Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (2336) (remove)
Language
- English (2336) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (2336)
Keywords
- Deutschland (115)
- USA (51)
- Geldpolitik (48)
- monetary policy (46)
- Schätzung (45)
- Europäische Union (43)
- Bank (38)
- Corporate Governance (36)
- Monetary Policy (29)
- Sprachtypologie (23)
Institute
- Center for Financial Studies (CFS) (1363)
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (1293)
- Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE) (726)
- House of Finance (HoF) (596)
- Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS) (169)
- Rechtswissenschaft (146)
- Informatik (114)
- Foundation of Law and Finance (50)
- Exzellenzcluster Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen (34)
- Gesellschaftswissenschaften (29)
A logical framework consisting of a polymorphic call-by-value functional language and a first-order logic on the values is presented, which is a reconstruction of the logic of the verification system VeriFun. The reconstruction uses contextual semantics to define the logical value of equations. It equates undefinedness and non-termination, which is a standard semantical approach. The main results of this paper are: Meta-theorems about the globality of several classes of theorems in the logic, and proofs of global correctness of transformations and deduction rules. The deduction rules of VeriFun are globally correct if rules depending on termination are appropriately formulated. The reconstruction also gives hints on generalizations of the VeriFun framework: reasoning on nonterminating expressions and functions, mutual recursive functions and abstractions in the data values, and formulas with arbitrary quantifier prefix could be allowed.
Over the past few decades, changes in market conditions such as globalisation and deregulation of financial markets as well as product innovation and technical advancements have induced financial institutions to expand their business activities beyond their traditional boundaries and to engage in cross-sectoral operations. As combining different sectoral businesses offers opportunities for operational synergies and diversification benefits, financial groups comprising banks, insurance undertakings and/or investment firms, usually referred to as financial conglomerates, have rapidly emerged, providing a wide range of services and products in distinct financial sectors and oftentimes in different geographic locations. In the European Union (EU), financial conglomerates have become part of the biggest and most active financial market participants in recent years. Financial conglomerates generally pose new problems for financial authorities as they can raise new risks and exacerbate existing ones. In particular, their cross-sectoral business activities can involve prudentially substantial risks such as the risk of regulatory arbitrage and contagion risk arising from intra-group transactions. Moreover, the generally large size of financial conglomerates as well as the high complexity and interconnectedness of their corporate structures and risk exposures can entail substantial systemic risk and can therefore threaten the stability of the financial system as a whole. Until a few years ago, there was no supervisory framework in place which addressed a financial conglomerate in its entirety as a group. Instead, each group entity within a financial conglomerate was subject to the supervisory rules of its pertinent sector only. Such silo supervisory approach had the drawback of not taking account of risks which arise or aggravate at the group level. It also failed to consider how the risks from different business lines within the group interrelate with each other and affect the group as a whole. In order to address this lack of group-wide prudential supervision of financial conglomerates, the European legislator adopted the Financial Conglomerates Directive 2002/87/EC8 (‘FCD’) on 16 December 2002. The FCD was transposed into national law in the member states of the EU (‘Member States’) by 11 August 2004 for application to financial years beginning on 1 January 2005 and after. The FCD primarily aims at supplementing the existing sectoral directives to address the additional risks of concentration, contagion and complexity presented by financial conglomerates. It therefore provides for a supervisory framework which is applicable in addition to the sectoral supervision. Most importantly, the FCD has introduced additional capital requirements at the conglomerate level so as to prevent the multiple use of the same capital by different group entities. This paper seeks to examine to what extent the FCD provides for an adequate capital regulation of financial conglomerates in the EU while taking into account the underlying sectoral capital requirements and the inherent risks associated with financial conglomerates. In Part 1, the definition and the basic corporate models of financial conglomerates will be presented (I), followed by an illustration of the core motives behind the phenomenon of financial conglomeration (II) and an overview of the development of the supervision over financial conglomerates in the EU (III). Part 2 begins with a brief elaboration on the role of regulatory capital (I) and gives a general overview of the EU capital requirements applicable to banks and insurance undertakings respectively. A delineation of the commonalities and differences of the banking and the insurance capital requirements will be provided (II). It continues to further examine the need for a group-wide capital regulation of financial conglomerates and analyses the adequacy of the FCD capital requirements. In this context, the technical advice rendered by the Joint Committee on Financial Conglomerates (JCFC) as well as the currently ongoing legislative reforms at the EU level will be discussed (III). The paper finally closes with a conclusion and an outlook on remaining open issues (IV).
