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The crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) framework in the euro area requires a reset. Although its policy objectives remain valid, the means of achieving them do not. As the euro area comes the end of the long transition period taken to implement the BRRD/SRMR, it should take the opportunity to reset expectations about resolution.
Above all, resolution should be for the many, not just the few. There should be a single presumptive path for dealing with failed banks: the use of bail-in to facilitate orderly liquidation under a solvent-wind down strategy. This will protect deposits and set the stage – together with the backstop that the European Stability Mechanism provides to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) -- for the transformation of the SRF into the Single Deposit Guarantee Scheme (SDGS). To avoid forbearance, responsibility for emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) should rest, not with national central banks, but with the ECB as a single lender of last resort. Finally, national deposit guarantee schemes should function as institutional protection schemes and become investors of last resort in their member banks. Together, these measures would complete Banking Union, promote market discipline, avoid imposing additional burdens on taxpayers, help untie the doom loop between weak banks and weak governments, strengthen the euro and enhance financial stability.
This paper discusses policy implications of a potential surge in NPLs due to COVID-19. The study provides an empirical assessment of potential scenarios and draws lessons from previous crises for effective NPL treatment. The paper highlights the importance of early and realistic assessment of loan losses to avoid adverse incentives for banks. Secondary loan markets would help in this process and further facilitate bank resolution as laid down in the BRRD, which should be uphold even in extreme scenarios.
This in-depth analysis proposes ways to retract from supervisory COVID-19 support measures without perils for financial stability. It simulates the likely impact of the corona crisis on euro area banks’ capital and predicts a significant capital shortfall. We recommend to end accounting practices that conceal loan losses and sustain capital relief measures. Our in-depth analysis also proposes how to address the impending capital shortfall in resolution/liquidation and a supranational recapitalisation.
In this paper we put forward a legal argument in favour of granting more independence to BaFin, the German securities market supervisor. Following the Wirecard scandal, our reform proposal aims at strengthening the impartiality and credibility of the German supervisor and, as a consequence, at restoring capital market integrity. In order to achieve the necessary degree of democratic legitimacy for giving BaFin more independence and disassociating it from the Ministry of Finance, the paper sets out the necessary steps for a legal reform that creates accountability of BaFin vis-à-vis the Parliament, subjecting it to strict disclosure and reporting obligations.
Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods
(2021)
We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce a social good. Agents join teams where they allocate effort to either generate individual monetary rewards (selfish effort) or contribute to the production of a social good with positive effort complementarities (social effort). Agents differ in their motivation to exert social effort. Our model predicts that lowering incentives for selfish effort in one team increases social good production by selectively attracting and coordinating motivated agents. We test this prediction in a lab experiment allowing us to cleanly separate the selection effect from other effects of low incentives. Results show that social good production more than doubles in the low- incentive team, but only if self-selection is possible. Our analysis highlights the important role of incentives in the matching of motivated agents engaged in social good production.
Managed portfolios that exploit positive first-order autocorrelation in monthly excess returns of equity factor portfolios produce large alphas and gains in Sharpe ratios. We document this finding for factor portfolios formed on the broad market, size, value, momentum, investment, prof- itability, and volatility. The value-added induced by factor management via short-term momentum is a robust empirical phenomenon that survives transaction costs and carries over to multi-factor portfolios. The novel strategy established in this work compares favorably to well-known timing strategies that employ e.g. factor volatility or factor valuation. For the majority of factors, our strategies appear successful especially in recessions and times of crisis.
We empirically examine the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) used by the US gov- ernment to bail out distressed banks with equity infusions during the Great Recession. We find strong evidence that a feature of the CPP – the government’s ability to ap- point independent directors on the board of an assisted bank that missed six dividend payments to the Treasury – helped attenuate bailout-related moral hazard. Banks were averse to these appointments – the empirical distribution of missed payments exhibits a sharp discontinuity at five. Director appointments by the Treasury led to improved bank performance, lower CEO pay, and higher stock market valuations.
This paper explores the interplay of feature-based explainable AI (XAI) tech- niques, information processing, and human beliefs. Using a novel experimental protocol, we study the impact of providing users with explanations about how an AI system weighs inputted information to produce individual predictions (LIME) on users’ weighting of information and beliefs about the task-relevance of information. On the one hand, we find that feature-based explanations cause users to alter their mental weighting of available information according to observed explanations. On the other hand, explanations lead to asymmetric belief adjustments that we inter- pret as a manifestation of the confirmation bias. Trust in the prediction accuracy plays an important moderating role for XAI-enabled belief adjustments. Our results show that feature-based XAI does not only superficially influence decisions but re- ally change internal cognitive processes, bearing the potential to manipulate human beliefs and reinforce stereotypes. Hence, the current regulatory efforts that aim at enhancing algorithmic transparency may benefit from going hand in hand with measures ensuring the exclusion of sensitive personal information in XAI systems. Overall, our findings put assertions that XAI is the silver bullet solving all of AI systems’ (black box) problems into perspective.
We focus on the role of social media as a high-frequency, unfiltered mass information transmission channel and how its use for government communication affects the aggregate stock markets. To measure this effect, we concentrate on one of the most prominent Twitter users, the 45th President of the United States, Donald J. Trump. We analyze around 1,400 of his tweets related to the US economy and classify them by topic and textual sentiment using machine learning algorithms. We investigate whether the tweets contain relevant information for financial markets, i.e. whether they affect market returns, volatility, and trading volumes. Using high-frequency data, we find that Trump’s tweets are most often a reaction to pre-existing market trends and therefore do not provide material new information that would influence prices or trading. We show that past market information can help predict Trump’s decision to tweet about the economy.
We define a sentiment indicator that exploits two contrasting views of return predictability, and study its properties. The indicator, which is based on option prices, valuation ratios and interest rates, was unusually high during the late 1990s, reflecting dividend growth expectations that in our view were unreasonably optimistic. We interpret it as helping to reveal irrational beliefs about fundamentals. We show that our measure is a leading indicator of detrended volume, and of various other measures associated with financial fragility. We also make two methodological contributions. First, we derive a new valuation-ratio decomposition that is related to the Campbell and Shiller (1988) loglinearization, but which resembles the traditional Gordon growth model more closely and has certain other advantages for our purposes. Second, we introduce a volatility index that provides a lower bound on the market's expected log return.