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We investigate the impact of reporting regulation on corporate innovation. Exploiting thresholds in Europe’s regulation and a major enforcement reform in Germany, we find that forcing firms to publicly disclose their financial statements discourages innovative activities. Our evidence suggests that reporting regulation has significant real effects by imposing proprietary costs on innovative firms, which in turn diminish their incentives to innovate. At the industry level, positive information spillovers (e.g., to competitors, suppliers, and customers) appear insufficient to compensate the negative direct effect on the prevalence of innovative activity. The spillovers instead appear to concentrate innovation among a few large firms in a given industry. Thus, financial reporting regulation has important aggregate and distributional effects on corporate innovation.
We investigate the impact of reporting regulation on corporate innovation. Exploiting thresholds in Europe’s regulation and a major enforcement reform in Germany, we find that forcing firms to publicly disclose their financial statements discourages innovative activities. Our evidence suggests that reporting regulation has significant real effects by imposing proprietary costs on innovative firms, which in turn diminish their incentives to innovate. At the industry level, positive information spillovers (e.g., to competitors, suppliers, and customers) appear insufficient to compensate the negative direct effect on the prevalence of innovative activity. The spillovers instead appear to concentrate innovation among a few large firms in a given industry. Thus, financial reporting regulation has important aggregate and distributional effects on corporate innovation.
Dieser Beitrag ist ein Besprechungsaufsatz zu Beatrice Brunhöbers 2010 erschienener Dissertation Die Erfindung „demokratischer Repräsentation“ in den Federalist Papers (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen: Grundlagen der Rechtswissenschaft, Bd. 14), in der Brunhöber die innovative – und auch die Verfassungsentwicklung andernorts prägende – Kraft der Verbindung von Demokratie, politischer Repräsentation und Föderalismusidee durch die amerikanischen Verfassungsväter herausarbeitet. Auf der Basis von Brunhöbers Untersuchung geht es insbesondere darum, wie sich das von Hamilton, Madison und Jay entworfene ‚alte‘ Konzept zur Gestaltung eines starken Gemeinwesens (eingeschlossen das vertrauensbildende Prinzip der Gewaltenteilung) für einen integrativen Umgang mit den ‚modernen‘ Gegebenheiten pluralistischer Gesellschaften nutzbar machen läßt, im Blick die Gesamtheit (und Vielfalt) des Staatsvolkes als Geltungsfundament legitimer Herrschaft. Im Hintergrund steht die Frage nach Möglichkeiten zur Nutzbarmachung historischer Vergewisserungen für heutige Debatten überhaupt.
The Great Recession confirmed a bedrock principle of modern consumption theory: It is impossible to explain aggregate spending behavior without knowledge of the underlying microeconomic distribution of circumstances and choices across households. National accounting frameworks therefore need to be augmented by “bottom up” measures that both (a) capture the microeconomic heterogeneity (in expenditures, income, assets, debt, and beliefs) in the population and (b) sum up to statistics that have a recognizable relationship to the aggregate totals that are already reasonably well measured.
This paper summarizes the key proposals of the report by the Liikanen Commission. It starts with an explanation of a crisis narrative underlying the Report and its proposals. The proposals aim for a revitalization of market discipline in financial markets. The two main structural proposals of the Liikanen Report are: first, for large banks, the separation of the trading business from other parts of the banking business (the "Separation Proposal"), and the mandatory issuing of subordinated bank debt thought to be liable (the strict "Bail-in Proposal"). The credibility of this commitment to private liability is achieved by strict holding restrictions. The anticipated consequences of the introduction of these structural regulations for the financial industry and markets are addressed in a concluding part.
While the COVID-19 pandemic had a large and asymmetric impact on firms, many countries quickly enacted massive business rescue programs which are specifically targeted to smaller firms. Little is known about the effects of such policies on business entry and exit, factor reallocation, and macroeconomic outcomes. This paper builds a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous and financially constrained firms in order to evaluate the short- and long-term consequences of small firm rescue programs in a pandemic recession. We calibrate the stationary equilibrium and the pandemic shock to the U.S. economy, taking into account the factual Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) as a specific grant policy. We find that the policy has only a small impact on aggregate employment because (i) jobs are saved predominately in less productive firms that account for a small share of employment and (ii) the grant induces a reallocation of resources away from larger and less impacted firms. Much of this reallocation happens in the aftermath of the pandemic episode. While a universal grant reduces the firm exit rate substantially, a targeted policy is not only more cost-effective, it also largely prevents the creation of “zombie firms" whose survival is socially inefficient.
