiple linear regression are good estimation models for forecasting price effects also on an intraday basis. As most of the price effect magnitude and effect delay can be estimated correctly, it is demonstrated how a suitable mobile alerting service combining a low level of user-intrusiveness and timely information supply can be designed.
Serial correlation in dynamic panel data models with weakly exogenous regressor and fixed effects
(2005)
Our paper wants to present and compare two estimation methodologies for dynamic panel data models in the presence of serially correlated errors and weakly exogenous regressors. The ¯rst is the ¯rst di®erence GMM estimator as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and the second is the transformed Maximum Likelihood Estimator as proposed by Hsiao, Pesaran, and Tahmiscioglu (2002). Thereby, we consider the ¯xed e®ects case and weakly exogenous regressors. The ¯nite sample properties of both estimation methodologies are analysed within a simulation experiment. Furthermore, we will present an empirical example to consider the performance of both estimators with real data. JEL Classification: C23, J64
The effects of vocational training programmes on the duration of unemployment in Eastern Germany
(2005)
Vocational training programmes have been the most important active labour market policy instrument in Germany in the last years. However, the still unsatisfying situation of the labour market has raised doubt on the efficiency of these programmes. In this paper, we analyse the effects of the participation in vocational training programmes on the duration of unemployment in Eastern Germany. Based on administrative data for the time between the October 1999 and December 2002 of the Federal Employment Administration, we apply a bivariate mixed proportional hazards model. By doing so, we are able to use the information of the timing of treatment as well as observable and unobservable influences to identify the treatment effects. The results show that a participation in vocational training prolongates the unemployment duration in Eastern Germany. Furthermore, the results suggest that locking-in effects are a serious problem of vocational training programmes. JEL Classification: J64, J24, I28, J68
In recent methodological work the well known ACD approach, originally introduced by Engle and Russell (1998), has been supplemented by the involvement of an unobservable stochastic process which accompanies the underlying process of durations via a discrete mixture of distributions. The Mixture ACD model, emanating from the specialized proposal of De Luca and Gallo (2004), has proved to be a moderate tool for description of financial duration data. The use of one and the same family of ordinary distributions has been common practice until now. Our contribution incites to use the rich parameterized comprehensive family of distributions which allows for interacting different distributional idiosyncrasies. JEL classification: C41, C22, C25, C51, G14.
We propose a new framework for modelling the time dependence in duration processes being in force on financial markets. The pioneering ACD model introduced by Engle and Russell (1998) will be extended in a manner that the duration process will be accompanied by an unobservable stochastic process. The Discrete Mixture ACD framework provides us with a general methodology which puts the idea into practice. It is established by introducing a discrete-valued latent regime variable which can be justified in the light of recent market microstructure theories. The empirical application demonstrates its ability to capture specific characteristics of intraday transaction durations while alternative approaches fail. JEL classification: C41, C22, C25, C51, G14.
Although the commoditisation of illiquid asset exposures through securitisation facilitates the disciplining effect of capital markets on the risk management, private information about securitised debt as well as complex transaction structures could possibly impair the fair market valuation. In a simple issue design model without intermediaries we maximise issuer proceeds over a positive measure of issue quality, where a direct revelation mechanism (DRM) by profitable informed investors engages endogenous price discovery through auction-style allocation preference as a continuous function of perceived issue quality. We derive an optimal allocation schedule for maximum issuer payoffs under different pricing regimes if asymmetric information requires underpricing. In particular, we study how the incidence of uninformed investors at varying levels of valuation uncertainty and their function of clearing the market effects profitable informed investment. We find that the issuer optimises own payoffs at each valuation irrespective of the applicable pricing mechanism by awarding informed investors the lowest possible allocation (and attendant underpricing) that still guarantees profitable informed investment. Under uniform pricing the composition of the investor pool ensures that informed investors appropriate higher profit than uninformed types. Any reservation utility by issuers lowers the probability of information disclosure by informed investors and the scope of issuers to curtail profitable informed investment. JEL Classifications: D82, G12, G14, G23
Asset securitisation as a risk management and funding tool : what does it hold in store for SMES?
(2005)
The following chapter critically surveys the attendant benefits and drawbacks of asset securitisation on both financial institutions and firms. It also elicits salient lessons to be learned about the securitisation of SME-related obligations from a cursory review of SME securitisation in Germany as a foray of asset securitisation in a bank-centred financial system paired with a strong presence of SMEs in industrial production. JEL Classification: D81, G15, M20