This study examines the legal environment of netting agreements covering financial contracts. It concludes that an international instrument should be developed capable of improving the effectiveness of netting agreements in mitigating systemic risk. To this end, two different aspects of the enforceability of netting agreements are considered: (i) the general enforceability of netting, and (ii) the possibility of precluding the operation of netting a mechanism by way of a regulatory moratorium for considerations of systemic stability. The first part of the study presents the use of netting and the various forms it may take before going on to explain the benefits and drawbacks of enforceable netting agreements. Benefits for individual firms consist in lower counterparty risk and more favourable capital requirements. Benefits for the financial market as a whole flow from greater financial market stability since the contagion of systemically relevant institutions by the default or insolvency of another institution is limited, thus helping to avoid systemic effects. Additionally, the use of netting arrangements can improve overall market liquidity. A potential drawback of enforceability of netting, in certain situations, is that the operation of a netting mechanism could actually work against the purpose of systemic stability where the transfer of parts of the business of an insolvent financial institution to a solvent bridge entity would enhance or maintain value to a greater extent than the operation of a netting agreement would. Regulatory authorities are considering under which conditions a moratorium to halt the netting mechanism until the situation is solved could avoid this threat to systemic stability. The second part of the study examines whether there is the potential to support the purpose of enhanced systemic stability by way of international harmonisation of private and insolvency law. As regards the issue of general enforceability, the global picture of netting legislation is heterogeneous. Given the great practical relevance of the matter, an international instrument could be very useful. As to the issue of private law consequences of regulatory moratoria, the absence of a harmonised framework appears to lead to actual cross-border inconsistency and legal uncertainty as regards financial contracts that are governed by a foreign law. Taking these to aspects into account, this paper recommends that work on developing an international instrument be undertaken. The final part of the study suggests a set of preliminary guidelines for the development of suchan instrument. In the light of the findings of the previous sections, a mixed, two-step approach is recommended. First, a non-binding instrument could be developed, serving as a benchmark and reservoir of legal solutions in respect of the relevant issues. Secondly, isolated aspects relating to both the general enforceability of netting and the accommodation of a regulatory moratorium in foreign private and insolvency law could be dealt with in an international Convention, in particular where cross-border situations involving netting require uniformity of applicable legal rules.
We show that average excess returns during the last two years of the presidential cycle are significantly higher than during the first two years: 9.8 percent over the period 1948 – 2008. This pattern in returns cannot be explained by business-cycle variables capturing time-varying risk premia, differences in risk levels, or by consumer and investor sentiment. In this paper, we formally test the presidential election cycle (PEC) hypothesis as the alternative explanation found in the literature for explaining the presidential cycle anomaly. PEC states that incumbent parties and presidents have an incentive to manipulate the economy (via budget expansions and taxes) to remain in power. We formulate eight empirically testable propositions relating to the fiscal, monetary, tax, unexpected inflation and political implications of the PEC hypothesis. We do not find statistically significant evidence confirming the PEC hypothesis as a plausible explanation for the presidential cycle effect. The existence of the presidential cycle effect in U.S. financial markets thus remains a puzzle that cannot be easily explained by politicians employing their economic influence to remain in power. JEL Classification: E32; G14; P16 Keywords: Political Economy, Market Efficiency, Anomalies, Calendar Effects
The purpose of this essay is to assess the automatic exchange of information as described in EU Directive 2003/48 of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments with regard to the fundamental right of the individual to a private life, to banking secrecy and the freedoms on which the European internal market is based. The assessment reveals the conflicts of interests and values involved in the holding by banks (particularly those offering private banking services) of increasingly extensive, detailed and intimate information about their clients and in the automatic processing of that information by ever more powerful and sophisticated systems. Banking secrecy plays an essential role in protecting clients against the dangers which the disclosure of such information without their permission might produce. Banking secrecy exists not only in Luxembourg but also in many other European countries, and in Germany and France in particular it is not very different from the system applying in Luxembourg. While the French and German tax authorities do have some investigative powers not enjoyed by their Luxembourg counterparts, those powers are strictly circumscribed and cannot rely on the electronic exchange of information set out in EU Directive 2003/48/EC. While banking secrecy is totally incompatible with the electronic exchange of information, the core question is whether the latter can be reconciled with the respect for private life. In a Europe that sets itself up as the cradle of human rights, the general and en-masse exchange of private information cannot provide adequate and sufficient guarantees that the information exchanged will not be misused. The amount of interference in private life is clearly out of proportion to the public interest involved and is contrary to sub-section 2, article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and to articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Since the automatic exchange of information at least potentially risks restricting the free flow of capital among Member States and discouraging the use of transborder banking services, its compliance with the fundamental principles of the internal market also needs to be closely examined. The restrictions imposed by such exchange very probably go beyond the limits within which the free movement of capital and services is possible. The European Court of Justice has found that there is no proportionality if the measures supposedly undertaken in the general interest are actually based on a general presumption of tax evasion or tax fraud. However, it would be true to say that the ECJ does not always examine the tax restrictions placed on the free movement of capital particularly thoroughly to ensure that they are necessary or proportionate. The economic effectiveness of the automatic exchange of information is far from being proved and involves significant cost to the banks providing the information and to the tax authorities using it. To date the system does not appear to have produced any significant new tax revenue nor does it prevent the continuing outflow of capital from Europe. Yet withholding at source, which respects individual and economic freedoms, does generate tax revenue that is cost-free to the State. Exchange of information on request in justified cases using the OECD Tax Convention on Income and Capital model does also fight tax fraud while at the same time providing citizens with the guarantees required to ensure their private lives are respected. A combination of these two systems - withholding at source and exchange of information on request in justified cases - would create the proper balance between the public and private interest that the automatic exchange of information cannot provide.
