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In den 1980er und den frühen 1990er Jahren waren japanische Banken die weltweit größten Finanzinstitute und galten als Inbegriff „globaler“ Banken. Der Crash der japanischen Wertpapier- und Immobilienmärkte Anfang der 1990er Jahre und die nachfolgende Rezession waren Anlass zu tiefgreifenden Reformen im japanischen Finanzsystem. Die japanischen Banken waren gezwungen, ihre internationalen Strategien zu reformulieren. Als Konsequenz zogen sie sich aus vielen Märkten zurück und strukturierten ihre internationalen Netzwerke um. Vor dem Hintergrund theoretischer Überlegungen zu der Bedeutung von „Globalität“ und einer empirischen Untersuchung der Entwicklung der Auslandsstellennetze japanischer Banken in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren stellt der vorliegende Beitrag die Globalität japanischer Banken in Frage.
Over the course of the last financial crises, retail investors have been identified to bear a major share of the invoked financial losses. As a consequence, financial market regulators put major effort on retail investor protection, especially following the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2009. The major legislative initiatives, such as in the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, seemingly manifest retail investors’ overly fragile role among the variety of professional investors in the financial market by establishing additional protection requirements for retail investors. A vast majority of related international academic literature is supporting those steps. However, considering the most recent developments that occurred in the US financial markets, the dogma of the lamb-like retail investor seems to be crumbling: In 2021, under the synonym “WallStreetBets” retail investors systematically colluded in investment bets which eventually disrupted not only financial markets by distorting stock price formation of single firms but also systematically squeezed sizeable positions of institutional investors. The key question arises, how retail investors have changed, such that they not only became a source of price distortions and market turmoil but also endanger professional institutional investors. In this thesis, I study this changing role and investment behavior of retail investors, taking into account the retail investor’s wellestablished and researched behavioral characteristics to the changing environmental aspects such as regulation and the adaption and usage of technology for information gathering and collaboration. Based on the combination of those different research streams, I am able to deduct the sequential consequences of these developments for financial markets.
We analyze and compare the social, cultural and historical determinants that influence the international competitiveness of China and India. Starting with the discussion why pure economic determinants cannot solely explain a country's competitiveness, we will analyze previous qualitative research and evaluate quantitative data to assess which country has more favorable socio-economic factors influencing its economic performance in the long run.
In the mid-1990s, institutional investors entered the syndicated loan market and started to serve borrowers as lead arrangers. Why are non-banks able to compete for this role against banks? How do the composition of syndicates and loan pricing differ among lead arrangers? By using a dataset of 12,847 leveraged loans between 1997 and 2012, I aim to answer these questions. Non-banks benefit from looser regulatory requirements, have industry expertise which helps them in the screening and monitoring of borrowers and focus on firms that ask for loans only instead of additional cross-selling of other services. I can show that non-banks specialize on more opaque and less experienced borrowers, are more likely than banks to choose participants that help to reduce potentially higher information asymmetries and earn 105 basis points more than banks.
Although banks are at the center of systemic risk, there are other institutions that contribute to it. With the publication of the leveraged lending guideline in March 2013, the U.S. regulators show that they are especially worried about the private equity firms with their high-risk deals. Given these risks and the interconnectedness of the banks through the LBO loan syndicates, I shed light on the impact of a bank’s LBO loan exposure on its systemic risk. By using 3,538 observations between 2000 and 2013 from 165 global banks, I show that banks with higher LBO exposure also have a higher level of systemic risk. Other loan purposes do not show this positive relationship. The main drivers influencing this relationship positively are the bank’s interconnectedness to other LBO financing banks and its size. Lending experience with a specific PE sponsor, experience with leading LBO syndicates or a bank’s credit rating, however, lead to a lower impact of the LBO loan exposure on systemic risk.
This paper analyzes the influence Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs) have on the operating performance of the LBO target companies’ direct competitors. A unique and hand-collected data set on LBOs in the United States in the period 1985-2009 allows us to analyze the effects different restructuring activities as part of the LBO have on the competitors’ revenues. These restructuring activities include changes to leverage, governance, or operating business, as well as M&A activities of the LBO target company. We find that although LBOs itself have a negative influence on competitors’ revenue growth, some restructuring mechanisms might actually benefit competing companies.
Mittels des Gesetzes zur zusätzlichen Aufsicht über beaufsichtigte Unternehmen eines Finanzkonglomerats (Konglomerate, die aus mehreren Unternehmen aus verschiedenen Finanzmarktsektoren bestehen, beispielsweise aus dem Bankensektor und dem Versicherungssektor) sollen Regelungslücken geschlossen werden, die insbesondere die Gefahr betreffen, die sich aus der „Ansteckung“ einzelner Finanzkonglomerats-Unternehmen ergeben. Die vorliegende Stellungnahme weist auf eine Inkonsistenz in der beabsichtigten Ansiedlung der Aufsichtskompetenz hin und bietet einen Vorschlag zur Präzisierung der Eigenmittelvorschriften.