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Financial innovation is, as usual, faster than regulation. New forms of speculation and intermediation are rapidly emerging. Largely as a result of the evaporation of trust in financial intermediation, an exponentially increasing role is being played by the so-called peer to peer intermediation. The most prominent example at the moment is Bitcoin.
If one expects that shocks in these markets could destabilize also traditional financial markets, then it will be necessary to extend regulatory measures also to these innovations.
This article discusses the recent proposal for debt restructuring in the euro zone by Pierre Paris and Charles Wyplosz. It argues that the plan cannot realize the promised debt relief without producing moral hazard. Ester Faia revisits the Redemption Fund proposed in November 2011 by the German Council of Economic Experts and argues that this plan, up to date, still remains the most promising path towards succesful debt restructuring in Europe.
Social impact bonds are a special type of bond whose purpose is to provide long term funds to projects with a social impact. Especially in the UK and in the US these bonds are increasingly being used to raise funds to finance government projects. Their return depends on the social improvements achieved. Especially in times of crisis, governments lack funds to prevent the social consequences of recessions. Faia argues that the European Union should develop an equivalent to the British Social Finance Ltd. to finance projects for social improvement.
How people form beliefs is crucial for understanding decision-making un- der uncertainty. This is particularly true in a situation such as a pandemic, where beliefs will affect behaviors that impact public health as well as the aggregate economy. We conduct two survey experiments to shed light on potential biases in belief formation, focusing in particular on the tone of information people choose to consume and how they incorporate this information into their beliefs. In the first experiment, people express their preferences over pandemic-related articles with optimistic and pessimistic headlines, and are then randomly shown one of the articles. We find that respondents with more pessimistic prior beliefs about the pandemic are substantially more likely to prefer pessimistic articles, which we interpret as evidence of confirmation bias. In line with this, respondents assigned to the less preferred article rate it as less reliable and informative (relative to those who prefer it); they also discount information from the article when it is less preferred. We further find that these motivated beliefs end up impacting incentivized behavior. In a second experiment, we study how partisan views interact with information selection and processing. We find strong evidence of source dependence: revealing the news source further distorts information acquisition and processing, eliminating the role of prior beliefs in article choice.
This paper presents causal evidence of the effects of boardroom networks on firm value. We exploit exogenous variation in network centrality arising from a ban on interlocking directorates of Italian financial and insurance companies. We leverage this shock to show that firms that become more central in the network as a result of the shock experience positive abnormal returns around the announcement date. We find that information dissemination plays a central role: results are driven by firms that have higher idiosyncratic volatility, low analyst coverage, and more uncertainty surrounding their earnings forecasts. We also find that firms benefit more from boardroom centrality when they are more central in the input-output network, as this reinforces information complementarities, or when they are less central in the cross-ownership network, as well as when they suffer from low profitability and low growth opportunities. Network centrality also results in higher compensation for board directors.
Using a unique confidential contract level dataset merged with firm-level asset price data, we find robust evidence that firms' stock market valuations and employment levels respond more to monetary policy announcements the higher the degree of wage rigidity. Data on the renegotiations of collective bargaining agreements allow us to construct an exogenous measure of wage rigidity. We also find that the amplification induced by wage rigidity is stronger for firms with high labor intensity and low profitability, providing evidence of distributional consequences of monetary policy. We rationalize the evidence through a model in which firms in different sectors feature different degrees of wage rigidity due to staggered renegotiations vis-a-vis unions.
Most recent regulations establish that resolution of global banking groups shall be done according to bail-in procedures and following a Single Point of Entry (SPE) as opposed to a Multiple Point of Entry (MPE) approach. The latter requires parent holding of global groups to put up front the equity capital needed to absorb losses possibly emerging in foreign subsidiaries-branches. No model rationalized so far such resolution regime. We build a model of optimal design of resolution regimes and compare three regimes: SPE with cooperative authorities, SPE with non-cooperative authorities and MPE (ring-fencing). We find that the costs for bondholders of bail-inable instruments is generally higher under noncooperative regimes and ring-fencing. We also find that in those cases banks have ex ante incentives to reduce their exposure in foreign assets. We also examine recent case studies that help us rationalize the model results.