This paper analyzes the impact of blockownership dispersion on firm value. Blockholdings by multiple blockholders is a widespread phenomenon in the U.S. market. It is not clear, however, whether dispersion among blockholder is preferable to having a more concentrated ownership structure. To test for the direction of the effect, we use a large dataset of U.S. firms that combines blockholder information, shareholder rights information, debt ratings, accounting information, and financial markets information. We find that a large fraction of aggregated block ownership negatively affects Tobin’s Q. The negative impact is larger if blockowners are more dispersed, suggesting that a concentrated ownership structure is to be preferred on average. Results are robust to controlling for blockholder type as well as proxies for shareholder rights. Our empirical findings are also confirmed if we study the impact of ownership dispersion on firm debt ratings rather than Tobin’s Q. JEL Classification: G3, G32
We estimate the risk and expected returns of private equity investments based on the market prices of exchange traded funds of funds that invest in unlisted private equity funds. Our results indicate that the market expects unlisted private equity funds to earn abnormal returns of about one to two percent. We also find that the market expects listed private equity funds to earn zero to marginally negative abnormal returns net of fees. Both listed and unlisted private equity funds have market betas close to one and positive factor loadings on the Fama-French SMB factor. Private equity fund returns are positively correlated with GDP growth and negatively correlated with the credit spread. Finally, we find that market returns of exchange traded funds of funds and listed private equity funds predict changes in self-reported book values of unlisted private equity funds.
A call on art investments
(2010)
The art market has seen boom and bust during the last years and, despite the downturn, has received more attention from investors given the low interest environment following the financial crisis. However, participation has been reserved for a few investors and the hedging of exposures remains dificult. This paper proposes to overcome these problems by introducing a call option on an art index, derived from one of the most comprehensive data sets of art market transactions. The option allows investors to optimize their exposure to art. For pricing purposes, non-tradability of the art index is acknowledged and option prices are derived in an equilibrium setting as well as by replication arguments. In the former, option prices depend on the attractiveness of gaining exposure to a previously non-traded risk. This setting further overcomes the problem of art market exposures being dificult to hedge. Results in the replication case are primarily driven by the ability to reduce residual hedging risk. Even if this is not entirely possible, the replication approach serves as pricing benchmark for investors who are significantly exposed to art and try to hedge their art exposure by selling a derivative. JEL Classification: G11, G13, Z11
The objective of this study is to determine whether specific industries across countries or within countries are more likely to reach a stage of profitability and make a successful exit. In particular, we assess whether firms in certain industries are more prone to exit via IPO, be acquired, or exit through a leveraged buy-out. We are also interested in analyzing whether substantial differences across industries and countries arise when looking separately at the success’ rate of firms which have received venture funding at the early seed and start-up stages, vis-à-vis firms that received funding at later stages. Our results suggest that, inasmuch as some of the differences in performance can be explained by country-specific factors, there are also important idiosyncratic differences across industries: In particular, firms in the biotech and the medical / health / life science sectors tend to be significantly more likely to have a successful exit via IPO, while firms in the computer industry and communications and media are more prone to exit via merger or acquisition. Key differences across industries also emerge when considering infant versus mature firms, and their preferred exit. JEL Classification: G24, G3 Keywords:
We study the impact of the arrival of macroeconomic news on the informational and noise-driven components in high-frequency quote processes and their conditional variances. Bid and ask returns are decomposed into a common ("efficient return") factor and two market-side-specific components capturing market microstructure effects. The corresponding variance components reflect information-driven and noise-induced volatilities. We find that all volatility components reveal distinct dynamics and are positively influenced by news. The proportion of noise-induced variances is highest before announcements and significantly declines thereafter. Moreover, news-affected responses in all volatility components are influenced by order flow imbalances. JEL Classification: C32, G14, E44