This working paper gives insights on a theoretical perspective on class formation in the context of global financial markets and presents first empirical findings regarding the formation of a global financial class. It draws on numerous encounters with financial professionals that were inter- viewed in Frankfurt (Germany) and Sydney (Australia). As a preliminary conclusion from those inves- tigations on a micro-perspective, we state that acting on the market creates a sense of global socia- bility, whereby organizations only play a secondary role. Careers in finance follow internationally homogenized pathways. This process of global class formation is taking place prominently in global financial centers. Therefore we link the level of investigation on a micro-perspective (experience of financial professionals) with global city life and the fabric of the city. This results in empirical findings on a meso-level from an ethnography of the social and professional urban environment of finance in the two global cities. Symbolic struggles engraved in the built environment of Frankfurt and Sydney are traced and discussed against the background of every-day-practices of aspiration in the financial districts investigated.
The crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) framework in the euro area requires a reset. Although its policy objectives remain valid, the means of achieving them do not. As the euro area comes the end of the long transition period taken to implement the BRRD/SRMR, it should take the opportunity to reset expectations about resolution.
Above all, resolution should be for the many, not just the few. There should be a single presumptive path for dealing with failed banks: the use of bail-in to facilitate orderly liquidation under a solvent-wind down strategy. This will protect deposits and set the stage – together with the backstop that the European Stability Mechanism provides to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) -- for the transformation of the SRF into the Single Deposit Guarantee Scheme (SDGS). To avoid forbearance, responsibility for emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) should rest, not with national central banks, but with the ECB as a single lender of last resort. Finally, national deposit guarantee schemes should function as institutional protection schemes and become investors of last resort in their member banks. Together, these measures would complete Banking Union, promote market discipline, avoid imposing additional burdens on taxpayers, help untie the doom loop between weak banks and weak governments, strengthen the euro and enhance financial stability.
Market fragmentation and technological advances increasing the speed of trading altered the functioning and stability of global equity limit order markets. Taking market resiliency as an indicator of market quality, we investigate how resilient are trading venues in a high-frequency environment with cross-venue fragmented order flow. Employing a Hawkes process methodology on high-frequency data for FTSE 100 stocks on LSE, a traditional exchange, and on Chi-X, an alternative venue, we find that when liquidity becomes scarce Chi-X is a less resilient venue than LSE with variations existing across stocks and time. In comparison with LSE, Chi-X has more, longer, and severer liquidity shocks. Whereas the vast majority of liquidity droughts on both venues disappear within less than one minute, the recovery is not lasting, as liquidity shocks spiral over the time dimension. Over half of the shocks on both venues are caused by spiralling. Liquidity shocks tend to spiral more on Chi-X than on LSE for large stocks suggesting that the liquidity supply on Chi-X is thinner than on LSE. Finally, a significant amount of liquidity shocks spill over cross-venue providing supporting evidence for the competition for order flow between LSE and Chi-X.
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, both resolution planning, i.e. contingency planning by both regulated institutions and public authorities in order to prepare their actions in financial crisis, and concepts for structural bank reform have been identified as possible solutions to ending “Too Big To Fail” and foster market discipline among bank owners, bank managers and investors in bank debt. Both concepts thus complement the global quest for reliable procedures and tools for bank resolution that would minimise systemic implications once large and complex financial institutions have reached the stage of insolvency. Given the complex task of orchestrating swift and effective resolution actions, especially with regard to cross-border banking groups and financial conglomerates, planning ahead in good times has since been widely recognised as crucial for enhancing resolvability. At least part of the impediments to resolution will be found in organisational, financial and legal complexity that has evolved in banks and groups over time. To remove these impediments, interference with existing corporate and group structures is all but inevitable. However, in both international standard setting and at the European Union level, issues related to resolution planning (within the context of bank resolution reform) and structural banking reforms to date have been discussed rather separately. This lack of consistency is questionable, given the obvious need to reconcile both approaches in order to facilitate effective implementation and enforcement especially with regard to large, complex banking groups. Based on an analysis both of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the SRM Regulation, this paper explores how these problems could be dealt with within the context of the European Banking Union.