Empirische Wohlstandsanalysen können prinzipiell anhand dreier Indikatoren durchgeführt werden: Anhand des Privaten Verbrauchs, anhand des verfügbaren Einkommens oder anhand des Nettovermögens.1 Während es für die Definition der Indikatoren des Privaten Verbrauchs und des verfügbaren Einkommens zumindest einigermaßen akzeptierte internationale Konventionen gibt, ist dies bezüglich der Definition des privaten Vermögens nicht annähernd der Fall. Im Unterschied zu den Volkseinkommensrechnungen sind Volksvermögensrechnungen im internationalen Maßstab deutlich weniger gut ausgebaut. Dies mag damit zusammenhängen, daß bei einer Bestandsgröße wie dem privaten Vermögen Aspekte der Verwertung, Nutz-ung, sozialen Absicherung wie auch der Verleihung von Macht2 intensiver zum Tragen kommen als bei einer Stromgröße wie dem privat verfügbaren Haushaltseinkommen. Aus welchen Bestandteilen sich das Gesamtvermögen zusammenzusetzen hat, ist daher einem heftigeren Diskurs als bei den anderen Wohlstandsindikatoren ausgesetzt. Es herrscht beispielsweise Uneinigkeit darüber, ob das Human- oder das Sozialvermögen sinnvolle Vermögenskomponenten sind. Eine eher negative Einschätzung in diesem Zusammenhang wird üblicherweise damit begründet, daß beide potentiellen Gesamtvermögensbestandteile das Kriterium der interpersonellen Veräußerbarkeit nicht bzw. nur unzureichend erfüllen.1 Auch ist die Forschung vor zum Teil schwer überwindbare Bewertungsprobleme einzelner Vermögenskomponenten gestellt, und zwar stärker als bei den beiden anderen Wohlstandsindikatoren, bei denen zumindest die überwiegende Anzahl an Teilelementen mittels nachvollziehbarer Marktpreise vergleichsweise einfach bewertet werden kann. Hinzu kommt die schlechtere Datenlage hinsichtlich der Erfassung privaten Vermögens im Vergleich zum Privaten Verbrauch bzw. verfügbaren Haushaltseinkommen, was nicht zuletzt auf die - in Befragungen - (noch) größere Sensibilität der Interviewten bezüglich der Beantwortung vermögensbezogener Fragen im Vergleich zu den beiden anderen Wohlstandsindikatoren zurückzuführen ist. Alles in allem bleibt festzuhalten, daß allein die Deskription der Höhe und Verteilung privat gehaltenen Vermögens eine höchst komplexe Aufgabe ist. Es ist daher keineswegs unwahrscheinlich, daß verschiedene Vermögensanalysen selbst auf einer einheitlichen Datengrundlage zu zum Teil entgegengesetzten Aussagen gelangen werden. Diesen letztgenannten Gedanken aufgreifend, werden in der vorliegenden Studie in beispielhafter Form drei auf Basis der Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS) 1988 durchgeführte Analysen zur bundesdeutschen Vermögensverteilung privater Haushalte einer vergleichenden Betrachtung unterzogen. Es wird gezeigt, an welchen Stellen Abweichungen zwischen den einzelnen Studien auftreten und worauf diese (vermutlich) zurückzuführen sind. Das vorliegende Arbeitspapier ist wie nachfolgend aufgebaut. Kapitel 2 vermittelt einen Eindruck von der Datenbasis, auf der die drei genannten Studien jeweils basieren, Kapitel 3 schildert kurz die Konstruktionselemente der drei behandelten Analysen, und in Kapitel 4 werden in einer Gegenüberstellung der drei Studien Unterschiede kausal herausgearbeitet. Es folgt in Kapitel 5 eine Bewertung der Untersuchungsergebnisse.
To ensure the credibility of market discipline induced by bail-in, neither retail investors nor peer banks should appear prominently among the investor base of banks’ loss absorbing capital. Empirical evidence on bank-level data provided by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority raises a few red flags. Our list of policy recommendations encompasses disclosure policy, data sharing among supervisors, information transparency on holdings of bail-inable debt for all stakeholders, threshold values, and a well-defined upper limit for any bail-in activity. This document was provided by the Economic Governance Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.